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# THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW

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*Stephen OLESKIW*

## **THE NATIONALITY PROBLEM IN THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Since the emergence of the Soviet Union on the world political arena after the Second World War, and particularly after Soviet attainment of super-power status, many books and articles dealing with the most important aspects of Soviet military doctrine and capabilities have been published. Indeed, Western scholars and students of military affairs have researched and analysed almost every dimension of Soviet operational art, tactical and strategic doctrine, weapons systems capabilities, and organisational principles. And yet, some of the most important aspects of Soviet military power, most of which have a significant effect on overall Soviet force effectiveness and performance, have hardly even been touched and remain largely unexplained. Perhaps the major reason why, to date, an in-depth study of these important factors has not appeared in print, is that they tend to be generally subjective in nature and information on these issues is not readily available, thus making it difficult to measure or quantify them. After all, the task of assessing the performance of one's own forces is difficult enough, let alone those of a foreign power, or potential adversary, whose wartime levels cannot be easily deduced from the peacetime status.

One of these central issues is the nationality problem in the Soviet armed forces. In view of the ongoing demographic shift, which threatens to reduce the Soviet Union's Russian population to a sizeable minority by the end of this century, with important implications for the Soviet military, it is time that the ethnic factor received the consideration and attention it deserves, from military analysts and Sovietologists in the West. With this in mind, it is the aim of my paper to determine the nationality problem in the Soviet armed forces, to define the nature and characteristics of this problem, and to analyse the findings in the light of Soviet operational principles and manpower requirements, drawing certain conclusions regarding the potential effects of the nationality question on Soviet combat effectiveness and performance. However, before I proceed to tackle the problem of the nationality question, I think it worthwhile to give a brief summary of Soviet ethnic policies and practices.

## SOVIET RUSSIAN NATIONALITY POLICY

Soviet society is by no means a homogeneous Slavic, let alone Russian, mass. The Soviet Union comprises some 102 different nations and nationalities (according to the 1970 census), 21 of which, including the Russians, have populations of over a million<sup>1</sup>. The Ukrainians, for instance, are the largest of the non-Russian nations. According to the census of 1979, there are nearly 42.5 million Ukrainians living in the USSR, comprising some 16.2% of the total Soviet population<sup>2</sup>. Together, the peoples of the Soviet Union reflect a wide cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity, comprising, among others, Eastern Orthodox, Eastern Catholics, Catholics, Lutherans, Sunnite and Shi'ite Muslims, Jews, Ismailis (Nazarit), Armenian Gregorians, Buddhists, Buddhist Lamaïtes, Nestorian Christians, and animists. It logically follows, therefore, that the same wide diversity will be reflected in the cohort of draft-age manpower available to the Soviet armed forces, and thus in the armed forces themselves. Because of the imperial nature of the state with all its implications, ethnic considerations govern all things military — all planning, decision-making, recruitment policies, training, force composition, and the stationing of units.

In Soviet theory and practice, Russians are considered to be the "leading nation". This forms the basic tenet of Soviet Russian nationality policy, designed to assimilate the non-Russian peoples of the USSR and integrate them into a unitary Russian-speaking, Russian-orientated "Soviet nation", imbued with the spirit of "Soviet patriotism", undivided loyalties to the Soviet Union and the party, and the ideas of "proletarian internationalism" at home and abroad, in short, a policy of Russification.

In the same way, Soviet military authorities are trying to weld together ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse individuals into an effective and cohesive, to all intents and purposes Russian, military force. In practice, therefore, the Soviet armed forces constitute one of the most important instruments of national intergration (and hence of Russian nationality policy) in the multi-ethnic Soviet society.

The model on which Soviet soldiers are assimilated is that of the Russian soldier. Thus, the predominant Russian character of the armed forces reflects the present demographic realities, the military traditions of the Tsarist army, on which the present-day Soviet armed forces are largely based, and the qualitative hegemony enjoyed by the Russians in Soviet society and political life. The problem of the impact of military service on the national integration

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1. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone: "The Soviet Army as the Instrument of National Integration", in John Erickson and E.J. Feuchtwanger (Eds.): *Soviet Military Power and Performance*, p. 129.

2. Roman Solchanyk: "Nationality and language aspects of the 1979 census in the Ukrainian SSR", in I. Dmytriw and J. Wasyluk (Eds.): *Ukraine and the Ukrainians. A Collection of Selected Articles*, table 1, p. 112.



of soldiers does not arise in the case of ethnic Russians, who form the backbone of the armed forces. It is, after all, their army in tradition, in organisation, and in overall esprit de corps. As far as the ethnic Russians are concerned, the thrust of political indoctrination on the theme of the "friendship of the peoples" is designed to develop their acceptance of non-Russians as comrades-in-arms, and to imbue them with a sense of responsibility for helping non-Russian conscripts become good Soviet soldiers, i.e. to assist in the process of Russification — one of the most significant aims of the armed forces. For Russian servicemen the notion of Soviet patriotism presents no special problems. They merely equate it with the old concept of Russian patriotism and loyalty to the Russian motherland.

The assimilation and integration of conscripts is achieved through the mechanism of the induction system, through stationing practices, through the composition of the armed forces, including the rank structure of the officer corps and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and through the creation of an environment conducive to integration, reinforced by an extensive all-pervading system of political indoctrination to which both enlisted personnel and officers are exposed.

**Recruitment:** The Soviet induction system is designed to ensure a proper ethnic balance in different services, branches and units of the armed forces. It consists of 3 stages:

a) A central military authority, probably the General Staff, estimates the number of recruits needed by individual services and branches.

b) On the basis of the information from local conscript offices (*voenkomats*), the authority determines the number, profile and ethnic origin of the conscripts available from each *voenkomat*.

c) It then directs buyers (*Pokupateli*) from military districts or units to particular *voenkomats* in order to match demand and supply.

By sending buyers from the same formation to different parts of the Soviet Union, the military authorities can control the nationality mix.

**Stationing:** The ethnic factor plays a critical role in, and has a decisive influence on, Soviet Russian stationing practices. The basic and most prominent principle related to the stationing practices is extra-territoriality. This means that, after induction, recruits are sent to geographically distant and ethnically different regions.

In addition to national defence and the need to maintain an effective deterrent, the Soviet army has the equally important task of maintaining internal security and state control. Therefore, the principle of extra-territoriality is derived from the very real possibility that the army may one day be required to put down internal unrest, anti-regime demonstrations, and other disturbances (as happened on more than one occasion), for which a reliable force must be maintained. If non-Russian servicemen are stationed in their native regions, they may be inclined to side with their ethnic kin in a crisis, assisting

them with weapons if the need were ever to arise. Thus, keeping non-Russians away from their home areas would make the task of maintaining control in a crisis easier. Furthermore, the further from home troops are stationed, the more difficult it is for them to run away. It is not uncommon, therefore, to find Russians serving in Kazakhstan, Kazakhs serving in Ukraine, Ukrainians in Georgia, and Georgians in the Baltic. In this way, Soviet soldiers have no ties with the local populace of the regions where they are serving.

The only exception are the troops engaged in non-military tasks, such as the construction battalions (*stoibats*). Thus many Asians, conscripted into support units, often serve in their own republics. However, these units are not armed and seldom, if at all, receive adequate military training.

On the basis of these factors, the Soviet induction system and stationing practices are a clear indication that the political and military leadership of the USSR is fully aware that a serious, and potentially dangerous, ethnic problem exists within the structure of the Soviet armed forces.

**Composition of the armed forces:** official adherence to the principle of universal conscription in a multi-ethnic society implies the notion that the diverse nationalities which form the Soviet Union should be proportionally represented in the composition of Soviet recruits. In practice, however, certain major planned differentials of the ethnic mix occur in the different services and branches of the armed forces. For instance, there is a marked difference between combat and non-combat units. Non-Russians particularly dark-skinned Muslims, are not allowed to serve in combat units in numbers proportionate to their share of the general population. Thus, combat units are manned by 80% or more Slavs, whereas units which do not serve in a combat capacity, such as construction battalions and other support troops, are comprised of 70-90% non-Russian nations, particularly Central Asians and Caucasians<sup>3</sup>.

Such huge disparities in ethnic composition of the Soviet forces exist because of perceived disloyalty, technical incompetence, insufficient education, and poor knowledge of the Russian language on the part of the Muslim-Turkic peoples. For this reason the smallest percentage of non-Slavs is to be found in the most modern and highly technological services — the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), the Air Force, and the Navy. Only some 10% of the SRF are composed of non-Slavs, and the Air Force and Navy are almost exclusively (close to 100%) Slavic, with a large Russian majority<sup>4</sup>. To the extent that non-Russians, particularly dark-skinned non-Europeans, serve in the SRF and combat units, they do so in non-combat capacities, such as construction work, manual labour, and other menial tasks. Non-Slavs can be found in greater numbers (over 20% in smaller units and 20% in regimental-

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3. S. Enders Wimbush, Alex Alexiev: *The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces*, R-2787/1, p. v.

4. *Ibid*, p. 15.



size units) in the more traditional branches of the army: armour, artillery and infantry<sup>5</sup>.

The ethnic composition of the NCOs and officers is even more disproportionate. Most career NCOs in combat units are Slavs, with a large number of Eastern Ukrainians serving in this capacity. Among those NCOs serving only their minimal 2 or 3 year conscription period, some sergeants of non-Slavic origin can be found. However, these conscript NCOs wield very little power and are relatively unimportant. On the other hand, non-Slavic NCOs can be found in larger numbers in non-combat support units, where non-Slavs, especially Muslim-Turkic recruits, heavily outnumber the Slavs.

The officer corps is mainly Slavic, with an overwhelming Russian majority, and members of non-Slavic nations are dramatically under-represented. Thus, the officer corps comprises some 80% Russians and 10-15% Ukrainians, Byelorussians and others<sup>6</sup>. In addition, the officer education system houses certain built-in prejudices against the admission of non-Russians:

1) a compulsory entrance examination in the Russian language and Russian literature;

2) involuntary recruitment of graduates in militarily-related subjects; and

3) non-Slavs are discouraged from participation in officer training programmes by discriminatory practices once in the service, such as no opportunity for promotion and professional advancement.

Thus, the Russian superiority is most clearly demonstrated in the officer corps.

**Russian-orientated environment:** On commencement of military service, young non-Russians are immediately exposed, perhaps for the first time in their lives, to an environment which revolves around the Russian language, Russian customs and traditions, and a general Russian way of life. Such an environment is conducive to assimilation and national integration, and the two most important factors encountered by the recruits are the **enforcement of the Russian language** and intense **political indoctrination**. Russian is the common language. All written materials, training manuals and so on, are in Russian, and all commands and orders are given in Russian. Recruits are compelled to use Russian at all times, although, in practice, the "Russian only" rule can only be effectively applied in formation. When not engaged in military activities, non-Russian soldiers tend to use their own language, and it is extremely difficult to enforce the use of Russian in off-duty hours.

Although the knowledge of the Russian language of many recruits is largely rudimentary, after a year they are able to function in so-called "Kitchen Russian", i.e. they are able to respond to basic, uncomplicated commands. There is no formal language training. The authorities rely solely on

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5. *Ibid*, p. 16.

6. *Ibid*, p. 22.

the concentrated Russian-based environment, to which the conscripts are subjected, in order to bring them to an acceptable level of working Russian.

Throughout his service in the armed forces, the Soviet conscript is subjected to intense political indoctrination on the issues of "proletarian internationalism", which emphasises unity based on a common working class consciousness of the Soviet peoples under the leadership of the CPSU; "Soviet patriotism", which inculcates loyalty to the "Soviet" motherland; and the "friendship of the peoples", which describes the alleged process by which Soviet nations are growing "ever closer together".

This diet of political education has received particularly strong emphasis since the 1970s, reflecting the CPSU's perception of the growing problem of ethnic nationalism in Soviet society as a whole. Both the party and the higher military leadership are convinced that political indoctrination will stimulate the morale and patriotism of the Soviet fighting man as an individual, and mould the Soviet armed forces into a cohesive and effective fighting force.

## **THE NATIONALITY PROBLEM**

Having looked at Soviet nationality policy, I would now like to turn to the central theme of my paper, namely the nationality problem in the Soviet armed forces.

To begin with, I would like to point out that, as far as "functional integration" is concerned, one can safely say that Soviet nationality policy is relatively effective and successful, inasmuch as military service eventually does enhance the ability of the non-Russian conscript to function in an integrated environment with a basic command of Russian (however rudimentary his knowledge of the language may be). On completion of his military service, the ethnic soldier has the ability to become socially and geographically mobile. However, as far as "attitudinal integration" (national assimilation) goes, it is almost impossible for the military authorities to overcome the national conditioning to which non-Russian conscripts, particularly those who originate from the areas with a long a tradition of national consciousness and a strong sense of separate national identity, such as Ukraine, Georgia and the Baltic States, have been subjected since childhood, in a matter of a mere two or three years. As such, in most cases, Soviet authorities fail to bring about the homogenisation of interests and the levelling of cultures and ethnic consciousness of Soviet servicemen. On the contrary, in many cases, probably the majority, national distinctions appear to become enhanced by the experience of military service.

On this basis, Soviet Russian ethnic policy is ineffective and counter-productive, and is, therefore, far from conducive to the creation of a new



*Homo Sovieticus*, whose nationality defences have been stripped away, and whose underlying motivations are not "national narrow-mindedness", but "Soviet patriotism". Instead, because of the ineffectiveness of Soviet Russian nationality policy and the failure of its specified aims, Soviet military leadership has to face the continued resurgence of national consciousness and the whole series of related problems which together form the overall nationality problem of the Soviet armed forces.

### **The problem of national consciousness**

This century has witnessed a rise of national consciousness throughout the world, coupled with the emancipation of subjugated peoples from under the rule of their colonial oppressors. Already during the First World War, the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia declared their independence and set up their own national governments on the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian and Tsarist Russian Empires. However, many of these nations once again found themselves under foreign occupation, this time under Communist Russia, after several years of fighting to preserve their independence. Since then, the rising nationalism of the subjugated peoples continued to grow in the 1920s and 1930s, as a result of which, during the Second World War, many of these nations restored their independence and set out to defend it against all foreign invaders. Ukraine, which fought a war of national independence against Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia until well after the end of WWII, is a prime example. With the termination of armed resistance in the 1950s, the struggle continued, this time in the form of political, cultural and religious opposition of the 1960s and 1970s. Today, the struggle is still going on, and the national and religious consciousness of the subjugated nations of the USSR continues to grow.

The Soviet Union is not a state in the normal sense of the word. It is a huge colonial empire, which has survived all its rivals throughout the world. With the exception of the Russians, the nations which form the USSR were incorporated into the Union not through their own voluntary decision (i.e. by referendum or other means), but purely by force of arms, and are held together by an all-pervading system of oppression and terror, which penetrates every level of daily life.

Today, about 50% of Soviet conscripts come from one of these subjugated nations, and, as such, are well aware of their national, religious and cultural differences, and the colonial status of their peoples. Thus, for the non-Russian soldier, service in the Soviet armed forces is no more than enforced conscription into the colonial armies of the power that has oppressed and exploited his people for many years. With such strong inbred national feelings, the non-Russian soldier has no desire to lay his life on the line for the interests of the country which subjugates his nation, or for the preservation of

the empire in which his people have been forcefully incorporated, and the prevailing communist system. In short, therefore, he has no real reason to fight. As such, he is demoralised and lacks the will, incentive and motivation to risk his life for the ambitions and imperial designs of his oppressor. In consequence, the loyalty and reliability of the non-Russian soldier, and hence of 50% of the armed forces, in any future conflict involving the Soviet Union, is very much open to question. Of course, Soviet soldiers will be compelled to do battle with Russian guns at their back, but they will not be prepared to give their maximum potential, and will seek the first opportunity they can to defect.

To have some idea of the effects this may have on Soviet force effectiveness and military performance in any future conflict, it is important to recall the problems, stemming from the central nationality issue, experienced by the Soviet army during the Second World War and, more recently, during the present-day Afghan conflict.

In the first weeks of the German-Soviet war (June 1941), as the German armies pushed deeper into the heart of the Soviet Union, overrunning the Baltic States in the north, encircling Bialystok and Minsk in the centre, and penetrating the deep defences of the Stalin line and besieging the Ukrainian port of Odessa in the south, entire regiments of the Red Army surrendered without even firing a shot. Soviet soldiers, particularly Ukrainians, defected in hundreds of thousands, expecting to take part in the liberation of their country. Before the Germans reached the Dniro (Dnieper), they had already captured whole Soviet divisions and army corps. In the battle of Kyiv alone (September 1941), they took 675,000 prisoners<sup>7</sup>. On the battlefield, they found the corpse of Colonel Genral Kryvonos and 17 of his General Staff officers, who were shot by the NKVD as suspected Ukrainian nationalists prepared to surrender the entire army group to the Germans.

This unusual phenomenon could only be explained by the strong anti-communist and anti-Russian feelings prevailing among the subjugated nations of the USSR. Undoubtedly, at that time, the military situation of the Soviet Union was extremely critical, but it would be a mistake to think the initial German successes were due solely to the superior strategy and tactics of their commanders, and the preponderance of their armed forces. These successes would not have been possible without the mass-scale surrender and defections of Soviet soldiers who hoped that Hitler would re-arm them and turn them against the Russians. Had the Germans been willing to cooperate with the subjugated peoples and not interfere in their internal affairs, they could have found wide-scale cooperation and support from Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Ukraine alone could have raised an army of 3-4 million men and mobilised vast resources for the fight against Soviet Russia. But the Germans came not as liberators, but as conquerors, and it was the Führer's Eastern policy that saved Stalin from debacle.

7. Oleh Martowych: *Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Modern Times*, p. 92.



A similar situation materialised at the beginning of the war in Afghanistan. Once the troops in the units brought in from Soviet Central Asia realised they were deployed against their own brothers in blood and in religion, whom they were expected to kill, they refused to fight and had to be withdrawn after many had already defected to the side of the Mujahideen along with their weapons.

The Afghan army of the Soviet puppet regime in Kabul faced similar problems. By the time of the Russian invasion in 1979, the demoralised army had shrunk, through desertions and defections, from its original strength of roughly 100,000 to less than half the number<sup>8</sup>. Afghan soldiers, many of them secret members of various Mujahid parties, often defected within a month or so of call-up, going over to the resistance movement with their weapons. As the insurgency spread, the army proved increasingly less reliable, and soldiers defected readily, often killing their officers and Soviet advisers in the process. The defectors, both from the Soviet forces and the Afghan army, proved a major source of weapons for the Mujahideen.

The consequences of the two major wars fought by the Soviet Union in the last 40 or so years, one in the 1940's, the other in the 1980s, have proved to be the same — serious problems in the armed forces, revolving around the nationality question. On this basis, I think it a reasonably safe assumption that the same can only be expected in any future war fought by the USSR.

Non-Russian servicemen have several things in common which unite them. Firstly, they are aware that they are all subjugated by the same enemy; and secondly, they realise full well that they are united in a common struggle to free their peoples from Moscow's yoke, and in their common hatred for the Russian overlord. This situation is potentially explosive. Thus, in any future conflict, the nationality problem will play a key role. If properly exploited and correctly managed, it has the potential for delivering a crippling blow to the Soviet Union by bringing about the internal disintegration of the USSR and its mighty arsenal. This favourable situation is there to be exploited. To make use of it would give NATO and Western powers an immense strategic advantage. To ignore it any further would be strategic folly.

### Language-related problems

Tied closely to the problems of rising national and religious consciousness among Soviet conscripts, and among the Soviet population in general, are the language-related problems. These stem from the fact that people of different ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds are forcefully integrated and compelled to function effectively as a single unitary fighting force. To the ethnic soldiers, Russians are strangers, disliked for their dominance over the

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8. Edward Girardet: *Afghanistan. The Soviet War*, p. 23.

other nationalities, and, more often than not, despised and hated as foreign occupants, or even, in some cases, as infidels, in whose army the non-Russians are compelled to serve. It is understandable, therefore, that ethnic conscripts have very few friends among the Russians. They seek to create their own environment, isolated from Russian soldiers, so that they can live in their own world where they can speak their own language, live their own lives, and protect one another. Contact with Russians is minimal and there is a great reluctance on the part of ethnic conscripts to speak Russian. They do so only when absolutely necessary — when communicating with soldiers of different nationality, or when on duty. Thus, more often than not, the language barrier leads to the isolation of different language groups from the Russians, and hence to the breakdown of the Kremlin's attempts to bring about national integration and assimilation on the Russian model.

Language differences increase the natural inclination of distinct national groups to isolate themselves from Russian soldiers. Such attitudes cause widespread dissimulation (i.e. pretending not to understand Russian, which non-Russian conscripts hate, and also to avoid various duties); give rise to difficulties in carrying out military tasks by soldiers whose ability to understand and communicate in Russian is minimal; and lead to conflict with Russian servicemen, brought about by a breakdown in communication. Thus, language failure is an important catalyst for feelings of hatred and animosity towards the Russians, who form the dominant national group.

## CONCLUSION

Such is the nationality problem facing the Kremlin and Soviet military leadership — a problem which, in view of present developments and circumstances, will not subside in time, but will increase in scale and become more serious in the years ahead. Before bringing this brief survey to a close, I would like to draw several conclusions regarding future Soviet force effectiveness and military performance, in light of the ever-growing nationality problem.

First of all, I think it most important to analyse the demographic trends, affecting Soviet society since the 1950s, and its implications for the armed forces of the Soviet Union. The most important demographic development is the dramatic slowdown of the growth of the Russian population, a process which began in 1959 and continues to the present day. This is coupled with the considerably higher growth rate of the non-Slavic population, particularly the Muslim-Turkic peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Between 1959 and 1979, the major Slavic groups grew by 19% (from 159 to 189 million), and the non-Slavic peoples by 47%<sup>9</sup>. In the same period, the main Turkic

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9. Wimbush and Alexiev, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

and Iranian peoples of Central Asia (Uzbeks, Tadjiks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz and Turkmen) had a growth rate of close to 100%. Thus the Russian share of the total Soviet population fell from 54.6% in 1959 to 52.4% in 1979, whereas that of the Muslim-Turkic peoples rose from 12.6% to 17.4%<sup>10</sup>. Moreover, the Muslim-Turkic group is becoming "younger", that is, an increasingly larger share of its population is between 17 and 25 years old, while Slavic populations are rapidly becoming "older". Presently, therefore, ethnic Russians comprise less than half of the draft-age male cohort available to the armed forces, and by 1995, 46% of the total<sup>11</sup>.

These immense demographic changes bear a number of important implications for the future. Firstly, the Turkic-Muslim group of peoples is the only one which will increase its share of the Soviet population from the 1980s to the mid- to late 1990s. During the same time span, the Turkic-Muslim peoples will be the only group in which the percentages of Soviet draft-age males will increase (from 23% in 1980 to 28.7% in 1995)<sup>12</sup>.

If the problem appears serious now, it will only become progressively worse as time goes by, due to the momentum of the present demographic shift. Thus, by the year 2000, the Russians, who have traditionally drawn most heavily from the available Russian manpower to man positions of authority, technical sophistication, and political sensitivity in the armed forces, will be faced by the spectre of an army composed mainly of non-Russians. By the end of the 20th century, more than half the conscripts recruited into the armed forces will be of non-Russian origin, and a third or quarter of the entire force will be Muslims. In consequence, the authorities will find it increasingly difficult to maintain Russian dominance and control. In order to cope with these far-reaching developments, the Soviet leadership will have to introduce dramatic changes into its nationality policy — a policy with roots that go back to the armies of the tsars. However, neither the current patterns of the treatment of non-Russians in the armed forces, which reflects historical experience and regime objectives, nor the attitudes of non-Russian conscripts towards the dominant Russians, are likely to witness dramatic changes in the near future. Their roots are dug in far too deeply.

So, how will all this effect Soviet force effectiveness and military performance? With the increased numbers of Turkic-Muslim conscripts, whose Russian is not good and whose education is poor in comparison with Slavic recruits, the Soviet military command will be faced with serious constraints to the ability to field a modern, technologically advanced, cohesive and effective fighting force. As the number of Russians decreases, the Soviet leadership will have to meet the formidable challenge of integrating a greater number of non-Russian personnel than before into positions of combat and technological responsibility. In the short run, this may result in certain shortcomings in

10. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

basic training, among some sections of the ground forces; a reduced capability and potential unreliability of the support troops, a vital element of any armed force, crucial to its smooth running, and to the attainment of success on the battlefield; as well as serious training deficiencies among a sizeable proportion of reservists.

In Addition to these short-term deficiencies, the Soviet forces may suffer a number of equally serious problems in the long-run, such as unit training weaknesses; limitations on the introduction and mastering of modern technology and weapons systems; potential limitations on force size, in view of the large contingent of non-Slavs available for conscription in a decade or so; and the possibility of heightened security dilemmas.

Under certain circumstances, the Soviet forces may also face significant combat-related shortcomings, which will particularly come to light in a protracted conflict, the most important being the possibility of disproportionate losses of Slavs on the ground; possible mass-scale defections, as happened in the Second World War and the war in Afghanistan; and also the likely possibility of "second battle" weakness, on account of the accumulated effects of the short- and long-term problems. National uprisings, mutiny, and conflict with local populations, hostile to the Russians, cannot be ruled out either. Therefore, in any major conflict of the future, the Soviet leadership will have to contend with some very severe problems, reflecting a range of internal weaknesses which are potentially crippling to the combat effort of the Soviet armed forces. These problems stem from the nationality question.

Finally then, despite the many serious problems which it has to contend with, the Soviet army "remains a most formidable opponent with its main advantages lying in large numbers of men, awesome amounts of military equipment, and the strategic and tactical advantages arising from its present deployment"<sup>13</sup>. However, NATO does have one very important card up its sleeve — the nationality problem in the armed forces of its main adversary.

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*Capt. J. P. NOLAN*

**AN ARMY WITHOUT A STATE:  
THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY (UPA)  
AND NATIONAL RESISTANCE DURING AND AFTER  
THE SECOND WORLD WAR\***

**I. The Development of the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement**

From the end of the 10th century, when the state of Kyivan Ruś was organised and embraced Christianity, until the 18th century, Ukraine had remained as a political unit, even though divided. However, in 1775, Catherine the Great, continuing the policy of her predecessors, destroyed the Zaporozhian Sich (stronghold), the centre of the Ukrainian Cossacks, and in 1785 abolished all Ukrainian political institutions and privileges. From that time onwards, Russian administration was imposed in full, and no effort was spared to eradicate every vestige of Ukrainian nationality and culture. The great landed estates were owned largely by Russians and Poles, and those Ukrainian landowners who remained became Russianised. The revival of nationalist sentiment can be traced back to the literary revival of the first half of the 19th century and was strongest in Western Ukraine. (Western Ukraine is generally used to describe the area comprising east Galicia, the western parts of Polissia and Volhynia, and Carpatho-Ukraine. Galicia, Carpatho-Ukraine and Bukovyna were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.) Eastern Ukraine, not surprisingly, was more Russianised, and at the time of the 1917 revolution the miners and industrial workers of Kryvyi Rih and the Donets Basin were both radical and pro-Russian. The large Jewish population of Ukraine also tended to support Russian unity, and separatist feeling was strongest in the rural communities<sup>1</sup>.

The nationalists' dream of the independent Ukrainian state came briefly true in the closing months of the First World War. In Kyiv the independent Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) was proclaimed on 22 January, 1918, and was recognised by the Central Powers on 9 February. On 1 November a Western Ukrainian republic was set up on the ruins of the Habsburg Empire, the two republics being formally united on January 22, 1919. The UNR immediately had to fight for its existence against the Bolsheviks, the Whites (who wished to reincorporate it in Russia) and Poland which was expanding towards the Dnieper. With only the beginning of a national army and no pro-

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\* MA thesis for the War Studies course at King's College, London.

1. Clarence A. Manning, *Ukraine under the Soviets*, (N.Y. 1953), p. 18.

spect of assistance from the West, it is hardly surprising that the UNR was unequal to the task. By 1923, Eastern Ukraine was incorporated into the Soviet Union as the UkSSR, and Western Ukraine into Poland, with the exception of Carpatho-Ukraine, which went to Czechoslovakia, and Bukovyna, which along with the Ukrainian parts of Bessarabia, was given to Rumania. Yet the creation, however short-lived, of a free and united Ukraine was of considerable significance to the nationalist movement, providing at the same time a symbol of resistance and a precedent.

During the 1920's, Moscow pursued a relatively liberal policy with regard to the nationalities question, but this changed after 1930. The effects of Stalin's policies on Ukraine, particularly during the period of enforced collectivisation, which culminated in the artificial famine of 1932-33 in which some six million Ukrainians perished, are now well known. In particular, there was a systematic attempt, through countless purges and trials, to liquidate the Ukrainian intellectual élite who might provide the leadership for future resistance. The Ukrainians under Polish, Czech and Rumanian rule were by contrast allowed a certain measure of political development, although the seven million Ukrainians in Poland (amounting to one-quarter of the population) were treated in many respects as second-class citizens and on every occasion actively persecuted. In addition to the legally permitted political parties, there was founded an underground military organisation (UVO), under Col. Evhen Konovalets, which committed a number of terrorist acts against the Polish state. In 1929, this organisation was subsumed into the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which became the most active and influential of the nationalist groups. (Konovalets was assassinated in Rotterdam in 1938, probably by a Soviet agent. A similar fate had befallen Symon Petliura, former head of the Ukrainian government and commander-in-chief, in Paris twelve years before).

The OUN established a network of underground cells in the Ukrainian parts of Poland and in addition to mounting attacks on Polish police and government agencies, provided ideological and political training for Ukrainian youth, and disseminated propaganda. Present-day Ukrainian nationalists are at pains to point out that the nationalism of the OUN was free from any taint of fascism or Nazism, particularly as these are the terms used by Soviet propaganda to discredit the movement<sup>2</sup>.

On the eve of the Second World War, the dominant figure in the OUN was Col. Andriy Melnyk, a former officer in the short-lived army of the UNR, but he was coming under increasing criticism from the younger and more radical element, led by Stepan Bandera, Mykola Lebed, and others. This caused the movement to split early in 1941 into two factions, known as OUN-M and OUN-B, after the initials of their leaders. This split was to prove permanent and exists in exiled Ukrainian nationalist circles to this day.

2. c.g. Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaluk, *UPA Warfare in Ukraine*, (N.Y. 1972) p. 12.

Among other less influential groups should be mentioned the monarchist followers of the Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi, who had formed a short-lived government in Kyiv during the summer of 1918.

In 1938, the German Foreign Office seemed to be encouraging the idea of a small independent Ukrainian state fashioned from former Habsburg possessions. Later, at the negotiations which preceded the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, Stalin was sufficiently worried at the prospect of a Ukrainian puppet government in Lviv to insist on the Galician capital being included in his share of the Polish spoils<sup>3</sup>. Meanwhile, events in Carpatho-Ukraine served to warn the OUN leadership that no great reliance could be placed on Germany. With the dismemberment in September 1938 of the Czechoslovakian republic, Carpatho-Ukraine proclaimed its independence. After the German occupation of Prague in March 1938, Hitler handed over Carpatho-Ukraine to Admiral Horthy's Hungary, thus calming the apprehensions of Hungary, Poland, Italy and the Soviet Union with a single gesture. The nascent Ukrainian state was quickly overrun by superior German-equipped Hungarian forces. Yet it is one of the ironies of history that the Ukrainian national resistance, which was to prove a thorn in the German side during their occupation of Ukraine, was assisted greatly by German acts of policy before and after Barbarossa. After the invasion of Poland in September 1939, German troops entered Lviv, but soon pulled back, as agreed, to allow the Soviet Russians in. For a time the borders were open, allowing many thousands of Ukrainians to take refuge in the German zone (the "General Government"). By the spring of 1941, conditions in Western Ukraine, now annexed to the USSR, were rapidly assuming the same dire form they had taken in Eastern Ukraine during the inter-war years. In the General Government, however, Hans Frank's Nazi administration encouraged Ukrainian nationalism as a useful stick with which to beat the Poles. Bandera, imprisoned by the former Polish government, was released.

The OUN was given a further boost after Barbarossa, when the German armies rapidly overran Ukraine, by Hitler's decision to attach Galicia to the General Government rather than to the *Reichskommissariat* of Erich Koch set up over the rest of Ukraine. This was an attempt to defeat the activities of the Ukrainian nationalists whose centre Hitler correctly judged to be Lviv rather than Kyiv. Yet the effect was entirely the opposite. The Ukrainians were allowed to set up committees in Lviv and Cracow. Their spokesman, Professor Volodymyr Kubyiovych was in constant touch with Frank and Waechter, the Austrian SS officer who was Commissioner for Galicia<sup>4</sup>. "The nationalist movement", writes John Armstrong, the American authority on Ukrainian nationalism, "gained incalculable advantage by the fact that the Germans permitted its propaganda in the crucial months immediately following the Soviet evacuation. Moreover, even after they had suppressed the

3. Gerald Reitlinger, *The House Built on Sand*, (London 1960) p. 45.

4. *Ibid.* pp. 170-175.

OUN they continued to favour Ukrainian language and culture"<sup>5</sup>. One aspect of this was their tolerance, at least for a time, of the OUN-organised "march groups" who followed the advancing Wehrmacht into East Ukraine to spread the nationalist gospel among the population.

As early as 1940, the Germans surreptitiously formed armed units for Ukrainians. Early in 1941, the "Nachtigall" battalion was formed in the General Government, with Wehrmacht uniforms and "unofficial" Ukrainian officers led by Roman Shukhevych, who was later to command the Ukrainian Insurgent Army under the *nomme de guerre* of Taras Chuprynka. Another battalion, larger but less significant, known as "Roland" was formed in Austria. Many members of these units were later to desert, with their arms, and join the insurgents. In the spring of 1941, discussions were held between the Wehrmacht and the OUN-B concerning the employment of Ukrainian troops in a future war with the USSR, but they seem to have been somewhat vague and informal. German policy towards Ukraine was inconsistent, or more accurately, different groups were pursuing different policies.

Alfred Rosenberg, placed by Hitler in charge of the *Ostministerium*, had met Hetman Skoropadskyi and was sympathetic to Ukrainian nationalism. His scheme for a number of separatist states to replace the Soviet Russian empire envisaged giving a greater degree of sovereign power to Ukraine to provide balance should the residual Russian state prove troublesome in the future<sup>6</sup>. Rosenberg maintained that the Ukrainians had been capable of maintaining a separate status in their past, but must now be helped to do so as the only way of destroying the Soviet multi-national state. Hitler, with the events of 1918 in mind, believed that the Ukrainians were basically unreliable and would once again prove a bad investment. He completely failed to appreciate the effects of the Bolshevik repression and terror of the 1930's on the population. (Not so the advance units of the Wehrmacht, who were at first welcomed as liberators.) Hitler declared on 16 July that "only the Germans shall bear arms". The Wehrmacht would carry all before it without needing any help from the despised Ukrainians. Two years later, further attempts were made to organise armed Ukrainian units, but by then it was too late since Nazi policy in Ukraine in the intervening period had alienated the population to the extent of creating outright resistance.

## II. The Move Towards Resistance 1941-43

In the towns and cities of Western Ukraine, the advancing Germans in the summer of 1941 discovered the bodies of several thousand Ukrainian political prisoners, massacred on the spot by the NKVD as there was no time to

5. John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, (Columbia 1963) p. 286.

6. Memo to Hitler April 2, 1941. Reitlinger, *op. cit.* p. 134.

arrange their transport to the interior. Small groups of NKVD men were deliberately left behind to stage "incidents" with the intention of provoking German reprisals against the population. An example of this tactic was seen further east, in Kyiv, where the retreating NKVD mined the entire city centre. After the German *Kommandatur* had been installed, the mines were detonated one by one, convincing the German occupiers that they were under terrorist attack. In Lviv, the followers of Bandera acted swiftly; on 30 June they proclaimed the independence of Ukraine and set up a government led by Yaroslav Stetsko. This certainly disturbed some Wehrmacht officers who were hoping to create a friendly autonomous Ukrainian government (at least in Galicia) without antagonising Berlin; they also feared arousing Russian patriotism against the Germans. On the other hand, the Banderites thought that a *fait accompli* might preclude German action, since any move to crush a proclaimed Ukrainian state might jeopardise relations with the other nationalities. It is doubtful whether Bandera and his associates knew at this stage what the true German intentions were towards Ukraine; in fact the *Akt* of 30 June probably made little difference<sup>7</sup>. Nationalists maintain that Bandera's action forced the Germans to show their hand and was of great symbolic importance for the coming struggle<sup>8</sup>. In any event, within a month the Germans moved against the OUN-B and the government. The leaders, including Stetsko and Bandera were arrested. (Bandera and Stetsko were to spend most of the war in the "political wing" of Sachsenhausen concentration camp.)

In August, Erich Koch was put in charge of the *Reichskommissariat* of Ukraine, his appointment apparently due to the fact that he would allow every other agency to run the country for him except Rosenberg's ministry. The economic exploitation of the area backed by intimidation and terror was a mirror-image of Stalin's policy as Koch freely admitted. The hated collective farms were retained and Ukrainians were shipped off to Germany as part of the *Ostarbeiter* programme, with all its associations of exile to Siberia. However, in the first year of the German occupation of Volhynia, neither the OUN-M nor the OUN-B had what might be called an effective partisan organisation, although isolated attacks were made on German and Red partisan positions. The nearest thing to a nationalist partisan movement at this time was the *Poliska Sich* (Polissian stronghold) led by Taras Borovets, who called himself Taras Bulba after Hohol's hero. It was Borovets who first used the term Ukrainian Insurgent Army (*Ukrainska Povstanska Armiya* or UPA) to describe his forces, which in the winter and spring of 1942, were engaged in sporadic fighting with small groups of Red partisans. It is by no means certain that any open attacks on the Germans were carried out at this stage. Borovets had links with both the OUN-B and the OUN-M, as well as ties with the UNR (Ukrainian National Republic) leadership-in-exile in Warsaw,

7. Armstrong, *op. cit.*, p. 82 et sequ.

8. Tys-Krokhmaluk, *op. cit.*, p. 24.



but acted mainly on his own initiative. In October 1942, negotiations were held with the Soviet partisan leader Lukin who proposed joint action against the Germans. Borovets refused, as co-operation would have meant subservience to Moscow; and furthermore he could not risk an all-out campaign against the Germans which would have proved suicidal for his group at the time. He also feared German reprisals against the Volhynian population\*\*.

The arrival on the scene in 1942 of Soviet partisan forces led by General Kovpak was the catalyst which converted the OUN-B from an underground political organisation to an overt partisan military force under the name of UPA and became the rallying point of all Ukrainians who wished to fight for the independence of Ukraine against both Nazi and Bolshevik tyranny. A major role in the development of the Red partisans was played by the NKVD. They were an artificial creation of the Moscow regime and their leaders were mostly dedicated communists drawn from all geographic and ethnic groups in Ukraine. This nucleus of party and government functionaries was joined by large numbers of Red Army soldiers cut off from the main body by the swiftness of the German advance, many of them political officers (Commissars), *Politruks* or NKVD men. Khrushchev is said to have played a major part in the organisation of Red partisans in Ukraine. Despite Soviet attempts to portray these partisans as being motivated by local patriotism<sup>9</sup>, there is no evidence that the Ukrainian patriots rallied to the Soviets<sup>10</sup>. The Soviet partisans made use of both compulsion and persuasion to secure local support\*\*\*. They were assisted by German atrocities, particularly those committed by the *Ostarbeiter* agencies. Kovpak's first raid into Western Ukraine caused large-scale German reprisals which injured the Ukrainian peasantry and led to desertions from the Ukrainian police units. The OUN-B was unwilling to risk the police units (which they had infiltrated and dominated) passing to the Soviet guerillas and by November 1942 regarded the adoption of large scale partisan activity as inevitable. Borovets and Melnyk supporters wanted to avoid this, but were not strong enough to counter the Bandera group who could draw on Galician manpower and leadership, and who had infiltrated the police units in Volhynia (an invaluable recruiting source). Thus the UPA which emerged in the winter of 1942-43 was dominated by the OUN-B; the OUN-M continued for the time being to cooperate with the (now enlarged) Bulba groups.

The UPA had an estimated strength at the beginning of 1943 of 40,000. By the end of the year, it had grown to number 100,000 and by the end of 1944 had a probable strength of 200,000: some German sources suggest an even higher figure. In July 1943, a large-scale Soviet partisan army under Kovpak

\*\* The Soviet approach to Bulba-Borovets is recalled by Khrushchev. See Crankshaw (ed), *Khrushchev Remembers*, (London 1971) pp. 190-1.

9. e.g. in the book supposedly by S. A. Kovpak himself, which appeared in translation in 1947 under the title *Our Partisan Course*.

10. Armstrong, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

\*\*\* The Soviet partisans normally operated east of the Dnieper.

entered Galicia. It skirted the areas known to be held by nationalist forces, and having failed to destroy the German oil installations, which were ostensibly its objective, it was surrounded and all but destroyed by German forces in the low-lying areas, and the UPA forces in the Carpathian mountains. Only seven hundred (including Kovpak himself) escaped.

### III. UPA-OUN organisation and concept of operations

The UPA saw its chief task as follows. In the first place, it had to organise the population both politically and militarily against the invader. It aimed to set up an anti-German sabotage network and frustrate German deportation of Ukrainians under the *Ostarbeiter* scheme and German forcible requisition of grain and other supplies. A major propaganda programme sought to educate the population as to the true intentions of the Nazis and the Bolsheviks towards Ukraine. It had to build up a supply of arms and ammunition. Finally, it had to be continually on its guard against infiltration of Soviet agents (some of whom had even penetrated the SS and the Gestapo)<sup>11</sup>. The highest organ of the UPA was the General Staff under the leadership of the Supreme Commander. From 1943 until 1950, this position was held by Roman Shukhevych, alias Lt.-Gen. Taras Chuprynka. Under him were the group commanders and their staffs, next the district commanders, and under them the commanders of sectors. There were four regional operational groups known respectively as UPA-North, South, East and West. As in most armies, the staff was divided according to function, i.e. operations, intelligence and logistics; there was a military instruction section and, very important, a political instruction section.

The tactical operational unit was usually the company. Battalions, or more rarely regiments (brigades) were normally only formed on the orders of a district commander, who would then personally command the unit formed. Command posts of military districts were mobile, which enabled the commander to supervise operations closely. Companies were designated "light" and "heavy", according to the weapons carried. A light company (168 men) were armed with small arms, grenades and demolition materials. Sometimes it might carry anti-tank weapons. Fifty-millimetre mortars were organic to the platoons. A heavy company usually consisted of 186 men and had, in addition to the above, three heavy machine guns and three medium (82mm) mortars. Anti-tank weapons included the hand-held *Panzerfaust* and *Panzerbuchse 43* and anti-tank mines were also used. Until mid-1944, the majority of the weapons were captured German ones; thereafter Soviet weapons predominated. In the northern areas, some troops were mounted and had light artillery, but towed guns with their reliance on roads are not suited to guerrilla warfare.

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11. E. Martinez Codo in F. M. Osanka (ed) *Modern Guerrilla Warfare* (N.Y. 1962) p. 114.

Captured guns, armoured cars and occasionally tanks were stored and generally used only for the defence of strongpoints.

The UPA regarded themselves as a national army and wore military uniform (acquired from a number of sources, German, Polish and Soviet) and the national insignia of the *tryzub* or trident. Although the type of warfare in which they were engaged is often termed "partisan" warfare, they were not partisans in the sense of Soviet partisans, who operated behind enemy lines with the support of and supplied by (on the occasion when supplies actually arrived) the Soviet government. They were, as their title indicates, more correctly insurgents, receiving no outside assistance and depending on the support of the local population. The tactics of the insurgents were usually dictated by the enemy. Against the Germans, for instance, large-scale operations were effectively carried out, even in the winter. The Germans could not spare large numbers of troops to counter the UPA and often relied on police units including Polish ones. Unused to this type of warfare, their tactics tended to be too inflexible<sup>12</sup>. The chief UPA-controlled areas were the swamps and forests of Volhynia and the Carpathian mountains. German control was tenuous, they did not possess an effective intelligence network at village level, and most of the time did not even attempt to keep open the main supply routes to the front. Things were very different when the Soviets returned, since the latter could call on large concentrations of troops, had a strong spy network, and had units well-trained in guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations.

The emphasis on military instruction is understandable in any army and was of particular importance for the UPA for whom the shortage of trained officers was always acute. Two officers' schools were established in the north and west regions, and there were NCO schools in every military district. A comprehensive training manual, based on experience, the 364-page *Practical Manual of Guerrilla Warfare*, was printed and widely used. Other supporting services included the highly effective intelligence service, benefitting from the co-operation of the local population; a communications and liaison service; and a medical service providing qualified doctors at company and battalion level and a network of concealed field hospitals. There was also an efficient Ukrainian Red Cross (not recognised by the Germans or the Soviets), which included a civilian department to assist the population of the zones outside the control of the occupying forces.

Parallel with the UPA was the civilian network of the OUN which provided the political base on which the former could operate. The UPA had of course grown out of the OUN, and from it had received its ideology and recruit training. The civilian sector furnished men, arms, foodstuffs, military equipment, clothing, and, above all, intelligence. The OUN and UPA were closely linked, and in many cases the UPA and OUN commands at a particular level were held by the same person. At the top of the OUN was the su-

12. Tys-Krokhmaluk, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

preme leadership or *Provid*, which was able to meet in UPA-controlled territory and issue directives and policy statements in the name of the Ukrainian people. A meeting in November 1943 resulted in the formation of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, an attempt to link the Ukrainian movement with other repressed nationalities of the USSR. As the military struggle intensified, the nationalist movement tended to become less ethnocentric, and although there was still much romanticised history and the usual emotional appeals for action, there was greater emphasis on economic and social welfare and the securing of individual rights. This was partly because of the necessity of appealing to the East Ukrainians, who wanted something more concrete than the "pure" nationalist ideology which had been the OUN's stock-in-trade before the war, but it was also due to the predominance of the military element led by Chuprynka which tended to be more tolerant and pragmatic<sup>13</sup>. In June 1944, on the eve of the Soviet re-occupation, a so-called "universal" conference was held in UPA territory, resulting in the formation of the UHVR (*Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada* or Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council), which was supported by most groups (although the OUN-B was by far the most important) and both the main Churches, the Autocephalous (autonomous) Orthodox Church, and the Ukrainian Catholic Church<sup>14</sup>. The UHVR published an official organ *Visnyk* (Herald), which had a small circulation and appeared quarterly. *Ideya i Chyn* (Idea and Action) had a monthly circulation of 20,000 and the UPA provided *Povstanets* (Insurgent) and *Do Zbroyi* (To Arms); to keep people informed of outside events, weekly bulletins based on BBC news reports were produced and circulated<sup>15</sup>. A typical example of UPA propaganda is the following message addressed to soldiers of the Red Army:

"The Ukrainian insurgents together with the entire Ukrainian people do not want German slavery or Bolshevik Siberia. Nor do they want Hitler's 'New Europe' nor Stalin's prison the USSR. . . we want to live in free friendly countries without the terrorist dictatorship of Hitler and Stalin".

(*To be continued*)

13. Armstrong, *Op. cit.*, p. 160.

14. Oleh Martovych, *Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Modern Times*, (Edinburgh 1952) p. 118.

15. *Ibid*, p. 112.

Wolodymyr SLEZ

## WRITINGS ON MODERN UKRAINIAN LITERATURE

The journal *Dnipro* (No. 3 1965) carried an article by Ivan Svitlychnyi entitled "Harmonia i Alhebra". In it the author with heavy irony inveighs against recent "scholarly" publications:

*Shevchenkove slovo ta poetychnyi kontekst. Vykorystannia zaimennykiv u poeziakh T.H. Shevchenka* (X., 1960), by P. O. Petrova.

*Mova Tarasa Shevchenka* (X., 1963), by V. S. Vashchenko.

*T. H. Shevchenko v istorii ukrainskoi literaturnoi movy* (Naukova Dumka, 1964), by I.K. Bilodid.

*Zbirka statei. Dzherela movnoi maisternosti T.H. Shevchenka*, (Vyd-vo AN URSR, 1964).

One of the authors by implying what might loosely be termed the "arithmetic method", reduces his evaluation of Shevchenko's poetic art to the number of times the poet uses the pronoun "ya" (I). However, in Svitlychnyi's view, the chief crime was that such drivel was actually published. His main concern as a critic and poet in his own right, was for higher standards in Ukrainian literary creativity and removing the strictures of socialist realism and party politics imposed on art in general.

This conflict can be traced back to the beginnings of the Soviet regime in Ukraine, more than half a century ago. We are reminded of the literary discussion of 1925-1928 when there was a conflict between supporters of free creativity and literary eruditeness and the party and its gang of hack writers and scribes.

In the Manifesto on Art of the Molodyi Teatr, Les Kurbas wrote:

"After a long epoch of Ukrainophilism, romantic admiration for the Cossacks, ethnographism and modernism based on the Russian pattern we see in our literature which has hitherto reflected all social moods, a vital and most important turning point. It is directed straight toward Europe. . . without any intermediaries of authoritative models. This is the only true path for our art".

V. Polishchuk, member of "Hart", went so far as to say that Ukrainian Culture was also to give something to Europe.

Mykola Zerov complained:



"There is very little literary education, and therefore very little possibility of learning from literary models, of testing various styles, of emancipating oneself from the strong influences of a master in order to crystallise one's own literary personality".

His was an appeal for less patronage and soft soap and more refinement and criticism. It reflected a deep concern for quality and artistic integrity. Quality became the watchword and not quantity: *non multa, sed multum*.

The Neoclassicists called for the creation of a "great style" in Ukrainian letters.

Meanwhile, "proletarian" hack writers sought to impose the will of the masses (i.e. the Bolshevik Party) on the artist and in the long run they were successful, for as Yuriy Lavrinenko points out not without a sense of irony: "In order to win the discussion on style, Moscow was forced to use its final argument in all its more important discussions, the Cheka"<sup>1</sup>, in other words violence.

In 1926, the Party Central Committee condemned the call for a European cultural orientation as petit bourgeois agitation aimed at breaking with Moscow, the "citadel of international revolution".

During the period 1930-1940, Ukrainian literature became a manufacturing (vyrobnycha) industry, national in form and socialist in content as Stalin had decreed. It praised the "glorious" achievements of Soviet industry and was factory produced itself, written to order. Such abominations as collective poems came into being. Alas, they were not of the same quality as the collective sculptures of the ancient Egyptians.

During the Second World War, Stalin gave more scope to national sentiments in order to whip up support for the war effort, only to make a complete volte-face when victory had been won. After the war, the party resumed its assault.

In August 1946, the Central Committee held an extraordinary meeting to discuss the Russian language journals: *Zvezda* and *Leningrad*. Both were accused of publishing a-political works which took too pessimistic a view of the future of Soviet society. The fact is, *Zvezda* had published works by A. Zoschenko (a writer of Ukrainian descent) such as "Pryhody mavpy" (The Adventures of a Monkey) which was seen by some party literary specialists as a parody of Soviet life, with the added danger that it might corrupt Soviet youth. *Zvezda* had also published poems by Anna Akhmatova (Hurenko, also of Ukrainian descent) which were regarded as over-pessimistic and not political enough. The party insisted that literary works be more politicised

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1. Yuriy Lavrinenko, *Rozstriliane Vidrodzhennia*, Instytut Literacki, Paris 1959. "Literatura Vitaizmu" 1917-1933, p. 961.

since they were a powerful means of educating the Soviet people and youth in particular.

The publication *Narys Istorii Ukrainskoi Literatury*, Akademia Nauk, 1945, edited by S. Maslov and E. Kyryliuk had also come under fire. Party specialists accused it of "bourgeois nationalism". There was too much emphasis on the "national moment" in the outlined development of Ukrainian literature. Actually, the authors had used Hrushevsky's and not Lenin's scheme.

The following Ukrainian literary works published in 1944 were accused of "reactionary romanticism of national originality"<sup>2</sup>, *Sofia* by L. Smilianskyi, *Ukrainska khata* and *Yak Taras yikhav na Ukrainu* by O. Kundzich and *Chomu ne hasnut zori* by O. Kopylenko.

In December 1954, at the 2nd All-Union Congress of Writers, the Party Central Committee reiterated its policy on socialist realism, however, writers were not to gloss over life's difficulties in their works. Writers and critics called for principled and thoughtful criticism, more variety of style and genre and warned of the harm caused by a dogmatic understanding of the principles of socialist realism and ignoring artistic skill. Indeed, after the 20th Party Congress, they felt it was time to look seriously at the following problems in literary works: lack of complexity, lack of conflict, paltry themes (milkotemia), adornment (lakuvannia) of reality, not enough realism in the depiction of reality, schematism, declarativeness and illustrativeness. Svitlychnyi and Dziuba called for higher standards in literary output and especially in psychological characterisation which did not exist at that time. They also criticised socialist realism. Both critics: "readily welcomed young poets who showed considerable artistic potential, giving free reign to their feelings, moods, experience and new thoughts, unusually bold and unprecedented in Soviet reality"<sup>3</sup>.

The Kyivan newspaper *Literaturna Hazeta* of January 1962 devoted two pages to extracts from the works of the young writers, V. Drozd, Ye. Hut-salo, I. Drach, F. Boyko, V. Shevchuk and Yu. Koval. On February 20, 1962, it published a series of short stories by V. Shevchuk. These were mature works. Nevertheless, there was opposition to the younger generation of writers from reactionary editors and directors of Soviet publishing houses.

At the 3rd Plenum of the Ukrainian Writers' Union (SPU) on January 10, 1962, Oles Honchar, although acknowledging the merit of learning from modern artistic trends and developments in world literature, warned that, "often under the banner of modernism and the call to unbridled innovations,

2. "Literaturni protsesy pislia druhoi svitovoi viyny. Ohliady i vybrani pytannia ukrainskoi ta inshykh literatur". *Zapysky NTSh*, T. 195. Red. kol. B. Romanenchuk, N. Pazuniak, L. Rudnytskyi. Philadelphia, New York 1982. "Ukrainska literatura pislia druhoi svitovoi viyny", B. Romanenchuk, p. 71.

3. *Ibid*, p. 93.

in the past and present we have seen those who sought to attack the literature of socialist realism and the principles of popular realistic art"<sup>4</sup>.

At the same plenum P. Zahrebelnyi advised that writers and editors too should strive constantly to improve their cultural awareness. How else could the latter appreciate the new literary and artistic trends and make competent decisions on what to publish and what to reject.

At the meeting of the Presidium of the SPU which took place on March 20, 1926, the party apparatchiks, V. Pianov, Yu. Zbanatskyi, I. Tsiupa and L. Novychenko, though acknowledging the existence of the group of new young writers hoped nevertheless that while emulating Böll and Hemingway, they did not stray from the path of Marxism-Leninism.

Novychenko gave an ominous warning, "Soviet literature can only be party literature, it can only be popular and will exact cruel vengeance on any artist who at any time forgets this"<sup>5</sup>.

V. Shevchuk came under particularly heavy scrutiny and was reprimanded for signs of "Western influences" in his work.

Despite Zahrebelnyi's brave defence of the younger generation and call for a more sympathetic appraisal of their work and that it should not be banned from publication, concrete measures were discussed on how to suppress the new generation and eliminate the danger of "ideological distortions".

At a meeting with the creative intelligentsia on March 8, 1963, Krushchev dealt a further body blow:

"... socialist realism is our banner, only it can guarantee the level of literature and art necessary for implementing tasks set by the party on the communist education of the workers and the creation of the values of communist society. . ."

This effectively scotched the rebirth in Ukrainian literature during the period 1956-62.

The struggle continued. The appearance of Honchar's *Sobor* fuelled further controversy. In the wake of the 1968 debate, the party called for strict control of literature and extra vigilance against non-conformism.

In 1970, the following writers came under criticism, V. Drozd, I. Chendey, V. Maniak and R. Andriashuk. On January 21, 1973, the Central Committee of the CPSU passed a resolution "On Literary-Artistic Criticism". Critics were to be more diligent in implementing the party line in artistic creativity. They were to look out for ideological mistakes such as misrepresentation of rela-

4. Bohdan Kravtsiv, *Zibrani Tvory*, T. 2. Vyd-vo Niu Yorkskoi Hrupy, New York, 1980. Chastyna Druha. "Do synikh zir (pro modernu ukrainsku prozu v URSR", p. 446.

5. *Ibid*, p. 454.

tions with Russia, national narrow-mindedness and glorification of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. The Bolsheviks showed a "pathological sensitivity toward the issue of Russian Colonialism"<sup>6</sup>. There were attacks on the use of religious themes. Writers were again to depict life as it ought to be according to the government view.

In the literary discussion of 1980-81, the younger authors advocated experimental prose, psychologism and interest in mythology and folklore. This presumably was one step away from a return to national traditions. One author concludes: "The party's control of literary affairs seems to be total, and no substantial deviation from its policy of provincialising Ukrainian literature can be detected"<sup>7</sup>.

As for the new generation of critics, I. Svitlychnyi, I. Dziuba, Ye. Sverstiuk, I. Boychak and others, they, in the tradition of the critical realists of the 19th century, maintained that literature should, amongst other things, play a leading role in social criticism, be honest and look into life and its motive forces more deeply.

There have been other schools of literary criticism in Ukraine this century, far removed from the crude, socialist realist sociological analysis employed by party hack writers. However, during the period 1905-1917 "none of the existing Ukrainian universities had a chair in the theory and history of Ukrainian literature"<sup>8</sup>. There was no official scholarly centre for the systematic study of Ukrainian historical-literary matters. V. Perets's work, *Z lektsiy po metodolohii istorii literatury*, laid the foundation for a new methodology of Ukrainian literary criticism, the aesthetic formal-poetical method. Other works were published in the field of criticism, Biletskyi's *Osnovy ukrainskoi literaturno-naukovoi krytyky (sproba literaturno-naukovoi metodolohii)* T. 1, Praha, Ukrainskyi Vydavnychi Fond, 1925. The second volume which did not appear in print was to deal with the sociological, dialectical and evolutionary aspects of the historical school of criticism and consider the psychological and philosophical schools. All trace of it is lost. P. Fylypovych produced, "Ukrainske literaturoznavstvo za 10 rokiv revoliutsii" (v zbirnyku *Literatura*, T.1, Kyiv 1928. And the Odessan literary specialist and historian Kost Koperzhynskyi published "Ukrainske naukove literaturoznavstvo za ostannie desiatylyttia 1917-1927 (u vydanni *Studii z istorii Ukrainy naukovo-doslidnoi katedry istorii Ukrainy*, T. 11, Kyiv 1928. In 1957, the AN URSR published Biletskyi's *Ukrainske literaturoznavstvo za sorok rokiv (1917-1957)*.

The first decade after the 1917 Revolution saw the growth of the philologi-

6. *Ukraine after Shelest*. Edited by Bohdan Krawchenko. CIUS Edmonton 1983. "Literary Politics and Literary Debates in Ukraine 1971-81", Myroslav Shkandrij, p. 58.

7. *Ibid*, p. 67.

8. Pavlo Fylypovych, *Literatura — statyi, rozvidky, ohliady*, edited by Hryhoriy Kostiuik. UVAN (USA), New York — Melbourne, 1971, p. 558.

cal school, comparative-historical school, formal-poetic (formalist) school and psychological and sociological (Marxist) schools.

Fylypovych was a disciple of the comparative method in the tradition of Drahomanov, Franko, Sumtsov and O. Kolessa. This method allows links to be examined with the literature of other peoples, deeper study to be made of works and broader sociological generalisations.

There came into being a so-called "nova-shkola" (new school) of literary criticism and scholarship. Its chief exponents were M. Zerov, O. Biletskyi and M. Hlobenko. Rejecting the narrow-mindedness of the populist approach they insisted that a literary work had to be placed in the context of the general cultural process and general developments in world literature. Style and form were to be studied more deeply.

Zerov, regarded as the founder of Modern Ukrainian literary history, used several methods — historical-sociological, historical-literary, historical-cultural and formalist-sociological. M. Hrushevskyi used the philological, spiritual-historical and socio-political approaches.

Yuriy Sherekh (Shevelov) introduces another dimension to our rather factual account. In his essay *Dva styli literaturnoi krytyky*<sup>9</sup>, first published in 1948, he considers two fundamentally different approaches to literary criticism, "krytyka vqliadu" ("perceptive criticism") and "krytyka nahliadu" ("prescriptive criticism").

The prescriptive critic tends not to consider the literary process or the nature of the author. He has a table of accepted standards, a template which he sets on literary works. If the template does not fit the work is rejected. In one of its extreme and disreputable forms as we see in the Soviet Union, rejection of a literary work is often followed by imprisonment of the author in labour camps or psychiatric hospitals. The prescriptive critic performs a kind of policing function.

The perceptive critic, on the other hand, attempts to capture the inimitable essence of a work and understand the interrelationship of its components. He seeks to help the author to understand himself and the reader to understand the author. A kind of literary consultation takes place.

Shevelov refers to authoritative opinion. The critic with a one sided taste (the prescriptive approach) tends to compensate for this by increased partiality (Lessing). A literary work should be read and appreciated without prejudice (the perceptive approach), a *laissez-faire* approach is recommendable (Sainte-Beuve). A writer should be judged according to the laws he creates himself (Pushkin).

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9. Yuriy Sherekh, *Ne dlia ditei*, Essays on Modern Ukrainian Literature. Vyd-vo Prolog 1964. "Dva styli literaturnoi krytyky", p. 404-414.



Two underlying approaches are involved here. Liberal and dictatorial. Clearly, the prescriptive critic has less to be concerned about since his table of standards or party directives have made all the difficult decisions for him. He requires less literary and cultural baggage since it is the perceptive critic who must actually discuss works, draw comparisons and perhaps place them in wider contexts. It is easier to simplify and more difficult to appreciate or even advocate diversity.

Shevelov concludes that the policing method precludes any intellectual play (hra) and the possibility of thereby introducing real values to the reader.

Throughout the Soviet period and even in Tsarist Russia for that matter, Ukrainian literature has never been allowed to grow to its full stature. Many attempts at genuine progress, growth and development have met with cruel, devious and cynical oppression<sup>10</sup>. Svitlychnyi, as Dray-Khmara before him in the 1930s, refused to compromise his beliefs, while Dziuba and Drach were terrorised into submission like Tychyna and Rylskyi. Soviet literary politics have on the whole given Ukrainian writers nothing of value, nothing to really stimulate creativity. The crimes committed against Ukrainian culture and particularly Ukrainian literature by Moscow and her lackeys, are inexcusable.

\*

### 1. Executed by firing squad

Kost Bureviy — prose-writer, dramatist, parodist (1934).

Oleksa Vlyzko — poet (1934).

Mykhailo Havrylko — sculptor (1920).

Petro Doroshenko — art critic (1919 in Odessa).

Mykhailo Donets — prose-writer (1934).

Hryhoriy Kosynka — prose-writer (1934).

Ahatanhel Krymskyi — poet, linguist (1941?).

Ivan Krushelnytskyi — poet (1934).

Taras Krushelnytskyi — (1934).

Mykhailo Lebedynets — prose-writer (1934).

Mykola Leontovych — composer.

Serhiy Matiash — critic (1934).

Lada Mohylianska — poet.

Oleksander Murashko — painter (1918).

Hnat Mykhailychenko — prose-writer (executed by Denikin's followers).

Volodymyr Naumenko — literary critic, pedagogue (1919).

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10. Yar Slavutych, *Rozstriliana Muza — Sylvety*, Vyd-vo "Prometey", Michigan, USA, 1955. "Moskovske nyshchennia Ukrainskoi Literatury", p. 7-11.

Serhiy Pylypenko — prose-writer, fabulist, publicist.  
Kostiantyn Pivnenko — critic (1934).  
Mykola Plevako — literary critic (murdered in exile 1941).  
Havrylko Protsenko — critic.  
Dmytro Revutsnyi — music critic, folklorist (1941).  
Roman Skazynskyi — prose-writer (1934).  
Oleksander Soroka — poet (1941).  
Ivan Steshenko — literary critic (murdered 1918).  
Liudmyla Starytska-Cherniakhivska — (1941?).  
Ivan Tereshchenko — critic (1934).  
Dmytro Falkivskyi — poet (1934).  
Vasyl Chumak — poet (executed by Denikin's followers, 1919).  
Hryhoriy Chuprynka — poet (1921).  
Roman Shevchenko — literary critic (1934).  
Ivan Yukhymenko — stage-director (burnt alive, 1941).

## **2. Committed suicide**

Dmytro Borziak — prose-writer (with a piece of glass in prison).  
Hryhoriy Holoskevych — linguist (hung himself in exile).  
Arkadiy Kazka — poet.  
Vadym Okhrimenko — prose-writer (shot himself in 1941).  
Liudvik Sidletskyi (Sava Krylach) — prose-writer and his wife Vira.  
Mykola Skrypnyk — cultural and political figure (shot himself in 1933).  
Borys Teneta — prose-writer (hung himself in prison).  
Mykola Khvylovyi — poet, prose-writer, pamphletist (shot himself in 1933).

## **3. Exiled to concentration camps**

Ivan Andrienko — prose-writer.  
B. Antonenko-Davydovych — prose-writer.  
Vasyl Atamaniuk — poet.  
Yulian Bachynskyi — publicist.  
S. Sen (Bendiuzhenko) — poet.  
F. Bila-Krynytsia — poet.  
Vasyl Bobynskyi — poet.  
Sava Bozhko — prose-writer, poet.  
Mykhailo Boychuk — painter.  
Dmytro Buzko — prose-writer.  
Petro Vanchenko — prose-writer.  
Ivan Vrona — painter (died in exile).

Mykola Voronyi — poet.  
Marko Voronyi (M. Antiokh) — poet.  
Vasyl Vrazhlyvyi — prose-writer.  
Yuriy Vukhnal — prose-writer, humorist.  
Mecheslav Gasko — poet.  
Kost Horban — critic.  
Mykola Horban — prose-writer.  
Dmytro Hordienko — prose-writer.  
Dmytro Hrudyna — theatrical critic.  
Yukhym Gedz — prose-writer, humorist.  
Yosyp Germaize — historian.  
Volodymyr Gzhytskyi — prose-writer.  
Vasyl Desniak (Vasylenko) — critic.  
Antin Dykyi — poet.  
Oles Dosvitnyi — prose-writer.  
Spyrydon Dobrovolskyi — prose-writer.  
Mykhailo Drai-Khmara — poet, literary critic.  
Viktor Dubrovskyi — linguist, critic (died in exile).  
Mykola Dykun — prose-writer.  
Hryhoriy Epik — prose-writer.  
Serhiy Yefremov — literary critic.  
Pylyp Zahoruyko — prose-writer.  
Dmytro Zahul — poet.  
Mykola Zerov — poet, literary critic.  
Pavlo Ivanov — prose-writer.  
Ovsiy Iziumov — linguist.  
Myroslav Irchan — dramatist.  
Mayk Yohansen — poet (after going insane, died in a deportation prison).  
Ivan Kalianyk — poet.  
Pylyp Kapelhorodskyi — poet, prose-writer.  
Ivan Kapustianskyi — literary critic.  
Yevhen Kasianenko — translator, journalist.  
Ivan Kyrylenko — prose-writer.  
Meletiy Kichura — poet (died in exile).  
Borys Kovalenko — critic.  
Yakiv Kovalchuk — prose-writer.  
Mykhailo Kozoris — prose-writer.  
Petro Kolesnyk — literary critic.  
Hryhoriy Koliada — poet.  
Volodymyr Koriak — critic.  
Hordiy Kotsiuba — prose-writer (executed by firing squad in exile?).  
Antin Krushelnyskyi — poet.  
Mykola Kulish — dramatist (executed by firing squad in exile?).

- Les Kurbas — stage director (executed by firing squad in exile?).  
Ivan Lakyza — critic.  
Maksym Lebid — poet.  
Ananiy Lebid — literary critic.  
Petro Lisovyi — prose-writer (?).  
Ivan Lyzanivskyi — editor, publisher.  
Ostap Lutskyi — poet (died in exile).  
Mykola Liubchenko (Kost Kotko) — prose-writer, humorist.  
Hryhoriy Mayfet — literary critic.  
M. Makarenko — art critic, archaeologist (died in exile).  
Ivan Mykytenko — prose-writer, dramatist (shot himself).  
Ivan Myronets — critic.  
Andriy Mykhaliuk — poet (?).  
A. Muzychka — literary critic.  
I. Nedolia — dramatist.  
Andriy Nikovskyi — literary critic.  
Mykhailo Novytskyi — literary critic.  
Halyna Orlivna — prose-writer.  
Ivan Padalka — painter (executed by firing squad in exile?).  
Andriy Paniv — poet, prose-writer.  
Hryhoriy Piddubnyi — essayist.  
Valerian Pidmohylnyi — prose-writer.  
Liutsiana Piontek — poetess.  
Yevhen Pluzhnyk — poet (died in the Solovki Islands).  
Oleksiy Pravdiuk — critic.  
Valerian Polishchuk — poet.  
Fedir Pushchenko — foreign languages specialist.  
Mykhailo Rudynskyi — art critic, archaeologist.  
Andriy Richytskyi — publicist.  
Petro Rulin — theatre critic.  
Yakiv Savchenko — poet, critic.  
Yuriy Savchenko — literary critic.  
Oleksa Slisarenko — poet, prose-writer.  
Vasyl Sedliar — painter.  
Mykhailo Semenko — poet.  
Oleksa Syniavskyi — linguist.  
Mykhailo Strutynskyi — critic.  
Havrosh Siryi — poet (?).  
S. Smerechynskyi — linguist.  
Oleksander Sokolovskyi — prose-writer.  
Todos Stepovyi (Didenko) — dramatist.  
Dmytro Tas (Mohylianskyi) — prose-writer.  
Ivan Tkachuk — prose-writer, publicist.

- Zinaida Tulub — prose-writer.  
Pavlo Fylypovych — poet, literary critic.  
Mykola Filianskyi — poet.  
Andriy Khvyliya — critic, publicist.  
Hnat Khotkevych — prose-writer.  
Pavlo Khrystiuk — publicist.  
Dmytro Chepurnyi — poet.  
Veronika Cherniakhivska — poetess (went insane in exile).  
Vasyl Chechvianskyi — prose-writer.  
Vitaliy Chyhyryn — prose-writer.  
Yevhen Shabliovskiy — critic.  
Ivan Shalia — linguist.  
Geo (Yuriy) Shkurupiy — poet, prose-writer.  
Volodymyr Shtanhey — prose-writer.  
Ivan Shevchenko — poet.  
Illia Shulha — painter.  
Mykhailo Shulha-Shulzhenko — poet (?).  
V. Shchepotiev — literary critic.  
Samiylo Shchupak — critic.  
Volodymyr Yurynets — publicist.  
Matviy Yavorskyi — historian.  
Hr. Yakovenko — prose-writer.  
Feliks Yakubovskiy — literary critic.  
Mykhailo Yalovyi (Yulian Shpol) — prose-writer.  
Volodymyr Yaroshenko — poet, fabulist.
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## ENGLISH DIPLOMATIC REPORT FROM VIENNA ON MAZEPA IN 1708

At the mention of the name Mazepa, most English-speaking people think of Byron's mythical hero bound on a horse galloping through the wilderness, rather than about a historical person. The historical Mazepa is quite different from the one depicted in literature<sup>1</sup>.

Ivan Mazepa (1639-1709) was Hetman<sup>2</sup> or Chief Executive of the autonomous Ukrainian Military Republic, known also as the Hetman State (1649-1764), first under a Polish protectorate, and from 1654 under a Russian one. At that time, protectorate status was a very common condition even for such countries as Holland under Spain, Prussia under Poland, Livonia and Estonia under Sweden, and the Balkan countries under Turkey. Although the Ukrainian Military Republic or the Hetman State was a protectorate, nevertheless, as the German historian Hans Schumann observed in his dissertation, the Hetman State had its own territory, people, specifically democratic system of government, and military forces, namely the Cossacks, so that the creator of this Ukrainian Military Republic, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, was *de facto* an independent ruler<sup>3</sup>.

It should be pointed out that the designation of the Hetman State refers to the Ukrainian Military and not the Cossack Republic, because the Cossacks were not a nation, but military forces of this Ukrainian state which lasted until 1764, when Catherine II forced the last Hetman, Cyril Rosumovsky (1750-1764), to abdicate and ultimately incorporated Ukraine into the Russian Empire.

The term "Ukrainā represents not only a geographical and linguistic, but also a political background. In the 18th, 19th, and even in the 20th century, certain Polish and especially Russian circles rejected the name "Ukraina" and

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1. For details see: H.F. Babinski, *The Mazepa legend in European Romanticism*, (New York & London, 1974).

2. "Hetman" derives from old German "Hoeftmann" or Commander-in-Chief. Hetman is approximately equivalent to the title of "Hospodar" of Moldavia or "Doge" of the Republic of Venice.

3. H. Schumann, *Der Hetmanstaat 1654-1764*, (Breslau, 1936), p. 4. (The text of this dissertation is also published in *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, (1936), Vol. I, pp. 499-548).

"Ukrainians". Instead, the Poles preferred "Ruś" and "Rusin", the Russians "Malorossiya" (Little Russia) and "Maloross" (Little Russian)<sup>4</sup>. The Ukrainians have refused these names as discriminatory. The sensitive historical consciousness of the Ukrainians defends itself even now in the Soviet Union, where folk identity is most called into question. Thus the linguistic definition of the word "Ukraina" as border area ("Okraina"), as well as the Tsarist "Malorossiya", are rejected. The name is explained in the native tongue as "Kray" (country or land) and is regarded as the symbol of the origin of the Ukrainian sense of national identity and feeling for the homeland in the 13th century<sup>5</sup>. The name "Ukraina" was mentioned for the first time in the Kyivan Chronicle for the year 1187.

When Mazepa was elected new Hetman (August 4, 1687), his prerogatives were limited by the so-called "Kolomak Terms". In general outline, the articles of Kolomak assured "rights and liberties" though they were considerably curtailed. According to these terms, the register of the Cossacks was fixed at 30,000 (instead of 60,000). Mazepa had no right to conduct diplomatic relations with foreign countries and the letters from foreign governments had to be sent to Moscow (Article VII). For "security" of his person, a Russian Infantry Regiment was stationed at his residence in the city of Baturyn (Article XVII). In the XIXth Article, intermarriage between Ukrainians and Russians was highly recommended in order to make "unity under the Tsarist Majesty"<sup>6</sup>.

Although Mazepa's prerogatives were curtailed by the Kolomak articles, he still exercised the full power of his civil and military authority and was regarded as the Chief Executive by contemporary foreign diplomats in Moscow. For example, Jean de Baluze (1648-1718), the French envoy in Moscow, visited Mazepa in 1704 at his residence in Baturyn, and made the following remark about him: ". . . from Muscovy I went to Ukraine, the country of the Cossacks, where for a few days I was the guest of Prince Mazepa, who is the supreme authority in this country"<sup>7</sup>. Another French diplomat, Foy de la Neuville, who met Mazepa, remarked that ". . . this Prince is not comely in his person, but a very knowing man, and speaks Latin in perfection. He is

4. For selected bibliography see: Andrew Gregorovich, "Ukraine, Ruś, Russia, and Muscovy", *The New Review*, Vol. X, No. 4, (1970), pp. 197-213.

5. D. I. Myshko, "Zvidky pishla nazva 'Ukraina'", *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal*, (Kyiv, 1966), Vol. X, No. 7, p. 42.

6. O. Ohloblyn, *Hetman Ivan Mazepa ta yoho doba, Zapysky Naukovoho Товариства ім. Шевченка*, (hereafter ZNTS), (New York-Toronto, 1960), pp. 31-5; D. Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian History*, ed. by O. W. Gerus (Winnipeg, 1975), pp. 315-6; N. Kostomarov, *Mazepa i mazepintsy. Polnoye Sobranye Sochineniy*, (St. Petersburg, 1905), Vol. VI, pp. 391-2.

7. Baluze's letter was discovered by Ukrainian historian, Elias Borshchak in the Bibliothèque Nationale under "Fonds Baluze", Vol. CCCLI, and was published in an Ukrainian translation as an appendix to his essay "Mazepa — liudyna i diach", *ZNTS*, Vol. CLII, (1933), pp. 28-30.

Cossack born”<sup>8</sup>. And the English envoy in Moscow, Charles Lord Whitworth (1675-1725), remarked in his report of November 21, 1708, that Mazepa in Ukraine “governed so long with little less authority than a sovereign Prince”<sup>9</sup>.

Mazepa’s contemporary, the brilliant English journalist, Daniel Defoe (1661-1731), wrote in his book about Tsar Peter I that “. . . Mazepa was not a King in Title, he was Equal to a King in Power, and every way Equal if not Superior to King Augustus in the Divided Circumstances in which his Power stood, even at the best of it”<sup>10</sup>. Indeed, Mazepa was aware of his position and “considered himself a little less than the Polish King”<sup>11</sup>. In fact, the Russian government communicated with the Hetman State through the Russian Foreign Office (“Posolskiy Prikas”) <sup>12</sup>.

Mazepa, with his good education, rich experiences, and personal charm, won not only the favour of the new Tsar Peter I, but was also highly respected by him. Otto Pleyer, the Austrian envoy in Moscow (1692-1718), in his report on February 8, 1702, remarked that “. . . Mazepa is very much respected and honoured by the Tsar”<sup>13</sup>.

Undoubtedly, Mazepa was an unusual man who is not only famous in Ukraine and in Western Europe, but also became a controversial figure in world history. The crux of the controversy centres as much upon the question of Mazepa’s character (selfishness, desire for power, revenge, Machiavellianism, etc.) as upon the question whether or not he, as the Hetman, should have remained loyal to the Tsar, or whether he should have accepted Swedish protection. Furthermore, the question is whether or not he invited the Swedish King to enter Ukraine and then failed to give him the help he had promised. The subject of this controversy became the source of extensive research and discussion. Hetman Mazepa was involved in the Great Northern War (1700-1721) from the very beginning and had been known in Western Europe a long time before.

In 1684, the Emperor Leopold I organised the “Holy Anti-Turkish

8. Foy de la Neuville, *Relation curieuse et nouvelle de Moscovie*, etc., (de la Haye, 1699); I used the English translation: *An Account of Muscovy as it was in the year 1689*, (London, 1699), p. 43.

9. Public Record Office in London, *State Papers Foreign Russia* (hereafter PRO SP), 91, Vol. 5. Whitworth’s reports were published under the title: *Donneseniya i drugiya bunagi chrezvichaynago poslannika angliyskago pri russskom dvore, Charlsa Witworta, s 1704 po 1708 i 1708 po 1711 g.*, in *Sbornik Imperatorskago Russkago Istoricheskago Obshchestva*, (hereafter Sbornik), (St. Petersburg, 1884, 1886), Vol. 39, 50.

10. D. Defoe, *An Impartial History of the Life and Actions of Peter Alexowitz. . . Czar of Muscovy*, (London, 1729), p. 208.

11. Kostomarov, *op cit.*, p. 422.

12. M. M. Bogoslovskiy, *Petr I*, (Materialy dla biografii), (Moscow, 1848), Vol. IV, pp. 320, 332.

13. Haus, Hof, u. Staatsarchiv, (hereafter HHS), Russica I-20. cf., N. Ustrialov, *Istoria tsarstvovaniya Petra Velikago*, (St. Petersburg, 1885-1863), Vol. IV, part 2, p. 655.



Alliance" to which Austria, Venice, the Papal State, Poland and Russia belonged. Thus, this war against Turkey had international character. It included the Ukrainian Cossack Forces under the command of Hetman Ivan Samoylovych, as well as the Russian Army. During the first unsuccessful campaign against the Crimea (1687), the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, Prince Vassiliy Golitsyn, in order to save his reputation at the court, persuaded the Cossacks to depose Samoylovych, accusing him of a connection with the enemy, and elected Mazepa as the new Hetman (August 4, 1687). The Western European press carried reports of Mazepa's election as the new Hetman.

The first English newspaper to mention Mazepa, was *The London Gazette* of October 6, 1687. Using information from Hamburg, dated September 30, 1687, *The London Gazette* reported that according to the news from Kyiv, Samoylovych and his son were being taken to Moscow to answer charges of treason and in the meantime Golitsyn put "the Sieur Mazepa, a Person of Great Reputation for his Valour" in charge of the Cossack forces. Mazepa's election was also reported in the London Magazine, *Modern History, or a Monthly Account of All Considerable Occurrences for December 1687*, (No. 3, p.19).

At the beginning of 1704, the Tsar, having regained the Baltic provinces, increased his aid to his ally, the Polish king, Augustus II, by sending him Russian troops and calling on Mazepa for the Cossack regiments. Consequently, Mazepa appeared in the pages of the English press and was often mentioned in such London magazines as *A General View of the World, or the Marrow History*; *The Master Mercury: being an Abstract of the Publick News*, *The Monthly Register or Memoirs of the Affairs of Europe*, and newspapers such as *The Daily Courant*, *The Flying-Post*, *The London Gazette*, *The Post-Boy*, *The Post-Man* and others.

Reports about Mazepa even reached America. One of the oldest contemporary American newspapers, New England's *The Boston News-Letter*, reporting on the Great Northern War, mentioned Mazepa several times. In the edition of January 29, 1705, *The Boston News-Letter*, copying the London semi-weekly, *The Post-Man* of August 15, 1704, reported verbatim: ". . . the Cossacks commanded by famous Mazepa, consisting of 19,000 Choice men with a Train of Artillery of 36 Pieces of Cannon have join'd King Augustus near Jaworow"<sup>14</sup>. (In fact, Mazepa did not join him, he only sent 10,000 men).

Mazepa's support of the Polish King in 1704 also aroused public interest in the Hetman in the German press. Many German newspapers reported Mazepa's military operations in 1704; just to mention a few: the Hamburg weekly, *Historische Remarques*, of July 20, 1704, No. 31, and the Leipzig

14. For details see my book: *Prince Mazepa: Hetman of Ukraine in Contemporary English Publications, 1687-1709*, (Chicago, 1967).

*Die Europaeische Fama* of 1704 published Mazepa's biography, (Vol. XXV, pp. 57-60), and in the second edition published his picture on the first page<sup>15</sup>. The Viennese newspapers, such as *Wienerisches Diarium* and the *Post-taeglicher Mercurius*, often included news of the Hetman's activities. The *Wienerisches Diarium* of February 2, 1704, for example reported about a conference between Peter I and Mazepa, when the latter presented the Tsar with an expensive sabre. The same paper of March 16, 1706, referred to Mazepa as a "Feldmarschall".

The *Post-taeglicher Mercurius* quite often deemed the Hetman newsworthy. In the edition of April 4, 1704, the *Post-taeglicher Mercurius* stated: "Moscow, February 11, . . . Yesterday His Excellency Sir Hermann [Ivan] Mazepa, General or Commander-in-Chief of the Cossacks, who are under His Tsarist Majesty, after having many conferences with His Excellency, Sir Governor Count Mainschifoff [Menshikov] and other Ministers, left for Barudin [Baturyn] in the Ukraine, in order to make preparations for an early campaign in Poland".

Mazepa's support of the Polish King aroused interest not only in the Western European Press, but also in the diplomatic, especially the English, circles. England was not directly involved in the Great Northern War, but the English government vigilantly followed the development of the war through its diplomatic corps.

The contentions and events in Russia, Poland and Ukraine, were reported not only by the already mentioned English envoy in Moscow, Charles Lord Whitworth, but also by the English resident at the Swedish Royal Headquarters, Captain James Jefferyes<sup>16</sup>, the English envoy in Poland and in the Baltic area, Dr. John Robinson<sup>17</sup>, in Vienna by Sir Philip Meadowe<sup>18</sup>, (or Medows) and others.

In 1704, Mazepa was supposed to join the Polish King. In connection with this operation, Dr. Robinson, without mentioning Mazepa by name, mentioned in his report to the Secretary of State, Hedges, from Danzig on June 7, 1704, that ". . . assurances are still given that a Body of Muscovites and Cossacks are on their march to join the King's forces"<sup>19</sup>. In his next dispatch to the Secretary of State, Harley, of August 6, 1704, Dr. Robinson reported that

". . . the letters of the 1st inst. from Warsaw say the King of

15. For details see my book: *Mazepa im Lichte der zeitgenoessischen deutschen Quellen*, ZNTS, (Munich, 1963), Vol. 174.

16. Jefferyes's reports are located in London, at P.R.O., S.P., Sweden 95, Vol. 17, and were published by R. M. Hatton under the title: "Captain James Jefferyes's letters to the Secretary of State Whitehall from the Swedish Army 1708-1709" in *Historiskit Magasin*, Vol. 35, No. 1, (1953), pp. 1-85.

17. Dr. Robinson's reports are located in P.R.O., S.P., Poland 88, Vol. 16, 17.

18. Meadowe's reports are located in P.R.O., S.P., Austria 80, Vol. 29.

19. P.R.O., S.P. 88, Vol. 16.

Poland was retir'd towards Lemberg, which place the Muscovites, said to be 16<sup>m</sup> foot, and 3<sup>m</sup> Cossack Horse had already pass'd in order to their junction with that King, who will thereupon be superiour in number to the Army the King of Sweden leads agt [against] them, altho' His Maj<sup>ty</sup> shall have drawn to Him the Troops under Genl Reenshield. Nevertheless it is still believ'd the King of Poland will, if it be possible, avoid a Battle"<sup>20</sup>.

In his report of August 29, 1704, Dr. Robinson, being more specific, wrote: ". . . the King of Poland as those letters say retires from the King of Sweden and will continue to do so till the Cossack Genl Mazepa comes up to him with his Army, which is said to mount 80 M. men"<sup>21</sup>. (In reality, Mazepa commanded 40,000 men at that time.) Dr. Robinson mentioned the Cossacks in several other reports (September 3, 10, and November 19, 1704). In his dispatch of August 19, 1705, Dr. Robinson wrote:

" . . . We are told here the King of Sweden is on his march towards Warsaw; how near the Czar is to that place is not certainly known. Letters come yesterday say the King of Poland is to come with his Army into Poland & that Genl Mazepa was advanc'd with 40 M Cossacks as farr as Lemberg & hasting to the Vistula in order to joyn the Czar or the King as shall be most practicable"<sup>22</sup>.

Whitworth also often mentioned Mazepa in his reports to London. He was quite well informed about the situation in Ukraine. In his dispatch of August 11, 1706, he remarked : ". . . Cossacks from the Don, who are subject to the Czar, routed the rebels of Astrachan last year. These are very different from the nation of Cossacks, who are under Mazepa's command"<sup>23</sup>.

Reporting on September 28, 1708, about the Swedish campaign in Russia, Whitworth commented that the Russians burned and destroyed everything on their retreat so that the Swedes "will run further into want and cold", but

"had they gone down to the Ukraine, they would have found a noble campaign, plenty of forrage, and many rich towns of the Cossacks, a free people, not so well affected to the present Government as to suffer a total desolation for its sake, the old General Mazepa having work enough to keep them stedly in their duty as it is"<sup>24</sup>.

Mazepa had a difficult task in Ukraine at that time indeed. The Tsar

20. P.R.O., S.P. 88, Vol. 16.

21. P.R.O., S.P. 88, Vol. 16.

22. P.R.O., S.P. 88, Vol. 16.

23. P.R.O., S.P. 91, Vol. 5.

24. P.R.O., S.P. 91, Vol. 5.

demanded not only combat-troops from the Hetman, but also insisted that the Cossacks build fortresses at their own expense. In return for their services, the Cossacks received little gratitude. Moreover, they received no pay, and were beaten, mistreated, and insulted in many ways<sup>25</sup>.

The Austrian envoy in Moscow, Otto Pleyer, also mentioned in his report of July 15, 1706, that "the Cossacks are very dissatisfied", because "Menshikov confiscated more than 6,000 horses from them", and "Mazepa had to complain about that. . ."<sup>26</sup>.

All of the above, led the modern English historian, L. R. Lewitter (Cambridge University), to observe in his essay "Mazepa" that "the treatment meted out to the civilian population of the Ukraine by the Russian Army, with its daily routine of plunder, arson, murder, and rape, was more reminiscent of a punitive expedition than of allied troop movement"<sup>27</sup>. In fact, the Russian behaviour was so outrageous that the Tsar himself ordered the Russian Army "to pass by modestly without doing any harm or destruction to the inhabitants of Little Russia [Ukraine] under our extreme anger and punishment by death"<sup>28</sup>.

Such conduct on the part of the Russians must have caused gloom in Mazepa's heart. In addition, rumours were spread in military circles that the Tsar intended to abolish the autonomy of Ukraine and annex it as part of the Russian Empire<sup>29</sup>. Moreover, the rumour was that the Tsar did not hide his intention of entrusting the office of Hetman to his favourite, Alexander D. Menshikov. These rumours were confirmed by a letter to Mazepa from a friend, the Countess Anna Dolska, an aunt of the Polish King Stanislaw Leszczynski. The Countess in her letter described a conversation with two Russian Generals, Sheremetyev and Renne. She wrote to the Hetman saying that when she had made a friendly remark about him, Renne said: "O Lord, have pity on that good and clever man. The poor man does not know that the Count Alexander Danilovich [Menshikov] digs a grave for him, and after he is rid of him [Mazepa], then he himself will become the Hetman of the Ukraine". Sheremetyev confirmed Renee's words<sup>30</sup>.

25. Kostomarov, *op. cit.*, pp. 476-7, 489-490, 530, 541, 551-4.

26. HHS, Russica I-20.

27. L. R. Lewitter, "Mazeppa", *History Today*, Vol. VII, No. 9, (1957), pp. 593-4.

28. *Pisma i bumagi Imperatora Petra Velikago*, (St. Petersburg-Moscow, 1887-1956), Vol. V, p. 334, ("... prokhodit skromno, nie chynia nikakikh obid i razorenia malorossiyskogo krayu zhitelam pod opaseniym zhestokogo nashego gneva i kazni").

29. Philip Johann von Strahlenberg, *Das Nord-und Oestliche Theil von Europa und Asia*. . . (Stockholm, 1730), p. 252. For details see: O. Subtelny's "Mazepa, Peter I and the Question of Treason", *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Vol. II, No. 2, (1978), pp. 158-193.

30. Kostomarov, *op. cit.*, p. 550; S. M. Sholovyev, *Istoriya Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, (St. Petersburg, 1851-1879), Vol. XV, pp. 1490-3. See also: O. Pricak, "Ivan Mazepa i kniahynia Dolska", *Pratsi Ukrainskoho Naukovoho Instytutu* (hereafter "PUNI"), (Warsaw, 1939), Vol. 47, pp. 102-117.

After the Hetman's chancellor, Philip Orlyk, finished reading Dolska's letter, Mazepa said:

"I know well what they want to do to me and all of you. They want to satisfy me with the title of Prince of the Holy Roman Empire. They want the officer corps annihilated, our cities turned over to their administration, and their governors appointed. If our people should oppose them, they would send them beyond the Volga, and the Ukraine will be settled by their people"<sup>31</sup>.

There is evidence that the Tsar authorised his envoy to the Viennese Court, a German diplomat in the Russian service, Baron Heinrich von Huysen, to request Emperor Joseph I to grant Mazepa this title. Peter von Haven (1715-1757), a Dutch scholar to whom Huyssen left his memoirs and notes (before his sudden death in 1742 on the boat returning from St. Petersburg to Germany), observed in his work about Russia that Huyssen obtained from Joseph I the title of Prince for A. Menshikov, and the title of Prince for Mazepa. The Emperor granted Mazepa the title of "Prince of the Holy Roman Empire". The grant, effective from September 1, 1707, is recorded on the last page of Mazepa's previously unpublished letter, undated but presumably written in 1707<sup>32</sup>. It should be added that Mazepa's title of Prince is also recorded in an official register under "M", Vol. XII, in the *Reichsadelsamt* in Vienna.

As to the controversial question whether Mazepa had invited Charles XII to enter Ukraine and failed to give the help expected by the Swedish King, Mazepa is blamed by some historians even today<sup>32a</sup>.

Mazepa, according to a secret alliance with the Swedish King completed either in the city of Smorgony between February 11 and March 18, 1708, or in the city of Radaszkowice between March 27 and June 17, 1708<sup>33</sup>, was supposed to deliver the fortresses in Severia, supply the Swedish Army with food, and join Charles XII on his "march directly to Moscow"<sup>34</sup>.

In fact, as an English special envoy at the Swedish King's Headquarters, Captain James Jefferyes, noted in his report of October 7, 1708, to the Secretary of State, Whitehall, as follows: "... certain it is that His Majesty has sent

31. Kostomarov, *op. cit.*, p. 550; Solovyev, *op. cit.*, p. 1491.

32. Mazepa's letter is located in the *Reichsadelsamt* of the *Haus, Hof, u. Staatsarchiv* in Vienna and was published for the first time in the appendix to my article "Mazepas Fürstentitel im Lichte seine Briefes an Kaiser Josef I." in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, Vol. XLIV, No. 3 (1962), pp. 350-356.

32a. H. von Rimscha, *Geschichte Russlands*, (Darmstadt, 1979), p. 289.

33. B. Krupnycky, "The Swedish-Ukrainian Treaties and Alliance, 1708-1709", *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. XII, No. 1 (1956), pp. 47-57.

34. G. Adlerfelt, *Histoire Militaire de Charles XII* (Amsterdam, 1740), I used the English translation (London, 1740), Vol. III, pp. 193-4.

an express with letters to Bataryn [Baturyn] that Gen:ls residence to invite him to take our party and desire winter quarters in Ukraina. . .”<sup>35</sup>.

Mazepa did not expect the Swedes to enter Ukraine, and when he learned that the Swedish King had gone into Ukraine, he angrily remarked to his chancellor, Philip Orlyk: “. . . it is the devil, who sends him here. He is going to ruin all my plans and bring in his wake the Russian troops. Now our Ukraine will be devastated and lost”<sup>36</sup>.

Mazepa's alliance with the Swedish King in 1708, when the fate of the Tsar and Russia itself seemed to hang in the question, not only provided rich material for the press, but was a sensation in diplomatic circles. For example, in his dispatch of November 10, 1708, the Prussian envoy in Moscow, Georg Johann von Kayserling devoted a great deal of attention to Mazepa's alliance with Charles XII<sup>37</sup>. The Austrian envoy Otto Pleyer in his report of November 16, 1708, also wrote at length about this event<sup>38</sup>.

English diplomats also commented on this matter. Captain James Jefferey, was one of the first diplomats, who in his report of October 28, 1708, affirmed that “tis now certain that Gen:ll Mazepa has declar'd for the Svedish party, yesterday he payd his first visit to his Maj:ty who gave him a gracious reception”<sup>39</sup>. Another English envoy, Charles Lord Whitworth, first in his report of November 21, 1708, briefly indicated that “the revolt of General Mazepa to the King of Sweden” might change the outcome of the war<sup>40</sup>. On November 28, 1708, Whitworth wrote at length and in considerable detail to the British Secretary of State, explaining why Mazepa had taken the Swedish monarch's side<sup>41</sup>.

A month later, on December 26, 1708, the English envoy in Vienna, Sir Philip Meadows also sent a relatively long report to Secretary of State, Charles Spencer III:

Vienna, December 26, 1708

. . . We have here advices from the Russian camp in Ukraina, that Count Mazepa, General of the Cossacks, was gone over to the King of Sweden, but that he had carried along with him only three colonels, and a small number of his Body; the rest having declared they would continue faithful

35. P.R.O., S.P. 95, Vol. 17; cf., Hatton, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-4.

36. Kostomarov, *op. cit.*, p. 615.

37. B. Krupnycky, “Z donezen Kayserlinga, 1708-1709 rr.,” *PUNI*, (1939) Vol. XLVII, pp. 25-27.

38. H.H.S., Russica I-20: cf. Ustrialov, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, part 2, p. 655.

39. P.R.O., S.P. 95, Vol. 17; cf., Hatton *op. cit.*, pp. 64-66.

40. P.R.O., S.P. 91, Vol. 5.

41. P.R.O., S.P. 91, Vol. 5 (The full text of this report see my book *English reports on Mazepa, 1687-1709*, New York-Munich-Toronto, 1983), pp. 152-3.

to the Czar. Some few days after the General's defection, and a train of Artillery, to Baturin, the place of General Mazeppa's Residence, whither the General had sent six thousand of his Men for the security of his Estate; but the Prince made himself master of the Town, and put all he found in it to the edge of the sword. The Muscovites have prevailed on the Cossacks to proceed to the election of a new General; and the choice is said to have fallen on one Skoropacki. The Czar had been endeavouring for some time past to procure to General Mazeppa the Dignity of a Prince of the Empire, as a recompense for his past services. Those Letters from the Russian Army say, that the King of Sweden was encamped between Starodub and Czernichow on the River Dessna; but there have been no direct advices from the Swedish Army of a long time.

I am with the greatest respect Sir,

your most faithful and obedient servant  
P. Meadows<sup>42</sup>

Last page

Sr. P. Meadows, Vienna

Dec. 26, 1708

Received — Jan. 2

Count Mazeppa, Gen. of the Cossacks goes over to the King of Sweden.

Although England did not participate in the Great Northern War, the English Government carefully observed its development through its diplomatic corps. Several diplomats had urged their government to prevent Russian occupation of Estonia and Livonia since this would "lay our nation and Navy at his [the Tsar's] discretion"<sup>43</sup>.

Concerned for preserving the balance of power in the Baltic Sea, England was not interested in the Russian victory over the Swedish King. At an audience (on May 30, 1707) given to the Russian envoy in London, A. A. Matveyev, Queen Anne asserted that England wished to maintain friendship with Russia, but that she "does not desire to make an enemy of our old, immaculate Swedish friend and powerful monarch"<sup>44</sup>.

It is to be said that in all these diplomatic reports Mazepa was conceived to

42. P.R.O., S.P. 80, Vol. 29.

43. Quoted by M. S. Anderson, *Britain's Discovery of Russia*, p. 68; cf., D. B. Horn, *Great Britain and Europe in the Eighteenth Century*, (Oxford, 1967), p. 203.

44. L. N. Nikiforov, *Russko-angliyskiye otnosheniya pri Petre I*, (Moscow, 1950), p. 54.

be a figure of considerable consequence in East European affairs during the Great Northern War. The fact that at the solemn burial of Mazepa in Bender, a representative of England with the Swedish King was present<sup>45</sup>, indicates that the English government was interested in Mazepa's activities and concerned about the future of the Hetman State.

In general, the English diplomats, such as Dr. Robinson in Danzig (Gdansk), James Jefferyes at the Swedish headquarters, Sir Philip Meadows in Vienna, and Charles Lord Whitworth in Moscow, wrote about Hetman Mazepa in their reports in an unbiased manner, merely giving facts. Especially the latter, writing his report of November 21, 1708, expressed his doubt that Mazepa, as a man of nearly seventy years of age, very rich, childless, enjoying the confidence of the Tsar, and exercising his authority like a monarch, would have joined the Swedish king for selfish or other personal reasons<sup>46</sup>.

Not only Whitworth, but also other contemporary eyewitnesses expressed their positive opinion about the alliance of Mazepa with Charles XII. The already mentioned Prussian envoy in Moscow, G. J. von Kayserling, wrote in his report of November 28, 1708, the following comments on Mazepa: ". . . There could not be a doubt that this man is loved as well as respected by his people, and that he will have great support from his nation. . . Especially the Cossacks like him very much, because the present government treats them very badly and they are robbed of their liberties. Therefore, it is rather to be believed that either all the people, or at least the bigger part of them will follow the example of their leader"<sup>47</sup>.

The German eyewitness and historian, Johann Wendel Bardili, who met Mazepa in person at the Swedish headquarters, considered him a Ukrainian patriot and hero whom even former foe, the Turkish Sultan, refused to extradite to the Tsar, in spite of the latter's insistent requests and even threats. The Sultan justified his stand because of an old law of asylum, and according to Bardili, he did not see any "reason of importance for extradition of such a person, who because of freedom, liberty, and rights of his own people endeavoured so much and suffered so many persecutions and tortures to promote the liberation of his people from the Moscovitian yoke. For this reason at first he had to ask for the Swedish and now for the Turkish Protection"<sup>48</sup>.

The Swedish eyewitness and historiographer, Gustav Adlerfelt, also pointed out that Mazepa had good reason to join the Swedish king. He, too, maintained that the Russian administration treated Ukraine badly<sup>49</sup>.

45. E. Borshak, "Early relations between England and Ukraine", *The Slavonic Review*, Vol. X, No. 28, (1931), p. 149.

46. P.R.O., S.P. 91, Vol. 5.

47. Krupnycky, "Z donesen Kayserlinga 1708 i 1709 rr.", *PUNI*, Vol. 48, p. 17.

48. J. W. Bardili, *Reisebeschreibung von Pultava durch das Desert Dzikie Pole nach Bender*, (Stuttgart, 1714), pp. 106-7.

49. Adlerfelt, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 16.



This was recognised by the Tsar's closest associate, Alexander Menshikov, who immediately understood all the political importance of Mazepa's step, when he reported to Peter I on October 17, 1708,: ". . .if he [Mazepa] did this, it was not for the sake of his person alone, but for the whole of Ukraine"<sup>50</sup>.

Finally, Hetman Mazepa was not the only one who tried to protect the rights and privileges of his country. For example, Johann Reinhold Patkul from Livonia rebelled against the Swedish King (1697); the Transylvanian Prince Ference Rakoczy II led an uprising against the Habsburgs (1703-1711); Stanislaw Leszczynski, representing the republican traditions of Poland, aided by the Swedes, fought against the autocratically minded Polish King Augustus II; Demetrius Kantemir, Hospodar of Moldavia, a vassal of the Porte, aided by the Tsar, rebelled against the Sultan (1711). Yet none of them were branded as a "traitor", but Mazepa was<sup>51</sup>. The Russian historian of German descent, Alexander Brueckner, not only justified Mazepa's policy, but even regarded it as a masterpiece ("ein meisterstueck") and his attempt to liberate Ukraine as an heroic act"<sup>52</sup> ("ein heroischer Akt").

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50. *Pisma i bumagi imperatora Petra Velikago*, Vol. VIII, Part 2, pp. 864-865, ("...ponezhe kogda on seye uchynil, to ne dla odnoy svozey osoby, no i vsey rady Ukrainy. . .").

51. O. Subtelny, *The Mazepists*, (New York, 1981), p. 10.

52. A. Brueckner, *Peter der Grosse. Onckens Allgemeine Geschichte*, (Berlin, 1879), Vol. VI, p. 405.

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## THE USSR BETWEEN 1945-1975: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC STUDY (Conclusion)

### (B) Soviet International Relations

We have already commented on the fact that World War II was the catalyst that plunged the Soviet Union into the international arena as a major world power. Its appearance was as sudden as its change from extremely isolationist policies prior to the war, to a foreign policy with global implications afterwards.

Before considering specific areas of Soviet interest, an overall historical view of the issue is in line. Thus, Richard Rosser's *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), provides an excellent summary examining the bases of Soviet foreign policy within the framework of its roots, its relation to Marxism-Leninism and its tactics. Aside from an historical account from 1917 on, the author dwells on the Cold War (1946-1953), "the interregnum" (1953-1957), "the coexistence offensive" (1958-1964), and "globalism" (1965- on), touching upon such problems as the Sino-Soviet dispute, Vietnam, détente, the Third World, and so on. However, the work that is considered a milestone in this field is Adam Ulam's *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967* (New York: Praeger, 1968). In its coverage of Soviet diplomacy up to the Six Day War (1967), the most important and controversial portion of the book concerns the key issue of the Cold War. The author's analysis comforts "neither hardliners blaming it on Western concessions, nor revisionists blaming it on Western threats and hard line". Ulam sees it as an inevitable outcome of internal causes on both sides: basic differences in the Soviet and Western (especially the U.S.) systems resulted in unreconcilable differences in the psychology of their diplomacy. This is an outstanding and systematic analysis of the internal causes of East-West conflict.

Another book that is meant to be read in conjunction with historical and analytical accounts of Soviet Russian foreign policy (the two books discussed above) is *The International Situation and Soviet Foreign Policy* edited by Myron Rush (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1970), which consists of key reports by Soviet leaders (Lenin, Stalin, Krushchev, Brezhnev, and others) from the Revolution to the present. The documentation gives their perception of major developments and their influence on subsequent events. Brief com-

ments introducing each report provide the background of the events as well as an analysis and interpretation of the significance of each particular report. This anthology can be supplemented by Leonid Brezhnev's *On the Policy of the Soviet Union and the International Situation* (prepared by Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1st ed.; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973), which is a book that contains his major policy statements. Brezhnev outlines the Soviet position on both domestic and international affairs — arms control, trade, etc. The book gives Moscow's "official view" of world affairs. Although such works are designed primarily for disinformation and propaganda purposes, they do provide useful insights into Moscow's global strategy.

After World War II, Europe became divided into two spheres of influence — Soviet Russian and Western. As a result of the war and post war negotiations, a number of countries of Central and Eastern Europe were forced into what has become known as the Soviet Bloc. There has always been little harmony within the Bloc despite Soviet Russian claims to the contrary (anti-Soviet upheavals in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, etc., bear witness to this). This complicated issue of USSR-Soviet Bloc relations is incisively and methodically treated in Zbigniew Brzezinski's book *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967). While his treatment of the subject is chronological, it is also essentially analytical with a great respect for facts. This makes the book rich in reliable information and insights.

Another key work on the subject, but which encompasses European countries on either side of the Iron Curtain, is Thomas W. Wolfe's *Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1970). This study, which is detailed and well documented, deals with the post-war period under Stalin, the Krushchev era, and the Brezhnev period. The book, being a balanced appraisal of the evolution of Soviet Russian policy towards both halves of a divided Europe, seeks also to view the USSR's European policy in the framework of Soviet domestic developments and global interests, with particular attention paid to the changing Soviet-American strategic balance of power. At the end of each chapter, the author gives both points of view on a given issue — the Soviet Russian and the Western.

Turning away from the European scene, let us consider the deteriorated situation in the Far East, known as the Sino-Soviet conflict. The implications of the split between the two most powerful Communist powers has brought about crucial changes in international relations, spheres of influence, and balance of power. What we have now is three super-powers — the U.S., the USSR, and China — whose interests either meet or clash in various key areas of the world (Vietnam, Middle East, Latin America, etc.). A pioneer book that has already attained the status of a classic in the field of the Sino-Soviet dispute is Donald S. Zagoria's *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961* Prince-

subject. The material contained in these publications falls basically into two groups: source material; and scholarly studies, articles and essays.

Since the Soviet press is government controlled, it provides an invaluable source of information on the most recent changes and developments in the Soviet Russian system within and its policies without. For the benefit of Western scholars and readers *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Joint Committee on Slavic Studies, 1949-) provides on a weekly basis an English-language selection of the content of the Soviet press, carefully translated or objectively condensed.

For current trends and background material on ideology, industry and agriculture, domestic and foreign policy, culture and religion, we can refer to *Studies on the Soviet Union* (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1961-). Emphasis is placed on developments in the Union Republics and other non-Russian areas of the USSR.

Widening the scope, we have two influential publications. On the one hand, *Problems of Communism* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Information Agency, 1952-), which provides scholarly analyses and significant background information on various aspects (political, economic, cultural) of the communist countries and world communism today. On the other hand, the material in *Foreign affairs* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1921-) deals with questions of contemporary international interest. Its contributors — scholars, statesmen, prominent journalists — cover a broad range of subjects, not only political, but also historical and economic.

A number of other journals tend to cover more extensively topics in the cultural, social and economic fields besides the general political one. Among them *The Slavonic and East European Studies* (London: School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, 1922-) is devoted primarily to the history, institutions, political and economic conditions, literature and the arts, and philology of all Slavic nations, and to a lesser degree to their neighbours. *Survey*, a journal of East and West Studies (London: International Association for Cultural Freedom, 1956-) which began as a publication devoted mainly to factual information from Soviet sources about literature, arts, and sciences in the USSR, and about Soviet attitudes towards the outside world, gradually extended its coverage of issues related to international relations, communism in general, and other subjects.

Primarily concerned with sociological, economic and legal issues in the USSR we have *Soviet Studies* (London: Pub. by Blackwell for the Department for the Study of the Social and Economic Institutions in the USSR, University of Glasgow, 1949-). This journal studies the functioning and development of society under Soviet conditions, thus filling the gap in the social sciences in that particular area.

*The American Review of Soviet and Eastern European Foreign Trade* (New York: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1965-) is a specialised journal

which publishes translations of articles from Soviet and East European publications, original articles, and information and statistics on current developments in Soviet and East European foreign trade.

Up to a certain point the *Central Asian Review* (Oxford: Central Asian Research Centre, 1953-) can be considered a major source in that it aims at giving a balanced and objective assessment of Soviet writings on social, political and cultural development in Central Asia, and adjacent countries. Since most journals tend to concentrate on material covering primarily in the European part of the USSR, this specialised publication helps in filling the vacuum regarding the peoples of Central Asia — an area which has rather been neglected for a long time by Western scholarship.

Finally, two additional publications concerned with source material should be mentioned: the *USSR and Third World* (London: Central Asian Research Centre, 1970-1971-), and *Soviet Periodical Abstracts: Asia, Africa, Latin America* (New York: Slavic Languages Research Institute, 1961-). Both publications have substantially the same aim, that is, to give an idea of the Soviet view of political, economic and social developments in the countries located in those areas, and to survey Soviet relations with those countries. There is, however, a difference in the type of material that these journals are concerned with. Thus *USSR and Third World* consists of brief Soviet media reports on the subject; and *Soviet Periodical Abstracts* publishes summaries of articles, essays, etc., which strictly reflect the views of the original Soviet author.

## Conclusion

In this survey of material pertaining to the subject of the USSR since 1945, we have covered sixteen bibliographic works, and a total of sixty-three items with the following breakdown: thirty-five items covering Soviet internal affairs (including several works for basic reference); seventeen for international relations; and eleven journals and periodicals. It is considered that a more extensive coverage of the various aspects of the Soviet Union in itself (internal affairs) was necessary because of its complexity, and because its external image and activity vis-à-vis the rest of the world is directly dependent on its internal make-up.

We live in a fast-moving world in which values, policies, and socio-political systems change, old structures disappear and new ones emerge — all of which affects information, political and social analysis, history writing, etc., making it useless or outdated practically overnight. Some of the material that we have included here has already fallen into that category. Some, but not all of it, for we have taken special care to select the type of material that has a good chance to withstand the onslaught of change.

Due to radically new developments, the decade of 1975-85 warrants a thorough update and a separate bibliographic commentary.

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## ***News from Ukraine***

### **ANATOLIY MARCHENKO DIES IN CHISTOPOL PRISON**

Anatoliy Marchenko, who spent many years in Soviet Russian prisons and camps, died in Chistopol prison on December 8, 1986, aged 48.

Marchenko, a worker, was born on 23.1.1938 in the village of Barbinsk, Western Siberia, and is the author of *My Testimony*, published in Britain in 1969.

He was arrested on 17.3.1981 for writing a book *From Tarusa to Chuna*, samvydav articles *Live like everybody*, *The third has been given* and others, and various open letters. His trial was held on 2-4.9.1981, during which he was sentenced to 10 years of strict regime imprisonment and 5 years of exile. He was previously imprisoned in 1960-1966; 1969-1971; and 1975-1979.

Marchenko suffered from polyneuritis with short-term paralysis, chronic bilateral otitis (after-effects of meningitis suffered during imprisonment), deafness, chronic gastritis and arthritis.

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*Roman SOLCHANYK*

### **HERALD: NEW SAMVYDAV JOURNAL FROM UKRAINE REACHES THE WEST**

A new samvydav journal circulated by Ukrainian Catholics in Western Ukraine has made its appearance in the West. Titled *The Ukrainian Catholic Herald* (Ukrainskyi katolytskyi vistnyk), the first issue consists of approximately 20 typewritten pages and is scheduled to be issued on a bi-monthly basis. The journal is undated, but it appears to have been compiled in mid-April 1984.

*The Herald* resembles, both in format and style, *The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine* (Khronika Katolytskoyi Tserkvy na Ukraini), ten issues of which have recently surfaced in the West. Unlike the *Chronicle*, however, the *Herald* is not identified as an organ of the Initiative Group to Defend the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine, which was formed in 1982.

Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that the new publication has its origins in the same circle of activist Ukrainian Catholics centred in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR. The *Herald* appears to be largely the work of Josyp Terelya, the first chairman of the Initiative Group and the present head of the Central Committee of Ukrainian Catholics. Mr. Terelya was arrested in December 1982, shortly after the formation of the Initiative Group, and on April 12, 1983, he was tried and sentenced to a term of one year in a strict-regime camp. His release followed on December 26, 1983.

Apart from the various short reports concerning searches, arrests, trials and other forms of repression of Uniate priests and believers, including non-Catholics, the premiere issue of the *Herald* contains several items by Mr. Terelya which were written at various times.

The first is an article dating from March 1976, titled "Schism and its consequences", which is a critique of the servility of the Russian Orthodox Church vis-à-vis the state both in the tsarist and Soviet periods. Mr. Terelya cites the July 1927 statement by Metropolitan Sergey and eight Orthodox bishops acknowledging the legality of the Soviet regime and promising to subordinate the Church in its decrees. According to the author, the price that the Russian Orthodox Church was forced to pay for its "legal" existence was to support the authorities "in suppressing Christianity on the territory of the USSR".

Mr. Terelya's purpose is to show that Christianity and communism are incompatible and can not exist:

"Communists are the personification of evil and falsehood. They try to put evil and falsehood into practice. It is their all. So, whoever is with them can not be with Christ. 'One can not serve two masters'. The aim of Communists is to completely destroy all religious life".

The second article, undated and anonymous, is titled "Why do they want to destroy our rights?", and focuses not only on Ukrainian Catholic rituals, but also on national folklore, customs, traditions and the Ukrainian language. The article serves as an introduction to a discussion of the authorities' hostility to such national and religious traditions as Christmas carolling, noting that in January 1984, 240 druzhynnyky, 10 officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and three KGB officers were sent to the village of Dovhe in Transcarpathia to prevent local inhabitants practicing such "survivals of the past".

Perhaps the most interesting section of the *Herald* is Mr. Terelya's thoughts on the current status of the Ukrainian nation and the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the USSR and prospects for the future, which are voiced in the form of an interview titled "Ten Answers to Ten Questions". The interview is not dated and the "interviewer" is not identified, although in one instance a question is posed by the Ukrainian journal *Suchasnist*, which is published in the West. Responding to the question why he has chosen an open form of

protest against the regime's policies in support of the legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Mr. Terelya answers that "open, legal protest gives the nation the right orientation, and also helps to better understand what we must do today, tomorrow".

Later, he deals with the issue of the legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church:

"Sometimes I think, do we need this legalisation? Under conditions of continual terror against Christians, is it not better to remain underground. Repressions against the Church only add to its strength, the Church is enlivened and has the strength to resist, to struggle. It does not grow weak. And having given us 'freedom', the KGB would destroy everything that is alive in our Church, because there is not and never has been any kind of democracy in the USSR. After my last term [in camp], specifically for legalisation of the Church, I have become an ardent opponent precisely of legalisation. Every trial of a Catholic is a defeat for the regime and a victory for us. In future, we will prepare such trials against the government's will. And the Church will be free to function when Ukraine becomes an independent state".

It should be noted that in his statement to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine announcing the formation of the Initiative Group, Mr. Terelya stated: "We have one aim — legalisation!". However in a discussion with Party and government representatives from Kyiv that took place on April 23 and 24, 1984, Mr. Terelya made it clear that he was opposed to the legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church if it meant breaking with the Vatican and placing the Church at the disposal of the regime. Clearly, it is legalisation under imposed conditions to which Mr. Terelya refers in the interview and to which he has declared his opposition.

In other parts of the interview, Mr. Terelya discusses what he sees as a critical situation in the USSR brought about by the authorities themselves and resulting in further repression of Christians. He also refers to "the chauvinistic policies of Moscow" directed against the Ukrainians, which took the form of mass deportations to Siberia, Kazakhstan and the Far East; forced collectivisation of the peasantry; and forced conversion of Catholics to Orthodoxy.

According to Mr. Terelya:

"... if you love your nation, speak your native language, then you are a nationalist! Our youth has been robbed of its native language and its history! Officially, Ukraine is the Ukrainian SSR, that is, an independent state, but there are no customs borders between the Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSR; the Ukrainian Soviet Republic does not have its own currency, its own state language, and even being a citizen of the Ukrainian SSR is a crime, you are a nationalist. There is only one conclusion — to be a Ukrainian is a crime".

The way out of this situation, argues Mr. Terelya, is for Ukrainians to

undertake "creative work" more resolutely and struggle against those who are opposed to a political, national and economic rebirth of the Ukrainian nation. Finally, the interview includes an interesting detail about the death of Mr. Terelya's brother, Borys, in a shoot-out with the authorities on June 10, 1982. Previous accounts of the incident had led to the conclusion that Borys Terelya was killed in an exchange of gunfire with militia and KGB forces. According to the interview, he had run out of ammunition and committed suicide rather than be taken alive by the KGB.

The *Herald* also has a short article written by Mr. Terelya in 1970 called "Marx and Slavdom", which is critical of Marx's avowed negative attitude towards Slavs in general and specifically Ukrainians, Croats and Czechs. Mr. Terelya writes that Marx also showed himself to be "a confirmed assimilator and anti-Semite". There is the text of a second letter from Mr. Terelya to the Director-General of UNESCO, Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, which was written early in 1984. It refers to linguistic discrimination against Ukrainians in the USSR, and solicits Mr. M'Bow's aid for the publication of a Ukrainian-language edition of the journal *UNESCO Courier* and the establishment of an ethnographic-historical journal called *Boykivshchyna* in Transcarpathia. These requests had also been made in a previous letter to Mr. M'Bow. The *Herald* concludes with several poems written by Mr. Terelya in the late 1960s and early 1970s, including one dedicated to Vasyl Makukh, a Ukrainian teacher who set himself on fire in Kyiv in November 1968 in protest against Russification policies in Ukraine.

*The Ukrainian Catholic Herald*, like its companion journal *the Chronicle*, attests to the vitality of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, particularly in the Western regions of Ukraine, in spite of almost 40 years of systematic persecution and official "non-existence". The appearance of both samvydav journals comes at a time when the unresolved issue of Ukrainian Catholics in the USSR is assuming greater urgency both in Moscow and in the Vatican. Western observers have speculated that the plight of the Ukrainian Catholics may have been discussed by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko and the pope during their meeting.

The latest indication that Moscow is disturbed by the Vatican's support for Ukrainian Catholics was revealed in the interview with Metropolitan Filaret in the Italian Communist daily *L'Unita*. Although omitting any explicit mention of Ukraine, Metropolitan Filaret stated that the Vatican's intentions with regard to "the 'Uniate' communities" did not favour the deepening of the Catholic-Orthodox dialogue.

In the meantime, the authorities have arrested Vasyl Kobryn, Mr. Terelya's successor as chairman of the Initiative Group, thereby serving notice that there will be no compromise with the activists in the Ukrainian underground Church.

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## THE UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC HERALD

### Number 1

#### ***Christ is Born!***

Dear brothers and sisters!

Another year has passed in captivity. I am, however, grateful to God that I once again see the familiar kind faces of friends, family, my young children, and my loving wife.

We are created for this earth to praise God and achieve eternal happiness: the Glory of God is the goal of every human being on our immoral earth. For this reason, I wish to remind you to do good and to beware of evil. In these times of hardship for our Church, we must work continuously, for the door will open, but only for those who knock. In the words of St. Paul, "Everyone who wants to live a godly life in Union with Christ Jesus will be persecuted" (2, Timothy, 3, 12).

A Christian's life consists of agony and the crucifix, especially if he wishes to follow the Holy Book. It is written: "I am sending you out just like sheep to a pack of wolves" (Matthew, 10, 16). Remember, the Lord never disappoints those who put their trust in Him.

***Christ is born!***  
***He is indeed born!***

(Greetings from the chairman of the Central Committee of Ukrainian Catholics and member of the Initiative Group to Defend the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine, J. Tere-ly).

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### SCHISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The role of the Church is fighting against evil. Such a goal is supernatural, as it consists of saving souls and bringing them to redemption; doing what is good. However, if someone "sincerely" renounces Christ, he withdraws from the Church of Christ, and enters the Babylonian (Devil's) Church. By this deed, he associates himself with lies.

Communists are the personification of evil and falsehood. They try to put evil and falsehood into practice. It is their all. So, whoever is with them cannot be with Christ. "One cannot serve two masters".

The aim of communists is to completely destroy all religious life. In order

to reach this goal, they persecute the clergy and all those who believe, through assassination, starvation in prisons and camps, and deportation to far off Siberia.

Consequently, those who very "sincerely" wish to serve the Bolsheviks can never be religious or Christian; they must, therefore, abdicate from Christ.

The victory of Satan over the Church and people in the Russian empire was largely due to its Church. The Russian Orthodox Church itself, taking the schismatic teachings of Photius and Cerularius as its basis, entred into sin; it became schismatic. True, the Russian Church kept the form of Christianity, but it has lost its Christian content.

The form was always supported by the authorities — be they tsarist or imperialist. This support was always suppositious though, because under the guise of Christianity, the authorities were free to enforce their unchristian intentions. Thus, they used the schism in religion to achieve their own goals. The relationship between the schism and the authorities was often one of interdependency, because, as the authorities used it for their own benefit, similarly, the schism needed the authorities to survive.

Clear indications of such processes are events which occurred after the communist upheaval of the Russian Orthodox Church. These events should also serve as precautions to people of good will. For ten years, the Church fought Bolshevism, but in the end it bowed before the belligerent atheists, as once Photius did before Bardas, or the schism before the Russian Tsars.

On August 19, 1927, the Russian Orthodox Patriarch, Metropolitan Sergey, together with eight bishops issued an epistle which was published in the Bolshevik press — in *Izvestia* itself! It is a fact, that for the first time, an organ of the Communist government published an epistle of a member of the Christian hierarchy. Obviously, the Bolsheviks sought some sort of gain from this situation, as they see everything in terms of their own profit only.

The Russian Church leaders wrote: "We recognise Soviet authority as normal and lawful, and will obey its ordinance(s) fully and sincerely". Further, they state that "a contingency for Christians does not exist", and that "a regime of monarchy is a transitory phenomenon".

As is evident, the epistle is inconclusive, as well as inconsistent — it lacks depth of thought, clarity and deduction. Firstly, if no contingencies exist for a Christian, how then can a monarchy be a transitory phenomenon for him? Secondly, the leaders of the Church write that they seek peaceful, "legal" existence. This consequently means that the Orthodox Church decided, on the part of all people, that it would lay all of their lives on the line.

Beginning in 1927, and up to the present time, the so-called Russian Orthodox Church has served as a faithful right hand of the authorities in suppressing Christianity on the territory of the USSR.

From 1917 to 1936 alone the Bolsheviks annihilated

— 28 bishops and archbishops

- 6,778 priests
- 6,484 teachers
- 8,000 doctors
- 51,850 senior government officials
- 250,420 junior officials
- 11,488,520 peasants and workers, excluding victims of two famines in Ukraine.

Can a Christian consciously accept the authority of criminals only because they hold power?

14.3.1976

J. Terelya

\* \* \*

### WHY DO THEY WANT TO DESTROY OUR RITES?

*Our ballad, our song  
Will not die, won't perish,  
That's where, my friends,  
Lies our glory,  
Glory of Ukraine!*  
Taras Shevchenko, *To Osnovnyanenko*  
(St. Petersburg, 1839)

Ukraine and Ukrainians are enduring the consequences of occupation which has been destroying and paralysing our lives for sixty years now. Among the civilised nations of the contemporary world, Ukraine is among the few nations that have preserved their own ancient culture in its maiden form, up to the present day. By comparison, Japan is the only nation which has preserved its ancient culture to an even greater measure than Ukraine. Ukrainian national dress, our embroidery, wood carvings, dishes and tapestry are so beautiful that they are marvelled at on world markets by collectors and visitors alike. Those who study our language, our contemporary Church rites, and particularly our songs and ancient customs, find it difficult to imagine how we preserved all this in its original form and beauty, particularly since Ukraine is surrounded by communist contempt and ruin.

To my deepest regrets however, there are great numbers of Ukrainians serving the occupants, who themselves destroy the very things that constituted the nation's livelihood for over 1,000 years.

For examples of such destruction, one need not look far — Christmas 1984! An event occurred in my village that roused the whole district. Long before Christmas, meetings of local communists took place, in which the main theme was the "fight" against religious events, or in more concrete terms, on the State level: preventing people from carolling. To the village of Dovhe alone, 240 troops, ten officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) from Irshava, and three KGB officers from Uzhhorod were dispatched.

Consequences: two patients suffering from tuberculosis were brutally attacked at the village council meeting; Ivan Kopolivets, a father of young children and a worker at a local timber yard, was forced to the ground, tied up and taken to the "Fakel" rest home where he was brutally beaten and then driven to the police station at Irshava.

Kopolivets was imprisoned, his family left without a husband, father and provider. His only crime was carolling, but local converts went out of their way to serve the occupants against their own people. This is not surprising however, given the fact that the head of the village council, A.J. Nod' was, in his time, a member of the fascist organisation "The Levents", who went to the front for a month (the war ended), trying to save himself from the communists. Thereafter, Nod' gradually wriggled his way into the communist party and began to work faithfully for the new masters. One would wonder how fascists continue to govern in freedom and the "competent organs" are unaware. Or are they? In the Khust district alone, more than 25 officers of the SS, who were never persecuted, occupy high level state posts.

We must remember that the occupant who manages to destroy national culture can consider himself victorious. For this reason, as of late, such brutal religious repression throughout Ukraine has been the main goal of the communist authorities.

The trial of I. Kopolivets took place in the city of Irshava: Zaychenko was chairing, and Braila was prosecuting. Kopolivets, a Ukrainian, was convicted, for practicing an ancient rite, to two years of "Chemistry". He belongs to the Orthodox Church.

In the village of Dovhe, the following Ukrainian Catholics gave up their passports:

Polania Batyo  
Mykhailo Trykur  
Maria Trykur  
Anna Trykur  
Maria Bondar  
Iryna Bysmak  
Maria Bysmak

As a sign of protest against the persecution of our Church, the head of the Central Committee of Ukrainian Catholics, J. Terelya, burnt his passport before hundreds of his supporters.

On Christmas eve, January 6, during carolling in the village of Lysycheve of the Irshava district, police, together with the regional authorities were beaten up by the villagers, who then overturned their vehicles, throwing them into nearby ditches. This occurred because of a planned police raid to prevent the people of the village from celebrating Christmas. The authorities "overlooked" this incident in their reports.

On March 18, a Catholic priest Fr. Stefaniy Hryhorovych was arrested



along with his daughter Katrusia. They gave up their passports to the communists.

On March 9, Fr. A. Potochniak was transported from a camp hospital to a prison hospital. This is the ailing priest's third operation. He is 72 years old.

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## TEN ANSWERS TO TEN QUESTIONS

### Question:

Mr. Terelya, please tell us, why did you choose the route of open protest against the existing orders of the regime for legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church (UCC)?

### Answer:

How can I put this? I'll say one thing: in our time, there exists a great enemy of mankind — disorientation. The seeds of disunification and disorientation were implanted from the time the communists of Russia took power — they systematically and persistently destroyed the foundation of our culture and our evolution so that Ukrainians would never represent a threat for them to deal with. Open, legal protest gives the nation the right orientation, and also helps to better understand what we must do today, tomorrow.

### Question:

Josyp Mykhailovych, can you comment on the strengthening of repressions in the USSR?

### Answer:

To understand a system it is not enough to sit and watch — that is superficial. The situation in the state is critical, in the sense that it was fostered by the state officials in conjunction with the KGB. Everything was premeditated in its consecutive order. The consequences of the Helsinki agreement frightened the rulers of the USSR because there was a demand for carrying out the signed agreement. They found another way out — shooting down a passenger airliner and repressions against Christians. Strengthening of the repressions against Christians is a drop in the ocean of crimes against the peaceful citizens of the USSR. Tension is created, which benefits only those who seek its benefits. The myth of war which President Reagan is allegedly planning only takes attention away from the silent undeclared war that the Soviet government waged against its own people. . . after only a year's rule of Andropov's clique, concentration camps doubled in number.

### Suchasnist:

In your opinion, what caused the downfall of religion in Ukraine after World War II?

### Answer:

First of all, it was the mere results of the war. Ukrainians found themselves in a paradox: on the one hand, the enormous loss of life left us drained of all

our blood; Stalin's government, on the other hand, had its hands freed by the allied nations and their memorandum of April 22, 1944.

Secondly, it was the chauvinistic policies of Moscow. After the war, forced deportation of Ukrainians to Siberia, Kazakhstan and the Far East were carried out. Ukrainians were being torn apart and destroyed by the forced collectivisation of farms, which left even the holiest conscience of thousands of people bruised and outraged. The roots of all contact with their native land were being cut for Ukrainians. We were systematically torn apart and liquidated by forced Orthodoxy — we were and still are, being forced to believe in the gods they themselves do not believe in. Almost all the ties between the Ukrainian population and the intelligentsia were destroyed — if you love your nation, speak your native language, then you are a nationalist! Our youth has been robbed of its native language and history! Officially, Ukraine is the Ukrainian SSR, that is, an independent state, but there are no customs borders between the Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSR; the Ukrainian Soviet Republic does not have its own currency, its own state language, and even being a citizen of the Ukrainian SSR is a crime, you are a nationalist. There is only one conclusion — to be a Ukrainian is a crime.

**Question:**

Are there any guarantees that you won't suffer further repression, and a possibility that the Ukrainian Catholic Church would ever be able to function freely and independently?

**Answer:**

There aren't any guarantees. I am a potential "convict" of the Soviet concentration camps. Moscow's governing authorities are afraid of only one thing — publicity. And I openly protest against the occupants. As far as the Church is concerned, the problems are not hopeless. Sometimes I think, do we need this legalisation? Under conditions of continual terror against Christians, is it not better to remain underground. Repressions against the Church only add to its strength, the Church is enlivened and has the strength to struggle. It does not grow weak. And having given us "freedom", the KGB would destroy everything that is alive in our Church, because there is not and never has been any kind of democracy in the USSR. After my last term [in camp], specifically for legalisation of the Church, I have become an ardent opponent precisely of legalisation. Every trial of a Catholic is a defeat for the regime and a victory for us. In the future, we will prepare such trials against the government's will. And the Church will be free to function when Ukraine becomes an independent state.

**Question:**

What can you tell us about the death of your brother Borys-Mykhailo; was it not the cause of your arrest?

**Answer:**

My brother died on June 10, 1982, in the village of Polyana. He was a member of an armed faction of conscious nationalists who fight for freedom.

It is the right of every Ukrainian to fight for his freedom by the method he chooses. We did not ask for Russian occupation, therefore it is our right to fight on our soil however we choose. In my opinion, every Ukrainian has the right to carry on a political and social life of his choice. As a Christian, I condemn terror, but my brother was not a terrorist — he defended his own life against terrorism. Borys Mykhailo Terelya sent 16 years in communist torture chambers. The communists implanted malice in him, and killed off all his hope. . . he made his own choice. Borys shot himself with the last bullet in his pistol, so that the KGB would not take him alive.

**Question:**

What is your ultimate goal, or, in other words, what is your “credo”?

**Answer:**

I want Ukraine to be an independent state, so that it would be able to take its rightful place among the cultured nations of the world, and so that in the future, we would look to Christ for our freedom and unification.

**Question:**

What is needed to reach this goal?

**Answer:**

As Ukrainians, we should undertake “creative work” more resolutely and struggle against any enemy that tries to stifle the political, national, and economic rebirth of our people. Our enemy is anyone who does not want our country’s freedom, who wants to keep our country as a slave in bondage.

**Question:**

Repressions against Christians, and especially against the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Ukraine have increased; what is the reason for this?

**Answer:**

In Ukraine, repression has never ceased. It is only that in the last decade the West received more information about this, which in turn slowed the pace of the belligerent atheists. However, it did not stop their terror and injustice. We will all be destroyed if we do not accept their doctrine, but there is a hope that Christians of the West will not be intimidated by communist lies. The communists try to frighten the West by a new war, one which they fear themselves, because if this war breaks out, it will be their last. . .

Not only was our Church taken from us, but also Christ was hidden from us to keep the people silent, disfranchised, and consequently denationalised. Faith is the mother of Knowledge, and, therefore, we must endure and conquer. A nation which has suffered so much in the last 60 years and remained faithful to Christ has a right to a better future.

**Question:**

Is there a possibility that the authorities will give you and your family permission to visit the West?

**Answer:**

Never. I am an eternal convict of the communists.

## MARX AND SLAVDOM

Marx had the first opportunity to voice his views on the questions of nationalism in 1843, when in his article *The Jewish Question*, he entered into controversy with Bruno Bauer, involving political emancipation for German Jews. In this article, Marx clearly showed himself to be a confirmed assimilator and anti-semitic.

"If a society succeeds to wipe out the empirical essence of Judaism, that is, trade with everything that calls for it, — the Jew will cease to exist, because his self-knowledge will have no infrastructure". As one can see, Marx makes his stand here as a German nationalist, and though a Jew himself, obviously denationalised himself in Germany's favour. . .

After his long controversy with Bakunin, Marx directed his anger against Slavs, particularly those Slavs who populated the Austrian Empire. A congress of Slavs took place in Prague on September 12, 1848, where Bakunin made his stand on Slavic rebirth with the slogan "fight for life, not for death". Marx paraphrased this slogan to propagate the complete annihilation of Slavs. Throughout his life, Marx dealt with people for whom a question of nationalism did not exist, as it did not for him. After Czechoslovakian Prague ceased to support a revolution in Vienna, Marx's hatred was transferred towards Ukrainians, Croats and Czechs. The measure of Marx's hatred for Ukrainian and Croatian independence movements is clearly visible in this statement: "wouldn't it be nice if Croats and Czechs created a vanguard of European Democracy, and if the ambassador of the Siberian republic turned over his official papers in Paris?"

The course of history seems to serve as evidence of Marx's mistakes. Marx built his *Communist Manifesto* on these grounds, and from here took his stand against Slavdom; however, this did not mean that he would not, in time, change his mind about Ukrainians, Czechs, and Croats.

Communists summon Marx for and in everything. One must give them credit, however, because they do not sway a fraction from their prophet's dogma. Here is what Marx said and wrote in the newspaper he himself edited: "we now know where the enemies of the revolution have accumulated — in Russia, and in the Slavic lands of Austria. And, thus, their vague clichés of democratic freedom will never deter us from dealing with these nations as we would with an enemy".

There is no doubt that the prophet of "wordly bliss" for the proletariat of all nations had Ukraine and Ukrainians in mind. But let us read further: ". . . we must fight not for life, but to the death with the Slavic nations who betray the Revolution, and to beset on them, in the interest of the Revolution, terror and total annihilation". As is evident, the "feeding hand" of the proletariat had no diplomacy towards its enemy, wishing on the latter total annihilation and terrorism. According to Marx, Ukrainians, Czechs and

Croats would have to denationalise themselves in Hungary's favour because the latter defended us against the Turks and Tatars in the 15th century! In this way, Marx the historian disposed of fates of three nations, in the benefit of his taste and opinion. He prophesied the same fate for the Dutch, the Swiss, and Norwegians. . . : "all Slavs, with the exception of the Poles, Russians, and perhaps Turkish Slavs, lack the necessary historic, geographic, political and economic conditions for political independence, not to mention mere existence".

I believe commentary is unnecessary.

*J. Terelya, 1970.*

\* \* \*

## ARRESTS

On January 15, Ilko Ulyhanenets', a Ukrainian Catholic from the village of Tybava of the Svalyava district in the Transcarpathian region was arrested. During a search, the following items were confiscated:

- a) a catechism, dated 1908.
- b) a Bible, published during the times of the inter-war Czech State,
- c) hand-written prayers: "For the people of Ukraine", "Novena to St. Joseph", and "Prayer for all needs".

All of his life savings (110 rubles) were also confiscated. The motive for this, in the words of Col. Rybak was: the arrested was suspected of sending money to prisoners of conscience, in which case the money served anti-Soviet interests.

I. Ulyhanenets' is a poor man, and in no way comes close to Col. Rybak's standards — the latter owns a Volga, lives in a building paid for by the police, and has a "healthy" bank account, or two. . . I. Ulyhanenets' was one of the Catholics who burnt his Soviet passport.

\* \* \*

Considering that Ukrainian Catholics can spend time in Soviet prisons and camps for their convictions alone, 520 of them still burnt their Soviet passports in protest against forced citizenship.

\* \* \*

2,349 Catholics gathered for a joint prayer to honour the return of J. Terelya, head of their movement, from a Moscow camp. After Mass, J. Terelya gave a brief address on the fate of Catholics in the USSR. A ceremonial burning of passports followed.

\* \* \*

The same day, prayers also took place for the well-being of Elena Sannikova, a Russian Christian.

110 widows of the Ukrainian Catholic Church took a vow to carry out a 90-day vigil and Novena prayers to St. Theresa for the well-being of our sister E. Sannikova who, at this time, is being punished in a KGB prison.

\* \* \*

A meeting took place between the executive committee of the Ukrainian National Front (UNF) and the active members of the "Rumanian Group for National Rebirth".

One topic discussed at this meeting: the illegal occupation of Moldavia and Bessarabia by Soviet Russia. A joint declaration stipulated methods for the fight to annex primordial Rumanian territory with the motherland. The UNF declared that helping our Rumanian brothers in their fight for unification is the sacred duty of every Ukrainian. Ukraine will never agree to the annexation of Rumanian territory by Soviet Russian occupants. The joint declaration was sent to the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR, K. Chernenko.

\* \* \*

Ivan Smetana, a Ukrainian Catholic, was arrested and later convicted to a two-year term in a concentration camp. He was officially sentenced for violating Article 214 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, which is in itself vague. This is the fifth term for I. Smetana, who gave up his passport and other documents to the authorities. He is an active member of the underground Ukrainian Catholic Church. His address is: village of Salashi, Yavoriv district, Lviv region.

\* \* \*

Heorhiy Postulati, a native of the Chernivtsi region, was arrested and convicted to a three-year camp term. H. Postulati is a Jehovah's Witness. He was taken to Lviv strict-regime labour camp VL-315/30, where he is still being held today.

\* \* \*

In the village of Vytvytsia, district of Dolyna, 73 year old Anton Protsiuk was arrested for circulating Church literature. This is his third term for the same offence. His last term was five years of hard labour camps. He is sen-

tenced this time to one and a half years of hard labour. A. Protsiuk is an Orthodox.

\* \* \*

After provocation by the KGB, Fedir Plaksun, an Orthodox and native of Ivano-Frankivsk region, Nadvirnia district, was arrested. His term — five years of hard labour. F. Plaksun is a member of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Send him your prayers, for he is innocent and forced to suffer for God's Truth.

\* \* \*

Fr. Andriy (Anatoliy Shchur), a monk of the Pochayiv monastery, was once again arrested.

In November 1983, Fr. Andriy was released from camp VL-315/30 where he was serving a term. Fr. Andriy was officially convicted for violating Article 214 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, but unofficially, for sympathising with the True Orthodox Church.

\* \* \*

### TO THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF UNESCO AMADOU-MAHTAR M'BOW

Exactly two years have passed since I wrote a letter to you, which was full of anger and despair. I have now been out of prison for three months. In this letter, I shall address a pressing problem which needs your attention.

We, Ukrainians, a nation of 50 million people, have been robbed of the most elementary necessity — our word. It strikes me as being odd that the *UNESCO Courier* is not published in the Ukrainian language. I remember your words, Mr. M'Bow, that in order to mobilise social thought and individual conscious perception of the world, mankind must unite on the basis of "intellect and the moral solidarity of mankind".

The words are fine, but they do not apply to us. . . Before the onslaught of the Russians, Transcarpathian Ukraine had 15 publications, today — none remain!

Therefore, I turn to you, on behalf of the conscious strata of Ukrainians, as well as myself, to seek the help in the following:

- a) to publish the *UNESCO Courier* in Ukrainian; and
- b) for the authorities to allow the publishing of an ethnographic-historical journal *Boykivshchyna* in Transcarpathian Ukraine, under the auspices of UNESCO. The journal *Boykivshchyna* is forbidden from publishing political

propaganda of any sort. In the event that the Soviet authorities disallow publishing this periodical in Transcarpathia, we are asking to be allowed to publish it, under the auspices of UNESCO, in Paris.

Head of the Central Committee of Ukrainian Catholics,  
*Josyp Terelya.*

January 16, 1984.

\* \* \*

### JOSYP TERELYA

J. Terelya, a Ukrainian poet and political activist, has endured 20 years of torture in communist prisons and concentration camps. He is the founder and first chairman of the Initiative Group to Defend the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine. J. Terelya wrote the story *On the threshold of the heart*. The following is a selection of his poems, including "The Third of November".

\*

#### Makukh\*

The masses, roaring and raging with ecstasy.  
The platform, crying symphonies of lies.  
Contagions, cling to one another —  
its a demonstration, flowing down the Holovnaya. . .

The crowd roars.

The slogans — white on red  
are flahsing at me, enraging my mind.  
Roars are ringing from the speakers,  
bursting the feeble minds. . .

Vasyl forced his way to the platform. . .  
"Where are you going?" they hissed at his back  
And suddenly,  
                    as if the earth shook —  
a fire, like the red demon,

discharged into the sky, and droned.  
The slogans, boring and barbaric stopped dead in their track. . .

---

\* Vasyl E. Makukh, born about 1918, was a teacher from the Dnipropetrovsk region and a prisoner of Stalin's concentration camps. After writing against Russification, he committed suicide on the Khreshchatyk boulevard in Kyiv, on November 5, 1968.



Before Khreshchatyk a life was suffocating —  
a human being, burning at the stake. . .

And once again, the crowd drifts over trodden scorn.  
Red slogans, on a mortal shroud.  
From loudspeakers, a nauseating “hurrah!”  
thunders ecstatically down the Central street.

1969

### **Auto-da-fé**

Auto-da-fé! — my mind is dormant. . .  
Only dust remains from scalded  
thoughts. . .  
Who consciously would dare  
to disturb unruffled calm?!  
The bells of time toll:  
tolerance plunges painfully into the fire,  
The conception — a man,  
rupturing abasement's spine.

1971.

### **The Third of November**

The days are dragging by. . .  
It is not my first time behind bars.  
Shulha, my warden, spits obscenities into my eyes. . .  
Such is not forbidden.  
And the “mentor”, such a big man. . .

My satiation has consumed me,  
I'm crushed against the bars.  
So, long 'til freedom.  
For now, it's: who gets whom!  
My tormentor's eyes  
flash nearby. . .

Such pettiness!

We are condemned.

A convict's anthropology.  
For three hundredth time, smothered,  
their hands are bloodied.  
I'm not buying!

I am completely ragged!  
 They, buyers of stinking stench. . .  
 In misery  
     I am acquainted with the System  
 without diplomas  
                     or any notes. . .  
 Taught for eternity!  
 But moreso by the first. . .  
 I live a wasted life.  
 "May they bathe in blood!  
 May they  
     never live to see old age!  
 May they all perish  
 in a trice!" —

These were the words of anger that I spoke  
 When the chief made a mask of my face. . .  
 In one stroke. . .

\* \* \*

They stood in a circle.  
 There were nine. . .  
 One carelessly whispered,  
 that I had not collapsed. . .

You filth! . . . Lie down!  
 Bandera!  
     Son of a bitch! — they all beat me deliberately.  
 Shameless shadows leaped  
                     on the bars,  
 My cries stifled  
     in sweaty palms,  
 my eyes cried out:  
     eat!  
     feast on my flesh. . .  
 Once again, in Red captivity —  
 no one around. Just filth and garbage.  
 I have an urge to speak  
     the words of Pluzhnyk:  
 "Vladimir Lenin!  
 Your Leninist work is being fulfilled!"  
 And with taste,  
     and the blood of a convict  
                     to spit  
 upon Soviet "modernisation"

\* \* \*

The beating stopped. They lit up a cigarette.  
Slowly, greedily, they sipped the parasite whisky. . .  
Confirming fully  
the idea of pigmies, of evil descent.  
They urinated from atop. . .  
Oh fate!

                  how bitter you can be. . .  
Someone shouts: "take his legs!"  
and kicks me in the ribs. . .  
I screamed in pain. . .  
For the rest, no strength remained. . .  
They dragged me somewhere —  
  left,  
  then right  
wiping filth and dust.

This begs an end.  
Who wants a bloody poem?  
As for their state of order,  
I certainly won't write anymore. . .  
Not true!

                  No one will silence me.  
I will scream to the sun, to the stars!  
I will lead my withered fate  
to the mountains inclined.

1966

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### Documents and Reports

## NEW DOCUMENT FROM UKRAINE

*A new document from Ukraine has recently appeared in the West. Dated 1985, the document, **A Ukrainian's Appeal to his Afghan Brother**, expresses praise and admiration for the persistence and courage of the Afghan people in their relentless 7-year struggle against Soviet Russian occupation, and their love for their country, and for freedom.*

*Calling the Ukrainian and Afghan peoples brothers, through their struggle against a common enemy, the Appeal expresses solidarity with the Afghans, and pledges the support of the Ukrainian people in their struggle for independence.*

*The author holds a firm belief that, inspite of much blood-letting and great sacrifice, Afghanistan will be the turning point of the Soviet Russian expansionist drive, which will lead to the collapse of Moscow's imperial system.*

*But the author reminds the Mujahideen that when they venture across Ukrainians among the Soviet soldiers to remember that "they have been sent to Afghanistan against their will. . .".*

*The document ends in the belief that the time will come when the Kremlin leaders will pay for their crimes in Ukraine and Afghanistan. When they are punished, "the world will sigh with relief because the crime was not left unpunished, and the millions of victims of Russian terror will finally be able to rest in peace in known and unknown graves".*

\*

### A UKRAINIAN'S APPEAL TO HIS AFGHAN BROTHER

Our countries — Ukraine and Afghanistan — are divided by thousands of kilometres. In past history, our peoples had nothing in common, yet today we are brothers. We became real brothers, not through the blood of a father or mother, but spiritual brothers on account of the blood we have both shed in the fight against our common enemy — Russian imperialism, which holds our freedom-loving nations captive.

Ukraine fell victim to insidious Moscow more than three centuries ago.

Since then, the new Kremlin tsars, just as the tsars of old, plunder our homeland, torture and destroy our people, our culture, turning Ukraine into one of their colonies and the Ukrainian people into their serfs, or else by Russifying them, turn them into traitors — Russian henchmen.

You, Afghans, have been leading a heroic struggle for over six years now, against the Russian occupants, who cunningly seized your beloved Afghanistan. Your persistent courage in this uneven struggle is amazing, and we bow our heads before the love you possess for your beloved country and for freedom. Be assured that you are not alone in your holy war — we, Ukrainians, are with you — just as, throughout the course of our whole history, we were always with those who defended their freedom, for the Ukrainian people never subjugated anyone. When, in the last century, the Russian tsars were subjugating your Muslim brothers from the Caucasus, with fire and sword, our great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko, fearlessly stood in their defence and in his famous poem *The Caucasus*, he wrote:

“Mountains beyond mountains, crags in stormclouds cloaked,  
Wild heights sown with sorrow, soil that blood has soaked”.

And at the time when nobody believed in the victory of the proud Caucasian fighters, and the most prominent Russian poet, Aleksander Pushkin, wrote: “Submit Caucasus — Yermolov (tsarist general and bloodthirsty conqueror of the Caucasus) is coming!”, the Ukrainian poetic genius and bard [Shevchenko] daringly and passionately exclaimed:

“And Glory to you, dark-blue mountains,  
Frost and snow protect you;  
And to you, great hearted heroes,  
God does not forget you.  
Battle on — and win your battle,  
God himself will aid you;  
At your side fight truth and glory,  
Right and holy freedom!”

With these words, Shevchenko not only appealed to the courageous fighters-Djiguits [Caucasian horsemen], but to all those who defend their own country from aggressors, and fight for their freedom.

For his open stance against the enslavers, and for his firm resistance to Moscow, Shevchenko spent ten years in exile far beyond the Ural mountains and the Caspian Sea, where he lived among your own Muslim brothers, befriended them, and depicted them with great love in his paintings. If Shevchenko were alive today, he would without doubt stand up in defence of your righteous war. Therefore, we, his descendants, with every right, appeal to you with his prophetic words filled with hope:

“Battle on — and win your battle!”

Glorious Mujahideen fighters! Today the whole world is watching your heroic and self-sacrificing struggle against a merciless enemy, armed to the teeth, — an enemy, which is conducting a dirty war against your freedom-loving nation. Unfortunately, however, the world perceives all this quite inactively, with unseeing eyes, still unable to fully understand that you are shedding your warm filial blood, not only for your beloved Afghanistan, but also for the freedom and future of its own descendants. For along the path of the insatiable Russian imperialists lay, among others, the proud Caucasian peoples, then our green Carpathian mountains, and now your beloved mountains. If no one were to stand in the way of this Russian covetousness, just as you have done, then Russian imperialism would spread as far as the Alps, the Pyrenees, the Cordilleras, and the Andes. This insatiable Russian dragon consistently requires new victims, fresh blood, until the day it dies.

However, we, Ukrainians, firmly believe that the nations of the world will recover their sight and that victory will be yours. The last hour of the Russian empire has struck, for God removed the last remaining sense from the Kremlin leaders when they attacked your land, so that it would become the bone which will stick across the ravenous throat and foul-smelling mouth of the Russian vampire, which will choke and perish. It appears that it is the will of great Allah that you should be the ones to inflict this deadly wound, from which its rabid blood will flow, and which will be the cause of its ignoble perdition. And although you will have to make a great sacrifice for this by paying with the lives of many of your faithful sons — national avengers — all the nations of the world will show their children the place where your holy, blood-stained mountains are to be found, and will teach them to pray fervently for you. And for centuries people will go on pilgrimages to your country to fall on their knees in respect and prayer, and bow their heads over the graves of the noble fighters, who fell for their beloved country and holy freedom.

The Russian conquerors are now mercilessly plundering your country: they are ruining your agricultural system and burning your crops to the ground; they are destroying your settlements and looting your property; they openly terrorise the peaceful population and mutilate your children; and resort to undisguised genocide of the Afghan people. The Russians acted in the same way in Ukraine. In 1932-1933 alone, Moscow exterminated over six million Ukrainian peasants by an agricultural famine. And how many more were killed in battle with foreign collonists, executed, or deported from Ukraine. After the Second World War, a heroic unparalleled struggle of the glorious Ukrainian Insurgent Army was led against the Russian occupants. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians were arrested, whole Ukrainian villages were deported to Siberia, the land was burnt. The best sons of Ukraine — the bloom of our nation — took up arms in order to defend the independence of

their beloved homeland. Yet, the shameless enemy labels these Ukrainian freedom fighters as “bandits”, just as it now calls your courageous national avengers — the Mujahideen — “bandits”. The Russian occupants have centuries of experience in such abusive lies: in the past, they called our glorious Haydamaky thieves and robbers. In his work *The Cold Ravine*, Taras Shevchenko uses these lying Russian words as a counterattack:

“The Haydamaky were no warriors,  
Thieves they were and robbers”.

And replies to such slander:

“Thou liest, people starver:  
For freedom and the holy truth  
A robber does not rise up”.

And throws in the enemy’s face:

“It is you that are the robbers,  
You the insatiate!”

Yet in those post-war 1940s and 1950s, it was very difficult for us, Ukrainians, to fight against Moscow. We were left completely to ourselves in this struggle with the overwhelming forces of the enemy, inasmuch as, after the defeat of Nazi Germany, the nations of the world were blinded and deceived by false Soviet propaganda and naively believed the Kremlin vultures, who pretended to be innocent doves, cooing about peace on earth and peaceful co-existence among nations. Meanwhile, they were preparing a noose around the neck of the free world.

And only now, by what is happening in your country, the world will come to understand with full insight their [the Russians’] ravenous interior and criminal nature. You have pulled off the lamb’s mask from their faces, and the whole world has now seen Moscow’s lupine smirk in this infamous war against a free people, which has never threatened anyone and whose only “fault” has been the immense love for its beloved country and ancestral faith.

The Ukrainian people express their solidarity with the freedom-loving Afghan people in their liberation struggle. We, Ukrainians, will help you fight our common enemy with all possible means at our disposal. But if you, Afghan partisans, ever come across any young sons of Ukraine among the soldiers of the Soviet occupational army, then remember that they have been sent to Afghanistan against their will, and the Ukrainian nation bemoans their fate, just as Taras Shevchenko bemoaned the death of his beloved Yakiv de Balmen, who perished in the Caucasus mountains while marching with the tsarist Russian army against the Circassians:

“And they drove you there, Yakiv, to die as a stranger,  
My friend, my one friend! Not for our Ukraine,

But for her hangman they have made you shed your blood,  
— Not black blood, but good; and you drank your reward  
From a Muscovite chalice of Muscovite poison!"

The innocent blood, which both our people have shed, is falling on the heads of the Kremlin autocrats, but these criminals will be rightfully punished. The time will come when the Kremlin tyrants will stand trial by the free nations for all the grievances they have caused to peoples; for all the mothers' tears; for all the orphaned children's cries; for the trampled honour of girls; for the destruction of human fates; for the burnt down villages and ruined towns; for the wounds, the torture and death of our fighters. This trial will go down in history as the Moscow trial. And when the enemy is led onto the scaffold, the world will sigh with relief because the crime was not left unpunished, and the millions of victims of Russian terror will finally be able to rest in peace in known and unknown graves.

1985

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## THE "CAMPAIGN FREEDOM" ABN CONFERENCE

Toronto  
November 20-22, 1986

The Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN) in Canada hosted the 1986 Campaign Freedom Conference from Thursday, November 20 to Saturday November 22, at the downtown Holiday Inn, Toronto. Over 20 subjugated nations were represented by national delegations at the three-day conference.

The Conference theme was "National Liberation as an Alternative to a Nuclear War". The goal of the Conference was to focus the attention of the West on those nations subjugated under Soviet Russian domination struggling to achieve national independence. It is these nations which hold the key to lasting peace in the world, if they are supported in their national liberation struggles.

The opening and closing ceremonies were conducted by Orest Steciw, President of ABN-Canada. Among the topics addressed by the speakers were: "Terrorism in the Free World — The Soviet Connection"; "Soviet Active Measures Against the West — Forgeries and Other Aspects of Disinformation"; "The Subjugated Nations, a Key Issue in World Politics"; "The Soviet Manipulation of the West's Peace Movement"; and "Communist Subversion in Central America". One of the sessions was devoted to "National Insurgencies in Countries Under Soviet Russian and Communist Domination" and focused on the struggles presently taking place in Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan, Mozambique and South East Asia.

Among the guest speakers who addressed the Conference were: Slava Stetsko (ABN President), Colonel Brian Macdonald (Director, Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies), Mr. Bertil Häggman (European Freedom Council), Mr. Dolf Dröge (Accuracy in Media), Eric Margolis (Foreign Affairs Specialist, *The Toronto Sun*), Herbert Romerstein (U.S. Information Agency), Maurice Tugwell (Past Director, Centre for Conflict Studies), Mario Calero (Nicaraguan Democratic Force), Dr. Artur Vilankulu (Friends of Mozambique Foundation), Stephen Oleskiw (Ukrainian Central Information Service), Yonas Deressa (Ethiopian Refugees Education and Relief Foundation), Mr. John Kolasky, and Mr. Habib Mayar (Afghan Community in America). Professor W. Zarycky and A. Bedriy focused on Ukraine as the country which organised ABN over 40 years ago and today continues to be a leading force in the liberation struggles of the subjugated nations. Today, the ABN provides a vehicle for all the subjugated nations for bringing their plight to the public.

The Conference was supported by 15 national organisations and among its

patrons were the Hon. David Crombie (Secretary of State and Minister for Multiculturalism), Toronto Mayor Arthur C. Eggleton, Metro Chairman C. Dennis Flynn, numerous religious leaders and politicians from all levels of government.

During the Conference tribute was paid to the late Hon. Yaroslav Stetsko with an ABN Medal of Freedom in Gold. ABN Medals of Distinction were also awarded to Mr. Yuri Shymko M.P.P., Congressman Jack Kemp and Mr. Bertil Häggman. Mr. Shymko hosted a well attended reception at Queens Park for the delegates of the Conference.

The Metro Council sponsored a luncheon with an address by Alex Chumak. The Conference culminated in the Campaign Freedom Dinner on Saturday Evening attended by 800 guests, during which greetings from Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and President Ronald Reagan were read, along with addresses by various parliamentarians. Over 250 delegates participated in the Conference, along with some 100 observers and media representatives.

\*

### RESOLUTIONS OF THE "CAMPAIGN FREEDOM" ABN CONFERENCE

**WHEREAS**, the Soviet Union with its satellites is the evil empire of the 20th century where from Cuba to Vietnam, from Hungary to Angola, the sun never sets on the zone of Soviet Russian control and although the era of world imperialism is over — the world is faced with a new, far more dangerous and complex, form of imperialism, a mixture of Tsarism, Russian messianism and Marxist communism with colonial appendages and overtones; and

**WHEREAS**, this unprecedented rise to power has been paved by millions of human victims sacrificed to secure the hegemony over free and independent nations; and

**WHEREAS**, the blatant disregard by the Soviet Russians of international covenants, declarations and United Nations Charters contributes to the constant tensions and conflicts between East and West and gives little hope that this long-established trend the Russians pursue will change; and

**WHEREAS**, the intensified Russification, ethnocide and repression of the citizens of the various subjugated nations, who lawfully engage in calling the Soviet Russian government to account for violations of national and human rights, rights to free religious exercise as well as rights of family reunification; and

**WHEREAS**, the recent tragedy of the nuclear holocaust at Chornobyl once again demonstrated Russia's disregard for basic safeguards which created a

mega disaster in Ukraine with a huge nuclear fallout to neighbouring lands; and

**WHEREAS**, millions of people around the world who lost their freedom and independence as a direct result of various ill advised or nefarious international agreements where the free governments of the West acquiesced the enslavement of entire nations and thus handed them over to the Soviet Russian totalitarian system; and

**WHEREAS**, these subjugated nations continue to resist Soviet Russian domination by periodic guerilla wars such as the UPA in Ukraine (1942-55), in Poznan and Budapest in 1956, in Prague in 1968 and in Poland with the Solidarity movement; and

**WHEREAS**, millions of people around the world who lost their freedom and independence as a direct result of various ill advised or nefarious international agreements where the free governments of the West acquiesced the enslavement of entire nations and thus handed them over to the Soviet Russian totalitarian system; and

**WHEREAS**, these subjugated nations continue to resist Soviet Russian domination by periodic guerilla wars such as the UPA in Ukraine (1942-55), in Poznan and Budapest in 1956, in Prague in 1968 and in Poland with the Solidarity movement; and

**WHEREAS**, Public Law 86/90 reaffirms the United States' solidarity with the aspirations of the Captive Nations in the USSR and the so-called satellite states by calling upon the free nations to support the rightful claims to sovereignty and independence of those nations suffering under the yoke of Russian domination; and

**WHEREAS**, it behooves the governments of the free world to boldly reject all those agreements that inadvertently created the untenable situation where these peoples are subjected to the captivity of Soviet Russian despotism through the stroke of a pen at conference tables; and

**WHEREAS**, the nations in the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN) call upon the governments of the United States, Canada and other democracies to repudiate the spheres of influence and proclaim the right to national independence within the framework that will guarantee lasting and just peace; and

**WHEREAS**, the sovereign rights of self-government shall be restored to the Captive Nations in accordance with the solemn pledge of the Atlantic Charter and the primary principles of freedom enunciated in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These rights can be guaranteed only in a free society regulated by open elections within the framework of a constitutional government; and

**WHEREAS**, the representatives united in the ABN are waging various forms of resistance and form a cohesive, viable front against Soviet Russian avarice, by forging a united phalanx in an ongoing process of enlightening conferences lobbyings, lectures, publishings and public awareness programmes which have earned ABN a rightful place of leadership among defenders of freedom and independence; and

**WHEREAS**, a full scale revitalisation of the USIA, the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Radio Marti is urgently needed, a revision of language programming is a must as freedom's cause cannot hope to gain by beaming programmes in the language of a chauvinist oppressor. By focusing on the chief vulnerability of our adversary — the Russian Empire — one can easily prognosticate that it would lead to the prevention of a nuclear war rather than provoke it; and

**WHEREAS**, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is the pivotal defence mechanism the free world can count on, we fully support President Reagan in his quest to safeguard this defensive network as a guarantee of a survival strategy.

**NOW, THEREFORE, WE, ASSEMBLED** here in Toronto at the ABN International Conference entitled "Campaign Freedom" appeal to and call upon the people and governments of the free world to use their mandate as free people in an effective call to implement their obligation to secure freedom and sovereignty to the enslaved nations of the world, thereby assuring the survival of civilisation. The passion of freedom is on the rise and tapping this new spirit is the noblest and most ambitious task free peoples must embrace.

\*

## **GREETINGS FROM PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN**

**The White House, Washington  
November 17, 1986**

I am delighted to send warm greetings to those gathered for the 1986 International Conference of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations.

We are all aware of the many nations that are the victims of totalitarian ideologies, ruthless regimes, and occupying armies. These are the nations held captive by forces hostile to freedom, independence, and national self-determination. For those who seek freedom, security, and peace, we are the custodians of their dream.

Our nation will continue to speak out for the freedom of those denied the benefits of liberty. So long as brave people suffer persecution because of

their national origin, religious beliefs, and desire for liberty and democracy, the United States will demand the signatories of the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Accords to live up to their obligations under international law.

I applaud your efforts on behalf of those under totalitarianism and I assure you that the American people share your dream of international liberty and justice. Nancy joins me in sending you the best wishes for continued success. God bless you.

*Ronald Reagan*

\*

### **GREETINGS FROM BRIAN MULRONEY, PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA**

I am delighted to extend my warmest greetings and sincere best wishes to all those attending the 1986 International Campaign Freedom Conference.

I am sure you will agree with me that human rights and fundamental freedoms are the foundations of any civilized and caring society. It remains the belief of this Government that adherence to internationally accepted human rights is an important factor in the development of better understanding and in the creation of confidence in our bilateral relations.

I can assure you that members of the international community are under no illusions as to the seriousness with which my Government regards respect for human and civil rights. We will continue to monitor with grave concern the treatment of those who are continually being denied their political, cultural and religious freedoms.

On behalf of the Government of Canada, may I wish you all the very best for productive discussions.

*Brian Mulroney*

**Ottawa 1986**

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*Scenes from the "Campaign Freedom" Conference Toronto, November 20-22, 1986.*

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## ROME BULLETIN DETAILS CATHOLIC PERSECUTION

(UNIS) The Lviv Archdiocese of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, temporarily based in Rome, has reported several instances of increased persecution and harassment of Ukrainian Catholic priests and human rights activists in Western Ukraine.

According to *Visti z Rymu* (News from Rome), published by the Lviv Archdiocese Ukrainian Press Service (UPS), the families of political prisoners in the Kuchino 36-1 prison camp have turned to the International Red Cross seeking attention to the “catastrophic” situation faced by a large number of the camp’s political prisoners. The UPS reported that a significant number of political prisoners seem to be suffering from heart diseases.

The November issue of *News from Rome* has reported the following:

- Due to the continued harassment of the Ukrainian Catholic faithful, priests this summer have been forced to hold religious services in the woods of the Galician and Transcarpathian regions of Western Ukraine. An estimated 300 faithful have attended these clandestine services.
  - Two Ukrainian Catholic priests in the Ivano-Frankivsk region were forced to change jobs five times in 1986. Harassment by the KGB has resulted in the inability of the priests to perform their religious duties.
  - In September 1986, a priest in the Ivano-Frankivsk region had his church artifacts confiscated by the KGB.
  - A Basilian Monastery Church in Chervonohrad, built during the 18th century, has been turned into an atheistic museum. In the middle of the church was placed a statue with a plaque on which was inscribed: “Honour the individual and not God”.
  - Prisoner of conscience Oksana Popovych, now completing a five-year term of internal exile following an eight-year prison sentence, is being forced to perform hard labour. Ms Popovych, a 60-year old invalid, has been consistently harassed by Soviet officials. Her mail from Germany and Austria has not been reaching her, and she has not been allowed to routinely visit her 93-year old ailing mother.
  - Mykhailo Horyn, sentenced to ten years of hard labour and five years of internal exile, is in poor health.
-

## **CATHOLIC PERSECUTION IN UKRAINE HIGHLIGHTED BY PRESIDENT**

(UNIS) In his remarks and proclamation for international Human Rights Day, President Reagan mentioned the persecution of Ukrainian Catholics as an example of the Soviet Union's violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948.

At a White House ceremony, the President paid tribute to former prisoners of conscience now residing in the United States. Prominently mentioned were Yuriy Orlov and Natan Shcharansky. Former Ukrainian prisoners of conscience Nina Strokata and Nadia Svitlychna were among those human rights activists seated in the audience.

During the President's remarks, special mention was made of the late Anatoliy Marchenko, who had died in vain in a Soviet Russian prison as a result of a four-month hunger strike. The President stated that "Marchenko and so many others have not died in vain.

Ambassador Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, pointed out that, contrary to newspaper reports which stated that Mr. Marchenko was the first to die in prison, several prominent prisoners of conscience have died in Soviet Russian prisons within the last several months due to medical neglect.

The large Ukrainian-American contingent present at the White House ceremony were pleased with the President's statement on Ukrainian Catholics. The latest State Department report on compliance with the Helsinki Accords stated that persecution of Ukrainian Catholics continues unabated.

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## **HUMAN RIGHTS DAY, BILL OF RIGHTS DAY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS WEEK, 1986**

**By the President of the United States of America**

### **A PROCLAMATION**

On December 15, 1791, our young Nation celebrated the ratification of the Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the Constitution of the United States, which gave legal form to the great principles our Founding Fathers had set forth in the Declaration of Independence less than a generation earlier. As we celebrate that occasion some 195 years later, it is well to recall those principles, which endure today as they have for nearly two centuries.



They endure because they rest on a simple but profound truth, that each of us is created with equal moral dignity, that every individual is endowed by nature and nature's God with inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. On this foundation of individual rights and self-government our Founding Fathers created a great Nation, setting it on the course of liberty that continues to this day.

As we look around the world, however, we see a very different history. Some nations, to be sure, have followed a course similar to our own and today enjoy the liberty that we Americans have long cherished. But others have never known genuine liberty, while still others, especially in our own century, have lost the liberty they once enjoyed.

Thirty-eight years ago, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. Yet many of the governments that voted for that Declaration are flagrantly ignoring the principles they affirmed on that momentous occasion. The Soviet Union continues its repression of Catholics in Lithuania and Ukraine, and of other religious activists. Hundreds of thousands of Jews are still being denied the right to emigrate, while Soviet armies, for the seventh year now, have brutally repressed the people of Afghanistan. In Berlin, the world marked the 25th year of a wall built not to protect people but to keep them in their place. In Poland, workers will sadly mark the fifth anniversary of martial law and will mourn those who suffered for their defence of human rights.

Unfortunately, no continent has been spared the pain of human rights violations. In South Africa the manifest of injustices of the apartheid system of racial discrimination persist. Refugees continue to flow from the communist nations of Southeast Asia. And the world is listening increasingly to the tragic stories of those who have suffered so long in the Cuban gulags just 90 miles from our shores — and in the emerging gulags of Nicaragua.

Yet despite this reign of repression, there is reason for hope. In our own hemisphere in this decade the movement has been toward freedom, not toward repression, as country after country has brought into being the institutions of democracy.

The defence of human rights is a humanitarian concern, and a practical one as well. Peace and respect for human rights are inseparable. History demonstrates that there can be no genuine peace without respect for human rights, that governments that do not respect the rights of their own citizens are a threat to their neighbours as well.

**Now, therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America,** by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, do hereby proclaim December 10, 1986, as Human Rights Day and December 15, 1986, as Bill of Rights Day, and I call upon all Americans to observe the week beginning December 8, 1986, as Human Rights Week.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this tenth day of December, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and eleventh.

*Ronald Reagan*

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### **U.N. RAPPORTEUR INFORMED ON RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN UKRAINE**

(UNIS) The destruction and forced liquidation of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches in Ukraine, as well as instances of religious persecution and harassment of Ukrainian believers, were highlighted at a breakfast meeting held in Washington, D.C. with Dr. Angelo Robiero, the U.N.'s rapporteur for religious intolerance.

Dr. Angelo Robiero, former chairman of the Portuguese delegation to the United Nation's Human Rights Commission to examine, report and recommend remedies in situations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. Dr. Robiero's first report is scheduled to be released in February 1987 with specific recommendations to the U.N. Human Rights Commission.

Robiero was updated on the current status of Catholic persecution in Ukraine's western regions as well as the Ukrainian diaspora's preparations for the Millennium of Christianity of Rus-Ukraine. The special rapporteur was also presented with a series of booklets from the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and copies of previously passed Congressional legislation on the destruction of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches.

Robiero, who was scantily informed about current events in Ukraine, said there was very little hope for vast changes in the Soviet Union with respect to religious persecution. He was acutely aware of the historic situation with the Ukrainian and Lithuanian Catholic Churches, and summarily knew that these two groups posed a severe problem to the Kremlin due to the intertwined relationship between religion and nationalism within these two subjugated nations.

The Special Rapporteur completed a ten-day visit to the United States at the invitation of the Ad Hoc Committee for Religious Liberty. The Ad Hoc Committee is comprised of several ethnic and religious groups in the U.S., including: Freedom House, Institute on Religion and Democracy, the Anti-

Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the Ethics and Public Policy Center, the American Jewish Committee, the Providence Association of Ukrainian Catholics and the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America.

The Rapporteur's meeting with Ukrainians was sponsored by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and the Providence Association of Ukrainian Catholics.

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## **MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN ON UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY**

**White House, 21 January, 1987, 6 p.m.**

It gives me great pleasure to extend to the Ukrainian Americans and the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America my hearty greetings as you gather to commemorate the 69th anniversary of the proclamation of the independence of Ukraine.

As you call to mind the joyful day of independence seven decades ago and celebrate the freedom accorded in a democratic society, we are mindful of those behind the iron curtain who continue to be harassed and persecuted for their religious and political convictions. The campaign against the defenders of the Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox Churches proceeds relentlessly. The imprisonment of Josyp Terelya, Vasyl Kobryn, Lev Lukyanenko, and the forced internal exile of Yuriy Shukhevych are tragic examples of the lengthy imprisonment and harsh treatment accorded to Ukrainians who espouse freedom and national self-determination.

The continued Russification of Ukraine and the increased destruction of historic and cultural institutions underscore the Soviet regime's contemptuous policy of neo-colonialism.

During this time of testing and trial of your beloved nation we continue to look to the future with hope and trust that with God's help Ukraine will once again know the joy of freedom and independence.

Shchasty Vam Bozhe.

*Ronald Wilson Reagan*

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**Book Reviews****THE HARVEST OF SORROW: Soviet Collectivization  
and the Terror Famine**

*By Robert Conquest (Hutchinson: £16.95), 1986*

Genocide is a word often loosely applied, but in its fullest legal sense there are less crimes in this century to justify its use. The worst example, everyone believes, was Hitler's extermination of the Jews (and other races) in the Holocaust. Yet everyone is wrong. Stalin's destruction of the people of Ukraine, as a deliberate policy in the early 1930s, was an even greater crime against humanity. And in caring so very much more about the former, indeed in not even wanting to know the facts about the latter, we ourselves, ordinary people, our political leaders, the press, the Church, compound the felony.

The immediate heirs of those who committed these crimes in Ukraine over fifty years ago are the present rulers of the Kremlin. That so little of what they did has entered the consciousness of humanity is a massive triumph of communist propaganda and deforms the view of so many who accept the legitimacy of the Soviet Union as a political system. "Disinformation (to use the Soviet term) has been endemic ever since Walter Duranty, of the *New York Times*, and others compromised themselves at the time of the events. "The scandal", Robert Conquest writes on p. 321, "is not that they justified the Soviet actions, but that they refused to hear about them, that they were not prepared to face the evidence". Mr. Duranty's successors are with us today, not least among church leaders in democratic societies. Mr. Conquest's magisterial volume presents, signs and seals the evidence about the worst crime of the 20th C., the murder of 14 million people, over twice the number who perished in the Holocaust. He writes superbly and imposes supreme order upon the chaos of subject matter which often upset him so much that he "hardly felt able to proceed".

*Harvest of Sorrow* answers a question which has long troubled me. Why is it that Ukraine, as a nation, receives either no press or a bad one (Though since Chornobyl at least most people know where it is)? The country which, in surface area, is the largest in Europe after Russia, and has a population of 51 million, is simply not seen as an entity. Robert Conquest's book shames all who think thus (or it would if they read it).

Stalin believed Ukraine as a nation was the biggest single threat to Soviet

power, so he set out to eliminate it. He successfully spread the myth that only the rich peasants ("kulaks") were under attack, but the book proves that the whole nation, its history, its future, its culture, its religion, was to perish and only a dehumanised work force left in its place to fuel his enterprises. Systematic famine was the chief, though not the only, weapon. Later myths blamed the German invasion of a decade later for Stalin's evils (it is surely time for us to stop accepting Soviet "losses in World War II" as a rationale for all their current international attitudes).

Just as there can be no lasting peace in Europe without a solution to Poland's problem, *a fortiori* the same is true of Ukraine — for the nation did not die and signs of its resurgence are growing, despite the effective control of the KGB. Robert Conquest's achievement fills one of the largest gaps in the world's agenda of concern.

Michael BOURDEAUX

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### **Books Received**

BOSHYK, Yuriy (ed.): **UKRAINE DURING WORLD WAR II: HISTORY AND ITS AFTERMATH**, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, Edmonton, 1986. Boshyk deals with Ukraine during the Second World War, a subject little known and often misunderstood, even though it was here that the war lasted the longest and caused devastation on an unprecedented scale. Millions either lost their lives or became slave labourers. In some areas armed underground resistance to Nazi and later Soviet Russian rule did not subside until the early 1950s.

This book is of interest to those concerned with the history of Ukraine during WWII, as well as the controversy over the presence of alleged war criminals in Canada and the United States.

Photographs, extensive documentary materials, a chronology of events, and a detailed bibliography make the book a comprehensive guide to one of the most complex aspects of modern East European history. It also offers informed discussion about issues related to the current investigations of war criminals.

FR.- CHIROVSKY, Nicholas L.: **AN INTRODUCTION TO UKRAINIAN HISTORY, Vol. III: Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Ukraine,**

Philosophical Library, New York, 1987. The final volume in this comprehensive series on the historical development of the Ukrainian people. The author details the important events and trends of the past two hundred years, including the continuing Ukrainian effort to gain political and cultural freedom from Tsarist and later Soviet Russian domination.

As in the first two volumes, he provides a detailed picture of Ukrainian culture, society, and everyday life as they have evolved over the period. But never far from view are the momentous and tragic events that shaped the modern course of Ukrainian history.

**KHVILOVY, Mykola: THE CULTURAL RENAISSANCE IN UKRAINE. Polemical Pamphlets 1925-1926**, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, Edmonton, 1986. Translated, edited and introduced by Myroslav Shkandrij. Mykola Khvylovy, more than any other figure dominated the wide-ranging debate, known as the Literary Discussion, which took place during the so-called period of Ukrainisation, proclaimed in 1923. The debate raised issues of vital importance for Ukrainian culture, such as: How would it be affected by the cultural values of the past? What was to be the character of Ukrainian literature? What would be its relations with Russian Literature? etc.

In his pamphlets, Khvylovy argued that Ukrainian literature should take an independent path, abandoning its former reliance on Russian models and seeking inspiration from European sources. His outspoken advocacy of this course soon brought him into conflict with the Stalin regime and drove him to suicide in 1933.

This volume represents the first English-language collection of his polemical writings.

**KOSYK, Wolodymyr: L'ALLEMAGNE NATIONAL-SOCIALISTE ET L'UKRAINE**, Publications de l'Est Européen, Paris, 1986. This book, in French, traces the development of the Ukrainian resistance movement in the Second World War, from the inter-war years until the Soviet Russian re-occupation of Ukraine in 1944. The main focus of **L'Allemagne National-Socialiste et L'Ukraine** is the period of Nazi German occupation of Ukraine, 1941-1944. The author describes Nazi imperialist plans for Ukraine, as well as their attitudes and racial policies towards its people, and the wide-ranging atrocities committed against the Ukrainian population by the German armies of occupation. He goes on to describe the activities of the Ukrainian resistance movement, the formation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Galicia Division. The book contains almost two hundred documents from this period.

KOZIK, Jan: **THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN GALICIA: 1815-1849**, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, Edmonton, 1986. This volume is a detailed study of the origins of Ukrainian nationalism. It is an abridged translation of Kozik's two works, *Ukraiński ruch narodowy w Galicji w latach 1830-1848* (1973) and *Między reakcją a rewolucją. Studia z dziejów ukraińskiego ruchu narodowego w Galicji w latach 1848-1849* (1975). The work is based on a thorough study of published sources and on a wealth of documents from Ukrainian and Polish archives. In the first part of the book, Kozik traces the formation of a Ukrainian clerical intelligentsia in Austrian-ruled Galicia, discussing its cultural activities, ties with other Slavs, and the beginnings of political awareness. In the second part, he analyses the conflict precipitated by the revolution of 1848. Out of this struggle emerged the national movement that was to establish Galicia as a Ukrainian piedmont.

POTICHNYJ, Peter J., and SHTENDERA, Yevhen (eds.): **POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE UKRAINIAN UNDERGROUND 1943-1951**, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, Edmonton, 1986. For the first time in English, this book brings together a rich selection of analytical essays and programmatic statements written by those directly involved in the OUN-UPA struggle against Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. The essays provide a thorough discussion of the problems facing the Ukrainian insurgents: imperialist plans and occupation policies, ideological questions, and the formation of strategy and tactics. Seven programmatic documents round off the collection. The volume includes a historical introduction and is fully annotated.

SERBYN, Roman, and KRAWCHENKO, Bohdan (eds.): **FAMINE IN UKRAINE 1932-1933**, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, Edmonton, 1986. This is a collection of articles relating to the man-made famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine, which claimed the lives of seven million people. Some of the issues covered by the book are: "Ukraine's Demographic Losses 1927-1938" by M. Maksudov, "The Famine of 1933: A survey of the Sources" by James E. Mace, "Blind Eye to Murder: Britain, the United States and the Ukrainian Famine of 1933" by Marco Carynnyk, and "The Impact of the Man-made Famine on the Structure of Ukrainian Society" by Wsewolod W. Isajiw.

SYSYN, Frank E.: **BETWEEN POLAND AND THE UKRAINE. The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600-1653**, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985. In his book, Frank E. Sysyn examines the rise of the Cossack Hetmanate and the failure of Polish policy in the 17th C. through the career of Adam Kysil. A leader of the Ukrainian nobility and an

official of the Polish government, Kysil sought answers to the major problems of 17th C. Ukraine — religious disputes over the Union of Brest (1596), unrest among the Zaporozhian Cossacks, and military attacks by Tatars, Turks, and Muscovites.

Based on extensive archival research in Poland and Ukraine, Sysyn's study contributes not only to the history of Eastern Europe, but also to discussions on the preconditions and nature of early modern revolts and on the change of political and social élites.

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**THE EXPERIENCES AND SUFFERING  
OF UKRAINIANS IN AUSCHWITZ!**

**IN THE GERMAN MILLS OF DEATH 1941-1945**

**By Petro Mirchuk**

(Second Edition)

This timely publication has appeared at the height of the Soviet Russian campaign of defamation against Ukrainians. Based entirely on fact, *IN THE GERMAN MILLS OF DEATH* is a fitting answer to the KGB's anti-Ukrainian propaganda which attempts to defame Ukrainian nationalists, who fought against both the Nazis and the Soviet Russians during and after WWII, and discredit the Ukrainians in the eyes of the West with a view to cutting short Ukrainian attempts to acquire Western political support and material aid in their struggle for an independent Ukraine.

In this remarkable book, Petro Mirchuk, who was a Ukrainian political activist when he was taken to Auschwitz, explains why thousands of Ukrainian political prisoners were imprisoned and exterminated in German concentration camps. He relates how life and death was from day to day in a place which most prisoners were convinced they would leave only as corpses. Such was the nature of the concentration camp that simple existence was a miracle of no small accomplishment, and those who managed it are well worth listening to.

Published in 1985 by: The Survivors of the Holocaust and the Ukrainian American Freedom Foundation, Inc., Rochester, N.Y., U.S.A.

Price: U.K. — £5.00,

U.S.A — \$12.00.

Canada & Australia — \$15.00.

Orders to be sent to:

Ukrainian Publishers Ltd.,

200, Liverpool Road, London N1 1LF, U.K.



**The  
UNIVERSITY  
REVIEW**



**II**

**1987**



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# Bekanntmachung

Wegen Verbrechens nach §§ 1 und 2 der Verordnung zur Bekämpfung von Angriffen gegen das deutsche Aulbauwerk im Generalgouvernement vom 2. 10. 1943 (VOBl. 4. d. GG. Nr. 82.43) wurden vom Standgericht beim Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD für den Distrikt Galizien am 20. 1. 1944

## zum Tode verurteilt:

- 1) **Kundrack Paul**, geb. am 14. 6. 1912 in Ujycz, Ukrainer, Arbeiter, ledig, wohnhaft in Ujycz Nr. 68, wegen Bandenzugehörigkeit,
- 2) **Dmytryshyn Anna**, geb. Kaczor, geb. im Jahre 1850 in Kruszelnica, Ukrainerin, verh., wohnhaft in Kruszelnica, wegen Bandenbegünstigung,
- 3) **Kindratyshyn Wladimir**, geb. am 9. 8. 1912 in Podhoródce, Ukrainer, verh., Landwirt, wohnhaft in Podhoródce Nr. 285, wegen Bandenbegünstigung,
- 4) **Zazullner Nikolaus**, geb. am 25. 2. 1912 in Podhoródce, Ukrainer, Landwirt, wohnhaft in Podhoródce, wegen Bandenbegünstigung,
- 5) **Maletyn Olenna**, geb. Sawczin, geb. im Jahre 1856 in Rakow, Ukrainerin, verh., wohnhaft in Rakow Nr. 62, wegen Bandenbegünstigung,
- 6) **Lawry Theodor**, geb. am 16. 2. 1911, in Rakow, Ukrainer, verh., Gistbahnarbeiter, wohnhaft in Rakow Nr. 62, wegen Bandenbegünstigung,
- 7) **Peczenyi Theodor**, geb. am 1. 2. 1915 in Suchrow, Ukrainer, verh., Bauer, wohnhaft in Suchrow, wegen Bandenzugehörigkeit,
- 8) **Choma Kornelia**, geb. Stehnicka, geb. im Jahre 1906 in Citynowice, Ukrainerin, verh., wohnhaft in Suchrow, wegen Bandenbegünstigung,
- 9) **Katola Petro**, geb. am 10. 7. 1900 in Suchrow, Ukrainer, Landwirt, verh., wohnhaft in Suchrow Nr. 173, wegen Bandenzugehörigkeit,
- 10) **Masjan Anna**, geb. im Jahre 1901 in Dowszky, Krs. Tuksa, Ukrainerin, ledig, Arbeiterin, wohnhaft in Stryj, Schloßstrasse Nr. 8, wegen Judenbegünstigung,
- 11) **Peczenyi Oleksa**, geb. am 26. 3. 1907 in Suchrow, Ukrainer, vern., wohnhaft in Suchrow Nr. 120, Landwirt, wegen Bandenzugehörigkeit,
- 12) **Peczenyi Dimitro**, geb. am 26. 10. 1911 in Suchrow, Ukrainer, verh., wohnhaft in Suchrow Nr. 37, Landwirt, wegen Bandenzugehörigkeit,
- 13) **Stoboda Oleksa**, geb. am 27. 3. 1912 in Suchrow, Ukrainer, Landwirt, verh., wohnhaft in Suchrow Nr. 128, wegen Bandenzugehörigkeit,
- 14) **Kaszynek Wladimir**, geb. am 22. 12. 1904 in Skole, Ukrainer, verh., Magaziner, wohnhaft in Skole, Serec-Sala Nr. 25, wegen GUN-Organisationszugehörigkeit,
- 15) **Dyrkauer Michael**, geb. am 20. 11. 1923 in Korostow, Ukr., ledig, Waldarbeiter, wohnhaft in Korostow, Krs. Stryj, wegen GUN-Organisationszugehörigkeit,
- 16) **Swistun Michael**, geb. am 1. 10. 1923 in Korostow, Ukrainer, ledig, Waldarbeiter, wohnhaft in Korostow, Krs. Stryj, wegen GUN-Organisationszugehörigkeit,
- 17) **Jaksz Theodor**, geb. am 16. 4. 1889 in Rozaria-Wyzyne, Ukrainer, verh., Förster, wohnhaft in Korostow, Krs. Stryj, wegen GUN-Organisationszugehörigkeit. Mord an dem volksdeutschen Förster H a b i j und Ubefall auf das Baudienstlager in Swietotaw,
- 18) **Uzniewicz Ewa**, geb. Pankw, geb. am 20. 7. 1905 in Korostow, Ukrainerin, verwitwet, wohnhaft in Korostow, Krs. Stryj, wegen GUN-Organisationszugehörigkeit,
- 19) **Sawczyn Wasyl**, geb. am 27. 8. 1910 in Korostow, Ukrainer, verh., Heger, wohnhaft in Korostow, Krs. Stryj, wegen GUN-Organisationszugehörigkeit,
- 20) **Iwaszkiewicz Nikolaus**, geb. am 1. 12. 1892 in Suchrow, Ukrainer, verh., Dorfschulze, wohnhaft in Suchrow, wegen Bandenbegünstigung.

Das Urteil an den zu Ziffer I) bis 10) Genannten ist am 21. 1. 1944 in Stryj vollstreckt worden, als Sühnmaßnahme für den am 14. 1. 1944 von ukrainischen Banditen erschossenen ukrainischen Polizeimeister

**Himki Wladimir**, in Daszawa, Krs. Stryj.

Die Verurteilten zu Ziffer II) bis 20) sind für einen Gnadeneweis in Aussicht genommen.

Freigesprochen wurde:

**Maletyn Oleksa**, geb. im Jahre 1881 in Rakow, Ukrainer, verh., Landwirt, wohnhaft in Rakow Nr. 62.

Sollten in den nächsten 3 Monaten im Bereiche der Kreishauptmannschaft Drohobycz und Stryj Gewalttaten, insbesondere auf Deutsche, Angehörige der mit dem Großdeutschen Reich verbündeten Staaten oder im Interesse des Aulbauwerkes im Generalgouvernement arbeitenden Nichtdeutschen begangen werden, so wird, sofern die Täter nicht sofort ergriffen werden, das Urteil auch an den für den Gnadeneweis in Aussicht genommenen Verurteilten vollstreckt werden, und zwar in der Form, daß für jede Gewalttat an einem der Schutzbelohnten des Großdeutschen Reiches, der beabsichtigte Gnadeneweis für mindestens 10 der Verurteilten hinfällig wird.

Ist die Tat von kommunistischen Elementen begangen, so werden aus dem Kreise der oben angeführten Personen Kommunisten, ist die Tat von sonstigen irregulierten Elementen begangen, so werden von den oben angeführten diejenigen, die diesen politisch radeslarden, von dem Gnadeneweis ausgeschlossen. Es liegt deshalb in der Hand der nichtdeutschen Bevölkerung durch sofortige Festnahme

oder Veranlassung der Festnahme des oder der Täter oder durch Einwirkung auf ihnen bekannte, irregulierte Elemente, oder durch Anzeigen verdächtiger Personen dafür zu sorgen, daß das Urteil an den für den Gnadeneweis in Aussicht genommenen Verurteilten nicht vollstreckt wird

Stryj, den 21. 1. 1944

**Der SS- und Polizeiführer  
im Distrikt Galizien.**

Proclamation issued on 21 January 1944 by the SS and Police Leader in Galicia informing the local population of death sentences passed against prisoners convicted of OUN and UPA membership and of sheltering Jews. Half of the prisoners had already been executed; the others were being held as hostages, with the promise of a pardon if attacks on Germans ceased.  
(Archives of the ZP UHVR – Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, New York)

## Defamation of Ukrainians

### SEARCH FOR ALLEGED WAR CRIMINALS MOVES TO GREAT BRITAIN

Presently, the search for alleged war criminals has moved to Britain. This hunt seems mainly to consist of offensive and libellous, yet completely groundless, persecution and harassment of innocent (until proven guilty, let us not forget, we are after all, in the **free** world) people. But this attack not only affects the individuals in question and their families. It affects whole communities: Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Latvians. Negative and subjective coverage of the issues concerned, be it the trial of Ivan Demjanjuk in Israel, or the search for alleged war criminals in this country, defames the Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Latvian people, and undermines the political and moral standing of our communities in Britain and around the world, giving the impression that every Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Latvian is an anti-semite, a Nazi collaborator and, presumably, a war criminal.

As you well know, I'm sure, this is not so. One should not forget that the Ukrainians were among the first people to resist the Nazi *Drang nach Osten*, first in Carpatho-Ukraine in March 1939, and then in Ukraine as a whole from June 1941 until the very end of German presence in Ukraine in August 1944. After that, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which had fought the Nazis, continued the liberation struggle against Soviet Russia. The armed struggle continued until the early 1950s.

The Ukrainian nation suffered many terrible atrocities committed by Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. During WWII Ukraine lost 7 million people (4.5 million civilians) at the hands of both the Nazis and Soviet Russians, and many thousands of Ukrainian political activists and intelligentsia perished in Nazi concentration camps alongside the Jews and other nationalities. Beginning in 1942, several million Ukrainians, capable of heavy manual labour, were rounded up in the schools and market places of towns and villages throughout Ukraine and deported to Germany as slave labourers. They were classified as *Ostarbeiter* (eastern workers), this being the lowest class of foreign labourers in Germany. They were given especially poor living conditions and were poorly fed; they were deprived of any rights, and lived under constant threat of police terror. Many even committed suicide. At that time, young men and women were afraid to leave their homes in case they were caught and sent off to Germany. On what grounds, then, can the Ukrainian people be regarded as collaborators or war criminals?

As a result of this anti-Ukrainian attack, many Ukrainians in Britain, particularly women and children, fear that this search for alleged war criminals may very soon get out of control and degenerate into an all-out "witch-hunt" affecting every Ukrainian living in this country. Some of the elderly members of our community may not be able to bear such an attack. In consequence,

many innocent victims would suffer wrongful and needless persecution, particularly young children in schools throughout this country.

And yet, the allegations made against these innocent people seem mainly to be based on "evidence" supplied by the Soviet Union, the main "document" being a list of 34 alleged war criminals prepared by the Soviet Union and presented to British journalists by the Russian Embassy. But, however sceptical of Soviet Russian "evidence" we may be, Rabbi Marvin Hier and the researchers from the Simon Wiesenthal Centre claim that all "documents" from the Soviet Union concerning the alleged war criminals are genuine. Their claim is supported by Mr. Greville Janner QC, MP, Secretary of the Parliamentary Commission dealing with alleged war criminals.

As the Centre believes in the credibility of Soviet "evidence" and regards it as *bona fide*, then let the researchers examine **all** "evidence" and "documentation" from the Soviet Union. It is, after all, only fair in the name of true justice.

The following is a translation of an excerpt of a "document" about Mr. Wiesenthal, which appeared in issue No. 9 (1985) of the *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal* (Ukrainian Historical Journal), published in Kyiv. This is supposed to be a respectable and highly-regarded historical journal in the Soviet Union. We ask, therefore, is this Soviet "document" also genuine? If not, then why is the other Soviet "evidence" and "documentation" genuine? Let the "Nazi"-hunters be objective and consistent.

### UKRAINSKYI ISTORYCHNYI ZHURNAL (UKRAINIAN HISTORICAL JOURNAL)

Issue No. 9 (1985), p. 105

*Excerpt from an article by L.A. Ruvinskyi, entitled "Criminal Conspiracy of Zionists and Fascists on the eve of and during the Second World War".*

... After the end of the Great Patriotic War, in a reply to a question by the writer, V.P. Byelayev, the former Gestapo chief of Lviv, P. Krause, stated the following: "If we did not have several agents from among the Zionists working for us in the Gestapo, we would never have been able to catch and exterminate as many of the Jews, living under false documents and other names as we did"<sup>23</sup>. Thus, in July 1941, together with 39 other representatives of the Lviv intelligentsia, the well-known Zionist, S. Wiesenthal, ended up in prison. However, as a result of a "secret run of events" all those who had been arrested, apart from him, were shot; he was set free. Thus, it isn't strange that, after this, the Zionist provocateur became a regular agent of the Nazis. The above fact was established by Polish journalists on the basis of archival material. For this reason, the Hitlerites did not throw Wiesenthal into their torture-chambers, as he often maintains, but sent him there to organise his next provocation. Of course, he was not lying when he said that he went through 5 Nazi prisons and 12 concentration camps. But it is not difficult to imagine how many innocent victims rest on the conscience of this bitter Zionist provocateur<sup>24</sup>. Such loathsome servants of the fascist murderers were at work in the Yaniv concentration camp, where people of various nationalities — Ukrainians, Poles, Jews — were sent. . .

23. V.P. Byelayev: "Ya obvyniyau!" (I accuse!), *M*, 1980, p. 104.

24. *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (Komsomol Truth), March 6, 1983.

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## **NAZI HUNT OR WITCH HUNT**

### **A report by the Ukrainian Investigative Committee**

In 1977 the Ukrainian-American community was stunned to learn that the OSI's list of suspects with regard to Nazi war criminality included a number of their kinsmen. Many in the community, having lived through the terrifying Nazi occupation of Ukraine during World War II, found the notion of Ukrainian involvement in Nazi atrocities shocking, or more accurately, perplexing. Bewilderment, however, quickly turned into another equally powerful emotion — suspicion — when OSI followed up with revelations that Soviet Russian evidence would be used in future deportation trials. Many in the community, having also lived under Soviet Russian rule before and after World War II, knew from first hand experience Soviet tactics of disinformation against perceived opponents. As a result, massive protests were launched to alert the OSI to the fact that Soviet Russian intrigue was possible if Soviet documents or witnesses were used. The protests did not help. Indeed, they directly backfired. The OSI was spurred to launch a campaign of its own directed at the general American public. Its specific position was that the Soviet evidence was not invalid in and of itself. The overall argument was that the Soviet government was a very reluctant participant in the Nazi hunting process, often hesitating to supply the material it had. As such, the Soviet Russian "intrigue" charges was absurd cold war rhetoric. The rebuff won over most Americans. The Ukrainian-American community, without clear and distinct proof for its fears, was left to watch helplessly as the deportation proceedings went forward. For a time, the matter lay dormant as Ukrainians like Bohdan Koziy and John Demjanjuk were expelled from the US. But shortly after the exit of the latter, strange new charges began to surface about the Soviet supplied evidence used in his case. In particular, the Trawniki ID card, which had done major damage to Demjanjuk's case, contained several irregularities. The card understated his height by five inches, contained a photo resembling a Soviet Army recruit rather than a Nazi guard, and placed Demjanjuk at Sobibor rather than Treblinka. The reports clearly put OSI's position on Soviet evidence in serious jeopardy. Sadly, the majority of Ukrainian-Americans were too exhausted by the emotional roller coaster of previous years to fight the issue. A small group did have the energy, but not the resources, to engage in new battles. Instead the group decided to form an investigative committee to uncover and disclose any further "problems" with the OSI's attitude vis-à-vis the Soviet Russians. Research proceeded for nearly six months. In the end, the work turned out to be productive far beyond expectation. The group discovered a wealth of solid evidence indicating that the OSI's contention that the Soviet Russians were

uninterested or uninvolved in the "Nazi hunt" process is as fully flawed as OSI's position towards Soviet evidence was proving to be.

Getting the investigation off the ground was not an easy task. Attention initially centered on locating additional anomalies in Soviet evidence. The first stop in the venture was the familiar Demjanjuk case. A thorough examination revealed nothing of importance beyond what was already known. In frustration, the group gave some thought to moving on to the Koziy case, where claims of coached Soviet witnesses were being reported. But some cursory digging deeper into the Demjanjuk case brought to light two intriguing facts of a different order. The first involved the work of a private eye hired to help Demjanjuk. This detective had discovered that Demjanjuk's life began to unravel when allegations about his "Nazi" past appeared in a left wing Ukrainian-American newspaper, prompting OSI's original interest. The second involved OSI director Allen Ryan reporting that OSI's attention turned to Demjanjuk in earnest after his name appeared on a list of 73 alleged "Nazis" that had been supplied by an "unnamed" Ukrainian living in the US. On a hunch, the committee decided to search for the identity of Demjanjuk's accusers. For a time frustration set in again. The search, centered on American sources, yielded nothing. But, fortunately, the European press was also interested in the Demjanjuk case. The committee found out that the German press agency Ost Dienst had, in fact, published a full report on the "Ivan Prozess". Obtaining the report broke the ice. The Ost Dienst gave the needed names and more, much more. The agency revealed the *Ukrainian News* as the newspaper which first pointed the finger at Demjanjuk, and Michael Hanusiak as the individual who had submitted the list of 73 alleged war criminals to the OSI, sealing Demjanjuk's fate. In addition, three key new facts emerged. Michael Hanusiak worked for the *Ukrainian News*, or more precisely, was its editor. He had obtained his list by studying archival material in the USSR, and the *Ukrainian News* was not simply left wing, but pro-Soviet — "*moskaufreundlichen*". With these interesting bits of information, the group made a crucial decision — to shift its efforts from the somewhat established Soviet evidence issue to the riskier Soviet involvement problem.

The first question that the committee had on its mind was: how, in fact, closely associated was the *Ukrainian News* with the Soviet Russians? Research found the newspaper operating out of a New York address: 85 East 4th Street. A quick reading of a number of issues revealed that the editorial policy of the gazette could well have been set as *Pravda*. Having confirmed Ost Dienst's assessment of the paper's viewpoint, the committee decided to do an extensive monitoring of the *Ukrainian News* in all aspects of its work. Initial observation revealed that the *Ukrainian News* had close ties with a plethora of Soviet organisations and fronts operating in the US and abroad. It was in regular contact with the UN Soviet Embassy and the Tass office in New York. It was in frequent communication with the US communist party newspaper *The People's Daily World*. It was likewise in frequent communica-



tion with the Russian language Canadian communist publication *Vestnyk* and the Prague based journal *Nove Zitja*. Follow up observation revealed that the *Ukrainian News* performed informational services for an organisation called the Ukrainian American League. The League, with branches in fifteen major cities throughout the US, in turn, was intimately connected with the Ukraina Society, a Soviet organisation working out of Kyiv, Uk.SSR, vaguely known by Ukrainian emigré groups to be a propaganda operation aimed against them. A short side study of the Ukraina Society indicated just a bit more. It was found that the organisation, through its publication *News From Ukraine* (NFU), was in the habit of painting Ukrainians with nationalist sentiments — in Ukraine and in the diaspora — as Nazi collaborators. A closer reading of *Ukrainian News* revealed that it was taken to using much the same broad-brush. While, all told, the research already suggested some disturbing conclusions about the *Ukrainian News*, new more startling information soon appeared, the result of a casual spot check of UAL branches. The New York branch of UAL was found working at the same address as the *Ukrainian News*: 85 E 4th St. The branch operated through various front organisations — Ukrainian Progressive Worker, Progressive Ukrainian American, Robitnyk Publishing Company — and those also were located at 85 E 4th St. The obvious query arose: was there anyone else at the address? The answer came back a large affirmative: The National Council of American Soviet Friendship. The name itself piqued curiosity. So attention turned to the NCASF. It was quickly discovered that the NCASF had many of the same basic connections with Soviet organisations as the *Ukrainian News*. But further research indicated other connections as well. On the one hand, NCASF's director Rev. Alan Thompson was in constant and close contact with high level Soviet Embassy personnel operating out of Washington DC. On the other hand, Thompson was in equally intimate contact with a cluster of close knit peace groups. Following up on the latter, it was discovered that the NCASF was playing the role of initiator for the groups, particularly in regard to a project called the "Campaign for the People's Peace Treaty". The investigative group was not certain what to make of the NCASF and its activities. Some rather reputable individuals and organisations worked with it on the treaty campaign. But the contact with various Soviet outfits and with high level Soviet officials seemed somewhat sinister. So the committee decided to refer to various books on Soviet Russian operations in the US to get a better perspective. Checking John Barron's work *KGB: The Hidden Hand* provided a stunning perspective. His indication, quoting FBI Assistant Director Edward O'Malley, was that the NCASF maintained regular contact with KGB operatives and had been charged with penetrating the US peace movement. Barron's work also indicated that at least one organisation in the cluster of peace groups around the NCASF, the US Peace Council, was no stranger to the Soviet Russians either. In fact, the US Peace Council was an American affiliate of the World Peace Council, purportedly the largest Soviet front working on the peace issue in the world. The committee's question

raised about the *Ukrainian News* — i.e. how pro-Soviet was it? — seemed almost moot. In the worst case, the *Ukrainian News*, taken in all its aspects, was a classical Soviet front operation. A much kinder interpretation still had to characterise its activities, including the submission of the “Nazi” list, as Soviet linked.

After the investigation at 85 E 4th St., the committee’s next big question was: did Soviet links to the US Nazi hunt process end with the *Ukrainian News*’ list submission? To find out, the committee decided not only to further study the *Ukrainian News*, but to begin extensive monitoring of the various organisations that had been discovered to have close contact with it. A natural division of labour soon appeared in the work. One section of the investigative committee turned to following the Ukraina Society’s publication, *News From Ukraine* (both in its English and Ukrainian language versions). The other section concentrated on all the US based organisations. A double hint of strange new possibilities was eventually discovered. On the one hand, the *News From Ukraine* was found promoting, with great enthusiasm, the concept of a 40th anniversary commemoration of the Judgment at Nuremberg to remind the world of Nazi fiends of the past and their descendants — the Cold Warriors. On the other hand, Rev. Thompson was found to be in contact with a Nuremberg Judgment Commemoration Committee (NJCC) in New York, more specifically at 130 East 16th Street. Following up on the coincidence proved an eye opener. A letter of invitation to one of the committee’s events indicated that the full name of the organisation was “The Committee to Commemorate the 40th Anniversary of the Judgment at Nuremberg”. The letter’s cartoon display gave the theme, “Smash the Nazis”. The caption below it added a remark about the descendants — the Cold Warriors. Among the individual endorsers was Thompson himself and his coaddressee Michael Hanusiak of the *Ukrainian News*. Among the organisational endorsers was the already known US Peace Council. Present as well was WREE (Women for Racial & Economic Equality), another group in NCASF’s peace “stable”. Perfunctory further checking indicating that one of the speakers was a member of the GDR (East German) Parliament, that another was a GDR Peace Prize recipient, and that an organisation called The Council for Friendship with GDR was also an endorser. While the Nuremberg Committee did not seem altogether “clean”, there was initially some hesitation, as once before with the NCASF. The NJCC was not without its contingency of reputable individuals and organisations. So the process of checking coaddressees was restarted. 130 East 16th St. proved to be a déjà vu situation. First, the ironically amusing Council of Friendship with the GDR was found at the address. A side check of the two yielded nothing on the “GDR Friends”, but WREE turned out to be a “pen pal” with virtually every Soviet Bloc nation in the world. A final check uncovered the oldest member of the 16th Street fraternity (around since 1917), the *Russkyi Golos* — a Russian language version of the *Ukrainian News*. Once again, hard reality spoke for considering the NJCC to be an outright attempt by the Soviet Russians to sustain a “root

out the Nazis" ("Nazis" supplied by the Soviet lists) effort in the US. And, once again, even the gentlest of assessments had to describe the committee as Soviet related.

The experience at 130 East 16th Street was unnerving. Members of the investigative committee began to greet one another with a crude adaptation of a line from the Ancient Mariner rhyme: Soviets, Soviets, everywhere. . . The greeting soon became a policy decision on method. In continuing any further study of a Soviet connection with the US "Nazi hunt" process — i.e. in accurately assessing how deep the entanglement went — all individuals and organisations, however reputable, who had any contact with the *Ukrainian News* or its ever growing group of "friends" were to be considered fair game for monitoring. The new method of operation initially taxed the committee to the maximum. But eventually, the approach brought an interesting item to the group's notice, a book review in the *Ukrainian News* of a work called *Nazi War Criminals in America* by one Charles R. Allen Jr. The review was extremely uninformative, praising Allen and his work, without explaining the contents of the book or Allen's credentials. In fact, the piece was little more than a typical bashing of the Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalists" as old "Nazi collaborators". But the newspaper had kindly published a blurb about Charles Allen to go along with the review. The blurb revealed that Charles Allen was a former editor of the *Nation* and the present editor of *The Churchman*. He was also reported to be a reknown scholar — "a preeminent authority" — with regard to the Nazi war criminality issue in the US". In fact he was considered competent enough on the "Nazi" issue to have testified as an expert before the US Congress. The man's credentials were obviously intimidating, but the committee did not relinquish its commitment to the "thorough investigation of all contacts" approach. Indeed, the very preeminence of Allen prompted curiosity about the *Ukrainian News*' fondness for him. To do the work properly, the investigative committee split into three groups. The first section turned to checking Charles Allen's generally known credentials. The check proved that Charles Allen was in fact well known as an authority on the "Nazi" question. Further, the check disclosed that part of his reputation rested on the fact that he, according to Allen Ryan's book *Quiet Neighbors*, had been agitating the Justice Department on the "Nazi" war criminals in America problem in the early 1960s, years before the OSI was created. The credentials run down set off no alarms, though Allen's pioneering enthusiasm was deemed noteworthy. The second action turned to monitoring Ukraina Society's *News From Ukraine*. The *NFU* so often carried news items that had previously appeared in *Ukrainian News* (or vice versa) that the notion seemed worth a try. The notion proved to be on target. An article in *NFU* soon appeared in connection with Charles Allen. The article first quoted his work *Nazi War Criminals* on the problem of the US government's unconscionable neglect of the Nazi question. The article went on to quote his work on a possible US government whitewash of the issue. Reading the article set off some minor alarms with regard to Mr. Allen.

The third section turned to a study of Charles Allen's writings. Obtaining a copy of the *Nazi War Criminals* book proved impossible. So efforts focused on his *Churchman* pieces, particularly those with references to the "Nazi hunt" question. The writings proved to be "strange". His attitude about Nazis in the West was already known. But his attitudes about Nazis in the East proved a surprise. His argument, particularly with regard to the GDR was that there were none left! The GDR had taken care of all 11,000 of its old Nazis (meaning that the eastern portion of Germany had produced only that number during the entire Third Reich period). The writings, more closely examined for ideological content, also strongly hinted at a pro-East Bloc slant. To say the least, a perusal of Allen's *Churchman* pieces set off some major alarms. The section reports, brought together, gave clear indication that the Allen case merited pursuit "on linkage". Allen's fondness for the GDR caused initial attention to focus on the US Council of Friendship with the GDR. But the focus went nowhere. So monitoring turned general. Of the other organisations in the *Ukrainian News* "fraternity", the NCASF proved the most interesting candidate for a link with Allen. On the one hand, the NCASF maintained an Educational Services branch, whose purpose was to keep contact with various academics and scholars. On the other hand, NCASF's director Alan Thompson was found to have contact with a variety of church groups (clustered around the Prague based Christian Peace Conference). Taking a chance, the investigative committee decided to put all its efforts into finding a possible Allen-NCASF link. The efforts proved fruitful. A connection was found via the director emeritus of the NCASF, Reverend Richard Morford. The good Morford, fearless leader of the NCASF during its darkest days (including its temporary demise as a declared "communist front") and recipient of the prized Medal of Friendship of the Peoples of the USSR (bestowed by the USSR Supreme Soviet), had very recently passed away. To commemorate the man and his work, his successor, Rev. Thompson had decided to hold a memorial, inviting Morford's closest associates (including some rather important Soviets). The invitation list, obtained by the investigative committee, turned out to have Charles Allen Jr.'s name on it. While finding a connection, the committee immediately recognised that friendship with Morford could have been of recent date. Equally important, such friendship did not necessarily mean that Allen had ever worked for or with Morford and the NCASF. So the committee members scattered in all directions to check for full fledged links. Pressing hard, the deeper connections were soon found. All were discovered in a single place, in a book written by Allen in the early 1960s entitled *Journey to the Soviet Trade Unions: An American Eyewitness report*. The book was generally remarkable — a panegyric to the Soviet system — fully confirming Mr. Allen's pro-East Bloc slant. But the clinchers came in the first two pages of the work. For one, the work was dedicated to Morford with "regard, esteem, and affection". Of equal significance, Allen indicated clearly that he had been commissioned by the NCASF to do the piece. Finding the deeper links verified, in no uncertain

terms, several unsavoury facts about the preeminent Mr. Allen and his "Nazi" work emerged. But the process did more, frighteningly more, especially when juxtaposing Allen's call for the "Nazi hunt" in the early 1960s with his work for Morford during the same period. It brought into clear focus an angle the investigative committee had not even contemplated considering — a Soviet connection with the campaign to have the OSI set up in the first place.

The investigative committee, in sum, discovered that notwithstanding OSI denials of Soviet intrigue vis-à-vis it, Soviet involvement was quite visible in various aspects of its Nazi hunt work — from the lists the OSI used and obtained to the public pressure that helped create and sustain it. Moreover, the group amassed an enormous amount of data to corroborate every finding it made, lest it be challenged for building "sand castle" cases. In fact, the data was so bulky at the end that it caused a delay in disclosure. The committee eventually found a simple solution. It decided to weed out all but the most relevant material. The committee wishes to make clear that scoring debating points with the OSI is not the issue. What is the issue are the lives of a number of Ukrainian-Americans. John Demjanjuk faces a possible death sentence pending the conclusion of his trial in Israel. Bohdan Koziy has already been sentenced to death in absentia by the USSR and the USSR is doing everything in its power to extradite him from Costa Rica where he presently resides. The committee, therefore, has higher hopes for its travails. It hopes that, in the immediate future, its findings will help bring back the attention of the American public to OSI's method of operation. It hopes that the increased attention will eventually oblige the OSI to radically reexamine its use of Soviet evidence, especially as the evidence pertains to Ukrainian-Americans, the perpetual targets of vitriolic Soviet Russian attacks. It hopes that the increased attention will ultimately oblige the OSI to give a full account of how it initially obtained all its various lists of suspects. For the record, the committee has never had nor does now have, despite its findings, anything against an OSI style process. Nazi criminals still at large must be brought to justice. But it does hold that a general rule of thumb must be adopted in the future: Nazi hunting is one matter, witch hunting is quite another.

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## THE CASE OF BOHDAN KOZIY

For the last few months, Bohdan Koziy has been living under house arrest in Alajuela, Costa Rica. He is facing extradition to the Soviet Union where he is to be tried for "treason against the Soviet state". On March 17, 1987, the Superior Penal Tribunal of Alajuela reversed a lower court decision which permitted Mr. Koziy to remain a legal resident of Costa Rica denying Soviet Russian demands for extradition. Bohdan Koziy and his wife Yaroslava immigrated to Costa Rica following Mr. Koziy's denaturalisation by the United States courts.

In November 1979 the United States Department of Justice through its Office of Special Investigations (OSI) commenced a denaturalisation proceeding against Bohdan Koziy, alleging material misrepresentation both at the time of his entry visa application and on his petition for naturalisation as a citizen of the United States. The OSI alleged that Koziy covered up his membership of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Police during the Second World War, thus concealing not only his collaboration with Nazi Germany, but also his perpetration of crimes against humanity. The controversy that arose surrounding the denaturalisation by the United States of Bohdan Koziy stems from the OSI's reliance on evidence provided by the Soviet Union.

The OSI was established in 1979 ostensibly for the purpose of identifying and deporting "Nazi war criminals". However, numerous prominent Americans have strongly challenged the procedures utilised by the OSI, particularly its virtually exclusive reliance on Soviet supplied evidence and its insistence on deporting denaturalised US citizens to the Soviet Union to face arbitrary justice. Mr. Patrick Buchanan, the former Communications Director of the President of the United States, Mr. Ramsey Clark, former US Attorney General, Senator Jesse Helms and other members of Congress, as well as several noted political commentators have spoken out against these OSI procedures and practices. Some have maintained that US citizens being subjected to denaturalisation by the OSI are essentially of East European origin who, as firm anti-communists, are the targets of a Soviet Russian disinformation campaign, which includes KGB fabricated evidence against them.

The denaturalisation proceedings which the OSI initiated against Bohdan Koziy relied exclusively on evidence provided by the Soviet Union. The only eyewitness testimony presented by the US government was supplied by Soviet and Polish communist witnesses whose videotape depositions were taken either in the USSR or Communist Poland and presided over by a Communist Procurator or Judge.

Additionally two documents from Soviet archives (ostensibly Ukrainian Police applications for health insurance and subsequent withdrawal) were offered and admitted for the purpose of proving that Bohdan Koziy was a member of the Ukrainian Police. The reverse side of each of these documents includes an attestation of authenticity by the Consul of the Embassy of the USSR. No form of authentication was offered by the US

Government, other than a single witness, who asserted that although he saw no reason to doubt the Soviet claim, he cannot conclusively confirm the authenticity of the documents. Nevertheless, the court admitted the documents submitted by the OSI on the basis of the positive authentication by the Soviet Embassy alone.

The charge that Bohdan Koziy was a member of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, was in part admitted by the defendant. He did acknowledge that he supported the activities of the OUN. However, the Court did not independently consider the nature of the OUN, but merely adopted the dubious position of the US Displaced Persons Commission. In the late 1940s this commission haphazardly compiled a "list of organisations considered inimical to the United States" with Soviet assistance and included numerous incongruities and inaccuracies.

Based on this tenuous evidence, Bohdan Koziy was denaturalised by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in March 1982. Subsequently, the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. Regarding the defendant's membership of the OUN and the nature of that organisation the Circuit Court stated:

"Koziy also testified declaring that the OUN was never hostile to the United States. Koziy, however stated that the OUN killed Russian partisans during World War II. The United States and Russia were allies during World War II".

The Supreme Court of the United States refused to hear the appeal.

At this point Bohdan Koziy voluntarily left the United States. Had he remained, he would have had an opportunity to defend himself at the deportation proceedings and if need be, subsequently appeal an unfavourable decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court of the United States.

According to Bohdan Koziy, his decision to emigrate rather than face deportation proceedings was based on what he perceived to be a hostile political environment in the United States. Specifically, he believed that the US Justice Department and principally its Office of Special Investigations were being unduly influenced by certain interest groups, whose specific intentions include maligning and discrediting Eastern European communities and other staunch anti-communists. In this way, these special interest groups purposefully work to weaken the struggle of these communities against Soviet Russian encroachment in various regions and countries. As one who had struggled against both Nazi Germany and Communist Russia during World War II and who continued his principled position against Soviet Russian expansionism as a United States citizen, Bohdan Koziy opted to emigrate rather than allow himself to be used as a vehicle for this campaign.

In 1985, following Bohdan Koziy's arrival in Costa Rica, the OSI overstepped its legal mandate, and attempted to exert its influence outside the United States. It delivered copies of the Koziy file to the government of Costa Rica, pressuring the government to expel Bohdan Koziy. Costa Rica refused. Moreover, notwithstanding Bohdan Koziy's residency in Costa Rica, the OSI petitioned the Immigration Court in the United States to issue an order deporting Koziy from the United States to the USSR.

In tandem with OSI efforts, in March 1986, the Soviet Embassy in Costa

Rica submitted a formal request to the Costa Rican government for the extradition of Bohdan Koziy to the Soviet Union to stand trial for "war crimes" against Soviet citizens. That request was dismissed on procedural grounds. However, in the fall of 1986, the Soviet Embassy in Costa Rica submitted a new set of papers with affidavits of Soviet witnesses and a Soviet indictment requesting Koziy's extradition. Once again, based on the merits of the Soviet case, the Costa Rican courts refused to grant extradition. Yet, the Superior Penal Tribunal of Alajuela reversed the lower court order pending Soviet assurances that Bohdan Koziy will not be sentenced to death in the USSR. This latter decision was made despite the lack of an extradition treaty between Costa Rica and the USSR. The Soviet Embassy in San Jose sent a message to the Costa Rican government claiming that the Soviet Russians will guarantee that Bohdan Koziy will stand trial in the USSR on war crimes charges and not for political or religious reasons. Furthermore, the Soviet ambassador in San Jose advised the court that assurances that Bohdan Koziy would not be sentenced to death would be forthcoming. These statements clearly contradicted a January 1987 article about the Koziy matter in the official Soviet organ, *News From Ukraine*, which specifically referred to the previous decision of the Alajuela court refusing to extradite Mr. Koziy by stating that "the crimes Koziy is accused of are punishable by death in the country which demands his extradition. This answer cannot satisfy Soviet people who demand just punishment for the Nazi butcher. . .". Incredibly, despite the Soviet Russians' record of fabrication and deception, the Costa Rican court awaits Soviet assurances.

According to Carlos Ibarra, Mr. Koziy's attorney in Costa Rica, unless the decision of the Superior Penal Tribunal is reversed, Bohdan Koziy stands condemned to Soviet "justice". Therefore he has brought a legal action on behalf of Mr. Koziy against the judges constituting the Superior Penal Tribunal. This action alleges violation of Costa Rican law on the part of the tribunal, inasmuch as their decision to extradite Koziy was based on Soviet law and not Costa Rican law. Additionally, a petition for a "revision" of the tribunal's decision has been filed with another court in San Jose, Costa Rica.

The appeals on behalf of Bohdan Koziy have not been limited to the courts of Costa Rica. The Patriarch of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Myroslav Ivan Cardinal Lubachivskyi, as well as several Ukrainian bishops throughout the United States and Canada, have interceded on behalf of Bohdan Koziy. Through their communications to the Archbishop of Costa Rica, they have helped to expose Soviet Russian intentions towards the East European community and Bohdan Koziy specifically. The Soviet government has branded Myroslav Ivan Cardinal Lubachivskyi a liar. In fact, in a seemingly unrelated propaganda ploy, the Soviet propaganda sheet *News From Ukraine* recently published an article branding the late Josyf Cardinal Slipyj as a Ukrainian nationalist "Nazi collaborator".

Through the Koziy case the Soviet Union has attempted to influence all levels of Costa Rican society, including the judicial branch of the government against Ukrainian nationalists and Bohdan Koziy in particular. The Costa Rican government should not allow Bohdan Koziy to be extradited to the USSR where he faces certain death. Soviet evidence and guarantees are as trustworthy as Soviet Russian compliance with international treaties and its human rights record.



Wolodymyr KOSYK

## THE THIRD REICH AND THE UKRAINIAN QUESTION

A few hours before the attack on the Soviet Union Hitler wrote to Mussolini that one of the major aims of the German Eastern campaign was the domination of Ukraine and her wealth. The Third Reich indeed needed Ukrainian agricultural resources and raw materials in order to realise its plans for expansion and drive for domination in Europe and throughout the world.

For this reason it is of capital importance to have a complete picture of the Third Reich's Eastern policy, and to research this policy with regard to Ukraine, the Ukrainian question and the Ukrainian independence movement. Unfortunately, very little has been written on this topic. Particularly striking is the obvious lack of objective scholarly works supported by documents, factual evidence, and knowledge of the true historical situation.

This article is an attempt to fill in these gaps, albeit partially. Although there are numerous aspects to the Third Reich's policy regarding Ukraine, my article deals with only one aspect, a crucial one, nonetheless, namely, Nazi Germany's attitude towards the Ukrainian question and the liberation movement in Ukraine. Thus other important aspects, such as administration, economics, law, education and culture, or the question of the forced deportations of manpower to Germany, the mass executions of hostages, and the destruction of millions of prisoners of war, are not dealt with. Although each of these issues deserves full coverage based on archival material, I have limited myself to the problem of the Ukrainian national resistance movement during the period of the German occupation of Ukraine from June 1941 to early September 1944. Therefore, my attention was focussed on the most important issues, as well as the permanent elements of the Ukrainian struggle for independence, undetermined by any economic factors.

Ukraine declared her independence after the Russian Revolution of 1917. In the first place, the Ukrainian revolutionary parliament, the Ukrainian Central Rada (Council), proclaimed the autonomy of Ukraine, and then, on November 16, 1917, the Ukrainians took control of all their national territories. This was the beginning of an independent Ukrainian governing force. On November 20, the Central Rada declared the establishment of the Ukrainian National Republic, and on December 16 the newly-established Ukrainian Republic was recognised by Russia.

However, Soviet Russia gave Ukraine an ultimatum with various demands, which were rejected by the Ukrainian government. Thus, on December 20, 1917, Soviet Russia began its invasion of Ukraine. On January 4, 1918, during the war between Russia and Ukraine, the Ukrainian state was recognised *de*

*facto* by France and later by England. But the Soviet Russian invasion complicated the situation insofar that the Ukrainian government, which did not receive the expected aid from France, was compelled to look for a solution in the negotiations with Germany and Austria in Brest-Litovsk. Germany exercised restraint with regard to an independent Ukraine. On December 20, 1917, Germany's Secretary of State von Kühlmann, explained Berlin's position and stated that the German government would only be prepared to recognise the independence of Finland and Ukraine if they were recognised as independent states by the Soviet Russian government.

The Ukrainians were recognised as an independent delegation in Brest-Litovsk by Germany and Austria on January 12, 1918, after they had been formally recognised as an independent delegation by the head of the Russian delegation, Leon Trotsky. In order to strengthen its international status and to emphasise the fact that Russia had no right to interfere in Ukraine's internal matters, the Ukrainian government formally declared the independence of Ukraine on January 22, 1918.

On February 9, 1918, the Ukrainian government signed a peace treaty with the Central Powers. Nine days later, the German advance on the entire Eastern Front began. On March 2 Kyiv was liberated from the Soviet armed forces, which had occupied the city on February 9.

After the Germans had helped Hetman Skoropadskyi to take over the government by a coup d'état on April 29, 1918, they established a tyrannical occupational regime which lasted until the end of the war. Hetman Skoropadskyi resigned on December 14, 1918, and the republican form of government was restored in Ukraine. The Ukrainian National Republic remained in existence until November 1920.

With the downfall of the Ukrainian state, Ukraine was divided between four powers. The largest territory came under the control of Soviet Russia in the form of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which was incorporated into the USSR on December 30, 1922; the smaller western territory was annexed by Poland, Bukovyna by Rumania, and Carpathian Ukraine by Czechoslovakia. However, in all parts of the country the Ukrainians continued the struggle for their national rights although in different ways and with different intensity.

In the Ukrainian SSR this struggle had its own specific character, whereas it assumed other forms on the territories under Polish rule. Alongside the activity of the legal Ukrainian parties, an illegal struggle was being led by the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO) and later by the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). In the 1930s, the OUN, called into being in Vienna in 1929 during an assembly of representatives from Western Ukraine and the emigration, developed into one of the most serious political and revolutionary forces on the territories of Western Ukraine. It also assumed responsibility for penetrating the Central and Eastern areas under Soviet Russian rule, and led an uncompromising revolutionary struggle for the restoration of the Ukrainian state in order to secure for the Ukrainian nation its due place among the nations of the world.

The OUN became the most important force in the armed struggle for the independence of a united Ukraine. Because the programme and activities of the OUN posed a direct threat to the existence of Poland and the Soviet Union, both of whom were not prepared to concede to the Ukrainian nation the right to its own state, this provoked Poland and Russia to take active measures against the organisation.

In this situation all the Ukrainian forces, including the OUN, turned their attention to those states, primarily England, France, Germany and the United States, which could assist the Ukrainians in the realisation of their political aspirations. The Ukrainians made an attempt to inform the relevant political circles in these countries about the Ukrainian question, and to convince them that Ukraine was in great need of their aid in the establishment of its own independent and sovereign state, which would also greatly benefit the balance of power in Europe. Thus the Ukrainians searched for the possible aid and support of all states and did not concentrate exclusively on the possibility of establishing a partnership with any particular state. This applied to the OUN as well. Certain Ukrainians, however, more or less pinned their hopes on Germany, but it remains to be emphasised that neither the leader of the OUN, Evhen Konovalets, nor the OUN leadership in Ukraine or the organisation as a whole ever held the desire to link their fate with Germany. They paid no attention to Germany's interests. Their negotiations were directed purely by the interests of the Ukrainian nation.

Numerous articles, directed against Germany and Nazism, appeared in the official OUN press. This was well known to the NSDAP, and A. Schickendanz, from the Foreign Affairs Department (APA) of the NSDAP, informed the state, military and party authorities about this. He underlined the fact that Konovalets had left Germany after the Nazi takeover and that the OUN had begun an anti-German campaign. This was especially intensified at the time when the Germans extradited several OUN members, suspected of participating in the assassination of the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs, Pieracki, in 1934 to the Polish police. For this reason the OUN press criticised Nazi racist theory and the cultural situation in Germany. In connection with this the Foreign Affairs Department (Rosenberg's bureau) pointed out through A. Schickendanz that the wives of several leading members of the OUN were of Jewish descent.

During the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1938-1939, Hitler's Germany assumed a negative position in regard to the Ukrainian question. It supported neither the autonomy nor the independence of Carpathian Ukraine established on March 15, 1939. On the contrary, Hitler handed it over to Hungary. For this reason the Ukrainian nationalist press described German policy as cynical speculation and barter with the territory of the subjugated Ukrainian people.

After the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and Russia on August 23, 1939, Stalin proposed a toast to Hitler's health, but the Ukrainian nationalist press, which appeared in various countries of the free world, assumed a decisively negative position with regard to the new German policy. Furthermore, it is to be noted that there is not the slightest indication

either in German or Ukrainian documents that Konovalets, who was assassinated by a Soviet Russian bomb on May 23, 1938, or his successor had ever conversed with Hitler or proposed a toast to his health.

In the secret provisions of the Non-Aggression Pact, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia divided Eastern Europe between themselves. As a result, the Baltic countries and the western parts of Ukraine and Byelorussia became Soviet Russian spheres of influence. In practical terms this meant that, should the Polish state be destroyed, Soviet Russia would annex the areas of Ukraine and Byelorussia then under Polish rule. The autumn of 1939 brought with it the realisation of the Russo-German agreement. After the German attack on Poland, the Red Army invaded Polish national territory on September 15, 1939, and occupied the Ukrainian and Byelorussian territories which had formerly been under Poland. For this reason, the OUN newspaper *Ukrainske Slovo* (Ukrainian Word) attacked Germany's policy of the *Drang nach Osten* (Drive towards the East), Hitler's imperialism and the Nazi theory of the master race. The article in question, which appeared on September 24, 1939, described the similarity between the imperialism of Hitler and that of Stalin, and stated that the Ukrainian nation could survive both. Somewhat later this same newspaper wrote that Germany had taken a negative position regarding the Ukrainian question and that, consequently, its policy with regard to Ukrainians had become dangerous. Furthermore, it stated that the Western powers did not comprehend this and continued to believe that Germany had in mind the establishment of an independent Ukraine. The Western powers were urged to support the idea of an independent Ukraine, as an independent country with the geopolitical position of Ukraine corresponded to the interests of the Western countries, and would resist both the German and the Russian drive for supremacy in Europe.

In addition, the Ukrainian nationalist press emphasised the fact that the Ukrainians did not expect anything from Germany, neither independence nor any kind of aid, and that only a war could improve the fate of the Ukrainian nation. The NSDAP continued to devote great attention to this Ukrainian press. In September 1940 A. Schickendanz pointed out to Hitler's chancellery and to other government offices that, outside Germany, the OUN press had assumed a completely hostile position. Therefore, he suggested that this purely "terrorist group" should not be supported. In a letter to SD leader, Heydrich, Schickendanz proposed banning the OUN because its activity threatened German state security.

Alfred Rosenberg, who had been authorised to study the problems of Eastern Europe, did not have any clear or consequential views regarding these questions. However, his plans did not include the existence of an independent Ukrainian state. He spoke merely of different geographical units of the Soviet Union from which commissariats of the German Reich were eventually to be formed.

In the meantime the OUN had divided itself into two completely separate organisations: one under the chairmanship of Stepan Bandera; the other

under the leadership of Andriy Melnyk. In December 1940 the OUN-Bandera issued a statement expounding the aims and principles of its struggle. It was fighting not only for the independence of Ukraine, but also for the rights and liberty of all subjugated nations. In April 1941 the OUN-Bandera issued a statement on its political goals. Among other things, the OUN-Bandera would "continue the revolutionary struggle for the liberation of the Ukrainian nation by every means, regardless of all territorial and political changes which may take place on the territory of Eastern Europe", and thus, also in the case of a German occupation of Ukraine.

In view of the imminent war between Germany and Soviet Russia, the OUN-Bandera laid down its political guidelines in May 1941, announcing its firm opposition to the fact that the territory of Ukraine would very shortly become the battle ground for two hostile enemy powers. Taking advantage of this situation the OUN-Bandera had decided to proclaim the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state and the formation of an independent Ukrainian government. In a memorandum of June 15, 1941, delivered to the chancellery of the Third Reich, the OUN-Bandera pointed out that, although the Ukrainian people might initially greet the German armed forces as liberators, Ukrainians would very quickly change their attitude should Germany not consent to the establishment of a Ukrainian state. Furthermore, the OUN-Bandera was convinced that a military occupation of Eastern Europe was, in the long run, impossible and that the existence of an independent and sovereign Ukrainian state would effectively contribute to the solution of the problems of the East, as well as those of the whole of Europe. But Ukraine had to be completely independent, economically as well as politically, and should have strong armed forces. The solution which Berlin had considered for Slovakia and Croatia was rejected by the OUN-Bandera, and its leadership made exclusive demands for the sovereignty of Ukraine as a European power with equal rights.

Seven days after Hitler's surprise attack on the Soviet Union, and immediately after the occupation of Lviv by the German armed forces, the Ukrainians proclaimed the restoration of the Ukrainian state, on the initiative of the OUN-Bandera, and confronted the Germans with a *fait accompli*. Berlin was extremely surprised by this action and ordered immediate counter-measures against the OUN-Bandera, and also as a preventative measure against several leading activists of the Ukrainian emigration. In Cracow a special commission, headed by the Under-Secretary of the Third Reich, Kundt, interrogated the members of the Ukrainian National Committee. This Committee, composed of representatives of practically all political parties (with the exception of the OUN-Melnyk), was set up on June 22, 1941, on the initiative of the OUN-Bandera. Stepan Bandera was also summoned to this interrogation. Kundt explained that the Germans were not allies of the Ukrainians, but rather "conquerors of Soviet territory" and Hitler alone would decide "what was to happen there". Bandera took responsibility for the events upon himself and explained that there had been no agreement with the German authorities regarding the proclamation of the Ukrainian state. He also

made clear that he did not appeal to foreign authorities for permission and merely carried out orders which he had received from the Ukrainian people.

Bandera was arrested on July 5 and deported to Berlin. The same day, leading members of the Ukrainian National Committee (Horbovyi and Yaniv among others) were also arrested. Other Ukrainian politicians were placed under house arrest.

In the meantime, Yaroslav Stetsko, the new Prime Minister of Ukraine, continued his efforts to form the government, while Kundt carried on his investigation. He interrogated Prof. Koch, a Captain in Counter-intelligence, who had participated for a short time in the National Assembly in Lviv. Koch explained that he had not approved the proclamation of the Ukrainian state, but rather warned the Ukrainians against this "irrational step". Although the Germans initially hesitated in taking any measures against Stetsko and his government because they were expecting an uprising behind their lines, the Ukrainian Prime Minister was arrested on July 12 and deported to Berlin. Roman Ilnyskyi was arrested with him.

In Berlin Stetsko and Bandera were pressured to revoke the proclamation of the Ukrainian state and to dissolve the government. But Stetsko only emphasised one more time that this proclamation had been made without the knowledge of the German authorities.

During a meeting with the leaders of the Third Reich on July 16, 1941, Hitler explained the basic principles of his Eastern policy. At that time he had already considered the division of Ukraine and the colonisation of parts of the country. In his opinion, Germany's goal was the domination, administration and exploitation of the whole of Eastern Europe, where the German occupational forces should not hesitate to employ such measures as mass executions and deportations. According to Hitler, Stalin's order for the initiation of partisan warfare on the territory of the Soviet Union would serve the purpose of "destroying everything that [was] set against [the Germans]". The following principle: "Never allow anyone other than a German to carry a weapon" became the basis of the Reich's security policy in the East.

The German policy of colonialism and destruction gave rise to the emergence of a liberation movement to secure independence and preserve the rights of the Ukrainian people. Hitler, however, ignored Rosenberg's warning about a need for a moderate policy in Ukraine, particularly in the field of culture, and appointed Erich Koch, the Gauleiter of Eastern Prussia, renowned for his cruelty, as the Reich Commissar for Ukraine.

In the meantime the Germans had almost completely liquidated the Ukrainian press. Berlin had finally established that the proclamation of the Ukrainian state on June 30 had in fact been a "surprise coup by Bandera's people", and had taken place without the knowledge and against the wishes of the Germans. This was confirmed by the political bureau of the OUN-Bandera in a memorandum dated July 21. The OUN-Bandera explained that the proclamation was already a *fait accompli* and would not be altered by anybody.

Subsequently, the Germans noticed a great increase in the activities of the

OUN-Bandera in all of the occupied territories of Ukraine, and emphasised the fact that this activity "would have consequences". This extraordinary increase in the activities of the OUN-Bandera was also observed by the Russians. As a result Soviet Russia decided to play an active part in the struggle for the hearts and minds of the Ukrainian people in the occupied territories. Russia wanted to prevent the population from being influenced by the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists under the leadership of Stepan Bandera. Thus on July 31, 1941, with the assistance of the newspaper *Za Radiansku Ukrainu* (For a Soviet Ukraine), destined for the occupied parts of Ukraine, the Soviet Russian government launched a bitter campaign against Ukrainian nationalism. Ukrainian nationalists were portrayed as traitors of the Ukrainian people in the service of Hitler and the Gestapo. Various articles claimed that Bandera and his government had received their orders from Hitler, and the first issue of the above-mentioned newspaper saw only one answer to the Ukrainian nationalists — death!

At that time the Germans noted that the proclamation of a Ukrainian state and the activity of the OUN-Bandera harmed German interests considerably. Therefore, additional arrests of OUN members followed. In its memorandum of August 14, 1941, the OUN-Bandera again refused to surrender to Berlin's pressure to revoke the proclamation of the Ukrainian state and dissolve the government. The OUN began to spread its activity throughout Central and North-Western Ukraine. In the middle of August 1941, six weeks after the beginning of the occupation of Ukraine, the first armed nationalist units came into being in the Pinsk region, which, according to a German report, harassed the surrounding areas under the slogan: "Away with German administration! We want a free Ukraine without Germans, Poles and Russians!". The idea of independence was supported with great enthusiasm throughout the towns and villages of Ukraine. For instance, according to *Report on events in the USSR No. 78* of September 9, in Volyn and Halychyna "public oaths were sworn to Bandera by the Ukrainian people" in loyalty to the Ukrainian government which had been dissolved by the Germans.

The Reich Security Central Office (RSHA) devoted special attention to the activity of the OUN-Bandera in the Reich Commissariat for Ukraine and considered it "detrimental in every aspect". As a result of German activity in Ukraine, the population's mistrust of the new occupants grew. The Germans passed a resolution that all "Western Ukrainians" (meaning members and sympathisers of the OUN) "were to be removed from the Reich Commissariat as soon as the situation had become more stable. The NSDAP, the RSHA and Rosenberg's bureau believed, for whatever reasons, that only Ukrainians from the Western regions, formerly under Polish rule, belonged to the OUN. In Germany it was generally believed that Soviet Ukraine was populated by naive, uneducated and politically unconscious masses with whom one could do anything. But first they had to be isolated from Western Ukraine which was incorporated into the General Government. (This General Government, which was composed of the remaining Polish territory, was considered as the

Reich's adjacent land). In reality the resident youth from all of the regions recaptured by the Germans joined the underground movement for an independent Ukraine, and new underground groups were formed everywhere.

The first mass-scale repressions against the OUN-Bandera were carried out on September 15, 1941. Hundreds of people were arrested and imprisoned, and hundreds more were sent to concentration camps. On the same day Bandera and Stetsko were brought to the concentration camp in Sachsenhausen.

Hitler, who had opposed the idea of an independent Ukraine and even the establishment of a university in Kyiv, relegated the Ukrainians, together with other Slavic people, into the category of *Kaninchenfamilie* (Rabbit family), the lowest race over which anyone could dominate. Reich Commissar Koch promised the Führer he would proceed with cruelty and an iron fist right from the beginning. In Hitler's headquarters Koch was regarded as a "suitable man to best carry out his orders". Hitler felt only contempt towards the Ukrainians, as well as towards the Russians, and believed that they could only react to force and the whip. For this reason he praised Stalin and called him "one of the greatest men alive" because he knew how to form a state out of such people. Hitler considered the German settlements in the East as Europe's eastern border. Everything beyond this border, including the Slavs, was Asia as far as he was concerned.

The Germans had always opposed the idea of an independent Ukraine. On every occasion they emphasised the fact that the OUN-Bandera had formed the government arbitrarily, and established their administration against the wishes of the German administrative bodies and without the approval of the appropriate authorities. In German reports it was noted that, in the middle of October 1941, the OUN-Bandera had held meetings in Horodyshe in Central Ukraine (Cherkasy region) in order to gain the support of the people for the act of independence it had proclaimed. Under the influence of the propaganda of this organisation the population, which had initially greeted the Germans with goodwill, increasingly expressed its dissatisfaction. In German opinion, the OUN-Bandera had a well-functioning intelligence service. In October 1941, a circular letter was despatched to all the administrative departments in Ukraine demanding a halt to "the Bandera activities".

The RSHA knew that the OUN-Melnyk had also made attempts to establish an independent Ukraine, but it was their opinion that these attempts had assumed a "less drastic form" than those of the OUN-Bandera. In *Report on the Events in the USSR No. 133* the following remark was made in connection with this: "as a result of the characteristic lack of initiative of the OUN's trend of thought, the existence of the Melnyk-OUN does not present any acute danger at this time". The Germans stated that only the OUN-Bandera posed a serious threat in Volyn, the north-western region of the Reich Commissariat where the nationalist forces were concentrated. But, in the opinion of the RSHA, if the OUN-Melnyk were to be disregarded in the battle against the OUN-Bandera, then it too could become dangerous.

The rapid and extensive expansion of the areas under the influence of the



OUN-Bandera and the Ukrainian independence movement as a whole greatly disturbed the Soviet Union as well as the Germans. At the beginning of November 1941, a leaflet in which the population of the occupied regions was warned against the Ukrainian nationalists, who were described as agents of German fascism jointly responsible for the "screaming and moaning of tortured and tormented old men, women and children", was circulated. According to this leaflet, the nationalists, the arch-enemies of the Ukrainian nation, were posing as friends of the Ukrainian people, and the Germans were using them to "divide the Ukrainian and Russian people" in order to turn the people of Ukraine into slaves of the German barons. Therefore, the Soviet Russian government urged the population of Ukraine to fight against the Ukrainian nationalists. On November 21, 1941, at the same time as the Soviet Russians called for the struggle against the Ukrainian nationalists, the German intelligence service ordered the arrest of all the members of the OUN-Bandera. "After exhaustive interrogations they were to be secretly liquidated as pillagers" because they were preparing an uprising against the German occupational forces. During discussions on the admission of Ukrainians to study at the University of Berlin, the RSHA demanded a halt to the Ukrainian struggle for independence and that the Ukrainians be accorded equal status to that of the Poles and Russians.

In the meantime the situation in Ukraine deteriorated from day to day. The population became more and more aware of the essence of Hitler's policies and of the fact that they were considered racially inferior by the Nazis. The OUN-Bandera continued its anti-German activities and made every effort to place its people in influential positions. Its' followers ignored all inconvenient German instructions. Furthermore, the organisation accumulated weapons for the formation of partisan groups; its leading elements did not believe in a German victory. The German Wehrmacht was considered to be the greatest enemy, but the OUN-Bandera believed that the war would weaken Germany and Russia to such an extent that neither would be in a position to oppose the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state.

In *Operations and Situation Report No. 8* from December 1941, it was emphasised that, apart from the OUN-Bandera, no other resistance organisations, which could present a serious danger, existed in Ukraine. Therefore, the measures being taken against this organisation were greatly intensified. Members of the OUN-Bandera were active in the Crimea and in other regions of Ukraine. Many were arrested. At times there were up to 2,000 people present at the meetings during which recruits for the OUN-Bandera were selected.

On the basis of notes found on the person of arrested OUN members and the results of exhaustive interrogations, the German authorities gained an insight into the structure of the OUN, its secret anti-German operations and its preparations for an uprising. Furthermore, it was established that O. Kandyba was at the head of the OUN-Melnyk which wanted to form a Ukrainian National Council in Kyiv. Its followers controlled the press and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kyiv, and expanded their cultural and

educational activities. In the *Report on Events in the USSR* of February 4, 1942, it was established that the struggle against the communists in Kyiv had developed "more and more into a battle against the national Ukrainian formations". According to this report, since no collaboration with the OUN-Bandera was possible, the only alternative remaining to the Germans was the complete annihilation of this movement.

Additional reports documented continuous arrests of members of the OUN-Bandera in the Reich Commissariat for Ukraine. From March 1942 these reports also included the term "Ukrainian Resistance Movement". One report stated that the OUN-Bandera issued forged documents not only to their own members, but also to Jews. The underground activity of the OUN-Melnik in Kyiv was also observed. In Rivne the circulation of a legal newspaper in Ukrainian was halted. Nationalist propaganda was compared to that of the communists.

In April 1942, as a result of the numerous arrests, the Germans discovered that the OUN-Bandera was secretly training the youth with the aim of forming a national revolutionary army. In connection with this, the mayor of Poltava was arrested because he had organised meetings of members of the Bandera organisation and had proposed the establishment of a Ukrainian army to fight against the Wehrmacht. Based on intercepted correspondence between Ukrainians, the German intelligence service, even in Prague, warned Berlin that the outbreak of an uprising in Ukraine was imminent.

In the spring of 1942 the OUN-Bandera organised armed self-defence units in Volyn and continued the secret military training. In addition to the preparations undertaken by the OUN-Bandera, Taras Bulba-Borovets organised his own partisan unit. In May 1942 the leadership of the OUN-Bandera ordered the preparation of the hidden weapons for combat. In leaflets distributed by the OUN-Bandera the population of Ukraine was urged to offer passive resistance to the occupational regime, to carry out acts of sabotage, and to withhold food supplies from the Germans. Furthermore, the OUN-Bandera condemned the deportation of Ukrainians to Germany. *Report from the Occupied Eastern Regions No. 14* from July 1942 mentions the intensified activity of the partisan groups in Volyn and Podillia within the framework of the Ukrainian revolutionary movement.

In its anti-German propaganda the OUN-Bandera led a vigorous attack against Nazi, as well as Soviet Russian totalitarianism. As time went by, increasing numbers of OUN-Bandera members were arrested. Reich Commissar Koch decided to embark on the complete realisation of Hitler's political plans in Ukraine, namely, to export food to Germany, to retain a low level of education (grade three level schools) and to decrease the birthrate. Koch declared: "We have not liberated the Ukrainian people in order to delight Ukraine, but rather to secure the necessary Lebensraum [living space] and food supplies for Germany".

The *Situation Report from the Occupied Eastern Regions No. 21* from September 18, 1942, underlined the fact that the OUN-Bandera was the most

radical organisation in the struggle for independence of Ukraine. Furthermore, it was noted in the report that the attitudes of the OUN-Bandera, which stressed the need "to throw the Germans out of the country as well [as the Russians]" in its publications, were extremely anti-German. In September and October 1942 the SD (security service) arrested members of the OUN-Melnyk. In mid-October 1942 the preparations of the OUN-Bandera were complete and it was ready to lead an armed struggle for the liberation of Ukraine. According to the report of the W.BfH Ukraine (Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht) from October 16, 1942, groups of Ukrainian nationalists had united, for the first time, into a larger unit.

The brutal "recruitment", in reality forced deportation, of manpower to Germany and the requisition of food supplies greatly contributed to the deterioration of the situation in Ukraine. In connection with this the OUN-Bandera gained access to secret instructions regarding Nazi policies in Ukraine. Additional arrests of Ukrainian nationalists followed, but the Ukrainian national resistance movement was not weakened. It continued to expand. Already in December 1942 the Germans faced considerable setbacks in the requisition of grain in Volyn. A report from December 4, 1942, noted that, as a result of the "Bandera activities", several districts were far behind estimated expectations: Pinsk was down by 28%, Kostopil by 32-35% and Sarny by 25-30%. The war against the Ukrainian revolutionaries inflicted serious economic losses on Germany.

At the same time the Ukrainian nationalists appealed to the Soviet Russian partisans not to fight for foreign interests and to join in the struggle for the independence of Ukraine.

At the end of 1942, the leading members of the OUN-Bandera, W. Lobay, Y. Staruch and I. Legenda were arrested. During a SD operation in Lviv the SS Storm-trooper leader, Gerhard Scharff from the Reich Security Headquarters in Berlin, was shot by a member of the OUN-Bandera. More arrests followed. Every month hundreds of members and sympathisers of the OUN-Bandera were arrested both in and outside Ukraine, but, above all, in Germany, where a great number of Ukrainian workers resided. Many of them were executed. Others died either as a result of interrogation procedures, or in German concentration camps.

The armed struggle of the revolutionaries and partisans intensified, as well as the anti-German propaganda. During its Conference in February 1943, the OUN-Bandera emphasised the fact that both tyrannical powers (Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia) were fighting exclusively for domination over Ukraine. Therefore, the Ukrainian people had no other alternative, but to lead their struggle for national liberation against both foreign occupants. The basis and prerequisite for cooperation with other nations, those of East or West, would be their recognition of the right of Ukrainians to their own statehood. All forms of collaboration with the occupying powers were condemned by the OUN-Bandera.

The OUN-Bandera, which had an enormous military potential, continued

its revolutionary underground struggle expanding its anti-German propaganda, particularly against German colonial policies, while the UPA conducted a series of military operations, from March 1943, in order to oust the German administration and the Soviet Russian partisans from the regions of Volyn and Podillia. In a letter from April 1, 1943, a German official from Rivne reported that the Ukrainian national revolutionaries had attacked German trucks and other objectives even in broad daylight and that all journeys outside the towns were dangerous. The economy suffered greatly in that "a German administration no longer [existed] in many areas". The forestry and lumber departments in Rivne reported that approximately 400 of its officials and workers had already been killed during such attacks.

On April 4, 1943, the Reich Commissar for Ukraine reported that the situation had also become worse in the regions of Volyn and Podillia. As a result, only two districts in Volyn were "free of bands". Furthermore, this report noted that "the appearance of the national Ukrainian bands in the Kremianets-Dubno-Kostopil-Rivne areas [was] especially dangerous". On the night of March 20-21, the Ukrainian partisans attacked all of the regional agricultural administration offices in the Kremianets area completely destroying one of the offices and killing twelve Germans.

In his report from April 30, 1943, the General Commissar of Volyn and Podillia explained that the Ukrainian national revolutionaries had gained superiority over the occupational forces in the western and southern areas of Volyn, and that in this case one now had to speak of a revolutionary movement. This movement had also expanded to Podillia. In May 1943, the Germans sustained heavy economic losses in Volyn and Podillia. It was reported that there was a registered total loss of 32% of arable land, 17% of corn fields, 33% of the cattle, 28% of the swine and 52% of the sheep, or rather that a registration was not possible. Forty per cent of the arable land, 51% of the corn-fields, 36% of the cattle, 41% of the swine and 28% of all the sheep remained for normal raising, cultivation and registration.

In March 1943, after Stalingrad, a time of great expansion of the national revolutionary movement in Ukraine, the Nazi Party continued to spread its idea of a master race and subhumans, and maintained that even "the most insignificant German worker was racially and biologically a thousand times more valuable than the local population". In the summer of 1943, when the UPA had brought great areas of Volyn and Podillia under its control, the Germans decided to counter-attack, and concentrated a substantial amount of their armed forces for this purpose. This counter-attack was unsuccessful. It is interesting to note, however, that the German propaganda which accompanied the operation coincided with the propaganda campaign of the Soviet Russian government whose armed forces had already reached the borders of Ukraine. The following statements appeared in a German leaflet dropped out of aircraft over the areas controlled by the UPA: "Moscow gives orders to the OUN", "the OUN is connected with the Kremlin Jews", "Moscow's agents are at the head of the OUN", "the OUN is a tool of Jewish Bolshevism" and "the OUN is a national Bolshevik combat unit in disguise". This

leaflet urged the Ukrainian people to refuse to obey the OUN, and reminded the Ukrainians of Soviet Russian persecution and deportations to Siberia. The text of the leaflet was concluded with the words: "The OUN could never represent the national interests of the Ukrainian people. The OUN and the Bolsheviks are one and the same and, therefore, both must be destroyed!"

In another leaflet, the military commander responsible for the battle against the Ukrainian revolutionaries, *SS-Obergruppenführer* and General of the Police, von dem Bach, maintained that, on the basis of a supposed appeal by Marshal of the Soviet Army, Vasilevskiy, "the Ukrainian bandit leader, Bandera, was to be ceremonially appointed as the most honoured Bolshevik of Soviet Ukraine, in the name of mass murderer of Katyn and Vynnytsia, red comrade Stalin, and that this same Bandera, 'with his bandits', would fight against Europe. The great German Reich would, however, defend Europe and its ancient culture against the Asian attack, and 'in the days of victory, Bandera and his saboteurs would be punished with the communists.

Yet what did the Soviet Russians write in their leaflets? In a leaflet from June 25, 1943, a severe attack was made on Ukrainian nationalists, alleging that they were not fighting for an independent Ukraine. In the same leaflet it was stated that the Red Army was not pursuing any fresh imperialistic designs, and did not desire new conquests and subjugation of nations. Bandera, on the other hand, it was said, had entered Ukraine with the Germans, and the Ukrainians "[remembered] well his ceremonial trip to the Germans". The leaflet also said that even under the Soviet regime the Ukrainians were the true rulers of their country. No one had forced a "foreign will" or "foreign interests" upon them. They had full rights and enjoyed autonomy and independence.

The Ukrainian independence movement paid no regard to the threat from both sides and did not surrender its position. During its Extraordinary General Assembly in August 1943 the OUN-Bandera analysed its struggle against the German occupational forces during which it had lost thousands of its members. In the conference resolutions it was maintained that not only was the OUN-Bandera defending "the moral position of the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian national revolution, but it had also procured the practical requirements in order to go over to the attack and to gain final victory". In defending the Ukrainian people the OUN-Bandera had fought a successful battle against the forced deportations of Ukrainian men and women to Germany and the requisition of food supplies. This was coupled with successful military operations of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which had extended from Polissia and Volyn to Podillia, the Kyiv region, Central Ukraine and Galicia.

At that time the Ukrainian independence movement was already certain of the inevitability of a Soviet Russian reoccupation of Ukraine and the OUN-Bandera was aware of the fact that there could be no other alternative but to continue the struggle for the independence and liberation of the Ukrainian nation. On November 6, 1943, the Soviet army occupied Kyiv and within a short period of time had advanced to Zhytomir and entered the operational

areas of the UPA. The front moved towards the west and the south, and divided the UPA-controlled regions in two. Thus some groups of the UPA began to fight against units of the NKVD and the Red Army, while others continued the armed struggle against the German occupational forces and the communist partisans. On the Soviet Russian side of the front the Ukrainian nationalists explained to the population that German and Soviet Russian socialism was identical, and that the revolutionary struggle for an independent Ukraine remained the only viable alternative for the Ukrainian people.

At that time the estimated strength of the armed forces of the Ukrainian national movement was at least 80,000 men. Disturbed by the existence of this considerable anti-German and anti-Russian national force in Ukraine, Moscow attempted to deny, by means of propaganda, the participation of Ukrainian nationalists in the struggle against German occupation. Furthermore, Soviet Russia wanted to prevent the Ukrainian nationalists from becoming renowned in the war against Nazism and from receiving their part of the credit for the defeat of Germany. But, above all, the Russians wanted to prevent anyone, particularly the progressive Western powers, from supporting Ukraine's struggle for independence, or offering material aid to the Ukrainian resistance movement. With this aim in mind, Soviet Russian propaganda described the Ukrainian nationalists as stubborn and ambitious people, as German collaborators, and as enemies of the Ukrainian nation.

On January 12, 1944, the Soviet Russian government launched an appeal to the Ukrainian people signed by government officials of the Ukrainian SSR and Nikita Khrushchev. This appeal maintained that the enemies of the Ukrainian nation were not only the "German robbers", but also the "German-Ukrainian nationalists" — "traitors of the people" and "Hitler's vassals", who "pretended to have participated in the fight against the Germans". It further stated that people should not believe the Ukrainian nationalists for they had not killed a single German. These "Ukrainian-German nationalists" were "Hitler's accomplices", who wanted to break-off the blood-brotherhood of the Ukrainian and Russian nations and to surrender Ukraine to Hitler.

At the same time, as documented in German reports, the UPA sustained additional losses in military operations against the Wehrmacht, as well as units of the SIPO (Security Police) and SD. The last acts of combat between the UPA and the retreating units of the German army took place on September 1, 1944.

Shortly afterwards the armed forces of the Third Reich, which had searched for Lebensraum in Ukraine and which had dreamed of transforming this and other countries into its colonies, finally left Ukrainian territory.

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\* In connection with these accusations it must be pointed out that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army continued its fight for the liberation and independence of Ukraine until 1953.

Dr. Lubomyr Y. LUCIUK

## UKRAINE'S WARTIME UNIT NEVER LINKED TO WAR CRIME

Sporadically since the end of the Second World War, reports have appeared in the media suggesting that large numbers of Nazi war criminals and collaborators managed to escape justice and hide in Canada.

Amid recent media scrutiny, however, were serious misrepresentations regarding the character and role of the Ukrainian Division "Galicia", comprised of Ukrainians recruited by Germans to fight against the Soviet Union.

These charges rest on the false assumption that all soldiers of East European units attached to the German armed forces were motivated by collaborationist and anti-Semitic sentiments.

This situation has deeply concerned the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, which recently issued a statement indicating that whereas all Canadians wish to see genuine war criminals found and legally prosecuted, the current publicity has impugned the good name of Canadians of Ukrainian background.

When Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, its leadership had no intention of recruiting Ukrainians to the German armed forces. Like all other Slavs, the Ukrainians were relegated to the category of *unttermenschen* (subhumans); Ukraine was considered a source of food and raw materials for the Third Reich as well as an area of future German colonisation. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians were persecuted by the Nazis; thousands were to perish in concentration camps.

Not until following the German defeat at Stalingrad, was the Waffen-SS permitted to recruit a "Galician Division" from the population of Western Ukraine. Even at this point (July 1943) Adolf Hitler and Heinrich Himmler strongly opposed any concessions to Ukrainian nationalism and insisted that the Division be referred to as "Galician" and not "Ukrainian".

Ukrainians were willing to join the Division because they anticipated that the defeat of Germany would be followed by a further conflict between East and West. They were eager to have ready a military formation — even one originally sponsored by the Germans — to serve as a nucleus for an independent and national Ukrainian army able to resist communist aggression. Accordingly, the agreement creating the Division specified that it would be used exclusively against Soviet forces and not against the Western Allies.

Following several months of training the Division was transferred to the Brody area of Western Ukraine, where it was included in the 1st Armoured Army of the "North Ukraine" Army Group. Thrown up against vastly superior Red Army forces and surrounded in the "Brody pocket" on July 19-20,

1944, the Division's 13,000 soldiers were badly mauled. Only one in five survived. Some of these men joined the Ukrainian Insurgent Army which fought both Germans and Soviet Russians.

Subsequently, the Division was reformed at Neuhammer in Silesia, thereafter taking part in relatively minor military engagements. At no point was the Division involved in the Nazi extermination of Jews or other Slavs.

On April 27, 1945, at the insistence of the Ukrainian soldiers, the Division was renamed and reconstituted as the 1st Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army under the command of Major-General Pavlo Shandruk. It surrendered as such to the British near Radstadt on May 8, 1945, its members being accorded the status of surrendered enemy personnel.

Eventually the Division was interned at a camp near Rimini, Italy, where British and Soviet investigators thoroughly reviewed its war record. In a then-secret report prepared for the British Government, D. Haldane Porter, who was in charge of Refugee Screening Camp 374, Italy, wrote (Feb. 21, 1947) that Ukrainians had enlisted in the Division "in the hope of securing a genuinely independent Ukraine. . . they probably were not, and certainly do not now, seem to be at heart pro-German".

In a "top-secret" report regarding the repatriation of Soviet citizens, sent to the undersecretary of state at the British War Office, London, it was noted that compelling members of the Division to accept repatriation to the Soviet Union would certainly "involve the use of force or drive them to committing suicide". Furthermore, the knowledge that these individuals, if sent back, would be despatched to "an almost certain death" was considered out of keeping with British traditions of justice and democracy. Since the United Nations War Crimes Commission indicated to the British Foreign Office that it had no Ukrainian war criminals on its list, the decision was made not to forcibly repatriate members of this unit to the Soviet Union.

The Division was therefore transferred to Britain, beginning in June 1947, and held there by the British Government until further screening could be carried out. As early as 1946, prominent Ukrainian Canadians had attempted to secure the release of the Division's members, while also helping them to emigrate to Canada. On May 31, 1950, following consultations with the RCMP\*, the Cabinet issued a statement admitting members of the Division to Canada.

The High Commissioner for Canada in Britain wrote to the Secretary of State for External Affairs that, "while in Italy these men were screened by Soviet and British missions and neither then nor subsequently has any evidence been brought to light which could suggest that any of them fought against humanity. Their behaviour since they came to this country has been good and they have never indicated in any way that they are infected with any trace of Nazi ideology.

From the reports of the special mission set up by the War Office to screen

\* Royal Canadian Mounted Police.



these men, it seems clear that they volunteered to fight against the Red Army from nationalistic notions which were given greater impetus by the behaviour of the Soviet authorities during their earlier occupation of the Western Ukraine after the Nazi-Soviet Pact: Although Communist propaganda has constantly attempted to depict these, like so many refugees, as 'Quislings' and 'war criminals' it is interesting to note that no specific charges of war crimes have been made against any member of this group".

Understandably, the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC) was concerned about the admission of individuals allegedly guilty of "war crimes" to Canada. Its representations to the Canadian Government, however, were based on misinformation.

The CJC claimed that it possessed "actual documentary proofs" of the Division's involvement in war crimes. When asked to produce these by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, during August and September 1950, it failed to do so. Nonetheless, the stir created prompted the Cabinet once again to consult the British Foreign Office to make certain the Division was not a Nazi formation. The British confirmed that the group was neither anti-Semitic nor guilty of war crimes. On September 25, 1950, the Cabinet reaffirmed its earlier decision to admit the Division's members to Canada.

No evidence has since been produced to suggest the Cabinet's decision was inappropriate.

The major, and highly dubious, source of allegations against the Division is the Soviet propaganda machine. Since the war's end, Soviet authorities have generated a stream of undocumented brochures associating the Division with the Holocaust. The most recent of these was titled *The SS Werewolves* by V. Styrkul. No scholarly work has substantiated any of the Soviet claims. One may refer to the following non-Ukrainian historians — John Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*; Nikolai Tolstoy, *Victims of Yalta*; Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945*; or David Littlejohn, *The Patriotic Traitors* — for objective descriptions of the Division's history. Regrettably, Soviet misinformation continues to fuel controversy about an issue that was resolved by 1951.

Furthermore, a wealth of documentary and oral evidence shows the Division cannot be linked to crimes against humanity. For example, Dr. Wasyl Veryha, a veteran and author of several books on this formation, says, "The Ukrainian Division 'Galicia' never took part in the extermination of the Jews or in the suppression of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. It was strictly a military, front-line unit of the Waffen or Armed SS, and never a concentration-camp guard formation".

Those concerned with identifying and prosecuting war criminals should make full use of the material readily available in Canadian archives and libraries before making charges. To ignore the evidence is to fall prey to propagandistic distortions.

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## DOCUMENTS FROM GERMAN ARCHIVES

Berlin, 2 July, 1941

The Chief of the Security Police

and SD

— IV A1 — B. Nr. 1B/41 g. Rs. —

Secret state matter!

### REPORT NO. 10 ON EVENTS IN THE USSR

(. . .)

II) Reports from the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos

(. . .)

The elements of the Bandera Group headed by Stetsko and Rawlyk, are organising a militia and a municipal office (in Lviv). The Einsatzgruppe is setting up an independent administration for the city, in opposition to the Bandera Group.

Other measures against the Bandera Group, and chiefly against Bandera himself, are being taken. They will be put into operation as soon as possible.

(. . .)

(BA R58/214 S. 53-54)

Berlin, 3 July, 1941

The Chief of the Security Police

and SD

— IV A1 — B. Nr. 1B/41g. Rs. —

Secret state matter!

### REPORT NO. 11 ON EVENTS IN THE USSR

I) Political outline

(. . .)

b) In the Government-General

Einsatzgruppe B reports that on July 2 and 3, 1941, the Ukrainians headed by Bandera, attempted to put the Germans before a *fait accompli* by setting up a Ukrainian Republic and organising a militia.

The Bandera Group has lately displayed a great activity, namely in distributing leaflets, etc.

In one of these leaflets it is said, among other things, that the Ukrainian liberation movement, that used to be repressed by the Polish police, would, from now on, be repressed by the German police.

(. . .)

Considering that the emigrated Ukrainian groups want to outdo each other in this activity, the following measures have been taken on July 2, 1941:

- 1) the various emigrated Ukrainian leaders, particularly in the Government-General, are under house arrest on their word of honour, including Stepan Bandera;
- 2) the leaders of emigrated Ukrainian organisations have been threatened once more with the strictest measures if their members did not comply with the regulations notified to them.
- 3) All the Ukrainians who happen to be in the Government-General but who do not have a fixed residence are invited to leave this territory and go home, lest they be arrested.

(. . .)

(BA R58/214 S. 58-60)

**STATEMENT FROM THE POLITICAL BUREAU  
OF THE ORGANISATION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS  
CONCERNING THE PROCLAMATION OF THE UKRAINIAN STATE**

Berlin, 21 July, 1941

Subject: The situation in Lviv (Lemberg)

**I. The facts and the causes**

1. The proclamation of the restoration of the Ukrainian state on 30 June, 1941, in Lviv, is a historical fact that will become one of the most glorious traditions of the Ukrainian people. Like the decrees of 22 January, 1918, in Kyiv and 1 November in Lviv, which became the symbols of the war of liberation of the years 1917-1921, the decree of 30 June, 1941, also became the symbol of the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian nation.

(. . .)

2. . . . The Ukrainian state was not proclaimed only in Lviv. The state power was also established in the countryside, wherever the Russians had lost control, and in some places, even before the Lviv proclamation. This shows the spontaneous aspirations of the Ukrainian people for their political sovereignty.

After the creation of the state power, in the villages, towns, districts and regions, the administration passed into the hands of the Ukrainians.

The same occurred in Lviv.

3. (. . .) The [Ukrainian] government used its efforts to organise the administration, economy, militia, health, etc., that is to say, all that the Ukrainian people needed, as well as the occupying army.

(. . .)

5. Although the OUN had initiated the formation of the government, only a few government jobs were held by members of the OUN. Most of the departments were given to people who, without being members of the OUN, were experts or well-known Ukrainian personalities. (. . .)

The repressive action against the Ukrainian government is running the risk of being understood as an unfriendly act from the German Reich toward the very idea of a Ukrainian state. (. . .)

## II. Practical conclusions

1. The proclamation of the Ukrainian state in Lviv is therefore an accomplished fact. As of that date, all actions were made in the name of the Ukrainian state. This is valid for the entire ethnic territory already liberated.

2. As regards the Ukrainian people, the Ukrainian government founded in Lviv under the leadership of Yaroslav Stetsko, Deputy Leader of the OUN, continues to be in force.

(. . .)

Political Bureau of the Organisation  
of Ukrainian Nationalists  
Foreign Policy and Propaganda  
Department

(*AA Ukraine, Pol. XIII, 24*)

### MEMORANDUM FROM THE ORGANISATION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS CONCERNING THE GERMAN DEMAND THAT THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT BE DISSOLVED

Berlin 14 August, 1941

(. . .)

#### The Ukrainian state and the objectives of the OUN

The purpose of the fight of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) is solely the Ukrainian state, but not necessarily a state where the OUN would be a leading power. The OUN submits itself to the Ukrainian

state, not the contrary. It is important for the OUN that the Ukrainian government subsists as a distinctive mark of the Ukrainian state; but we are not speaking here of a precise government made up of precise persons.

(. . .)

The disintegration of the existing Ukrainian government, born on Ukrainian soil from the will of the Ukrainian people without Germany having announced its position with respect to the foundation of a Ukrainian state, can only mean it did not agree with it.

(. . .)

### **Attitude of the OUN with respect to the Ukrainian government**

The government of the Ukrainian state had been initiated by the OUN, but this did not mean that it depended on the leaders of the OUN.

(. . .)

The OUN had no right to dissolve the government. Only the Ukrainian national legislative assembly could do so.

The OUN and the government of the Ukrainian state are today two factors independent one from the other. The government is above parties. It is constituted on a very wide basis, including some representatives from Eastern Ukraine, as well as from Western Ukraine (from Galicia and Volhynia, for instance). The head of the government of the Ukrainian state does not depend on the Chief of the OUN regarding organisational matters (questions involving the party). It is not only the OUN and its members, but also the Ukrainians of various political tendencies who placed themselves under the authority of the government.

(. . .)

*(AA Ukraine, Pol. XIII, 24)*

### **NAZI DIRECTIVE TO LIQUIDATE UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS**

No. 7

Service command of the  
Security police and of  
the Security Service S/5  
Command Log-book No. 12432/41

Headquarters  
November 25, 1941

To the advanced posts of  
Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk,

Rivne, Mykolaiv  
Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia.

Subject: OUN (Bandera Movement)

It has been ascertained that the Bandera Movement is preparing a revolt in the Reich Commissariat which has as its ultimate aim the establishment of an independent Ukraine. All functionaries of the Bandera Movement must be arrested at once, and after thorough interrogation, are to be liquidated as marauders.

Records of such interrogations must be forwarded to the Service Command C/5.

Heads of commands must destroy these instructions on having made a due note of them.

(signature — illegible)  
SS — Obersturmbannführer.

Berlin, 10 April, 1942

The Chief of the Security  
Police and SD  
(. . .)

Secret state matter!

#### **REPORT NO. 191 ON EVENTS IN THE USSR**

(. . .)  
Einsatzgruppe C;  
Station: Kyiv.  
The situation and spirit in Ukraine.  
The situation and spirit in Western Ukraine.

In Western Ukraine (Volhynia, Podolia). . . , among the various ethnic groups, Ukrainian nationalism is to be considered as the strongest political movement. The Bandera movement, which is the most active and the most important of all the nationalist groups, has become essentially an anti-German and illegal organisation.

(. . .)

On the other side [in Eastern Ukraine], the numerous Ukrainian refugees who came from Western Ukraine explain to the Ukrainian population the fact that the Germans intend to consciously stifle all hopes and national desires, or even to physically destroy all national movements.

In this respect, the Bolshevik agitation and these extremist nationalists are very much alike.

(. . .)

### **The Ukrainian chauvinistic groups.**

The *Bandera Group*, whose core, at the beginning, was founded by the young intelligentsia from Western Ukraine (Lviv's students!), gained ground amongst the young people, especially in the Volhynia and Podolia regions. Here, the illegal activity is based on the organisation of secret courses at the militia school in Klevan. The young Ukrainians have received a secret education of a political and military nature concerning their duty as members of the nationalist "revolutionary army". The propaganda was spread directly among the country folks.

(. . .)

### **The Ukrainian resistance movement**

(. . .) The mayor and three other persons have been arrested in Poltava. The mayor had been holding meetings in his office with the Bandera followers, and spreading the idea of creating a Ukrainian army to fight the German Wehrmacht.

(. . .)

(BA R58/221 S.288, 290, 295, 304f., 315f.)

## **RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE OUN**

April, 1942

### **Introduction**

In our present fight, we are basing ourselves on the decision of June 30, 1941, which is for us a historical and legal deed, a revolutionary political demonstration of the will of the entire Ukrainian people to live its own political life.

(. . .)

### **Political resolutions**

(. . .)

II. In the present complex and variable situation, we practice a long-term policy which foresees various possibilities to end the war. We also consider the possibility of an armed fight in the near future. . . For this reason, so that the energy of the people, instead of being employed in small partisan skirmishes, would take the form of a wide popular movement, we are orga-

nising and as of now mobilising forces in all the sectors, according to a precise plan.

III. Our policy is based on:

a) the creation and development of our own political and military revolutionary forces;

b) the absolute independence of the Ukrainian policy of revolutionary struggle;

c) the utilisation of all the possibilities and forces likely to promote the creation of the Ukrainian state, and especially the formation of a joint front of all subjugated peoples of Eastern and Western Europe;

(. . .)

f) We oppose the Russian-Bolshevik concept of the International and the German concept called "New Europe" with our own international concept of a just transformation of Europe on a national, political and economical plan, on the basis of free national states, according to the principle: "Freedom to nations and the individual";

g) we insist on the idea of an independent and united Ukrainian state which is a vital necessity, and the materialisation of the centuries-old aspirations of the Ukrainian nation, because we consider that only a just solution to the Ukrainian issue can balance the East European forces and warrant a free life to the peoples oppressed by Moscow.

(. . .)

(VI, S.61-63)

## SECRET GERMAN INSTRUCTION CONCERNING UKRAINE

November 1942

1) Our enemies: the communists, Bandera's followers, the partisans. The potentially most dangerous are Bandera's followers. They must be destroyed at all costs.

2) Schools of more than 4 classes. They must be closed next year [1943].

3) The "Prosvita" associations must be watched. The B. [*Bandera's followers*] are active there.

4) Cultural associations (theatres, cinemas) must be taken away from them [Ukrainians].

5) The least possible scientific institutions, such as laboratories, etc. Allow only the ones necessary for the army.

6) Do not allow understanding within the Church.



7) Do not fight tuberculosis and typhus. Close hospitals to the population. Stop the training of doctors.

8) Only German courts. All Germans are judges. (. . .)

9) Fight juvenile offences if they are prejudicial to Germans.

10) Spread everything that is immoral; do not punish abortion.

11) Break down everything that has a structure.

12) Do not allow understanding between the (Soviet) partisans and the nationalists.

13) Control inside trains.

14) Place secret agents in all factories, workshops, churches, offices, etc. Observe the enemies of Germany. Make priests work for us.

15) The Germans must not speak with the population.

16) Say nothing about misunderstandings in the party.

*(VIII, S81.)*

### **EXCERPT FROM GESTAPO REPORT NO. 8 ON IMPORTANT POLICE MATTERS**

Strictly confidential!

Central Security Office of the Reich  
Office IV

Berlin, November 27, 1942

#### **Ukrainian underground movement**

The hypothesis that the arrest of Stepan Bandera, Leader of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and its leaders in the Reich and in Lviv, would greatly reduce the activity of this organisation has not been confirmed. The tone of Bandera's propaganda, moderate at first, has become more and more aggressive. The leaflets distributed lately are clearly turned against Germany. The propaganda-instigation has already led Bandera's followers to attempt on the life of some Germans, particularly of members of the security police.

(. . .)

*(BA R58/208 S.158)*

**EXCERPT FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE THIRD  
CONFERENCE OF BANDERA'S OUN**

17-21 February, 1943

A.

1. (. . .) The present war is one chiefly fought on Ukrainian territory. Ukraine appears in the aggressive plans of both imperialisms, as a central problem inherent in their imperialist policy in Eastern Europe, and as a basis for other conquest.

(. . .)

2. By its imperialistic policy towards the European peoples, and by the terror and plundering of occupied territories, Germany has mobilised all the peoples of Europe against it. . . It has thus created the ideological and political foundations of its downfall. . . Germany's efforts to win over the oppressed peoples in the fight against Bolshevism, or to oblige them to adhere to it, or to shed their blood in the present war for Germany's own imperialistic interests, are merely a perfidious manoeuvre on the part of the occupying authorities, and a late attempt to avoid the consequences of the errors they have made. It is also a means to reinforce their military potential by using the oppressed peoples.

(. . .)

6. Ukraine is presently balanced between the hammer and the anvil of the two imperialisms — those of Moscow and Berlin — both of whom consider Ukraine their colonial goal. Thus the absolute imperative for the Ukrainian people is to fight both imperialisms, relying on its own forces. The recognition of our own independent state becomes the foundation of our cooperation with other peoples. It is on this basis that we must seek the common interests of the peoples of East and West in their common struggle against the German-Russian imperialism.

(. . .)

B.

18. . . .We condemn any collaboration, both individual and collective, with the occupying powers, because it is harmful, in fact, treason against the Ukrainian people.

(. . .)

(VI, S75-77, 87, 89)

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Capt. J. P. NOLAN

## AN ARMY WITHOUT A STATE: THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY (UPA) AND NATIONAL RESISTANCE DURING AND AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

(Conclusion)

### IV The nationalist movement and the Germans 1943-45

By March the country surrounding the major towns of Rivne, Lutsk, Kovel, Dubno and Kremenets was in the hands of the nationalists. Reitlinger contends that this state of affairs was a direct result of Hitler's decision to separate Galicia from the rest of Ukraine<sup>16</sup>. The Germans were frequently unsure of the identity of a particular group, for example a memorandum from Leyser to Rosenberg concerning the *Generalbezirk* of Zhytomyr reported that nearly half of the area was in the hands of the Red partisans, yet it omitted to mention the fact that all the western districts were controlled by the UPA<sup>17</sup>. As far as the latter was concerned, the activities of the Soviet Russian partisans throughout 1943 posed a greater threat than did the Germans. Up to the end of the year, according to one source, UPA-North was involved in 44 engagements with the Germans, and 54 with the Soviet Russian partisans<sup>18</sup>. The groups of Kovpak, Mikhailov and Medvedev were skilled in partisan warfare, frequently posing as UPA units in order to infiltrate nationalist-held areas. In October 1943, one Nikolai Ivanovich Kuznetsov, a member of the reconnaissance unit of Medvedev's Soviet Russian partisans, succeeded in assassinating a high ranking official of the *Reichskommissariat* leaving behind "evidence" to suggest that it was the work of the OUN. The Germans executed six hundred Ukrainians in reprisal<sup>19</sup>. As a general rule the UPA did not attack units of the Wehrmacht, but did its best to disrupt the German administration, particularly the *Ostarbeiter* programme, and most of its clashes were with German security forces and auxiliary police units. (As the Ukrainian police deserted to the UPA, the Germans tended to replace them with Poles). Raids were made to secure arms and ammunition, to free Ukrainian prisoners, and in retaliation for German atrocities against the civil popula-

<sup>16</sup> Reitlinger, p. 247.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* p. 245.

<sup>18</sup> Tys-Krokhmaluk, p. 246.

<sup>19</sup> Confirmed later by Medvedev. Kuznetsov was later captured and executed by the UPA.

tion. Typical actions were those of 16-17 July 1943, when the UPA captured the town of Stepanska Huta, the capture of a train loaded with arms and ammunition on 29 July, and the capture of the military centre of Kamin Kosyrskiy on 20 August. A large-scale engagement (by the standards of this type of warfare) took place at Radovych on 7 September. Three UPA battalions were involved, the Germans suffered over 300 killed, and the garrison at Kovel had to be hurriedly evacuated.

In May 1943, while travelling with a strong escort, General Victor Lutze, Head of the German *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD) in Ukraine, was ambushed by a UPA company at Klevan, near Rivne, and killed. Following this, the Germans launched a major operation against the UPA commanded by SS General von dem Bach-Zalewski with ten battalions of motorised SS troops with heavy weapons and artillery, 10,000 German and Polish police, 2 Hungarian regiments and 3 Cossack battalions recruited from Soviet Russian prisoners of war. In addition, there were 50 tanks, 27 aircraft and 5 armoured trains. The operation was not a success. It was directed mainly against the civil population rather than the armed forces of the UPA; in some cases whole villages were wiped out and their inhabitants massacred. This was counter-productive, leading to increased recruitment to the UPA. Furthermore, German intelligence assumed that UPA-North was based south of the line Brest-Kovel-Rovno-Shepetivka, and, consequently, operations were confined to this area. In actual fact, the UPA strongholds were north of this line, between the Prypiat and Horyn rivers.

By the closing months of 1943 the whole German eastern front was being pushed back. Wishing to occupy defensive lines on the Dnipro near Kyiv, the Germans mounted an offensive in October and November to clear the hinterland of partisans, both Soviet Russian and nationalist, which meant establishing control over the Carpathian mountains. The Ukrainian population here had already been organised by the OUN into self-defence "village militias" (known as SKVs). As a result of German operations they became integrated into the UPA-West command. During the second half of November 1943 there was a series of engagements between German and UPA forces in the Chornyi Lis (Black Forest) area. The insurgents, though out-numbered, had the advantage of knowing the terrain which was in any case ideally suited to partisan warfare. Although Ukrainian casualties were heavy, the region was secured and provided a base for future anti-Soviet operations. At this time the UPA was simultaneously fighting the Germans and the Soviet Russian partisans. A further complication was provided by the activities of Polish partisan groups formed to resist the Germans and operating in Ukrainian ethnic territory. They were frequently hostile to the civil population and sometimes co-operated with the Soviet Russian partisans. The long history of Polish-Ukrainian hostility and the designs of many Polish nationalists on Ukrainian territory made an understanding between the Polish and Ukrainian under-

grounds difficult to achieve and there was sporadic fighting between the UPA and the Polish groups<sup>20</sup>.

In the autumn of 1943 the Germans began to round up those Ukrainian nationalist leaders still at large. Borovets and Stuhl were arrested and joined Bandera and his associates in Sachsenhausen. Early in 1944 the OUN-M leadership received the same treatment, Melnyk himself being arrested in January. All were held there until the end of the year. Yet at the same time the Germans were making serious attempts to enlist Ukrainian support against the Soviet Russians — the inconsistency of their policy towards Ukraine, already noted, was again apparent. High army circles including General von Schenkendorff had been trying for some time to persuade Hitler that help must be enlisted from the Kremlin's former subjects<sup>21</sup>. In the General Government the SS persuaded Himmler's staff to permit the recruitment of Galicians into the German armed forces. (The situation in Galicia was relatively peaceful, at least until Kovpak's incursions). As a result the Division "Galicia" was formed on 4 May 1943. The OUN-M supported it, and the OUN-B did not actively work against it, although since the war they have claimed that they never agreed with this sort of collaboration, and have denounced those nationalist groups who did. Shukhevych, the UPA Commander-in-Chief, thought it would provide valuable military training and ordered many UPA-members to join. The Germans made important concessions — there was to be no Nazi propaganda, and the Division would not be used against the Western Allies. Furthermore, it was allowed its own chaplains. Metropolitan Sheptytskyi of the Ukrainian Catholic Church gave his blessing to the venture, despite the fact that he believed (after witnessing Nazi massacres of the Jews in Lviv) that Nazism on balance was a greater evil even than communism.

In view of the many atrocities perpetrated by the SS on the Ukrainian population it might appear surprising that the "Galicia" Division received so much support. In fact, it is understandable given the nationalists' attempts to create an effective military force, the lack of which had proved disastrous in 1918. The UPA were not short of volunteers, but desperately needed trained officers. When it became clear that Germany could not win, the Ukrainians expected, and indeed hoped for, a protracted struggle in which the two opposed dictatorships would exhaust their strength, providing an opportunity for the establishment of an independent state. No one expected that the Soviet Russians would win so quickly and conclusively. And in the last resort it seemed inconceivable to the nationalist leaders that the USA and Britain (especially Britain) would ever allow the Soviet Union to overrun and enslave Central and Eastern Europe. Their failure to appreciate the true

20 For a complete study of this particular aspect see Peter J. Potichnyj, *Poland and Ukraine Past and Present*, (Toronto, 1980) esp. pp. 229-271.

21 Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, p. 167.

intentions of the Western Allies is perfectly understandable, but no less tragic for that. The Division "Galicia" was not committed to battle until the summer of 1944 when it was used to cover the Galician capital Lviv. By 20 July, after the Battle of Brody, it was no longer an effective fighting unit, and many escaped to join the UPA.

In February 1944 the Germans appealed to the UPA to cooperate in the struggle against the Soviet Russians, but the UPA high command strictly forbade any co-operation with the Germans; indeed, two UPA commanders who entered into negotiations were court-martialled and shot<sup>22</sup>. As the situation in the East grew worse for the Germans, they made greater efforts to enlist the support of anti-Bolshevik elements, although they never seem to have come to a firm decision as to whether to support the Ukrainian or the Vlassov movement<sup>23</sup>. Vlassov, a former Red Army General who had "defected", was allowed to form a committee in Prague in November 1944, for the liberation of the people of Russia (sic) — *Komitet Osvobozhdeniia Narodov Rosiyyi* or KONR, out of which grew the Russian Liberation Army or ROA. Although some Kyivan Ukrainians joined the KONR, the OUN leadership denounced the movement, seeing Vlassov as a Great Russian hegemonist. Many Germans, however, believed that Vlassov could serve as a rallying point for all anti-Bolshevik groups<sup>24</sup>. A large number of released Ukrainian prisoners of war did find themselves in the ROA. At the same time the "Galicia" Division was re-formed as the 1st Ukrainian Division and a 2nd Division was organised for East Ukrainians. When, finally, they surrendered to the British and Americans, many East Ukrainians escaped "repatriation" to the Soviet Union by claiming to be from Galicia. By the autumn of 1944 German propaganda was even describing the UPA as "Ukrainian freedom fighters" where a few months previously they had been "Ukrainian nationalist brigands". In conclusion, military co-operation with Germany had some benefits. It provided valuable training for men who were late to join the ranks of the UPA, and formed a rallying point for Ukrainians who might otherwise have attached themselves to the Vlassov movement. It gave some an escape route to the West. However, in the long run the Ukrainians could not expect much from Germany. As George Fischer writes:

"The Ukrainians were too numerous, the nationalism of the Galicians too extreme, and their homeland's exploitation too important to Germany to permit such independence for long. Indeed the OUN's 'state' was dissolved within a month after which the Ukraine was the least favoured of the potentially separatist areas"<sup>25</sup>.

<sup>22</sup> Tys-Krokhmaluk, p. 247.

<sup>23</sup> Armstrong, *Op cit.*, p. 185.

<sup>24</sup> For an analysis of German attitudes to the Vlassov movement, see George Fischer *Soviet Opposition to Stalin* (Cambridge Mass. 1952).

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.* p. 21.

## UPA against the Soviet Russians — The Ten Year Struggle 1943-53

As early as 1943 a special department was set up within the All-Union Partisan Staff in Moscow to study Ukrainian partisan movements under the German occupation, and one of General Kovpak's objectives on his two raids into Galicia was to gauge the strength of the nationalist forces. The Soviet Russians were able to infiltrate agents into the OUN and the UPA, and had a network of local informers or *sek-sots*. Often they were unmasked by the UPA's counter-intelligence service and dealt with by the security service (the SB), an organisation of the OUN which worked closely with the UPA and proved itself efficient. Suspected agents and informers were court-martialled and executed. An example of Soviet Russian infiltration is the case of NKVD Major Chkheidze, who posed as an anti-Soviet Georgian and was zealous in unmasking agents and in some cases executing them personally<sup>26</sup>. It transpired that the Partisan Staff in Moscow had supplied him with a list of the less important agents, so that by denouncing them he could improve his standing with the UPA. The Russians were assisted in their task of infiltration by the "deconspiracy" of the movement which accompanied the decision of the OUN-B to adopt large-scale overt resistance to German rule.

The advance of the Red Armies into Volhynia in the spring of 1944 was accompanied by the conscription of Ukrainians of military age into the Soviet forces. Those suspected of nationalist activity (bourgeois nationalism) were usually sent to penal battalions which were regarded as completely expendable. As a result the UPA was flooded with volunteers, many of whom were unsuitable or politically unreliable. In March Marshal Vatutin, one of the ablest of the Soviet Russian generals, was ambushed by the UPA while travelling in convoy to Rivne and was mortally wounded. The official Soviet line was that he died of wounds received at the front.

The UPA tactics were to avoid combat with the Red Army, and concentrate on the NKVD and police units coming up behind; to resist as far as possible the restoration of Soviet Russian military and civilian authority; to try and prevent the restoration of collective farms and the requisitioning of grain; and to fight Russian attempts to deport whole sections of the population and replace them with Russians. The Soviet Russian operations against the UPA began with propaganda appeals to the insurgents to lay down their arms, promising amnesty, and to the local population to try and discredit the nationalists by branding them as paid agents of the Nazis. Sometimes NKVD murder squads would don UPA uniform and terrorise the local population. The military offensive began on 26 March with 2 infantry divisions, 2

<sup>26</sup> Martovych. *Op. cit.*, p. 114.

\* As illustrated by the unique Soviet mine-clearing technique.

NKVD brigades, an armoured brigade, 2 NKVD frontier police regiments and a few thousand militia and Soviet Russian partisans. Their starting point was the line Kovel-Rivne-Shepetivka, and they moved north to confront the UPA who had formed defensive positions along the Sluch river. A battle fought near the town of Hurby from 22 to 25 April resulted in some tactical success for the insurgents, but casualties were high and thereafter operations with large units were discontinued except on rare occasions.

South of the Dnister, in the Black Forest area of the Carpathian mountains near the town of Stanislaviv (now Ivano-Frankivsk), a three-cornered battle involving the UPA-West, a Soviet Russian partisan force (remnants of a Red Army unit which had been cut off) and German forces took place, with sporadic fighting between April and June 1944. The UPA could not risk losing its stronghold in the Carpathians; when the Germans finally withdrew, the remaining Russian partisans were destroyed by the insurgents. The second operation against the insurgents began in July, and like the first, was not too successful. By now the UPA had re-organised itself in smaller units, had amassed arms and ammunition, and was preparing a series of raids into East Ukraine. Although Soviet Russian propaganda plays down the significance of the UPA, there is little doubt that Stalin regarded the situation, particularly in West Ukraine, as being very serious.

Under the direction of Nikita S. Khrushchev three large-scale offensives were carried out against the insurgents, the first during the winter of 1944-45, the second during May and June 1945, and the third beginning in the winter of 1945-46 and lasting through the following spring. The exact number of Soviet forces involved is not known for certain, but was considerable; one Ukrainian source puts the figure for the third offensive at 585,000, mostly special NKVD\*\* units<sup>27</sup>. In Khrushchev's own supposed memoirs we read:

"During the war (Bandera) fought against both us and the Germans. Later, after the war we lost thousands of men in a bitter struggle between the Ukrainian nationalists and the forces of Soviet power"<sup>28</sup>.

It was originally planned to use Red Army units which were being moved from west to east after the final collapse of Germany, but they proved somewhat susceptible to UPA propaganda and were replaced by specially trained units, mostly of ethnic Russian origin. Ruthless methods were used; forests which could provide cover were burned, along with entire villages whose population was deported to the interior. There were mass-scale deportations, mostly to Siberia or Kazakhstan, in the spring and summer of 1945. So-called *istrebitel* units (punitive units consisting of criminal elements) were let loose on the population. Ukrainian sources claim that in 1946 the Russians used a form of bacteriological warfare. In addition to poisoning wells and food stores

\*\* Redesignated MVD — MGB after the war.

27 Lev Shankovsky, quoted in Tys-Krokhmaluk, p. 30.

28 Crankshaw, *Op cit*.



it is said that they flooded the black market with poisoned anti-typhoid vaccine knowing that this was where UPA doctors acquired drugs<sup>29</sup>. Some maintain that special units were formed consisting of men with Siberian syphilis who were encouraged to spread the disease by raping as many Ukrainian women as possible<sup>30</sup>.

What is certain, however, is that there was a famine in Ukraine during 1946 and 1947, caused by prolonged drought and the effects of ruined agriculture. For the UPA the winter of 1946-7 was a particularly hard time. They were virtually unable to conduct operations in the open and were forced to hide out in bunkers, constructed underground in the forests and elaborately camouflaged and guarded.

Khrushchev's third offensive was directed in particular against the underground organisation of the OUN, and seems in part to have been provoked by a fairly effective boycott of the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR instigated by the UHVR. The countryside was saturated with police backed up by the *sek-sot* network, and suspected persons were arrested and deported. Despite great difficulties and serious losses, the determination to resist was if anything intensified by a new wave of religious persecution, directed at the Uniate Church (more correctly, the Ukrainian Catholic Church of the Eastern Rite) to which most Ukrainians in Galicia adhere. In April Archbishop Slipyi of Lviv (he succeeded Sheptytskyi on the latter's death in 1944) was arrested along with six other Galician bishops. Within the next few years the remaining Ukrainian bishops, together with many priests and faithful, were also rounded up. The Church was forced underground.

In 1945 groups of the UPA made raids into Carpatho-Ukraine, Hungary, Rumania and Slovakia. Other groups went north to Lithuania. In partisan terminology a raid is a long march, executed by a unit on the basis of a specific tactic and for the purpose of attaining a designated objective. In the cases mentioned above the objective was political, namely to spread anti-Bolshevik propaganda. Similarly, raids into Eastern Ukraine from 1944 onwards explained the nature of the "liberation movement" and called on the peasants to join in the common struggle against the Bolsheviks.

After the war UPA-OUN activity in East Ukraine was very limited, but some groups did operate in the area near Cherkasy and in the Chernihiv region<sup>31</sup>. Nationalist activity never seems to have been very strong in Carpatho-Ukraine, despite the suitable terrain and the proximity of the area to Hungary, Slovakia and Rumania. Here the Soviet Russian partisans were able to play on the anti-Hungarian feelings of the rural population to some effect.

29 Tys-Krokhmaliuk, p. 285.

30 e.g. Martovych, *Op cit.*, p. 131. It sounds far-fetched, but in the context of Stalin's USSR is not wholly incredible.

31 This is even confirmed by an official Soviet source, viz. a history of the UkSSR pub. 1958. See Armstrong p. 294n.

The UPA was active after the war in Poland, where it made raids from 1945 onwards in co-operation with Polish anti-communist groups. The Polish-Soviet "treaty" of 16 August 1945, which fixed the boundary between the two states, made provision for the transfer of Ukrainians living on the western side of the Curzon line across the border to the USSR. In most cases this had to be carried out forcibly and the army and police of the Polish communist government found themselves being opposed by units of the UPA-West<sup>32</sup>. On 28 March 1947 the UPA ambushed and killed the Polish deputy defence minister, General Swierszczewski. This led to the signing of a tripartite pact involving the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia for the purpose of concerting military action against the UPA. The activities of the UPA-West in Slovakia during 1947, where they were supported by Slovak opponents of the Prague government, received coverage in the Western press due to the relatively free access permitted to foreign correspondents by the Czech government at this time. In the autumn of the same year a group of the UPA entered the American zone and surrendered to the military authorities, hoping thereby to alert the West as to the true state of affairs behind the Iron Curtain. The UHVR's foreign service, directed by Mykola Lebed, sent appeals to the Vatican, the American Secretary of State, Winston Churchill and others. Nationalist propaganda stressed that the UPA was involved in a legitimate struggle, and pointed out that the insurgents wore uniforms and insignia, and respected international rules regarding the conduct of warfare. (The latter claim seems to have been largely true. Prisoners were usually disarmed and released. The opponents of the UPA, however, did not apply the same rules to them.)

Evidence is scanty concerning UPA-OUN activities in the Soviet Union during the post-war period. The assassination of Father Kostelnyk, who had left the Ukrainian Catholic Church to become a propagandist for the Russian Orthodox Church, may have been the work of the nationalists. The assassination of Yaroslav Halan, the pro-communist Galician writer on 24 October 1949 probably was. As late as the end of 1949 most peasants in the principal UPA areas had still not been collectivised, which seems to testify to the strength of the organised opposition. However, the rate of attrition among the leadership was high, and on 5 March 1950 General Shukhevych-Chuprynka was killed in an MVD ambush. Open resistance was largely at an end by 1953, although the movement still exists as an underground organisation.

## Conclusion

"If one takes into account duration, geographical extent and intensity of activity, the UPA is probably the most important example of forceful resistance

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32 Polish communist military writers. e.g. Ignacy Blum. supplement Ukrainian accounts of those actions.

to communist rule"<sup>33</sup>. This is Armstrong's view and in itself represents no small achievement. That achievement was made possible by several factors. Firstly, the terrain in which the UPA operated, chiefly the forests and marshes of Polissia and Volhynia and the Carpathian mountains, which was impenetrable to regular units yet close to food sources. Next there was the nearly unanimous support of the local population, a large nationality group (some forty million) to provide a supporting base, a powerful nationalist ideology, an effective organisational structure, and a good supply of arms at the outset. Its success can mainly be measured in political and psychological terms, but was achieved at the cost of enormous losses<sup>\*\*\*</sup>.

Since Stalin's death the Soviet government has made great efforts to foster the concept of the mutual interdependence of Russia and Ukraine, with Russia as the senior partner. For example, in 1954 the tercentenary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav between Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and the Russian Tsar Alexis was celebrated officially, and Ukraine's greatest literary figure, the early 19th century poet Shevchenko is given due prominence. There is stress on the UkSSR as a separate legal entity (Stalin set up a foreign ministry in Kyiv and gave the Republic its own seat at the United Nations), but obviously no genuine independence is tolerated or envisaged. Attempts at "Russification" proceed, and it is noticeable that the Communist Party apparatus in the UkSSR contains a high proportion of Russians. Ukrainian nationalists are active in the West, especially in the United States and Canada. Most of the Ukrainian "Displaced Persons" after the war were from Western Ukraine, whose nationalism was always more fervent than that of the East Ukrainians. From the Soviet Russian point of view, Ukrainian nationalism does not pose any immediate threat, and its manifestations can be quickly dealt with by the security organs of the state. But an alteration in the power balance in Central Europe, resulting from a major war, might well present the Russians with a highly unwelcome repetition of 1918 and 1941. The economic importance and geographical position of Ukraine, whose 42.3 million people (in the USSR alone) represent the second largest ethnic group in the USSR, make it imperative that the Russians maintain their hold on the area. Unless and until the Ukrainians can be completely reconciled to both Russian domination and the Soviet system, neither of which has greatly appealed to them in the past, the Soviet Russian leaders have every reason to feel uncertain of the consequences should they ever become involved in a major land war with NATO.

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<sup>33</sup> Armstrong, p. 300.

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> Bandera himself was assassinated by a KGB agent in Munich in 1959.

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Wolodymyr SLEZ

## P. D. YURKEVYCH — THE NEGLECTED PHILOSOPHER

(Part 1)

Little is known about the Ukrainian philosopher Pamphil D. Yurkevych despite his obvious contribution to philosophical thought. As Rev. S. Jarmus has pointed out, most of what has been written about him hitherto has been of a fragmentary, biographic or publicistic nature. Like many of his accomplished fellow countrymen he has shared the tragic historical fate and obscurity of his homeland.

Son of a Ukrainian Orthodox priest, Pamphil Danylovych Yurkevych was born on 16 February 1826 in Poltava. After completing his studies in humanities and theology at the Poltava Seminary he attended the Kyiv Theological Academy (1847-51) and in 1851 was appointed to the Chair in Philosophy at the Academy. In 1861 he took up the invitation to teach philosophy at the University of Moscow where he also taught pedagogy at the Teachers' Seminary. In 1869 he was appointed Dean of the Historical Faculty, a post which he retained until his untimely death in 1874.

Yurkevych's most productive years were spent in Kyiv; his creative powers atrophied in Moscow. In all he wrote ten treatises:

1. *The Idea* (1859).
2. *Materialism and the Duties of Philosophy* (1860).
3. *The Heart and Its Meaning in the Spiritual Life of Man according to the Word of God* (1860).
4. *Peace with Fellow Men as the Condition of Christian Community* (1861).
5. *Teachings on the Spirit of Man* (1860).
6. *Apropos the Articles of Theological Content Published in the Lexicon of Philosophy* (1861).
7. *Proof of the Existence of God* (1861).
8. *The Language of the Physiologists and Psychologists* (1862).
9. *Reason According to Plato and Existence According to Kant* (1865-66).
10. *The Play of the Hidden Forces* (1870).

In addition he published two books on education:

1. *Readings in Education* (1865).
2. *A Course in General Pedagogics* (1869).

All the above works were written in Russian. The Valuyevskiy Ukaz (1863) banned all publications in the Ukrainian language except some private literary works which were nevertheless subject to censorship.

Yurkevych's idealist philosophy cannot be identified with any specific school of thought, though the term Concrete Idealism with its stress on concrete knowledge as opposed to abstract thought, has been applied. In this he approaches Kierkegaard. Familiar with the works of Plato, Kant, Spinoza, Descartes, Hume, Newton, Leibnitz, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Steintal, Boehme and Swedenborg, Yurkevych maintained that philosophy, as every other branch of science, depends on the condition of true knowledge. If it cannot back its claims for true knowledge by the positive sciences it is not true philosophy. His theses are based largely on the teachings of the Bible tested against the evidence of contemporary science.

Yurkevych's philosophy of the heart is rooted in Ukrainian philosophical tradition which gives the emotions predominance over reason. This is evident in Pre-Christian Ukrainian mores, the Medieval Ukrainian thought and ethics of the 11th-13th century, the writings of Kyrilo Tranqvilion Stavroverskyi in the 17th century and the philosophy of Hryhoriy Savych Skovoroda in the 18th century. This legacy is shared by P. Kulish, M. Hohol (Nikolai Gogol) and Taras Shevchenko. The heart, very much in the biblical sense (devoid of sentimentalism), is regarded as the centre of man's entire bodily and spiritual life.

Yurkevych's treatise *The Heart and Its Meaning in the Spiritual Life of Man According to the Word of God* is crucial to his understanding of the heart as the centre of human life. He believes it to be the guardian and carrier of all the physical powers of man, the centre of life for man's soul and spirit, the citadel of all the activities of knowledge and the centre of the manifold spiritual feelings, disturbances and passions.

Reason is subordinated to the heart. Knowledge must become the warmth and life of the spirit by first penetrating the heart. The "thought of the heart" grasps the truth immediately while reason recognises a kind of "delay".

Yurkevych sets great store by heartfelt conviction. A man is to be valued not by the amount of truth he knows, not by his knowledge, but by what truth means to him, how it affects him and what he does with his knowledge of the truth. When evaluating a man we should establish where his spiritual interest lies, what arouses his sympathy, what brings him joy and what grieves him. We need to know the treasure of his heart.

Yuriy Lavrynenko provides the following representation of Yurkevych's juxtaposition of the heart (emotion) and the head (reason):

**THE HEAD (REASON)**

1. The superstructure of the human psyche.
2. Cognition in the form of inanimate, but orderly schemes.
3. Governs, directs & regulates. The upper part of spiritual life.
4. Abstraction and generalisation. Common to all people.
5. Calculation.
6. The theoretical element of the spirit. The basis of calculation.
7. Regularity, correctness and complexity which is open to analysis.
8. The result of the development from lower to higher forms. Mobile.
9. Is enriched by gaining new external features (progress).
10. Governs conception.
11. The illuminator and the light.
12. Is peripheral, readily accessible and conscious.
13. The human being is only a "series produced" standard unit, the simple representation of its kind.
14. Ethics are "formal" and "abstract". Morality is based on gain, design, agreement or egoism. Utilitarian approach to the world.
15. Tends to run dry and expire.

**THE HEART (EMOTION)**

The basis of the psyche.

Perception of the world as it is: diverse, alive and beautiful.

Originates. The root & seed of spiritual life.

Concrete and individual. The heart denotes the individuality of man. Intuition.

The practical, moral element of the spirit. The basis of will, affects and intuition.

A simple, elementary entity which has no constituent parts and escapes analysis.

From the beginning it has had its own completely original contents which resemble other primitive (e.g. animal) forms of the psyche, but is completely separate and original.

Grows in the self-fulfilment of its inexhaustible possibilities (organic growth).

It grasps the idea, sometimes even manifests it.

A dark, unfathomable domain, the basis where the illuminator can appear and which can sporadically, through some of its manifestations, come to light.

Hidden usually in the depths. Subconscious which is in some measure conscious.

Man is a unique individual, one of his kind in the whole world.

Morality is based on an inborn feeling of compassion, on the ability to recognise the order of things and an unmercenary interest in them. An ethical-aesthetic attitude to the world.

The continual source of new life, new aspirations and stirrings which are contained in final forms of spiritual life and make it fit for eternity<sup>1</sup>.

Yurkevych shows the tendency of reason to be formal, abstract, schematic and utilitarian and yet at the same time specific. He never refutes the validity of reason, only its extreme manifestations. The heart emerges as a kind of underlying essence, free and spontaneous, with an undogmatic, fathomless quality. It is both disinterested and concerned.

<sup>1</sup> Dyvnych Yu.: "Viyaduk u maybutne", *Litavry*, No. 1, Salzburg, 1947, p. 61-62.

The task of mankind is not to choose between the two, but to bring them into harmony.

As regards cognition, the absolute is inaccessible to man though he can acquire knowledge of it by heartfelt, religious feeling, sincere and conscious philosophic meditation and sincere and conscious mystical insight.

For an understanding of the mystery of life and the individual the world of ideas per se is inadequate. There has to be a real, concrete, existential context and dimension to enable ideas to be comprehensible and meaningful to man.

In the field of ethics the heart also demands free, heartfelt action and morality. Yurkevych regards this as more valid than obedience to law per se. He seeks to develop the consciousness and self-awareness of the individual. However, for him the subconscious (the deep emotional nature of man) is higher and above the conscious.

Yurkevych refutes the idea that man's spirit is determined automatically by the family and the community. The development of personality is not determined by an outside force. The individual soul has its own particular destiny to fulfil. Man can never be the expression or the organ of the communal or family life-soul. Our words, thoughts and actions are born not out of the communal or family substance of the human soul, but from our own particularly developed, specifically personified spiritual life.

Clearly, Yurkevych values the individual whose free and independent development should be guaranteed by the existing order. Society should be based on the individual and his initiatives and therefore essentially democratic. The social order must not be imposed from above by the masses, but emerge from the individual.

Contemporary Ukrainian poets and intellectuals reiterate this belief in the value of the individual. In his poem *Ya Vasyl Symonenko* writes:

"We are not a multitude of standard units,  
But an ocean of different universes".

Meanwhile, Yevhen Sverstyuk in *Sobor u ryshtovanni* in his quest for social reform, reminds us that we must begin by reshaping the individual who is the basis of society.

Naturally, Yurkevych is an enemy of totalitarianism which may be a contributory factor to his unpopularity in Imperial Russia.

Yurkevych believes that it is not natural for man to live in enmity with his neighbour. He refutes the validity of the law of the jungle when applied to human society. Indeed, in his treatise *Peace with Fellow Men as the Condition of Christian Community* he states:

"Man needs to express himself, to be understood, to be spiritually supported and nurtured, to be able to share and to accept the thoughts, the wishes, the joys and the sufferings of other people. This gives him the sense of human-ness (of being human)".

Peace between men is possible through faith in Christ, Christianity trans-



lated from the realm of thought to concrete reality. As Rev. Jarmus points out:

"Here we have the same concerns we find in Kierkegaard. Yurkevych is not satisfied with the speculative truth of Christianity; he wants the truth of Christ to become the motivating force of man's existence. Thus, Yurkevych, like Kierkegaard, moves away from the speculative philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel, the sceptical philosophy of Kant and speaks positively about man's concrete existence<sup>2</sup>."

Yurkevych is an opponent of the rationalistic, sceptical and nihilistic school of thought. This was to bring him into conflict with the Russian materialist philosophers of his day and their preoccupation with natural science and materialism. His ideological rivals were his equals neither in the sphere of thought nor in the plane of human ethics.

When in 1860 Nilolai Chernyshevsky published *The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy*, Yurkevych responded with a critique of the said work which appeared in the journal *Russkiy Vestnik*. In it he points out a whole series of errors and groundless conclusions made by Chernyshevsky.

Angered by Yurkevych's critique Chernyshevsky protested to Dudyshkin, editor of *Russkiy Vestnik*:

"So to you it seems unbelievable that I was interested enough to read Mr. Yurkevych's article. . . shall I have to prove it to you? Please. . . I feel myself so much above the thinkers of Yurkevych's school that I am completely disinterested in knowing what they think of me<sup>3</sup>."

Chernyshevsky did not bother to read Yurkevych's critique. His reaction is typical of the general attitude towards Yurkevych. Slander, ridicule and obscurity have been the reward for his eruditeness, scholarliness and originality both in Tsarist Russia and in the Soviet Union.

H.H. Shpet admits:

"The debate was waged by unequal means. On the side of Yurkevych was knowledge, keen understanding, independent thought. He strove for truth which does not vanish, but stands over time<sup>4</sup>."

More recently B. Hubenko wrote the following:

"He was not a worthy opponent of any polemics. . . and his material did not contain anything worthy of serious scientific discussion<sup>5</sup>."

And lastly, Vladimir Solovyov, Yurkevych's eminent pupil, wrote that the suppression of his master was the work of:

"underdeveloped minds, overpowered by the themes of materialism."  
"charlatanism and deceit<sup>6</sup>."

Yurkevych is credited with sowing the seeds of Christian Existentialism in Eastern Europe. Indeed, his influence on the Russian philosophers Solovyov, Berdyayev and Bulgakov is considerable. Rev. Jarmus maintains that 20th century Russian Intuitivism and Existentialism must be traced back to Yurke-

2 Rev. S. Jarmus: *Pamphil D. Yurkevych & His Philosophic Legacy*, St. Andrews College, Winnipeg, 1979, p. 43.

3 *Complete Collection of Works* (Moscow, 1950), p. 764-765.

4 "The Philosophic Legacy of P. D. Yurkevych", *Voprosy Filosofiyyi i Psichologiyi*, 1914, V.

5 B. Hubenko. *Z Istoriyi Idealistichnoyi Filosofiyyi na Ukrayini, Borot'ba mizh Materializmom ta Idealizmom na Ukrayini v XIX st.*, (Kyiv), p. 108-109.

6 "O Filosofskikh Trudakh P. D. Yurkevycha", *Sobraniye Sochineniya V. I.*, p. 187 & 196.

vych. The Russian intuitivists S.L. Frank, N. Losskiy and A. Losev owe a great deal to Yurkevych.

Parallels have been found between Yurkevych and some 20th century philosophers.

The heart is an important component in Max Scheler's theory of emotional intuitivism which he formulated over fifty years after Yurkevych. In his work *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materielle Werteethik* (1913, 1916), he writes: "feeling is an intentional mental act directed upon objective values and to bringing them into the subject's consciousness." Karl Jasper (1883-1969) insists on man's uniqueness and his value as a free being while Carl Jung (1875-1961) deals with the development of personality and the individuation of man in a manner closely akin to Yurkevych's concept of the intellectual and spiritual development of man.

The ideas with which Yurkevych wrestled in the 1850s and 1860s engaged the minds of prominent thinkers in Western Europe 50 to 80 years later!

Yurkevych emerges as a Christian thinker steeped in Ukrainian and universal philosophical tradition. He shared the fate of his neglected homeland and was unable (as many Ukrainian artists and thinkers today) to publish in Ukrainian. Yurkevych once wrote:

"Our epoch, indeed, is the complete opposite of the Middle Ages. It happens very often that in the name of the completely innocent natural sciences they persecute and torture people for their love of spiritual truth, as the honourable inquisitors once tortured and persecuted people in Christ's name for their love of the truth of natural science."

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This introduction is based largely on the observation and insights of Rev. S. Jarmus in his book *Pamphil D. Yurkevych and His Philosophic Legacy*. We wish to thank Rev. Jarmus for kindly allowing us to publish translations in English of treatises by Yurkevych which recently appeared in *Pamphil D. Yurkevych — Works*, edited by Rev. Jarmus of St. Andrew's College in Winnipeg.

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### THE HEART AND ITS MEANING IN THE SPIRITUAL LIFE OF MAN ACCORDING TO THE WORD OF GOD\*

Anyone who read the Word of God with proper attention can see easily that all the sacred tomes and every writer inspired by God regard the heart as the centre of man's entire corporal and spiritual life, the vital organ and the very cradle of all the forces, functions, motions, desires, feelings and thoughts of mankind with all their tendencies and nuances. First and foremost let us consider some passages in the Holy Bible which demonstrate that the deliberations of the sacred writers on the essence and meaning of the human heart

\* Published in *Trudy Kyievskoy Dukhovnoy Akademiyi* (Works of the Kyivan Theological Academy) 1860, 1, p. 63-118.

in every walk of human life are distinguished by precision, clarity and all the signs of conscious conviction. We will then compare the teachings of the Bible with the prevalent views in contemporary science on this subject.

The heart is the guardian and carrier of all the corporal powers of mankind. David expresses his physical exhaustion from painful suffering thus: "*therefore my heart faileth me*" (Psalm 40, 12); "*My heart panteth, my strength faileth me*" (Psalm 38, 10). The weary pilgrim "*comforts his heart with a morsel of bread*" (Judges 19, 5) and in general, "*wine. . . maketh glad the heart of man. . . and bread which strengtheneth man's heart*" (Psalm 104, 5). Accordingly, the heart withers when man forgets "*to eat his bread*" (Psalm 101, 5). Intemperance overcharges the heart "*with surfeiting and drunkenness*" (Luke 21, 34), "*nourishes the heart, as in a day of slaughter*" (James 5, 5). Merciful God "*fills our hearts with food and gladness*" (Acts 14, 17).

The heart is the centre of life of the soul and spirit of mankind.

The heart is where man's decision to take this or that action originates and is conceived. It is where different intentions and desires arise. The heart is the seat of the will and its desires. These actions of intention, desire and resolution are defined in the following expressions: "*and I gave my heart*" (Eccl. 1, 13); "*But Daniel purposed in his heart*" (Dan. 1, 8); "*and it was in the heart of David my father*" (1 Kings 8, 17). The same idea is expressed in the following: "*my heart's desire*" (Romans 10, 2), "*as he purposeth in his heart*" (2 Corinth. 9, 7), "*purpose of heart*" (Acts 11, 23). Ancient Israel had to bring gifts for the building of a tabernacle, "*whosoever was of a willing heart*" (Exodus 35, 5), "*and everyone whom his spirit made willing*" (v. 21). Anyone who expresses his wishes speaks of "*all that is in his heart*" (1 Kings 10, 2). When we do something willingly then our action comes "*from the heart*" (Romans 6, 17). Whoever we love we give our hearts to and vice-versa, we have that person in our heart: "*My son, give me thine heart*" (Prov. 23, 26); "*ye are in our hearts*" (2 Corinth. 7, 3); "*I have you in my heart*" (Philippians 1, 7).

The heart is at the root of all the cognitive processes of the soul. Meditation is "*the preparation of the heart*" (Prov. 16, 1), the admonishment of the heart: "*then I consulted with myself*" (Nehem. 5, 7). To consider "*in thine heart*" (Deuter. 8, 5) is to understand; to "*know in all your hearts*" (Joshua 23, 14) is to understand entirely. Anyone who does not have a "*heart to perceive*" does not have "*eyes to see*" and "*ears to hear*" (Deuter. 29, 4). When the heart grows fleshy a man loses his ability to observe and understand the most obvious manifestations to Divine Providence: "*ears are made heavy*" and "*eyes shut*" (Isiah 6, 10). In general these are "*the thoughts of the heart*" (Genesis 6, 5). A wicked person has a "*heart that deviseth wicked imaginations*" (Prov. 6, 18). False prophets prophecy "*the deceit of their heart*" (Jerem. 14, 14), "*they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the*

<sup>7</sup> The English translations of this and subsequent quotes from the Bible are taken from the Bible, Authorized Version, edited by John Stirling and published by the British and Foreign Bible Society, London, OUP, 1959.

mouth of the Lord" (Jerem. 23, 16). Thoughts are "*the counsels of the hearts*" (1 Corinth. 4, 5). The word of God "*is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart*" (Heb. 4, 12). What we remember vividly we engrave in our soul, take possession of or deposit, entrust, store and inscribe in our heart: "*lay up these my words in your heart*" (Deuter. 11, 18); "*set me as a seal upon thine heart*" (Song of Solomon 8, 6); "*But Mary kept all these things, and pondered them in her heart*" (Luke 2, 19); "*write (words of great wisdom) upon the table of thine heart*" (Prov. 3, 3). Every thought or memory which occurs to us wells up "*in the heart*". In the kingdom of glory to the men of great deeds who suffered in the name of truth and faith "*the former shall not be remembered nor come into mind*" (Isiah 65, 17); "*Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard/Neither have entered into the heart of man/The things which God hath prepared for them that love him*" (1 Corinth. 2, 9).

As the word is the manifestation or expression of thought it too springs from "*out of the heart*" (Job 8, 10); "*out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh*" (Matth. 12, 34). And as thought is the discourse between the soul and itself, so the thinker conducts this inner discourse in his heart: "*I command with mine own heart*" (Eccl. 1, 16); "*I said in mine heart*" (Eccl. 2, 1); "*that evil servant shall say in his heart*" (Matt. 24, 48).

The heart is the centre of the various feelings, emotions and passions of the soul. The heart can experience all the degrees of joy, from good humour (Isiah 65, 14) to ecstasy and exultation in the presence of God (Psalm 83, 3 and Acts 2, 46); all the degrees of sorrow, from affection when "*sorrow afflicts the body the heart is wounded*" and when "*sorrow injures a man's heart*"<sup>8</sup> to annihilating grief when a man "*cries for sorrow of heart*" (Isiah 65, 14) and when he feels that his "*heart trembleth, and is moved out of his place*" (Job 37, 1); all the degrees of animosity, from jealousy and "*bitter envying*" (Prov. 23, 17; James 3, 14) to fury when a man gnashes with his teeth (Acts 7, 54) and his heart is hot with vengeance (Deuter. 19, 6); all the degrees of discontent, from restlessness when "*heaviness in the heart of man maketh it stoop*" (Prov. 12, 25) to despair when it "*despairs of all labour*" (Eccl. 2, 20); and finally all kinds of fear from the most reverent awe (Jerem. 32, 40) to suffocating horror and consternation (Deuter. 28, 28; Psalm 14, 4). The heart melts away and is stricken with anguish (Joshua 5, 1; Jerem. 4, 19); according to the various types of tribulation it "*dissolves like wax*"<sup>9</sup> or withers (Psalm 102, 4), warms and stirs itself<sup>10</sup> breaks or is crushed (Jerem. 23, 9)<sup>11</sup>. When dejected a man is "*fearful and fainthearted*" (Deuter. 20, 8). Our hearts "*turn within*" (Hosea 11, 8) in compassion. The blessed word of God acts in the heart like "*a burning fire*" (Jerem. 20, 9); the heart is enflamed and burns when the Divine word shines on it (Luke 24, 32).

Finally, the heart is the centre of the moral life of man. All the moral states of man are concentrated in the heart, from the most exalted, mystic love

<sup>8</sup> The two latter quotes do not appear in Proverbs 25.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., Psalm 21, 16.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., Psalm 38, 4, 72, 21.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., Psalm 146, 3.

of God which calls out: "*God of my heart who is part of me for eternity*"<sup>12</sup> to the kind of arrogance which in adoration of itself thinks it is "*as the heart of God*" and declares "*I am God*" (Ezek. 28, 2). According to the various moral ailments the heart is darkened (Romans 1, 21), made fat (Isiah 6, 10), becomes hardened (Isiah 63, 17), stony (Ezek. 11, 19), inhuman, like a beast's heart (Dan. 4, 13). It becomes evil (Jerem. 16, 2), vain<sup>13</sup> and foolish. The heart is the source of all good and evil words, thoughts and actions; it is the treasury of human good and evil: "*A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good; and an evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is evil*" (Luke 6, 45). The heart is the table on which is written the natural, moral law; on its basis the heathen "*bear witness to the law written in their hearts*" (Romans 2, 15). The table also bears the blessed law: "*My people,*" calls the Lord, "*whose hearts carry my law*" (*commandments*)<sup>14</sup>; "*and write it (the covenant) in their hearts*" (Jerem. 3, 33). Accordingly, the word of God is sown in the "*heart*" (Matth. 13, 19); the conscience has its seat in "*our hearts*" (Heb. 10, 22); Christ "*dwells in our hearts by faith*" (Eph. 3, 17), and has "*given the earnest of the spirit in our hearts*" (2 Corinth. 22). "*And let the peace of God rule in your hearts* (Coloss. 3, 15); "*because the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost*" (Romans 5, 5). "*For god, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts*" (2 Corinth. 4, 6). However, on the other hand the Devil puts evil ideas "*into the heart*" (John 13, 2), fills the heart with evil thoughts (Acts 5, 3). As for those who do not heed the word of God, "*Satan cometh immediately, and taketh away the word that was sown in their hearts*" (Mark 4, 15).

As the centre of the corporal and manifold spiritual life of man, the heart in the issue of life, the source of existence: "*Keep thy heart with all diligence, for out of it are the issues of life*" (Prov. 4, 23); it is the "*sphere of our birth*"<sup>15</sup>, the circle or wheel in whose rotation we exist. Accordingly, it is the deepest part of our existence: "*the heart is the deepest part of man, who can comprehend it*"<sup>16</sup>. This source cannot be exhausted by the external revelations of word, thought or deed; "*the hidden man of the heart*" (1 Peter 3, 4) is open only to God: "*For he knoweth the secrets of the heart*" (Psalm 44, 23). The condition of the heart reflects our entire spiritual disposition (Psalm 51, 12; 84, 3). Mankind should devote its heart to God alone so as to obey Him in thought, word and deed: "*My son, give me thine heart*" (Prov. 23, 25) the wisdom of God calls out to man.

In conformity with this view of the merit and meaning of the heart in human existence the holy scribes speak figuratively "*of the midst of heaven*" (Deuter. 4, 11), "*the heart of the earth*" (Matth. 12, 40), "*in the midst of the seas*" (Jonah 2, 4). In this manner they sometimes describe a spiritual change

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., Psalm 72, 26.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., Psalm 5, 10.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., Psalm 51, 7.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., James 3, 6.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., Jeremiah 17, 9.

in the heart metaphorically as a bodily change. Thus we read in one of the most striking passages of Ezekiel: *"And I will take the stony heart out of their flesh, and will give them an heart of flesh: that they may walk in my statutes and keep mine ordinances"* (Ezek. 11, 19). The apostle Paul writes as follows to the Corinthians: *"Ye are our epistle, written in our hearts, know and read of all men: forasmuch as ye are manifestly declared to be the epistle of Christ ministered by us, written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God; not in tables of stone, but in fleshy tables of the heart"* (2 Corinth. 3, 2-3). These passages demonstrate perfectly plainly that the holy scribes regard the heart as the centre of our bodily existence and the organ of our entire spiritual life the same heart whose beat we feel in our chest. When a man suffers spiritually then this fleshy heart is moved out of its place (Job 37, 1). Our remarks are aimed at those interpreters of the word of God who see in the passages quoted the incidental image of an expression not contained as it were in the given thought and in which it would be fruitless to search for the complete meaning of the essence of the subject under examination as understood by the holy scribes. A simple reading of the holy writ provided we do not misinterpret the previously mentioned ideas confirms immediately that the holy scribes recognised unequivocally and in full awareness of the truth that the heart is the centre of all the phenomena of human physical and spiritual life.

While exalting in this way the importance of the heart in human life the holy scribes knew full well that the head which science acknowledges because of its superiority as the seat of the soul, is in fact closely and tightly bound to the phenomena of spiritual life and is their key organ. Consequently, inasmuch as the body is completed by the head and since as regards the aims of life and their achievement it is not the body which carries the head, but the head the body which it controls, Jesus Christ is regarded as the *"head of the Church which is his body"*<sup>17</sup> (Coloss. 2, 19). The Church, which has many members, is bound up and completed in the single Head ruling it. The blesser lays his hands *"on the head"* of the blessed (Genesis 48, 14; 49, 26) and *"blessings are upon the head of the just"* (Prov. 10, 6); the sanctifier also places his hands *"on the head"* of the sanctified (Lev. 8, 10). Benediction and sanctification, like anointing oil (Psalm 132, 2; Lev. 8, 12) should spread from the head to the whole of man's being pervading all his ways. It is thus that the Holy Ghost appeared to the apostles like tongues of fire and by this miraculous *"imposition of hands"* quickened and enlightened their whole spiritual being (Acts 2, 3, 4). In a similar fashion the healer lays his hands *"on the head"* of the sick (Matth. 9, 18). The dignity of ruler is conferred on a high priest in the Church by the adornment of his *"head"* (Lev. 8, 9). Inasmuch as a ruler is the head of the community it is in recognition of this that *"a crown of pure gold is set on his head"* (Psalm 20, 3).

*"The face of the head"* is an expression or as it were the very reflection of the spiritual state of a man so that in general *"a man will be recognised by*

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., Hebrews 5, 23.

*his appearance, the wise man will be recognised on seeing his face.*"<sup>18</sup> "A man's wisdom maketh his face to shine and the boldness of his face shall be changed" (Eccl. 8, 1). The communion which took place between God and Moses on Mount Sinai was evident in the very brightness of Moses's face: "the skin of his face shone" (Exodus 34, 29). During the glorious Transfiguration of our Lord "his face did shine as the sun" (Matth. 17, 2). The joy and triumph of the angel sent down to the grave of our Lord to bear witness to mankind of the Resurrection of the Saviour were reflected in his radiant face: "His countenance was like lightning" (Matth. 28, 3). Accordingly the "Divine countenance" signifies the complete revelation of the glory of God which man is not fit to receive in this life. As the Lord said to Moses: "Thou canst not see my face: for there shall no man see me, and live" (Exodus 33, 20).

The holy scribes realised, therefore, the considerable importance of the head in the spiritual life of man; however, we repeat, they saw the heart as the centre of this life. To them the head was so to speak the visible pinnacle of this life rooted primarily and directly in the heart. "The head," writes an interpreter of the holy writ, "is to the outer being what the heart is to the inner spiritual being, and only in this sense is a predominant role ascribed to it from the biblical point of view". Besides, the above citations from the Holy Bible demonstrate quite clearly that the head is the organ which "mediates" between the whole essence of the spirit and the influences on it which stem from the outside world and beyond and that it plays a governmental role through the entire order of spiritual activity. Psychology cannot but agree with these definitions whatever its own conceptions on this subject may be in the meantime. However, it is also possible to surmise *a priori* that the phenomena of spiritual activity indicated do not yet exhaust the entire scope of the soul. Since it is necessary to think we are obliged to acknowledge the existence of a certain primary essence which requires the mentioned mediation and direction of the head. This primary spiritual essence has according to the teaching of the word of God the heart as its most immediate organ. In the following explanations we shall see the actual meaning and foundations of these principles. For the present let us note on the strength of the previous discussion that though Jesus Christ be called the head of the Church this does not define fully and comprehensively His relation to the Church. He is the "head" (Ephes. 5, 23) and the "foundation" (1 Corinth. 3, 11), the "light" and "life" of the Church (John 1, 4). He is the "Rock" (Creator) of the Church (Matth. 16, 18) and, therefore, such an extraordinary Head "from which all the body by joints and bands having nourishment ministered and knit together, increaseth with the increase of God" (Coloss. 2, 19). These observations demonstrate how harmonious and consonant the biblical teaching on the human spirit is both in itself and in its explanation of the higher dogmas. Of course, a specific psychological view such as we have here differs from many assertions of contemporary science on the soul. It would be a good idea to examine the grounds on which science diverges from the biblical teaching that

<sup>18</sup> This reference, Ecclesiastes 19, 26, is not given in the Authorized Version.

the heart is the centre and focal point of man's spiritual life. It is possible that thereby it will become evident that the biblical view is not of such little interest to us as to be left out of our study of the soul. It is also possible that we will discover an inner relationship between this view and our moral and religious needs highlighting its importance in particular if not within the narrow confines of science then in the realm and limited aspirations of the human soul to perfection, well-being and God.

On the basis of indisputable physiological factors which we will indicate below psychology teaches that the head or brain together with the nerves connected to it serve as the indispensable and immediate physical organ of the soul forming ideas and thoughts out of impressions received from the outside world, or that this organ alone is the direct controller and carrier of spiritual activity. Linked with this undoubtedly truthful interpretation of the physical organ of spiritual phenomena, there has been in psychology a longstanding particular view of the essence of the human soul; a view which incidentally could, to a certain degree, have also developed freely and independently. When the nerves concentrated in the head are stirred by effects and impressions of the outside world, the direct and immediate consequence of this stirring is the birth in the soul of ideas, notions or perceptions of the outside world. Hence, it is easy to propose that the essential property of the human soul is the very fact that it can conceive or form ideas of the world through the stimulation of the nerves by an exterior object. What actually exists in the nerves as a stirring, unfolds, comes into being and subsists in the soul as an idea. Correspondingly, in philosophy there has been the longstanding view, which even now prevails in part, that the human soul is primarily an entity to which thinking accounts for man's entire spiritual being. The will and feelings of the heart were interpreted as phenomena, phases and fortuitous conditions of thinking. In the proper development of human spiritual life these two secondary faculties coincide with thinking and disperse in it thereby losing all trace of independent existence and substantiality. According to these definitions the substance of the spirit is also revealed and readily examinable as the forms of thinking which among other phenomena of spiritual life are distinguished by particular lucidity and clarity. Any notion that there is *something of the spiritual* in the soul itself, a kind of essentiality which is never exhausted by the processes of thought would be completely incompatible with these definitions. Here for the first time we can see, to a lesser extent, the tendency to explain phenomena where substantiality is not regarded highly or as being most significant in comparison with its phenomena which are accessible to our scrutiny. Whoever, on the contrary, believes that in the human spirit as in every creation of God there are sides which our limited means of knowledge are unable to fathom, can see in advance the importance of the biblical teaching of the *profound* heart whose secrets are known to Divine intelligence alone.

In the meantime it is clear that the psychological teaching under our examination explains with difficulty the possibility and reality of man's free will.



Furthermore, it does not easily acknowledge the moral value and import of human action, which stems from the direct impulses and feelings of the heart, and is not determined by an abstract thought concerning duty and obligation. Consequently, philosophy has so frequently rejected man's freedom and has so frequently affirmed that the lives of man and mankind are dominated by the same insuperable inevitability found in the logical deductions of thought which are made not freely, but out of necessity according to the nature and meaning of the premises. In this way philosophy has replaced the warm and vital commandment of love so important to the *heart* by the abstract and cold recognition of duty which, moreover, requires not the animated, ardent impulse of the heart towards good, but a simple, unconcerned understanding of phenomena. In conclusion, inasmuch as our notions of God are anthropomorphic this philosophy demands that the existence of God be treated in abstract terms. It defines the inexhaustible richness of Divine life such as the idea and thought as immutable and equal thereby positing a world without will, without love, simply according to logical necessity.

The one-sided theories which we have only touched on become understandable if we accept the proposition that the essence of the soul is thought and nothing more. In this case they serve as an indirect refutation of the proposition underlying them. Thought does not exhaust the plenitude of the human soul in exactly the same way as the perfection of thought falls short of defining all the perfections of the human spirit. Whoever asserts that *thought is man* and hopes to explain all the variety or spiritual phenomena by thought will achieve as much as the physiologist attempting to explain the phenomena of hearing-sound, tone and word, or tell from the phenomena of sight the dimension, shape and colour of something and so on. Correspondingly, we can now propose that human spiritual activity has as its immediate physical organ not just the head or brain and nerves connected to it, but is rooted further and more deeply in the body organism. Both the essence of the soul and its link with the body are much richer and more varied than is generally held. This obviously general and as yet indeterminate notion of the *many* — *not one sided* link between the soul and the body is contained in the biblical teaching on the heart as the direct and most immediate organ of spiritual activity and states. The physical organ of the soul can be nothing other than the human body. Therefore, as the heart contains all the powers of the body, it then serves as the most immediate organ of spiritual life. The body is the purposeful organ of the soul not *in one part alone*, but over its entire composition and make-up.

We stated above that the physiological facts by which it is proven that the brain is the seat of spiritual activity, are irrefutable. One of the most unimpeachable truths of physiology is the fact that the *cognitive* activity of the soul has its immediate organ in the brain. Thus after long and intense reflection we feel heaviness and pain in the head and inversely heaviness and pain in the head make a person incapable of thought. A heavy blow to the head often causes loss of memory or one or another series of events. When the

visual nerve becomes disconnected from the brain, then even were the eye to reflect objects in its mirror, nevertheless, sensation, vision and perception of these objects or cognition of them could not take place. The same should be said too of all the other organs of sensation on the basis of precise, physiological experiments. However much these organs were to be excited by external objects all of these excitations would not be converted by the soul into feelings and notions if they did not reach the brain. However, these indubitable experiments of physiology do not provide much material for the psychological tenet that the soul exists in the body. We can only say that the activity or more accurately the *movement* of the brain is a necessary condition for the soul to be able to produce feelings and perceptions of the world. Or, in order that movement communicated to an organ become a spiritual feeling or perception (notion) it should spread to the brain. If as a result it is concluded further that the soul in its essence should exist in the brain, then this supposition is based on an incidental observation taken from the sensual world. In this world where two interacting organs subject only to our observation are equally sensitive, movement transfers from one to the other by means of pressure or a jolt; the moving body should put pressure on or jolt the spatial side of the movable body which thereby generates within itself this or that type of motion. However, this pressure or jolt is not possible in the interaction between soul and flesh when one member, in this case the soul, is non-spatial essence. The soul does not have a spatial side for receiving jolts from the spatial movements of the brain. Consequently, although the activity of the brain is a necessary condition for the soul to be able to generate feelings and perceptions, we, nevertheless, do not see the necessity for the soul to reside in the head for this purpose, as though this were its place. The link between the movement of a given part of the brain and perception which the soul forms thereby is not a mechanical link of pressures and jolts (which certainly would suggest the spatial compatibility of the linked members), but a *purposeful*, ideal spiritual link. The soul receives impressions not from the spatial movement of the brain mass, but from its *purposeful* activity which clearly does not require that the interacting organs be spatially compatible.

These observations whose further elucidation would take us too far, demonstrate that the most authentic facts of physiology which substantiate the close link between the cognitive life of the soul and the activity of the brain, do not necessarily contradict the biblical teaching that the heart is the real centre of spiritual life. It is quite possible that the soul as the *foundation* of the familiar, cognitive, psychic phenomena has the heart as its most immediate organ although its cognitive life manifests itself on condition of the activity of the brain.

(To be continued)

B. O.

## RECOLLECTIONS OF UKRAINE\*

(Part 1)

### I

Both my parents were born in Western Ukraine, in the region called Halychyna. My mother was born in 1895. She came from Zolochiv, which lies some twenty-five kilometres south-east of Lviv. Her father was a regimental sergeant-major in the Austrian Army, and was in charge of horses, boots, saddles, and supplies.

A distant ancestor on my father's side had lived near Zaporizhia, and when the Cossacks were disbanded he came to settle in Halychyna. My father was born in 1892, in a village ten kilometres from Zolochiv. His father was a farmer, and chairman of the village elders for about forty years. He was a Ukrainian nationalist, and during the First World War was taken prisoner and shot at Talerhoff. My father was one of thirteen children — the eldest worked in the Polish Post Office.

My father went to the primary school in his home village, and from there he went on to the High School in Zolochiv for eight years. After he had matriculated, and having developed an interest in theology, he went to the Theological College in Lviv, where he studied for four years. He married my mother in 1915, and then was ordained as a priest of the Greek Catholic Church in Lviv by Metropolitan Sheptytskyi.

My parents went to live in a village about four kilometres from Zolochiv. My father worked as a curate, assisting the priest who was already there, and it was in this village that my elder brother and I were born. After three years had elapsed, my father heard of an opening for a vicarage to be built in a village of some 250 inhabitants lying between the towns of Zboriv and Berezhany. (At Zboriv, the Cossacks, with Taras Bulba among them, gave the Poles such a thrashing that the Polish King ran back to Warsaw dressed in nothing but his underpants!) The parish also contained two other villages, one nearer Zboriv, and the other three kilometres away.

The parish land was very flat — you could see for miles in either direction — with a few small hills. The local *Graf*\*\* owned 60,000 hectares of the surrounding land, and my father had to apply to him for approval as priest of

\* Written by his son Paul.

\*\* Count or nobleman.

that parish. The house took two years to build, so during that time we had to live in lodgings. The priest was expected to farm his glebe land to support himself and his family, and in my youth my father owned a hundred hectares altogether. When my parents married, my maternal grandfather, as part of his daughter's dowry, had given sufficient money to enable her to buy forty hectares of prime arable land. (The *Graf* had donated a certain amount of land to be sold to the local smallholders and peasants).

Our village was a lineated settlement, with houses on either side of the large pond. An ordinary villager's house was a bungalow, usually consisting of three rooms — kitchen, bedroom and living-room. The foundations were made of sandstone. Thick oak beams were positioned horizontally on these foundations to form the framework upon which the walls were built, and then more oak beams were placed vertically in these. In addition, stout sticks of ash or elm, shaped to be square in cross-section and about two inches thick, were placed between these vertical beams. To complete the wall a mixture of brown clay and straw was prepared, squeezed into "sausages" and used to infill the spaces — essentially a wattle-and daub type method. The villager would have to provide his own timber. As it was, twenty hectares of my father's land was a woodland of oak, beech and elm trees. When the walls of the house were complete, it was time to celebrate, and the neighbours came to have a good time and join in the singing and dancing, known collectively as the *toloka*.

The next step was to put the ceiling-boards in position. These were made of ash and elm. Then professional thatchers came to thatch the roof — rye-straw was used for the house, and reeds for the barns. Some of the more wealthy villagers had their roofs made out of slates or tin. Glass for the windows was obtained from Zboriv. Finally the exterior of the walls was smoothed, and whitewashed with lime, and a big bunch of flowers was put on the roof to announce that the building was complete. The upper part of the foundation formed a protruding base which was painted brown or blue. On summer evenings the old men and women would sit on this and have a good gossip.

The villager would have a stove in the living-room and in the kitchen. The one in the kitchen was longer, and made mostly from bricks, with a wide surface on the top upon which saucepans could be placed to cook food. The floor of the kitchen, always made of hardwood, was ten to twelve centimetres above the level of the soil. In the centre was a table and long wooden benches for the household to sit on at mealtime. At other times these benches were put by the walls to be out of the way. There was also a cupboard with drawers, and a smaller table upon which meat was chopped and food was prepared.

The living-room also had a central table, but here the benches were wider and had hinged tops. They contained mattresses and could be converted into

beds. The walls would be hung with simple woven tapestries, and there would also be religious icons draped with embroidered cloth. A bed was usually placed in this room in case a friend or relative came to stay.

The bedroom — unheated — contained a double bed with embroidered pillow-cases and an embroidered bedspread, and perhaps a cot for the smallest child. The children would sleep in the living-room on the bench-beds during the winter, and on the hay during the summer months, in the barn.

The house would be lit by paraffin lamps and storm-lamps, and by beeswax candles during festivals.

Each house would have an area of land attached to it, often as much as an acre in extent — 100 yards long and 50 yards wide. Nearest to the house were a barn for grain or hay, a yard wide enough for a horse-and-cart, and stables. The land belonging to the house would be separated from that of its neighbours only by a path on either side. Next to the yard would be an orchard of apple, pear, cherry and plum trees; beyond that would be a large vegetable patch in which the villager would grow potatoes, cabbages, gherkins, sunflowers, garlic, onions, beetroots and flax or hemp for shirts, sacking and rope.

The village pond had been created by the construction of a dam across the stream. A road ran across the top of this dam, and here, where the water was deepest, we often fished for carp. The southern end of the pond was shallower. Here bundles of hemp and flax were put in the water, covered with mud and left to soak for six or eight weeks before being retted.

Towards the northern end of the village were the brickworks, whose construction was instigated by my father. The villagers could not afford to buy bricks from any of the nearby towns, and so, during the first service which my father conducted, he suggested that they should all contribute a small amount of money towards the creation and maintenance of these brickworks. Consequently, any new house was built from bricks made out of clay that was dug and fired in the village itself. The clay was first mixed with sand, shaped with a wooden mould, left to dry in the sun and then fired. This took place in a kiln shaped like a large tunnel, with an iron door at one end and a chimney at the other. Up to a thousand bricks were placed on iron tiers within this tunnel, and logs were burnt beneath the tiers. After about three weeks, the bricks cooled off and were ready to be used. Firing took place between April and October.

The primary school, which my brothers and I all attended, was situated at the southern end of the village. It was built of bricks, and had a room at the top where the schoolteacher and her assistant lived. The caretaker lived a few houses away. There were about fifteen pupils in each year, and there were four years, schooling from the age of six until the age of ten being compulsory. Behind each long desk was a bench at which six of us would sit to be taught mathematics and spelling in both Ukrainian and Polish. The girls were

taught embroidery and knitting; we boys were taught farm management. School hours were from eight o'clock until twelve, five days a week. I would set off from home with my slate and my slate-pencil under one arm and my satchel, containing my lunch — cheese sandwiches and an apple, perhaps — slung over my shoulder. Halfway to school I would be met by my friend Ivan; a little further on we would meet Petro, and then all three of us would walk to school. My sandwiches were always made with white bread; those of my two friends were always made with black bread. I preferred black bread to white, and Ivan and Petro preferred white bread — so we usually ended up swapping sandwiches.

## II

My father's church, situated a short distance from the main village buildings, was built in the Byzantine style and had round cupolas made of copper, each surmounted by a cross. There were graves on either side, and about ten yards from the building stood a separate little bell-tower, which housed four bells. The church had a very long nave. In front of the altar were a few benches upon which the oldest villagers would sit during a service; the rest of the congregation stood behind them. By the side of the altar was the vestry, where my father kept his robes. There was always a large Bible and the communion cup on the altar, which was covered in an embroidered cloth. The icons on the walls of the nave were lit from below by little jars of butter with wicks. When he blessed the congregation, my father used an oak cross with a figure of Christ carved on it, and a censer filled with incense from the Orient.

There were a great many trees in the churchyard, because it was the custom to plant a sapling at the foot of a relative's grave. (The villagers also planted trees when they moved into a new house: the father would plant an oak sapling (*dub*); women would plant ash (*yasen*) saplings, and young girls would plant a *kalyna* — rowan). There were several fine cherry-trees in the churchyard, which produced magnificent crops of dark Morello cherries. My parents would never touch these cherries, because they insisted that the trees' roots fed on the corpses buried in the churchyard; but we boys did not worry about little details like that, and ate as many as we wanted!

I remember there used to be flocks of goldfinches and bullfinches congregating in these trees, and we frequently had swallows' nests under the eaves of the barns and stables. The superstitious villagers always kept their hats on when they walked under a swallow's nest, because they believed that if swallow's mess fell on your hair you would go bald. My father never worried about that, because when I was about two years old he had caught typhus fever and lost all his hair, which had been black and curly.

The most beautiful birds, which we had in the village, arrived from the south in April and left again in September. These were the storks. Altogether there were four or five of their nests in the village. We had one on the roof of our barn. A pair of storks would return to the same nest every year, and, using sticks and straw, they would add to that nest. By the time I left to join the Navy, the nest on our barn was about a yard high. Sparrows took advantage of this and built their little nests in the interstices between the sticks. No one ever shot a stork or disturbed a stork's nest. The presence of a nesting pair in the village was regarded as a good omen, especially for the family who owned the building on which the nest had been built. It was believed that if you disturbed a stork's nest the stork would take revenge. It would wait until someone had lit a bonfire, and then fly down, pick up a burning stick in its beak, and drop it onto the roof of your cottage as it flew over. As nearly all the roofs in the village were thatched, you can imagine how devastating the resulting fire would be.

The storks would be seen catching frogs and newts at the edges of the village pond, in company with the wild geese and ducks. It was strange to observe that a pair of storks only reared an even number of youngsters — two or four. If, say, a fifth hatched out, the parents would throw it out of the nest. I assume this was an adaption to cope with any shortages which might arise in the food supply.

One of our pastimes involved attempting to shoot a wild goose or a duck at the pond using our bows and arrows, but we never managed to hit one. Our bows were made by peeling the bark off the main stem of an ash sapling and hanging it up in the barn to dry. This was then bent by holding it above the huge drum in which potatoes were boiled for pigs' mash: the rising steam would render the wood flexible, and it could then be bent into a curve. Our arrows were made out of pine. The point was made by hammering a nail out flat, and the feathers came from the wings of our geese.

The rectory, which, as I have said, took two years to build, was a rectangular bungalow. The foundations were of stone, like the other buildings in the village, and the walls were two-and-a-half bricks thick. We had a large kitchen, and a scullery in which cheese was kept. In the huge cellar potatoes were stored for the winter, together with other vegetables, my father's home-made wine and especially his home-made cherry brandy. Underneath the porch, which led in from the yard, was a space — here the geese were kept during the winter. We had one gander and about ten geese; and after they had been in there all winter, cleaning it out was a real headache! Above the porch my elder brother and I kept pigeons. There were three or four fan-tails and some of the amusing kind which we called twirlers — they would fly up and tumble over and over in the air for a few seconds before flying away.

The hallway gave access to the cellar, the stairs that led up to the interior of the roof, and to my father's office where he kept his library and all his

papers — marriage certificates, birth certificates, and so on. The rectory ceiling had oak beams, and the roof was covered with tin. There were fireplaces in all the bedrooms, and their flues met in one large chamber in the roof. In this chamber hams, sausages and bacon were hung for smoking. Because of this chamber the whole interior of the roof was always warm, and so grain was dried here, and baking-flour was stored on benches — we baked our own bread.

On the other side of the building was the sun-porch, where my mother kept her pot-plants. Two vines grew here. Their roots were outside, but the foliage, carefully pruned, was inside along the panes. Our living-room was similar to that of an ordinary village house, with half a dozen chairs as well as cupboards and sideboards. During festive seasons our meals were held here, otherwise they were always in the kitchen.

Because our animals had to be kept indoors for much of the year, we had enough stables for twenty cows and four or five horses. We usually kept three pigs for fattening: one for Christmas, one for Easter and one for the summer. One of the stables was divided into three compartments for the geese, ducks and the turkey. The ducks were clever — they never wandered into the compartment where the geese were kept — but the turkey often did, and they always gave him a good beating and sent him back where he came from. Outside, towards one side of the yard, there was a duckpond, and also a manure dump which provided us with fertiliser. Hay and straw were stored above the barns and stables.

My father kept about twenty beehives in the orchard. These were the double-walled kind still used nowadays in Spain, with large frames and an opening at the side. They contained eight brood frames on runners, a vertical excluder and between eight and ten honey frames as necessary. My maternal grandfather kept as many as sixty hives!

Our household was as follows: my mother, my father, we five boys, our cook and the two young maids, Maria and Hanna. And I could never be forgiven for missing out our farm workers.

Our cook had been married before the First World War, and her husband had died fighting on the Yugoslav Front. Shortly afterwards both her young children — one aged three, the other only one — died from diphtheria. When my parents first came to the village, my mother contacted her, and she moved in as cook and general helper — and she was a wonderful cook, I can tell you. She stayed right until the Bolsheviks came, and died in 1947.

Father provided the clothing and boots for both the maids. When Maria got married, my father gave her a pregnant cow; and when Hanna got married, my father gave her a cow with a 14-day old calf.

Our old stableman did not approve of this at all. He was a bachelor, and he had served in the Austrian Army. We used to call him *Diadia* (grand-



father). He was grey-haired, about five foot eight, and broad-shouldered. He was a clean-shaven, quiet man, and he always wore long boots, no matter what the weather. In the winter he would wear a Cossack hat, and in the summer, a straw hat. He refused to sleep in the house — his room was adjacent to the stables. He would get up at 4.00am! It was his job to look after the wagons, keep an eye on the hayloft, and sharpen the ploughs; he also shod the horses and took care of the milkmaids, who pulled his leg. He went to stay with his family near Zolochiv for a couple of days every Christmas, but he always came back again as soon as possible. Whenever my father had to travel to one of the nearby towns for some reason, *Diadia* went with him as coachman. He had a scar from his Army days on one side of his face, in the shape of a small hole. He would visit the village barber every two days to be shaved, and the barber usually had to pluck out two or three seeds or wheat-grains which had lodged themselves in this hole!

No one could predict the weather better than *Diadia*. His capacity for doing this seemed almost supernatural. Equally amazing was his rapport with the horses — he could talk to them, and I'll bet they understood every word he said! Once, in the winter, he and my father were returning through the woodland with a wagon full of logs. *Diadia* was walking beside the wagon, and he happened to slip in the mud, and fell right in front of the horses. They stopped instantly, and pushed their backs against the wagon to bring it to a halt!

Our cook's brother eventually took over from *Diadia*. He was a jolly chap with blonde hair, and he was a fine story-teller. He was the ploughman, and he also helped during the harvest, when he was in charge of the horses which pulled the binder. Despite the fact that he had only been to school for three years in his life, he was a brilliant mathematician. He could mentally reckon up the number and price of bushels of corn faster than I could with a pencil and paper.

And, finally, we kept three dogs. Two were similar to Alsatians, and my father always let them run free in the yard during the night, just in case of any trouble from horse- and cattle-thieves. The third dog was a St. Bernard. He was the size of a small calf! Whereas the two Alsatians slept in kennels, he slept in the house; and the two Alsatians respected him. I remember when we boys went swimming during the summer, the St. Bernard would stand and watch. Sometimes my younger brother would start calling out and waving his arms as if he were drowning, and straightaway that St. Bernard would swim out to him and nudge him with his nose towards the shore. This swimming-place was in the little River Strypa, a tributary of the Dnister. We also fished here, for dace, roach and tench. We often saw big eels, as well, which had migrated north up the Dnister from the Black Sea.

## III

In the previous chapter I mentioned that we kept four or five horses. In addition to these, we bred some for the Polish Cavalry. Those which were rejected by the Cavalry made excellent cart-horses. One of the mares gave birth to a foal in the middle of an Easter vacation, and this foal became so fond of my younger brother that it followed him around instead of following its mother. It would actually lick his face like a dog — and a horse's tongue is like sandpaper!

My youngest brother was very interested in medicine and biology. He had a collection of skeletons of all kinds: rabbits, mice, even frogs. He obtained these in the following way. After he found a dead animal, such as a mouse, he would search in the woods until he came across a wood-ants' nest (a mound of pine-needles, up to two feet in height); then, using a spade, he would make a cavity in the top of the mound, drop the mouse in, and cover it up, having previously tied a piece of string to the mouse's foot so that he would be able to find it again. He would come back to the ant's nest a fortnight later, find the string and pull out a complete mouse skeleton, beautifully white.

He was still interested in medicine when he went to high school, and by the time he was fourteen he was taking anatomy lessons. Somehow he managed to persuade his teacher to let him take a human skull home for the summer vacation — to examine it at leisure, he said. Now, we boys usually kept a few sweets, and at frequent intervals we would try to pinch them from each other, but we never tried to pinch those of my youngest brother. Why not? Well, the top of the skull had been sliced off to form a lid so that you could study the inside, and he kept them in there! Once he used that skull to frighten the maid, Hanna. It was her job to clean the bedrooms and make the beds every morning. My brother put the skull in the middle of his bed, and draped the sheet over it to conceal it. When Hanna found it she ran out of the room screaming, and refused to go back in again until someone had removed the terrible thing!

When my brother took the skull back to school at the start of the autumn term, our household was rather relieved, as you may imagine.

My elder brother and I got up to quite a few tricks, too. Every spring my father usually bought six or seven young calves which he put to graze in the pastures near the rectory; and one day my brother, myself and a couple of the village lads took it into our heads that it might be rather amusing to attempt to ride these calves. The result was rather less than amusing — five lashes on the behind from father's belt! On another occasion my father's cherry brandy was involved. He used to make this by soaking black cherries in vodka for about six weeks before straining the cherries off and discarding

them. They were either baked into cakes or eaten as they were. My bother and I happened to be sitting on the fence eating some of these cherries when we thought that perhaps the chickens might like some. And there was sufficient vodka left in those cherries to make the cockerel drunk!

There was an old house at the other end of the village which had been owned by a Pole — he had sold his land and gone to live in Lviv. The house stood empty for several months, and then, either by accident or on purpose, a fire started. Only the walls and a bit of the roof were left. Jackdaws began to nest there. Once, a young jackdaw thought that he was old enough to leave home, but he was unable to fly, and fell straight to the ground and sat there. My younger brother found him, took pity on him, and brought him home. He kept his new pet in the stable and fed him on cottage-cheese, worms, bread soaked in water and then beetle-grubs. As soon as my brother entered the stable, the jackdaw would recognise him and start squawking! After two weeks, he was let out — but he would not go away! He roosted under the eaves of the stable. When anyone came to visit us — perhaps one of the village women had come to ask mother's advice about a child who was ill — the jackdaw would fly down and sit on the villager's shoulder, and introduce himself! He frightened several women callers, as well as our cook and Hanna; old *Diadia* gave the pest a whack with his hat when he tried to sit on his shoulder, and the jackdaw never bothered him again. Finally, father declared that unless the jackdaw was taken away he would be shot; so my brother and I took the jackdaw eight kilometres away and released him into a wood.

For years we had the same pair of barn owls nesting in the barn; it was quite common to see two or three fluffy little heads peeping out of the nest. Like the storks, we never disturbed them. When the barn was closed at night we left a few dead mice on the floor, and by the morning they had gone. It was believed that if a barn owl sat on the roof of your house and hooted, one of your household would die within a week.

We boys frequently associated with older lads of perhaps eighteen or nineteen years of age. I remember that one of these lads was courting a girl, and for some reason her father disapproved of him. Right, we thought, we'll show the old man what we think of him! We collected several frogs from the village pond and put them in a sack: if we thrashed the sack with sticks, the frogs would set up an almighty croaking. So, one night at about eleven o'clock, we crept into the disapproving father's orchard with this sack of frogs, set it down, and began to thrash it vigorously. Those frogs performed magnificently, and the disapproving father, in his nightshirt, flung open the window: "Hey! What the hell's going on out there?" Needless to say, we had already made our escape.

Despite the fact that our orchard was possibly the best in the village, we

were of the opinion that apples stolen from anyone else's orchard were much tastier. Once we were caught red-handed, and although we escaped, the owner of the orchard went to father, who gave him a sack and told him to go and pick as many apples as he wanted from our orchard. For us the punishment was the same as for riding the calves. Our ploughman was grimly amused. "Well, I would've dealt differently with you", he said. Apparently he had once caught a few lads stealing apples from his orchard, and he had brought them indoors, set a large basket of apples in front of them, and told them to eat the lot, or he would skin them alive. I'm sure the stomach-trouble those boys had afterwards cured them of any desire to go apple-scrumping again. . .!

There was one villager, old Aaron the Jew, who kept a shop on the western side of the village. Most of the villagers did not really trust him, because it was suspected that he was employed by the Poles to "snoop around" and give information about certain people. He kept two cows, and attended the synagogue in Zboriv. His wife tended the garden while he looked after the shop, selling groceries such as sugar, salt, matches, tobacco, sweets and paraffin. Sometimes the village women would bring him eggs. He would pay them perhaps twopence for each egg, and then they would have enough money to buy some groceries. More about eggs in a minute.

Aaron had kept his shop for several years, when the villagers began to think that perhaps he was getting a bit too much of their money; and at my father's suggestion a little co-op was built, with money which everyone had contributed, like the brickworks. This was a two-storey stone building. The lower room was the co-op itself, and a villager named Mykhailo was in charge of it for six days of the week. His wife and brother cultivated his land, and for running the co-op he was paid about thirty shillings a week. One corner was a "bartering corner"; in another stood three barrels of paraffin, and behind the counter was tea, sugar, coffee and so on. This co-op prospered, and Aaron began to lose trade, so he closed up his shop and began to deal in kosher livestock instead.

The upper room of the building was used for village meetings and for the presentation of plays performed by the younger folk of the village. I participated in a couple of these plays, taking the role of a young Cossack. We also held choir performances and concerts in this room.

Almost every night of the year a fire-watch was organised. This would involve four villagers, two on the western side, two on our eastern side. Fires were a constant hazard because of the thatched roofs; the two peak danger periods of the year being Easter, when housewives were baking their festival loaves and made their stove fires too big, and summer, when lightning could easily start a fire. We were fortunate because our house had an iron lightning-conductor; but I remember one tragic incident. A man who had been out scy-

thing grass was on his way home. He was walking with his scythe over his shoulder, leading his horse, and a thunderstorm was gathering. Lightning struck and killed both him and the horse; and he had a wife and three children. The village organised a collection for his widow, and the resulting money was sufficient to pay for his children's education.

When the rain came, you knew that there would be no further danger from lightning and so we boys, dressed in nothing but our swimming-trunks, went outside and romped about — a natural shower! The rainwater was collected from the gutters in large barrels; and now that I've told you that, I can tell you the story about the Jews and the eggs.

There were two Jews who came to the co-op regularly with a cart from a nearby town, to buy eggs. They paid for these by the score — twenty — and put a layer of them in their cart before covering them with a layer of sawdust; another layer of eggs would be placed on top of this, then another layer of sawdust, and so on. The Jews would then take their cart to Zboriv or elsewhere to sell the eggs. This state of affairs went on for several months; but then another pair of Jews started to do the same thing — and they paid the co-op an extra penny for each score of eggs! It was not long before arguments erupted between the two pairs of Jews, and the co-op did not know whom to sell their eggs to, so all four Jews were sent to my father to see if he could solve the problem. That day my father was working in the yard with old *Diadia* and the ploughman, and I dare say they found four Jews arguing between themselves quite an amusing sight. Father told them they would have to sort it out themselves; so they did. The two newest Jews grabbed one of the others, tipped him upside-down, ducked him twice in the rainwater-barrel, and then left him there! All you could see were two legs sticking out! The two Jews walked off, and, in response to the squeals of the other, father and *Diadia* ran across and pulled his companion out of the barrel, because otherwise he would have drowned. How he coughed and spluttered and raved! Fortunately his clothes soon dried in the sun, and the two Jews went on their way. Our ploughman had been utterly incapable of lifting a finger to help, because he had been lying on the ground laughing until the tears streamed down his cheeks!

Every year the co-op was partly responsible for organising the fair on the village green. The villagers would wear their festive national costumes for this event: the boys and young men would wear white linen embroidered shirts, and baggy Cossack trousers (*sharyvary*); the girls wore embroidered blouses and kaftans with red, blue or black boots. The farm workers would wear white linen shirts and trousers, moccasins, and hats made of plaited rye-straw. During the fair there would be egg-and-spoon races for the youngsters and sack-races for the older men, with chocolates and tobacco as prizes respectively. There was also a contest for the women to see who could bake the best cake.

One of the inhabitants of our village was Danylo, the vet, who suffered slightly from asthma. He was a friend of my father's — in fact, it was father who introduced him to bee keeping. Because Danylo had been to school for an amazing six years, he was the village "scribbler" and took care of all the paperwork. He paid a few farmers to cultivate his smallholding for him, and in return the farmers could take advantage of his veterinary knowledge and contact him in an emergency. One of the most common "emergencies" that Danylo had to deal with was if a cow had grazed in clover and became bloated — Danylo had to pour liquid lime down the animal's throat to clear the intestines. If the cow had been grazing for more than three hours, however, then he would be unable to help, and the cow would have to be shot. Danylo also helped if a cow's calf was breached, if it lay the wrong way round in the womb; and he dealt with lame horses as well.

There were several bee keepers in the village, including father and Danylo. There were two on the western side, and four in the next village. They would frequently congregate in our yard on Sunday afternoons in the summer to swap yarns and drink father's mead. Sometimes my parents would play cards with Danylo and another bee keeper called Petro.

One final incident connected with village life. Quite a few Ukrainians had emigrated to Argentina in the past, and one year a man came back for a visit. He eagerly described how good life was over there, and this, together with the fact that he was wearing a silk shirt, made quite an impression on several villagers. One particular villager was so impressed that he announced to his wife that he intended to go to Argentina to see if the things the visitor had said were true. His wife was enraged, and the argument reached such a pitch of intensity that she seized a sledgehammer and smashed his brains out. She was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

*(To be continued)*

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## News from Ukraine

### CHORNOBYL REVISITED

#### Nuclear Disaster in Ukraine: The First Year (April 1986 — April 1987)

A year ago the world witnessed the terrible explosion at the Chornobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine — a consequence of gross negligence and mismanagement of the Soviet Union's nuclear industry coupled with technological incompetence. But today, a year later, we still don't know the full extent of the damage to the population and the environment. Soviet authorities have not, to date, released a credible situation report stating the actual death toll and the true number of casualties.

According to Ihor Herashchenko, dissident Soviet Ukrainian physicist and husband of recently-released Soviet poet Irina Ratushynska, who stayed in Kyiv during last year's explosion, 15,000 people died in the 5 months after the blast (*The Daily Telegraph*, Wednesday, April 1, 1987). Letters from various parts of Ukraine received in the West confirm the fact that many people, particularly children, have already died as a consequence of the disaster, and many continue to die. However, Soviet TV still claims 31 official deaths.

The UCIS recently received an important document from Ukraine concerning the nuclear disaster in Chornobyl. According to the document, entitled *Wind from Ukraine*, the authorities had failed to inform the population. Only when the whole world began to speak of the disclosure of the powerful source of radiation, and it was no longer possible to conceal the fact that a nuclear accident had occurred in Ukraine, did the Soviet leadership admit that something was in fact not quite right at the Chornobyl plant. We learnt that there was a fire, but, basically, that nothing serious had happened, and that people were managing to deal with the disaster by themselves without the help of foreign specialists.

People were not warned in time of the terrible health hazards and threat to human lives. On the contrary, in order to keep the world convinced for as long as possible that the accident was trivial, the 1st of May Parade, in which children participated, was held in Chornobyl. In the meantime Party officials, who had been informed of the actual extent of the damage, quietly and quickly evacuated their families from Kyiv to distant regions of Ukraine and other republics. In Kyiv one scientist measured radiation levels 2 to 3 times higher than official figures released on Soviet TV.

In the two months after the Chornobyl catastrophe, the population of Kyiv had to make use of drinking water from the Dnipro River (radiation level:  $10^{-7}$  curies), not having any other safe water supply. Later the Ukrainian capital switched to water from the nearby Desna River ( $10^{-11}$  curies).

Some people brought drinking water from distant springs outside Kyiv. Much effort was needed to acquire fresh vegetables, which are delivered to fruit and vegetable stores from far-off regions of Ukraine, and usually in insufficient amounts.

People living in Kyiv are still worried about their children, and parents' hope purely for the survival of their family, kin and the nation.

All children of pre-school age, for whom the higher levels of radiation are particularly harmful, are deprived of any centrally organised help. Due to financial reasons, most parents are unable to accomodate children outside Kyiv for a long period of time, since accommodation, food and care are extremely expensive. Doctors were ordered to write on the medical cards of children who stayed in the zone with the highest radiation levels, that they are suffering from fictitious diseases. What of the children not yet born, asks the author of the document? No one can answer this. Doctors are advising young married couples to postpone family plans for a few years.

At the Congress of the Writers' Union of Ukraine (June 1986) Ukrainian writers spoke out not only against the threat to the Ukrainian language from the incessant russification of language and culture, but also of the ecological damage and the threat to the continued existence of the Ukrainian nation. During the Congress Ivan Drach, prominent Soviet Ukrainian writer, stated that the nuclear lightning had struck the genetic root of the Ukrainian nation.

Accidents can happen anywhere, but nuclear plants require special additional safety systems, employing the latest developments in the field of nuclear science. In Chornobyl the concrete dome used as a secondary containment measure was built only **after** the explosion, and there were deficiencies in the automatic working controls of the reactor. The power plant had been constructed under the typical conditions of Soviet planned production. Production norms had to be met regardless of cost and safety, and we know for a fact that the fourth reactor block, where the accident occurred, was put to work prematurely (*Literaturna Ukraina* No. 13, Kyiv, March 27, 1986). The fact that foreign specialists were not allowed to participate in the clearing up of the reactor leads one to assume that the reactor was probably overburdened with additional tasks, such as the production of materials for military means, or academic research for military needs. Presently, suitable explanations are being found for the cause of the accident (without any indication of the high accident potential of this type of reactor). Scape-goats are being found. The first on the list are all the personnel employed at Chornobyl, perhaps even a few directors on various levels. It has already been established that the personnel have admitted to 6 serious mistakes, and that they had



conducted a series of experiments for which they had no permission from the central nuclear authorities in Moscow.

But what of the mistakes of the highest Party chiefs, not only those specifically concerned with nuclear matters, but also those who play a decisive role in all matters? The greatest mistake was the location of the Chornobyl nuclear power plant — right in the heart of Ukraine, an extremely densely populated region.

### RECENT INFORMATION FROM UKRAINE BASED ON LETTERS

a) (15.9.1986): In Ukraine there is presently great discontent over the handling of the Chornobyl disaster, particularly over the fact that the authorities failed to give out sufficient information and advice. People are openly laying the blame on the Russians, saying that Moscow had arranged the accident because Ukrainians demand independence. Quarrels have arisen between Russian and Ukrainian Party members as a consequence of the disaster.

The first and second year of high schools in the Ternopil region have been taken away to work on the construction of Novyi Ternopil, a new settlement near Kyiv to replace the towns of Prypiat and Chornobyl.

b) (19.11.1986) **Kremenchuk**: Many people here are dying, particularly those who returned from Chornobyl. Many of those who came back from the site of the accident are suffering from various illnesses and from nervous tension. They have lost their will to go on living.

c) (3.2.1987): In the rivers the radiation has to some extent flown away with the water. In lakes, however, it will remain for many years. The radiation from Chornobyl covered large tracts of land. Byelorussia suffered particularly badly.

The number of casualties increases day by day as the people, who were recruited by the *voenkomats* (local conscription offices) to clear the Chornobyl power plant and the surrounding area and to put out the fire, die off. The people mobilised for these jobs worked inside the contaminated zone without any special protective clothing. Today they have begun to die. Those who remain alive for the time being, are suffering from leukemia and other illnesses. Part of these people (the 30 year olds) have been pensioned off. Because the *voenkomats* mobilised people aged between 18 and 30 years old, covering 12 age groups, there will be a dramatic drop in the natural growth rate of the population in the near future. The Russians will fill this gap with an artificial increase in the population — an influx of foreigners, primarily Russians.

d) (20.2.1987) **Ivano-Frankivsk region**: Through official channels people knew nothing of the explosion until April 28. They officially learnt of the disaster through foreign broadcasts. On April 28, Gorbachev appeared on TV

with a brief announcement. This was followed by limited advice: it was forbidden to let cattle out for grazing, cattle had to be fed dried cereals, people should remain outside for limited periods only, clothes should be changed, floors should be washed down with water, etc.

An instruction was sent out to all collective farms that each collective should build one house at its own expense. The larger collectives should build two 3-room houses; the smaller ones — only one.

Carpenters made windows and doors and delivered them along with wood and bricks to the new settlement near Kyiv. People from the collectives went there to build the houses. They had no protective clothing. There were several cases of radiation found on the clothing of people who returned home from the construction site.

In the autumn it was forbidden to burn leaves. They were to be left lying on the ground over winter. They would rot and the radiation would go into the ground and not up in the air with the smoke from burning leaves.

e) (10.3.1987): Radiation levels in the area near the reactor reached several hundred milliroentgens an hour. In Kyiv, at the start, there was real panic. The airports and stations were packed with people. Tens of thousands of people were trying to leave the capital.

## **WAS IT REALLY RUSSIA THAT WAS CHRISTIANISED IN 988?**

**By His Beatitude Myroslav Ivan  
Cardinal Lubachivsky**

**Second revised edition**

Basing himself on both Ukrainian and Russian historiography, the author points out the distinct origins of the Ukrainian and Russian nations and describes the historic process by which Christianity was officially adopted as the state religion of Kyivan-Rus' in 988. The Cardinal argues very convincingly that the true descendants of Rus' are the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian Church, with its many denominations, and not the Russians and the Russian Orthodox Church, and that in two years time it is the Ukrainians who will be celebrating the 1000 years of Christianity in Ukraine. He also explains why the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet Russian authorities are trying so hard to convince the world that 1988 will see the alleged millennium of Christianity in Russia. The second edition includes several documents.

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### Documents and Reports

## **UKRAINIAN CONCERNS RAISED WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE**

(UNIS) The struggle and persecution of Ukrainian political prisoners was the topic of a special meeting between Ukrainian-American representatives and Ambassador Richard Schifter, US Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs on January 22, 1987.

The hour-long meeting was intended to raise various human and national rights related issues with the Assistant Secretary, as well as a general discussion of significant cases. Highlighted were the plights of Yuriy Shukhevych, Oksana Popovych and Lev Lukianenko, and a general discussion on the Soviet Russian regime's persecution of Ukrainian believers which in the past several months has reached staggering levels.

Ambassador Schifter stated that his office, as well as the US delegation attending the Vienna review meeting of the Helsinki Accords, will continue to highlight the cases of Ukrainian political prisoners, as well as the Ukrainian nationality question which he finds of equal importance to solving individual cases.

Aside from the persecution of believers and activists in Ukraine, the continued harassment of the Ukrainian minority in Poland was also discussed. Within recent months the Jaruzelski regime has stepped up its efforts of forced assimilation of Poland's large Ukrainian population. The meeting was completed with a discussion on the Millennium of Christianity in Rus'-Ukraine (1988) and the need to sensitise US foreign service officers in Moscow to the Kremlin's public relations gimmicks with respect to the Millennium.

The Ukrainian American delegation was headed by Mr. George Nesterchuk, National Vice-President of the Ukrainian Congress Committee, Mrs. Roksolana Lozynskyi of the UCCA's New York chapter and Myron Wasyluk, Director of the Ukrainian National Information Service in Washington, D.C.

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## **STATE DEPT CLAIMS "NO INSTITUTION HAS SUFFERED MORE THAN THE UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH"**

(UNIS) The US State Department has made public its special report on the plight and struggle of Ukrainian Catholics in the western and Transcarpathian regions of Ukraine, titled *Soviet Repression of the Ukrainian Catholic*

*Church.* The Department of State has assessed, based on historical data and current repressive efforts by Soviet Russian authorities, that "no institution has suffered more than the Ukrainian Catholic Church".

Setting forth a detailed historical account of the Ukrainian Catholic Church since the Soviet Russian occupation of Western Ukraine in 1939, the paper offers a graphic analysis of the losses suffered by the Church in its forced reunion with Russian Orthodoxy, which was proclaimed in Lviv on March 8-10, 1946, without the presence of Ukrainian Catholic hierarchs.

The report mentions KGB propaganda efforts geared at discrediting and defaming Church leaders in an effort to intimidate believers. Acknowledgement is made that the great Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytskyi was a target of such propaganda efforts and further verifies that the Metropolitan, who "led his church for four and one half decades (1900-1944) and saved the lives of thousands of Jews during World War II", is still maligned by the KGB to this day.

Detailing the contemporary catacomb Church, the report claims that the underground movement embraces hundreds of priests headed by a number of secret bishops all working under the authority of Myroslav Cardinal Lubachivskyi in Rome. More than 1,000 religious women in orders are said to be serving throughout Ukraine along with many former Catholic and non-Orthodox priests who have taken up civilian professions and continue to celebrate the sacraments in private.

Special attention is paid to the *Samvydav* Chronicle of the Catholic Church which first appeared at the beginning of 1984. Commenting on the renaissance of Ukraine's religious movement, the State Department writes that it was "years of abortive demands by believers that authorities legalise the activities of the Catholic Church in Western Ukraine that brought the emergence of an organised human rights movement among believers". The organised rights movement, united under the auspices of the Central Committee of Ukrainian Catholics, is headed by Josyp Terelya, who is reported to have been released from Soviet Russian prison camp No. 36 near Kuchino on February 8, 1987.

The long report concludes with an analysis of the current interest in religion which is supposedly widespread among Ukrainians. Indeed, nearly half of the officially permitted religious congregations in the Soviet Union are located in Western Ukraine. Furthermore, the report stresses that the proximity of the Polish Solidarity movement and the election of a Slavic Pope are important factors in the growth of religious interest.

Special report No. 159 on Soviet repression of the Ukrainian Catholic Church was prepared by the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs at the Department of State.

Special Report No. 159

## SOVIET REPRESSION OF THE UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

January 1987

United States Department of State  
*Bureau of Public Affairs*  
Washington, D.C.

*The following report was prepared by the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in January 1987.*

During the nearly seven decades that have elapsed since the Bolsheviks seized power, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has sought to eliminate religion or, failing that, utilise it for the purposes of the state. In this deliberate attack on religion, no institution has suffered more than the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Claiming the devotion of millions in Western Ukraine, the Church — leaders and laity alike — has been systematically repressed by Soviet rule. Official Soviet historiography even goes as far to claim that the Church “liquidated itself” in 1946, that its followers “voluntarily joined” the Russian Orthodox Church<sup>1</sup>.

But the Ukrainian Catholic Church lives on, in the catacombs, as witness numerous samizdat documents and repeated discussions in Soviet publications of the need to repress it. This paper sets forth an account of that repression.

### Church and State in the Soviet Union, 1917-46

Situated primarily in Western Ukraine, which the Soviets forcibly annexed from Poland in 1939, the Ukrainian Catholic Church traces its modern lineage to the 1596 Union of Brest, through which it affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church while preserving its Byzantine form of worship and spirituality. Thus, unlike the Russian Orthodox Church or the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church that arose after the revolution in Eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainian Catholic Church has looked to the West, recognising the authority of the Pope from its inception.

Western Ukraine poses a particular problem for the Soviet regime, since, according to Soviet sources, nearly half of the officially permitted religious congregations in the Soviet Union are located there<sup>2</sup>. In addition there are many unofficial groups which include Ukrainian Catholics. Furthermore, the Ukrainian Catholic Church has served as a focus for the development of a distinct Ukrainian national and cultural identity in Western Ukraine. Not surprisingly, these characteristics have marked the Church in Soviet eyes.

<sup>1</sup> See note 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma*, publication No. 24, Moscow, 1979, p. 46. *Stanovleniya i rozvytok masovoho ateizmu v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainskoi RSR*, (Kyiv, 1981), p. 51.

In its first years the Soviet regime attacked all religious institutions, accusing them of political opposition to the regime and collusion with its internal and external enemies. All religious groups suffered from discriminatory Soviet legislation, beginning with the Soviet Decree of February 5, 1918, on the Separation of Church from State and School from Church. The new laws transferred all church property, including all houses of worship, to the state. Clergy and their families were stripped of their civil rights. Organised religious instruction of minors was made a criminal offense, and all theological schools were closed, as eventually were all monasteries and convents. The regime sponsored abusive antireligious campaigns which were accompanied by the harassment of believers and their exclusion from all positions of importance.

During the 1920s, however, the regime shifted its tactics in the direction of "sovietisation" of individual Churches and sects. "Disloyal" religious leaders were replaced by others who were willing to accept a platform of loyalty to the Soviet state and were prepared to submit to far-reaching controls over the external and internal activities of their groups. By 1927 these conditions were accepted by the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church in return for a limited and uncertain tolerance; but the price was the alienation of many Orthodox bishops, clergy, and believers who considered such a compromise with the atheist state to be incompatible with the integrity and spiritual mission of their Church.

These early won concessions did not last long, however. By 1929 Stalin's regime had embarked on a violent, widespread antireligious campaign. More and more churches and prayer houses of all faiths were closed down by the authorities, often on the basis of fabricated "demands of workers". Growing numbers of bishops and clergy were banished, imprisoned, or executed. This situation worsened during the late 1930s, culminating by the end of the decade in the near total suppression of institutional religion throughout the Soviet Union. Soviet authorities destroyed what remained of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church during this period, killing most of its bishops and many thousands of its followers<sup>3</sup>. They also drew up plans for the

3 Soviet repression and liquidation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church in Eastern Ukraine in the 1920s and 1930s was a portent of its later repression and liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine. Shortly after the revolution, a number of Ukrainian Orthodox bishops separated themselves from the Russian Patriarchal Church, creating in 1920 an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church. By 1924, the Church embraced 30 bishops, 1,500 priests and deacons, and 1,100 parishes in the Ukrainian SSR. From 1922, however, Soviet authorities began imposing restrictions on the Autocephalous Church, attempting to split it from within by supporting a splinter faction. In 1926 they arrested its Metropolitan, Basil Lypkivsky, along with a number of other leaders and ordered the dissolution of its central body, the All-Ukrainian Church Council. Then in 1929, massive repressive measures were taken against the bishops, clergy, and faithful, culminating in the dissolution of the Church in 1930. The remnant of the Church was allowed to reconstitute itself at the end of 1930 but was progressively decimated until the last parish was suppressed in 1936. According to Ukrainian Orthodox sources, two metropolitans of the Church, 26 archbishops and bishops, some 1,150 priests, 54 deacons, and approximately 20,000 lay members of the church councils as well as an undetermined number of the faithful were all killed. See *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, Vol. II, University of Toronto Press, pp. 170-71.

liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church; these became reality with the Soviet acquisition in 1939 of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, which had large congregations of Catholics. With Soviet occupation, there immediately followed the abolition or state takeover of longstanding church institutions — including schools, seminaries, monasteries, and publishing houses — and the confiscation of all church properties and lands. Finally, as the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Soviet secret police rounded up a large number of Ukrainian Catholic priests who were either murdered or deported to the east.

Following the Nazi attack on the USSR, Stalin altered substantially his tactics toward religious communities. Fearing for the very survival of the Soviet regime, he reduced antireligious propaganda and offered significant concessions to the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as other denominations, in the hope of harnessing all the potential of the Soviet Union in its struggle against Nazi Germany. But with the Soviet reoccupation of Ukraine in 1944, repression of Ukrainian Catholics, already suffering under Nazi occupation, was resumed once again, culminating in the official “liquidation” of the Church in 1946.

### **Liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, 1946**

From the very beginning of the Soviet reoccupation of Western Ukraine, measures aimed at liquidating the Ukrainian Catholic Church were undertaken. In the winter of 1944-45, Soviet authorities summoned Catholic clergy to “reeducation” sessions conducted by the secret police, the NKVD. On April 5, 1945, the Soviet media began an anti-Catholic campaign. Then on April 11, 1945, the NKVD began arresting the entire Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy of Western Ukraine, including the secular and monastic clergy — a program that would last for the next 5 years. Along with Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj, the NKVD arrested Bishop Nykyta Budka, the Vicar General of the Metropolitan; Gregory Khomyshyn, the Bishop of Stanislaviv, and his Auxiliary Bishop, John Liatyshevsky; Paul Goydych, the Bishop of Priashiv, and his Auxiliary Bishop, Basil Hopko; Bishop Nicholas Charnetsky, Apostolic Visitor of Volyn; Monsignor Peter Verhun, Apostolic Visitor for Ukrainian emigrants in Germany; and Josaphat Kotsylovsky, the Bishop of Pere-myshl, and his Auxiliary Bishop, Gregory Lakota. (All but one of these either died in prison or died shortly thereafter, their health ruined by the abuse they had suffered; only Metropolitan Slipyj, through the efforts of Pope John XXIII, was finally released from prison in 1963 and allowed to leave for Rome). According to eyewitnesses, in Lviv alone there were about 800 priests imprisoned at that time; and in Chortkiv about 150 priests from the district of Ternopil were deported to Siberia<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> Analecta O.S.B.M., *First Victims of Communism White Book on the Religious Persecution in Ukraine* (Rome, 1953) pp. 42-44. This book was composed by Ukrainian Catholic priests resident in Rome; it was translated from Italian with Ecclesiastical Approbation.

Meanwhile, in late May 1945, as these mass arrests of Catholic clergy were being carried out, Soviet authorities sponsored the so-called Initiating Committee for the Reunification of the Greek Catholic Church with the Russian Orthodox Church. This was a preparatory committee, which subsequently convened a pseudosynod — the authorities proclaimed it a “Sobor” — in Lviv on March 8-10, 1946. In that “Sobor” an end was proclaimed to the 1596 Union of Brest, and the Ukrainian Catholic Church was declared “reunified” with the Russian Orthodox Church.

This entire exercise was planned and guided by Soviet authorities. Knowledge of the “Sobor” was withheld from the public; no advance election of delegates was held, and only 216 clerics and 19 laymen — allegedly representing the Ukrainian Catholic Church — brought about “reunification”. Not surprisingly, the NKVD was entrusted with the task of coercing the remaining Catholic clergy to join the Russian Orthodox Church.

Both the Vatican and the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the West have refused to recognize this forced reunification, considering it to be uncanonical and illegal: according to Catholic and traditional Russian Orthodox canon law, to be valid, a synod must be called by the Pope or by a patriarch and must be attended by bishops. Yet Soviet authorities consider this “Sobor” and its decisions binding on all Ukrainian Catholics in the USSR to this day<sup>5</sup>. The protests of almost 300 Ukrainian clerics and the 1946 and 1952 encyclicals of Pope Pius XII in defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church have gone unheeded. Moreover, the same fate met the Catholic Church in Transcarpathia, a part of Czechoslovakia incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR at the end of World War II, where the Mukachiv eparchy was liquidated and subordinated to the Russian Orthodox Church in 1947. Its bishop, Theodor Romza, was killed<sup>6</sup>.

The following table, comparing the situation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church prior to World War II with the situation in 1950, offers a graphic picture of the losses suffered by the Church from its forced reunion<sup>7</sup>.

### Situation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church

Number in 1939	Losses Suffered by 1950
Dioceses .....	4 All dioceses liquidated.
Territory of Apostolic Visitor .....	1 Liquidated.

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, K. Kharchev, Chairman of the Council of Religious Affairs to the USSR. Council of Ministers, in an interview for the Warsaw weekly, *Prawo i życie*, February 8, 1986, p. 13. The current stand of the Russian Orthodox Church regarding the Lviv “Sobor” is presented in detail in “The Moscow Patriarchate and the Liquidation of the Eastern Rite Catholic Church in Ukraine,” *Religion in Communist Lands*, Vol. 13, No. 2, Summer 1985, pp. 182-188. Compare the article of Metropolitan Nikodimus of Lviv and Ternopil, published in *Visti z Ukrainy*, No. 5, January 1986, with the article in *Moskovskyye novosti*, No. 22, June 1986, and the article of K. Dmytruk in *Radianska Ukraina*, May 31, 1986.

<sup>6</sup> *Analecta, First Victims*, pp. 30-59.

<sup>7</sup> *Soviet Persecution of Religion in Ukraine*, Human Rights Commission World Congress of Free Ukrainians, Toronto, 1976, p. 28.



Bishops .....	8	All imprisoned, condemned, died in prison, killed, or exiled.
Parishes .....	2,772	Taken over by the Russian Orthodox Church; some liquidated.
Churches and chapels .....	4,119	Taken over by the Russian Orthodox Church or closed.
Monasteries and convents .....	142	Confiscated and closed by the authorities; a few transferred to the Russian Orthodox Church.
Other Church institutions .....		All liquidated.
Secular priests .....	2,638	Fewer than half forced into Russian Orthodox Church; others imprisoned or in hiding.
Monastic clergy .....	164	Dispersed, imprisoned together with three Provincial Superiors.
Brothers .....	193	Dispersed or imprisoned.
Seminarians .....	229	Dispersed or refugees.
Nuns .....	580	Dispersed.
Faithful .....	4,048,515	Many imprisoned or deported for their faith; majority resisting passively.

### The Ukrainian Catholic Church in the Catacombs

Forty years after the abolition of their Church, Ukrainian Catholic communities continue to exist in the Soviet Union, as even Soviet sources attest. The most telling evidence of the survival of the Catholic Church is to be found in Soviet propaganda, which wages a vigorous campaign against the Church through books, pamphlets, periodicals, television programs, movies, lectures, and exhibits, all designed to falsify the historical record, defame Catholic leaders and clergy, and intimidate church members. To this day, the great Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky, who led his Church for four and one-half decades (1900-44), saving the lives of thousands of Jews during World War II, is maligned by Soviet officials.

At the outset, the priests of the Catacomb Church were those who did not rejoin Russian orthodoxy during the 1945-49 period but remained Catholics, giving up any public exercise of their clerical duties. After 1946, a significant portion of Catholic laymen continued to depend on the services of these "illegal" priests and monks, whose numbers increased after the mid-1940s with the return of what the Soviets called "recalcitrant" clergymen — those who had completed their sentences or had benefitted from the post-Stalin amnesties.

The hope that de-Stalinisation would lead to the restoration of the Ukrainian Catholic Church produced a marked intensification of covert Catholic activities. By the late 1950s, however, as more and more "converts" to the Church began to repudiate orthodoxy, communist authorities dispelled any hope for a change in official policy toward the Church by arresting even more priests and unleashing a new wave of anti-Catholic propaganda. Notwithstanding this widespread antireligious campaign, the number of priests increased in Western Ukraine in the 1950s and thereafter, due in part to sec-

ret ordinations in exile. In addition, the existence of secret theological "seminaries" in Ternopil and Kolomyia was reported in the Soviet press in the 1960s in connection with the arrests of their organisers.

Today, the underground Catholic Church is said to embrace hundreds of priests, headed by a number of secret bishops working under the authority of their primate in Rome. Religious women in orders working throughout Ukraine number more than 1,000. Many former Catholic and non-Orthodox priests have retained a spiritual allegiance to the Pope as well, while others have taken up civilian professions and continue to celebrate the sacraments in private. A certain number of Ukrainian Catholic priests live in exile outside Western Ukraine or as free settlers in Siberia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, and Eastern Ukraine, often serving their faithful from afar. Members of religious communities and monastic orders have maintained close contact with each other, and most have remained faithful to their vows. In 1974, a clandestine Catholic convent was uncovered by police in Lviv.

Almost invariably, these clergymen and monastics hold full-time secular jobs or have retired from such employment. The identities of the other clergy seem to be known to the Soviet police, who frequently subject them to searches, interrogations, and fines but stop short of arrests unless they have extended their activities beyond a narrow circle of friends in private homes. It appears, however, that Soviet authorities are much more ruthless in dealing with new, secretly ordained priests.

In 1968, apparently in connection with the legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia, the harassment of "recalcitrant" clergy escalated into a large-scale campaign against "illegal" Ukrainian Catholic clergy. Many of these clergymen were subjected to searches, interrogations, fines, and beatings. In January 1969 the KGB arrested an underground Catholic bishop named Vasyl Velychkovsky and two Catholic priests, sentencing them to 3-years imprisonment for alleged violations of the "law on cults".

Religious activities that are "illegal" when performed by Catholic priests or members include holding religious services; educating children in the Catholic faith; performing baptisms, wedding rites, and funerals; hearing confessions; anointing the ill; copying religious materials; and possessing prayer books, icons, church calendars, religious books, and other sacred objects. Soviet sources reveal numerous examples of arrests for such activities. One is the case of Reverend Ivan Kryvy, who was arrested in 1973 for organising the printing of a Ukrainian Catholic prayer book (actually a reprint of a prayer book published in Canada in 1954) in three consecutive editions (1969, 1971, and 1972) totalling 3,500 copies. The work was done by two employees of the Lviv state printing shop who were also arrested in 1973 together with another person involved in the distribution of these materials. In the same manner, the clandestine printers also produced 150 copies of a "Carol and Church Songs" book and 150 copies of the "Missal".

The most active lay people and clergy of the "illegal" Church have tried to

use legal means to defend their Church. By 1956-57, there were cases in which believers had tried to legalise their Ukrainian Catholic communities according to Soviet law by petitioning the proper authorities to permit their parish congregation to operate openly. A number of such petitions were sent in the late 1960s and early 1970s, including an appeal from the Ukrainian Catholics of the city of Stryi, which reached the West in 1972. All of these petitions were refused. In 1976 a Ukrainian Catholic priest named Reverend Volodymyr Prokopiv was arrested for accompanying a delegation of Ukrainians to Moscow with such a petition, signed by a large number of Catholics from the Lviv region. The Soviet response to these petitions has been to sharpen repressive measures against the activist clergy, monastics, and lay people and to intensify their propaganda.

In recent years, the cause of persecuted Ukrainian Catholics has been taken up by the dissident movement in Ukraine. Since 1970, the movement's organ, the *Ukrainian Herald*, has carried accounts of the harassment, searches, arrests, and trials of Catholics and has editorially condemned "wanton liquidation" of the Church as "illegal and unconstitutional". A leading Ukrainian dissident, historian Valentyn Moroz, devoted part of his *Chronicle of Resistance* to the nation-building role of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine; he equated the regime's anti-Catholic struggle with an attack upon "the spiritual structure of the nation".

Lithuanian Catholic dissidents also have raised their voices in recent years. In their petitions to Soviet authorities and in their underground *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church*, they have joined Ukrainian dissidents in calling for the lifting of the illegal ban on the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Likewise, in September 1974, a leading Russian Orthodox dissident named Anatoliy Levitin-Krasnov appealed to Sakharov's human rights committee in Moscow to raise its voice in defence of Ukrainian Catholics and other persecuted religious groups. "The Union in Western Ukraine", wrote Levitin-Krasnov, "is a massive popular movement. Its persecution means not only religious oppression, but also restriction of the national rights of Western Ukraine"<sup>8</sup>.

### Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine

At the beginning of 1984, a group of Ukrainian Catholics began to publish and disseminate a *samizdat* publication, the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church*. To date, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in Munich has received and broadcast nine numbered issues of the *Chronicle* plus one special issue. The 10th edition of the *Chronicle* was published in June 1986 and had a significant change in title: *Chronicle of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the Catacombs*. The *Chronicle* is published by members of the "Initiative Group for the

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

Defence of the Right of Believers and the Church in Ukraine", which was established in 1982 and spearheads the campaign of Ukrainian Catholics for the legalisation of their Church<sup>9</sup>.

It was the years of abortive demands by believers that authorities legalise the activities of the Catholic Church in Western Ukraine that brought about the emergence of an organised human rights movement among believers. In early 1982 the Central Committee of Ukrainian Catholics was formed, and Josyp Terelya was elected its chairman. In a statement about the formation of the Initiative Group, addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Terelya wrote:

This was the response of Ukrainian Catholics to increasing repression against the Ukrainian Catholic Church. From now on, all information about the Ukrainian Catholic Church will be passed on for scrutiny by the world public. The Catholics of the world should know and be reminded in what conditions we exist<sup>10</sup>.

The first three issues of the *Chronicle* are varied, although they deal largely with the lives of believers — Catholics, Orthodox, Baptists, Pentecostals, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Seventh-Day Adventists — giving accounts of repressive measures taken against them and naming the camps and psychiatric hospitals in which they are confined. The journals also devote considerable attention to the sociopolitical situation in Ukraine and discuss such diverse subjects as the Raul Wallenberg case, Russification, and the Polish workers' movement. Most of the information in the *Chronicle*, however, relates to the lives of members of the banned Ukrainian Catholic Church, especially to violations of their human rights. These journals underscore the needs of the people to worship freely in their own rite, to have their own churches with free access to them, and to have their own priests and their own language<sup>11</sup>.

The founder of the Initiative Group and moving force behind the *Chronicle*, Josyp Terelya, was arrested on February 8, 1985, and sentenced on

9 Because of the potential for intentionally planted disinformation, it is impossible to be certain that all items in the *Chronicle* were written by or reflect the opinions of Ukrainian Catholics in Ukraine today. However, enough of the facts have been substantiated by other sources to make the *Chronicle* on the whole a credible source of information about the true status of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

10 Josyp Terelya, "Declaration to the CC CPU on the formation of the Initiative Group for the Defence of the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine," *Arkhiv Samizdata* (AS) 4897, *Radio Liberty*, Munich, 1983.

11 On the *Chronicle*, see *Radio Liberty* 3/85, "Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine," January 7, 1985; Bohdan Nahaylo, "The Church Rumbling Beneath the Kremlin," *The Times*, January 12, 1985; Maxine Pollack, "KGB Crackdown in the Ukraine," *The Sunday Times*, January 27, 1985; Bohdan Nahaylo, "Persecuted Ukrainian Catholics Speak Out," *The Wall Street Journal* (European edition), February 18, 1985; Ivan Mhul, "La resistance tenace des catholiques clandestins d'Ukraine," *Le Monde*, March 1, 1985; George Zarycky, "Soviet Journal on Religious Dissent May Embarrass Kremlin," *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 6, 1985; *Radio Liberty* 71/85, "Moscow Still Putting Pressure on Ukrainian Catholics to Break with Rome," March 8, 1985; and *Radio Liberty* 101/85, "First Issue of New *Samizdat* Journal Put Out by Ukrainian Catholics (Uniates)," March 26, 1985.

August 20, 1985, to 7 years imprisonment and 5 years exile for his religious activities. He had already spent years in various camps, prisons, and psychiatric institutions. He is currently serving his sentence in Camp 36 near Kuchino, the so-called death camp where, since May 1984, four prominent Ukrainian prisoners have died — Ukrainian Helsinki Monitors Vasyl Stus, Oleksa Tykhy, Yuriy Lytvyn, and journalist Valeriy Marchenko.

Terelya's successor as chairman of the Initiative Group, Vasyl Kobryn, also was sentenced in March 1985 to 3 years imprisonment for "anti-Soviet slander". The plight of Terelya and Kobryn is just one example of the persecution of countless numbers of Ukrainian Catholics who have suffered harassment, illegal searches, beatings, and arrests solely because of their attempts to practice their religious beliefs.

### Grounds for Repression

Clearly, the Ukrainian Catholic faithful who were driven underground following the forced 1946 "reunion" have posed an especially complicated problem for Soviet authorities. Enjoying massive support from believers in the Western Ukraine, as well as from the strong Ukrainian Catholic diaspora in the West, the faithful have survived despite repeated repressive measures. They have survived both within the formal Orthodox Church — so-called secret Catholics — and as an "illegal" Church with a succession of its own bishops and a network of secular and monastic clergy, performing clandestine religious rites in private homes, at cemeteries, and even in officially "closed" churches. Among young people, in particular, there has been a growing acceptance of religious traditions and symbols as important links with the past and as integral elements of national culture.

The reaction of the regime has been to renew its emphasis on mass, antireligious propaganda, especially in Western Ukraine. Conferences have been organised on the subject of perfecting the methodology to combat Ukrainian Catholicism in Western Ukraine<sup>12</sup>. Numerous publications have appeared that attempt to discredit the union of the congregations in Ukraine and what is now Byelorussia with Rome in 1596; these go to great pains to prove the allegations that the Catholic Church conducted activities that were directed against the population of Ukraine during the first half of the 20th century.

The growth of interest in Ukrainian Catholicism has to be understood in relation to the general rise of interest in religion, spiritual values, and ethics

<sup>12</sup> In November 1982 a conference was held in Kyiv on the topic "The Anti-Communist Essence of Uniate-Nationalistic Falsification of the History of the Ukrainian Nation," (*Liudyna i Svit*, No. 2, February 1983, p. 21). Toward the end of 1983, in the city of Kalush, Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, a conference was held dealing with "Uniatism and Ukrainian Bourgeois-Nationalism," (*Liudyna i Svit*, No. 1, January 1984, p. 33). In April 1984 a conference was held in Lviv on "Critique of the Catholic Uniate Ideology in Atheist Propaganda," (*Nauka i Religiya*, No. 11, November 1985, p. 34).

among the younger generation in Ukraine. Complaints by Soviet officials and their publications attest to this revival. A letter by an avowed atheist published as part of an article on religious belief and atheist propaganda in a 1984 issue of *Nauka i Religiya* (*Science and religion*) states:

If you could only imagine how difficult it is for us atheists in Ukraine. For many years now, I have been involved in the thankless propagandising task of Soviet ritualism. I have ploughed through mountains of literature, observed, pondered, and spent many hours in the churches where religious rites are practiced. I have come to the conclusion that Soviet official statistics are very far from reality<sup>13</sup>.

The problem of religious activities in Western Ukraine also was raised by the first secretary of the Lviv Komsomol, Oleksiy Babiychuk:

... in this oblast, particularly in the rural areas, a large number of the population adheres to religious practices, among them a large proportion of youth. In the last few years, the activity of the Uniates [Ukrainian Catholics] has grown, that of representatives of the Uniates as well as former Uniate priests; there are even reverberations to renew the overt activity of this Church<sup>14</sup>.

Another important factor in the steady growth of Catholicism in Ukraine has been the proximity of the Solidarity movement and the election of a Slavic Pope. It is worth noting that for some years now the Polish dissident movement — particularly members of Solidarity — has supported Ukraine's quest for self-determination in its official statements and publications and, conversely, members of the dissident movement in Ukraine, like Vasyl Stus and Josyp Terelya, have praised Solidarity in their activities. In an open letter, published in 1981 in the journal of Catholic opposition in Poland, *Spotkanie*, Ukrainian Catholics registered their joy on the occasion of the election of Cardinal Wojtyla as Pope<sup>15</sup>.

At the same time, Soviet authorities have launched a related propaganda campaign in Ukraine, disseminating publications that criticise the Vatican's support for believers in Soviet-bloc countries. The mass media also has stepped up its attacks on Pope John Paul II, especially his support of Ukrainian Catholics<sup>16</sup>. The antireligious journal *Liudyna i Svii* (*Man and the World*), published in Kyiv, stated the following:

Proof that the Church is persistently striving to strengthen its political influence in socialist countries is witnessed by the fact that Pope John Paul II gives his support to the emigre hierarchy of the so-called Ukrainian Catholic Church. . . . The current tactic of Pope John Paul II and the Roman Curia lies

13 *Nauka i Religiya*, Moscow, No. 10, October 1984, p. 11.

14 *Ibid.*, No. 1, January 1985, p. 10.

15 Ivan Hvat, "The Ukrainian Catholic Church, the Vatican and the Soviet Union During the Pontificate of Pope John Paul II," *Religion in Communist Lands*, Vol. II, No. 3, (Winter 1983), pp. 264-280.

16 *Ibid.*, pp. 277-278; See also L. F. Shevtsov, *Sotsializm i Katolitsizm*, (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), p. 39.

in attempts to strengthen the position of the Church in all socialist countries as they have done in Poland, where the Vatican tried to raise the status of the Catholic Church to a state within a state. In the last few years, the Vatican has paid particular attention to the question of Catholicism of the Slavonic nations. This is poignantly underscored by the Pope when he states that he is not only a Pope of Polish origin, but the first Slavic Pope, and he will pay particular attention to the Christianisation of all Slavic nations<sup>17</sup>.

These same themes were stressed at a 1981 symposium in Bratislava for specialists in antireligious propaganda in Warsaw Pact countries. One of the papers dealing with Ukrainian Catholicism stated the following:

Pope John Paul II has approved certain additional measures, directed in support of the Uniates. . . [The] Head of the Vatican underscored his "dedication" to the Uniates by approving the claims of Cardinal Slipyj to represent and speak on behalf of all the faithful of the Western province of the Ukrainian SSR<sup>18</sup>.

However, Ukrainian Catholicism, seen as the strongest and most representative exponent of cultural and spiritual ties with the West, remains an obstacle to the Soviet goal of creating a single Soviet people. The Soviet regime has officially liquidated the Church and also has attempted to erase it from historic memory. To enable Moscow to achieve its goals, all signs of the religion's ongoing revival are continually repressed.

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
17 I. Tykhonov, "Catholic Church: New Trends, Old Goals," (in Ukrainian), *Liudyna i Svit*, No. 10, October 1982, pp. 53-54.

18 B. Lobovik, I. Myhovic, "Zlopovestne tiene minulosti," *Ateizmus*, No. 4, Bratislava, 1981, pp. 361-469.

## Book Reviews

### **DAS DRITTE REICH UND DIE UKRAINISCHE FRAGE: DOCUMENTE 1934-1944.**

Collected and with an Introduction by Wolodymyr Kosyk.  
Munich, Ukrainisches Institut, 1986.



As in his earlier work (*La politique de la France a l'egard de l'Ukraine, mars 1917 — fevrier 1918*, Sorbonne, 1981), Wolodymyr Kosyk is again impressive in his directness and clear phraseology while confronting his chosen theme. This time he subjects the Third Reich and the Ukrainian question to a painstaking analysis by assembling and commenting on the crucial documents covering a decade (1934-1944) which encompasses both years of peace and war.

This period of German-Ukrainian relations has, heretofore, been largely overlooked by Ukrainian and German scholarship. Thus Mr. Kosyk's attempt is a pioneering one. In it he carefully separates the issue of origins from that of historical tradition. Being a historian trained at the Sorbonne, he is well prepared to deal with the problem.

Mr. Kosyk's work has five distinct parts: an introduction, an index of sources used, the documents themselves, and a list of abbreviations together with name and subject indi-

ces. He unerringly and objectively drew the documents for his work from such unimpeachable sources as the following: the German Federal Archives (civil and military), the German Foreign Affairs Office, the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, the collective work titled *The OUN in Light of Decisions of its General Meetings, Conferences and Other Documents Refer-*



ring to its Struggle, 1929-1955 (Munich, 1955), *Party Underground and Partisan Movement* (Kyiv, 1969), Lebed's *Ukrainian Underground Army* (Munich, 1969), and *Collection of Documents from Soviet Ukraine* (Kyiv, 1980).

In the richly documented and easily readable introduction, Mr. Kosyk relies on factual material. He records the phases of Ukrainian-German relations roughly in chronological sequence (as he also presents the documents themselves) and avoids the difficult if not hopeless task of tracing the impact of these relations on the Ukrainian question in world politics. He says that the leadership of the OUN (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists) and in particular its head, Yevhen Konovalets, never wanted to connect the fate of the organisation with Germany. Konovalets and the organisation always acted only in the interests of the Ukrainian people. Already in 1934, a year after the Nazis came to power, the OUN strongly criticised their racial theories and the cultural situation in Germany.

In 1938-1939, of course, the world witnessed Hitler's negative stand on the independence of Carpathian Ukraine, which he permitted to be given to Hungary, thereby exposing thousands of Ukrainian patriots to suffering and annihilation. The Ukrainian nationalist press then heavily criticised Germany, calling Hitler's policy "a cynical speculation" and "an irresponsible trading of the territory of an enslaved nation". *The Ukrainian Word* from Paris, in its September 24, 1939, issue, in an article entitled "An Infamous Crime Perpetrated on Ukraine" wrote: "The Ukrainian nation will live despite the devilish Hitler-Stalin plans". The specific reference here was to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact of September 23, 1939, for the division of Poland.

Mr. Kosyk's principal goal, expressed early and reiterated again and again, becomes helpful in formulating the fundamental German-Ukrainian differences and permits him to explore them within an established pattern. He calls readers' attention to a very important document, No. 21, dated July 3, 1941, in which German Assistant Secretary of State Kundt told the Ukrainian leaders from the National Committee that "in a war against the Soviet Union, the Germans are not in an alliance with Ukrainians, but consider themselves the sole occupiers of the Soviet regions", and that "Hitler himself will decide what will happen to the occupied territories".

At that meeting Stepan Bandera from the OUN leadership took full responsibility for the proclamation of Ukrainian independence which occurred on June 30, 1941. Two days later he was arrested and deported to Berlin. The same day other leading members of the committee were arrested. In Berlin, pressure was exerted on Bandera and later on Yaroslav Stetsko, head of the Ukrainian government, to rescind the proclamation of independence and to dissolve the government. But all German efforts were in vain (see documents Nos. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26).

Next Mr. Kosyk discusses the *Ostpolitik* which Hitler formulated at a special conference on July 16, 1941 (document No. 29). That policy was to have three general objectives: (1) to dominate, administer and exploit the newly

conquered areas for the greater benefit of Nazi Germany; (2) to create in the newly occupied areas, which should be later extended to the Ural Mountains, an unlimited opportunity for Nazi German colonisation and (3) to use the native population of the areas for labour, never allowing them to bear arms or to enjoy any type of self-government. At that conference Erich Koch was appointed Reichskommissar for Ukraine. His appointment, as we know from history, began one of the most striking feuds in Nazi party ranks and in the German administration, one which had tragic consequences for Ukraine.

Thus Mr. Kosyk continues to provide the reader with a richly documented introduction. Each and every document which he cites, German or Soviet, is anti-Ukrainian, directed against Ukrainian aspirations for independence. Reading these documents one cannot avoid asking oneself whether it was possible that, under such conditions, the Ukrainians could have cooperated with the Germans during the war. Could they have really collaborated with the Germans when they were considered *untermenschen*, were rejected by the Germans, and had no right to decide about their future?

In the meantime the Soviet Russians began their propaganda (document No. 118). They termed the Ukrainian Underground Army of about 80,000 people (document No. 123) — which courageously fought against the Germans and the Russians — German collaborators who did not deserve the support of the Ukrainian nation. On January 12, 1944, the Soviet government published a proclamation to the Ukrainian people, signed by Krushchev and others (document No. 122), in which they said that the enemies of the Ukrainian people are not only "the German robbers", but also "the German-Ukrainian nationalists, the people's traitors and Hitler's vassals". This proclamation also called the Ukrainian nationalists "Hitler's associates in crime" who wanted to destroy "the blood brotherhood of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples and to deliver Ukraine to the Germans" (document No. 122). This and similar leaflets greatly strengthened the Soviet cause, did much damage to Ukrainian national aspirations, and left to this day an anti-Ukrainian legacy to the world.

To comprehend correctly the stand of Ukrainian nationalists during the crucial decade treated by Mr. Kosyk is central to any objective judgement of the Ukrainian war effort. The 125 documents published and analysed in this work facilitate such comprehension.

If Mr. Kosyk stirs some readers to anger, so much the better; it will be of interest to see, for example, whether any champions will still appear to defend the notion, created out of whole cloth by the Soviet Russian propaganda machine, of Ukrainian collaboration with Nazi Germany. In the meantime we highly recommend that an English translation of this valuable work be provided quickly.

Wolodymyr ZYLA

*The*  
**UKRAINIAN  
REVIEW**



**III**

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# THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW

A Quarterly Magazine devoted to the study of Ukraine.

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*Cathedral of the Assumption,  
Monastery of the Caves in Kyiv, 1073-1078,  
Destroyed during the Second World War in 1941*

Blanka JERABEK

## NATIONAL SOCIALIST RELIGIOUS POLICY IN UKRAINE, 1941-1944\*

### 1. Getting into the Problem

The approaching Millennium of Christianity in Rus'-Ukraine has a far-reaching influence on the more exhaustive studies of the various fields of Ukrainian church history. New questions from the fields of theology, liturgy, linguistics, literature, philosophy, pedagogy, history, economics, jurisprudence and so on will be increasingly examined and debated.

The Ukrainian Church, on the basis of its past 1000-year-old existence since Rus'-Ukraine accepted Christianity in 988 A.D., can demonstrate a very rich history. Its history is abundant not only in flowering epochs when Ukrainian Christianity experienced great advances and successes, but also in tragic events that have played an important role in its history. This is the question of an outright suppression of Christianity as it has been practiced in Ukraine under the Soviet Russian regime for more than sixty-five years; at the same time it has been connected with persecutions and very drastic and cruel measures including merciless punishment of the practicing Ukrainian Christians.

Also, the three years of the German occupation of Ukraine (1941-1944) belong to a dark period in the 1000-year-old history of Ukrainian Christianity. Of course, this was not simply a question of the liquidation of the Ukrainian Churches during the National Socialist occupation of Ukraine, or the persecution of individual believers. However, the hostile and pagan views of the National Socialists and the complete turn away from Christianity constitute evidence that in these dark years the Ukrainian Church not only could not develop freely, but in reality was only tolerated very reluctantly.

To Adolf Hitler Christianity was something that had been smuggled into the Western World by the Jews. In keeping with National Socialist philosophy, he called for the revival of the old German paganism and the worship of the National Socialist Party, the Führer and the State. Accordingly, it was obvious that the fundamental assumptions of both National Socialism and Christianity were totally incompatible<sup>1</sup>.

The most immediate goal set by the National Socialists was the liquidation

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\* The author presents this article on the occasion of the Millennium of Christianity in Ukraine, 988-1988.

1. Harry Picker, *Hitlers Tischgespräche*, Bonn, Athenäum, 1951.

of the Churches, since they were considered to be in direct competition in the fight for power and control over humanity. To them their greatest enemy was, quite naturally, the strongest religious organisation in the world — the Catholic Church — with its supranational and independent power of faith.

## 2. Rosenberg — an Enemy of the Church and his Policy of Tolerance

The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Alfred Rosenberg, was a great enemy of religion, and this was attested to by the views expressed in his book *The Myths of the 20th Century*<sup>2</sup>. After all, his intention was to eliminate the Church completely in the occupied Eastern territories. At the same time, Rosenberg was not only a great enemy of Catholicism, but also of Slavism and, consequently, he was against the Orthodox Church as well. Both aims of his Church policy could be clearly detected in all of his statements.

According to Rosenberg, the Orthodox Church was a strong bonding agent of Russian imperialism, and since the Russian empire was condemned to annihilation, Russian Orthodoxy, in contrast to the non-Russian Churches outside the ethnic Russian territories, should not be tolerated<sup>3</sup>. However, there emerged a problem in that Rosenberg of all leading National Socialists was appointed Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. But the practice of such an anti-Christian attitude in the occupied Eastern territories would have invited hostile sentiments from the broad masses of population against the National Socialists. Therefore, there seemed to be a necessity to lift the religious restrictions introduced by the Russian Bolsheviks in order to gain propaganda capital from it.

Furthermore, the Baltic friends of Rosenberg, as well as his colleagues at the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories succeeded in convincing him of the advantages of the policy of religious tolerance<sup>4</sup>. These suggestions met with approval by both Hitler and Martin Bormann, Director of the Nazi Party Bureau, and even the Reich Commissar for Ukraine, Gauleiter Erich Koch, promised not to raise any objections. Notwithstanding that, in consideration of “the past, the present legal situation and the aspired future relations”, Rosenberg demanded a discriminatory church policy in the separate territories of the East<sup>5</sup>.

Although Rosenberg gave up his anti-Christian attitude in the occupied Eastern territory mainly on principle and out of political reasons, he

2. A. Rosenberg, *Der Mythos des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts*, München, 1935.

3. Alexander Dallin, *Deutsche Herrschaft in Rußland 1941-1945*, Athenäum, 1984.

4. O. Bräutigam, *Überblick über die besetzten Ostgebiete während des 2. Weltkriegs*, Tübingen 1954.

5. A. Rosenberg, *Allgemeiner Aufbau und Aufgaben*, 29 April 1941; A. Rosenberg, *Allgemeine Instruktion für alle Reichskommissare in den besetzten Ostgebieten*, 8 Mai 1941.



demanded a strict separation of Church and State. He ordered his Reich Commissars "neither to give new life to the repressed Church nor to continue the former Bolshevik view of destruction"<sup>6</sup>. Accordingly, the policy of religious tolerance of the Berlin Reich Ministry was tied to the following three conditions:

1. Loyalty of the Church to the occupational authorities;
2. Abstention of the Church from all political activities;
3. In the non-Russian territories, continuation of the Church on separatist basis by means of the so-called autocephalous denominations<sup>7</sup>.

These conditions quite clearly brought to light the disagreement which could also be continually observed in the policies of the National Socialists with respect to the question of whether the Church should be depoliticised or whether it should be made a tool of German politics. Consequently, there were different groupings within the National Socialist movement which represented or favoured one view or the other with its different practices.

With respect to the religious policy in Ukraine, Rosenberg favoured the division of the Ukrainian Church into the Orthodox and the Catholic Church, and the split of the Orthodox Church into an additional three groups: the Russian Patriarchal, the Ukrainian Autonomous and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. To eliminate the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, Rosenberg called for the exclusive use of the Ukrainian language in all church communities and demanded that all priests should be Ukrainian<sup>8</sup>.

### 3. Religious Life under the Military Administration

At first, during the initial phases of the military campaign there were absolutely no conflicts over religious policies since the German leadership was busy with other matters; the regulation of the Church matters was fully relinquished to the military administration. Contrary to instructions neither to promote nor to hinder religious life, the military administration began to take an unmistakably mild and tolerant attitude towards the Church. In many countries solemn openings of churches, closed for years by the Soviet Russians, were celebrated. Some festive acts, like the reopening of the cathedral in Minsk and Smolensk, Byelorussia, were reported quite widely by the press<sup>9</sup>.

From the reports of the military administration one could also learn how

6. A. Rosenberg, *Instruktion für einen Reichskommissar in der Ukraine*, 7 Mai 1941.

7. H.W. Scheidt, "Kulturpolitische Aufgaben in den besetzten Ostgebieten" in: *Probleme des Ostraumes*, Berlin, RMfBO, 1942, p. 142.

8. F. Heyer, *Die orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine*, Köln 1953.

9. *Abschlussbericht*, p. 139.

many churches in the various districts previously closed by the Russian communists were reopened. In the region of the Novi Sanzhary, for example, seven churches which had been used by Soviet authorities as grain elevators were reopened. It was also reported that the number of churches in Dekanka was relatively small; out of an original 14 churches that existed there before World War I, five that still stood were closed. In these five churches permission was granted by German military authorities to hold services. The number of churches in the town of Reshetylivka came to six, while in the entire region their total was sixty.

During the Soviet Russian occupation of Ukraine, churches for the most part were destroyed or, as far as this was possible, served as clubhouses or granaries. But in the period of German military administration, they were reopened<sup>10</sup>. There were even military units and commanders that provided for the return of church buildings and church property to the communities, as well as the procurement of construction materials. In many places, especially in the countryside, a strong religiosity prevailed. The period of the military administration with respect to the religious policy may be characterised as follows: in most territories there prevailed a gradual transition "from the principle of beneficent tolerance to the principle of open support"<sup>11</sup>

In addition some military clergymen participated in the religious life of the civilian administration. The armed forces and the military intelligence services, contrary to instructions from Berlin, even granted permission to the immigrant priests, both Orthodox and Catholic, as well as Roman Catholic, to return to the East. But these actions did not remain secret and soon became the topic of intense discussion. The High Command of the armed forces and Rosenberg's Ministry were receiving complaints that German assistance in the restoration of religious life in the East was not in the interest of the German Reich<sup>12</sup>.

#### 4. Rosenberg's Decrees Regarding German Religious Policy

It is not known who caused Rosenberg to issue a "decree of tolerance", which he suddenly ordered at the end of November 1941. Initially, this "decree of tolerance" had a very detailed formulation. The rights filled three paragraphs, while the obligations consisted of 31 paragraphs. Here we can clearly see Rosenberg's anti-Christian views. The suppression of synagogues continued; churches were not allowed to own any landed property in addition to church buildings serving religious purposes only, to collect any taxes or to

10. *Erreignismeldungen der Einsatzgruppen*, Nr. 13, 34, 37, 43, 52, (5, 26, 29 July and 5, 14 August 1941).

11. *Deutsche Post aus dem Osten*, Berlin, September 1941, pp. 11-12.

12. Dienststelle Rosenberg, *Die Frage der konfessionellen Verbände*, 29 July 1941; *Weisung an militärische Dienststellen über das Verhalten in der Religionsfrage*, 3 August 1941.

receive any collections, but had to base their existence exclusively on voluntary donations of the faithful.

Since Rosenberg was advised that so many prohibitions could produce negative propaganda results, he ordered that a great number of them be transferred to a secret decree, which was to be sent to the various government departments at the time the decree was announced. When in May 1942 the decree emerged in its final form, Rosenberg was informed through Bormann that Hitler did not wish Rosenberg to place his name under the religious tolerance decree. Consequently, it was understood that Hitler declared himself against the decree as such. In his opinion, tolerance could be practiced for the time being, but the required instruction should take the form of secret directives to the Reich Commissars and not the form of law. And this is what happened<sup>13</sup>.

All the inhabitants were entitled to freedom of religious beliefs granted them by Reich Minister Rosenberg's decree of March 1942, with reference to paragraph 8 of Hitler's decree on the administration of the newly occupied Eastern territories of July 17, 1941. Individuals of the same religious persuasions received the right to organise religious denominational communities<sup>14</sup>.

The leading idea of the National Socialists or the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, as the case may be, was that the Ukrainians must no longer be politically engaged through participation in church affairs. Rosenberg sent the text of the decree on the regulation of church matters to the Reich Commissars with the request to furnish it with a signature and to publish it in the respective official gazette<sup>15</sup>.

According to this decree all the existing religious communities had to register with District Commanders with an official declaration that would contain the complete statement of the name, addresses, religious affiliation, list of the board of directors, all the organs as well as their duties, responsibilities and a statement of purpose. It was forbidden to set up new religious communities without explicit permission from the Reich Commissar who had unlimited power to dissolve them.

"The General Commissars have the duty to prevent these differences of opinion, especially under the present circumstances of uninterrupted work for the war economy, from degenerating forms that could lead to disruptions of the economic life or of the general order. The subordinate government departments are receiving special instructions to point out the fact that in the preservation of the various religious associations one must envisage an expression of German toleration towards all people with religious affiliations"<sup>16</sup>.

13. Bräutigam, *Überblick über die* . . .

14. *Verordnung über die Religionsfreiheit für die besetzten Ostgebiete*, Berlin, März 1942.

15. *Religionsgesellschaften in den besetzten Ostgebieten*, *Der Reichsminister f.d.b. Ostgebiete, an den Reichskommissar*, Berlin, 13 Mai 1942.

16. *Verordnung des Reichskommissars*. . . *über die Rechtsverhältnisse religiöser Organisation*, 1942.

Some regulations which were communicated to the Reich Commissar for Ukraine were considered strictly confidential. According to them, the Russian Orthodox Church was not to be promoted or assisted in any way since it was "the carrier of the Great Russian and pan-Slavic ideas. On the other hand, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church is to be supported against Russian Orthodoxy. However, there is the danger that those church institutions might become a centre of Ukrainian national aspirations. It is generally known that this was the reason why the Soviet government liquidated the Church in 1930 after it was used as a counterbalance against Moscow".

"In the general church affairs the fact that Ukrainians are Catholic in the West and Orthodox in the East must be taken into account. Here the Reich Commissar has to take the view that religious needs are a personal matter and of a local nature. He should not interfere with the denominational commitments, but in any case, the religious events taking place on the whole Ukrainian national territory may be conducted only in the Ukrainian language. Any influence of Russian Orthodoxy and its priests, as well as the entry of all church emissaries from foreign countries into the Reich Commissariat of Ukraine must be prevented".

"Since different sectarian groups will most likely be organised, as was the case in the past, an increase in the numbers of these sects should be resisted, but they should get equal treatment with other denominational groups. The Reich Commissar must prevent religious denominations and sects from engaging in politics and from appearing in public with any political statements. Obviously, the Reich Commissar should not receive a Ukrainian bishop as a representative of the Ukrainian people, but only Ukrainian spokesmen appointed by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. German officials are not allowed to visit the churches"<sup>17</sup>.

## 5. Religious Life under the Civilian Administration

Both fundamental elements of the Berlin decision regarding church policy, depoliticisation and fragmentation, were completely acceptable to Erich Koch, the Reich Commissar for Ukraine<sup>18</sup>. In February 1942, "Zentralblatt" Koch declared that "Religion is anybody's private matter, the costs of private matters are the responsibility of every individual himself. Therefore, the charges for the maintenance of Orthodox priests must be met through voluntary donations by those who use their services"<sup>19</sup>.

Very soon, religious life assumed an important turn for the better. First and foremost there was a strong renewal of religiosity in the country.

17. *Lagebericht*, (without author, place and date. Incomplete).

18. Dallin, *Deutsche Herrschaft*. . .

19. Koch, "Rundschreiben", 19 February 1942, *RKU Zentralblatt* I (1942).

Although the young generation, for the most part, manifested lesser interest, nevertheless church life, newly made possible, found an active and lively participation. Even numerous Jewish committees, that recovered their synagogues, awakened to a new life.

No objections were raised by the authorities against wishes, expressed time and time again, for new education of the local school youth in a religious spirit. From the suppression of the religious instruction of the Ukrainian population over the long period of Soviet Russian occupation of Ukraine, the German occupational authorities expected very positive results and they hoped to be able to influence the mood of the population and, at the same time, to turn them away from the new political education.

Certainly, as was frequently the case with the National Socialists, in practice things looked different. "It seems to me a mistake, that of all things, in the area of religious affairs we imitate the methods employed by the Bolsheviks in as much as we do not allow religious education in schools, although we should have used all suitable means to support the war against Bolshevik ideology. And, if at the same time or at a later date, it was pointed out that a large part of the Ukrainian people do not wish to have anything to do with religion, and hence its significance is exaggerated in order to justify this prohibition then it must be added that it was in our power to bring to bear once more the religion that is 'the opium of the people' in the East".

"Also, the longer the younger generation of the local people is kept away from Bolshevik education, the more difficult it will be to prevent it from being influenced by the mystic impressions of Church services, particularly on religious holidays, at processions, religious ceremonies and sacred hymns. Sometimes, one had the impression that our attitude towards the Orthodox Church had been influenced by our views on political Catholicism and the denominational front in the Reich"<sup>20</sup>. The number of Orthodox priests who answered the call and took charge of the parishes was exceptionally large. It came to light that many of them found refuge in civilian professions and particularly at economic agencies. Religious effects and vestments were taken out of hiding-places.

At the same time, however, government agencies were prohibited from going beyond tolerance towards the support of any church aspirations through a variety of measures. Therefore, religious communities were not allowed to receive any materials needed for the renovation of churches from the German government agencies. Likewise, it was forbidden to tolerate the participation of the members of the German armed forces in the religious services of the local population, as well as to hold any religious observances, e.g., the administration of the sacraments in front of the local population. Conversely, the civilian authorities of German government agencies were

20. *Die Hoheitsverwaltung und die einheimische Bevölkerung*. Report without date and signature unclear.

not permitted to take part in the divine services of the local population. Certainly it was known that this prohibition was frequently broken since most Germans had the desire to participate in solemn liturgies or other Orthodox divine services out of curiosity.

With respect to dioceses it was decreed that their territories would correspond to the borders of the General Districts. The bishops were expected to refrain from all political activities and were not allowed to leave their dioceses. It was prohibited to have a metropolitan for the whole of Ukraine, and when the Church Synod was called in Kharkiv, this was categorically denied by Reich Commissar Erich Koch<sup>21</sup>. This became the subject of sharp criticism by the National Socialists themselves as shown in the following statement:

"The mere denial of permission for the election of an exarch destroyed the confidence in us. In my opinion, however, it would have been highly desirable, if the orders from one supreme administration were directed to only one native who would be of entirely the same opinion as we are. Then the church leader would publish the appropriate instructions in a circular letter sent to the bishops. This way, we could be spared entering into correspondence, case by case, with each individual bishop, which only gives rise to an impression of our government's interference in church matters. From the government policy point of view, in a foreign country it is always better to give orders only to one native. In one particularly unfavourable moment for us Stalin took advantage of this mistake and himself appointed a patriarch for the autonomous Church in Moscow"<sup>22</sup>.

Thereby, under no circumstances did any missionary activity of the Roman Catholic Church take place in the occupied Eastern territories, since Hitler unconditionally prohibited the admittance of any clergy from abroad into the occupied Eastern territories<sup>23</sup>.

## 6. Concluding Reflections

As far as religious life in occupied Ukraine was concerned, the leading idea of the National Socialists was that through participation in church affairs Ukrainians would not engage in politics of any sort. Hitler's attitude towards the heavy church attendance of the Ukrainian rural population, which at first evoked "no mental reservations" on his part had changed in the course of time. He believed that, as far as possible, the Eastern nations' "return to Christianity" must be prevented since it might develop into an organisation<sup>24</sup>.

21. Bräutigam, *Überblick*. . .

22. *Die Hoheitsverwaltung*. . .

23. Bräutigam, *Überblick*. . .

24. Dallin, *Deutsche*. . .

Indeed, the fact is that the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church which held its services in the Ukrainian language expected a positive German policy towards Ukraine. These hopes did not come true, as the Reich Commissar for Ukraine Erich Koch ordered the persecution of all Ukrainian national movements. And, up until this point, Moscow kept further reprisals against Ukraine concealed. As soon as Stalin learned that German tolerance might eventually lead to a better mood of the Ukrainian population, he ordered Russian communist partisans to murder leading Ukrainian clergymen. Thus, the Ukrainian bishops of Kyiv fell victim to such criminal attacks<sup>25</sup>.

“Yet the Church was indebted for its rebirth not only to the persistence of religious beliefs, but also to the fact that it was the only surviving institution that had been neutralised under the Soviets and then, under the Germans, was in the position to preserve an element of autonomy. In a deep, frequently unclear, longing of the people for a third solution — neither Soviet nor German — it was the Church, regardless of the persuasion, that unavoidably attracted the masses. A long and severe persecution by the Soviet regime, notwithstanding, its appeal even if mainly resting on the older generation and rural population, was continually preserved”<sup>26</sup>.

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25. Bräutigam, *Überblick*. . .

26. Dallin, *Deutsche*. . .

*Bertil HÄGGMAN*

## **A CENTURY OF SUPPORT FOR UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE**

### **A few historical notes on Swedish-Ukrainian relations**

In the second half of the 14th century a Lithuanian-Ukrainian kingdom was founded. The Polish-Lithuanian accords of 1569 divided Ukraine between the two countries. In consequence, the central territories of Halychyna came under Polish rule. Lithuania claimed the remainder of Ukraine. The total population of Ukraine at that time was estimated at around 2 million, so Poland gained much through the accords, as the Polish parts of Ukraine were the most populous. The leading Ukrainian nobility gradually had to give way to a growing Polish influence. Catholic Poland was anxious not to let the Greek-Orthodox Ukrainians have much influence in state affairs and, during the 1590s, the underlying religious problems led to a bitter struggle between Ukrainians and Poles. The situation also worsened for the Ukrainian peasantry. In the Ukrainian-Lithuanian kingdom the peasants had in principle been free. Now serfdom was gradually being introduced.

The increasing level of the struggle of the Cossacks at the beginning of the 17th century greatly contributed to a national rising against Polish domination. Already in 1623, before he became the leading defendant of the Protestant faith on the continent, the Swedish King, Gustavus II Adolphus, had considered support for the Ukrainians against his relative, the Polish King, Sigismund III. Three years later, in 1626, the King of Sweden made his first diplomatic move in this direction. Through his representatives in Moscow he used the argument that the Pope and the Polish kingdom were threatening both Protestantism and the Greek-Orthodox faith. Special emphasis was put on the persecution of Greek-Orthodox believers in Ukraine and the fact that Russia's own believers were possible future targets. The Royal instruction to the Swedish representatives state that "The persecution of the Greek religion in Poland which the Poles attempt to moderate or exterminate sometimes with artifice and sometimes with violence is to be especially exaggerated". It was to be suggested to the tsar that he join in a treaty with the Zaporozhian Cossacks to extract them from Polish domination and use them for the "plunder of Poland", as it was bluntly stated, which would not be hard to accomplish "as they were offended by the Poles especially because of their reli-



gion, which the King of Poland attempts to exterminate".<sup>1</sup> However, the Swedes were not successful in their attempts to convince the tsar to come to the aid of the persecuted Cossacks. (In later years, Russia not only would not aid the Cossacks but oppressed them). They were Polish citizens, was the answer, and Russia had a truce with Poland. Fighting Poland was one thing, but to instigate a revolt against the Polish King was not an acceptable procedure. The Poles could strike back with similar tactics in Russia. Besides, the Cossacks were unreliable. If they revolted against the Polish King they could easily turn against the tsar next time.

Nevertheless, King Gustavus pursued his plans. In the summer of 1626 he sent a delegation to seek Russian permission for Swedish representatives to travel to Cossackia to make proposals. But Moscow refused them passage across Russian territory. However, the king persisted in his Ukrainian policy. His brother-in-law, the Prince of Siebenbürgen, was ready to help. He arranged contacts with the influential Patriarch Kyrillos Lukaris in Constantinople and the Dutch ambassador to Turkey, Cornelius Haga, a firm believer in a Protestant-Greek Orthodox union against the Vatican.

In July 1630 the governor of Swedish Livonia, Johan Skytte, received orders to send representatives to establish covert contacts with the Zaporozhian Cossacks, urging them to continue resistance against Poland, and to promote Swedish aid. The next year two Royal legates travelled to Ukraine. Their mission was the proposal of a Swedish-Ukrainian union for the liberation of Ukraine from Polish rule. The King of Sweden, a protector of Protestantism and the Greek-Orthodox faith, was willing to extend his protection to Ukraine. The organiser of the expedition was Jacques Roussell, a Frenchman in the service of Sweden. The affair, however, ended in dismal failure. By mistake the legates had made contact with the "registered" Cossacks, faithful to the Polish crown. But Gustavus continued his attempts to establish a union between Ukraine and Sweden. In 1632 a Swedish representative, Benjamin Baron, visited the Khan of Crimea to suggest a Swedish-Tartar union against Poland and Austria, but the same year, Gustavus II Adolphus was killed during the Battle of Lützen in the Thirty Years War, in his struggle to defend Protestantism.

To a certain extent the diplomatic efforts of the Swedes were forerunners of the policies of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi which led to the Pereyaslav military treaty in 1654. The Ukrainian revolution of 1648 was closely monitored by Stockholm. For years the Swedish Chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna, had been building up an extensive intelligence network from north-western Russia over Narva, Reval, Dorpat, Riga, Novgorod, Pleskov, Moscow and Danzig (Gdansk) all the way along the Baltic coast to Hamburg. Swedish reporters, correspondents and commissioners were active in these cities, and Danzig

1. B. Kentrschynskyj: *Till den karolinska politikens förhistoria*, Karolinska Förbundets Årsbok, Stockholm, 1959, p. 139 ff.

became the centre of Swedish intelligence in Poland, monitoring Polish politics. As a result, Stockholm was well informed about the Ukrainian victories over the Polish forces, about the Cossacks and their organisation, as well as the social, religious and political background of the Ukrainian revolution. The protocol of the Royal Council (a rough equivalent of a present-day government) contains many details, maps, organisational charts, and information on the origins of the Cossacks, their organisation and political objectives<sup>2</sup>. Statements of Polish officials to the effect that the revolt in Ukraine had almost ruined Poland were quoted in reports by Swedish agents. The Swedish correspondent in Danzig, Paul Pels, made this claim: "To summarise, as long as Poland has existed it was never subject to such destruction"<sup>3</sup>.

Swedish interest in Ukrainian affairs continued in the 1640s and in the coming years Russian aid to the Cossacks in their struggle against Poland would draw Sweden closer to Ukraine. For generations Sweden would be regarded by Ukraine as a natural ally against Russia and Poland. In Eastern Europe rumours that Sweden was joining Ukraine and Siebenbürgen (present-day Hungary) in an alliance were widespread. In reality, however, there were no such plans. Alex Oxenstierna was no supporter of the pro-Ukrainian policy of Gustavus II Adolphus.

It was not until the Count Palatine Charles ascended the Swedish throne in 1654 (as King Charles X Gustavus) that the ambassador of Hetman Khmelnytskyi managed to deliver a letter to Swedish Queen Christina (daughter of Gustavus II Adolphus and his successor) and Charles. In the letter Khmelnytskyi suggested joint Swedish-Ukrainian military action against Poland. The ambassador, the Greek priest Daniel Atheniensis (later to become a Swedish nobleman under the name of Oliveberg) proposed an alliance against Poland and Russia, if the latter threatened Swedish interests in the east. Charles Gustavus regarded Russia as Sweden's main enemy and attempted to seek Polish aid. Having failed in this, he decided on military action against Poland. In 1655 Swedish troops were shipped across the Baltic Sea to intervene in Poland, but also to establish Swedish supremacy over the whole Baltic region. Khmelnytskyi was regarded as a natural Swedish ally and negotiations for an alliance were initiated. When they ended in the Treaty of Korsun on October 8, 1657, Stockholm recognised Ukrainian borders stretching to the Vistula in the West, and to Prussia in the north-west. The treaty was signed a few months after the death of Hetman Khmelnytskyi. When Russia declared war on Sweden in 1656 the Ukrainian Hetman had a hard time explaining his contacts with the Swedish government, Russia's sworn enemy, to the Tsar. But Khmelnytskyi stated that his friendship with Sweden was much older than the union with Russia. He told the boyars to suspend "the unjust activities against the Swedes"<sup>4</sup>.

2. Protocols of June 5 and June 23, 1648.

3. Pels in his letter to Axel Oxenstierna of June 23 and July 18, 1648.

4. B. Kentrschynskyj: *Op. cit.*, Karolinska Förbundets Årsbok, Stockholm.

Two years later, however, Charles X Gustavus had to abandon his eastern policies. Denmark had declared war on Sweden and he had to march on Copenhagen. Sweden's role as protector of Ukraine's independence had to be temporarily abandoned. Under Hetman Petro Doroshenko, in the 1660s, Ukraine joined in alliance with Turkey. This revived Moscow's fear of a Swedish-Tartar-Turkish conspiracy with Ukraine. In 1668 Hetman Doroshenko had once more established a unified Ukraine. Four years later, in 1672, with Turkish help he forced Poland to renounce all rights to Ukraine west of the Dniro.

At the beginning of September 1687 Stockholm received a dispatch from the Swedish ambassador in Moscow, Kristofer Koch, which stated that a new hetman had been elected in Ukraine. His name was Ivan Mazepa. From Warsaw the Swedish resident, Simon Dorffler, reported rumours of a Cossack revolt against Russia and a possible union between Ukraine and the Tartars against Poland.

From 1688-1698 the Ukrainian population suffered terrible hardships under the constant pressure of Tsar Peter's war with the Turks and Tartars. The country was constantly crossed by Russian armies en route to the south. Anti-Russian feelings were growing and Mazepa made constant demands on Moscow that Russian soldiers in Ukraine be disciplined, and ordered not to act without the approval of the Hetman and the Ukrainian government.

Meanwhile the Saxon nobleman August had ascended the Polish throne. He joined in alliance with Denmark and Russia against Sweden. This ignited the Great Nordic War which ultimately led to ruin for both Sweden and Ukraine. Tsar Peter demanded from Mazepa that Cossack troops be used against Sweden in the new war. The young Swedish King, Charles XII, was not discouraged by the formidable alliance against his country. He attacked Denmark and established peace with this country. His troops were then shipped to the Swedish provinces on the Baltic coast and Charles defeated Tsar Peter at Narva in 1700. After that he marched his troops southward to deal with Poland.

The years 1704-1705 saw a patriotic resurgence in Ukraine. Art and literature flourished under Hetman Mazepa and the Academy in Kyiv was founded.

### **Charles XII and the Ukrainian Campaign 1708-1709**

When Charles XII entered Lithuania and Byelorussia in 1708 he commanded an army of 35,000 men. During the spring of that year Mazepa's close associates, the Quartermaster General, Lomykovskiy, and Colonels Apostol, Horlenko and Dmytro Zelenskyi, attempted to persuade him to enter on a course of total independence from Russia. The Swedish victories

in Byelorussia made quite an impression on Mazepa, who called his chancellor Pylyp Orlyk, and his colonels to a secret meeting in Bila Tserkva. In June 1708 the decision was made to join Sweden in the struggle against Russia. In August and September 1708 Mazepa was forced to send four Ukrainian regiments against the Swedish army in Byelorussia. Only 1,000-1,500 Cossacks were left in Ukraine. When, in September 1708, the advance guard of the Swedish forces entered Ukraine they spread leaflets promising personal safety for everybody who remained and sold provisions to the Swedish troops. At the same time, Russian troops were looting and Mazepa protested to the Tsar: "While the Russian troops are ravaging with fire and sword, destroying and looting all over the Starodub district, the enemy [the Swedes] does not demand contributions or persecute the population"<sup>5</sup>. Now both Swedish and Russian troops were moving in on Ukraine and, to calm Peter, Mazepa assured him that he intended to join the Russian forces against the Swedish invaders.

In October the Russian observer at the Swedish headquarters, Captain James Jeffries, reported to London: "Certain it is that His Majesty has sent an express with letters to Baturyn [Baturyn] and that Genl's residence, to invite him to take our part and desire winter quarters in Ukraina"<sup>6</sup>. Charles XII knew that Mazepa had fought Sweden earlier under pressure. In a letter Mazepa now asked for Swedish protection of the Ukrainian people and Swedish support against Russia. The king was asked to send an advance troop and Mazepa promised to help ferry the Swedish army across the Desna at Makoshyn. Mazepa's legate, Bystrytskyi, came to the Swedish headquarters on October 19. Five days later Mazepa left Baturyn to join Charles XII at Horthy with 4,000 to 5,000 troops. On October 29 Mazepa arrived at the Swedish camp in a carriage preceded by his "bulava" and the banner of the Hetmanate. With his chancellor, Orlyk, Apostol and other Ukrainian dignitaries, he was met by Charles XII. After an exchange of speeches the king and the hetman withdrew to hold discussions. Later Mazepa and some of his highest dignitaries dined at the king's table. The next day the negotiations continued. On November 10 Charles XII issued a bulletin promising not to harm the Ukrainian people, to protect them, and to liberate them from the Russian yoke.

In the meantime, Tsar Peter's troops invaded Ukraine, burnt Baturyn to the ground, established a Russian puppet hetman, Ivan Skoropadskyi, held trials and executed large numbers of Mazepa's followers, who had remained behind. Mazepa on his part opened negotiations trying to convince the Zaporozhian Cossacks to join him in the alliance with Sweden. He badly needed the 15,000 Cossack soldiers to strengthen his army for the coming showdown with the Russians. On March 12, 1709, a formal agreement was

5. B. Kentrschynskyj: *Mazepa*, Stockholm 1966, p. 322.

6. Jeffries to Henry Boyle October 7, 1708, Public Records Office, State Papers Foreign (S.P. 95), Vol. 17.

presented to the Cossack council at Perevolochna. It was accepted and the Zaporozhian delegation was received by Charles. Ten thousand Cossacks from the Sich joined the Ukrainian forces. Tsar Peter took a terrible revenge. In May 1709 he destroyed the Sich, slaughtering the 1,500 men defending it.

Mazepa accepted the Zaporozhian demand that all agreements with foreign powers would have to be approved by both the Hetman and the Zaporozhian army. Any treaty between Charles XII and Mazepa would have to be ratified by the Cossack council. Treaty provisions were presented to the Swedish king and signed on March 30. According to Swedish sources the statutes, as they were called, contained a promise by the King to take Ukraine and its people under his protection. No peace or ceasefire with the tsar was to be signed without their consent, with no conditions other than that Ukraine and the Zaporozhians would be recognised as free from Russian rule and would forever enjoy these freedoms. The second and fourth paragraphs contained military rules for the duration of the war. The third regulated the relations between the Ukrainian population and the Swedish army. Any Swedish soldier harming a Ukrainian would be severely punished. The Ukrainians expressed a natural wish that the war be transferred onto Russian territory as soon as possible. Later, in April 1709, Charles promised that even if the Swedish army was to leave Ukraine, he would guarantee Ukrainian peace, security and independence. Ukraine was now under Swedish protection, but events would soon prove that this protection was, unfortunately, of limited value. The treaty was celebrated for three days and gifts were exchanged. Swedish eyewitnesses claim that the feasting was so thorough that Mazepa had to stay in bed for several days.

### The Propaganda War in Ukraine

The Swedish army communicated with the Ukrainians in a number of "universaler" (manifestos). Hetman Mazepa also spread a number of pro-Swedish and anti-Russian pamphlets. The Swedish manifestos were based on reliable knowledge of Ukraine and Ukrainian conditions. Arguments that would surely be appreciated by the Ukrainians were used, and were probably written with the aid of Mazepa's chancellery. The basic Swedish version evidently originated from the Secretary of the Swedish Field Army Chancellery, Olof Hermelin, in Latin and were then translated into Ukrainian<sup>7</sup>.

Mazepa's agents were active all over Ukraine, persuading Ukrainians to rise against Russia. One of them, Feska, who was later captured by the Russians, spread the idea that nobody should trust the Muscovite tsar because he was preparing everybody's ruin. He was planning to banish everybody to

7. B. Kentrschynskyj: *Propagandakriget i Ukraina 1708-1709*, Karolinska Förbundets Årsbok, 1958, p. 103.

Siberia. If only God would keep Mazepa and the Swedes in good health, they would guarantee the end of Muscovite slavery.

In his pamphlets Mazepa warned the people of Ukraine that Russia was planning to put an end to freedom and the rights of the Cossacks, to occupy Ukrainian cities, force the Ukrainian people to move east of the Volga to Siberia, and distribute their land to Russian immigrants. The Russian invasion was the first step in the realisation of these plans. The Swedish manifesto of 16 December 1708 described Russian oppression and tyranny in Ukraine. In the same manifesto Charles claimed that Tsar Peter was involved in negotiations with the Pope to exterminate the Greek-Orthodox faith and replace it with Roman Catholicism. Swedish manifestos, generally emphasised the perfidity of the Russians and exhorted the Ukrainians to commit acts of sabotage and ambush the Russian army. The manifesto of 16 December 1708 described the evil intents of Moscow in the following way: "We ask the people of this country to turn their eyes to the hangman's tools, which are on display in Moscow. Look carefully at the border people in the Muscovite state and note the terrible traces of tyranny found in them. This awaits all who bend their necks under the Russian yoke. All true patriots must rally behind the Hetman to liberate their homeland. A cruel punishment with fire and sword will strike those who aid the Muscovites". They ought to consider this carefully as "Moscow is far away, while our [Swedish] armies are here and can carry out revenge at once"<sup>8</sup>.

### **Charles XII and Mazepa**

Mazepa was personally highly respected by the Swedish king, the Swedish generals and the civil servants travelling with the Swedish army. The hetman's tent was always erected close to the royal tent in the camp. In Swedish records his titles are given as prince, military commander and excellency. He had access to the royal tent at any time and was continuously consulted on all important matters. His comment on the Swedish art of war were especially appreciated. In reports it was often noted that "it pleased the military commander Mazepa very much". After a small battle in February 1709 when Mazepa viewed a Russian detachment scatter a Swedish one, the Hetman is reported to have commented thus: "I did not believe that the Swedes could ever flee".

Another famous episode is the "Asian incident". At Kolomak in Ukraine enormous plains stretch eastward. Charles XII and Mazepa were studying the horizon side by side on horseback and the king asked Mazepa what was behind the horizon. A note in a Swedish diary reports that the hetman said: "There is the borderland to Tartary and only 50 miles to Asia". On returning

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8. Manifesto of Charles XII, *ibid.*, p. 124.

to his tent the king told his Quartermaster General, Gyllenkrook, that he wanted information on the roads to Asia, so that they could say that they had been there too. Frightened, Gyllenkrook went to Mazepa's tent and asked the hetman about the routes to Asia. Mazepa answered that he had only been joking when claiming that Asia was that close. When Gyllenkrook returned to the king, he laughed at the whole thing. In Soviet Russian history books this episode is used in an attempt to portray Charles XII as a reckless adventurer.

### Swedes in Ukraine — the Officers' Diaries 1708-1709

When the Swedish army reached Ukraine in mid-November 1708 it must have seemed like paradise. Several officers kept diaries throughout the whole campaign. The following description of Ukraine appeared in one of them: "In this country there are only flat fields, no woods, but small willow bushes, of which they build houses. Otherwise, in peaceful times, this country is a wonderful and beautiful land, with barley, rye, wheat, oat, flax, hemp and tobacco, and much else growing in abundance — as is there also an abundance of honey and beautiful, fat livestock, so it can rightly be called the land of Kanaan"<sup>9</sup>. Joachim Lyth wrote of the fertile land where corn, fruit, tobacco and cattle are to be found on the wide, open ranges.

A third soldier, Lieutenant Friedrich Christoph von Weihe, was more interested in the people: "Both men and women wear boots and have a preference for strong drink. It is alright to take a few glasses at the market and it is, therefore, not strange that there is an appetite for love affairs"<sup>10</sup>.

In 1708 the winter was particularly harsh. One diarist noted: "It was so cold that the oxen fell down and died still in their yokes. Birds flying in the sky fell down dead in flight. Yes, many will remember that Christmas night, and the whole feast, should he live long enough"<sup>11</sup>. The barber-surgeons worked around the clock to cut off frozen arms and legs: "now many a strong man was turned into a cripple and all houses were full of poor wretches. All day dead were carried away on sledges to be buried in cellars and other holes because they could not be buried in the earth. No man who has ever seen it can believe it"<sup>12</sup>.

Sixteen-year-old Gustav Abraham Piper of the Guards was carried wounded in the colonel's wagon. On the way, just before Christmas, the driver froze to death and Piper lay covered only by his coat for 48 hours. The first

9. Lieutenant Anders Pihlström's diary cited in Alf Åberg-Göte Göransson; *Karoliner*, 1982, p. 126.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 126.

11. Diary of Eric Larsson Smepust: *ibid.*, p. 126.

12. Battalion priest Sven Agrell: *ibid.*, p. 126.

night he was given something to drink, but the man-servant who gave it to him forgot to close the leather curtains of the wagon. Piper, too weak to leave his bed, lay unattended until Christmas night, when he was brought to the field hospital where his heelbones and toes had to be cut off.

The 27-year old King Charles is said to have stopped beside Piper's wagon one spring day in 1709 asking: "How are you?". Piper said his toes and heelbones were gone and the king answered: "Oh, nothing, nothing". The king then put up one booted leg on the saddle and said: "I have seen them with half the foot gone, but when they stuffed the boot, they could walk as well as before". Perhaps in this rough way he tried to console the boy. Riding away he said to the young officer's Colonel: "It is a great pity, he is so young"<sup>13</sup>.

### **Poltava and Afterwards**

When the army left Saxony in 1708 the king had 35,000 men, but in the winter of 1708-1709 he was down to 25,000. Reinforcements from Poland and the Baltic provinces were delayed. In May 1709, along with Mazepa's forces, he began the siege of Poltava. Towards the end of June the decision was taken to strike at the Russian army camping north of the city. King Charles was wounded and had to be carried on a stretcher. Command was handed over to Field Marshal Carl Gustav Rehnskiöld with General Lewenhaupt commanding the infantry (around 8,000 men) and Major General Creutz the cavalry (also around 8,000 men) and the Vallack Horse Regiment consisting of some 1,000 light cavalry. Hetman Mazepa commanded 2,000 Ukrainian cavalrymen and 10,000 Zaporozhian Cossacks. One thousand-three hundred men were left in the trenches around Poltava and 1,800 Swedish cavalry guarded the Vorskla crossing south of Poltava. The Swedish-Ukrainian forces faced 30,000 Russian infantry and 10,000 cavalry. The Swedish-Ukrainian forces had to regroup during the night because it was discovered that the Russians had built a number of new redoubts. This caused some confusion. After passing the redoubts the allied armies regrouped west of the Russian army camp. The final battle was fought on the open field in front of the Russian camp. The Russian army was formed in lines with 100 cannon in front, and when the allied armies advanced they were met by heavy artillery fire. In the end, the Russians managed to break the Swedish-Ukrainian line. Both armies suffered heavy casualties. Six thousand-six hundred Swedish non-commissioned officers and men, and 300 officers were killed during the battle. Three thousand Swedes were captured on the battlefield. The retreat towards Perevolochna began on the evening of June 28, and on July 1 Mazepa and Charles XII crossed the Dnipro. The Swedish general Lewenhaupt commanding the remainder of the two armies, surrendered and agreed to deliver the Ukrainians and the Zaporozhian Cossacks to the Russians, a

13. *Ibid.*, p. 128.



shameful act. It is said that king Charles never forgave him for the surrender. The Russians slaughtered the Ukrainians and the Cossacks together with women and children in front of the captured Swedes. Many tried to escape across the river and not a few drowned during the crossing. Thus ended the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance — in tragedy. General Lewenhaupt decided to surrender despite a vote taken among the remaining six Swedish regiments. Officers and men voted unanimously to continue fighting. Sixteen thousand were captured, including 7,000 wounded and 9,000 non combatants (wives, children, servants and so on). Around 7,000 Swedes lay buried all over the field near Poltava. In 1909 a monument was erected there to commemorate the fallen.

Towards the end of July Mazepa and Charles reached Bender in Turkish-occupied Rumania. The Swedes camped outside the city and Mazepa and his closest followers were given quarters in the town. On arrival both rulers were greeted with a gun salute from the Bender city walls.

Charles was not taken back by the Poltava defeat. Almost immediately he began planning a renewed struggle to aid Mazepa in recapturing Ukraine. The Cossacks helped the Swedish headquarters in Bender to establish contact with the Swedish army of General Krasnow in Poland, to keep open the lines of communication with Ukraine and Crimea and to hand over Russian spies sent to infiltrate the camp. In September 1709 Mazepa's health was failing. He contacted Charles, whom he still regarded as Ukraine's protector. On September 22 he died and was given a royal funeral outside the Zaporozhian camp at Varnytsia. The funeral procession was led by all the Swedish trumpeters and kettle-drum players at Bender. They were followed by a Cossack dignitary carrying Mazepa's *bulava*. The body of Mazepa was carried on a wagon drawn by three white horses. On both sides Cossacks with drawn sabres paraded. Chancellor Orlyk and other Ukrainian noblemen followed the wagon on horseback. Thirty Swedish officers rode at the end of the procession. Although Pylyp Orlyk continued the cooperation with Sweden until 1720 after his election as hetman following the death of Mazepa, and lived in exile in Sweden from 1715-1720, the death of Hetman Ivan Mazepa in 1709 was to all intents and purposes the end of a century of Swedish support in both word and deed for Ukrainian independence.

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**Bibliographical note:** The archive of the Swedish Field Army Chancellery was lost at Poltava. Thus it has been a complicated matter for historians to reconstruct the history of the campaign against Russia in 1708-1709 of Charles XII. For further details on the lost archive see Alf Åberg's article "Det försvunna fätarkivet", Svenska Dagbladet, Stockholm, 14 October 1960.

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## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO SPANISH-UKRAINIAN CULTURAL AND LITERARY RELATIONS

(Part 1)

Due to geographical accident and historical circumstances, Spain and Ukraine have never enjoyed formal relations. Nevertheless, mutual awareness and contact between the two nations seems to have been extensive at particular stages of their history. The geographical position of both countries has set its people at a major crossroads of man's history and culture: Spain at the threshold of Europe and Africa; and Ukraine, between Europe and Asia. Both nations have developed under the cultural hegemony of the Mediterranean basin, and both have found themselves in the forefront of Europe's long struggle to stem the tide of Islam.

The lines of communication have been many and varied. They have been military, political, religious, educational, cultural and personal, of a voluntary and involuntary nature, with the participation of warriors, men of letters, churchmen, students, travellers, lovers, brigands, adventurers and slaves. Whoever they have been, and whatever the reasons for their interest in Spain throughout the ages, they have created a broad canvas upon which the "Spanish school" in Ukrainian literature took shape.

The frontier nature of both nations has created in some respects a similar world view. One can sense that in Ukraine as well as in Spain Don Quixote and Sancho Panza dominate the spiritual landscape: high-spirited idealism on one hand, and self-centered realism, on the other.

### Ukraine and Arabic Spain

Information about the ancient inhabitants of Ukraine had already appeared in pre-Arabic Spain in the fifth century. In A.D. 418 a Spanish churchman and scholar, Paulus Orosius, composed at St. Augustine's request his famous treatise entitled *Historiarum Adversum Paganos Libri VII*<sup>1</sup>, in which he discussed, *inter alia*, the Scythians — the ancient inhabitants of Ukraine. This work contains perhaps the first references to Ukrainian territory and its dwellers to have originated in the Iberian Peninsula.

The Slavs and the inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula began to develop interest in each other at an early stage in medieval European history. Thus, from the middle of the 7th century, Arab sources begin to disclose unique information about the Slavs, their land, customs and activities, and, later on, about their presence in Arabic Spain as well. A. Harkavyi in his critical anthology *Skazaniya musulmanskikh pisatelei o slavianskikh i russkikh* (Accounts of Muslim Writers about Slavs and Rus'ians)<sup>2</sup>, compiled many such accounts written in the 7th-10th century.

Many Arab writers<sup>3</sup> had dwelt upon the subject of the Slavs and Rus'<sup>4</sup> in particular, considering *Kubaya*<sup>5</sup> (Kyiv) their principal city. They had also referred to differences between the people of Rus' and other Slavic groups, and hinted at a growing process of unification which in the 9th century gave rise to Kyivan Rus' — a powerful medieval realm comprising the greater part of Ukraine. Arab sources characterise the people of Rus' as being stern and bellicose, devoted to agriculture and also to cattle-raising.

As early as the 9th century an Arab geographer of Persian origin, Ibn Khurradadbih, had already mentioned the Slavs and one of their major branches, the Rus':

La Terre habitée a été divisée en quatre parties: 1. Urûfâ (L'Europe) qui comprend L'Espagne, les pays des Slaves, des Rûm (Byzantins et Romains), des Firanja. . .<sup>6</sup>

And in his description of the itinerary of the Rus' merchants, the author had stated that the Rus' people "sont de race slave. Des régions les plus éloignées de leur pays, la *Çaqlaba* (Pays de Slaves). . ."<sup>7</sup>

The famous tenth-century Arab historian and geographer from Baghdad, Al-Mas'udi, and a tenth-century Spanish-Jewish traveller from Tortosa, Ibrahim Ibn-Ya'qub, provided ample data on the ninth- and tenth-century Slavic world, including Ukrainian tribal formations and their principalities. Al-Mas'udi, for example, wrote about one of the main Ukrainian tribal conglomerates, the *Volynians*, who, in the 6th century, had established a powerful military alliance<sup>8</sup>:

Rus' is composed of numerous peoples who are subdivided into various tribes. . . Heretofore we mentioned a king to whom in times past were subjected other kings. This king was Madzak, King of Volynania, a people who were one of the principal Slav peoples, and who held in high esteem by the other peoples, were commonly regarded as the strongest of all. But when dissension spread among their people, their power was destroyed. They declined in strength and were divided, each tribe electing their own king. . .<sup>9</sup>

Finally, Ibn-Ya'qub gave a succinct overall view of the Slavs, stating that:

In general, the Slavs are a brave people, capable of making enduring military raids, and if it were not for the dissension that exists

among the various tribes, no people in the world could resist them. They inhabit lands richest in settlements and means for livelihood. They apply themselves to agriculture and, as far as gaining a livelihood is concerned, they surpass all the peoples in the north. Their wares are sent by land and sea to Rus' and Constantinople<sup>10</sup>.

Arab reports on trade activities of the Slavs, and in particular of the people of Rus', provide revealing information on the scope of the commercial connections of Rus', the Arab world being a very important trade partner. It is interesting to note that Arabic Spain seemingly had been an important trading point in the sphere of Rus'-Arab economic relations. Ibn-Khurradadhbih, in his description of the long itinerary of the Rus' merchants which took them throughout Europe, Northern Africa and Asia, referred to Spain as their springboard to Africa: "Ils ont aussi un itinéraire pour voyager seulement par terre. D'**Espagne** [emphasis added] ou de Firanja, ils passent au Sûs al-Adnâ; de Tanger, ils arrivent en Ifriqiya, puis en Egypte. . . au Hind et en China"<sup>11</sup>.

Al-Mas'ûdi, with reference to commerce, also stated what he believed to be the four major trading partners of Rus', *Andalus* being listed in the first place: "Rus' is composed of numerous peoples. . . among them are the people of Ludana<sup>12</sup> who are the most numerous of all. Their trade extends to *Andalus* [emphasis added] and Rumija [Rome], Constantinople and the Khazars"<sup>13</sup>. Al-Mas'ûdi wrote that even their "goldwashers" had maintained commercial relations with Andalus<sup>14</sup>. This indicates that trade relations between Rus' and Arabic Spain were developed and varied.

Ibn-Hauqual, a tenth-century Arab traveller and geographer from Baghdad, well acquainted with Spain and its affairs, noted that: "Les peaux de castor mises sur le marché en **Espagne** [emphasis added] proviennent des fleuves de la contrée des Slaves. . . La plupart de ces pelleteries et les meilleures existent dans le pays des Russes. . ."<sup>15</sup>

Numerous ancient (including Arab) sources suggest that Rus', due to its geopolitical position, was located at the intersection of major trade routes. Thus, Rus' commerce had developed in three main directions: Western (Western Slavs, Scandinavia, Hungary, Germany, Italy, France and Spain), Eastern (Volga Bulgars, Khazars and Asia Minor), and Southern (Crimea, Byzantium and the Southern Slavs)<sup>16</sup>. Our interest, however, is in the trade with the West. The Arab sources mentioned above provide some information in regard to it. Therefore from the West, Rus' obtained raw materials, slaves and manufactured goods (swords, for instance), among which there were also products of Italian and Spanish origin<sup>17</sup>. Furthermore Ibn-Hauqual clearly states that the slave trade flowed in two directions: eastward to Khorassan [N.E. Persia] mainly through Rus', and westward through Spain into Northern Africa. Among the slaves there were also Spanish girls<sup>18</sup>. Rus', for its part, exported furs, leather, slaves, firestone, wax, honey, grain, cattle, and

so on<sup>19</sup>, part of the fur shipments being destined for Spain, as we have seen above. Al-Mas'udi and Ibn-Hauqual note that Kyiv had been visited by Arab merchants<sup>20</sup>. In addition to these sources, archaeology has also provided ample evidence of such visits by unearthing, for instance, large quantities of medieval Arab coins on Ukrainian territory<sup>21</sup>.

The presence of Slavs in Arabic Spain had already been recorded in ancient Arab sources and noted by renowned orientalists. The Dutch orientalist Reinhart Dozy has this to say on the matter:

Originally the name of Slavs (Ar. Saqaliba) was applied to prisoners captured by Germanic nations in their wars against Slavonic tribes, and sold by them to the Saracens of Spain; but in the course of time, a multitude of men belonging to other races began to be classed as Slavs, and the name was applied to all foreigners who served in the harem, or in the army, whatever their origin. An Arab traveller of the 10th century explicitly states that the Slavs who were the retainers of the Khalif of Spain, comprised Galicians, Franks (French and German), Lombards, Calabrians, and **natives of the northern coasts of the Black Sea**. . . [i.e. Ukraine. Emphasis added]<sup>22</sup>.

This, however, was not the only route by which people from Rus' and other Slavs penetrated Spain. The fact that there had been commercial relations between the two sides indicates that there had also been a free flow of people. Vladimir Lamansky has suggested still other reasons why Slavs were attracted to Arabic Spain: the wealth and easy access to the country, invitations from the caliphs, who needed loyal mercenary troops in their conflicts with the nobility, the participation of Slavs in land and sea forces of the Arabs, previous contacts between Arabs and Slavs in Asia minor, Africa and Sicily, and last, but not least, daring and the spirit of adventure<sup>23</sup>. These motives appear plausible in the light of the high esteem in which the Arabs held the Slavs, and their military prowess in particular. Al-Bakri praised them as a "nation redoutable, puissante et impetueuse"<sup>24</sup>.

Various Arab sources provide some evidence that substantiates the above remarks regarding the military exploits of the Slavs and of Rus' in particular. Al-Ya'kubi, an Arab geographer, originally from Baghdad, who lived in Egypt, recorded two events worth noting. One was the participation of Slavs in the power struggles among the Abassides, caliphs of Baghdad, in the second half of the 8th century:

Puis le califat échet à Abú Dja'far Mansûr, qui se nommait aussi Abd-Allah ibn Muhammad ibn Alî ibn Abd-Allah ibn Abbâs ibn Abd al-Muttalib: il fonda une nouvelle ville entre Kûfa et Hîra, qu'il appela également Hâshimîya. Il y demeura quelque temps, jusqu'au moment où il décida d'envoyer son fils, Muhammad Mahdî, **combattre les Slaves** [emphasis added] en l'an 140 (757-758)<sup>25</sup>.

There is also evidence that at the turn of the 11th century a Rus' expeditionary force had joined the Byzantine army in an invasion of Syria<sup>26</sup>.

The second event Al-Ya'kubi described was a raid on Spain by the Normans; his description contains a curious detail:

La cité de Séville est à l'ouest d'Algésiras, sur un grand fleuve qui passe à Cordoue. Cette ville fut envahie par les Madjus qu'on appelle les Rus' en l'année 229 (844): ceux-ci firent des captifs et livrèrent la ville au pillage, à l'incendie et au massacre<sup>27</sup>.

Al-Mas'udi also recorded a similar raid on Spain by warriors who allegedly came from the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov areas:

Before the year 300 (912-913) there came to **Andalus** [emphasis added] vessels from the sea bearing thousands of men who attacked the coastal lands. The inhabitants of Andalus thought that they were the Madjus. . . But I think, and God knows better. . . that those people are **Rus'** [emphasis added]. . . for nobody besides them sails that sea. . . [Black Sea and the Sea of Azov]<sup>28</sup>.

A general statement by Al-Mas'udi regarding warfare between the Andalus and other peoples, including the Slavs, seems to give some credibility to his allegations that the men who raided Andalus in 912-13 were of Rus' origin: "The Galicians, the Franks, the **Slavs** [emphasis added], the Lombards, and other peoples. . . the majority of whom **wage war upon the inhabitants of Andalus** [emphasis added]"<sup>29</sup>.

Lastly, Ibn-Hauqual, in his discussion of the military expedition of Rus' against the Volga Bulgars, the Khazars, Bulgaria, Byzantium and other peoples in 964-72, also recorded a raid on Andalus seemingly mounted by Rus': "Rus' sacked the cities of Bolgar, Khazran, Itil and Semender in 358 (969) and immediately set out against Byzantium and **Andalus** [emphasis added]". There is, however, scepticism as to the likelihood of such a raid on Andalus, which Ibn-Hauqual might have confused with some commercial Rus' expedition to Spain<sup>30</sup>.

Although these alleged expeditions of Rus' warriors against Arabic Spain have not yet been conclusively proven or refuted as historical fact, it is certain that the recording itself of such real or imaginary events indicates that the people of Rus', and other Slavs, stimulated the interest and imagination of the Arabs (including those of Spain) over a long period of time.

The Slavs in Arabic Spain seem to have formed a very numerous and cohesive foreign ethnic group, to the extent that other foreigners were also known under that name. A seventeenth-century Arab historian from Egypt, Al-Makkari, maintained that during the reign of the Khalif of Cordoba, Abd-er-Rahman III (912-61), the Slavs numbered anywhere from 3,750 to 12,000<sup>31</sup>. According to other sources, however, their number was even higher, reaching

13,750<sup>32</sup>. These Slavs were destined to play an important role in politics and the military and even in literature and science in the tenth- and eleventh-century Arabic Spain. Al-Makkari's writings provide interesting information in this respect:

[The Slavs] were educated in the Mohammedan religion and formed the principal body-guard of the Khalifs. We see them occasionally playing a principal part in the affairs of Mohammedan Spain, and in the founding of independent Kingdoms. Zohhayr and Kheyran, both Kings of Almeria, were **Sclavonians** [emphasis added]. Wadha and Naja, the former Wizir to Hisham II, Sultan of Cordoba, and the latter confidant and prime minister of Hasan Ibn Yahya Ibn Idris, Sultan of Ceuta and Malaga<sup>33</sup>.

With regard to literature and the sciences, Al-Makkari wrote that:

During the reign of Hisham II [966-1013] the administration of Al-Mansur [939-1002], literature and the sciences flourished in Cordoba. Even the **Sclavonians of the palace** [emphasis added] cultivated it with greatness of success; and Ibn-Hayyan [a historian] has preserved the names of several who distinguished themselves by their productions in various kinds of literature. One of them was Fátim, who had not his equal in the knowledge of the Arabic language, and at whose death in 420 (A.D. 1029), a splendid collection of valuable works was sold. A Sclavonian named Habib is said also to have written [in Arabic] a work entitled **Clear and Victorious Against Those Who Deny the Excellences of the Sclavonians**, in which he introduced **all manner of entertaining anecdotes, history and verses of the Sclavonians** [emphasis added]<sup>34</sup>.

The information provided by Al-Makkari lends support to certain propositions advanced by Lamansky regarding the status of the Slavic group in Arabic Spain. The fact that Arab sources stress that scholars of the calibre of Fátim, Habib and others, were Slavs is an indication that they must have been at least aware of their ethnic identity. Furthermore, Fátim and Habib are known to have had a command of their native Slavic tongue<sup>35</sup>. Consequently, had the Slavs come to Spain only as slaves, prisoners or eunuchs, or as children, their chances of surviving as a distinct ethnic group would have been minimal, and their subsequent identification as Slavs by Arab writers purposeless. It would be reasonable then to assume that there may have existed in Spain a Slavic-Arabic bilingual community with some freedom of activity (or at least language privileges), which had been able to preserve, for a certain period of time, its culture and language, and pass it on to the following generations. For only such a community could produce its own historian in the person of Habib, who set himself the goal of preserving in writing the history and cultural achievements of his compatriots, and of neutralising any misconceptions that may have existed about the Slavs among their Arab neighbours<sup>36</sup>. Such achievements also indicate that the circle of lettered Slavs in Arabic Spain must have been indeed wide<sup>37</sup>.



Furthermore, there is evidence that the history of the Slavs in Spain did not begin with the arrival of the Arabs in the 8th century, but much earlier, during the invasion of the Iberian Peninsula by the Alani, Suebi and the Vandals in A.D. 406<sup>38</sup>. The heavily slavified<sup>39</sup> Alani who came from Eastern Europe occupied *Lusitania* and *Cartaginense*<sup>40</sup> and even founded a kingdom in Lusitania in A.D. 411. The Goths, however, defeated them seven years later, and the Alani dispersed<sup>41</sup>. This raises the question whether the Slavs who arrived in Spain during the Arab period found among the local population descendants of their Alani kinsmen. Or, whether they knew at all that, centuries earlier, Spain had been subjected to an undesirable visit from their ancestors.

The available information about the Slavs who had found themselves in Spain either as free men or slaves, and the position and influence they were able to secure for themselves there, can also serve as an indication that there probably was an Arab "open door" policy towards the Slavs. This "policy", however, functioned both ways, not only in commerce, but in culture as well. For it has been noted, for instance, that, with the acceptance of Christianity in Ukraine in the second half of the 10th century, "Byzantine custom and culture conquered the **earlier types** which had been primarily southern, **especially Persian and Arabian** [emphasis added]"<sup>42</sup>. In this respect, Spanish-Arabic influences obviously cannot be discarded.

Finally, if Rus' and the Slavs in general also drew the attention of the Spanish Arabs, Rus', for its part, closely followed the events that affected Spain, namely the process of the *Reconquista*<sup>43</sup>.

### Ukraine and Christian Spain

Regardless of the state and nature of the relations between Ukraine and Spain at a given point in history, the slave trade was a medium for continuous contact between the inhabitants of those lands for many centuries. Thus, the archives of the French city of Perpignan have revealed that already in the 13th century there were Ukrainian slaves living in Catalonia<sup>44</sup>. In documents relating to medieval land ownership in Spain and Italy, there are abundant indications of the presence of Ukrainian slaves along the entire northern shore of the Mediterranean. Names such as Olha, Kateryna, and so on, appear quite frequently, with the accompanying designation of "de natione rusorum". For example, in a document issued by King Martin I of Aragon and II of Sicily (1356-1410), relating to slave ownership, the national, origin of the slaves in question is listed. Among the Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians and others, are also found the "rossi"<sup>45</sup>.

The flow of slaves from Ukraine into the Tartar, Turkish and Arab markets was an ongoing process well into the 18th century, reaching its peak in the second half of the 16th and the 17th century. While scores of thousands of

captives were lost forever in the Islamic world, many did manage to escape their fate<sup>46</sup>. The periodic military expeditions of the Ukrainian Cossacks against Turkey, and the actions of the Spaniards and Italians in the Mediterranean, resulted in the freeing of thousands of Ukrainian and other captives. Some of these people would settle down in Spain and Italy, while others would begin their long journey home<sup>47</sup>. Dmytro Yavornytskyi, the renowned historian of Cossackdom, recorded, among others, the case of the Ukrainian Cossack Yefem Havryliv, captured by the Tartars in 1689. Havryliv managed to escape on a Dutch ship that eventually took him to Spain<sup>48</sup>. The title of one of the many Italian publications of the time on this subject exemplifies the scope of the Ukrainian slave flow through Western Europe, mainly Italy and Spain: "Relazione della presa della gallera capitana di Constantinopoli sotto il commando del grande Antibassa Marioli, con la liberazione de 207 schiavi Cristiani Ruteni. . . [emphasis added]", Rome, 1643<sup>49</sup>.

Another medium of contact for many centuries was the Church. The Catholic missionary drive towards Eastern Europe that had begun on a rather large scale in the 13th century was a major factor in an attempt to convert Ukrainian and other Eastern Slavs to Catholicism. The Dominican and Franciscan orders spearheaded the attempt<sup>50</sup>. We can safely assume that among those missionaries there were not a few Spaniards. A telling example of this is a geographical work composed by a Spanish Franciscan traveller in the middle of the 14th century. The author quite accurately describes the lands belonging to the Principality of Galicia and Volynia, the focal point of the Ukrainian realm in the late 13th and 14th centuries:

Party del Reynado de polonia y fuyme al Reyno de Leon [Principality of Galicia and Volynia] los alemanes dizenle lumbrec en que son cinco çibdades grandes la primera dizen Leon [Lviv] otra china [Kyiv] otra vasadino [Volodymyr, in the province of Volynia] otra tinez [Pinsk, presently in Byelorussia] otra ceuer [Seret, in the province of Bukovyna] Et sabet que este Reyno de leon parte con la prouinçia de Rumenia y con el Reyno de suana y el Rey desta leon a por señales un pendon verde con una cruz bermeja. . .<sup>51</sup>.

Elsewhere the Franciscan makes reference to Ukrainian lands using the traditional name of Rus': ". . . una grand prouinçia que dizen **roxia** [emphasis added] que es enella una grand ciudad dizen xorman y es cabeça del reynado y confina conel grand lago de tanay"<sup>52</sup>.

By 1345 the Franciscans had already established their "Ukrainian Province" with centres in Lviv, Halych, Kolomyia and other cities<sup>53</sup>. Given these facts, we can assume that the mission of this anonymous Spanish friar might have been to visit the expanding Franciscan centres, including those in Ukraine. The result of his lengthy journey was the *Libro del conocimiento*, which is perhaps the earliest source of information about medieval Ukraine to have originated in Christian Spain.

One of the most famous members of the Dominican Order, St. Hyacinth (San Jacinto), conducted missionary work in Kyiv as early as in the first half of the 13th century, and even founded a Priory there. St. Hyacinth is one of the most revered saints in Spain<sup>54</sup>.

Another Spanish document from the 14th century, a Catalan world map drawn in Mallorca in 1375, indicates the importance of the Ukrainian city of Lviv as a commercial centre in trade relations between East and West at the time. The map contains the following note to this effect: "Ciutat de Leo, en esta ciutat venar. . . merchaders de las pardidas de Llevant per esta mar de Lamanya [Baltic Sea] en Flandes"<sup>55</sup>. It is quite likely that those merchants continued their journey also to France and Spain.

When speaking of Spanish-Ukrainian mutual acquaintance in the 15th century, mention should be made of Pedro Tafur's travelogue. Pedro Tafur was a Spanish writer from Seville, who had journeyed through Ukraine and adjacent lands between 1435 and 1439. His account provides interesting, albeit scattered, information about the appearance of the inhabitants of Ukraine, Tartar raids, and Ukraine as a member of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth<sup>56</sup>.

The 16th century witnessed the birth of Cossack Ukraine. With it an entire new array of historical, political, religious and cultural realities came into being, keeping in step with the rest of Europe. The Ukrainian Cossacks began their historical career as frontiersmen defending the land against the constant Tartar incursions from the south. But towards the end of the 15th century, they already represented an established military force. Thus, one of the earliest organised Cossack actions recorded by history was the destruction in 1499 of the Turkish fortress of Ochakiv, located by the estuary of the Dni-pro river. The Cossack force had been led by the Ukrainian Prince Bohdan Hlynskyi<sup>57</sup>. By the time the 16th century had run its course, the Ukrainian Cossacks had become the uncontested political, military and social force that transformed the Ukrainian society into what history knows as the "Cossack nation". The Cossacks were to play this historical role until their last stronghold was destroyed in 1755 by Empress Catherine II of Russia<sup>58</sup>.

The nature and organisation of the Cossack military community is of interest to us. It was an all-male organisation of free men of all social origins, who elected their officials democratically according to seniority, experience and achievements. Their code of behaviour was based on the principle of freedom, equality, the struggle against the "infidel", liberation of Christian captives and the defence of the weak. Any foreigner who wished to join the Cossack community had to be a Christian, or become one, learn the Ukrainian language and become versed in Cossack affairs. Every member pledged to uphold the Cossack code of honour and traditions and obey his leaders. By the mid-16th century the Cossacks had established their permanent base called the *Zaporozhian Sich* (Zaporozhian fortress), and their community,

the Zaporozhian Host or the Zaporozhian Order of Knights. Their organisation has been also frequently referred to by the Cossacks, foreigners and historians, as the "Cossack Republic"<sup>59</sup>.

It is not surprising then, that this unique community attracted to its ranks men of different stations in life, backgrounds, even nationalities, who could join the Zaporozhian Host provided they accepted and obeyed the laws governing the Order. Among the foreigners who became Cossacks were Spaniards. This is evident from some documents of the time which single out the national origin of those who had joined the Order. A Spanish official in Prague, Don Guillén de San Clemente, in a letter of November 1, 1594, to King Philip II of Spain, wrote that ". . . los Cosacos, que es una gente de todas las naciones que se junta en las riberas y ysas del Boristen [Dnieper River] ha hecho daño a los Tartaros y gente de aquellos confines"<sup>60</sup>. Some Vatican sources, however, are much more specific as to the national composition of the foreign contingent in the Host's ranks. The Papal nuncio in Warsaw, Julio Ruggiero, in his *Relationi Informative de Ucraina* of 1565, wrote that the Cossacks "sono uomini di ogni nazione: Pollacchi, Tedeschi, Francesi, **Spagnoli** [emphasis added] et Italiani. . ."<sup>61</sup>. Another Vatican official in Cracow, Giovanni Andrea Caligari, wrote to the Cardinal of Como (N. Italy) on August 15, 1578, that "Li Cossacchi sono una gente collectiva di diverse nazioni, Polacchi, Russi, Ungari, **Spagnoli** [emphasis added], Italiani, ecc, che senza moglie et figli habitano le ripe et certe isolette del Boristene"<sup>62</sup>. In 1584, an Italian named Gamberini took down a detailed description of the Zaporozhian Host from a Ukrainian Cossack who had been taken prisoner by the Turks, but managed to escape to Italy. The Cossack had also told him that "Most of them [i.e. Cossacks] are men from neighbouring provinces, but there are also among them Poles, Germans, Frenchmen, **Spaniards** [emphasis added], Italians and all sorts of refugees"<sup>63</sup>. Yavornytskyi details even further the issue of Spanish presence among the Cossacks:

The Zaporozhian Order of Knights in its great majority was composed of Ukrainians. Nevertheless, at the Zaporozhian Sich there were also Russians, Englishmen, **Spaniards** [emphasis added], Wallachians, Italians, Jews, Armenians, Greeks and others. . . Among the foreigners who had lived at Zaporozhe and are known to history was **Martos, a Spanish nobleman**<sup>64</sup>, or at least a **great lord** [emphasis added], who appeared at the Zaporozhian Sich in the 17th century. . .<sup>65</sup>

We can assume, however, that not all of those Spaniards (and other foreigners) who came to Ukraine and joined the Cossacks did so with forethought. Many of them might have been former Turkish slaves, who, upon being freed during Cossack raids on Turkey, were taken to Ukraine, and only then decided to join their liberators, in the same manner as some Ukrainian captives, freed by Spaniards or Italians, would remain in Spain and Italy. The

fact that various independent sources mention the presence of Spaniards among the Cossacks of foreign origin is an indication that the Spanish "contingent" was not small.

Even after the devastating Tartar invasions of the 13th century that ended the supremacy of Kyiv, the Ukrainian principalities to the west managed to maintain their relations with Western Europe, in particular with Germany and Italy. As a result, information about Ukraine also continued to appear in Spain, although sporadically (*Libro del conocimiento, Andanças e viajes de Pedro Tafur*, and others). Thanks to the impulse provided by the Renaissance, there began, at the turn of the 16th century, a renewed interest in Ukraine all across Europe. The process, which was by no means simultaneous or of the same intensity everywhere, started in Italy in the 15th century, and maintained a high level in the quantitative and qualitative output of material on Ukraine throughout the 16th and 17th centuries. The same can be said of materials published in German, French, English, Latin and Spanish. Some works appeared also in Portuguese and Dutch. Due to the geographical remoteness and insufficient political intercourse with Eastern Europe, French and Spanish interest in Ukraine (and vice versa) became noteworthy only at the turn of the 17th century, and intensified from then on<sup>66</sup>. Many of the works about Cossack Ukraine that were appearing in the various national languages at the time were translated into Latin, becoming thus accessible to the educated strata and the ruling circles of all the European countries. Others were translated from Latin into the national languages<sup>67</sup>. With regard to Italy, we should recall its close ties with Spain at the time, which undoubtedly facilitated the flow of informative, interesting and politically useful publications between the two countries. Such a flow of information must have been extensive, since Cossack Ukraine and its affairs lay well within the sphere of interest of Spain, Italy and the Vatican throughout the 17th century in particular.

The first work containing authoritative information about Rus'-Ukraine and the existence of the Cossacks was the *Tractatus de duabus Sarmatis, Asiana et Europiana et de contentis in eis*, written by the Polish humanist Matteus Mechowita and published in Cracow in 1517. This work aroused such widespread interest throughout Europe that in the next one hundred years it was republished numerous times and translated into many European languages<sup>68</sup>. Another such work was *Rerum Moscovitarum Commentarii* (Vienna, 1549), written by Baron Segismund von Herberstein, German ambassador to the ruler of Muscovy (from 1517 to 1526), Vasilii Ivanovich. It seems that Herberstein had also travelled through Ukraine on his way to Muscovy, for he also included in his work extensive information about Ukraine and the Cossacks. His work became so popular in Europe that in the second half of the 16th century alone it had six editions in Latin, five in German and two in Italian<sup>69</sup>. An Italian translation appeared almost immediately in Venice under a more explicit title of *Comentari della Moscovia et parimente della Russia* (Venetia 1550)<sup>70</sup> where "Russia" refers to Rus' or Ukraine. The work was

reissued many times in the centuries that followed<sup>71</sup>. Due to the extreme popularity of the above two works it seems certain that they reached Spain as well.

(To be continued)

## NOTES

1. Paulus Orosius, *Seven Books of History against the Pagans*, trans. Irving Woodworth Raymond (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936).

2. Abraham Elijah Harkavy, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei o slavianakh i russkikh* [Accounts of Moslem Writers about Slavs and the Rus'ians] (1870; rpt. The Hague: Mouton, 1969).

3. We shall discuss mainly those Arab sources which also shed some light on Slavic-Ukrainian relations with Spain.

4. The name *Rus'* (pronounced "Roos'") was first used in reference to the lands of the Ukrainian tribe of the Polyanians, whose main city was Kyiv. In its ethnical and geographical sense, the term was traditionally applied to Ukrainian lands from the medieval times to the 17th century, when it became gradually superseded by the name *Ukraine* — first mentioned in the chronicles in the 12th century. Present-day Russia, however, was known under the name of *Muscovy*, *Moschovia*, etc., until the 18th century, when Tsar Peter I adopted the name "Russia" for his empire. Other variants of *Rus'*: *Ros*, *Roxia*, *Rus'ia*, *Ruthenia*, etc.

5. Ibn-Hauqual, *Configuration de la Terre*, trans. J. H. Kramer et G. Wiet (Paris: Editions G.-P. Maisonneuve & Larose, 1964, II, 382).

6. Ibn-Khurradadhbih, *Description du Maghreb et de l'Europe au III<sup>e</sup> = IX<sup>e</sup> siècle*, trans. Hadj-Sadok Mohammed (Alger: Editions Carbonel, 1949), p. 23-24.

7. Khurradadhbih, p. 23.

8. V. O. Kliuchevsky, *A History of Russia*, trans. C. J. Hogarth (New York: Russell & Russell, 1960), I, 35-36.

9. Al-Mas'udi, "Zolotye luga" [Golden Meadows], in *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei o slavianakh i russkikh, VII-X vv.* [Moslem Accounts about the Slavs and Rus'ians, VII-X centuries], comp. A. E. Harkavy (Petersburg, 1870; rept. The Hague: Mouton, 1969), pp. 130, 137-38, 163-64.

10. Ibrahim Ibn-Ya'qub, *Relacja Ibrahima Ibn Ja'kuba z podróży do krajów Słowiańskich w przekazie al-Bekriego* (Relatio Ibrahim Ibn Ja'kub de Itinere Slavico, quae Traditur apud Al-Bekri), ed. Tadeusz Kowalski (Kraków: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 1946), pp. 51-52.

Al-Bakri was an eleventh-century Arab geographer, historian, theologian and poet, native of Cordoba or Seville.

11. Khurradadhbih, pp. 23-24.

12. Harkavy suggested that "Ludana" refers to the dwellers of the city of Ladoha or "Ladozhane" (Harkavy, p. 155), located in the province of Novgorod, which until the 12th century was part of *Rus'* and enjoyed extensive trade relations with the rest of Europe and other regions. Interestingly enough, in the city of Ladoha, Arab coins from the 8th and 9th centuries were unearthed in recent times, as noted by N.

Polons'ka-Vasylenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy* (History of Ukraine) (München: Ukrainischer Verlag, 1972), I, 170. However, the Polish historian and scholar Joachim Lelewel (1786-1861) in his *Géographie du Moyen-âge* (n.p., 1849-57), III-IV, 48, put forth a hypothesis (strongly contested by Harkavy) that the Ludana "Ce sont les Loutzaniens de Loutzk sur Stir [N-W Ukraine]; ils avaient des relations avec Constantinople par Kijov [Kyiv] et l'ambassade de Slaves, en 955, au **Khaliph de Kordoue. . . confirment l'existence antérieure de relations Slaves avec l'Espagne** [emphasis added]" (cited by Harkavy, p. 156). Regardless of which hypothesis is closer to the truth, it seems quite certain that Rus' maintained relations with Spain.

13. In Harkavy, p. 130.

14. Cited by Joseph Marquart, *Osteuropäische und Ostasiatische Streifzüge* (Hildesheim: Georg Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1961), p. 348.

15. Ibn-Hauqal, p. 382.

16. I. M. Shekera, *Kyivska Rus' XI-ho st. u mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh* [Eleventh-Century Rus' in International Relations] (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 1967), p. 36.

The Volga Bolgars, a Turkic people, formed a kingdom on the Volga River (10th-14th centuries), with Bolgar as their main centre. The Khazars, also of Turkic stock, settled between the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea. Their major centres were Itil and Semender. Both realms were overrun by Rus'.

17. M. Hrushevskiy, *Istoriya Ukrainy-Rusy* [History of Rus'-Ukraine] (New York: Knyhospilka, 1954), I, 293.

18. Hrushevskiy, pp. 292-93.

19. Shekera, pp. 20-28; Hrushevskiy, p. 297.

20. Hrushevskiy, p. 296.

21. M. Hrushevskiy, *A History of Ukraine*, trans. W. Halich, O. Revyuk, et al. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), p. 37; Shekera, p. 30.

22. Reinhart Dozy, *Spanish Islam. A history of the Moslems in Spain*, trans. Francis Griffin Stokes (London: Frank Cass, 1972), p. 430; Joseph J. Reinaud, *Muslim Colonies in France, Northern Italy and Switzerland*, trans. Haroon Khan Sherwani, 2nd rev. ed. (Lahore, Pakistan: Muhammad Ashraf, 1964), pp. 183-85.

23. Vladimir Lamansky, *O slavianakh v Maloi Azii, v Afrike i v Ispanii* [On Slavs in Asia Minor, Africa and Spain] (Sanktpeterburg: Imperatorska Akademiia Nauk, 1859), p. 232.

24. Cited by Lamansky, p. 321.

25. Al-Ya'kubi, *Les pays*, trans. Gaston Wiet (Le Caire: Institute Français d'Archéologie Orientale, 1937), p. 9.

26. Shekera, p. 52.

27. Al-Ya'kubi, pp. 218-19. This particular raid has been discussed at length by E. Lévi-Provençal in *Historia de España*, vol. I: *España Musulmana hasta la caída del Califato de Córdoba (711-1031)* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1950), pp. 144-150. Serious doubt has been expressed whether those Madjus were actually Rus' warriors. Lévi-Provençal, Joseph Marquart and others simply considered them Norman pirates. To be sure, however, it should be pointed out that Rus' in the 9th and 10th centuries experienced a strong infusion of Varangians in its ruling strata and the military, and that the expansionist drive during the 9th, 10th and 11th centuries depended on military campaigns and trade. This earned Rus' the name of "a country of soldiers and

merchants". Even the rulers of the Byzantine Empire were forced on various occasions by the Princes of Kyiv to sue for peace and pay tribute (Hrushevskiy, *A History of Ukraine*, pp. 42-46). The possibility should not be ruled out completely that sea-born parties from Rus' ventured also into the Mediterranean to seek their fortunes, after having neutralised Constantinople for a period of time.

28. In Harkavy, p. 129.

29. In Harkavy, p. 138.

30. Ibn-Hauqual, "Kniga putei i gosudartstv" [The Book of Roads and States], in Harkavy, pp. 218-9, 226-27.

31. Ahmed Ibn Mahammed Al-Makkari, *The History of the Mohammedan Dynasties in Spain*, trans. Pascual de Gayangos (London: Oriental Translation Fund, 1840-43), I, 238.

32. Dozy, p. 430.

33. Al-Makkari, I, 380-81.

34. Al-Makkari, II, 200.

35. Lamansky, pp. 306-307.

36. Lamansky, pp. 229-34, 306-310.

37. Dozy, p. 430.

38. Pedro Aguado Bleye, *Manual de historia de España* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1963), I, 336.

39. The Alani, a nomadic people of Iranian origin, had settled in the southeastern regions of Ukraine (second century B.C.), mixed with the local agricultural population, and gradually come to dominate several of the east Slavic tribes. A Leading Alanic clan was called *Rukhs*, and it is from this name that *Ros* or *Rus'* presumably derives. Some historians also maintain that the ancient Ukrainian tribes of the Antae were actually part of the Alani. For further details see Hrushevskiy, *A History of Ukraine*, pp. 20-25; Polonska-Vasilenko, I, 67-68; George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 21-23.

40. Cartaginense was one of the five provinces into which Emperor Constantine divided the Iberian Peninsula in A.D. 332. Its territory comprised the modern Spanish provinces of Alicante, Valencia, Albacete, Murcia, a large part of Granada, the eastern part of Jaén, most of Toledo and Ciudad Real, as well as parts of Cuenca, Guadalajara, Segovia, Soria, Zamora, Valladolid, Palencia and Burgos. "Cartaginense (Hispania)," *Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada*, XI, 1441.

41. "Alanos", *Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada*, IV, 23-24; Bleye, I, 336.

42. Hrushevskiy, *A History of Ukraine*, pp. 69-70, 117.

43. Shekera, p. 69.

44. Élie Borschak, "Zvidomlennia z doslidiv v arkhivakh Zakhidnoi Evropy" [Report from Research in West European Archives], in *Naukove tovarystvo imeni Shevchenka, Zapysky* [Shevchenko Scientific Society, *Proceedings*], 134-35 (1924), 245.

45. M. M. Kovalevsky, "O russkikh i drugikh pravoslavnykh rabakh v Ispanii" [Of Russian and Other Orthodox Slaves in Spain], *Yuridicheskyi vesnik* [The Juridical herald], 21, No. 2 (1886), 238-240. Kovalevsky found similar evidence in the *Archivo del ospizio di Gerona. Libro de los testamentos*.

46. Some of the Ukrainian captives in the Ottoman Empire, however, managed to secure notoriety. Such was the case of Roxolana (1505-1561), the influential and crafty



wife of Sultan Suleiman I the Magnificent. Her real name was Nastia Lisovska, a beautiful and talented girl, born in the town of Rohatyn (Western Ukraine), and taken prisoner at the age of fifteen in a Tartar raid in 1520. For further details see "Roxolana," *Ukrainska Radianska Entsyklopedia* [Soviet Ukrainian Encyclopaedia], 1963, XII, 338; Roger Merriman, *Suleiman the Magnificent, 1520-1566* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1944), pp. 183-190; et al.

47. D. L. Mordovtsev, *Istoricheskiya propilei* [Historical Propylaea] (Petersburg: Tip. N. A. Lebedeva, 1889), I, 239-45; Hrushevskiy, *A History of Ukraine*, p. 160.

48. Dmitri Evarnitskiy, *Istoriya Zaporozhskikh Kozakov* [History of the Zaporozhian Cossacks], 2nd rev. ed. (Moscow: E. K. Gerbek, 1900), I, 468-70.

49. Andrew Gregorovich, "Basic Sources in West European Languages on the Cossacks of Ukraine" (unpublished bibliography). I wish to express my thanks to Mr. Gregorovich for permission to consult this MS, and for supplying helpful information.

50. Hryhor Luzhnytskyi, *Ukrainska Tserkva mizh Skhodom i Zakhodom: Narys Istoriyi Ukrainskoi Tserkvy* [The Ukrainian Church between East and West: An Outline History of the Ukrainian Church] (Philadelphia: Provydinnia, 1954), pp. 114-18; Mykola Chubaty, *Istoriya khrystianstva na Rusy-Ukraini vid pochatku do 1353 r.* ("De historia christianitatis in antiqua Rus'-Ucraina a primis exordiis usque ad a. 1353") (Roma: Catholicae Universitatis Ucrainorum, 1956), I, 589-99, 680-83, 693.

51. Marcos Jiménez de la Espada, ed., *Libro del conocimiento de todos los reinos, tierras y señoríos que son por el mundo, que escribió un franciscano español a mediados del siglo XIV.* . . (Madrid: Fortanet, 1877), p. 33.

52. *Libro del conocimiento*, p. 205.

53. Luzhnytskyi, p. 116; Chubaty, p. 597.

54. William A. Hinnenbusch, *The Dominicans: A Short History* (New York: Alba House, 1975), p. 52; "Jacinto (San)," *Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada*, 1926, XXVIII, pt. 2, 2342; Cristóbal de Miranda, *Historia de la Provincia de España de la orden de Predicadores* (Madrid: Herederos de Antonio González de reyes, 1727), II, pt. I, 432-37.

55. "Mapamondi vol dir aytant con ymage del mon e de les regions qve son svs la terra e de diversas maneras de gens qve en ela habitan" (Facsimile reducido a la tercera parte del original), *Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada*, XXI, 1092.

56. Pedro Tafur, *Andanças é viajes de Pedro Tafur por diversas partes del mundo avidos 1435-1439* (Madrid: Imprenta de Miguel Ginesta, 1874), pp. 162, 164, 183.

57. Hrushevskiy, *A History of Ukraine*, pp. 144-64.

58. Hrushevskiy, *A History of Ukraine*, pp. 446-61.

59. D. I. Evarnitskiy, *Istoriya Zaporozhskikh Kozakov*, I; D. I. Yavornytskyi, *Yak zhylo slavno Zaporozhskhe Nyzove Viysko* [The Life of the Zaporozhian Host], 2nd ed. (Katerynoslav: K. A. Andruschenko, 1914), pp. 12-13; Hrushevskiy, *A History of Ukraine*, pp. 156-59, 223.

60. *Elementa ad Fontium Editiones: Documenta Polonica ex Archivo Generali Hispaniae in Simancas*, VI Pars (Romae: Institutum Historicum Polonicum, 1968), XIX, 16.

61. *Analecta Ordinis S. Basilii Magni*, ser. 2, sectio 3, *Documenta romana Ecclesiae Catholicae in terris Ucrainae et Bielorussiae, Litterae nuntiorum, secretariatuum, officiorum, etc., Litterae nuntiorum apostolicorum historiam illustrantes* Romae: PP. Basiliani, 1959), I, 25.

62. *Litterae nuntiorum*. . . , p. 105.
63. Cited by Dmytro Doroshenko, *History of Ukraine*, trans. Hanna Keller, ed. G. W. Simpson (Edmonton: The Institute Press, 1939), pp. 147-48.
64. Martos probably came from the ancient Spanish city of Martos, in the S.W. of the province of Jaén.
65. Yavornytskyi, *Yak zhylo slavno Zaporozhske Nyzove Viysko*, pp. 12-13.
66. D. I. Nalyvaiko, "Ukraina v zakhidnoevropeiskyykh istoriko-literaturnykh pamiatkakh doby Vidrozhennia" [Ukraine in Western European Historical-Literary Works of the Renaissance], *Slovianske, literaturoznavstvo i folklorystyka* [Slavic Literature and Folklore], No. 4 (1968), pp. 134-35.
67. This becomes evident upon checking such works as: Antonio Palau y Dulcet, *Manual del librero hispano-americano*, 2nd ed. (Barcelona: Librería Anticuaria A. Palau, 1948-1976); V. Kordt, *Chuzhozemni podorozhi po Skhidniy Evropi do 1700 r.* [Foreign Travel Through Eastern Europe to 1700] (Kyiv: Ukrainska Akademiya Nauk, 1926); Élie Borschak, *L'Ukraine dans la littérature de l'Europe occidentale* (Dijon: Imprimerie Durantière, 1935); n. 23, et al.
68. Maciej z Miechowa, *Opis Sarmacji Azjatyckiej q Europejskiej* [Description of the Asiatic and European Sarmatia] (Warszawa: Polska Akademia Nauk, 1972), pp. 46, 61-64; Tadeusz Ulewicz, *Sarmacja. Studium z problematyki słowiańskiej XV i XVI w.* [Sarmatia. A Study on Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Slavic Issues] (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Studium Słowiańskiego Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 1950), p. 52.
69. Nalyvaiko, "Ukraina v zakhidnoevropeiskyykh. . . ," *Slovianske literaturoznavstvo i folklorystyka*, No. 5 (1970), p. 50.
70. British Museum, Dept. of Printed Books, *General Catalogue of Printed Books* (London: Trustees of the British Museum, 1961), CII, col. 170.
71. British Museum, cols. 168-170; Kordt, pp. 22-23.

Wolodymyr SLEZ

## P.D. YURKEVYCH — THE NEGLECTED PHILOSOPHER\*

(Conclusion)

At this point let us leave the special field of physiology and turn our attention directly to the phenomena of spiritual life which anyone can verify by their own inner self-contemplation. However, it appears that physiology itself points to facts which mediate between phenomena perceived by us from external experience or study of our physiognomy, and phenomena, which are the product of inner experience. At the present time physiologists know that the heart is not a simple muscle nor an unfeeling mechanism which only controls the flow of blood in the body by mechanical pressure. The heart combines the two main nervous systems, the so-called *sympathetic* nerves which control all the vegetative functions of the human organism, the chemical conversion of materials, the nourishment and renewal of the body, organisation of its component parts and finally the proper balance between the size and form of its individual actions; and the nerves which serve as the vital organ of feeling of perception and the will. Although physiologists admit that their research into the composition, structure and functions of the heart are far from complete, however, it appears from the above that the heart, the source of blood, is the meeting point of both nervous systems. It is the *very substance* of spiritual manifestations. It is in the heart that the two nervous systems are permeated by a unity and interaction which perhaps no other human body organ possesses. To anyone not claiming that it is possible to explain every phenomena of human, physical existence from the point of view of a blind and lifeless mechanism, it will now at least be clear how the Bible perceives the heart: the source and centre of all human, physical strength. Cannot we assert without contradicting the facts of physiology that the heart is the pivot of all the major functions of the human organism and the guarantor of their well-being and life? In any event, to a lesser extent it becomes evident why the feeling which we have about our own spiritual-corporal existence manifests itself in the heart so that the very slightest change in this feeling is accompanied by a change in the heart-beat. And this general, spiritual feeling we feel is one of the most important facets of the biblical view that the heart is the centre of spiritual life. The conditions and moods of the soul in their entirety are by no means covered by the five sense organs which communicate the impressions received from the outside world to the brain. If our body lacks the necessary nourishment or if any part of the body is disturbed from its normal position and relation to other parts these *mechanical*

\* Continued from *The Ukrainian Review* No. 2, 1987, pp. 51-64.

changes in the body are felt by the spirit as hunger and pain. These feelings as all the conditions and moods of the soul which constitute so-called *spiritual disposition* are based in the general feeling where *the whole body and every part of it serve to a greater or lesser extent as an organ*. The general feeling contains originally, before any external opinion, all the other, indivisible aspects of feelings; consequently, it is regarded as the root of all other feelings. Meanwhile, the conditions and dispositions of the spirit which comprise its general feeling, serve as the final, deepest foundation of our thoughts, desires and actions: *as indefinable, hardly recognisable, higher premises they are the basis of our every view in life, as well as every premeditation and action*. These very truths are revealed to us by the biblical view of the heart as the source of our thoughts, desires, words and deeds. While physiology points to the physical conditions in the brain on which the activity of the soul is dependent, the holy scribes demonstrate to us the direct, *moral-spiritual* source of the activity in the whole and indivisible condition and disposition of our spiritual being. Our thoughts, words and deeds are *primarily* not images of external objects, but images or expressions of the general feeling of the soul, the product of the condition of our heart. Of course, during our everyday lives filled with cares about immediate realities we do not pay enough attention to this *intimate* side of our thoughts and actions. Nevertheless, it remains true that everything entering the spirit from the outside through the intermediacy of the organs of feeling and the brain, is processed, converted and qualified finally and permanently, according to the particular and specific heart-mood of the soul. And, on the contrary, there is no action or stimulation stemming from the outside world that can arouse notions or feeling in the spirit if they are incompatible with our heart-mood. There is a principle in the human heart whereby its notions, feeling and actions assume the specific quality of the way in which the soul expresses itself, and no other. Or they show a *particular* specific turn by virtue of which they are the expression not of *general* spiritual being, but of a *separate* living, actually existing human being.

As for our inner experience we are completely unaware of the changes which take place in our brains due to changes in our thoughts, wishes and feelings; on the basis of direct self-contemplation we would not even know that it (our brain) is an organ of the cognitive and thinking soul. If this relationship between thought (thinking) and its organ has a rational basis when it comes to the function of thought which *per se* should be calm and indifferent awareness of the surrounding reality, it then follows, nevertheless, that both in thought and its corporal organ the soul does not reveal itself in the complete indivisibility and plenitude of its rich essence. Were man to reveal himself by thought alone which in this case would in all probability be the most authentic likeness of external objects, the multifaceted world rich in life and beauty would be perceived by him as an exact though at the same time inanimate mathematical value. He might comprehend this value thoroughly and completely, however, in return he would never experience real, live exis-

tence which would astound him by its beauty of form, mysterious tendencies and the inexhaustible fullness of its content. In our opinion in a real soul there is no such narrowness of thought. Furthermore, what would become of man if the only purpose of thought was to duplicate by his actions real events, or reflect within him phenomena which are irrelevant to the soul? It may be that in this case our thoughts would differ according to the same precision as mathematical values, however, in return our understanding of things would be in breadth alone and not in depth.

The world as a system of existential phenomena full of beauty and significance, exists and reveals itself first and foremost to the *profound* heart and hence *ipso facto* to intelligent thought. The tasks resolved by thought are ultimately not the product of impressions of the outside world, but of the tendencies and implacable requirements of the heart. Anyone who knows how little the sensual world contributes to our knowledge, how poor and empty are the feelings which result from the meeting between cognition and external objects, will understand in full the import of the biblical teaching that the foundation, existentiality and depth of our thought and cognition subsist in the essence of the soul whose phenomena we comprehend by direct, internal experience only in the tendencies of our hearts i.e. in the tendencies to which our hearts are so sensitive and so receptive. Accordingly, the better philosophers and great poets recognised that their hearts were the real source of the profound ideas which they conferred on mankind through their works; cognition, meanwhile, whose activity is linked with the function of the feeling organs and the brain, merely endowed these ideas with the clarity and precision proper to thought.

For reasons which it would not be expedient to explain here, we are accustomed to regard the soul as a mechanism which runs and is tuned in exact accordance with the jolts and impressions received from the outside world. We would like to define the essence of the spirit invisible to us which is designated for development both in time and in eternity, solely in terms of its states evoked by impressions of the outside world. Accordingly, one psychologist expressed the hope that as we develop our understanding of the soul it will be possible to define its motions and changes with the same mathematical precision as we now explain the workings of a steam engine. We will then be able to control the states and motions of the soul as easily and precisely as we do a steam engine. We, on the contrary, think that this hope will remain forever an impossible dream that there will always be in the human soul a number of states and motions to which the physical law of equality between action and counteraction will be always inapplicable. The Bible in its interpretation of the significance of the human heart to spiritual life, asserts with a great deal of truth this exclusive property of the human soul, in direct contrast to the mechanical view which attaches no importance to this property. If we consider just a simple representation produced by thought based on exter-

nal impressions, we must distinguish between two aspects: 1) knowledge of external objects which is contained in this representation and 2) the spiritual state which is conditioned by this representation and knowledge. The latter aspect is divorced from any mathematical calculation; it expresses directly and originally the quality and merit of our spiritual condition. In our one-sided desire for knowledge we often forget that every notion enters into our soul as its internal state and that we evaluate our notions only by the extent to which they serve us as images of things. Meanwhile, this aspect of the concept which defines the state and condition of the soul is of greater value to the entire life of the spirit than representation inasmuch as it is the image of things. It is possible from the theoretical point of view to state that everything worthy of existence is worthy of our knowledge too; therefore in the interests of higher moral-spiritual education we would be completely justified in positing the proposition that we should know only that which our moral and God-like being deserves. The tree of knowledge is not the tree of life while life to our soul is somehow dearer than the knowledge it possesses. And yet, this particular, singular life of the soul which cannot be defined mathematically, bears the closest relation to the human heart: "*keep thy heart with all diligence; for out of it are the issues of life*" (Prov. 4, 23). We find here vividly reflected the finest and most elusive spiritual motions and states which we are unable to form a clear notion of. We are never able to translate into exact terms the stirrings of joy and grief, fear and hope, indeed, the feelings of good and love which so directly affect the beatings of our heart. When we take joy in the contemplation of the beauty of nature or art, when we are moved by the intimate tones of music, when we marvel at great achievements, all these states of greater or lesser *animation* are instantaneously reflected in our hearts. This occurs with such originality and is so removed from the normal course of our spiritual states that human art, perhaps, will always bemoan with justification the lack of adequate means of expressing and portraying these heartfelt states. We are reminded here of the gospel account of the two disciples of Christ who on the day of the Lord's resurrection were on their way to Emmaus struggling at the same time with their doubt and uncertainty about the news of the Saviour's resurrection (Luke 24, 13-32). On the way the Lord himself stood before the travellers: "*But their eyes were holden that they should not know him*" (v. 16). The Lord in this way, unrecognised, reveals to his disciples the mystery of his resurrection; by his words, however, they do not realise who is talking to them. Only after the sacramental breaking of bread were "*their eyes opened, and they knew him*" (v. 31). Now the disciples in astonishment admit to one-another "*Did not our heart burn within us, while he talked with us by the way, and while he opened to us the scriptures?*" (v. 32). In the incident under scrutiny the heart recognised the truth before reason. The disciples first had thoughts in their *hearts* which nevertheless were not quickly nor readily acknowledged by their reason. Everyone experiences similar states especially at moments of great difficulty when there

is no time to wait for a clear syllogism and when it is necessary to submit to the direct mediation of the heart as to a certain moral-spiritual feeling. The Christian ascetics frequently complained about the slowness of reason to acknowledge that which was directly and immediately recognisable to the heart and often regarded the human brain as sentient and corporal; it may indeed appear so if we compare its *indirect* activity with the *direct* and suddenly occurring revelations of the truth which occur in our heart. Moreover, this is not to reject the notion that the slow motion of reason like a slow gait is distinguished by clarity, precision and deliberateness which are inaccessible to the heart and its too energetic motions. Both life without order and order without life are equally incompatible with the purpose of the human soul. Nevertheless, if the world of knowledge is to become the warmth and life of the soul it must penetrate to the heart where it might become part of the complete condition of the spirit. Thus, if the truth visits our heart it becomes our bounty, our inner treasure. It is only for this treasure and not for an abstract thought that a human being can struggle with circumstances and people; only the heart is capable of exploit and self-denial.

We can derive two propositions from these observations: 1) the heart can express, reveal and understand quite *originally* spiritual states which by virtue of their delicacy, predominant spirituality and vitality are beyond the grasp of the abstract knowledge of reason; 2) the conception and precise knowledge of reason inasmuch as it becomes our spiritual state and does not remain an abstract image of external objects, reveals itself or lets itself be felt and perceived not in the head but in the heart: it must plunge into these depths in order to become the active force and motor of our spiritual life.

When giving an actual appraisal of people and their merits we do not just point to their knowledge and ideas. Truth, inasmuch as it exists only in man's abstract thought, we do not refer in our appraisal immediately and directly to his spiritual being. We would like to know primarily whether his heart is moved by this truth, the nature of his spiritual tendencies and aspirations, what moves him to sympathy, what delights him and what saddens him, all in all, the "*abundance of his heart*" (Luke 6, 45). When we speak of the sham and hypocrisy of a man we state clearly that his thoughts and words are not in keeping with his inner being, that what is in his heart is completely different from what he thinks or says, or that apart from the thoughts displayed by him there are other thoughts in his spirit and in his heart. We differentiate here between man's false personality which we see before us and his real personality which in its manifold content is hidden in his heart. The phenomenon of *duplicity* demonstrates how enormous can be the rift between spiritual activity in notions and ideas and the actual states of the spirit which are summoned by the motions of the heart. Therefore, in instances which are of particular importance to us we ask a person to speak from the heart. Active relations where formality and appearances in human liaison are overcome

are relations of the heart: such relations are friendship, brotherhood, love and like. In such relations the whole man reveals himself, is alive, without dissimulation and constraint in the entire breadth and depth of his diverse spiritual states.

We should at this point refer to two theories which in particular impede a correct understanding of the biblical notion of the heart as the centre of man's spiritual activity.

From some time philosophers have preached the doctrine of the *independence* (autonomy) of men's reason, or, that reason of itself, by its own force and mediation, issues and lays down laws to govern all spiritual activity. Accordingly, it would be necessary to agree that man's entire worth or the entire spiritual man is contained in thought. Of course, the apostle Paul spoke of the gentiles "*which have not the law. . . are a law unto themselves*" (Romans 14). However, he was not postulating here the idea of the autonomy of human reason. The gentiles are a law unto themselves because "*God is manifest in them*" (Romans, 19). "*For the invisible things of him form the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead*" (Romans 1, 20). Consequently, the origin and source of the law by which the gentiles were governed, according to the Epistles, are found in the revelations about the invisible God, communicated to humanity through God's visible creation: on considering God's creations (*contemplating them*) the mind recognises in them the will of God and the Divine law. The law governing spiritual activities is not laid down by force of the mind, its invention as it were, but lies before man, a ready, unchangeable, moral-spiritual order established by God to govern the life of man and humanity. Furthermore, it lies according to the Epistles in the heart, the deepest side of the human spirit: the gentiles "*shew the work of the law written in their hearts*" (Romans 2, 15). God is the Creator of both the human soul and its laws, "*. . . and what hast thou that thou didst not receive? now if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it*" (1 Corinth. 4, 7). Autonomy is not natural to human reason, not in any sense. Among the phenomena and activities of the soul, reason is regarded as the light which illuminates man's spiritual life not proposed by it but created by God together with its God-given laws. The soul exists not only as the light, but also as the entity illuminated by it, with its diverse spiritual faculties which are governed by the creative will of God. Spiritual life is activated prior to and before the light of reason, in darkness and gloom, that is, in depths which are inaccessible to our limited sight. If, from the foundations of this life the light of knowledge and understanding arises as its consequent phenomenon, then this vindicates in full the biblical view of the significance of the human mind which is the pinnacle of spiritual life not its source.

However, in addition to this unfounded doctrine of the autonomy of the mind, in psychology we often meet a dubious view of the essence of the hu-



man soul. Very often psychology restricts itself in this view by referring only to the general and generic properties of the soul, that is, to those spiritual phenomena which are common to the human soul together with all other souls. In this case it (psychology) defines the human soul as a sensing, conceiving, feeling and wishing entity. It tries to explain the superiority of these phenomena in man compared with corresponding phenomena in other sensually observed entities by many reasons which in any case do not lie in the primary essence of the human soul and only change its general, generic character. Meanwhile it is necessary to present the matter completely vice versa: the human soul has a primary and particular tenor which is observed or reveals itself, incontestably, in the general and generic forms of spiritual life which are conceiving, feeling, wishing etc. Only on the grounds of this hypothesis is it possible to explain why these generic forms assume in man a particular and most absolute character; why these generic forms reveal the moral personality of man a given mechanism for the expression of which, one acting according to general rules, it would be in vain to search for in the human soul; and finally why these *finite* generic forms contain a feeling and awareness of the infinite for which again there is no given and particular vehicle or representative in the phenomena of spiritual life. However, we must take another step and propose that each part of the human soul has its own properties and has attained a particular development which is expressed in its turn in the general and generic forms of human spiritual life. According to the history of the creation of the world God created dumb, animated creatures "*after their kind*" (Genesis 1, 25), and man after his own indivisible nature as an individual and particular person (v. 26 onward). This image of creation is completely in keeping with man's purpose who, as an immortal being whose genus does not perish, has his own particular existence in time and eternity. Therefore, man can never be a passive expression or organ of the general, generic life of the spirit. Our words, thoughts and actions do not originate from the general, generic essence of the human spirit, but form *our* particularly developed, peculiarly individualised life: only on these grounds do they constitute *our* personal guilt or *our* personal merit which are ours alone. Where science offers general and generic conditions for the phenomena of spiritual life as a rule the holy scribes have in mind the particular and special source of these phenomena in man's heart. Stemming from the human heart in their totality they constitute *our* personal state and standing.

The previous explanations it seems lead us to understand that the difference between the psychological and biblical view of the essence of the human spirit comes to the general and simple difference between the explanation of phenomena from *physical* and *moral* principles. When investigating the phenomena of spiritual life science in keeping with its general method asks: according to what general conditions and laws do these phenomena come to be? And as soon as the required general conditions and laws for spiritual phenomena have been found the science of the soul can deal with and deter-

mine their inception and formation as easily as astronomy calculates and determines the future movements and position of the stars. However, this fruitful scientific method clearly is applicable only to secondary and derivative phenomena of spiritual life. Every *simple basis* of phenomena which still does not possess definite directions and forms and which still needs to be plotted, is inaccessible to scientific analysis since such analysis always presupposes the complexity and diversity of phenomena, it is in need of explanatory bearings which every *simple basis* lacks. If this is generally speaking true then one must agree even more that in human spiritual life there is something primordial and simple, the *hidden man of the heart*, the *depth* of the heart whose future motions cannot be calculated according to general and requisite conditions and laws of spiritual life. For this *extraordinary* side of the human spirit science cannot find any general or absolute forms attached to one or another pair of nerves which would occur necessarily on a movement in the nerves.

Mysticism in its attempt to demonstrate the forms which would correspond completely to the spiritual content of the human heart, could only deny all the forms and expressions accessible to us both of the finite world and the finite spirit. It appeared that not only do the lower spiritual faculties not correspond to the fullness and dignity of the life of the heart but that reason itself, inasmuch as it thinks in partial forms and generates a succession of thoughts in time, is a weak, inaccurate and thereby erroneous expression of that life. In advancing such propositions the mystic could only become immersed in the dark feeling of unity and infinity — in that depth of the heart where ultimately any light of cognition is extinguished. This painful phenomenon of mysticism which wishes to avoid all the finite conditions of our spiritual development, which wishes to achieve the final aim immediately and directly and not by the most arduous and gradual development in time — is in any event a noteworthy fact for explaining the spiritual life of man. It is founded on the genuine conviction that the fullness of spiritual life which we feel in the heart is not exhausted by the spiritual forms which arise in the conditions of this finite world, or that our development cannot be contained in the definite phenomena which occur under temporal conditions. Instead of believing and hoping and accordingly making his way in the temporal world, the mystic is hostile to and negates the existing order ordained by God of our temporal tutorage. However, we believe the opposite extreme is the psychological view which hopes to enumerate and define all the phenomena of spiritual life as its final and immutable forms, so that it is no longer possible for them to contain or command an original, simple and direct life which would unfold unexpectedly and spontaneously. It is our opinion that this view which would tie a particular, individual, spiritual activity to a particular nerve as its condition can only represent the spirit as an entity meant only for temporal, finite life. If this view generally speaking cannot indicate in the human soul the deepest foundations of its make-up and the beginnings of its future

life, then on the other hand it is baffled and always will be baffled by many many spiritual phenomena for which there is empirical evidence, for example: the significance of dreams, premonitions, clairvoyance, in particular, the various forms of religious cognition inherent in man and mankind. The truth between the demonstrated extremes of *mysticism and empiricism* is to be found in the biblical teaching of the heart as the centre of man's spiritual life. The heart generates all the forms of spiritual life which are subject to general conditions and laws; consequently, the heart cannot negate these forms, nor can it dissolve them by its direct impulses. In this way the heart does not transfer once and for all its entire spiritual content to these spiritual forms; in its *depths* inaccessible to analysis there remains always the source of new life, new motions and strivings which cross the boundaries of the finite forms of the soul and prepare it for eternity. Therefore even in temporal though particular conditions it is possible for such extraordinary phenomena to exist in the domain of spiritual life which are outside its usual mode of action.

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The practical applications which can be derived from the above observations are so patent that we can limit ourselves in this case to certain brief observations.

1. If the heart is indeed the centre of human spiritual life where tendencies, desires and thoughts originate spontaneously, or if it is that side which does not stem with mathematical uniformity, from external causes, then the most authentic theory of spiritual phenomena cannot determine the special features and differences by which they are observed in that part of the soul under the given conditions. As we have stated man is not a type of specimen which duplicates the general attributes of other specimen. He and in this case he alone in the world as we know it is particular, or as they say, an individual. Man recognises himself as this particular, ungeneralised being during direct self-awareness which therefore does not reveal to him the soul in general but (his) *that* particular soul with particular conditions, tendencies and thoughts. The general theory on spiritual life on the other hand is achieved as is the case with all theories, by comparisons, generalisations and abstractions from particular experiences. Hence, we can conclude that if in natural history everything were subject to a rigid mechanism which did not allow exceptions, in human history facts, events and phenomena are *possible* which will speak for themselves by virtue of their very existence. The same applies to possibilities which cannot be either admitted or rejected on the basis of *general* laws known to us from the science of the soul. When science has ascertained for itself the real meaning and the limits of this proposition then perhaps it will be able to relate properly to divine revelation. Hitherto it has reasoned more or less as follows. A known historical event judging by cogent evidence

should be acknowledged as having taken place, however, its appearance contradicts the *general* laws which explain the spiritual life of every human being; consequently, there are no grounds on which to accept it as a reality. We confront this reasoning by the following series of thoughts. In the human heart there is a source for phenomena which bear special features which are not attributable to any general concept or law. We can apply the general laws of spiritual life only to everyday, ordinary phenomena of human spiritual life subject to the general course of events since these laws are taken and derived from these identical or uniform phenomena. Therefore, where we meet phenomena which go beyond the limits of this ordinary scheme, we should first of all investigate their actual reality and not obscure them by general laws: since none has yet proved that the soul complies with these general laws out of mechanical necessity like a dead, inactive mass. Meanwhile, if it is not permitted that here as in the realm of physics, forces & counter-forces be equal then on the contrary unusual events as demonstrated by experience always come about in peculiar circumstances. From our point of view the whole of the remaining world appears as a river whose breadth and depth can be measured easily according to general rules. However, while floating on the surface of this river it may be that you meet unexpectedly such a whirlpool, such a quick and confused movement of waves, one moment spreading out, the next shooting downwards, that the general rules of measurement applied here might not be very accurate. Perhaps a similar analogy guided the thinking of the great psychologist who said: "the source of nature is in the human heart", because here in fact we are confronted by sources whose direction inwards and downwards is unknown to us. Indeed, phenomena can be observed here only after they have arisen; as for the actual depth from which they come and their aspects, this no laws can determine.

2. Let us assume that all the events observed by us are in essence such that we can as it were penetrate behind them and investigate their causes. We can then also penetrate behind these causes and examine the conditions and factors which brought them about: the same applying to all causes under scrutiny. Indeed, material things possess the authentic and decisive quality of the finite. But of course, if every existing thing had such an essence which can be derived and construed from extraneous causes then it would not even occur to one to speak in terms of an absolute cause. If, however, humanity unanimously concludes all its explanations in religious faith; if it can attribute the beginnings and ends of all the threads of life, knowledge and activity to God, then this religious cognition finds most justification in the nature of the human heart *behind* which we cannot penetrate in order to examine other additional causes which bring it about, and which (the heart) therefore possesses all the immediacy of existence conferred by God. The latest rationalism on the contrary, while ascribing to human religious cognition a somewhat insubstantial role, or even regarding it as the deception of an ignorant mind, finds

sufficient foundation in the science of the soul as a kind of albeit spiritual essence, which can nevertheless be explained by other factors, which constitute it. Using an inaccurate image, it can be said that there are in the heart such sources of water which in their turn cannot be formed out of the union of small and individual streams but can take their source solely and exclusively from a general and unbounded ocean of water. Revelation expresses this thought with a most profound sense of truth when it states that God directly and personally imbues mankind with "*the breath of life*" (Genesis 2, 7). St. Augustine's proposition that the human soul whatever its origin comes from God, is part also of man's general awareness which at any event does not wish to recognise a union between the human soul and God conditioned by extraneous factors foreign to the soul and the external members and which so willingly regards this union as something close and immediate. Here, in mankind's hope of attaining an active union with God, lies a natural disposition for prayer and faith. The basis of man's religious cognition lies in man's heart: religion is by no means foreign to its spiritual nature for it is rooted in natural soil. Quite rightly, revelation communicates to man truths which are beyond his reason though quite correctly too man is not a creature tutored solely by God. The soul itself contains within it the beginnings and predispositions of this extraordinary doctrine. The fact that the beginnings and predisposition cannot be found in the sphere of notions and ideas and that they are revealed to us as something which is indescribable and indefinable, a genuine awareness of infinity only in the heart, can be assumed now without need of proof. And if St. Augustine, examining the various bases of faith stated finally, *nemo credit, nisi volens*<sup>13</sup>, then the source of faith is defined here with inimitable truth since desire and will are determined *directly* by the tendencies and needs of the heart. Or, as the philosophers say, by the heart's striving for absolute good. "*It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks*", said Jesus Christ to one of his obdurate opponents (Acts 9, 5). Basically, in fact, no more and no less need be said in reply to any opponents of religion and revelation since they are contradicting the most urgent and essential impulses of their heart. Human hearts contemplating a better world and a better order as a result of some fated and *universal* error, is a thought which cannot be expressed openly by the most avid admirers of matter and its mechanical laws.

3. However, we do not deny that religion establishing itself firmly mainly in the human heart, finds more or less firm bases also in other worldly spheres. The significance of the heart in the realm of human activity becomes much clearer when we consider human actions in different ways to see whether they are determined by external circumstances and corresponding notions, or indeed, whether they stem from the direct and free motions of the heart. Only by the latter, properly, can we attribute moral worth when the

13. No one believes unless he wants to.

former (external circumstances and corresponding notions) possess to a greater or lesser extent the character of physical actions. Christian revelation tells us that love is the source of all truly and genuinely moral actions. As this teaching on a fundamental moral phenomenon form which as from a source all other moral phenomena arise bears a clear causal link with the biblical teaching on the heart, so we hope that it in its turn can be vindicated by the principles of moral philosophy with the same accuracy as the teaching on the heart found firm ground in psychology.

*We are called on to do good freely.* This general and indeterminate origin with which therefore every scientific theory of morality can agree is immediately defined when we ask why even to a savage does good not appear as the work of a journeyman which can be undertaken in captivity only, without freedom, out of necessity and in expectation of payment? What inclines a man to act justly with no intention of impressing an onlooker or idea of personal gain as a reward for his just deeds? Man's heart *loves* good and inclines towards it as the eye loves to view a beautiful painting and willingly rests on it. This is not to deny that as the eye of a crude person cannot appreciate an exquisite image, so the heart can become indifferent to good and extinguish its own nobler aspirations. But the ancients have already spoken of the fire of Prometheus which as though snatched from heaven, kindled in man's heart not earthly, not egoistic but moral aspirations. Many psychologists say that the human heart is subject to the constant effects and as it were inklings of a higher world and higher order of things. God's word clearly and with complete truth reveals to us this *metaphysical* origin of the heart's love of good as the basic moral act when it teaches that man was made in God's image. As every activity in the world is conditioned by the specific nature of matter, so too divine acts are natural to the divine nature of the human spirit. "*God is love* (John 1, 4, 16); God loved us *first* (v. 19) and by the effect of this love, after endowing us with existence in the extraordinary form of the God-like spirit and in as much as it is not appropriate to the general notion of creature, made our spirit capable not of simple physical or animal growth and increase in strength but both of feats of truth and love and triumph over the animal tendencies of sensuality and egoism: herein lies the ultimate condition of mankind's moral freedom. It is correct that the facts speak mostly against this moral freedom as they do against mankind's free love of good. People naturally striving for self-preservation, more readily and frequently act according to the impulse of egoism and have in mind their own personal interests and their personal advantage which they do not wish to sacrifice for higher goals. For this reason many, even conscientious observers of the human heart came to the sorry conclusion that all human morality is in essence refined and educated egoism. They therefore rejected even the possibility of moral actions and the entire moral order of the world. However, the Bible knows of these facts and is familiar with this deep-rooted

depravity of the human heart. Consequently, Jesus Christ in fact bestows upon mankind the commandment of love and therefore, it is necessary to renew man if he is to fulfil this new commandment. However, here we meet the article of the Christian faith which refers to the necessity of grace for mankind's freedom and morality which for a long time will remain incomprehensible to modern rationalist science.

Man is capable of moral acts because he is free. This freedom manifests itself in the phenomena of the soul by the fact that it acts independently. For example, a man can commit truthful acts even out of necessity in which case they possess only a legal significance. Let us now imagine that a man commits the same truthful deeds freely, *voluntarily*, out of love or from the heart and zealously. This being so, the deeds in that they flow from love and the heart, have a moral value. You say of this man: "He does good not under constraint, not by order, but freely and voluntarily, out of love for good. Therefore one can always rely on his moral character; his mode of action is unselfish and impeccable; he would not deceive you if you were unwary nor would he usurp your rights if you were weak. He is not afraid of standing before God with the secret motions of his heart: he is an honest and moral person." This is how we assess people everyday without referring to science which often points out other sources of morality. Similarly, it is easy to see that man ultimately locked in his own personal interests and driven only by egoism, nevertheless in every way conceals from onlookers his real motives as something unworthy. Who among us has not in his life pretended to be or imitated a person acting out of magnanimity and a free attachment of the heart to good? Who among us has not noticed how sometimes we conceal involuntarily and instinctively our selfish calculations by the *semblance* of love, devoted and doing good for the sake of good? Thus most people believe that the moral worth of an action is defined purely by the degree of the heart's unconstrained love of good, for the sake of which the act is committed; meanwhile as for the remaining additional factors which determine the act namely: art or an ability which suggest maturity and experience — a deep and authentic idea which demonstrates a developed mind — this whole aspect of the act is regarded as the physical strength of the spirit which without the grace of love manifests itself in the most unworthy deeds. Now ask a thief why he tramples the sacred laws of justice and why he has no respect for the property, liberty and person of his neighbours? He will probably reply with the familiar sophistry that the laws of justice stem from human free-will, that they have a conditional or *contractual* meaning and that people in order to protect their personal advantage and fulfil their selfish ends to the best, invent these laws as they invented steamships, railways, telegraphs, printing and so forth. What is the meaning of these expressions which in various forms are repeated in all corners of the globe by morally-corrupt people and which subvert morality to the core? The above thief would say: "The laws of justice are an invention of human reason which interpreting external circumstances and

human needs, established these rules concerning property, freedom and person: consequently, the laws exist only for *reason*, while the *heart* has no interest in them; as it does not oblige me *internally* to make use of other inventions of reason, so it does not recognise any internal and free requirement to respect the laws apart from any notions of advantage and personal profit."

Meanwhile at the moment strangely enough people often identify the reasonableness of an act with its moral worth and confuse so readily the two concepts *reasonable and morally good* that the Christian teaching of love, this voluntary and fervent striving to do good almost has no place in our moral systems. Everyday we assure ourselves that the most unworthy action, criminal and most offensive to mankind, can be altogether very *wise* on the most well-founded and prudent grounds and on deepest reflection; and nevertheless, the rule: *act reasonably* is accepted for the most part as the purest moral source. What does this mean? We are not going to examine why these different concepts are confused. Suffice it to say that this quasi-moral principle expresses the complete onesidedness of contemporary education. As we are able to be clever without conviction, so we wish to be moral without accomplishment: in actual fact both the former and latter occur according to the extent to which we transpose the basic principles of spiritual life from the depths of the radiant sphere of calm, dispassionate and disinterested reason. An act committed according to the most accurate, mathematically proven notions of reason, produces that cool contentment which wishes to intervene in the heart between a pure moral accomplishment and the crudeness of licentious orgies. This neutral state when a man is "*neither hot nor cold, when he is regarded as alive but is actually dead*" (Apoc. 3, 1, 15)<sup>14</sup>, when he strives for good without sacrifice, but on the other hand does not abandon himself with total heartlessness to passions, vices and open villainy, many people today are prepared to regard as the moral ideal. Hence, it is clear today that Christian morality requires too much sacrifice and heroism from us.

Recently, some scientists proposed to us the rule: *respect yourself or your own person* and thought that thereby they had established the principle of morally good human actions. We feel that this rule may or may not give rise to moral actions, as in the case of rules which flow from it analytically, such as: feed yourself, look after your body, keep it warm and maintain it, exercise your memory, develop your mind, your musical talents and so forth. We do not imply that the rule *respect yourself* should contradict man's moral purpose (appointment). However, we think that it can have a moral sense only *after* we have begun to act and live according to this purpose. Thus, for example, if you have a *metaphysical* idea which tells you that life must be maintained not just to live - or that the memory, the mind and faculties be aesthetically developed not just to gain in this way as from the profit on accumulated capital, peace and enjoyment: your daily care of your body and

14. Our translation.



health will have a relative merit in the system of morally good actions. Without this a priori moral principle your self-respect *can* have the same moral value as the striving of every animal to maintain itself: people will not begin to see in you a morally good individual for the simple reason that you are concerned about the health and beauty of the body, the development of the talents of wit, faithful representation and so forth. You can speak the language of *men and angels* and *know everything about anything*, you can possess such strength and firmness of character that you think whether this is required by your honour or your other concern - to offer your body up to *be burnt*<sup>15</sup> — nevertheless, even to this unusual development of the personality, no moral worth is attached.

The concept of moral law acknowledged by moral philosophy is of irrefutable scientific significance as well as the prospect of the duty or obligation to fulfil it. Both conscience and all religions regard moral actions as the prescriptions of a higher legislation and therefore acknowledge their fulfilment as a duty and obligation. Likewise, the revelation calls acts of truth and love commandments or the order of God. Thus Jesus Christ gave mankind a new commandment. In general people believe that the accomplishment of every good deed is the fulfilment of the will of God or that in this instance our will is in accord with God's will. However, philosophy links this altogether true teaching with the unjustified proposition that the primary source of moral legislation is reason. We have already mentioned above the so-called self-law of the mind and the so-called unity between rational acts and morally good acts. Since we are dealing here with one of the most difficult questions in moral philosophy, by way of elucidating our thoughts and removing misunderstandings we make the following observations:

a) The law governing moral activity is not for this very reason the *cause* of this activity in the same way for example as the law of falling bodies is not the cause of their falling. Thus the rationalist point of view it will never be possible to explain the origin or source of actions which appear to correspond with moral law as the prescription of reason. Every moral prescription of reason, every precept of reason as to how I *should* act, opens the way for me to actions still only anticipated but not yet realised. Whether I can commit these acts, whether I have the moral strength, the source of these acts, is another matter completely which the moral legislation of reason does not touch on. The mind can prescribe, order and even command accurately, but only when it has before it not a dead body but a living, animate human being and its prescriptions and orders are drawn from the nature of this human being and not imposed on him as something foreign and unnatural. Not one human being on Earth indulges in lawful activity which is based on impulses alien to him. The Russian proverb says that the mind is the ruler of the head and quite rightly so if we see it in terms of an actual image. A ruler does not de-

15. Ibid., (2) 1 Corinthians 13, 12.

fine the life of the people of himself, *a priori* with its language, religion and particular genius; his legislation is sacred to the people being an expression of their inner needs, an embodiment of their spirit. The mind is a faculty dealing with concepts, thoughts, rules, principles and laws, which it forms, however, as a rule, from particular circumstances and specific actions, whether in moral or physical sphere, it makes no difference. Rules and thoughts on moral activity are not innate in us, although actual tendencies and aspirations to them are. Reason, recognising moral activities, comparing and generalising them, sets common moral laws on how a person 'should act, and common moral rules and prescriptions and common ideas in which we recognise an existing moral order in the world. We know how necessary and dear to us these general ideas are. They enable us both in every instance and in the moral sense to act according to a definite, clearly discernable plan and clearly understood principles, while calmly considering ends and means and the sphere of our moral activity. They make us aware of the moral sphere even when in our hearts the source of morality has dried up and when therefore we are not capable of entering this sphere despite our very lucid notions of it. The apostle Paul refers specifically to this clear awareness of moral law or law of the mind together with the absence of a real source of morality, in Romans 7, 14-23. The mind according to the ancients is the *governing* or *ruling* part of the soul, and mysticism immersed in the direct tendencies of the heart while not converting them into abstract, calm and sure ideas and principles of the mind contradicts the properties of the human spirit. However, a governing and ruling force is not a creative force; it is a rule which extends to the content of the moral world which springs from the deepest essence of the spirit and in its direct form or primary and *fundamental* appearance is love of good. Sometimes we face so-called *temptations*, when external circumstances by virtue of their unexpected and unforeseen combinations upset all the notions, all the calculations and rules of reason. At such critical moments a man is in fact left with his heart as guide. Here indeed is the actual touch-stone of his moral character: either he emerges in the fulness of his nobility displaying the virtues of moral heroism, or reveals to us all the unworthiness of his being which until then he has concealed from us by prudent conduct controlled by cautious, calculating reason. Let us now finally express our thoughts on the meaning of the principles and general rules of reason in the moral sphere, by means of an image from the Gospel which through its vividness will always arouse the awe of the dispassionate observer. Active and not merely feigned moral activity requires a lamp and oil (Matth. 25,1 -10). As the oil of love in the human heart dries up, the lamp grows dim in equal proportion: moral principles and ideas fade and finally disappear from consciousness. This relationship between the lamp and oil, between the head and the heart, is the most common phenomenon in the moral history of mankind. And so this duality between moral legislation in whose form we picture our moral actions, and the source of moral activity, reconciles itself with the bibli-

cal point of view. Actually, morality is a commandment, a law: however, as is said of a benevolent law that it will be written in the *hearts* of renewed people, so too the people left to do as they wish, "*shew the work of the law written in their hearts*" (Romans 2, 15, Jerem. 31, 31).

b) When a man's conscience reproaches him for an unjust act or for cruelty, it does not say to him, "You with your legislating reason have made a mistake; your actions were directed by erroneous concepts and inaccurate notions," nor furthermore, does it say to him, "You did not heed the instructions of your reason." All such reproaches which we make to other people and receive from them with complete equanimity, like rebukes for mistakes in mathematical calculation, are but slight and of no consequence compared with the severe and grave response of the conscience to the criminal, "You have committed an injustice, you have done wrong, you are unworthy of the name human being, look at yourself now, at what sort of person you are and the fruits of your evil heart." Here we hear completely different tones which are comprehensible only to the heart and not indifferently pondering reason.

c) The revelation gives us the commandment, "*Thou shalt love the neighbour as thyself*" (Matth. 22, 39), and further, "*Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends*" (John 15, 13). We should love our neighbour as we love ourselves. A Christian should recognise in his neighbour himself, and sympathise with his misfortune and suffering while experiencing the same inner feelings as he himself experiences misfortune and suffering. We know which sincere capacity can bring us to the energetic state of pure and active love. Therefore we are justified in saying that in every act of love the Christian lays down *his soul for his friend*. The needs of a neighbour, his suffering and misfortune, fall upon his (the Christian's) loving heart with the same heaviness as if they affected directly his own and not a stranger's heart. Indeed, this is how this life bubbles at its source and on entering the world of phenomenon assumes specific forms: justice, integrity (honesty), fidelity of word and contract, magnanimity and nobility, resoluteness to sacrifice, placing the good of the whole before personal well-being and so forth.

We have dwelt too long on the Christian principle of morality, firstly, because it is closely wedded to the biblical doctrine of the heart and, secondly, because the needs of modern practical philosophy are too great and we think it must explain the spirit and the nature of Christian ethics. If in this latter respect we wished to specify only the main principle of Christian ethics, then in the first respect we reached conclusions which at least to us appear significant. The biblical doctrine of the heart as the centre of the entire life of the soul and spirit, does not stand alone and apart throughout the remaining doctrine. We wished to show what considerable practical interests of the human and Christian spirit are united with it. Thus, if due to the limited nature of our scientific means it was not for the moment justified

scientifically, then nevertheless we cannot pass by it with indifference if we value only the religious and moral life of mankind. We have expressed the hope that from this point of view it is possible to indicate the correct harmonious relationship between knowledge and faith. Furthermore, it is possible to demonstrate the deepest foundations of human religious cognition and finally and in particular that the Christian ethics from this point of view only can be understood in their deepest sense and immeasurable worth. If someone with more resources and greater experience were to examine how according to the biblical doctrine of the heart we should understand the task and aim of education, this would provide us with a considerable list of practical principles which would bring together the spheres of faith and science. For the rift prevalent today between faith and science as the need to know in this way and believe in another, appears to be intolerable to people of the most diverse convictions. To serve science is not to serve Mammon which would be incongruous with serving God. People feel this today though there are still few with any definite ideas about achieving a reconciliation between science and faith. In this paper our main premise is that such means of reconciliation lie in the thorough and dispassionate study of the Bible in all its detail, including its apparently most insignificant notions. "Take this and read it", said an unknown voice to Augustine who had lost his way amid the doubts and contradictions of his wide knowledge.

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B.O.

## RECOLLECTIONS OF UKRAINE\*

(Conclusion)

### IV

In the province of Volyn, in the north-western part of Ukraine, a German *Graf* had two villages built for the gypsies (*tsyhany*), who frequently wandered through his land. He told the gypsies that these villages were for their use alone, and so most of them settled there and became smallholders. But no gypsy can bear to stay in one place for any great length of time, and so part of a gypsy family would remain in the smallholding while the rest of the family went wandering; after two years they would swop over.

The wandering gypsies travelled with their horse-drawn caravans and their dogs right across the Carpathian Mountains into Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and even into Eastern Germany in those days. They were horse-traders and peg-makers, and tinkers — they made copper frying-pans, copper kettles, and horse-shoes. If they camped near a big estate, the landowner might ask them to help with the harvest, and in return give them potatoes and bacon, and sacks of oats for their horses. Nearly all the gypsy women were fortune-tellers.

During my years in the village, the gypsies visited up perhaps three or four times. They camped on the village green, upstream from the pond: the brook flowed through the middle of the green and was crossed by a small bridge. (Our village girls would never cross this bridge after dark at any time of the year, because an unpleasant goblin was supposed to live underneath it, waiting to grab them!) The gypsies' caravans — six to eight of them — were all painted differently, with little windows and chimneys, and entrances in the front and the rear. Their horses were of a similar breed to those of my father.

The head gypsy was called Batza. He had a big moustache and wore a red or green headscarf with a tassel; he had two golden ear-rings and several golden rings on his hands. He wore black *sharovary* trousers and long boots of calf-leather. His shirt was white, with a simple collar and a small black necktie; his waistcoat was embroidered.

The village elders were consulted for permission to camp on the village green, and the villagers gave the gypsies oats, eggs and chickens; father gave them some bacon and lard, but he said to them: "If even one egg is stolen from this village, we'll chase you out with pitchforks!" Those gypsies never stole that egg, or anything else. In fact, if you had dropped a purse full of

\* Continued from *The Ukrainian Review* No. 2, 1987, pp. 65-76.

money in the middle of the gypsy encampment, it would still have been there the next morning. Relations between the villagers and the gypsies were of the friendliest kind — gypsy children and the village children played together. (Amazingly enough, other villages in which the gypsies were in the habit of camping missed chickens, eggs, and even piglets!)

The gypsy women, who went round to the houses selling their goods, wore pleated skirts, leather shoes, white or cream-coloured blouses, and waistcoats like the men, but, whereas the men wore their waistcoats open, the women always buttoned theirs up. They wore their hair in plaits, often with a headscarf. The oldest gypsies would look after the children while the young men and their fathers made the horse-shoes, pans and other implements.

I am sure that most of the money came in through the women telling fortunes. The mothers of the village wanted to know whether their daughters would marry rich husbands, how many children they would have, and so on; and the daughters themselves wanted to know what their future husbands would be like. The gypsy woman would predict the future by using cards or by reading the girl's palm, and occasionally by cracking a raw egg into a tilted glass and watching the white of the egg as it ran down the side of the glass — "Oh, yes, my dear, there's a tall, blonde man. . . and, oh, yes, there's you, and. . ." and so on and so forth. I once had my future predicted by a gypsy woman. I paid her twopence, and she read my palm and then looked at the cards. She told me I would be travelling in faraway places. Strange as it may seem, at that time I had never even thought of joining the Navy. . .

If an old gypsy man or woman was dying, it was the custom never to let them die in a caravan: the other gypsies made a bed outside for them. No gypsy died in our village, but I heard from other villages that if a gypsy died, then the relatives buried him or her in the cemetery, saying their own prayers, without a priest.

The gypsies stayed for about three weeks. A couple of days before their departure they would invite everyone to join in their festivities in the evening by the camp fires. They had their own kind of dancing: the women danced with tambourines, to the accompaniment of fiddles, drums, saxophones and clarinets. One of the gypsy lads, aged about fifteen, was the best fiddler. One of my younger brothers was very fond of the gypsies' music, and he would take out his violin and play with the musicians, who applauded him.

The gypsies departed at dawn, and never left any litter behind them.

## V

Our uniforms for High School were usually obtained from a Jewish tailor, and a new one was bought every year after Christmas. The uniform was as follows: black socks and shoes, navy blue trousers and a navy blue jacket with a blue strip around the cuffs. If you were in the seventh or eighth year,

you could wear civilian clothing. (Civilian clothing was also worn by students of the University of Lviv, and it was possible to tell what they were studying by the colour of the braid on their caps — red for medicine or veterinary practice, blue for law, green for agriculture and green-and-yellow for engineering). Our school coats were like donkey-jackets, with the number of our school embroidered on the lapel.

My father sent my elder brother and me to the High School in Zolochiv for two years — this was the school he had attended — and then he transferred us to the Ukrainian High School in Ternopil. However, in 1930 the Poles suspected that nationalist plots were being hatched against them in the seventh and eighth years, so they forced the High School to close and we were transferred yet again, this time to the High School in Berezhany. It is to this High School that the next few paragraphs refer.

There were two classes in each year, and perhaps eighteen scholars in each class. It was a school for both boys and girls, and it was attended not only by Ukrainians, but also by Poles and Jews. Lessons were from eight in the morning until half past twelve. Afternoons were spent doing homework; Saturday mornings were spent engaging in sports — football or gymnastics.

My elder brother and I had board and lodging in Berezhany at a woman's home. Father delivered flour, potatoes and ham in return for her troubles. I remember she made tomato soup. Unfortunately neither my brother nor I were particularly fond of this, so we emptied our bowls out of the window when her back was turned. You can imagine how pleased she was when she found out.

In our spare time during the summer we went swimming in a lake near Berezhany. This lake had been created by damming a part of the Zolota Lypa (Golden Lime Tree) River. Downstream from the dam was a mill, and about another ten metres downstream was a locality where we used to fish for crayfish. You dangled a piece of raw liver in the water, and when a crayfish came to nibble it you scooped him up with a small net. We used to boil the crayfish for ten minutes and eat them when they had cooled off.

I can remember two rather amusing incidents connected with High School. One day, a Jewish pupil was annoying my brother, so my brother decided to do something about it. He went to the lake, caught a frog, put it in his sandwich box and brought it to school. At a convenient moment during breaktime he dropped the frog down the boy's trousers. He was jumping up and down and shrieking, and the girls were all laughing at him. . .! Eventually, the caretaker and one of the teachers shook the frog out, and demanded to know who was responsible. My brother was suspended from school for three days!

The other incident took place in my fifth or sixth year, and concerned our German teacher, Herr Mause. It was the start of one of the final German lessons of that year, and we decided to play a practical joke on him. We left a dead mouse on his desk. He came into the room, put down his papers, held up the mouse by its tail, said: "Herr Mause hebt die Maus ab und wirft sie

aus das Fenster hinaus!" and then proceeded to do so. That made us feel small, I can tell you!

My cousin Volodymyr often came to visit us during vacation. He stayed with us for a fortnight at a time, and spent most of that fortnight collecting bugs and beetles — mostly from under the manure dump! He was over six feet tall, and he loved yoghurt. We made yoghurt by leaving fresh milk in an earthenware jug on a shelf during the summer for about a week: it would separate into cream and yoghurt, and then be mixed. At table it was served in glasses. For a supper, when Volodymyr came to stay, we usually had boiled early potatoes and a good glass of yoghurt. My brothers, father, Volodymyr and I would see who could drink a glass of yoghurt the fastest. Mother would shout "One, two, three, go!" and before father had drunk half his, Volodymyr had finished!

He went to study medicine, and then worked as a doctor in a Polish mental hospital. The doctors worked on a shift system. One day, Volodymyr arrived at the hospital to find that the doctor on the previous shift had gone half an hour earlier than he should have done, and the warden was nowhere to be seen. Three strong inmates came menacingly towards him, and then grabbed him! "Come on, doctor", they said, "We're going to see if you can fly!" They manhandled him up three flights of stairs and forced him to stand by the window. "Go on, doctor," they said, "You're going to fly down there, and we'll watch you".

"What?" said Volodymyr, "Me? I mean — er — well, listen: you want me to fly down there, is that it?"

"Yes, doctor, that's right."

"Oh, come on! Flying down, well, that's easy: anyone can do that. It's upwards that's the most difficult part. You three wait here — I'll go down there, and you can watch me fly up — alright?"

The three inmates held a brief conference, and agreed. Volodymyr dashed downstairs and ran for his life — he vaulted a six-foot fence, and phoned for the police!

When he dies, his immense beetle collection is apparently to be donated to a Canadian museum.

The first part of the harvest was the hay harvest in mid-June. The hay was cut either by horse-drawn mowing-machine or by labourers with scythes, and left lying in long ridges (*pokos*). A couple of days after it had been cut, it was turned over with rakes, left for another couple of days, and then transported to the barn by cart. Father owned one hay meadow, some eight or nine acres in extent. When it was time for the hay to be harvested, father hired about twelve scythes, who would begin work at seven in the morning, singing as they walked along with their scythes over their shoulders. They would work solidly, pausing only to sharpen their scythe-blades, until a cart came from the rectory at eleven o'clock with their sandwiches and coffee. After a brief



rest they would continue until six in the evening. All the time, hares and partridges would be escaping out of the grass as the scythers moved on.

The hay harvest was usually over by the first week of July. From then until the middle of August, the weather was dry and sunny, and only disturbed by the occasional storm. This length of time was called *Peridnovok*, and the villagers took advantage of it to go into the woodlands and cut logs for the winter. The last Sunday in July was a saint's day, and if the weather was fine after the service, father and the church warden would get on a cart and drive round the field boundaries. The farmer and his wife would be waiting before each smallholding, and they would kneel for father to bless them and their land in the hope of a good harvest. He often did not get home until about eight o'clock in the evening.

To harvest the wheat we had a binder pulled by two pairs of horses. This bound the wheat into sheaves; the women came behind, and stacked the sheaves into stooks (*kopa*) with fifteen sheaves in each stook. Rye could not be harvested by binder because its straw was used for thatching, so this was cut by scythes, and again the women came behind to bind the sheaves and stack them.

By the end of August, the rye and wheat had been stacked separately in the barn (no smoking!) and in September threshing began. Threshing machines were run on petrol, and travelled from farm to farm. One threshing machine usually spent a week or so with us. Rye could not be threshed by machine, and had to be threshed by flails on a hard clay floor. Ploughing began in early September and was finished by the end of October.

The potato harvest came at the end of September. The plants were uprooted by a horse-drawn machine similar to a plough, which left them lying in rows: the women came behind and filled the sacks with the potatoes.

Some of our barley was sold to the local brewery; the local *Graf* sold a lot of his potatoes to the distillery to make vodka. The potatoes which were not sold were buried in potato-clamps in field-corners by the road. The final event of the agricultural year was winter ploughing.

Our equivalent of harvest festival was celebrated before threshing began. Everyone who had helped father in the harvest was invited to the feast. There would be between twenty and thirty people present. During the feast, father and mother wore corn garlands which had been plaited by the women. After the meal, these garlands were hung in the porch above the icons. There was a thanksgiving service that evening.

One year, in June, when I was about sixteen years old, our village was visited by a swarm of locusts. These creatures came through Greece and were usually stopped by the barrier of the Carpathian Mountains, but this time, for some reason, the mountains did not stop them. At about eleven o'clock one morning, the sun went dark. The peasants ran into their houses in terror, and Hanna started shouting that the end of the world had come! Farmers ran out into the fields and set straw alight in an attempt to drive the locusts away, but

before this was achieved the cornfields sustained considerable damage, and there was not a single leaf left in our orchard! The locusts covered the ground like leaf-drifts, and the pigs, chickens and geese gorged themselves. A couple of days later a few scientists arrived from Lviv to take samples. Even the oldest villagers could not remember a locust swarm in the area before.

Father grew hemp and flax, like most of the villagers, in a plot of land to the west of the rectory. Both hemp and flax were sown in the spring. Flax has pale blue flowers, which bees are very fond of, and the seeds are flat; hemp has greenish flowers that are pollinated by the wind, and its seeds are round. By September both hemp and flax were ripe. They were not harvested by scythe. The complete plants were tied in bundles, taken home and threshed on a hard clay floor by flails with leather straps. The seeds were then collected: some were stored, to be sown next spring; the oil was extracted by boiling the seeds and then milling them. The oil from flax was used in paints or to oil harnesses; the oil from hemp was used as cooking oil.

The bundles of haulm from hemp and flax were put in the shallow end of the village pond and covered with mud, and left to rot for about eight weeks. Then the women rinsed them and laid them out on the ground to dry for a week. At the end of that they were taken home and put through a retting machine to remove the haulm and retain the useful fibres. These fibres were light grey; those of hemp were slightly coarser than those of flax.

The fibres were combed during the winter. The fluff was made into string, and the remaining fibres were soaked in caustic soda to bleach them before being hand-spun and made into ropes or cloth. Flax fibres contract during storage, so they had to be stretched — usually by someone sitting on them like a swing. Then they were placed outside and watered three times a day to bleach them before being spun into linen.

We also made use of many animal products. Leather from the backside of a two-year old cow was used for harnesses and shoe soles; the leather from the neck and the belly was used for working boots. Calf-leather and horse-leather were used to make fine boots, and goat-leather was made by the Hut-zul people into ladies' long boots and gloves.

After the animal had been killed, its skin was immersed in a large shallow wooden barrel containing lime and water to dissolve the hair. There were two or three tanners in our village who did this, and it was always done in the barn, because the stench was awful! If the tanner could grip the hide between his fingers and thumb and rub away the hairs, then it had been immersed long enough. It was taken out, washed, and hung in the barn, where it was scraped with wooden knives. It was always hung out of the reach of the sun, because the sun would shrivel it; and tanning was never done in the winter because the hide would simply freeze. While it was hanging, it was scrubbed with alum-stone to soften it, and dyed, either with a pigment obtained from crushed crayfish shells or with an infusion of oak-bark, which imparted a dark brown colour. Rawhide was immersed in linseed oil for two or three days and

then pressed through a kind of mangle. Goat-leather was also soaked in oak-bark infusion: this turned it a buff colour and made it pliable. Pig-leather was tanned mostly by the Jews in the towns, and made into rawhide for the manufacture of suitcases. Shoemakers used pigs' bristles as thread.

Rabbits' fur was used to make collars, hats, and so on; and lambswool was used to make Cossack hats, like the one old *Diadia* wore.

## VI

We boys made our own skis for use in the winter out of ash-wood; we also went sledging, and ice-skating when the village pond froze over. Another of our pastimes was to take the two alsatians and go out hare-hunting: a hare crouches in the snow with one ear forward and the other ear back, to catch sounds from all directions, and we never managed to catch one.

There was a lake near Berezhany about three miles long, and, like the village pond, it would be frozen solid from December until about March. The road which ran beside it was often snowbound at this time, and so to get to Berezhany the sledges used to go directly across the lake. One year I heard the following story. A landowner had to go to a meeting in Berezhany one night, and he told his coachman, who was driving the sledge, to drive across the lake. This was at the end of February, when the thaw was just beginning, and there was thin ice in the middle of the lake. Suddenly, the horses broke through the ice: the coachman had the presence of mind to leap out and pull his employer clear by the collar of his coat. Both the horses and the sledge sank beneath the ice, and were not recovered until the spring. As a reward for saving his life, the landowner had a cottage built for his coachman, and made sure he had sufficient money to last him to the end of his days.

1928-29 was a very bad winter; our pump was frozen, and we had to obtain our water from a neighbour's well. The temperatures were so severe that if you left a bucket of water outside for a quarter of an hour, it would not just be frozen over, but frozen solid! We had fires burning in all the rooms; often we had to dig our way from the house to the stables through snowdrifts six feet deep. Under such conditions you never touched anything outside that was iron unless you were wearing gloves — the iron would take the skin off your hand. If we went to play outside, mother would rub our toes in snow or ice-cold water and make us dance up and down as soon as we got inside, to prevent us catching chilblains. Many people froze to death in the village that year; several were short of wood and were forced to go and fetch loads with their sledges. When you were returning with a sledge full of logs, you never sat on the sledge, because you would be chilled in five minutes — you ran with the horses.

Several times packs of wolves could be heard howling round the village: they would probably have come down from the Carpathian Mountains, some

thirty kilometres away, driven by hunger. It was not unknown for them to attack livestock at the edges of some of the neighbouring villages. Once, although the dogs were barking, a wolf pack literally chewed through a wooden door and killed a yearling calf. If a villager went visiting, a double-barrelled shotgun had to be carried on the sledge, because a pack of wolves could easily pull down a galloping horse. One night my father went visiting, and on the return he discovered that the roads were snowbound, so he told *Diadia* to drive across the fields. When there were still about another seven kilometres to travel, *Diadia* shouted that the horses were beginning to get nervous for some reason. Father looked back: the moonlight was reflecting upon the snow, and shining in what looked like a row of seven or eight double candles — father grabbed the shotgun and fired a couple of barrels, and the wolves dispersed. That was the only time old *Diadia* ever whipped the horses, to get some speed out of them.

I heard another story about wolves from the *Hutzuly*, the Carpathian Mountain people, whose flocks of sheep would often be attacked by wolves during the lambing season. Anyhow, one winter's night, a young Hutzul was on his way home across a mountain meadow when a strange growling commotion came to his ears. He was out in the middle of nowhere — it was about five kilometres to the nearest village — but he saw a large haystack a little distance away on the slope, so he ran up to it, jumped as high as he could, and climbed right to the top. There he waited to see what would happen. In about five minutes he saw a wolf-pack fighting with a huge Carpathian bear, which they had driven out of his winter lair! The bear tried to get away from the wolves, and he had the same idea as the Hutzul — he began to climb the haystack! Our hero did not know what to do; but like all Hutzuly, he was carrying his *topir* (a staff with an axe at the top), so he raised it in the air, and as the bear's head appeared he struck it as hard as he could. The bear fell right from the top of the haystack onto the wolves, who finished him off. In the morning the young Hutzul climbed down: there was nothing left apart from the bear's fur! He ran home as fast as he could!

Preparations for Christmas began at the end of the harvest, when several of the best sheaves of wheat were stored in the barn, bound, not threshed. Only one sheaf would be needed, but we had to make allowances for mice, and so on. A pig was fattened and killed by the butcher six weeks before Christmas so that sausages, hams and bacon could be prepared. We boys used to help in the preparation of black pudding — pig's blood was mixed with salt and boiled barley or buckwheat for this. The shoemaker used the pig's bladder to waterproof shoes: a section was placed above the sole, and could be guaranteed never to let water in. We also made a kind of haggis, saltzeson, using the pig's stomach.

A spruce tree (*yalynka*) was selected in the woods near my maternal grandfather's home, and cut down three or four days before it was needed. It was decorated with little candles, paper streamers, apples and chocolates, and brought in on Christmas Eve to be placed in a cross-shaped stand in the cor-

ner of our living-room. As Christmas Eve was a meatless day, our household sat down to a 15lb pike or carp, either in aspic or baked with onions, for the mid-day meal.

During the afternoon, the floor of the kitchen was strewn with barley-straw to remind the household of the stable in which Jesus had been born. The living-room table, which was going to be used for supper, was covered with a layer of hay and then with a richly-embroidered cloth. A large dark loaf of rye-bread had been specially baked, and this was placed in the middle of the table. The centre of the loaf was cut out and a large beewax candle inserted. This candle burned continually until after midnight mass. It is interesting to note that this candle was used for all the Christmas festivities and then kept to be taken to the room of any member of the family who was dying during the year, in the belief that in holding it, the person's sins were forgiven.

By four o'clock the whole household was ready, and waiting for the first star to appear. This was the signal for *Diadia* to bring in a sheaf of wheat from the barn. This was put on a stool in a corner and called the "grand-father" for two weeks. When the candle was lit, all was ready for the twelve-course supper. To begin with, two slices of white bread were buttered and made into a sandwich with honey. It was cut into small squares, and father took one square to each person, greeting them with a kiss or a handshake as appropriate, and saying "Veselykh Sviat Rizdva (Happy Christmas)". The meal continued with small helpings of *borshch* (beetroot soup), fish (again either carp or pike), *Holubtsi* (mushrooms, celery or rice wrapped in cabbage leaves), *pyrishky* (like ravioli, with infillings of cream cheese or mashed potatoes) and potatoes in their jackets with cheese. Apples, pears or prunes were served with cream, and then honeycake (*medivnyk*) was offered. The last course was a huge dish of refined wheat grains, boiled and mixed with honey and poppy-seeds, called *kutia*. When the dish was offered to father, he took a large spoon and threw the *kutia* onto the ceiling. The abundance of the next harvest could be judged by the number of the wheat grains which stayed up there.

After supper, it was the custom for young unmarried ladies to take two or three spoons outside and rattle them together. They listened for the sound of a dog barking, and from that direction their young man would come. (If no dog barked, we five boys were always ready to provide a howl!) Everyone sang Christmas carols and played games until midnight service.

The villagers journeyed to the church by sledge, with bells on the horses. The service was only a short one, lasting three-quarters of an hour and involving the singing of a choir, often with a solo singer. At the end of the service we all joined in the well-loved carol "Boh predvichnyi". Upon leaving church, everyone greeted each other, saying "Khrystos razhdayetsia" (Christ is born) and "Slavite Yeho" (Glory to Him).

Christmas Day was relaxed and peaceful. We youngsters would go sledging or skiing; married children would visit their psrents. Breakfast involved many

meat dishes: first came porridge, and then a help-yourself arrangement with bread-and-butter, sausage, ham, saltzeson and *burachky* (a kind of horseradish and beetroot mixture: it almost blew my head off when I tasted a bit, but *Diadia* was very fond of it). Presents were distributed from the tree — usually sweets, or perhaps a fountain-pen for school and evening service was early, at four o'clock, so that all would be ready for the carol-singers, who were all men. Thirty of them would sing first at our house, and stay for refreshments, mead, vodka or cherry brandy — and then the whole household would join in a final carol as the singers divided themselves into small groups to visit every house, carrying their star-lanterns and tins to collect the money, which was donated to the church.

"Little Christmas" (*Yordan* — Epiphany) came exactly a fortnight later, and once it was over, weddings could be held. First a group of men from the village went to the edge of the pond, where the ice was a good two feet thick, and cut a six-foot high cross out of ice. They lifted this out with poles, and set it upright at the edge of the pond. After the church service the next morning, my father led the congregation to this cross, where five or six buckets of water had been placed. He blessed this water, and the villagers each took a small amount home in bottles which they had brought with them. They sprinkled this holy water over their cows and horses. A stoop of holy water was left in the porch of our house, and any visitors who came that day dipped their fingers in and made a cross on their foreheads.

That evening it was the turn of the women of the village to go round singing, and like the men they always called at our house first. They were called the *shchedrivnytsi*.

The next day father and the church warden went round to each house in the village: the church warden carried a bucket of holy water, and the members of the household would kneel in the living-room while father blessed the house. The next day he would visit the other villagers in the parish. In the afternoons I would either go sledging with the others, or go round to Danylo's house to play chess. In the evenings a mixed group of us youngsters would go to a neighbouring village for some merry-making — I would play the banjo, my brother would play the accordion and there would be dancing and singing, often until long past midnight.

## VII

Every Friday during lent (the six weeks before Easter) was a meatless day: meals were served with pasta or cheese instead, and frying was done with vegetable oil, not lard. A pig was killed about three weeks before Easter, and girls began to embroider new blouses.

During Palm Sunday service, everyone was given a small branch of pussy-willow, which had been blessed. The members of the household who had

stayed at home to look after the animals would receive a gentle tap on the head with a pussy-willow branch, and be told, "Seven days from today is Easter Day". Two or three Basilian monks were asked to come from the nearby monastery on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday to hear confessions; pike and carp had to be specially prepared for them to eat.

On Good Friday morning the bells rang for the last time, and would not be heard again until Easter Morning. A large embroidered tapestry of Christ on the Cross was taken out of its wooden case under the altar and carried by the six oldest villagers three times around the church, held horizontally. It was followed by father, swinging his censer, and all the congregation. The tapestry was then laid before the altar, and surrounded by long troughs containing green shooting corn which had been grown in the stable. A torch was lit from an altar candle and used to light a small symbolical bonfire (*vatra*) in the churchyard, to remember the Roman soldiers who kept guard outside Jesus's tomb. We boys often played about with this fire: the Russian-Austrian front line had been only a few miles away, and it was still possible to find old rifles and cartridges — we dropped the cartridges into the fire and took great delight in the resulting explosions! Needless to say, father was not particularly pleased. When not busy with these pranks there were six or seven of us sitting round this bonfire, exchanging stories (mostly about the village girls); several of the old men used to come and sit with us, light their pipes, and tell tales about their wartime experiences. Lay people took it in turns to intone the four gospels day and night by candlelight in the church until Easter Morning, and people slipped quietly in and out at all times to make their devotions before the altar.

Meanwhile, the girls prepared hard-boiled eggs, called *pysanky*, and decorated them in traditional patterns, using beeswax and natural colours, for example a yellow pigment obtained from the skin of an onion. A huge loaf, called *paska*, was baked, sometimes containing raisins: it rose up pie-shaped. Every wife made sure her husband had a new embroidered shirt, and the girls fixed new ribbons for their garland head-dresses. We boys were kept out of the way as much as possible, looking after the animals or listening to our ploughman telling stories. People really did fast from Thursday night until Easter Morning, eating only toast and having drinks without milk or sweetening.

Very early on Easter Morning, perhaps at six o'clock when it was still dark, the churchyard fire was extinguished, and a procession made its way three times round the church with the tapestry and embroidered banners portraying St. Christopher and the Virgin and Child. My father was attended by a boy carrying the incense and a boy carrying a wooden clapper. After they had been round the church three times, he would knock three times on the church door with his wooden cross.

"Khrystos Voskres!" (Christ is risen) he said, when the door was opened.

"Voistynu Voskres" (He is risen indeed) all answered. Then everyone would enter the church, and the tapestry would be rolled up and put away;

the growing corn was moved to be round the altar, candles were lit, and High Mass would begin (sung by all in Ukrainian and including a sermon and "Kyrie Eleison").

Outside the church, a representative of every household stood with a decorated basket of Easter food — eggs, ham, butter, sausage, scones and cake, wrapped in an embroidered cloth. As the people waited in double line, father would walk slowly past with one helper carrying the huge church Bible and another with a bucket of holy water to sprinkle over the family food. The baskets were then taken home to become part of the Easter feast. Every member of the household shared a piece of blessed egg, the shell of which was always thrown in the fire (it was considered blasphemous not to do so).

All the bells began to ring, and did not stop until evening service. Young people, especially the girls, joined hands in the space around the church to sing Easter songs (*hahilky*); the young men played at leapfrog, or danced, or ran races round the church, or made pyramids of themselves (three of the strongest at the bottom, two on their shoulders, and so on) and tried to walk round the church like that. . .!

Easter Monday was known as *Oblyvanyi ponedilok* ("watering Monday") and was filled with rather saucy goings-on. It was the custom for young unmarried girls to hide at home, and for the young men and boys to break into her house, find her, and tip a few cups of water over her. Her father would set his shoulder against the door and pretend that he was trying to stop the boys from breaking in; of course, they would break in eventually: the old man would feign horror, and cry out, "Hey, lads, lads, don't rob my house, please!". "No, don't worry, we won't! We're going to christen your daughter! Where is she?" The old man would pretend that he didn't know, and they would try and make him tell him; in the end the girl's mother would drop a hint as to her whereabouts, and the boys would run and find her and give her a good soaking, some of the naughtier ones squirting water under her skirt as well! The girl would then get changed and go and boast to her friends.

On the Sunday after Easter, the first village dance was held, usually in the hall above the Co-op. There were *kolomyika* dances and usually a *hopak* as well. During the next few weeks there would be literally dozens of weddings: my father would be perhaps marrying two couples per day!

Four or five weeks after the Easter festivities, it was Whitsuntide, and the insides of the houses were decorated with leafy green branches, mostly lime; and if the house was thatched, a dozen or so small branches were stuck under the eaves or in the thatch itself. Troughs of sprouting corn were placed at the sides of the altar, as at Easter, and there were green boughs under the eaves outside the church. This was traditionally the time of the year when families went to tend their ancestors' graves — the other time being in November, when candles were lit on the graves. Apart from the greenery, nothing else was done at Whitsun; the boys were chasing the girls — as usual — and dances were being held. The animals may have been out on the pastures, depending upon the time of the year at which Whitsun fell.



The last Sunday in May or the first Sunday in June was Ivan (John) the Baptist Day, and this was traditionally considered to be the first day of spring. Bonfires were lit on the village green and straw effigies were burned — a relic from pagan days, symbolising the burning away of the winter. Everyone would be dressed in their festive national costumes. The girls would make little garlands of wild spring flowers, and throw these garlands into the stream. We boys and young men would be waiting downstream, and we would each pull out one garland with a stick. Then we would run back and find out which young lady we now had to spend the rest of the day with. Every girl had a basket of food, and the girl whose garland you had caught would link arms with you and go and share her picnic with you. This was traditionally how you got yourself a girlfriend; and if you were already courting a girl, it was up to you to catch the right garland!

## VIII

During one of the summer vacations, when I was perhaps fifteen years old, father sent my elder brother and me to the village blacksmith — his name was Nykyta, and he had a moustache. Sometimes we helped him with his work; and sometimes we just stood and watched. From him we learnt how to make horseshoes, how to clean hooves and then shod the horse, how to make nails and how to sharpen ploughs.

The next year I went to stay at a monastery, believe it or not. Having five sons, father thought that one of us should perhaps follow in his footsteps, so he sent me to stay at the Basilian monastery in Lviv. Before sending me, father wrote to the abbot, saying that I was a possible candidate for priesthood. No such luck. I was supposed to stay at that place for a fortnight, but I did not like it from the start. There were about twenty boys there, including me, and like me many of them were priests' sons. We did not wear habits, like the monks, but black choirboy vestments during service and ordinary shirt and trousers at other times.

At six o'clock in the morning we were all woken by one of the monks who had been wounded by shrapnel in the First World War — he walked with a limp, and we gave him the nickname Hephaestus. He woke us up by using a rattle and shouting, "Come on, gentlemen, wake up!". We then had to attend Mass, which lasted three quarters of an hour, and at quarter to seven we had breakfast — usually porridge and black pudding. After breakfast the monks needed volunteers to go to the stables and help feed the horses, and I volunteered almost every day. Two hours were spent on meditation and reading; then we put on our dark clothing and attended prayers until eleven o'clock. After dinner we relaxed in the monastery garden or in the orchard, and played football from two until four, when it was time for meditation. Vespers were from five until six, followed by religious education given by the abbot or another of the senior monks. We then had to spend an hour writing an essay

on what we had been taught the previous day. Supper, which was usually potatoes and yoghurt, was at half-past eight; and after another half-hour of prayers, it was time for bed.

After a week I had had enough! I managed to persuade one of the janitors to post a letter for me, and father came to fetch me home. "And don't send me to that place again!" I said, "otherwise I'll climb over the wall and go and stay with my uncle".

The most significant memories of my summer holidays come from the weeks I spent among the Hutzul people in the Chornohora district of the Carpathian mountains. The Hutzul men wore red, green or blue woolen trousers tucked into their dark socks, and moccasin-like shoes. Their long linen shirts were embroidered at the collar and cuffs, and tied around with a woven belt (*poyas*); they wore sheepskin waistcoats and felt hats, and carried long-handled steel choppers (*topir*). When out walking they wore dark blanket-like cloaks, so tightly woven that they were waterproof. If a Hutzul was out in the mountains and night fell, he had only to use his *topir* to cut himself sufficient firewood and wrap himself in his cloak to sleep.

My brothers, one or two friends from High School and I spent from a fortnight to three weeks among these people during the summer vacation. Father took my brothers and I to Zboriv by cart, where we caught the train to Lviv. Here we met our companions. We each had a rucksack with a blanket, a change of clothing and a waterproof coat; we brought maps, money, compasses, knives and aluminium plates and cutlery, and we each wore hiking-boots. From Lviv we caught the train to the mountains, to Chernivtsi. At Chernivtsi we stayed the night at a youth hostel, and in the morning, after buying porridge-oats, salt, lard, bacon and so on, we set off up the paths into the mountains.

The Hutzul shepherds kept their flocks on high plateaux or clearings, two or three acres in extent, called *polonyny*. These were usually near a river, and there would be a single log cabin — *kolyba* — about twenty metres from the edge of the clearing, in which up to ten Hutzuls would sleep. This log cabin was octagonal in form, with no windows and a very small entrance. There would be a fire in the middle, and a thin chimney. One clearing was occupied by between two hundred and three hundred sheep, all black, every tenth sheep having a bell around its neck. There were also two or three sheepdogs, similar to English sheepdogs, to guard the sheep during the night.

Hutzul villages were situated in the mountain valleys, lineated along the rivers. Each village usually had about twenty-five houses: the houses were similar to the shepherds' cabins, with overlapping pine boards to cover the roof like tiles. The interiors were of pine board as well, and gaps between the logs were infilled with clay. The stables were made of greyish yellow stone, again with pine-board roofs. The ponies which were kept in these stables were similar to Welsh ponies — sturdy little creatures, very steady on their legs.

We boys would often stay the night in the shepherds' log cabins. Polish or German students who came to the clearings were not welcome: but Ukrainians, oh, yes — we even had free meals! It took us a little while to get used to the Hutzuls' accented speech, but while we were doing that they fed us with bryndzia cheese — this was made from sheep's milk, and was very strong: it tasted like salty cottage cheese. In addition to the bryndzia we had porridge, or gruel with chopped bacon, or cow's milk. The shepherds also fished for trout in the swift mountain rivers, which nearly all flowed into the River Cheremosh. They sold us black bread and bryndzia. The bryndzia was stored in small barrels. Every Saturday the shepherds' wives or sisters brought ponies up from the village with supplies, and empty barrels which they exchanged for the full ones. The miners and quarry-workers had the same arrangement, as did the woodmen.

One morning, having left our hosts, we were walking down a mountainside along a stream surrounded by woods. We stopped for a rest, and sat down to cool our feet in the water. About a hundred yards to one side we heard a succession of peculiar, resonant, wooden sounds — probably a woodman cutting logs, we thought. One of us went to have a look. A large tree had been blown over by a gale, and long jagged splinters were still upstanding from the stump; and an old Carpathian bear was amusing himself by pulling these splinters and listening to the twanging noise they made.

I admired the Hutzul people for their character and tenacity. No one could conquer them, not even the Poles. In Chornohora we heard quite a few tales featuring the exploits of the outlaw Dovbush, roughly the equivalent of England's Robin Hood. Dovbush was the son of a smallholder. He was disrespectful to the Poles and Austrians, and one day he was struck with a whip for his insolence. So he got together a band of about fifteen men, stole rifles, and escaped into the mountains. From there his band made raids far and near, even into Hungary and Rumania. Like Robin Hood, Dovbush robbed the rich and gave to the poor. Eventually the band was lured down into a valley, and during the battle Dovbush was killed, although some of his men escaped. There is a song, "Hey, bratia opryshky" (Hey, brother highwaymen), which is associated with Dovbush and his men. The outlaws sing that while the earth is green and the leaves are on the trees, even the Devil himself will be unable to find them. There is a brief refrain about dancing after a robbery, and then the outlaws sing that they will bring tobacco from Hungary and clothes from a Jewish tailor: and no one will be able to chase them on horseback, because they will escape up the mountainside.

The Hutzul people were extremely musical, and knew no end of beautiful songs. The shepherds made flutes out of elder branches (*sopilka*), and they also had alpine horns made out of birch-bark (*trembita*). These horns could only play four notes, and were played when someone had died, when someone was born, or during festivities. There is a sad song about a trembita, featuring those who were killed in the 1917-1921 War of Independence.

On Sundays we usually saw the Hutzul villagers dancing outside their wooden churches, to the accompaniment of violins, *sopilkas*, drums and *tsymbaly* (dulcimers). Their favourite dance was the *Arkan*, performed in a circle with *topirs*, and with the four best dancers in the centre.

Apart from the Dovbush tales, I remember one tragic story, which involves the gypsies as well. A travelling gypsy community had a very strict code of conduct: if a gypsy girl wanted to marry a peasant lad, her family would disown her and have nothing more to do with her. One old gypsy man, Andronauti, had a daughter called Kateryna. On one occasion she went to read a nobleman's palm, slept with him, and became pregnant. Her mother, brother and sister cast her out of the community, but her father, old Andronauti, went and bought a plot of land in the foothills of Chornohora and built a log cabin for himself and his daughter. He stayed there, looking after her and doing odd jobs for the locals, who came to respect him. In time Kateryna gave birth to a baby boy, with Andronauti as midwife. When the baby was about a week old, Andronauti learnt that a farmer and his wife, who lived nearby, had never had any children. One night, after obtaining his daughter's agreement, he took the baby and left it, wrapped up in a shawl, on the doorstep. When the farmer found the baby in the morning, he called to his wife: "Maria! Look what God has sent us!" They christened the boy Hryhoriy, and brought him up as their own son.

Hryhoriy grew up into a fine, handsome lad. Old Andronauti had left his daughter by now, but he still came to visit her twice a year. Kateryna kept goats, and made her living by reading palms, acting as a midwife for the villages round about, and making herbal medicines. She kept her eye on Hryhoriy, but never revealed that she was his mother. He grew up and began work on his father's farm. Many of the village girls fell in love with him, and their parents often came to his parents to try to arrange a marriage; but the farmer said, "Well, he's twenty-four years old: we'll let him decide about marriage for himself".

One village girl decided that she would do anything to get him as her husband. She went to visit Kateryna and asked her if she could prepare an aphrodisiac for him — but she never mentioned his name. Kateryna gave the girl a bottle of love-potion. "When he comes to see you, put a teaspoon in his drink", she said. "But be careful — no more than a teaspoon".

The girl took the bottle and went home. In time Hryhoriy did come to see her, but she ignored the old gypsy woman's advice, and poured half the bottle into his drink. It poisoned him. There was a big upheaval, and she confessed to what she had done; Hryhoriy was buried on Saturday, but the village elders decided that they would have to report the incident to the police. The girl hanged herself.

When Kateryna found out, she nearly went mad with grief. She set fire to her log cabin, flung herself into the River Cheremosh, and drowned. None of the Hutzul people would swim or fish in that part of the river, because they believed it was haunted by Kateryna's ghost.

## IX

Because there was scarcely any inoculation of any kind, the infant mortality rate in Galician villages was quite high. Children died of diphtheria, scarlet fever and smallpox — an epidemic of smallpox made its way from Crimea in the 1920s, spread by gypsies. A friend of mine, Roman, died from scarlet fever when he was only ten years old.

Apart from diseases like these, and old age, the other main cause of death was accidents: there was a peasant who had been to fetch a cartload of logs — on his return he drove too fast down a hill: the wheel hit a stone, the cart overturned, and he was crushed by the logs tumbling on top of him.

In our area there was one doctor for ten villages, so we had our own “official” to ascertain the cause of death, whose opinion went down on the death certificates. He had served in the medical corps during the First World War, so he was made corpse-examiner. In most cases he would check the pulse (which naturally was not there), look at the eyes, and announce that the person had died because he was “short of breath”.

Coffins were made out of pine. A thin layer of hay was put in, then a sheet and a pillow, and finally the corpse. The whole apparatus lay on the living-room table for a day or so, with a candle burning at each corner of the coffin. The relatives came to father to arrange the funeral, and dug the grave themselves. On the day of the funeral, after the dead relative had been blessed and the coffin nailed down, a procession would make its way to the church: in the first cart sat father, a church warden and the immediate family of the dead person; in the second cart came the coffin, decorated with flowers or a wreath of spruce, depending on the time of the year. In the third cart came the rest of the dead person's family, and anyone else walked behind. The ceremony in church lasted only about ten minutes. When it was over the men carried the coffin to the grave and lowered it in; father blessed it once again and emptied his censer onto the coffin; everyone took a handful of earth and tossed it into the grave, and then it was filled in. It was possible to hire women “criers” whose job it was to weep and howl and carry on about how good the dead person was (even if he had beaten his wife!). In a month's time, the relatives came and planted a cherry or spruce sapling at the foot of the grave, and usually erected a wooden cross at the head.

One character I must tell you about was Mad Ivan. My uncle in Lviv told me about him. Apparently he was sixteen when his father — who was a smallholder — died, and this probably contributed to his mental state. Every Saturday his mother had a stall in the market place, where she sold lettuces, potatoes, cottage cheese and gherkins from a barrel. One day Mad Ivan was seen walking round and round his mother's stall, saying “Last night two rats drowned in our gherkin barrel, and mother fished them out, but Ivan isn't

going to tell anyone!" What has this got to do with funerals? Well, Mad Ivan was very partial to them. He would walk in the funeral procession, wearing a smart bowler hat and a necktie, and beating a small drum. He did this for about fifteen years. When he died from a heart attack, about a third of Lviv's population attended his funeral!

Village weddings took place either in the spring or early autumn. If a young man and his girl had agreed to get married, then the young man chose two companions — probably uncles, or brothers — and all three of them went round to the girl's house on a Saturday evening. The young man's two companions would say, "We've been hunting all day in the woods, and we saw a young gazellë. The girl's parents would say, "Well, hunters, come in, and we'll talk about it ". They would offer the three men bread and salt to welcome them, and then everyone would go inside. Discussions would follow concerning the girl's dowry and the house they would live in; the three men would sit there and eat sausages and have a few drinks. Finally the girl's parents would say, "Right, then, you guests stay here; and we'll go and have a short discussion".

Five minutes later the parents would return with the girl. If the parents had approved of the young man, then they would say, "Yes, hunters, your young man can have the gazelle". The girl would then take an embroidered linen towel and wrap it around the bodies of the two companions, and they would all, have a few more drinks.

But if the parents disapproved of the young man, they would give him a pumpkin (*harbuz*)!.

Assuming all had gone according to plan, and the girl's parents had approved of the young man, then the couple went to see the priest, together with the young man's father and the girl's mother. Father took them into his office, took their names and signatures, and talked to them about the responsibilities which they would be accepting. During the next week they came to see him in the evenings, and he made sure they could recite Our Father, the Creed, and the Ten Commandments; he also gave them a small amount of religious education. I remember one girl was a bit simple. He asked her "Where do souls go after the bodies have died?" The correct answer is Heaven if the person's been good, and Hell if the person's been bad. The girl replied "I think souls fly up into the chimney, father, because when the wind blows you can hear them moaning!"

Father called the banns three times in church, and then the date was fixed for the wedding. The women relatives made small myrtle garlands, one for the bride and one for the groom.

On the day of the wedding the groom and his friends would arrive at the church first, in carts; the bride came about ten minutes later. They would both be dressed in national costume, and stood just inside the door for the first part of the solemnisation of matrimony — "Wilt thou have this woman to be thy lawful wedded wife" and so on. Then father placed the girl's hand

on the young man's, and, draping a special scarf which hung down his robe over both their hands, he led them to the altar. After several prayers, garlands of myrtle were placed on the heads of the young couple, and also above their heads the bride's father and the groom's father held brass crowns. The ring was then placed on the bride's hand, the groom kissed her, and after the registers had been signed everyone went to the reception. The grandmothers and aunts had prepared this, and there was dancing, singing and feasting. Finally the groom sat on a stool in the centre of the room; his bride's hair was plaited; she sat on his knee and a headscarf was tied under her chin. She was a young girl no longer, but now a wife (*molodytsia*). Usually one or two saucy pranksters threw a glass of water under the chair, to pretend that the groom was so excited, he wet his pants!

When it was all over, a cart was piled high with cushions, towels, tablecloths, bedcovers and eiderdowns — all embroidered — for the young people. One chap was supposed to supervise what went into this cart — he was usually half-drunk, but that did not matter — and he always made sure a cradle was included. And then off they went to their home. If the young man was marrying into the girl's household, they went twice round the house instead. By eight or nine o'clock the wedding celebrations had ended, and after feeding the horses and clearing up, the young couple went to enjoy their wedding night.

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This account has attempted to record various aspects of a way of life in Ukraine more than half a century ago, and so it has naturally been entirely concerned with the past. What of the present? The village is unrecognisable now; there is not a single thatched roof left, and among other things a library and a comprehensive school have been built. Progress? Yes — but think of the traditions and philosophies which have been lost in the name of “progress”. . .

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News from Ukraine**CHRONICLE OF THE UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH  
IN THE CATACOMBS OF UKRAINE, Number 1 (10)**

Despite the arrest and imprisonment of Vasyl Kobryn, the Chairman of the Initiative Group to Defend the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine, and Josyp Terelya, the Chairman of the Central Committee of Ukrainian Catholics (released earlier this year), the underground *Chronicle of the Ukrainian Catholic Church* continues to appear. A new undated copy has reached the West. This issue, which appeared in Ukraine probably in the late spring of 1985, is dedicated to the trial of Vasyl Kobryn. Kobryn was sentenced in Lviv on March 22, 1985, to three years of imprisonment in a labour camp for alleged violation of Art. 187-1 of the UkSSR Criminal Code ("circulation of intentionally false fabrications defaming the Soviet state and social system").

The *Chronicle* reports that, according to the indictment, "the defendant, Kobryn, who holds personal nationalist-clerical beliefs, systematically disseminated incorrect, defamatory ideas about the Soviet state and social order, between the years 1975-1984, in oral, written, typed and photographic form. He spread this intentional falsehood about Soviet reality on the territory of the UkSSR and beyond it, making use of persons whose identity has not been established by the investigation and the most reactionary Western information services. Kobryn masked his criminal acts with the doctrines of the Ukrainian Catholic faith and demanded the rebirth of this faith".

The court consisted of V.M. Shevtsov, V.D. Chekhirkin, A.A. Sharmatkin, S.Ya. Dykunska, V.M. Dorosh, Yu.M. Makarov and N.A. Sofronova. Among the witnesses testifying against Kobryn were S.V. Savchuk, M.S. Chaikovkyi and Yu.Yu. Reshetylo. They testified that he had actively demanded the revival of the Ukrainian Catholic faith, stated that there is no freedom of religion in the USSR, that believers are persecuted like criminals and that the state destroys churches, and that he circulated calumny about the foreign and domestic policy of the Soviet Union.

Among the physical evidence presented by the prosecution were documents seized from Kobryn at the time of his arrest in November 1984. These presumably included material intended for the tenth issue of the *Chronicle*, which never appeared. As the court noted, scientific-atheist examination pointed out the defamatory nature of some of these documents.

The court also declared that Kobryn's opposition to the Lviv "Sobor" of



1946, which announced the liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and its "union" with the Russian Orthodox Church, gave his statements a hostile character vis-à-vis the Soviet state.

In its verdict, the Lviv Regional Court found that Vasyl Kobryn had disseminated falsehood about the "self-liquidation" of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and had glorified conditions in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

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**VERDICT OF LVIV REGIONAL COURT ON THE CASE  
OF VASYL KOBRYN, 22 MARCH 1985**

Ministry of Justice of the UkSSR

Case No. 2-01

1985

**Indictment**

On behalf of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, on 22 March, the Criminal Commission of Lviv Regional Court consisting of the following persons:

Chairman	— Shevtsov V.M.
People's Assessors	— Chekhirkin V.D.
	— Sharmatkin A.A.
Secretary	— Dykunska S. Ya.
In the presence of	
Public Prosecutor	— Dorosh V.M.
Attorney	— Makarov Yu. M.
and People's Prosecutor	— Sofronova N.A.

examined during an open sitting at the Lviv Court the case of Kobryn, Vasyl Antonovych, born on 1 January 1938 in the village of Tuchne, Pere-myshlyany district, Lviv region, resident of the town of Bibrka, Pere-myshlyany district, Lviv region; citizen of the USSR, Ukrainian, non-party member; marital status — single; with completed special secondary education; who is liable for military service and is registered at the peremyshlyany conscript office [*voenkomat*], district of Lviv; who, prior to his arrest, was employed by the "Dorozhnyi" restaurant at Lviv Railway Station; and who has no previous convictions. He is charged with the crime specified in Art. 187-1 of the UkSSR Criminal Code.

### Charges

The defendant, Kobryn, who holds personal nationalist-clerical beliefs, systematically disseminated incorrect, defamatory ideas about the Soviet state and social order, between the years 1975-1984, in oral, written, typed and photographic form. He spread this intentional falsehood about Soviet reality on the territory of the UkSSR and beyond it, making use of persons whose identity has not been established by the investigation and the most reactionary Western information services. Kobryn masked his criminal acts with the doctrines of the Ukrainian Catholic faith and demanded the rebirth of this faith.

Because of his nationalist-clerical beliefs, the defendant disseminated defamatory falsehood about the Lviv Sobor of 1946, during which, upon the demand of the faithful, the priests of this cult decided on the self-liquidation of the Uniate Church.

He glorified the conditions which existed under the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

By his fabrications the defendant, Kobryn, defamed the activities of the organs of law and order, talking about the persecution of religious believers in the USSR.

During his examination, the defendant did not plead guilty to the charges brought against him, stating that he had acted from religious motives, that his aim was the spread of the Greek-Catholic Church, that his conversations, written and photographic materials were objective, and that he did not disseminate these outside the USSR.

The materials relating to the case, collected and examined during the trial, have confirmed beyond all doubt that the defendant, Kobryn, is guilty of the systematic dissemination of calumny defaming the Soviet social and state order in oral, handwritten, typed and photographic form. Therefore, the court considers Kobryn's testimony during the trial to be false.

Witnesses Savchuk S.V., Chaikovskiy M.S. and Reshetylo Yu.Yu. pointed out that Soviet administrative and party organs, including the official for religious affairs for the Lviv region on the Council of Ministers of the UkSSR, began to receive letters from the defendant, Kobryn, in which he raised the issue of the revival of the activity of the Uniate Greek-Catholic Church.

Kobryn was summoned for talks. He made calumnious statements in the presence of the authorities on more than one occasion, alleging that there is no freedom of religion in our country, that the faithful are persecuted for their beliefs, and that the investigatory and judicial organs groundlessly persecute priests and faithful of this cult like criminals; he alleged that organs of Soviet rule destroy the buildings of the cult; and he circulated calumny about the domestic and foreign policy of our country. He opposed the decision of

the Lviv Sobor of 1946 on the self-liquidation of the Uniate Greek-Catholic Church, and his statements vis-à-vis the Soviet state were of a hostile rather than theological nature.

The correspondence of the accused, Kobryn, was of a similar defamatory nature, as pointed out by witnesses Savchuk S.V. and Reshetylo Yu.Yu.

According to the testimonies of witnesses Shynkarenko V.F., Yakymiv N.V. and Didovyk A.P., they spoke to Kobryn regarding his behaviour at the Yaniv cemetery, where he had laid flowers on the graves of the Sich Rifle-men, and his attempts to revive the activity of the Uniate Greek-Catholic Church. They also spoke to him about the dissemination of calumny and about the need to put a stop to such activity. The defendant, Kobryn, was ill-disposed towards conversations of this nature, made defamatory remarks about our Soviet reality and stated that he would carry on with this kind of activity.

The court considers the testimonies of these witnesses to be reliable.

The preparation of defamatory documents slandering the Soviet state and social order by the defendant, Kobryn, was confirmed by the protocol of the search conducted on 13 November 1984 at the Rika Dolishnia homestead, Dobrianychi village council, Peremyshlyany district, where the defendant's parents live, and the protocol of the examination of confiscated items and documents of 19-20 November 1984 (*case letters 45, 46-53*).

From the protocol of the examination of the exposed and developed films it is clear that they contain photographs of the above-mentioned documents (*case letters 91-93*). It has been established that the manuscripts on the films were written by the defendant, Kobryn. The expert examination of the Scientific-Atheist Commission pointed out the defamatory nature of the materials contained in these films, which slander the Soviet state and social order (*vol. 4, case letters 4-28*).

The preparation and dissemination by the defendant of documents defaming Soviet reality has also been established by the protocol of the search and confiscation of such documents held on 12 November 1984 at the place of residence of the defendant, who lived at citizen Zaplatynskyi's place: Lviv, Murmansk Street 1a, Apt. No. 23, without a permit, and from the protocol of the examination of the confiscated items (*case letters 24-30; 34-42; files no. 1, 7; vol. 2, case letters 233-237*).

According to the verdict of the court's Graphological Commission, the letter of 13 December 1983 to the Central Committee of the CPSU and the notebooks contain calumny against the Soviet state and social order (*vol. 4, case letters 4-28*).

Witness Hryshyshyn M.S. contradicted the defamatory fabrications of the defendant that, in relation to the latter, the organs of law and order had allowed a breach of constitutional guarantees of the inviolability of the domi-

cile, both during and preceeding investigation and the actual trial itself, and stated that he had no pretensions towards the organs of law and order and had never asked the defendant for protection of his rights, as he did not even know him.

From the verdict of the court's Graphological Commission given on 11 January 1985, it is clear that the handwritten text of the statement to the Committee on Religious Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of 14 August 1976 was written by the defendant (*vol. 3, case letters 15-16; file no.4*).

An excerpt from his indictment, contained in *vol. 2, case letters 259-260*, points out that Vynnytskyi M.I. was sentenced for the systematic violation of laws on religious cults and for organisational activity directed towards the violation of laws on the separation of Church and State and School and State, as the defendant wrote in his statement (*file no. 4*).

In his testimony during the trial, case witness, Budzinskyi, confirmed that he had written the defamatory letter to the Minister of the Interior of the UkSSR on 12 July 1983 (*files 3-5*) together with the defendant, Kobryn. Budzinskyi stated that he signed this letter and kept a typewritten copy at home. According to the verdict of the Scientific-Atheist Commission, this letter is of a defamatory nature (*vol. 2, case letters 4-28*).

From the copy of his indictment (*vol. 2, case letters 243-244*), it is clear that Terelya J.M. was sentenced on 12 April 1983 for malicious deviation from socially-useful work, and not because he was a religious believer.

That the defendant, Kobryn, disseminated the letter to the Interior Minister of the UkSSR of 12 July 1983, which contained defamatory fabrications against the Soviet state and social order, and handed over copies of the letter, through persons whose identity has not been established by the investigation, to reactionary bourgeois services and Ukrainian nationalist services has been established by the protocol of the study of bourgeois-nationalist newspapers (*vol. 2, case letters 233-237*).

That Kobryn wrote the defamatory document, which begins with the words: "To Hansjürg Stükelberger", discovered and confiscated from his home at: Lviv, Murmansk Street 1a, Appt. no. 23, where he lived without a permit, and the slanderous letter written by Kobryn and Terelya, which begins with the words: "Christian greetings to German Catholics", was corroborated by Terelya's testimony during the trial that the letter to German Catholics was written on his typewriter "Olympia-Progress", by himself and Kobryn (*vol. 2, case letters 74-82*).

The collected materials relating to the case also prove Kobryn's guilt in the preparation and dissemination of a whole string of other defamatory documents slandering the Soviet state and social order, and the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR; in particular, the defendant disseminated Nos. 1 and

6 of the so-called *Chronicle of the Catholic Church*. The sixth issue contains a letter to the Defence Minister of the USSR, written on 21 June 1984. Witness Terelya noted that he had written the above-mentioned letter together with Kobryn.

Witness Onashko stated that around September Kobryn dictated the letter to the Defence Minister of the USSR to him, which he took down without thinking about the content. Kobryn also gave him a text for temporary safekeeping, which was confiscated from him during a search. It is obvious from the protocol of the examination of documents confiscated during the search at Onashko's home (*vol. 1, case letters 66-78*), the verdict of the Scientific-Atheist Commission (*vol. 4, case letters 4-28*) and the text of the letter itself (*file no. 1*) that the documents published in the *Chronicle*, including the letter to the Defence Minister of the USSR, defame the Soviet state and social order and the peace-loving policy of the USSR.

The court considers the verdicts of the commissions of experts, corroborated by the indictment, academically grounded and reliable.

From the verdict of the court's Psychiatric Commission (*vol. 3, case letters 5-6*) it is clear that Kobryn is competent and can face criminal responsibility.

Having examined the evidence, the court finds the defendant, Kobryn, guilty of the charges brought against him — criminal acts which fall under Article 187-1 of the UkSSR Criminal Code: he systematically disseminated deliberately false fabrications defaming the state and social order of the USSR in oral, handwritten, typed and photographic form.

The court considers that deprivation of freedom is the only way to correct the erroneous ways of the accused and to re-educate him, as measures to put a stop to his criminal activity implemented by the community have failed to produce the desired results.

While establishing the degree of punishment, the court has taken into account the amount of danger posed to society by Kobryn's crimes, as well as his character, and finds no mitigating circumstances to reduce the sentence.

Kobryn is to serve his sentence in a corrective-labour colony of ordinary regimen. All material evidence is to be destroyed.

Basing itself on Arts. 323 and 324 of the Criminal Procedural Code of the UkSSR, the Criminal Commission of Lviv Regional Court has passed the following sentence:

#### **Sentence:**

Kobryn, Vasyl Antonovych, has been found guilty on the basis of the UkSSR Criminal Code and is sentenced to three years of imprisonment in an ordinary-regimen corrective-labour colony.

The term is to be backdated to 12 November 1984.

The material evidence contained in files 1-8 is to be destroyed.

The security around the convicted, Kobryn, is to remain as previously — he is to be kept under guard.

The sentence may be appealed in the Supreme Court of the UkSSR within the next seven days, by the convicted from the moment he receives a copy of the sentence, and by other participants of the trial from the moment it has been pronounced.

Chairman: *(signature)*

People's Assessors: *(signatures)*

Conforms with the original:

Member of Lviv Regional Court V.M. Shevtsov *(signature)*

Seal

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## KGB CHIEF IN UKRAINE DISMISSED

According to Western news agencies, the KGB Chief in Ukraine, Gen. Stepan Mukha, was removed from his post in May of this year. It was announced officially that he had been transferred to the army reserve.

Gen. Mukha is a long-standing activist of the *Komsomol* (Communist Youth League). On June 4, 1982, he was appointed head of the KGB in Ukraine on the Council of Ministers of the UkSSR. He replaced Gen. Vitaliy Fedorchuk, who became head of the KGB of the USSR in Moscow.

The new KGB chief in Ukraine is 50 year-old Mykola Holushko, who worked in the KGB since 1963.

It appears that Mukha's dismissal was connected with the scandal surrounding the illegal arrest of journalist Viktor Berkhin, who exposed the gross infringements of the law in the Voroshilovhrad (Eastern Ukraine) legal system. The main instigator behind the affair was an official in the Voroshilovhrad KGB. The affair ended with dismissals of local and republican party, militia and legal officials, including the First Secretary of the Voroshilovhrad Regional Committee Borys Honcharenko.

The removal of a line of party and other officials in the Voroshilovhrad region for "violation of Socialist legality" appears to be connected with the campaign of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev against the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi. In light of this, the latest dismissal of KGB Chief Stepan Mukha can be seen as the further

undermining of the last Brezhnevite in Gorbachev's *nomenklatura* — Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi.

The leadership of the USSR is carrying out a reorganisation of the Ministry of the Interior (MVD). This was clearly noted in the newspaper *Trud*, which stated that the Soviet Interior Ministry is planning to send 200 highly-qualified officials from the European areas of the Soviet Union to the Central Asian republics to raise the operational level of the local organs of internal security. At the same time, officials of the militia from the Central Asian and Caucasian republics will be posted to the RSFSR, Ukraine and Byelorussia. These measures will further assist Moscow in realising its two internal political aims:

- 1) the continuing struggle against local patriotism; and
- 2) the intermixing and assimilation of the nations forming the Soviet Union.

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## UKRAINIAN POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1987

The following is a list of Ukrainians who are known to have been released, for the most part, since February from Soviet Russian penal institutions. Most were obliged to sign some kind of statement to the effect that they will not commit any more "crimes against the state". A few refused to sign any statement at all and were released anyway; others refused and were sent back to camp.

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- **Volodymyr Andrushko** was released in May 1987.
- **Anatoliy Bedarkov**, a 46 year-old Ukrainian, was arrested in 1981 on charges of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda": released from external exile.
- **Sofya Belyak**, a young Ukrainian Catholic, was arrested in 1983 for having formed a small group of believers within the Komsomol (Young Communists): released from prison in Dneproderzhinsk though, according to the French daily, *La Croix*, she is under house arrest in the Ukrainian city of Vynnytsia and required to report to the police regularly.
- **Petro Butov**, a 40 year-old physicist from Odessa, was sentenced in 1982 for circulating Samvydav and making "anti-Soviet" oral statements: released from Mordovia camp 3-5.
- **Volodymyr Delydivka**, from Kyiv, was arrested in 1983 for possessing

addressed envelopes containing "anti-Soviet" leaflets: released from Mordovia camp 3-5.

● **Ulyana Hermanyuk**, a 56 year-old Baptist mother of five from the Kharkiv region, was sentenced in 1985 for her religious activities and for her participation in the Council of Relatives of Baptist Prisoners: released from a criminal camp.

● **Mykhailo Horyn**. Born on 20.6.1930 in the Lviv region. On 26.8.1965 he was arrested and sentenced on 18.4.1966 in a closed session of Lviv regional court to six years of strict-regimen camps for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda". Horyn was re-arrested in Lviv on 3.12.1981 and sentenced to ten years of camps and five years of exile. He is seriously ill. He was released probably at the end of June 1987.

● **Mykola Ihnatenko**, a Ukrainian, was arrested in 1981 and sentenced for "anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation": released from Perm camp 35.

● **Ihor Ivakhnenko**: released.

● **Volodymyr Khailo**, a 55 year-old Ukrainian Baptist, was interned in a psychiatric hospital in 1980 for his efforts to obtain permission to emigrate, eventually being formally sentenced to "an indefinite" term in a special psychiatric hospital: released in March from the Blagoveshchensk SPH in gravely declining health.

● **Stepan Khmara**, a 50 year-old doctor, was sentenced in 1980 for editing Ukrainian samizdat journal *Ukrainskyi Visnyk*: released from Perm camp 36.

● **Vasyl Kurylo**, a 66 year-old Ukrainian physician, was sentenced in 1980 for writing Ukrainian nationalist poems: released from Perm camp 36-1 in very poor health.

● **Anatoliy Lupynis**, a 49 year-old musical-choral society administrator from Kyiv has been confined to a psychiatric hospital since 1971 when he was arrested for reading poems during a meeting as well as for his samvydav writings: disabled, he was released in poor health from a psychiatric hospital in Saratov.

● **Myroslav Marynovych**, a 50 year-old Ukrainian electrical engineer, was arrested in 1977 for his participation in the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring group: released from exile in Kazakhstan.

● **Dmytro Mazur**, a 47 year-old Ukrainian philologist, was sentenced in 1980 for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda": released from Mordovia camp 3-5.

● **Yuriy Melnyk**, a 46 year-old Ukrainian, arrested in 1981 for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda": released from Mordovia camp 3-5.

● **Valeriy Ostrenko**, a radio engineer, was arrested in 1983 and sentenced for circulating nationalist leaflets: released from Perm camp 37-1.

● **Vasyl Ploskonis**, a 51 year-old agronomist and Communist Party member



from Cherkasy, Ukraine, was sentenced for writing complaints to the authorities: released.

● **Zoryan Popadyuk**, a 34 year-old Ukrainian in camp and exile since 1973 for publishing samvydav; re-sentenced in exile in 1983: released from Perm camp 36.

● **Mykola & Raisa Rudenko** were released from exile on 20.5.1987. They are both seriously ill.

● **Petro Rumachyk**, a 56 year-old Baptist, was sentenced six times for a total of 22 years for his religious beliefs: released from a strict regime camp.

● **Mykola Sementsov**, a 35 year-old Ukrainian, was sentenced for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda": released from Mordovia camp 3-5.

● **Vitaliy Shevchenko**, a 52 year-old Ukrainian journalist, was sentenced in 1980 for circulating samvydav and writing the article *Czechoslovak Politics from a Ukrainian Point of View*: released from Perm camp 37-1.

● Long-standing Ukrainian political prisoner **Danylo Shumuk** was released from exile on 22.5.1987 and allowed to emigrate to Canada.

● **Pavlo Skochok**, a 50 year-old journalist from Kyiv, was arrested in 1987 for his protests against political repression and his dismissal from work: released from psychiatric hospital.

● **Josyf Swydneytskyi**, a 49 year-old Ukrainian priest, was arrested in December 1984 for his religious work deemed "too active": released, mid-March, in grave condition from a labour camp in Kubychev, Siberia.

● **Josyp Terelya**, a 43 year-old Ukrainian, was sentenced in 1985 for his efforts to defend the rights of believers: released from Perm camp 36.

● **Viktor Yanenko**, a 33 year-old electrician, was sentenced in 1983 for his activities with the independent Soviet trade union, SMOT: released from Perm camp 37-1.

● **Pavlo Zinchenko**, a 29 year-old Baptist from the Kharkiv region of Ukraine, was sentenced in 1983 for his religious activities: released from a camp near Donetsk.

● **Oleksiy Zerkaltsev**, a 30 year-old Ukrainian, was arrested in 1981 and sentenced for circulating "anti-Soviet" leaflets: released from Mordovia camp 3-5 (perhaps at the expiration of his term).

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### Documents & Reports

*Alain BESANÇON*

## THE UKRAINIAN QUESTION

Ukraine is forgotten. It remains, however, a fundamental issue for Gorbachev. And, for different reasons, for the Pope.

Gorbachev is turning his attention not so much to a "reform", whose substance appears, from this side of the Iron Curtain, more imagined than genuine, as to two very real questions. The first is the disarming of Europe. The second is the resumption of the control over the peripheral republics of the USSR. For under cover of Brezhnev's inertia the fourteen "sister republics" which surround Russia have created a breathing-space for themselves. In the Caucasus, in Central Asia, on the Baltic, these republics were governed by stable communist parties, who were prepared to compromise with local, even national, interests, and had a mutual understanding with the black marketeers; in short, they became a sort of regional mafia, corrupt to the bone. The regions were no worse off because of this — quite the reverse — and they found they had room to manoeuvre amidst the weakening control and widespread corruption. They started to become relatively more prosperous than Russia.

The most important of these republics is Ukraine. This is a country which, in France, is spoken of much less frequently than Poland, because the conventions of the Franco-Russian alliance required that it be forgotten. And yet Ukraine exists, and when the Soviet regime disappears — which cannot fail to happen one day — it will once again resume its place in Europe. Its history lends credence to this.

At the time of the first Capets, it was a vast Christian state which gave France a queen. However, it was almost obliterated by the Turko-Tartar invasions. In the 16th century Ukraine, its population regenerated, came under the domination of the Polish-Lithuanian crown. The aristocracy embraced Polish culture, including the Catholic faith. In 1596 the Union of Brest was proclaimed, whereby a part of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, though retaining its rite, entered into communion with Rome. But the peasant serfs, who for the most part remained Orthodox, looked to the Cossack insurgents, who often emerged from amongst them and who waged war on the frontiers

of the Ottoman empire. In the middle of the 17th century an immense uprising, carried out by the Cossacks, ravaged Poland, which never completely recovered. But Ukraine was still too weak to gain independence. It had the choice of becoming the vassal of either Istanbul or Moscow. The tsar won.

For Ukraine, that was a catastrophe. It learnt within the span of one generation what Muscovite methods represented. It lost all political, religious and cultural autonomy. The Uniate Church was mercilessly persecuted. But, for Muscovite Russia, the conquest of Ukraine meant entry into the world of the great powers.

Without Ukraine, with its higher degree of civilisation, its formidable riches, without the Ukrainian cadres who came and placed themselves at the service of the Petersburg empire, Russia was condemned to remain a sort of Canada, cut off by its snows, without any major international role. Even today, the USSR can face the loss of Central Asia, of the Caucasus, of the Baltic countries: it would still retain the status of a great power. But if Ukraine were to secede, it would lose this for a long time to come. It was in order to retain Ukraine that the Petersburg emperors annexed Poland.

When the Russian Empire fell in 1917, Ukraine immediately renewed its independence. But, as in the 17th century, it could not keep it. The Bolshevik armies reoccupied it in 1920. This time the Soviet authorities used drastic measures to break the nation, the main one being the famine. In such a fertile country, this measure required exceptional energy, which Stalin was not short of. It is considered that 7 million Ukrainians died during the orchestrated famine of 1931 and 1932. A sixth of the population. This genocide was so well concealed that even today the historical conscience of the West has not really registered it. Occupation by the Nazis was terrible, Soviet reconquest no less so.

After such blows of the sledge-hammer is Ukraine still alive? Its élites have been methodically destroyed. Its language, hounded from Kharkiv, from Kyiv, from the main cities, has been reduced to existence as a peasant language, a language of the common people and of the low-level jobs. And yet Ukraine remembers that it was once free, that it belongs to European civilisation, and with greater justification than Russia. The Uniate Church, annihilated by Stalin and forcibly attached to Orthodoxy, still lives underground. It can be said that it remains the religion of Western Ukraine. But the best proof of national vitality is that the Communist Party of Ukraine, which emanates from Moscow and has been chosen as the instrument of Russification, becomes Ukrainianised in the course of time, and periodically has to be purged.

Ukraine is of current interest for two reasons. Gorbachev has reestablished centralisation and destroyed the apparatus in the whole empire, except Ukraine. He is now tackling the apparatus of Shcherbytskyi, who has governed this country for eighteen years. It is a big job, but he will do it. Mean-

while, the Pope wishes to go to Kyiv to celebrate the millennium of the baptism of "Rus", that is, of Ukraine. This visit could remind this land that it has not always been in Moscow's orbit. As Pope and as a Pole, John Paul II cannot but bring comfort to the Uniates, who have for so long been subject to the most atrocious of persecutions. But will he go to Kyiv? And if he cannot go there, is there any point in going to Moscow?

*L'Express*, 30 April 1987

Transl. M.J.-K.

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## GORBACHEV — GLASNOST — UKRAINE

*Rev. Michael BOURDEAUX*

### RELIGION UNDER GORBACHEV

**Lecture delivered at La Trobe University, Melbourne, on March 10, 1987**

The Soviet Foreign Minister Mr. Shevardnadze, when he was in Canberra was asked the question: "Is there religious persecution in the Soviet Union?", to which his answer was a categorical "no!"

Had he been further pressed on that question I suppose he would have referred to the Soviet Constitution, which stated that there is "freedom of religious worship". In fact there are grounds for pressing Mr. Shevardnadze a bit harder on this issue.

The Soviet Constitution's guarantee of "freedom of religious worship" is a very contradictory phrase, because it says one thing and actually means something different. "Freedom of religious worship" in the Soviet explanation of this phrase talks about what happens inside a church building. There are churches open in the Soviet Union and they do hold services of worship. But any Christian activity outside of that building is against the law.

If Mr. Shevardnadze had been pressed a little harder he would have had to admit that the laws actually contradict that guarantee of freedom in the Constitution. There is freedom of anti-religious propaganda, but no freedom of religious propaganda — of evangelism — in the Soviet Union today.

So, is there a new policy towards human rights and religious liberty in Mr. Gorbachev's Soviet Union? The answer must be at the moment that the policy of openness has so far affected only the surface rather than the substance. When those political prisoners were released — about 140 of them — it left several thousand people remaining in Soviet gaols. Amnesty Internatio-

nal's latest figure is, I think, about 2,000 political prisoners. That in itself may be quite an underestimate.

I'm not sure about the precise figures for political prisoners, but I am sure about the figures for religious prisoners; those imprisoned for setting up education programmes for young people; setting up secret Christian printing presses on which bibles are being clandestinely produced; and even setting up new churches where the government will not permit them.

We know of about 400 people who are in prison at the moment for breaking those laws. There may be others we don't know about, but we have at Keston College fully documented details for, roughly speaking, that number. And that number is the same today in March 1987 as it was before Mr. Gorbachev's policy of "openness" began.

There have been fifteen Christian prisoners released, and some of them are extremely important individuals whose leadership qualities will be of tremendous benefit to the church circles to which they are returning. But to compensate for that there have been at least fifteen new arrests — quite unpublished in anybody's newspapers — of other groups of Christian activists.

What Mr. Shevardnadze would have said is that they are not in prison because they are being persecuted, but they are there because they have broken the law. So the question comes back precisely to what Andrei Sakharov has said. That is, until you have a reform of the basic laws of the Soviet Union you're not going to have a guarantee that the situation will improve.

Now, how does the precise policy towards religion work out under Gorbachev? The government as well as a whole body of legislation, to which I have briefly referred, has a body which mediates between the Church and the State. That body is called the Council on Religious Affairs. Its main brief is to monitor religious activities and to make sure they do not step outside the realms of the established laws. They have a very close link with the KGB, which secretly observes all aspects of Soviet life.

So the Council on Religious Affairs is extremely important. It is a constituted body consisting of something like 20,000 members; full-time, paid, anti-religious workers. Just one month before Mr. Gorbachev came to power a new chairman of the Council, Mr. Konstantin Kharchev, a man who came into church affairs with no background whatsoever, was appointed.

The Western Press and Western visitors to the Soviet Union always, as a matter of rule, seem to view any change in the Soviet Union as beneficial, even before the evidence as to whether it is beneficial or retrogressive has accrued. Thus, the head of the British Council of Churches delegation to the Soviet Union, who interviewed Mr. Kharchev last year, described him on the BBC in the following terms:

"Konstantin Kharchev is a remarkable figure, said to be one of the most uncorrupt communist leaders. We found him to be a man of great strength, of immense intellectual ability and it was the kind of meeting which made us feel the Soviet Union is putting really significant people in charge of religious policy. To be able to talk to such people as this as frankly as we did, means that a dialogue has begun which may lead somewhere".

Well, included in that party meeting Mr. Kharchev was a priest of the Russian Orthodox Church in the United Kingdom, a fluent Russian speaker who heard what Mr. Kharchev was saying in the original without the need for an interpreter. He had a somewhat different view of Gorbachev's right-hand man on religion. He wrote:

"Kharchev has no background in religious matters. He's a man of vascillating nature, alternately bullying and trying to charm, he tries to disguise his ignorance by aggressive talk. Even if Gorbachev were interested in easing restrictions on religion, its likely that Kharchev would be a practical block to reform. . . In answer to a question (in East Germany) whether he would prefer to deal with Protestants, or Catholics he replied 'The only thing I would prefer is not to have to deal with Christians at all'".

So, if that is true it is unlikely that there is going to be a basic new deal for religion in Gorbachev's Soviet Union. The openness which has been talked about may well be a surface phenomenon.

But within that openness there are some elements of hope and, indeed, some interesting debates beginning to take place. It does seem as if the Soviet press has begun to publish information of importance about religion for the first time probably, since the Revolution.

So, there are clearly contradictory tendencies. But one of the most contradictory is to be found in Mr. Gorbachev's own statements. Gorbachev proclaims himself to be a Leninist. His policy of opening up debate; his policy of the country at the expense of developing greater nuclear weapons; it is obvious that a main part of his policy must be to siphon off that massive budget which that Soviet nuclear arms programme is costing and put the money into the urgently needed development of the economy.

But he can't do that unilaterally because of the United States building up its arsenal. Therefore, he urgently wants to communicate with the Americans to bring them to the conference table with a real determination that there should be a properly controlled agreement on nuclear arms, to which both sides are contributing.

That is obviously, to my way of thinking, Mr. Gorbachev's policy. And, therefore, his concessions on human rights are to prove to the world and to the Americans that he is a man who really means business. That's why Sakharov has been released, and why some top Christian leaders have been released rather than the unknown ones.

But at the same time it must not be forgotten that basically he is a Leninist. Lenin himself was a strongly anti-religious activist. The laws on religion were put in place by Lenin himself seventy years ago. Is there any evidence then, that Mr. Gorbachev's attitude on religion will be any stricter? Well there is.

It is not a matter of habit for Soviet leaders to make pronouncements about religion at all. It is something the top leaders usually leave to their underlings. But Mr. Gorbachev, as recently as last November, when he was in Central Asia in the city of Tashkent, addressed a rally of workers, — mostly Communist party members — and this is what he said to them:

"We must be strict, above all, with communists and senior officials, in particular those who claim to uphold our communist morality and ideals, but who in fact help to protect and support reactionary views and who themselves take part in religious ceremonies. We must declare a stringent and uncompromising struggle against all religious manifestations and also strengthen our political work and our atheist propaganda".

Not much sign of a concession in those words. But there is one curious aspect to that. That speech, before it was laundered for presentation to the world (it was published in full in the local press in Central Asia) by TASS the section which I just read was actually extricated from it.

Does that mean that Mr. Gorbachev had second thoughts, or that some public relations man thought that this was not the kind of thing Mr. Gorbachev should be saying to the world, as it was inconsistent with his liberal image? One simply doesn't know at the moment.

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*Andrew PYRCZ*

### **GORBACHEV'S HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE — A MEDIA STUNT?\***

Conspicuously absent among the 140 political dissidents pardoned recently in the Soviet Union have been imprisoned Ukrainian activists. Only a few, among them Josyp Terelya, Zorian Popadiuk, Vitaliy Shevchenko, and Mykola Ihnatenko, have been released although it is estimated by Russian dissident, Yuri Orlov, that up to 40% of all political prisoners in the USSR are Ukrainians.

The evidence suggests that the nationality question figured prominently in Mr. Gorbachev's selection of who to let go and who to keep captive.

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\* Reprinted from *Australian-Ukrainian Review*, Autumn, 1987.

For example, Lev Lukyanenko, a founding member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group in 1976 and a champion of Ukrainian independence from the USSR, has not been favoured with a pardon despite enduring 26 years in the Soviet gulag. The 60 year-old lawyer previously initiated the establishment of the Union of Ukrainian Workers and Peasants in 1960. The stated intention of this organisation was to facilitate the democratisation of all aspects of Soviet life and prepare for the possibility of Ukraine's legal separation from the USSR. Despite the Constitutional legality of its aims, the Ukrainian Workers and Peasants Union was crushed. Lukyanenko himself was then shuffled among KGB prisons and psychiatric clinics in an attempt to break him psychologically.

The Melbourne-based Committee for the Defence of Human and National Rights in Ukraine issued a letter to Foreign Minister, Mr. Hayden, on 12 February seeking his support in the Lukyanenko case. It said:

Recent events in the USSR, such as the release of Sakharov and Yuri Orlov, the founder of the Moscow Helsinki Group and others, along with the newly proffered policy of openness (*glasnost*) have created the circumstances where the treatment of Lukyanenko would be an excellent litmus test of the genuineness of Mr. Gorbachev's stated directions.

But Mr. Gorbachev has been careful not to allow Lukyanenko and Ukrainian dissidents of similar calibre to return home from exile in Perm concentration camps. Perm camp No. 36 — where Lukyanenko currently languishes, and where Ukrainians form a salient contingent — has earned the Amnesty International description of "death camp". Deliberate denial of medical care has killed 10 dissidents there over the last 30 months. Yet, so far, Mr. Gorbachev has failed to decree the closure of the Perm prison complex.

Critical observers also point out that any optimistic analysis of Mr. Gorbachev's amnesty needs to be modified by the fact that thousands of political prisoners remain incarcerated. Nathan Shcharansky, a Jewish dissident emigre, reportedly estimated a number exceeding 10 thousand. Thus, the *Times on Sunday* perhaps stretched the truth in suggesting on 22 February that "Gorbachev opened the gulag".

The Soviet leader's releases notably coincided with an international peace forum held in Moscow titled "For a non-nuclear world, for the survival of mankind" which hundreds of world scientific, business and cultural figures attended — among them, Dr. Sakharov. The Kremlin also apparently plans to host a human rights conference, and of course 1987 marks the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. Given such circumstances, Mr. Gorbachev's decree was arguably calculated to boost Moscow's international image.

Whether the Gorbachev amnesty can be hailed justifiably as an auspicious sign for future Soviet liberalisation is, however, a dubious question.

Nikita Khrushchev, too, released hundreds of victims of Stalinist terror; but



the repressive totalitarianism of the Soviet state did not thereby "wither away".

Whatever Mr. Gorbachev's intentions are, any genuine attempt at reform must encounter resistance in the KGB, the military and the CPSU, all of whom would have reason to fear a revolution of escalating expectations.

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*A. M. ROSENTHAL*

### THE FORGOTTEN PRISONERS

This is addressed to those many Americans who believe strongly that Mikhail Gorbachev is trying to lead his country into a new era of political and personal freedoms and that we should do what we can to support him.

There are those, myself included, who have doubts. But the purpose of what follows is not to debate what is going on in the Soviet Union but to call out the names of 20 political captives in the Soviet prison system who are among the most suffering, hoping that doing so now might bring their liberation closer.

It seems reasonable that if those Americans who have confidence in Mr. Gorbachev were to make themselves heard about these men it might carry special weight.

They can do so by writing to Mr. Gorbachev, who is responsible for the KGB, the political police army that has imprisoned them, or to the prisoners themselves. The prisoners will probably never get the letters, but their jailers will report to higher ranks in the KGB. Russian dissidents believe that signs of interest from the outside can be of help. At least it will diminish the particular sadness of political victims who believe the world is indifferent.

These prisoners are not guerillas or terrorists or leaders of conspiracies against the Soviet state. They have been imprisoned for what they have said, thought, or wrote about the freedoms in which they believe. One prisoner was jailed because he carved a sculpture in honour of American liberties.

Their crime is called "anti-Soviet propaganda".

Their address: USSR 618263, Permskaya oblast, Chusovskoy raion, poselok Kuchino, uchr. VS-389/36-1.

This is the address of VS-389, a large prison in the Urals, in the Perm area, where many prisons are situated. Perm is a vast district closed to foreigners.

The last three numbers are known to every Soviet dissident. They designate the "special regimen" prison-within-a-prison where political prisoners who have not been broken by previous jail terms are sent to be locked up, starved, destroyed mentally and physically.

These are the "forgotten prisoners" whose release the Soviet Union will not discuss. Not one prisoner in 36-1 has been released under the decrees freeing other dissidents. Nor has their treatment been made more bearable.

They wear striped convict clothes, spend much of their cell time in solitary and work at hard labour. In the morning they are fed bits of old fish and watery gruel. In the afternoon, entrails of lard and odorous soup. In the evening, the soup. It is a diet designed to keep the prisoners in perpetual starvation and nausea.

They come from all over the Soviet Union. What they have in common is that they are prisoners of conscience who could not be broken. Released, they again offended by writing or talking about political or religious freedoms. Then they are sent to 36-1.

The only time they leave 36-1 is for what is called special interrogation. They are brought back, still unbroken. Ten escaped in the last few years, by dying in 36-1.

Some have spent 10 years in political prisons. Balys Gajauskas is now 61 years old. He is a Lithuanian who did not accept the absorption of his country into the Soviet Union. His essays, translations of freedom writings into Lithuanian — including Solzhenitsyn's — have cost him 35 years of his life, thirty five.

Petro Ruban: He was sent back to prison for the third time for creating a wooden carving depicting the Statue of Liberty. That was in 1976 and it was supposed to be a Bicentennial offering.

These are the other names, listed for honour's sake:

Azat Arshakyan, Gunars Astra, Leonid Borodin, Mykola Horbal, Mykhailo Horyn, Vital'y Kalynychenko, Ivan Kandyba, Lev Lukyanenko, Vasyl Mazurak, Ashot Navasardyan, Mart-Olav Niklus, Vyacheslav Ostroglyad, Vasyl Ovsienko, Viktoras Petkus, Hryhoriy Prykhodko, Semen Skalych, Enn Tarto, Fyodor Trufanov.

Among them are poets, a psychologist, teachers, workers, a philologist. Most of them were first imprisoned in Stalin's time and remain imprisoned in Mr. Gorbachev's.

The United States Helsinki Watch Committee, set up to see if Moscow is living up to its promises of human rights, has more information: 36 West 44th Street, New York, N.Y. 10036. So does the Center for Democracy: 358 West 30th Street, New York, N.Y. 10001.

If enough people write to the prisoners in 36-1 somehow the word will get through to them and they will not feel forgotten.

*The New York Times*, April 23, 1987

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*Book Reviews*

## CHORNOBYL AND NUCLEAR POWER IN THE USSR

**David R. Marples. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta: Edmonton, 1986. Published in association with the Macmillan Press, London. 228 pages \$14.95.**

What really happened at the Chornobyl nuclear plant in April 1986? Was it due to human error or was it the result of faulty construction and lack of concern for safety? How are the affected people coping?

Are Soviet nuclear reactors basically unsafe? Could this tragedy happen again? What impact will the accident have on the future of nuclear power in the Soviet Union?

These questions and others are raised by David Marples in his timely and very well-researched book, **Chornobyl and nuclear power in the USSR**.

The first chapter provides an indepth, day-by-day chronology of events during the two weeks after the explosion — as the West and Soviet citizens were informed. The “Chornobyl Diary” begins on April 28, two days after the explosion, with the first acknowledgement by Moscow that an accident had taken place. The contradictions, omissions and untruths in the information provided by the Soviet media are pointed out and the motives queried. Many Soviet and East European sources are quoted, testifying to the phenomenal research effort by Marples.

In chapter two Marples takes a close look at the overall energy picture in the Soviet Union during the 1980s. He examines the problems with coal, oil and natural gas exploration and consumption. The chapter is a bit fact heavy and somewhat difficult to read for the layman. One can, however, skim over the difficult parts and go straight to the conclusion in the last few paragraphs, which sum up the chapter succinctly.

In the next few chapters Marples examines the nuclear power industry in Ukraine in the context of East European nuclear development and Ukraine’s position in the Soviet nuclear energy programme. Marples discusses how the nuclear reactors in Ukraine — there are 10 — were built very hastily, using mostly unskilled and unruly labour, substandard materials, and with very little concern for the safety of the workers, the local population, the surrounding countryside and the world at large.

Safety in the Soviet nuclear industry is the subject of chapter five. Marples

states that because the Soviet government never acknowledged any nuclear accidents (before Chornobyl) they claimed a 100 per cent safety record. The author proves that this is not true, and shows how the Chornobyl accident was a deadly and inevitable symptom of the general malaise in the Soviet nuclear industry.

Chapters six and seven deal specifically with the Chornobyl disaster. Marples looks at the background — how it was built, the local situation; the accident itself — what the Soviets said, what the West said, what Marples has put together using information from various sources; the question of radiation; casualties, the evacuation; what the public was told; the clean-up campaign afterwards; the political consequences of Chornobyl; and the future of nuclear energy and life in the countryside surrounding the Chornobyl plant.

In the epilogue, Marples draws some frightening conclusions about the disaster and Soviet nuclear energy, and shows that the onus is on the USSR to drastically improve its activities in the nuclear energy field if Chornobyl is not to be repeated.

Apart from a slight preponderance of technical data in some chapters necessary to prove the author's conclusions, the book is very well written and easy to read. The structure naturally draws the reader into the situation, gives him the broader picture, and leaves him with a very good idea of what is going on in the Soviet Union.

Marples is a specialist on nuclear energy in Soviet Ukraine. Because of the huge amount of research put into the work, the notes as well as the references and appendices and index of personnel, along with the information in the text itself would be of great interest and use to professionals and students in the fields of nuclear energy, East-West relations, political science, Soviet foreign policy, internal Soviet relations and related areas.

However, this book is definitely not just for professionals. Anyone even slightly interested in the nuclear world we live in would benefit from reading this book.

This is not, however, a "nice" book with a happy ending. The author does not wish to placate his readers, but rather to stimulate them into a greater awareness of the almost unfathomable danger that our planet is facing from the lacadaisical attitude of the Soviet Union towards nuclear safety.

*Tania CHOLIJ*

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**The  
Ukrainian  
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Holy Virgin. A mosaic in St. Sophia's Cathedral in Kiev (1037).



## IN MEMORIAM

**YAROSLAV STETSKO, 1912-1986**

**Leader of the OUN**

**Former Premier of the Ukrainian National Government**

*O. KOWAL*

### TRIBUTE PAID TO A GREAT SON OF UKRAINE

(The First Anniversary of Yaroslav Stetsko's death  
commemorated in Munich on July 11, 1987)

Munich... a city which since the war has become a centre of Ukrainian political and social life. A Ukrainian political centre, where the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), in particular the revolutionary OUN, has its headquarters. Here in Munich, the unforgettable leader of the OUN, Stepan Bandera, worked until he was murdered by a Russian agent in 1959, his successor Stepan Lenkowskyi also lived and died in Munich, and here, a year ago a great son of Ukraine, the head of the Ukrainian National Government, the initiator of the act of proclamation of an independent Ukrainian state and President of the ABN, Yaroslav Stetsko, passed away.

Saturday, July 11, 1987. A glorious sunny day embraces the Waldfriedhof cemetery in Munich. In the early hours of the afternoon, coaches, cars and crowds of people start to arrive. A certain gravity and reverence can be seen on the faces of the pilgrims, who have gathered here from different parts of the world to salute and pay their respects to a great and beloved man.

Within half an hour a lengthy column has been formed with a cross and flag bearers at its head. The flag bearers are former combatants, members of the Ukrainian Youth Association, men and women from Ukrainian organisations and from European and transoceanic countries. The flags are followed by wreaths from the deceased's wife, family, the OUN leadership and separate organisations and institutions, including members of the ABN — Balts, Rumanians, Hungarians, Croats, Georgians, Bulgarians, Poles, Afghans, and Iranians. Then come the bishops — Archbishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Anatoliy Dublianskyi and Exarch of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Germany, Bishop Platon Kornyliak, accompanied by priests and nuns. They are followed by the bereaved Slava Stetsko, sister of the deceased, Oksana Romanyshyn with her husband Dmytro and son Oleh, other members of the family, the chairman and members of the OUN leadership and numerous representatives of Ukrainian political and social organisations. The

column is extended by the groups of Ukrainian youth, former combatants and other members of the Ukrainian community in the diaspora.

Everyone is heading towards the newly erected marble tombstone engraved with the insignia of Prince Volodymyr the Great, a cross, and the symbol of the revolutionary OUN — the trident on a cross and sword. The inscription in Ukrainian and German with dates of birth and death 19.1.1912 — 5.7.1986 indicates that this is where Yaroslav Stesko, who has become one of the symbols of the Ukrainian revolution and one of the chief architects of the restoration of the Ukrainian state, has been laid to rest. The project of the tombstone was drawn up by Adriana Stebelska M. A.

The grave and tombstone are suddenly surrounded by hundreds of people and the mournful sounds of the requiem service fill the air, touching the people's hearts and evoking a whole string of thoughts and feelings. The bishops bless the tombstone.

Archbishop A. Dublianskyi of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was the first to speak. He recalled the monument which Yaroslav Stetsko had built throughout his life, the basis of which "was and will be a free and united Ukraine". While remaining loyal to the idea, he built yet another monument — one which cannot be erected by hands and which cannot be worn away by time or circumstance. The Archbishop stressed that Y. Stetsko always had a great respect for the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and emphasised its great role in the life of the Ukrainian people.

Bishop Platon Korniyak of the Ukrainian Catholic Church underlined the faithful, dedicated and loving character traits of the deceased.

The representative of the OUN leadership pointed out the great service the deceased had rendered the Ukrainian people. His firm and steadfast faith in God, his concept of man as God's creation and the family as the foundation of the society and nation were the basis of his philosophical concepts of a revolutionary struggle for a Ukrainian state and a just order in the world. For him, Ukrainian nationalism was not only a social and political or world concept, but also an ethnical and moral movement, and the essential factor in the formation of the OUN. The great services of the deceased include his widespread diplomatic mission in the international arena by mobilising the nations of the world to stand up and fight against their common enemy — Russian imperialism.

The Ukrainian National Government's spokesman was Mr. Bohdan Fedorak — the new chairman, who paid tribute to his predecessor as the initiator of the act of proclamation of an independent Ukrainian state on June 30th, 1941, and the promoter of Ukrainian statehood, which was his whole life's aim.

An emotional and deeply meaningful speech was delivered by the Estonian ABN representative Mr. S. Soldatov, who emphasised the great Ukrainian patriotism of the late ABN president, yet at the same time asserted his

universality as a revolutionary fighter for other nations for which he was and remains an unsurpassed model and spiritual leader. Mr. Soldatov recalled the great influence the underground struggle in Ukraine had for the underground organisations in the neighbouring countries, in particular in the Baltic states. He also mentioned his personal contacts with Ukrainian political prisoners in Soviet Russian concentration camps among whom the name of Yaroslav Stetsko, together with the names of Stepan Bandera and Taras Chuprynka-Shukhevych, was the banner of revolution against the imperialist occupant. He quoted Yaroslav Stetsko's words expressed on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the ABN on faith in the victory of the idea of the freedom of nations and the individual.

Due respect and grief at the loss of the co-founder and honorary member of the EFC Presidium were expressed by Mr. J. Jenkins from the British branch of the EFC. He emphasised the great creative contribution the deceased made to the struggle freedom and international justice and for the elaboration of the strategy of this struggle for the benefit of Ukraine and the whole of Europe.

Short salutes and tributes were paid by the following representatives of the OUN and the World Liberation Front in the diaspora: Dr. A. Lozynskyi (USA), Mr. I. Dmytriw (Great Britain), Mr. M. Tkaczuck (Australia), Mr. M. Szafowal (Argentina), Mr. P. Holowinskyi (Austria), Mr. I. Lewystskyi (Benelux), Mr. T. Buyniak (Canada), Prof. Dr. W. Kosyk (France), Mr. S. Mudryk (West Germany). All of the salutes vowed to unswervingly follow the same path of the deceased to victory and attainment of an independent and sovereign Ukrainian state.

The World Ukrainian Liberation Front honoured the memory of Y. Stetsko with short tributes paid by: Dr. A. Bedriy — member of the Presidium of the W.U.L.F., Mr. E. Hanowskyi — chairman of the Central Executive of the Ukrainian Youth Association, Mr. S. Lawrushka — on behalf of the Detachments of Ukrainian Nationalists, Mr. M. Hayva — from the Organisation of Ukrainian Former Combatants, Mrs. B. Krushelnycky on behalf of the World Association of Ukrainian Women, Mrs. M. Kolodiy — Association of Ukrainian Women in Canada, Mr. S. Oleskiw — World Executive of Ukrainian Student Associations and Mr. B. Kaczor from the Association of Ukrainian Political Prisoners.

The commemoration at the cemetery passed in a prayerful atmosphere, the words of the tributes and salutes filled the souls of the participants, evoking in them mixed feelings of sorrow and pride and at the same time arousing an even greater incitement for the unattained act of past and present generations, a living embodiment of which was Y. Stetsko. The ceremony at the cemetery ended with the singing of the Ukrainian national anthem which filled everyone's hearts with renewed energy for work and struggle.

The commemorative evening in tribute of Y. Stetsko was held in the spa-

cious Fingerle Kultur Zentrum which was filled to the brim. The programme comprised an opening and main address, performances by the male voice choir "Ukraina" and pianist Kalyna Chichka-Andrienko both from Germany, the bandura ensemble "The Kobzar Brotherhood" from England and two poetry recitals by Petro Kormylo from Scotland and Irene Chalupa from West Germany.

The next day, Sunday, July 12, mass was celebrated in the Ukrainian Catholic Cathedral in Munich by Bishop Platon Kornyliak in memory of Yaroslav Stetsko. Prayers were raised to Almighty God to bless the begun and yet unfinished work of the deceased and to help present and future generations achieve the long awaited freedom for Ukraine.

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*Wolodymyr MASUR*

### **A PERSON OF GREAT VISION**

On the first anniversary of the death of Yaroslav Stetsko

Over long decades we have travelled here to Munich from different countries of the world — for the first time without him.

Among us is his still grieving widow, his faithful wife and untiring co-worker, Slava Stetsko, but he is not among us... He will no longer greet us, gentle, smiling, with thoughtful eyes, he will not clasp our hand with that special grasp of a leader's hand... Having felt his touch it was easier to go on and struggle, but as Taras Shevchenko said, "Everything goes on, everything passes..."

Yaroslav Semenovych Stetsko, a great son of Ukraine, whose name has been eternally woven into the laurel wreath of Ukrainian glory, struggle and victory, is no longer with us.

Today we ceremonially unveiled and blessed his grave monument and almost felt his live presence once again among us, for as the poet said:

"Who says that you have died  
The worthy know no death".

A person dies, but ideas do not.

Yaroslav Stetsko not only carried forward and realised the national liberation ideas of Khmelnytskyi and Mazepa, Petlura and Konovalets, Chuprynka and Bandera, he became their embodiment. He not only carried on but further developed, deepened and realised the great Ukrainian ideal into practice.

The son of a priest, raised on the ideals of the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO) and the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), he

united within himself the noblest traits of a Ukrainian Christian and a Ukrainian liberation struggle leader. Not long before his death he wrote:

"I believe that I survived not only thanks to my will, but foremost because of my faith in God, which above all, gives strength of will".

A year has passed, and it is still difficult to be fully aware of whom we have lost, whom not only Ukraine, but the entire world has lost. And not only the subjugated nations, but free nations as well. It was he, our leader, who said this to the leaders of the powerful and democratic United States:

"If the United States chooses the road of helping the subjugated nations, then the USA will become a revolutionary liberation power, the USSR is a reactionary power".

President Ronald Reagan said the following about Yaroslav Stetsko in a letter to Slava Stetsko:

"... Your husband's courage and dedication to liberty will serve as a continuing source of inspiration to all those striving for freedom and self-determination and an abiding reminder of the timeless struggle of mankind to break the chains of tyranny".

President Reagan said this about the man who survived Polish and German-Nazi prisons and concentration camps, the man who came to Washington, to the White House as Premier of a spiritually free Ukraine, and he was received as such by the President of the greatest democracy in the world.

The Pentagon has undertaken a thorough study of a very significant directive of our late leader, on the following:

"Our liberation strategy of coordinated national revolution is proper, and in the west people are aligning themselves with our concepts. This is the only alternative to a totally destructive nuclear war. All the concepts of OUN have always prevailed.

He stands before us, from a young age a member of the UVO and the OUN, the ideological director of the National Executive of the OUN, authorised by Colonel Yevhen Konovalets to prepare the OUN Congress in Rome, vice-chairman of the leadership of the Revolutionary OUN from 1940, member of the OUN Leadership Bureau from 1945, long-term leader of the OUN, president of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, member of the honorary Presidium of the European Freedom Council, member of the Executive of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL), but first and foremost, the indomitable Premier of the Ukrainian National Government of June 30, 1941, which did not yield to Berlin or to Moscow.

For over half a century Yaroslav Stetsko gave his all to our ideas, he worked as a gifted publicist, constantly formulating our and the world's political liberation view, ever organising our own as well as international forces to struggle against Russian imperialism and communism, for the dissolution of the empire, for the victory of Kyiv over Moscow.

The participants of the 19th WACL conference in September of 1986 in

Luxembourg paid a special tribute to the memory of Yaroslav Stesko. They wrote the following:

"Yaroslav Stetsko, in his courage and dedication to freedom has inspired individuals committed to the struggle for national independence, social justice, and individual freedoms. His courage, vision, statesmanship, warmth and leadership will be greatly missed by all".

Both Ukrainian and international press reported about the passing away of our leader. The news, broadcast by radio into occupied Ukraine, shook the hearts of millions of people on whom our leader relied and in whose cause of freedom and happiness he worked. Even emigre press not supportive of our movement printed obituaries full of homage and tribute.

Leonid Poltava, a Ukrainian poet from Poltavshchyna was one of the first to respond to the death of Yaroslav Stetsko. Eastern Ukrainians, members and non-members of our movement in particular deeply felt Yaroslav Stetsko's commitment to unity and his tolerance. In a letter dated June 30, 1986, one of the last documents of his life — the already gravely ill Yaroslav Stetsko wrote:

"I ask you to relay to all the members of the organisation my most sincere thanks for their countless expressions of support and prayer, in particular our young generation, our youth, members of student and youth organisations as well as our older members, experienced in struggle and toil, my tribute to them all. Please convey my thanks to the entire Ukrainian community, to the bishops and the clergy of both denominations, who, as supporters of Ukrainian unity have understood that they are praying for an advocate of that same unity".

It is not easy to speak of such a great man, as dear to us as our own father, a spokesman of the Ukrainian nation. It is not easy to speak of a giant of political thought, a contemporary Moses who led his nation out of the desert of statelessness... to speak of him, who, as wrote Ivan Franko — all his life burned and toiled for one idea — the sacred idea of the liberation of Ukraine and other subjugated nations.

Yaroslav Stetsko often expressed deep, penetrating thoughts in the forms of mottos and slogans. Some of his expressions became aphorisms. For example, he brilliantly characterised those emigre unbelievers and changelings and our entire epoch with these words: "In this era there is no room for the rabbit-hearted pretending to be lions!" or "To achieve victory over Bolshevism we must arm ourselves, not negotiate!"

One motto which is pertinent to all of us as well as to those who will come after us into the organisation is:

"OUN was, is and will be the great guide, as it was 50 years ago — until the Ukrainian Independent and Sovereign State is restored".

Let us recall the great words of this great man, and let us mark those words well, in our awareness and hearts, and let us pass this learning to younger generations of Ukrainian fighters. Yaroslav Stetsko wrote:

"The idea of nationalism is the solution to the current world problems, because nationalism solves problems on the basis of national societies. All other ideas, such as containment and balance of power fall bankrupt. Only nationalism can be the adversary to the erroneous system behind which Russian imperialism and chauvinism stand".

I have already mentioned the deep Christian ethic which permeated the thinking of our unforgettable friend and leader, I have mentioned his religious tolerance and foresight. He called on all of us to actively prepare ourselves to celebrate the millennium of Christianity in Ukraine in 1988. He simultaneously reminded us of a current, important problem with these words:

"The issue of the patriarchate is a national issue. It is an issue of Ukrainian spiritual statehood. We support all efforts of both Ukrainian Churches in this endeavour".

As a political philosopher, in the last years of his life Yaroslav Stetsko anticipated great technological changes in the world. In a letter dated June 1986, (addressed to myself), he wrote the following:

"Electronics, technology, micro-electronics — they are a double-edged sword. Chornobyl is a frontier which Moscow has crossed, directing the Free World but in particular the nations and the people in the Russian empire against itself...In such a way technology creates a revolutionary situation within the empire. In this battle Moscow is destined to death. We must mobilise staffs of technologists, electronics experts and psychostrategists. God grant that I may be helpful in this giant battle of Kyiv against Moscow, of which General Hackett has already written".

From this letter, written by the hand of an already ill person, we see the foresight of our leader as well as his modesty. He, a giant of political thought, a strategist of the revolutionary struggles of Ukraine and the world, wrote that he wanted to be "helpful" in the struggle of Ukraine against Russia.

A colleague of Konovalets, Chuprynka, Bandera — Yaroslav Stetsko remembered his predecessors of the struggle with respect. He wrote about the soldiers and officers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army with great personal piety, calling the UPA the "revolutionary national army" which "rose as a deed of the political organisation OUN".

He always warned about the possibility of any lack any discipline or anarchy. These are his words:

"No insurgent leaders, modern-day Zelenyis or Makhnos [Otaman Zele-nyi, an insurgent leader, and Nestor Makhno, a Ukrainian anarchist leader, both of whom fought against the Bolsheviks in Ukraine in the 1920s] were able to conduct armed struggle against their occupant with the participation of the whole nation without a political and state oriented struggle. Only the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) under the leadership of General Roman Shukhevych-Chuprynka was such a military, political, revolutionary and national force, which created the political reality of our nation in occupied Ukraine and potentially throughout the entire country".

The highest achievement of Yaroslav Stetsko's life was, I believe, the Act

of the Restoration of Ukrainian Statehood of June 30, 1941, in Lviv. Dr. Dmytro Dontsov, a renowned theoretician of Ukrainian nationalist thought wrote:

“The Act of June 30 was a deed which proclaimed loudly that Ukraine is not renouncing its full rights to govern on its own lands, is not renouncing its truth, regardless of the sacrifices”.

The Act of June 30 has never been revoked, therefore, it remains legal until this day. To the end of his life Yaroslav Stetsko not only guarded and expanded the traditions of this Act, he also aspired to build upon this institution.

Yaroslav Stetsko devoted great attention to the consolidation of Ukrainian political forces which stood by uncompromising state-oriented positions. He is the author of many plans which were to become the basis for the creation of an all Ukrainian state centre. We cannot abandon this great statehood idea. That is why this concept is being worked on with the attention of being realised in the Struggle of Kyiv against Moscow. The creation of an active all-Ukrainian state centre would undoubtedly be greeted by Ukrainians on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

We live in dangerous and unstable times, times of political upheavals, times of growing nationalist forces, times of Afghanistan and Nicaragua, times of aid to anti-communist fighters. We live in times when the Ukrainian people in our homeland are utilising every means to deepen and strengthen their struggle for the dissolution of the USSR into independent national states. We live in times during which our organised work for the liberation of Ukraine demands great strength, concentration of efforts of our leadership, of our organisation.

Finally, we live in times in which the words of our leader Yaroslav Stetsko are realised — that only the forces of nationalism will overcome the last remaining empire on earth. Therefore, inspired by his spirit, his vision, armed with his teachings, let us be united in this struggle, believing and knowing that Ukraine has not died, and never will die!

Eternal glory and eternal memory to our unforgettable leader Yaroslav Stetsko!

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**On the 45th Anniversary of the Formation  
of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)**

*Bertil HÄGGMAN*

**UKRAINIAN RESISTANCE 1942-1952 AS A MODEL FOR  
MODERN COMBAT ON COMMUNIST TERRITORY**

I come from a country that was once allied with an independent Ukraine in a united effort to stop Russian expansionism. Unfortunately, our joint hopes were crushed at Poltava in 1709 when Tsar Peter defeated Hetman Ivan Mazepa's Ukrainian forces and the royal Swedish troops of King Charles XII. The Battle of Poltava was the beginning of a period of growing Russian strength. Sweden was also one of the first countries historically to receive Ukrainian emigration. I am also, naturally, a strong supporter of Ukrainian independence.

The operations of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army have been described in detail many times and I will, therefore, be brief in my background comments on the history of the UPA. By 1942 the UPA was fighting both Nazis and communists. The fighting was especially fierce in Western Ukraine. Even before the German armies retreated from Ukraine the insurgents were fighting Soviet Russian forces. The Soviet partisan Kovpak tried to reach Galicia through Central Ukraine but had to fight the UPA all the way and his forces had to retreat to Soviet occupied territory.

In 1943 a conference was held to form a united liberation struggle of the oppressed nations. There, Ukrainians met with Bashkirs, Georgians, Byelorussians, Armenians and Turkestanis on UPA held territory. At that time it dominated an area of about 100,000 square miles and exercised government control over approximately 15 million people mostly in Western Ukraine. The goal was to create an independent Ukraine free from Soviet control and supported by the West.

The same year, 1943, the UPA was at its strongest. Between 100,000 and 200,000 men and women were under arms. But the UPA's task was immense. It fought the German occupation troops while they retreated and then the Red Army and NKVD units that returned to control the Ukrainians once more. In preparation for the gathering communist storm a General Staff was organised and the country divided into regions.

The UPA had all the relevant staff functions — intelligence, logistics, communications and liaison services. The UPA freedom fighters were orga-

nised in platoons, companies, battalions and regiments. The light companies had 168 men and three rifle platoons and the heavy companies — 186 men, three rifle platoons, a heavy machine gun and a heavy mortar platoon. The UPA used the platoon and company for most of its operations like many of the post World War II guerrilla organisations. Artillery was also available to some extent. Heavy artillery for defending strong points and light artillery to be moved quickly by horses.

Every region had a school for non-commissioned officers and in Western Ukraine officers' schools were run. The military training came under the military instruction section of the UPA. The section published a manual on guerrilla warfare. The political and psychological warfare section of the UPA put out two publications to keep the freedom fighters informed and motivated.

In April 1944, the Red Army commenced attacks on UPA forces with up to 30,000 elite troops. In the late autumn of 1944 two regular divisions were brought into the anti-UPA offensive. In 1945 the Soviet Russians used classic anti-guerrilla tactics to make the struggle more difficult for the UPA. Great areas of forest were burnt down. In December 1945 the NKVD launched an offensive that was to continue for half a year. Guerrilla controlled areas were blocked by Soviet Russian troops in order to starve the insurgents. In the last major offensive against the UPA the Soviet Russians used communist Czechoslovakian and communist Polish troops along with Russian units. The operation continued through 1947 and 1948. As a result the UPA split into small units and escaped into forests and mountains in Western Ukraine.

It was during this period that the UPA dispatched units westwards to make the struggle known in the West. One of the groups travelled 1,500 kilometres across Czechoslovakia and Austria into West Germany.

In the first years of the 1950s the UPA grew less and less able to fight against large communist units and turned partly to covert forms of resistance like sabotage and, by 1952, armed resistance had almost ceased. However, Ukrainians in concentration camps continued to struggle and greatly contributed to the de-Stalinisation process.

### **Guerrilla Strategy and Tactics — a Marxist-Leninist Prerogative**

Between 1950 and 1975 a vast number of books on guerrilla warfare was published. Most of these books have very little or nothing to say about anti-communist insurgency of the type carried out by the UPA. So, for instance, Robert B. Asprey's 1600-page *War in the Shadows — The Guerrilla in History* of 1975 contains not a single word on the UPA. Since the end of the Vietnam war in 1975 the tables have begun to turn on Moscow and there is a great need for anti-communist guerrilla warfare analysis. Can the tactics of the UPA serve as a model for modern combat on communist territory? To find a few answers to this question it is necessary to analyse some of the tactical

principles of the UPA. I will limit myself to five cases, but there are of course many others, if thorough research were to be devoted to this problem.

### **1. Against an effectively organised enemy it is necessary to fight in small units**

The preferred size of fighting units of the UPA was the platoon or company. It is a universal truth of guerrilla warfare that small units fight better against regular troops and are more mobile, which is of great importance to the guerrillas.

### **2. Raids**

The UPA perfected the art of the raid to destroy posts, supply depots and communications centres, to capture military equipment and liberate political prisoners from jails and concentration camps. Typical of the UPA raids was the one on the town of Radekhiv on April 26-27, 1945. NKVD and NKGB detachments guarded a concentration camp for political prisoners established in the town. The task of the UPA forces was to liberate all the prisoners. All highways and railroads were heavily guarded to prevent Soviet reinforcements from getting through. Road blocks were set up and railroads were mined. Six UPA groups were used in the operation. At 24.00 hours the groups entered the town. The camp was stormed and the prisoners released. Later they dispersed in all directions from outside the town. At 03.00 hours the UPA retreated and at dawn there were no insurgents left in the town.

Raids may also be used for a political purpose — to attract the attention of the population in new areas. The UPA made such raids into Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Austria and West Germany and to Eastern Ukraine.

In Angola the UNITA insurgents fighting the communist regime and its Cuban support troops make similar raids far into government controlled areas. UNITA controls large areas in southern Angola, but has made raids far into the northern province of Uige.

### **3. Harassment**

Harassment was used by the UPA to keep the enemy in a state of constant tension, uncertainty and alertness. The size of the unit used for harassment was usually a squad. The UPA frequently harassed the *Wehrmacht*. The Russian troops were also targets for harassment. Similar tactics are used by Afghan freedom fighters against the Soviet occupational forces and their Afghan quisling troops, to mention one modern example.

#### 4. Diversionary tactics

Cutting telephone and telegraph lines, loosening railroad tracks, setting fire to houses used as quarters for enemy troops, burning food supply depots, sabotaging factories, destroying electric power plants and individual attacks against security police chiefs and collaborators are all examples of diversionary actions used by the UPA and almost all modern insurgencies against communist regimes.

#### 5. Ambush

In every defensive and offensive operation ambush was a strong weapon of the UPA. It was a powerful weapon to demoralise the enemy. One of the most famous cases of UPA ambushes was the killing of the general of the Nazi Sicherheitsdienst, Victor Lutze, in May 1943. Lutze had left the city of Rivne with a convoy of heavily armed security guards. First in the convoy were a number of cars with Nazi officials followed by SD troops on motorcycles. After them came about 30 cars with guards. In one of these was General Lutze. The ambush was set up by an UPA company near the town of Klevan. Outside the town the highway enters a dense forest. One platoon was positioned here. Its purpose was to let the convoy of cars pass and then block the retreat. Other units took their positions in the forest on both sides of the highway. The column of cars entered the forest and the insurgents opened fire. Lutze was riddled with bullets at close range. Erich Koch never admitted that Lutze was ambushed by the UPA. He was reported to have been killed in a "car accident".

The UPA experiences in fighting Soviet Russian troops ought to serve as a model in Afghanistan, although there are differences in development and physical environment, as well as weaponry between Ukraine and the only country where Soviet Russian forces are presently involved in anti-guerrilla warfare on a massive scale. The ambush is a favoured tactic of the Afghan freedom fighters, the Mujahideen. Several ambushes of Soviet military convoys in Afghanistan have been shown on Western television. Fortunately for the UPA, during World War II the Soviets lacked a new, dangerous anti-guerrilla weapon: the helicopter gunship. Still the Hind MI-24 helicopter gunship is not invulnerable. Now that the insurgents possess ground-to-air missiles it is relatively easy to shoot down.

There is a great need for anti-communist guerrilla warfare theory — theoretical works that apply older historical experiences of insurgent-partisan warfare, such as that of the UPA, to more recent insurgencies. A large number of writers on guerrilla warfare in the West have dismissed the possibility of insurgency on communist territory on two major grounds:

— the population in a communist country either could or would not support insurgency;

— the conviction of historical irreversibility of communist revolutions deriving from the belief that history runs on set stages.

The ongoing insurgencies on communist territory have shown that these assumptions are wrong.

There is presently a lack of coordination and solidarity between insurgents fighting communist regimes. The West has a responsibility to assist in supporting meetings among leaders and theoreticians of these insurgencies around the world. Exchange of information and observers in the field would be an important step. UPA veterans and students of UPA warfare can in many respects serve an important role here.

As stated by Harry Rositzke in his book *American Secret Operations* (Reader's Digest Press, New York, 1977), the West did almost nothing to support the UPA after World War II. Two American-trained radio operators remained with the UPA until, as Rositzke claims, the end of November 1953. According to him, by then only a large-scale military supply effort would have saved the UPA. The meagre support served the UPA only in two respects: to give a line to fellow countrymen in the West and to keep up morale to a certain extent.

The struggle of the UPA during and for over ten years after World War II against the armed forces of two superpowers has not been equalled to this day. The hope of the UPA leaders that the struggle between Nazi Germany, the Anti-Comintern countries and the Allies would continue long enough so as to exhaust the two sides and leave room for an independent Ukraine, did not become reality. The Nazis retreated from Ukraine after a few years of occupation and Soviet Russia soon regained strength after the 1941-42 defeats. In 1945 the UPA was surrounded by the areas controlled by the Red Army and no help from the West was forthcoming — not even after the true intentions of Moscow in Eastern Europe became evident. Few or no insurgencies are successful if support is not coming through a neighbouring country. In the Vietnam War Russian equipment was poured into North Vietnam to be brought to the South along the Ho Chi Minh trail. Without Russian support the NVA/NLF would probably have had no chance of winning the war in South Vietnam.

It is important for the insurgencies on the three continents, fighting against communist regimes since 1975, that books are written about them and that intellectuals argue over the details and the theoretical foundations of their campaigns. The insurgent experience in Ukraine can serve as a model encouragement for modern freedom fighters struggling to overcome a communist totalitarian system.

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Yona LIRON\*

## I WAS A SOVIET COUNTER-INSURGENCY EXPERT

*(As told to Leo Heiman)*

Forty three years ago, my name was Ivan Lirovsky and I was serving as a Captain with the Red Army's 64th Armoured Brigade, deployed against the German forces along the River Dnieper (First Ukrainian Front).

As Operations Officer at brigade headquarters, I saw action in the battles of Kyiv, Korosten, Zhytomir and Ternopil, where I was wounded in the neck by splinters from exploding German shells. I spent two months recuperating from my wounds at the 912th Military Hospital in Proskuriv, and was discharged with a clean bill of health and orders to report to NKVD Colonel V. S. Maslennikov for assignment to other duties. The orders did not specify the nature of my reassignment from front-line armoured troops to rear-area "Internal Security" forces, and it was with some misgivings that I approached Col. Maslennikov's headquarters, located at the time in the Western Ukrainian town of Sarny.

I am relating my experiences because the struggle of Ukrainian nationalist guerrillas against the Soviet Union is the only case of a popular people's war waged against a communist regime. A central theme of communist partisan strategy is that only progressive revolutionary forces can unleash and spearhead a popular people's war against a hated regime of reactionary oppression and/or colonialist exploitation.

I must say, the communist definition of partisan warfare is quite correct. What is not true is that such warfare is, or must be, some kind of communist monopoly. The Ukrainian insurgency against Soviet Russia in 1944-1950 was certainly a clear-cut case of a progressive revolutionary struggle against reactionary oppression and economic exploitation.

I have analysed the Ukrainian nationalist partisan movement (UPA — Ukrainian Insurgent Army), digesting the reasons for its initial success and

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\* Yona Liron is a Polish Jew who migrated to Israel in 1951. Born in the Polish-Ukrainian border town of Peremyshl, he was an electrical engineering student at the Lviv Polytechnical Institute in 1939, when World War II broke out and the Russians marched in from the East to grab Western Ukraine under the terms of the Hitler-Stalin pact.

During the Nazi invasion of Soviet Russia in 1941, he fled eastward to Central Asia, where he was drafted for service with the Red Army early in 1942. Decorated for bravery in action on the North Caucasus battlefield, he was commissioned as an officer of the First Armoured Army following graduation from Vystrel OCS in 1943.

Transferred to "Internal Security" (counter-insurgency) duties in 1944, he saw action against Ukrainian nationalist partisans for five years first as a captain in the Soviet Army, and then as a major in the Polish Army's KBW (Internal Security Corps).

Following his honourable discharge on medical grounds, as a result of wounds sustained in the fighting, he migrated to Israel where he worked as an electrical plant supervisor near Haifa.

subsequent failure. There are many Ukrainian refugees, resident in various countries of the Western free world, who can give a coherent account of the UPA's people's war from their point of view.

But how did it look from the other side of the hill, through the eyes of a Soviet counter-insurgency officer?

I reported to Col. Maslennikov's headquarters in Sarny and was appointed First Staff Section (Cadres and Training) officer of his "Operativnaya Grupa" (Operational Task Force), composed of an assortment of counter-insurgency units from all rear-area services of the First and Second Ukrainian Fronts.

It is clear to me now that the Russians committed the cardinal mistake, common to nearly all counter-insurgency forces in the world, of becoming the victims of their own propaganda.

The presence of anti-Soviet guerrillas in Western Ukraine should not have surprised them at all. For more than two years, the top authorities coordinating Soviet partisan operations behind the German lines were aware of the existence of anti-Soviet and anti-German Ukrainian nationalist units, in the vast areas between the Carpathian Mountains in the South, the Prypiat Marshes in the north, the Buh River in the west and the Dnieper River in the east.

In fact, the Soviet Union's ten biggest partisan "soyedineniya" (guerrilla divisions) under Generals Kovpak, Fiodorov, Savurov and Andreyev, and Colonels Medvedev, Naumov, Begma, Melnik, Barinsky and Taratuta, were ordered to penetrate Western Ukraine, not so much to cripple the German Army's communications in this region, as to wipe out the Ukrainian national "competition" and to pave the way for the re-establishment of a Soviet-imposed administration in Western Ukraine.

The ten Soviet guerrilla divisions accomplished a great deal against the Germans, very little against the UPA. They learnt it was much easier to take on the regular German Army, whose freedom of action was limited by over-extended communications, vulnerable lines of supply, and stupidity of counter-insurgency methods, than to tackle hostile guerrillas who enjoyed the local population's support and could beat Soviet partisans at their own game. Since operational, political and intelligence reports from all guerrilla divisions were regularly sent to Moscow by radio, liaison planes or couriers, the responsible Soviet authorities ought to have realised the formidable and tough opponents they would encounter on their way across Western Ukraine.

Alas, the Russians claimed that the entire population of Ukraine was eagerly awaiting liberation from Nazi oppression by the victorious Red Army. The "few isolated bands" in the forest were merely "Fascist gangsters", "Nazi agents", "Gestapo operatives" and "criminal underworld elements" hired by the Germans to assassinate Soviet patriots and communist officials.

Personally, I always managed to keep an open mind and was not easily

misled by official propaganda. But even I believed in the above line. By constant repetition the Russians came to believe in it themselves.

I understand now they could not have acted otherwise. To admit that the UPA was any kind of a popular partisan movement, an insurgent army, or even a bona-fide guerrilla formation, would be tantamount to admitting that a large part of the Ukrainian population did not want a Soviet-imposed communist regime, and preferred an independent nationalist Ukraine of their own.

And since the main strength of the UPA was in rural areas, it also meant that its support did not stem from "reactionary, bourgeois and Fascist circles" in the cities, but from the very grass-roots peasantry the Soviets claimed as their own.

Naturally, the Soviets could not admit all this. Therefore, they genuinely assumed that a few small-scale "police actions" would wipe out the "isolated Fascist bands" in the forests, and restore Soviet administration in Western Ukraine.

In March, April and May 1944, the Red Army pushed the Germans out of the Sarny, Rivne, Lutsk, Kovel and Ternopil districts of Western Ukraine. In June, July and August of that year, the Red Army's westward sweep towards Poland cleared the Stanislaviv, Drohobych and Peremyshl districts as well.

Even before my arrival at Col. Maslennikov's headquarters, attempts had been made by local NKVD chiefs to maintain security along the Red Army lines of communication and mount counter-insurgency drives with a number of "Istrebitelny" (destroying) battalions.

These battalions, about 300 to 450 strong, were formed out of hard-core veterans of Soviet guerrilla divisions who linked up with advancing Red Army units. Theoretically, the "Istrebitelny" battalions were an ideal anti-partisan weapon. It takes a thief to catch a thief, a fighter plane to bring down another military aircraft, and a tank to knock out an enemy tank on the battlefield.

Ergo, the best counter-insurgency weapons are other guerillas. However, it did not work out that way at all in actual practice. To begin with, the Soviet guerrillas who were drafted for the "destroying" battalions had no stomach for counter-insurgency operations. They were quite willing to be parachuted once again in the rear of retreating German armies, to raid enemy garrisons, blow up his trains, ambush his military columns. This was no picnic either, but at least the enemy was a tangible one.

To penetrate the forests in search of elusive nationalist guerrillas, to run into their cunningly located traps and ambushes, to behave as the Germans did against suspect villagers — was something no guerrilla veterans were very happy about.

In fact, the "Istrebitelny" battalions showed such great talent for staying



out of trouble, and avoiding action with the UPA, that we were forced to reassign them to outpost guard and railway security duties.

Most of them were later transferred to local militia units, or sent to the front.

By the time I reported to Maslennikov, the Colonel was disenchanted with his "destroying" battalions and requested the loan of regular army units and NKVD troops. We got two cavalry regiments (about 1,000 strong) from the First Cossack Corps, a brigade (2,000 strong) of troops from the NKVD Internal Security Forces with armoured cars and jeeps, and three mobile task groups ("zagraditelniye otryady") from the Border Security Forces, with heavy machine guns and medium mortars.

Including headquarters and administrative personnel, we had some 6,000 men for our first action against the UPA, not counting local militia and whatever remained of the "Istrebitelny" battalions.

This, as I can see it now, was a drop of water in an ocean of needs. But I had no experience in partisan warfare at that time, and it seems that I had been assigned to Maslennikov because the Colonel had requested a battle-wise officer with armoured unit background.

The way we operated at first looks pretty naive in retrospect. We had partisan officers on our staff, and the underground anti-Nazi intelligence network set up by the Medvedev and Novak organisations in the Rivne district, by Fiodorov in Kovel, and by Saburov in the Sarny-Lutsk region, were still intact. We just took over the partisan contacts, agents and sources, and used them against the UPA.

We thus had a pretty clear picture of where the nationalist guerrillas operated, and where their main bases were located. This I realise now, was next to nothing. The Germans had this kind of information against Soviet partisans all along, but could not utilise it for the same reason that we failed to get to first base.

To illustrate: On July 27, 1944, we received reports that a UPA "band" (we never called them "units," "partisans" or the like, but always "bandits" or "gangsters") raided the village of Horodyshche near Lutsk, killed the Selsoviet (village Soviet) chairman appointed by the regional communist party administration, disarmed the 12 local militiamen, killing their commanding officer. Following this they looted the militia precinct station and burnt it down together with the Selsoviet building.

The raiders departed without bothering to cut the telephone wires, linking the burning Selsoviet building with a nearby town. The reason for this omission became apparent after the wife of the late Selsoviet chairman entered the blazing house to call for help.

A truckload of militiamen rushed to Horodyshche to blow up mines

planted by the UPA raiders below a rickety wooden bridge, just outside the village.

We knew that the raiders came from an UPA unit which called itself "Lisovi Chorty" (Forest Devils) and operated in the Mikhalkovo forest. We also understood that the raid on Horodyshche was an "inside job," because the raiders knew exactly when, where and how to attack. It was obvious that UPA sympathisers from among the villagers "fingered" the objectives for the nationalist guerrillas.

The military damage inflicted upon the Soviet regime was slight. But the political impact was immense. Unless we could prove to the villagers that we knew how to eradicate the UPA and enforce agricultural collectivisation, the future of Soviet administration in Ukraine would be in doubt.

If we failed to protect such pro-Soviet elements as Selsoviet chairmen and local militia chiefs, the control of Western Ukrainian rural districts would go to the UPA by default.

Naturally, we did not commit the stupid mistakes of the Nazis. The Germans would have razed a couple of villages and massacred a few thousand civilians in retaliation, thus contributing to the further growth of an anti-Nazi partisan movement in the district. Colonel Maslennikov knew better than that. But he was pretty naive in other respects.

We sent to Horodyshche a motorised column of some 500 men, with four armoured cars, machine guns and mortars. They also had an Agitprop section with trained public speakers and a GGU (Gromko-Govoritelnaya Ustanovka — mobile loudspeaker van). As soon as the troops moved in to occupy the village and deploy on its outskirts, the GGU began broadcasting popular Russian and Ukrainian songs, martial brass band music and folk dance tunes. All villagers were ordered to attend a "protest meeting" against the killings, and express their "righteous wrath and indignation" against the "Fascist bourgeois nationalist hirelings of Nazi reaction".

The commissar harangued them for an hour against the UPA. He used all the standard names and epithets on the Soviet list of insults (bloodsucking leaches, contemptible bedbugs, Gestapo cut-throats, malicious midgets, nest of vipers, and so on), and whatever effect the meeting might have achieved, the commissar lost it by overdoing the propaganda mudslinging.

Some of the things he pointed out to the villagers were quite true and reasonable. Such as that Nazi Germany was as good as lost, the Soviet Union had triumphed, and it was foolish suicide to support the UPA now. The villagers could see where he was right. But when he started lambasting the nationalist guerrillas as "murderers," "criminals" and the like, the people did not go along with him, although they clapped their hands and cheered whenever he mentioned Stalin's name. Many villagers had sons, brothers and other relatives with the UPA partisans, and did not like to be insulted by an outsider, even if he spoke Ukrainian with a local accent.

The motorised column pushed deeper into the forest on a wild-goose chase after the "Forest Devils". Led by local guides who formerly served with partisan formations, the column came upon a forest where traces of a recent UPA encampment were found. That was all. The task group returned empty handed, which was just as well, because we learnt later that the "Forest Devils" were about 800 strong, and could have made mincemeat out of our column in a well planned ambush, without assistance of nearby UPA groups.

In the first period of our counter-insurgency operations we merely wasted a lot of gasoline, vehicle parts and tyres through wear and tear. To be sure, our own informants, former guerrilla agents, and pro-Soviet elements among the villagers, denounced hundreds of UPA sympathisers to the NKVD. Our motorised units drove into the villages, surrounded them to prevent escapes, conducted house-to-house searches, and rounded up the suspects on our arrest lists.

But this was a security-fringe job and had nothing to do with real counter insurgency action. The second phase of our activity began towards the end of August 1944. The front lines had been stabilised by then along the Vistula River in Southern Poland, and we could request some heavy-weight assistance from the army.

General Kiryl Moskalenko, former Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Airborne and Parachute Forces, who headed an Army Group on the Ukrainian Front (and 15 years later became Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Rocket Forces), was entrusted by Stalin with the difficult task of "mopping-up" Western Ukraine from UPA "bands".

Moskalenko deployed two cavalry divisions from the First Cossack Corps, two motorised infantry brigades from Katukov's First Armoured Army, an infantry division (154th) which happened to be passing through Western Ukraine on its way to the front, and three NKVD operational task forces under Colonels Maslennikov, Skvortsov and Badayev. All former partisan commanders who took over important administrative posts in Western Ukraine, like Colonel Begma in Rivne, or Lt. Col. Kozlov in Kovel, were instructed to mobilise former guerrillas, militia units and village "activists" for the all-out anti-UPA drive. In all, I estimate some 60,000 troops and police took part in this operation, which lasted for five weeks. The official report said some 15,000 "nationalist bandits" had been killed. I suppose this figure included local UPA sympathisers who were rounded up during the counter-insurgency action and summarily executed.

However, there is no doubt that numerous engagements were fought, and both sides suffered heavy casualties. Our military hospitals were full. Gen. Moskalenko himself was wounded in an UPA ambush, and many other officers were killed in action.

Both sides changed their tactics afterwards, and I think that both committed grave errors of judgement and planning. As far as I could see, the Soviet

Union, with all the resources and manpower at its disposal, could afford to be wrong. But the situation was more serious where the UPA was concerned.

The cardinal Soviet mistakes were:

— Trying to eradicate what was essentially a popular partisan movement by police-action methods. The number of UPA activists and sympathisers in Western Ukraine was estimated at 300,000. In actual fact, since over a million Ukrainians had been killed or deported by the time the war was over in 1950, it means we had constantly underestimated the enemy's strength or influence. But even for fighting a resistance movement numbering 300,000 activists and sympathisers, we needed at least a million troops and police. Such numbers were never available, the maximum being 100,000 for any single drive. Which is why the war dragged on for five and a half years.

— Alienating the Ukrainian intellectuals in the cities by indiscriminate arrests of political suspects.

— Not considering the genuine grievances, aspirations and emotions of the local Ukrainian populace. After the Nazis dropped their friendly mask and showed the true face of the criminal Third Reich, thousands of disenfranchised Ukrainian patriots fled to the woods to resist the Nazi-imposed regime. Their role in the struggle against German occupation forces was never recognised by the Soviets. All Ukrainians who were not supporting the Soviet-sponsored partisan movement, were branded as Nazi collaborators or worse. This attitude alienated a large part of the Western Ukrainian population during the first Soviet anti-UPA drives.

But Soviet counter-insurgency experts learned fast. And while they were not able to correct such mistakes as were inherent in Soviet political dogma (i.e. regarding all Ukrainian patriots as Nazis, all UPA freedom fighters as bandits, and so on) they profited from the mistakes committed by Ukrainian nationalist guerrillas.

The UPA operated in a strategic-political vacuum. There was no one willing or able to help the Ukrainian patriots in their struggle for national independence. Germany was willing to help only after it had lost the war in Russia, and in any case the German motives were selfish and ulterior, and could not be trusted in the light of past experience.

The UPA had to fight on four fronts — against the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as against pro-Soviet elements in its own backyard. In such circumstances with no outside support this struggle was doomed to failure in the long run.

Tactically, the UPA partisans were brilliant, much more efficient than the best Soviet guerrillas of WW II. But brilliant tactics and local victories could not offset political and strategic setbacks.

The UPA derived its support from the Ukrainian peasantry in the villages. According to Mao Tse-tung's famous dictum, they were perfect partisans

("We are the fish, the people are the water"). But most UPA units were organised on a local-territorial basis. They had their parents, children, brothers, sisters and kinsmen in the village.

Thus, if a village was threatened with permanent occupation by Soviet troops, and its inhabitants with deportation to Siberia, the local UPA unit was honour-bound to protect their families by counterattacking the enemy. In this way they gave up their vast advantage of operational initiative and unrestricted mobility, and tied themselves down to their rural districts. Moreover, by tackling regular troops they committed a tactical error as well. A campaign of highway ambushes and railway sabotage, coupled with planned arson and assassination of key administration officials, would have hurt the Soviet Union more than attacks on military outposts and garrisons. Soldiers were expendable and could be sacrificed to wear out and decimate the UPA, especially after Nazi Germany's surrender in May 1945, when Moscow had millions of troops to spare.

Early in 1946, I was transferred to the Polish Army's KBW Internal Security Corps with the rank of Major, and posted as senior adviser to the Military Commandant of the Sanok District in the Carpathians.

The Poles had a very efficient counter-insurgency method against the UPA. The entire theatre of operations between the towns of Krosno, Sanok, Lisko and the Dukla Pass on the Czech frontier was cleared of all Polish inhabitants.

The Polish populace was evacuated to the Western Territories annexed by Poland from Germany along the Oder-Neisse Rivers. They took their livestock and agricultural implements with them. Their villages were then burned, and the crops destroyed by bombers dropping incendiaries and by troops with flame-throwers.

Next, all Ukrainian villagers were ordered to report for repatriation to the Soviet-Ukrainian "republic" (in fact, most of them were sent east to Central Asia, or Siberia). Those who failed to report at repatriation points by a certain deadline were regarded as bandits and treated accordingly. Their villages were burned too.

Because of this scorched-earth policy, the Krosno-Sanok-Lisko triangle in south-eastern Poland looked like an uninhabited desert for many years after the events described.

But the UPA units operating there were left without a base of popular support, information, food supply, and manpower reinforcements. Decimated by typhus, starvation, cold, and various infections of skin and blood, the UPA units in south-eastern Poland held out for two years, mainly by growing their crops in forest clearings, and raiding Polish military supply dumps. But they were wiped out by the end of 1947, and only isolated groups remained in the mountains till the last anti-UPA drive in 1950.

The Russians in Western Ukraine could not emulate the Polish scorched-earth policy for many reasons. It meant self-mutilation and admission of failure, if carried out within the Soviet Union proper. All casualties — killed in action, dead through execution, imprisoned and deported — in the 1944-1950 UPA war of independence, added up to about one million Ukrainians.

From 1946 through 1950, the Russians pursued a policy of "planned resettlement". Military, internal security and militia units would occupy a number of villages and set up permanent garrisons on location.

Black-listed suspects were rounded up, and executed or imprisoned. Grey listed ones were ordered to pack up and move with their livestock and families to the nearest railway station where special trains hauled them to the Kazakh, Kirghiz, Uzbek, and Omsk-Barnaul regions of Central Asia and Siberia.

The remaining villagers were ordered to join a kolkhoz collective. Since the UPA could not watch all this passively, it raided villages and stormed the military outposts. Sometimes the raid would be a success, sometimes a failure. But even in cases of local successes, the minor tactical victories added up to a major strategic setback. In place of the destroyed garrison, the Russians sent in new soldiers, who built a much stronger outpost.

The UPA could not afford the staggering losses sustained in attacks on fortified positions. From time to time, Soviet forces took the tactical initiative as well, and, guided by local communists or renegades, raided a Ukrainian camp in the forest.

Along all main roads and railways "zagraditelniye otryady" of NKVD troops were deployed in "zavyesa" (continued blockade) positions. Movement of civilians from one "zavyesa" to the other was restricted to those holding special permits. All others were shot or deported.

Even so, it took the Russians five and a half years to wear down and decimate, but not completely destroy, the UPA. After 1950, survivors of the UPA went underground, but nationalist resistance and the spirit of Ukrainian independence have flared up from time to time in recent years as well.

All free world students of partisan operations and counter-insurgency methods ought to digest this partial account of my experience against the UPA to perceive the Soviet Union's most vulnerable spot.

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## “THIS IS THE NINE O’CLOCK NEWS”

‘This is the Nine O’Clock News —  
Today, there have been demonstrations against Russia in Latvia,  
Following upon a similar pattern of renewed, National awareness  
In Lithuania and Estonia;  
The Soviets encourage ‘open debate’  
As these innocents voice their distrust and hate  
Of their Nation’s oppressor —  
Glasnost — is it just a ruse  
On the part of the Russian aggressor?’

Muscovy allows them to air their dissent,  
Or, at least, we are told that such is its stance —  
Beware! Take care of quick-setting cement  
As the Serpent leads you in the Devil’s dance;  
Be silent, Ukraine, and do not speak,  
For now is not the time,  
God only knows what Russia seeks —  
The lives of yours and mine?

‘Further dissent in the USSR?’  
The newscaster muses complacently,  
Unaware of just how lucky we are  
That we are not imprisoned, ensnared,  
And that our Liberty is unimpaired,  
Neither do we endure the perpetual blasphemy  
Of living in Fear; afraid to speak out  
Lest our families should suffer, without a doubt!

While Russia pulls the wool over the eyes of the West,  
Our Ukrainian people will never rest  
In the Struggle for Freedom and for Peace,  
Because we’ll fight without cease  
Until the Battle is truly won —  
Then, shall our great task be done!

*Olena*

*Eugene KACHMARSKY*  
Ucrainica Research Institute

## THE EVOLUTION OF THE "SECOND" ECONOMY IN THE SOVIET UNION

There has been an increasing amount of study by Western scholars in recent years on what has been named the "second" or "parallel" economy in the Soviet Union. As economic questions become more and more important to the study of history, understanding the role of the second economy in the Soviet Union is essential to an understanding of the Soviet economy on the one hand, and Soviet politics on the other. The Soviet second economy has grown over the years to the point where it includes virtually every sector of regular activity. Therefore, it can no longer remain inconsequential.

There is nothing exceptional about illegal economic activity in the Soviet Union. This kind of practice is carried on in virtually every society. However, the second economy in the Soviet Union has several characteristics that distinguish it from the black market activities as we know them in non-Soviet societies.

Before examining how the Soviet second economy evolved, it is first necessary to define, in the Soviet context, what kind of activity can be considered to be in the realm of the second economy. As one view holds, second economy activity in the Soviet Union can be defined by

"... production and exchange activity that fulfils at least one of the two following tests: (a) being directly for private gain; (b) being in some significant respect in knowing contravention of existing law"<sup>1</sup>.

However, to place our understanding of a second economy in the Soviet context, it must also be considered that it includes activities

"... (a) not explicitly taken into account in the planning process or (b) not officially sanctioned as a part of the national economy"<sup>2</sup>.

The State Planning Commission (Gosplan) dictates strict parameters for the carrying out of economic activity. Therefore, the distinctively Soviet second economy does not simply include activities that are universally accepted as illegal, but also any activity that is not specified in the economic plan.

1. Gregory Grossman, "The Second Economy of the USSR", in *Problems of Communism*, vol. 26 (Sept.-Oct.), Washington, US Information Agency, 1979. p. 25.

2. Dennis O'Hearn, "The Consumer Second Economy — Size and Effects", in *Soviet Studies*, vol. 32, no. 2 (Apr.), Torquay (GB), University of Glasgow Press, 1980. p. 218.



It should be pointed out that in the Soviet context there is also a distinction between "illegal" economic activity and "economic crime". The planned economy directives can be considered an economic law, insofar as the document is officially ratified by the Supreme Soviet. Thus, any activity outside this plan can be considered illegal in that strict sense. However, the Criminal Code of the USSR lists specific activities that are considered to be "economic crimes". Activities such as false reporting, "theft of socialist property", and speculation are dealt with as crime when they are uncovered. Therefore, both criminally illegal and economically illegal activities are part of the Soviet second economy<sup>3</sup>

### Evolution of the Second Economy

Before and during World War II, production and consumption of consumer goods were low. This was because investment priorities were put on defence and heavy industry by Lenin, and, to a greater extent, by Stalin. Because the emphasis was on military and heavy industry development, there was a technological lag in consumer production, poor design and quality of consumer goods being the result. Stalin's neglect of consumer needs was well known to contemporaries and historians alike. "Consumers fared poorly under Stalin. In 1950 real household consumption per capita, after large declines during the 1930s and during the war, had reached a level only about one tenth above that in 1928. The people of the Soviet Union were ill-clothed, ill-housed and ill-fed by any modern standard"<sup>4</sup>. After Stalin's death, emphasis was periodically put on one type of consumer good but never for a sustained period or on the consumer sector as a whole<sup>5</sup>.

The hardships of collectivisation and the forced mass industrialisation of Stalin's "socialist reconstruction" in the 1930s (through forced famine in Ukraine) combined with the ravages of World War II to thrust other priorities upon the decision-makers in the Soviet Union. They could not afford to concentrate on consumer well-being. The population, however, wanted more and higher quality consumer goods and services<sup>6</sup>. Ideally, under the planned economy, the role of the consumer market would continually be reduced (until final elimination under communism), and be replaced by a free and equal distribution system<sup>7</sup>. But the very nature of the planned economy struc-

3 *Ibid.*, p.219, and F.J.M. Feldbrugge, "Government and Shadow Economy in the Soviet Union," in *Soviet Studies*, vol. 36, no. 4 (Oct.) 1984. pp.529-530.

4. Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Consumption", in Abram Bergson and Herbert S. Levine, eds., *The Soviet Economy Towards the Year 2000*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1983. p. 311.

5. A. Katsenelinboigen, "Coloured Markets in the Soviet Union", in *Soviet Studies*, vol. 29, no. 1 (Jan.), 1977. p.64, and Schroeder, "Consumption", p.327.

6. Katsenelinboigen, "Coloured Markets...", pp. 64-65.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

ture prevented this progression from taking place. Because Soviet economic organisation was strictly hierarchical by sector<sup>8</sup>, the relationships between the various sectors were bureaucratically defined rather than market - oriented. Each sector became primarily concerned with satisfying its own superiors, rather than ultimately satisfying consumers and the economic goals of the state as a whole<sup>9</sup>. **The need to satisfy consumer demand and to supplement the deficiencies within the planned economy itself became the chief factors behind the development of the Soviet second economy.** The shortcomings of the state economy, rising incomes and unequal access to suppliers (due to the hierarchical priority system) contributed to this.

As consumer demand began to increase, and as the use of terror to suppress individual needs was decreased after Stalin, the party and the state became more aware of the growing needs of the population, as well as of the inability of the planned economy to meet these needs. To alleviate the problem posed by increasing consumer demand, the network of the state shops was increased for the distribution of consumer goods. The number of these shops was small in proportion to the population, and they were poorly financed, as operating costs were covered strictly by sales income. To prevent speculation (the buying of goods for resale at higher prices), the state registered goods according to the seller's identification card, controlled the goods and prohibited the sale of goods by any other than authorised salespeople<sup>10</sup>. Despite the strict controls, numerous salespeople began to set aside certain items for preferred customers, who would pay higher-than-legal prices for them. The extra income of the salesperson was used partly as a bribe to the bosses or inspectors who would overlook the practice in return for a cut in the profit<sup>11</sup>.

To alleviate the problem of the inability of the planned economy to meet such basic needs as food distribution, the state allowed for an increase in agricultural private-plot production and sales of private produce. Private plots were sanctioned mainly so that collective farmers (kolkhozniki) could produce food for personal use. But in the post-Stalin period the private plot became the basis for legal and illegal private economic activity<sup>12</sup>. The state set up special markets at which private produce could be sold. Taxes were exacted from the sales income, and an upper limit was set on prices. But these markets were hard to inspect regularly, and control over them difficult. The markets became centres for the sale of private produce at above-normal prices, or in

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8. The Soviet supply system in the first economy is based on a system of priorities. The industries that are most closely related to defence or heavy industry have a priority in receiving supplies. In other words, supplies are delivered to these industries first, and those that are left over are distributed amongst the other industries, still according to the priority hierarchy.

9. Schroeder, "Consumption", p. 328.

10. Katsenelinboigen, "Coloured Markets..." p. 66.

11. Grossman, "The Second..." p. 30.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

exchange for consumer goods<sup>13</sup>. They also became centres where speculators could sell goods that were impossible to obtain through legal economic channels.

The most commonly sought-after consumer product in the Soviet Union in the post-Stalin era has been the automobile. While demand for cars has always been high, the supply of cars has been the worst of all products in the consumer sector. Over a two year period in Rostov in the 1960s, 1,000 of 3,500 cars held for the rural population were sold to people who had absolutely no rural connections. The only conclusion to draw from this is that speculators were buying up cars by stating that they had rural connections (relatives and so forth), and then selling these cars at two and three times higher than the state price. Thus, for the above-mentioned period, two out of every seven cars sold in Rostov were probably resold at the Rostov market by speculators<sup>14</sup>.

Housing was one of the first areas to which the second economy spread in its evolutionary process after the initial stage. With the increased availability of consumer goods through illegal channels (hand in hand with which went higher income levels), people began to expect more and higher quality living quarters. Due to an immediate post-war housing shortage, Stalin passed a law in August 1948, that allowed for private housing to be built on land allocated by local Soviets<sup>15</sup>.

House construction, renovation and repair were provided by state-run enterprises, such as the "Zarya" firm. But these enterprises were ill-equipped to fully satisfy the larger housing demand, due to the supplies-priority system and the low position of housing in that system. This opened up an opportunity for those who could offer their services to meet the consumer need. Enterprising individuals who had access to building materials (through theft or illegal buying) and construction or repair knowledge, began to offer their services. These individuals (and in some cases, whole underground enterprises) had better stocks of materials, more variety and better workmanship. Albeit for a higher price, they could be hired to complete a job that the state-run enterprises either could not do, could not complete properly, or could only do after a long waiting period. As an example, in 1972 in Moscow, it was estimated that for 120,000 newly built flats, 120 rubles were spent per flat for repairs and renovations, totalling 14.2 million rubles. However, state-run repair and renovation enterprises recorded an income of 4-5 million rubles.

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13. Katsenelinboigen, "Coloured Markets...", p.67, and Gregory Grossman, "Notes on the Illegal Private Economy and Corruption", in *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change*, Washington, D.C., US Government Printing Office, 1979. p. 877.

14. O'Hearn, "The Consumer...", p. 220.

15. Mervyn Matthews, *Privilege in the Soviet Union*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1978. pp. 110-11.

Therefore, 70% of the money spent in Moscow alone on housing repairs and renovations passed through the second economy<sup>16</sup>.

The state continued to fail in the provision of adequate consumer goods and services despite its realisation of growing consumer needs and because of the continued emphasis on the military and heavy industry. Individuals with access to or knowledge of demanded services now began to offer these services at their own exorbitant prices<sup>17</sup>. As the number and variety of these services rose, so did the demand for supplies to carry these services (spare parts, building materials, tools, equipment). Since there was no open market for obtaining these materials, individuals had to turn to the supplies circulating in the first economy. In order to get supplies for extra-plan activities, an individual in a firm, for example, would present a low plan-fulfilment capability, but then bribe supply officials to get supplies needed to carry on second economy activity. Others would simply steal the needed materials from their place of work, or from wherever they knew such materials were kept<sup>18</sup>.

At this point, the Soviet second economy began to play a dual role. Its first role was in the distribution of goods and services that could not otherwise be obtained in the first economy. These goods and services were either those offered by the state but hard to come by, or those demanded by the Soviet public but prohibited by the state (foreign recordings, literature, clothing, religious goods, dissident literature).

Its second role became that of acting as a supply sector for the first economy. The chief purpose of every state-enterprise administrator is to fulfil the quota set for him in the plan. However, the first economy has a priority supply system (see footnote 8) that results in huge supply deficiencies for lower priority industries. Low priority enterprises often could not meet their plan goals simply because they did not have the supplies with which to do so. The first economy suffers from inherent scarcity of producer's goods in the low-priority sector. Those administrators were then forced to look elsewhere for their supplies, or be faced with failure to meet planned goals. The only alternative outside state supply agencies was the second economy<sup>19</sup>. The administrator also has the option of turning to individuals who deal in stolen supplies. "[This practice] legalises improper means, inasmuch as it allows them [those who can get these supplies] to dispose of what was obtained with the aid of those means in the course of drawing up the plan"<sup>20</sup>.

This kind of activity resulted in the creation of a position in virtually every economic enterprise known as the *tolkach* (loosely translated: trouble-shooter). The sole job of the *tolkach* is to search for and obtain supplies

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16 William Moskoff, *Labour and Leisure in the Soviet Union*, London, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1984. p. 77, and O'Hearn, "The Consumer...", p. 225.

17. Katsenelinboigen, "Coloured Markets...", p. 72.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 74-5.

needed by a firm, whether through legal or illegal means. His job also involves the bribing of auditors, inspectors, supply allocators, managers, workers or the economic police (OBKhSS)<sup>21</sup>.

In the evolutionary process, the second economy finally spread to the area of health and educational services. Soviet citizens have always been forced to wait a long time for non-serious medical treatment at state clinics, and admission to a state hospital is equally as difficult to obtain. The best hospitals and clinics are located in the larger cities, and those in the rural areas do not have facilities for extensive medical care. Only a few physicians are allowed to have a private medical practice. But to meet the high demand for medical care, most physicians began to offer immediate medical attention for above-norm prices and after hours. Bribes could also be exacted for guaranteed medical attention during official hours<sup>22</sup>.

Similarly, the second economy spread into education, more specifically with private tutoring. The professors of most universities were so overburdened with work that their lectures and services could not satisfy the students' needs. Thus, many professors (or graduate students) began to offer private tutoring to students after hours for a high fee, the profits of which are not reported to state authorities. In Moscow University in the early 1970s, a survey revealed that an average 85% of students employed private tutors after hours in order to prepare for entrance exams<sup>23</sup>.

Thus, the Soviet second economy had its roots in the demand for consumer goods, evolved to include consumer services, and developed to a point where it has acted as a supply source for the first economy. Because it has evolved to such a sophisticated level, the question to be asked is what role the second economy plays in the overall Soviet economic picture, and how does it relate to the successful operation of the first economy.

The key in understanding the role of the second economy in the overall Soviet economic picture is the relationship it has vis-à-vis the first economy. This relationship is three-fold: supplementary, depletive and redistributive<sup>24</sup>.

### The Role of the Second Economy

The first role, as a supplement to the first economy, can be viewed as positive for the overall Soviet economic picture. The second economy provides a market for consumer goods and services that would not otherwise be obtainable by the consumer in the USSR. It not only provides a market, but

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21. Grossman, "Notes...", pp. 840-41.

22. Dmitri K. Simes, "The Soviet Parallel Market", in *Economic Aspects of Life in the USSR*, Brussels, NATO Directorate of Economic Affairs, 1975. p.94-5.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

24. O'Hearn, "The Consumer...", p. 229.

it gives Soviet citizens a source of income (albeit an illegal one), which they use to improve their living conditions<sup>25</sup>. In this sense, the second economy evolved as an element interdependent with the first economy. The state realised the deficiencies of the planned economy and resigned itself to allowing the second economy to fill the gaps left by the first<sup>26</sup>.

In its second role the second economy plays a depletive, and thus harmful role. Where theft of property or other second economy activities impede the successful implementation of the planned economic goals, the second depletes the resources of the first economy. This is also true when second economy production hampers performance in the first economy, resulting in poor quality or decreased production (as is the result from widespread alcohol production and distribution in the second economy. The case with narcotics also holds true, although to a much lesser extent)<sup>27</sup>. The depletive role has thus a negative influence in the overall economic picture and in the relationship between the first and second economies.

The third and final role of the second economy is of a redistributive character. The first economy, with its serious supply deficiencies, would not be able to meet its goals without the help of the second economy. The latter provides supplies and services for the carrying out of planned economic goals<sup>28</sup>. This in itself would indicate a positive relationship. The reverse is the case when redistribution results from the theft of supplies intended for other purposes. In the main, the redistributive role has a positive effect on the relationship between the first and second economies.

Despite its negative aspects, the Soviet second economy has flourished over the past forty years, and Soviet authorities have in fact done little to inhibit its evolution.

Soon after World War II, the Soviet authorities saw the futility of trying to curb all private economic activity. This was demonstrated by the increasing allowance for such activity in successive Five Year Plans<sup>29</sup>. In general, the authorities viewed the second economy in two aspects: parasitic and symbiotic. Second economy activity is parasitic when it harms the production process of the first economy, but it is symbiotic when it contributes to first economy success or when it acts as a supplement to first economy deficiencies<sup>30</sup>.

The difficulty facing the party and the state in the evolution of the second economy has always been the juxtaposition of the latter to the ideological principles which govern the Soviet economic and socio-political systems. These activities promote individual desire for material goods leading to an in-

25. *Ibid.*, p.229.

26. Feldbrugge, "Government...", p. 531.

27. O'Hearn, "The Consumer...", p. 230.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 230

29. Feldbrugge, "Government...", p. 530.

30. *Ibid.*, p.531.

crease in consumption. They also create strata and escalate class conflict by creating an unequal distribution of goods and thus wealth<sup>31</sup>.

### The Official Position

An overview of the Soviet press in recent years has revealed a trend that would seem to support the idea of compatibility of the second economy with so-called "socialist morality". As recently as 1984, virtually every issue of the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* had a minimum of one article referring to abuses related to second economy activities. The reports ranged from one involving a chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, to one involving common workers at the Volga Automotive Plant<sup>32</sup>. This would indicate that second economy activities are carried out on every level of the Soviet economy.

However, in 1985-86, the incidents of abuse and illegal activities according to press reports decreased by a substantial amount. Conversely, there was an increase in the public criticism by Soviet authorities of the poor consumer industry. These reports were mixed with admissions of the difficulties involved in improving the economy consumer sector<sup>33</sup>. A conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Soviet government realises the contradiction of a second economy with "socialist principles", yet,

"It is fair to say that while the authorities are basically opposed to the parallel market, they are forced to live with it..."<sup>34</sup>.

### Conclusion

The Soviet second economy has been forty years in the making, and it has reached such proportions that it must be considered when studying Soviet economic or political history. (For an example of the extent to which the second economy has evolved, see Table). For the authorities to restrict second economy activity they would have to force tighter centralisation of the economy and of society as a whole. This would result in eliminating the only source of filling in the gaps left by the first economy. It would also cause further unrest in the population — particularly among the non-Russian nations in the USSR — which can no longer live in an industrially advanced state, yet still have a standard of living that is well below that of other indus-

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31. O'Hearn, "The Consumer...", p. 231, and Grossman, "The Second...", p. 31.

32. "Izvestia", Jan. 6, 1984 and "Izvestia", June 8, 1984. Both articles are found in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 34, no.2, p.9 and no.23, p.3, Columbus, Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1984.

33. "Pravda", Aug. 5, 1986, in *CDSP*, vol. 38, no.35, pp.20-21.

34. Simes, "The Soviet...", p. 98.

trially advanced societies. Mikhail Gorbachev's present economic reforms would seem to indicate that the present Soviet government is not going along this road. The problem which he faces, as did every Soviet leader before him, is how to reconcile economic pragmatism with "socialist principles", and, above all, assuring the integrity of the Soviet Union. It is also a problem of when to draw the limit where the Soviet economy stops being socialist and begins to resemble its capitalist counterpart.

**Table 1**

**Second Economy Agricultural Output: 1982 (in millions of tonnes)**

Product	USSR total output	Second Economy output	Second Economy percentage total
potatoes	78.0	48.0	61.0%
vegetables	29.0	9.6	33.1%
meat	15.24	4.6	30.2%
milk	90.1	24.4	27.1%
eggs (billions)	72.1	22.1	30.5%

Sources; "The Development of Personal Auxiliary Farming in the Soviet Countryside", *Istoria SSSR*, no. 5, Sept.-Oct., 1984, pp. 120-126 in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 37, no. 19, pp. 14-15, and John L. Scherer, *USSR: Facts and Figures*, 1983, p. 159.

Although this is just a survey of one consumer sector, it provides an idea of the general extent of the second economy in relation to the first.



*Mykola ZEROV*

## **MODERN UKRAINIAN LITERATURE**

“Nove ukrainske pysmenstvo”, Instytut Literatury,  
Munich 1960, p. 11-38.

### **I**

#### **INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. PERIODISATION & SCHEMES OF MODERN UKRAINIAN LITERATURE. TRENDS & MOVEMENTS IN MODERN UKRAINIAN LITERATURE. RESERVATIONS & REMARKS.**

##### **1. Introductory remarks**

The starting date of Modern (New) Ukrainian Literature is regarded usually as 1798 when in St. Petersburg at the expense of the Konotop nobleman Maksym Parpura, the first three parts of Kotliarevskyi's “Parody of the Aeneid” were published.

However, of course, as is the case with all similar dates this year is an approximate and provisional date. The typical features of the modern literary age first came to light several decades before Kotliarevskyi and Parpura. Firstly, the social base of Ukrainian cultural life began to change markedly. The old Ukrainian clergy and the Cossack officers who were the creators and connoisseurs of literary values in the 17th century and the first half of the 18th century, began gradually to lose their national identity. Kyiv lost its place as the “Ukrainian Paris” and nursery of bishops; Ukrainian ecclesiastic publishing came under regulation and prohibition; cantors and itinerant scholars were restricted by special statutes and the old relationships among the clergy disappeared while instead the custom and practices of the Russian Church were introduced. The Cossack officers who until recently had held autonomous views and dreamt of noble privileges in the Polish mode, that is a certain amount of self-government and political rights, now more and more often began to turn their attention to the “liberties” of the Russian nobles. During the office of the “Chief Little Russian Commander” Rumyantsev in the 1760s-1780s, finally they went over to the Russian side moving towards a complete merger with the privileged Russian groups. Secondly, the literary centre, the old seat of Ukrainian Culture, the Kyivan Academy, went into decline. Patriarchal in make-up and scholastic in direction it ceased to satisfy the spiritual enquiries of the Ukrainian youth which thereupon flooded in waves to universities abroad and to schools in St. Petersburg and Moscow. Together

with the academy the old Slavo-Ukrainian written language also went into decline. Hryhoriy Konyskyi the Byelorussian Archbishop (1717-1795) in his spiritual dramas composed in the mid-18th century wrote in a language not far removed from Teofan Prokopovych. However, Skovoroda, who was his junior by only a few years (1722-1794) heralds a certain disintegration of the old written language. He mixes Slavo-Ukrainian expressions and idioms with popular Great Russian and Ukrainian equivalents and moreover in the most peculiar and sometimes grotesque combinations. As for the third at the time eminent pupil of the Academy, Samuil Myslavskyi this talented and flexible prince of the Church marks the now complete decline of the old language. After taking leave of Kyiv in the 1860s for a spiritual career in Great Russia he took part there in the formation of the Russian literary language. He became a writer "abundant in his knowledge of the Russian word". When in 1783 he returned to Kyiv to take up the Metropolitan Seat, he first of all ordered the students and professors of the Academy "to learn the Russian language and pronunciation". His biographer and panygerist in sweet words which hardly conceal the grim and unsavoury truth, notes "Even the children did not escape the attention of the zealous prelate. He appointed a special teacher at the technical college...to teach the boys living there Russian reading and writing and charged him to take every step to ensure the correct pronunciation. Samuil's insistence was so great that some tutors frankly explained to him that they could not carry out his will strictly, because they simply could not change their Little Russian pronunciation"<sup>1</sup>.

Such are the features of the second half of the 18th century. It is a period of resolute, involuntary and voluntary Russification of the privileged Ukrainian groups. Absolutely everyone of distinction or talent in Ukraine went it seems to the capital cities where they were promoted to high station (the ministers Zavadoskyi, Kochubei, Troshchynskyi and the chancellor Bezborodko) or joined in Russian literary and scientific life (the writers Emin and Ruban, the archivist Bantysh-Kamenskyi and the medical specialist Ambo-dyk-Maksymovych). The officers' children were followed by those of the clergy and the Cossacks. Russification was spread by the pupils of the St. Petersburg and Moscow schools to the academy youth of provincial Kharkiv and Kyiv. P. Zhytetskyi in his tract on Kotliarevskyi's *Eneida* and its links with the literature of the 18th century quotes two books whose special purpose was to make it easier for pupils in urban schools to learn the difficult Russian orthography and pronunciation. One of the books appeared in 1772 entitled *Pravila o proiznoshenii russkikh bukv i ob ispravnom tikh zhe v noviyshem grazhdanskom pismi upotreblenii, ili o pravopisanii, sobrannyya iz rossiyskikh grammatik* (Rules governing the pronunciation of Russian letters and their correct usage in modern civil writing, or on orthographies collected from Russian grammars).

The author lists a series of errors, phonetic morphological and stylistic made by Ukrainians using the Russian language. In particular he recommends that in the interests of good pronunciation they familiarise themselves "with

the gentle Muscovite pronunciation". The other book was published ten years later in Kharkiv, entitled *Kratkiya pravila rossiyskavo pravopisaniya, iz raznykh grammatik vybrannyya i po svoystvu malorossiyskavo dialekta dlya upotrebleniya malorossiyanam dopolnennyya* (A summary of rules governing Russian orthography selected from various grammars and supplements on the properties of the Little Russian dialect).

Alongside such textbooks, in the Ukrainian province disrespect spread for the Ukrainian language, old literary and living vernacular together with the entire popular-poetic tradition as though they were uncultivated, barbaric and not marked by "pure taste". In one provincial epigram, if it is possible to call 21 lines of ugly verse an epigram, written on the occasion of a provincial ode marking the death of Rummyantsev, the author of the epigram addresses the author of the ode as follows:

Akh, est li b ne pel geroyev  
 No slavu pel odnykh oslov.  
 I byl pravitel kobzy stroyev.  
 Izobretatel grubnykh slov!...  
 Ty b luchshe pel v shinke meshchanam  
 Kozatski podvigi i trud.  
 Voznes by v njih lyubov k stakanam,  
 To shag tebe za to dadut.

(If you'd but cease to sing of heroes  
 And celebrate instead just asses,  
 And be a sovereign of the Kobza's chords,  
 Contriver of coarse words!...  
 You'd better do to sing in taverns to the commoners  
 Of Cossack feats and labour,  
 Inspiring in their love of drink.  
 And there'd be half a kopeck for your trouble.)

The "kobza" is treated here as something immeasurably inferior to the mellifluous classical lyre, while the "coarse words" which can be used to describe only "Cossack feats" in terms of commoners' kopecks, are evidently the Ukrainian old literary and popular languages.

Nevertheless, in Ukraine some individuals and even groups kept apart from this powerful Russification movement. These were people who had been educated and who lived in quiet, old-world secluded corners far from modern influences. For them the "coarse words" and "Cossack feats" reflected in a colourful folk song had not lost their charm. They were old-world priests who found "Great Russian pronunciation" an insurmountable obstacle, petty nobility and provincial bureaucrats. Not without reason, Nekrashevych, not a bishop as were his predecessors the Baranovychi and Konyski but a priest, and Kotliarevskyi, an army officer and then a minor government official now dominated the literary scene.

Ivan Nekrashevych, academic reciter during the chancellorship of Samuil Myslavskyi "versed" in Latin and Slavo-Ukrainian oratory, began with works

composed in the old written language (the dialogue *Spor dushi s telom* — Dispute between the soul and the body). However, turning to as they were called then “vulgar” themes from peasant life he referred to the vernacular of the North Ukrainian type though considerably more pure than the language of Konyskyi’s intermedia. As for Kotliarevskyi, who grew up in the period of the decline of the old literary language, there could be no wavering for him between the written language and the vernacular. Before him lay only one path, namely to adapt the living Ukrainian spoken language to literary creativity.

Nevertheless, this was too bold a step. The vernacular was far removed from the lofty and refined material treated by contemporary classical literature. Ukrainian tradition provided only one example of the use of the “vulgar” language: the intermedia or interlude for serious “high style” religious or historical drama. Intermedia and primitive semi-popular Christmas and Easter verse were in fact the only point of reference that Kotliarevskyi and his contemporaries<sup>2</sup> could base their plans on. Doubtless, they felt a certain awkwardness at the very thought of using the living vernacular as a vehicle for “high” literature; therefore in their works they stopped short at a form of jocular, parodic poem which did not break so abruptly with tradition. Russian literature too converted the Ukrainian writer to this very way. At the time it had several works in the burlesque style which made wide use of vernacular and provided examples of crude popular writing.

Thus by the end of the 18th century all the characteristic traits of the new literary age were set: 1) Russification of the upper strata of Ukrainian society as a result of which the middle strata, petty landowners, provincial officials and clergy, became the producers and consumers of Ukrainian literature 2) the decline of the old literary Slavo-Ukrainian language, which on the one hand gave certain scope to the Russian language and on the other prompted a desire to use the popular tongue after putting its phonetics in order and perfecting its style 3) a certain timidity in literary initiative which after choosing the living vernacular, nevertheless, did not dare to break with tradition, restricting itself to “vulgar style” and burlesque, the only usage permitted by contemporary theories and 4) the obvious influence of Russian culture which from the mid-18th century began to reflect more and more clearly on Ukrainian life and creativity<sup>3</sup>.

The first literary work to appear under these circumstances, bearing all the indications listed above, for our purposes until Lobysevych’s *Shepherds* are found and the works of other figures “in taste public”, is Kotliarevskyi’s *Eneida*. Publication of it began at the end of the 18th century.

## 2. Periodisation and schemes of Modern Ukrainian Literature

Beginning their account in 1798 our historians include in the concept of modern Ukrainian literature all the literary production of the 19th century

and the first two decades of the 20th century. This gives us a lengthy period of time, 125 years, covering the most varied figures, trends and works. During this time span a considerable change occurred in the socio-psychological mode of the Ukrainian man of letters. There was a broadening and enrichment of the circle of readers and a considerable wealth of ideas was injected into literary turnover. This is reflected in the choice of subjects and characters, leaving its marks on the methods and means of artistic perception. Writers set themselves ever broader tasks and accordingly developed and enriched the literary language. Jocular and slightly caricatured in travesties it was adapted to Kvitka's sentimental pathos, gained in flexibility, gentleness and power in Shevchenko's lyrics, blossomed like honeysuckle in the romantic stories of Marko Vovchok while in Kulish's translations it strives to grasp Western European poets and expand in breadth towards assimilating the highest achievements of world literature.

What periods are discernible in the history of modern Ukrainian literature?

Academician M. I. Petrov who wrote in the 1880s and made quite comprehensive use of all previous literary surveys, divided the development of Ukrainian literature into six periods. He included Kotliarevskyi and Hulak-Artemovskiy in the first which he named the Pseudoclassical period and the reaction against it, a time of poetic parodies, odes and comic operas. Kvitka-Osnovianenko and his stories began in his opinion the second period, the Sentimental period. The third period, the period of "romantic artistic literature" which was "produced by the reciprocal influence of Russian and Polish poet-artists: Pushkin, Mickiewicz and others" encompasses the works of Metlynskyi, Zabala and Afanasev-Chuzhbynskyi. The fourth period, of "national literature", in Petrov's view presently came to be regarded as "a combination of Classicism and Romanticism according to the principle of nationality ("narodnist") but was in fact a copy of "sinister Slavophile aspirations". He includes here Maksymovych and Bodianskyi collectors of ethnographic material who stand outside the confines of artistic literature, Mykola Hohol and Hrebinka both being mainly historical story writers regardless of the fact that the historical tales were written in Russian, Oleksa Storozhenko and the untalented raconteur of "Little Russian anecdotes" without the slightest gift for literature, Petro Raievskiy. Petrov entitles the fifth period, the Ukrainian Slavophile period. It runs from the end of 1840s to the beginning of the 1860s and is characterised by links with Russian Slavophilism and hostility to the "Polish idea". Its representatives are Kostomarov, Kulish and Shevchenko. Finally, Petrov marks the beginning of the 1860s as the period of "modern Ukrainophilism" characterised by its "democratic direction", "resolute opposition to the Polish aristocracy" and literary links with the Russian realist school. The scheme ends with a reservation. In most cases it is difficult to ascribe Ukrainian writers completely to one or other group. The rapid change in literary concepts and taste attributable to lack of independence and plagiarism ("podrazhatelnost") inherent traits of Ukrainian literature, produced occasions when sometimes one and the same author tried his

strength "in various literary genres and directions" and could therefore be included "in several periods at once".

It cannot be said that academician Petrov's attempt at periodisation was very accurate. Our first object is the obvious smallness of division. In the period of so-called "national literature", if you exclude Maksymovych and Bodianskyi as men of science and Hohol-junior as a Russian writer, that leaves only two literary figures who hardly resemble each other, Hrebinka and Storozhenko; the anecdotists Raievskyi, of course, cannot come into the reckoning. The question arises of whether it is worth creating a separate category for two secondary writers. Petrov's other shortcoming is the vagueness (and clumsiness) of his historico-literary terminology. What for example is the meaning of the term "romantic-artistic literature"? Surely the literature of other directions was not artistic? Or, what is meant by national literature? And why are Hrebinka and Storozhenko included in it and not Kulish, Kostomarov and Shevchenko? Furthermore, a third misunderstanding, what principle does Prof. Petrov base his division on? At first it may seem that he is concerned about changes in "literary concepts and taste" when he refers to pseudoclassical, sentimental and romantic periods. However, when we come to the name of the fourth period, that of national literature with the explanation that this designation signifies the domination of "sinister Slavophile aspirations", it seems very doubtful. It compels one to think that the author is interested not in changes of taste but changes in social moods. As for the name of the last and sixth period, "modern Ukrainophilism", however much Petrov tries to endow it with a historical-social content, it is purely chronological and ultimately deprives the scheme of any logical consistency. The chronological framework of the periods applied by Prof. Petrov are likewise uncertain and unclear. And not to mention that in one period he includes the works of Hrebinka who flourished in the 1830s, Storozhenko, whose *Ukrainski opovidannia* were published in 1863 and Petro Raievskyi who began his quasilitrary work only in the 1870s.

Truer by far is the "geographic" view of Ukrainian literature which M. I. Petrov mentions in the foreword to his book and which researchers frequently adhere to later, particularly O. S. Hrushevskyi in the book *Z novoho ukrainskoho pysmenstva*. Turning points and changes in the history of Ukrainian writing according to these views bear a certain relationship to the location and source of cultural influences. Kotliarevskyi and Kvitka, Kostomarov and Metlynskyi linked exclusively with the left bank of the Dnipro and remain chiefly in the sphere of Russian influences. Their work covers the first Poltava-Kharkiv period in Ukrainian literature from 1798 to the beginning of the 1840s. Kostomarov's move to Kyiv and the organisation of the Kyivan centre initiates the short but brilliant first Kyivan period, the time of the Brotherhood of St. Cyril and Methodius and the sumptuous blossoming of Shevchenko's work. This is followed by the third Petersburg period of "Osnova" and hegemony of Kulish which covers the so-called 1860s a short period of liberal moods and liberal reforms between the Crimean War and

the first reactionary ripples (1856-1863); the fourth and second Kyivan period which runs from the start of the 1860s to the Ems Decree of 1876, the administrative persecutions which banned the publication of Ukrainian books on this side of the border; and the fifth-Kyivan-Lviv period dominated by Lviv (1876-1906) when almost every writer emigrated abroad gathering now round Drahomanov and the radical institutions, now round *Halytska Zoria* or the Shevchenko Society and the *Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk*. The revolution of 1905 which improved conditions for Ukrainian publishing inside Russia and heavy customs duties which made it impossible to disseminate Galician newspapers in Eastern Ukraine, introduce us to the sixth-Kyiv-Lviv period dominated by Kyiv. It commences with the transfer of the *Lit. Naukovyi Vistnyk* to Kyiv (at the end of 1906) and terminates with the decline of the Kyivan centre in 1919-1920.

This "geographic" view of Ukrainian literature as Prof. Petrov calls it, has the virtue of making it possible to encompass in a single scheme all the main phenomena of so-called history: the organisation of groups, civic societies, development of journalism and interrelations between writers and readers. However, even this view requires a host of corrections and additions particularly when we approach the main theme of historico-literary studies: changes in direction, the evolution of literary concepts and artistic means. Thus, when referring to the Poltava-Kharkiv period 1798-1845 we will have to add that from the stylistic point of view it divides clearly into two epochs: the age of burlesque and sentimental tale and the age of romantic themes and forms. In mentioning the Kyiv-Lviv period 1906-1920 we must emphasise that from a strictly literary point of view it is not consistent since the first years are characterised by a refinement of the realistic manner in prose (Kotsiubynskyi), the middle years, by a change to romantic moods and subjects (*Lisova pishnia* by L. Ukrainka, Oles, Kobylanska) and the final years, by definite sorties into Symbolism and Futurism.

Concluding our remarks on periodisations and schemes we mention in addition the ingenious though not unfortunately developed thought expressed by A. Vasylo (A.V. Nikovskyi) in one of his newspaper articles. Nikovskyi is interested mainly in the stages which Ukrainian literature passed through "as it was drawn into the mainstream of universal literature". He regards as typical and very important the facts that modern Ukrainian literature begins with none other than the attempts to clad in original national dress a literary work of European import, a prototype for many modern epic poems, Virgil's *Aeneid*. However, in Kotliarevskyi's *Aeneid* travesty there are no copies and there is no rehash, merely a parody, "a modest smile at a serious subject transferred to the setting of our diminutive life". The parodies were followed by translations. Beginning in the 1870s-1880s the Bible, Homer's poems, the tragedies of Sophocles and Shakespeare, Goethe and Schiller, gradually became acquisitions of the Ukrainian language. Finally, Lesia Ukrainka began her third period, the period of her own compositions on universal themes. This was the very pinnacle reached by Ukrainian poetry with such works as

*Kaminnyi hospodar*, *Kassandra*, *Iuda (Na poli krov)* and the Promethean *Katakomby*. Deep within, Nikovskyi's view contains a fine and true observation. Travesty, translation and finally the original treatment of a universal theme are indeed three stages in the development of Ukrainian poetic style. However, this view, of course, does not encompass the total diversity of literary events. They can only be encompassed by a scheme based on changes in literary events. They can only be encompassed by a scheme based on changes in literary directions, that is, changes not in style but in literary ideologies<sup>4</sup>.

### Trends and movements in Modern Ukrainian Literature

As in modern Russian or Polish literature, the Ukrainian literary scene in the 19th-20th century was gradually dominated by five literary movements — Classicism, Sentimentalism, Romanticism, Realism and Neo-Romanticism. However, in the Ukrainian case there are certain original traits in the nature of these movements, their vigour and duration and the development of corresponding ideologies and writing methods. Some movements came late and passed by without crystallising; others on the contrary manifested themselves vigorously and acutely, lasted long and then for a time outlived their stay in frozen, ossified forms.

At the very outset of the 19th century we meet a typical phenomenon in our literature, the coexistence of the poetic travesty, a literary genre which in other literatures had long since seen its golden age, and the sentimental comedy as exemplified by *Natalka Poltavka* and the sentimental story *Marusia*. In Russia the fashion for travesty passed away together with the 18th century with *Dushenka* by Bogdanovich and *Yelisey* by Maykov. Osipov-Kotelniitskyi's *Eneida na iznanku* which Kotliarevskyi began to revise was an anachronism in its time. In Ukrainian literature due to the specific conditions in which it developed and primarily its provincial characters, the travesty appeared on the scene in the shape of Liubysevych's *Shepherds (Pastukhy)* and Kotliarevskyi's *Eneida* at the very end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century. Lighting upon a local tradition of "studni kanty" (jocular, semi-literary — semi-popular verse) it won the sympathies of a wide circle of readers and assuming the remnants of pseudoclassical form, became one of the most popular genres. Thus it remained until the end of the 1830s roughly one year after Kotliarevskyi's death. It retained its popularity alongside the sentimental story and sharing literary honours with the latter exerted a great influence even on the age. Kotliarevskyi's *Eneida* was in the first decades of the 19th century the most significant and most important literary event, more so than Kvitka's *Marusia*. Therefore, we are completely justified in calling this the age of the classical travesty and the sentimental story (initially the travesty and subsequently the story).

The Romantic movement appeared in Ukrainian literature at the end of the 1820s partly influenced by scientific study of popular works and partly by



reading the Russian and Polish romantics. Byron and Byronism which reaped such an abundant harvest in Russia and Poland, caused no reverberations in Ukrainian literature if we exclude several translations by Kostomarov from his *Hebreiski meloodii* (*Zhurba ievreiska, Misiats and Pohybel Senakheryba*). Zhukovskiy and Kozlov played a slightly weightier role, the first with ballads, the second with his elegies. Of course, Pushkin and Lermontov were influential and of the Polish writers, Mickiewicz, who left his mark on Shevchenko's *Son* and Kostomarov's *Knyhy bytia Ukrainskoho narodu* with its "evangelical democratism", messianic idea and historical prophecies. Romantic moods and themes were retained by Ukrainian literature up to the 1860s. They break through the realistic intent of Kulish's *Chorna Rada*, colour the stories of Marko Vovchok, the poetry of Shchoholiv and Rudanskyi and are displayed only gradually by the Ethnographic Realism of Nechuy-Levytskyi and P. Myrnyi.

During the same 1860s while Marko Vovchok composed her sentimental romantic stories, an original ethnographic-realist movement began in Ukrainian literature lasting until about the mid-1890s. It came to the fore with the at the time unpublished story by Svidnitskyi *Liuboratski* and developed in the writings of Nechuy-Levytskyi and P. Myrnyi. Only at the end of the 1870s and the beginning of the 1880s subject to Drahomanov's critical remarks was this naive, superficially descriptive realism channelled into ideologically deeper waters. The young Galician radicals Pavlyk and Franko (especially the latter in his *Boryslavski opovidannia*) adopted the positivist view of literature as "artistic sociology" and "sociology in images" and thereby approached French Naturalism. The poetry of the 1870s and 1880s still retains romantic themes but presently even they disappear in Starytskyi's civic pathos and the social motifs of Franko's *Z vershyn i nyzyn*.

The mid-1890s brought a new pitch to Ukrainian literature in the sphere of artistic prose. In 1896 *Tsarivna* a story by O. Kobylanska appeared in several issues of the newspaper *Bukovyna*. The heroine of this story bored by the confines of Philistine life in a Galician family, reads Nietzsche and begins to write. She reveals a whole gallery of ideal women figures, Ukrainian Noras, cultivated women of substance who wage a stubborn struggle for individuality. On the whole Kobylanska as a writer is not without a gift for realism which is clearly evidenced by the pictures of the petty bourgeois life of the Ivanovychi in *Tsarivna*, stories like *Bank rustykalnyi* and *Zemlia*. However, internally she gravitates to the heights, the delicate psyches of selected exceptional natures and to legend. In one of the stories *V nediliu rano zillia kopala* she makes a decisive break with petty daily life. Proud, pristinely pure characters, virgin fir forests, a grim and bloody song of yore, fortune-telling and the secret voice of promotion — this is the stuff of her story writing. As for the other prose writers of this period, Yatskiv, talented but unbalanced wavers between extreme Naturalism and extreme Symbolism, Kotsiubynskyi, Stefanyk and Vynnychenko are skilled and profound exponents of Naturalism. Like Franko they are not afraid to confront the darkest sides of

life, especially Stefanyk, a penetrating observer of peasant grief. However, their narrative manner differs from Franko's, reverting time after time to protocolism. All three perfected their writing technique using impressionist means, are economic with words and know how to preserve the rhythm and musicality of the phrase. The same fluctuations between new refined Realism and Neo-Romanticism are manifest in poetry: in the works of Lesia Ukrainka, the Galician group "Moloda Muza", Oles, Filianskyi and others. This diarchy, the predominance in literature of Neo-Realism and Neo-Romanticism (on the one hand the rise of Futurism, the revolutionary poetry of the Kharkivites, the prose of Khvylovyi, and on the other, the symbolist manner of Tychna, Zahul, Savchenko and Mykhailychenko) are typical even today.

Consequently, putting chronological dates to our scheme we arrive at the following table:

- I The age of Classical remnants and Sentimentalism (the travesty, sentimental operetta and sentimental story), from 1798 to the end of the 1830s.
- II The age of Romantic views and forms (the imaginary tale and the historic tale, the ballad and song), from the end of the 1820s to the end of the 1860s.
- III The age of naive Realism, the Realism of descriptive manners and finally with a tendency to Naturalism — from the end of the 1860s to the mid-1890s.
- IV The age of Neo-Realism and Neo-Romanticism from the mid-1890s to the present day.

#### 4. Reservations and remarks.

Nevertheless, even this scheme cannot be accepted without several reservations and remarks.

The first apply to Galician literature at the beginning of the 19th century, the pre-Shashkevych era of Osyp Levytskyi, Symeon Lysentetskyi and others. Contemporaries of Kotliarevskyi, Hulak-Artemovskiy and Kvitka these writers still used the old Slavonic language littered with Polonisms and Germanisms which was at the same stage of disintegration as when Skovoroda composed his works. The literary forms, the panegyric ode, "vizerunok tsnot" (portrait of virtues) and the bursa (collegiate) verse "na vypadok" (in case), also date from the 18th century. In this case ideological horizons simply do not apply. Only chronological dates link such works as *Domobolie* (Heimweh — homesickness) by O. Levytskyi and *Vozzrinie strashilisha* by S. Lysetskyi with the 19th century. In terms of content this is scholastic poetry of the previous age, stemming from the times of Teofan Prokopovych or Mytrofan Dovhalevskyi. Therefore, quite justifiably, it is not included in the survey.

As a rule the phenomenon of delay and lagging behind, and not only be-

hind one's neighbours but one's own compatriots the leading Ukrainian writers, is a typical feature of our literary development. If we take a close look at the works of our authors we notice that on entering the literary scene they appeared as an enormous often even touching anachronism. We may quote as examples, Storozhenko's *Ukrainski opovidannia* and particularly the poem *Marko Prokliaty* at the end of the 1860s; Shchoholiv's oldfashioned, romantic ballads *Vorskla* and *Slobodzhanshchyna* in the 1880s and 1890s and Panas Myrnyi's "Durnytsia" and "Za vodoiu" in the *Literaturno-naukovyi Vistnyk* 1908-1919. This phenomenon is attributable to the abnormal situation in which our literature found itself and which gave our literary life an irregular, intermittent character. Various "scourges and scorpions", the Cyril and Methodius trial in 1847, the Valuyev Circular of 1863, the Ems Decree ("Yusefovychiv zakon") of 1867 and the censorship repressions of the 1880s-1890s were enormous obstacles in the path of our literary development, sometimes holding it back for a long time. As a result of these interruptions writers whose literary views and styles were established in a previous period when censorship was less severe, had to put their writing aside, concealing their literary plans and breaking off or postponing further the work they had began. When better times returned and they were able to publish it very often happened that their themes and artistic manner were obsolete and had become somewhat alien and superfluous to the new readership. Thus, O. Storozhenko (1805-1874) for example was an obvious "innate romantic". His literary taste was formed under the influence of Hohol's *Vechory* and *Myrhorod*. He was interested in historical legends and popular beliefs. "Our wonderful Ukrainian beauteous looks", he wrote, "warmed by the hot southern sun, sow the seeds of poetry and enchantment in the dmy; ripen like wheat in the sun and are gathered in sheaves and stacks. And so too the seed embedded in the heart and thought ripens into corncocks of words and is harvested in folk tales and legends". The writer's task in his opinion was in fact to shape and fashion the folk tales and legends giving them an artistically complete and effective form. All Storozhenko's tales, humourist-genre, fiction-fantasy and historical have a popular-poetic base. Like Hohol he interweaves in the most whimsical manner fantasy and reality and as with Hohol, the reader is struck by the excess of comicalness and colouring. Of course, if the stories had appeared in the 1830s and even the 1840s they would have met with undoubted literary success. However, an amateur ethnographer and romantic Storozhenko was at the same time a conscientious official of the borderland type, first in Kyiv and then Warsaw working under governor generals. As an ordinary functionary he was pathologically sensitive to government censures and the suspicious looks of high-ranking circles. The catastrophe of 1847 witnessed by him in Warsaw (the arrest and exile of Kulish) had a profound effect on him. It was only in 1861-1862 that his stories appeared in *Osnova*. However, by that time there was very little interest in him: "Kulish, Kostomarov, Bilozerskyi and tutti quanti", as he himself complained, "were full of praise for Marko Vovchok", while his stories were only

of secondary interest to Ukrainian readers who could find in them neither artistic depth nor accurate ethnographic detail. Moreover, if his best work the poem *Marko Proklyaty* remained unfinished then the reason was not only: "we were under attack from Cato (the reactionary Russian publicist Katkov) who rewarded our good intentions with the distateful epithet of separatism", and as a result "everywhere there arose a kind of indifference to the native tongue". There was another reason, the insulting indifference of his contemporaries to his colourful but oldfashioned writings. *Marko Proklyaty* found only one interested reader, but he was "a relic of the last century". There is a story told that old Hulak-Artemovskiy after reading Storozhenko's poem in manuscript, enraptured wrote in the blank margin: "I've never read anything better and won't do till the day I die". The younger generation certainly had a different view. It could give due credit to talent but itself needed realistic stories.

Yakiv Shchoholiv was even more of a latecomer. Whilst Storozhenko's literary development was delayed by his official conscience preventing him from writing works which were suspicious from the government point of view, Shchoholiv's pen broke on confrontation with hostile criticism. The intervals in his writings lasted several years; the longest pause was for nigh on 17 years. Shchoholiv himself tells us how after abandoning once and for all writing verse he by chance heard his song *Hei u mene buv koniak* ("I once had a horse") set to music and touched by the unexpected popularity of the work he decided to resume writing verse. However, having just retired and "gone to pasture" around 1880 he collected his former poems and adding to them a few freshly written ones, prepared for publication his first collection *Vorskla*, his "debt of memory and gratitude to the poetic river which nurtured him" his "childhood and youth...and inspired his first poetic visions". The contents of *Vorskla* and the latter collection *Slobodzhanshchyna* comprise songs and ballads based on folk songs and stories devoted mostly to the transitory age when the old Cossack psychology was dying out and the new farming spirit was being born (*Zolota bandura*, *Barvinkova Stinka*, *U poli*, *Babyna kazka*, *Khortytsia*, *Opiznyvsia*, *Ostannia Sich*, *Kobzar* and others). Of course, for the reader of the time brought up on the poetry of Nekrasov and drawn to the social timbre of Storozhenko's verse, this material was old-fashioned. Shchoholiv did not move the reader; his books were slow to sell (it was not difficult to obtain a copy of *Slobodzhanshchyna* in 1917-1918) while the poet himself felt like a "Lonely swan", an "unsung minstrel":

Tak v toy chas yak nastyhaye  
V samoti yoho kinets,  
Hordovyto umyraye  
Nepritanyi spivets.

(*Lebid*)

(And as it nears,  
His lonely end,  
Proudly he dies.  
The unsung minstrel)

The late and unsung writers, Storozhenko, follower of early Hohol, or Shchoholiv, the enraptured minstrel of romantic *Slobodzhanshchyna*, are only one consequence of the difficult conditions in which Ukrainian literature existed and developed. Another consequence was the protracted and obstinate experience of literary styles in the provinces in disseminated and often manuscript "reader's literature" ("literatura chytacha")<sup>5</sup>. The feebleness of our literary centres and the almost total absence of periodicals (we had no journals before the appearance of *Osnova* while collections such as *Snip or Lastivka* appeared seldom) led to a situation where in the provinces there were established a particular attitude to the Ukrainian word, a particular literary manner which recreated the style and means of the age which the centre had already experienced. While the front rank of writers turned to historical dramas and poems, romances and ballads, in the provinces, "in the villages and farmsteads" the travesty and vaudeville continued to flourish and *Eneida* and *Natalka Poltavka* were regarded as unrivalled examples of Ukrainian creativity. Let us cite as an example the Kuban officer and patriot Yakiv Kukhareenko who imitating the *Eneida* wrote *Kharko zaporozkyi koshovyi* and copying *Natalka* composed *Chornomorskyi pobyt*; in the same way the Ukrainian Theatre too which to an enormous degree was also a product of nature and the provinces preserved for a long time the naive-realistic manner and ethnographism of Nechuy-Levytskyi which had long since had their day in story writing. The popular-poetic symbolism and civic pathos à la Shevchenko were retained even in the printed collections of the revolutionary period. Our scheme traces only the line of development demarcated by the leading literary lights. The large drove of provincial writers whom the Ukrainian literary historian does not always have the right to ignore, brought up the rear about a decade or two behind, pouring out its works in archaic, old-world forms.

All of this should be remembered when we talk of a change of trends in our literature.

*Translated by Wolodymyr Slez.*

#### NOTES:

1. V. Askocheskiy: *Kiev s yevo drevniyshim uchilishchem Akademiei*, II, p. 343.
2. I say contemporaries since Kotliarevskyi, of course, was not the only innovator. The author of the first comprehensive history of Ukrainian literature in the 19th century, academician M. I. Petrov, discovered a letter from Panas Lobysevych former pupil of the Kyiv Academy to Hryhoriy Konyskyi. In the letter Lobysevych asks Konyskyi to send him some of his interludes and remarks: "every language dialect has its own beauty" especially apparent to those who "under the crust of popular language" can find "gems of thought". With praise he mentions "the glorious Tanskyi", "the natural poet, in taste public, in taste Platonic". As an example of his own work he sends Konyskyi *Virgil's Eclogues dressed in Little Russian hooded top coats*. It was not possible to find the actual *Shepherds*, however, inasmuch as we can tell from the title the work was probably a rehash of Virgil's *Eclogues* written in the same way as Kotliarevskyi parodied the *Aeneid*. The date of the *Shepherds* according to Petrov is probably the decade 1767-1776. In other words he precedes Kotliarevskyi by 20 years. See N. Petrov: "Odin iz predshestvennikov Kotliarevskavo. Af. Kiril Lobysevich." *Sbornik po slavyano-vidiniyu*, I. Spb., 1904.

3. Let us merely recall the professors of the Kyiv Academy who under order of Metropolitan Samuil had to teach poetics "according to poetic rules printed in Moscow", and oratory (rhetoric) "according to the rules of Mr. Lomonosov".

4. A special place should be reserved for the periodisation of Ukrainian literature in the 19th-20th century by S. O. Yefremov in his monumental *History of Literature*. In a similar way to popular surveys of Russian literature, S. O. Yefremov provides a purely mechanical division of writers by decades. This method of periodisation is not very apt. Probably, it is still relevant to Russian literature where the custom is to give each decade its own particular colour. The 1840s are regarded usually as a period influenced exclusively by Hegelianism, Belinskiy's criticism and the first vestiges of the realistic story; the 1860s as an age of Positivism, Materialism and the "dethroning of aesthetics"; and the 1890s as the time of the trivial "Chekhovian twilight" and dogged duels between the populists and marxists... But how does this apply to Ukrainian literature? In our literature decades never served as markers for ideological phases. Our shistdesiatnyky" (people of the 1860s) both in their social status and mentality are not at all that different from "the people of the 1840s". Moreover, the difference for example between Antonovych and Kulish is not as cardinal as between Chernyshevskiy and Herzen. Nor do the literary styles of decades in our literature differ substantially. In Russian literature it is worth considering two typical representatives, shall we say from the 1840s and 1870s. Immediately, we note the difference in style: in the former, a tranquil, concise style reflecting Pushkin's severity and simplicity, in the latter, a verbose, convoluted Aesopean-Schedrinian style "a style which had become inspired and threadbare in Gogolesque feuilletons". In our case contrary to M. I. Petrov's authoritative declaration, literary styles persist long and stubborn, sometimes for thirty years. Between the stories of Kvitka-Osnovianenko and Kulish there is almost no difference in the tone or philosophy of life (it is not surprising that in his critical articles too Kulish was such a faithful panegyrist of Kvitka). Meanwhile, the narrative methods of the young Kotsiubynskiy quite new to the 1890s in no way differ from the epic manner of Levytskyi of the 1870s "with its descriptive detailing and superficial grasp of everyday manners".

The ineptitude of S. O. Yefremov's periodisation is highlighted further when in dividing writers according to decades he begins with the date of their first work, published or accepted into the literary canon. Thus, he as it were forces on the reader the impression that Lesia Ukrainka is a most typical representative of the poetry of the 1880s while Kotsiubynskiy is the most typical representative of the Ukrainian prose of the 1890s. Meanwhile, Kotsiubynskiy became a writer of original power only 20-25 years after his debut having written *Fata morgana* and *Intermezzo*. Lesia Ukrainka's poetic talent was at its best when she wrote *Kassandra* and *Lisova pisnia*, that is in the last years of her life.

5 This term was coined by the Kharkiv professor O. I. Biletskyi. It is also applied to Ukrainian literature by I. Aizenshtok in the article "Izucheniye novoy ukrainskoy literatury" — *Put Prosveshcheniya*, 1922. No. 6. In Aizenshtok's view most of the early Ukrainian works of the 19th century, Kotliarevskiy's *Eneida*, Hulak-Artemovskiy's *Ody* and particularly so-called "Kotliarevshchyna" (Porfir Korenytskyi, P. P. Biletskyi-Nosenko, Dumitrashko and Oleksandriv) are best described by the reader's psychology. All Kotliarevskiy's followers are described by him as "readers who took up the pen". To illustrate his view I. Aizenshtok quotes the beginning of Oleksandriv's *Vovkulaky*. However, surely this "reader's" approach to subject matter is most clearly exemplified in the first stanzas of Biletskyi-Nosenko's *Horpyniada*:

Hei, muzu! Ke meni banduru.  
 Horpynu khochu velychat,  
 Divchynu harnu, bilokuru,  
 Yak vchyv ii Pluton kokhat!...  
 Smieshsia, zhvava Pierydo  
 Dmukhny v mene toi samyi zhar  
 Z iakym spivalas Eneida...

(Oh muse ! hand me my bandura.  
I wish to laud Horpyna,  
Maiden good and fair,  
As Pluto taught her love!...  
You laugh, oh sprightly Pieris,  
Breath into me the same ardour  
As was th'Aenead sung...)

Biletskyi-Nosenko admits sincerely and frankly that it was indeed reading *Eneida* which launched him on the writer's road.

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## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO SPANISH-UKRAINIAN CULTURAL AND LITERARY RELATIONS

(Conclusion)

As Ukraine and its affairs attracted increasing interest, it also drew the attention of renowned European intellectuals and scholars. Among the many works that dealt at least in some capacity with the subject of Ukrainian affairs, and which were at that time also available in the Spanish language, we can single out the following: G. Ramusio, *Secondo volume della navigationi et viaggi* (Venetia, 1559); P. Ribadeneira, *Tratado de la religion y virtudes que deve tener el Principe Christiano* (Madrid, 1595); G. Botero, *Relationi Universalis* (Roma, 1592-93); T. Campanella, *De Monarchia Hispanica discursus* (Amsterdam, 1640); and M. Bisaccioni, *Le descrittori universali et particolari del mondo* (Venetia, 1660)<sup>72</sup>. Other works with numerous editions, that must have been known and read in Spain as well, were: S. Münster, *Cosmographie der Beschreibung aller Länder* (Basel, 1541); Guillaume le Vasseur de Beauplan, *Description d'Ukraine* (Roüen, 1650); J. Pastorius von Hirtenberg, *Belium Scythico-Cosacicu; seu, De conjuratione Tartarorum, Cosacorum et plebis russicae contra Regum Poloniae* (Dantisci, 1652); Pietro della Valle, *Viaggi descritti in 54 lettere familiari* (Venetia, 1661), Pierre Chevalier, *Histoire de la guerre de Cosaques contre la Pologne* (Paris, 1663) and Alberto Vimina, *Historia delle guerre civili di Polonia* (Venetia, 1672)<sup>73</sup>. As already stated, the Latin-language publications, and the material issued in Italy, enjoyed an obviously special status as far as their accessibility to Spain was concerned. The former, by being published in the "lingua franca" of cultured Europe, and the latter, due to the close ties between Italy and Spain at the time.

The first Spanish-language publication on Ukrainian affairs presently known to this writer was a brochure entitled *Relación verdadera de la muerte y martirio que dievon los Cismaticos de la Rusia en el Reyno de Polonia, a su Arçobispo, llamado Iosafat, porque les exortava se convertieran a la santa Fe Catolica* (Sevilla, 1625)<sup>74</sup>. Another publication on the same subject was a work by Jacob Susza (or Susha), a Ukrainian Uniate (Catholic) bishop. This book, which was originally published in Latin, appeared in Spanish under the title of *Vida y martyrio de B.S. Iosaphat Kuncevicz...Aora finalmente traducida de Latin en Castellano e ilustrada con algunas consideraciones y notas por el M. Fr. Miguel Pérez* (Madrid, 1648)<sup>75</sup>. Among the Spanish publications reporting on Cossack exploits we have the following: *Relación historial de las invasiones que el Rey de Suecia, los Moscovitas, y Cosacos han hecho en el Reyno de*



*Polonia* (Sevilla, 1656); and *Relación extraordinaria, pvntral, y veridica... en la qual se refiere la dichosa, y felizissima vitoria que han conseguido los Polacos, Cosacos, Valacos, y Moldabos en el Pais de la Vcrania, contra el Poder Otomano* Madrid, 1684)<sup>76</sup>. Still another Spanish publication, from 1691, describes a Cossack naval victory over the Turks on the Black Sea<sup>77</sup>. Arturo Cronia states that this mass of literature about Cossack Ukraine that had been circulating throughout sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, was "piena di ammirazione per quel popolo combattente che fu la rivelazione del secolo"<sup>78</sup>. The general admiration that Europe felt for "la tierra de Cosacia" was also echoed by the Spanish scholar, missionary and traveller, Pedro Cubero Sebastián, who wrote that "estos Cosacos...es la gente más temida, y valerosa, que tiene aquella Region, y á la parte, que ellos se inclinan, se tienen por dichosos los generales, por la confianza de victoria..."<sup>79</sup>.

The underlying reason for this exceptional interest in Cossack affairs was the implacable and successful struggle of the Ukrainians against the Tartar and Turkish encroachment from the south, and that of Catholic Poland from the west. The situation on both fronts was viewed by other countries within the context of all-European events, namely, Europe's struggle against the expanding Ottoman Empire, and the religious and political rivalry between the Catholic and Protestant camps, which resulted in the Thirty Years War.

The Ukrainians have been opposing the advance of the Islamic peoples since the late Middle Ages. The Cossacks were to continue the struggle after their appearance on the stage of history in the 15th century. But it was only after the Battle of Khotyn (1621), against the Turks, that they earned European recognition as a fighting force with which to be reckoned. At Khotyn a forty-thousand strong Cossack army proved to be the deciding factor, in routing the enemy<sup>80</sup>. After the naval Battle of Lepanto (1571) Khotyn was a major land victory over the Turks, and as such it was applauded by all of Europe. It is not surprising, then, that in the aftermath of the battle a mass of literature on the subject appeared throughout Europe. Even the diaries of men who fought at Khotyn were translated into various Western European languages, including Italian and Spanish<sup>81</sup>.

The struggle of the Cossacks against the Turks and Tartars was particularly fierce in the first half of the 17th century. The Ukrainians fought and defeated the Turks in the Danubian principalities, dealt destruction to the Crimean Tartars, carried out forays against Anatolia and more than once even threatened Constantinople. Historians unanimously agree that the Cossacks actually ruled the Black Sea during the first decades of the 17th century<sup>82</sup>. As late as 1661, an Italian traveller, scholar and diplomat, Pietro della Valle, in his enthusiasm for the Cossacks, even ventured to write that they would eventually take Constantinople and destroy the Ottoman Empire<sup>83</sup>. Such statements were not mere exaggerations, for, as can be seen from a stream of reports from foreign diplomats residing in Constantinople at the time, the situation was truly bleak for the Turkish capital. Witness the follow-

ing excerpt from a letter dated July 8, 1628, that was sent to the Vatican by a Spanish resident in Constantinople:

La carestía que ay es tan grande que es poco menos que ambre porque del Mar Negro que es de adonde se prouee esta ciudad no viene cosa alguna porque los Cosacos lo toman todo quemando muchos lugares y los vaxeles que encuentran. Hasta la armada... se halla poco menos que sitiada de dichos Cosacos sin poder pasar a Caffa<sup>84</sup>.

As a result of successful Cossack activity on the Turkish front, and pro-Cossack sentiment in Europe, Ukraine became an important partner of the European anti-Turkish coalition in the 17th century. It covered the eastern-most flank of a vast front which extended all across Europe to Spain<sup>85</sup>. The importance of the Cossacks became even further enhanced in European eyes during the Thirty Years War, in which every state in Europe, including Ukraine, became involved in one way or another. Consequently, the struggle with the Ottoman Empire, the Thirty Years War and the fighting ability of the Cossacks were the most important reasons for the major European countries to seek their services either as allies or mercenaries. Spain was one of them.

Spanish interest in the Cossacks obviously did not begin in 1625 with the publication of the brochure about the death of Archbishop J. Kuntsevych. There is plenty of evidence in the Spanish archives of Simancas to show the Spanish government's continuous awareness of, and interest in Ukrainian Cossacks, dating back to at least the middle of the 16th century<sup>86</sup>. Reportedly, during the second half of the 16th century, there were already Cossack troops in the Spanish service<sup>87</sup>.

It seems that the Cossacks systematically played a double political role. On the one hand, they were engaged in constant warfare with the Turks and Tatars, and helped Poland against Muscovy and occasionally against Sweden. But on the other hand, they also actively supported the anti-Catholic camp in Eastern Europe, and fought against the encroachment of the Polish nobility, which eventually resulted in a long war between Ukraine and Poland (1648-1658). Such policies encouraged countries in the Protestant and Catholic camps, and also those among them which were in conflict with Turkey, to seek an alliance with the Cossacks. Austria, England, France, Germany, Holland, Naples, Poland, Persia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Vatican and Venice, at one time or another had engaged in diplomatic manoeuvres that directly involved the Ukrainians. Numerous diplomatic missions were dispatched to Ukraine over a period of several decades in order to attract Cossack support for one cause or another, were it Protestant, Catholic, or anti-Turkish<sup>88</sup>.

The main thrust of Spanish diplomacy, however, was to keep the Ukrainians fighting the Turks in the Black Sea basin, which would, in turn, reduce Turkish pressure in the Mediterranean, particularly on Italy and Spain. The rival states, however, such as Holland, England, France and Venice, did their best to undermine Spanish efforts in that direction, as we shall later see. Although the documentation regarding this matter is quite voluminous, two

letters from Spanish sources in Constantinople dated September 1 and 6, 1625, should suffice to illustrate the entire situation:

Este Embaxador de Francia se a interpuesto en ajustar las diferencias entre la Porta y los Cossacos, y para ello a imbiado persona al Rey de Polonia con fin de ganar aqui crédito, y también de conseguir su intento enque la armada Turquesca venga a estos mares de Italia hallandose desembarazada de las incursiones de Cossacos, y assi tendria por necessario se procurasse impedir dicha diligencia...si estas cosas se ajustan seran de grandissimo daño para la Christiandad porque todas las fuerzas deste Imperio cargarian a Italia, especialmente viniendo Venecianos con tanto cuidado lo que muestra bien quan grandes enemigos son de la casa de Austria la ruina de la qual procuran todos estos Embaxadores...

El Revelde llamado Genet ogli, y tambien los Cossacos hazen quanto daño pueden, y assi por este año no ay peligro de armada haviendo en todo aquí gran confussion<sup>89</sup>.

In the second letter there is also notable concern about a possible peace arrangement between the Cossacks and the Turks. In case of peace the Cossack raids would stop, which would enable the Turks "sacar la armada el año que viene al mar blanco a daños del Rey de España, que los Embaxadores de los Coligados procuran sumamente, y ajustar las diferencias entre la Porta, y Cossacos". It is obvious that the continuation of the Ukrainian-Turkish conflict was strategically advantageous to Spain, especially with the Cossacks holding the initiative: "[The Cossacks] cuios progressos en el mar Negro continuan cada dia haviendo quemado tres ciudades, y **teniendo la armada Turquesca ocupada, y aun mucha cavalleria en custodia de aquellas riveras** [emphasis added]"<sup>90</sup>.

These two documents can be viewed within the context of a diplomatic mission to Constantinople in 1625 on behalf of Spain, in an effort to bring about an armistice between the two countries. The mission was undertaken by the ambassador of Naples, Giovanni Battista Montalban, the Jesuit Antonio Pauli and Captain Francisco Aguilar. Their attempt failed badly due to a successful anti-Spanish lobby in Constantinople headed by Dutch, English and Venetian diplomats. Another factor was that the Turks intercepted some letters from Montalban and the Viceroy of Naples, Antonio Alvarez de Toledo, Duque de Alba, sent to Poland with suggestions of bribing the Cossacks with money to continue waging war on Turkey. One of the propositions of particular interest to us, which the Spanish emissaries had presented to the Turkish authorities, was the totally unrealistic idea that if a peace settlement were reached between Spain and Turkey, the Spanish King would take steps to safeguard the Turkish borders against further Cossack attacks<sup>91</sup>. All these machinations point to the fact that Spain and her allies had obviously long range plans: the chances of peace between Spain and Turkey being slim (although efforts in that direction were made), they tried by all possible means to keep the Ukrainians fighting the Turks in the Black Sea region for as long as possible, in order to reduce Turkish pressure on the Mediterranean.

Spanish efforts along these policy lines continued in the following decades as well. For example, in a secret message from a nuncio in Warsaw dated February 17, 1646, we read the following:

Questo Ambasciatore di Venetia ha ottenuto dal Re di Polonia l'uscita nel Mar Negro de quaranta saiche [Cossack war vessel] di Cosacchi contro il Turco per il futuro mese di Maggio de la Republica di Venetia dara m/70 tallari. Mi ha confidado che gli scrive cotesto Ambasciatore, che li Ministri del Re di Spagna già si sono lasciati intendere, che **il Re darà m/100 scudi per la mosa generale** [emphasis added]<sup>92</sup>.

In February 1647, Venice and Spain doubled their efforts to secure an even greater Cossack intervention against the Turks, this time with three hundred war vessels:

Di Possonia, da Mons. Nuntio, all'Imperatore, a 20 Febraro 1647. Deciferato a 14 Marzo.

Hoggi sono stati da me unitamente insieme il Sig. Ambasciatore di Spagna et il Sig. Ambasciatore di Venezia et hanno proposto, che vedendosi gli avanzi, che fa il turo nell'isola de Candia e la difficoltà di portergli resistere, e conoscendosi per prova, che la diversione sperata dal Re di Polonia è negozio difficile da concludere e senza dubio alcuno lunghissimo da porre in esecuzione, il Sig. Ambasciatore di Venezia rappresentava, che la via più spedita di aiutarsi era il muovere immediatamente li Cosacchi ad infestare il Turco per il Mar Nero, ma con invasione potente di 300 di loro lengi, ò saiche in un volta. Che a quest' (f.30v) effetto bisognavano m/100 tallari in circa, pronti et effettivi. Che la Republica non poteva supplire a tante spese, e però si raccomandava e chiedea aiuto. **Il Sig. Ambasciatore di Spagna, considerato tutto questo, si risolveva di dar parte del Re Cattolico prontamente m/30 tallari** [emphasis added] et ambedue pregavano me unitamente acciò facessi uffizio, che Nostro Signore concorresse in altra simil'somma, acciò con le forze di tutti tre si potess'effettuare opera così necessaria e tanto profittevole a tutti. Rappresentava il Sig. Ambasciatore di Venezia, che ciascuno de'tre potentati havrebbe potuto mandar'un huomo a posta in quei paesi, acciò il (f. 31) danaro si distribuisse immediatamente in mano di que' capi de Cosacchi senza passar altramente per le mani de Ministri Polacchi e del Re di Polonia e d'altri, che tavolta non succede molta bene, et il Sig. Ambasciatore di Spagna mostrava di haver per le mani a quest'effetto persone, ch'erano molto a proposito<sup>93</sup>.

A few years later, in December 1656, the Spanish ambassador in Vienna, the Marqués de Castel-Rodrigo, together with his counterpart from Venice, Giustiniani, was directly involved in diplomatic attempts to provoke still another Ukrainian attack on Turkey<sup>94</sup>. The urgency and even anxiety with which Spanish authorities watched the activities of the Ukrainians on the Turkish front can be sensed from the following decoded message from Constantinople, dated September 3, 1628: "Entretanto que no parte viniere algun aviso del mar negro de alguna novidad que ubiesen hecho los Cosacos se cree que no saldra **de todo yre avisando con puntualidad** [emphasis added]"<sup>95</sup>.

In spite of all of the diplomatic manoeuvring and concern, there seems to have been a tacit alliance between the Spaniards and Ukrainians *vis-à-vis* the Turkish threat. This can be inferred from still another document that originated in Venice on May 12, 1635:

Con lettere di Constantinopoli confermamo...Et che l'armata maritima [Turkish] non potesse più questo (f. 138v) anno tentare impresa per esser stata divisa, et mandata una parte nel Mar Negro contro Cossacchi, et l'altra nell'Arcipelago in guardia di quell'isole, per sospetto dell'armata Spagnola [emphasis added]<sup>96</sup>.

A similar attitude had been echoed in a document pertaining to religious matters, issued by the Metropolitan of Kyiv, Job Boretskyi, and his bishops, on April 28, 1621:

It is truly said that no one in the whole world does so much for the benefit of the persecuted and oppressed Christians as the Greeks with heavy levies, the King of Spain with his strong fleet, and the Zaporozhian Cossacks with their daring and their victories [emphasis added]<sup>97</sup>.

In the background of the Thirty Years War loomed the theological question: Reformation or Counter-Reformation, Protestantism or Catholicism. In Ukraine this religious strife was translated into a violent rivalry between Catholicism forced upon Ukraine by Poland, and Ukrainian Orthodoxy stubbornly defended by the Cossacks. This religious antagonism had also very strong national connotations, since the vast majority of the Poles were Catholics and the Ukrainians Orthodox. The Vatican and Spain, with the rest of the Catholic camp, supported Polish religious and state policies in the East, while the Protestant side had placed its sympathy with the Ukrainians, considering the Cossacks as potential allies.

The Catholic drive towards Eastern Europe, Ukraine in particular, began in the 13th century, and intensified in the 16th and 17th centuries, when religion became one of the main vehicles for Polish political expansion in the East. This provoked decades of violent confrontations between Ukrainians and Poles, and an all-out war between the two countries (1648-1658). The extent of Catholic attempted expansion at the time can be seen from some of their activities. As mentioned above, by 1345 the Franciscan Order had already established its Ukrainian Province with numerous centres, also bringing Spanish Franciscans to Ukraine, like the author of the *Libro del conocimiento* (nn. 7, 8). With regard to the Dominicans, as early as the 15th century Spanish missionaries were already working in Ukraine. They had established good relations with the Ukrainian population, learned the language, and became Ukrainianised. Since this brought them into conflict with the policies of the Polish Dominicans in the area, they decided to establish a separate "Ukrainian Province", which was formally approved in Valencia in 1569. The Ukrainian Dominican Province lasted until the 18th century, when it was abolished by the Russian Empress Catherine II. Dominican missionaries, however, continued their activities in Western Ukraine until the outbreak of the Second World War<sup>98</sup>. The establishment of the Ukrainian Dominican Province caused, with time, a greater Spanish involvement, as can be seen from a letter written from Vilnius by Giovanni, Archbishop of Adrianople, to a Rev. mo Sig. Padrone Col. mo, on April 29, 1648:

Già significai a Vostra Eminenza con una mia delli 5 di Marzo, che

havrei procurato di far'restar'capace Sua Maestà delle ragioni, che hebbe il Capitolo di Spagna de'Padri Predicatori intorno allo stabilimento delle due provincie di Russia [Ukraine] e di Lithuania [emphasis added]<sup>99</sup>.

In order to succeed in his planned expansion to the East, the Polish King Stephan Batory (1576-1586) sought and obtained support in the Catholic camp. As a result, one of the main conditions of an agreement between Batory and Pope Gregory XIII (1572-1585) was the total catholicisation of Poland. Special efforts, however, were to be directed to the conversion of Ukraine, since this country belonged to the Eastern Church, professed the Orthodox Faith, and was seen as a potential ally of the Protestants. (This concern was not without justification, since Protestantism was making serious progress in sixteenth-century Eastern Europe<sup>100</sup>). To intensify the campaign of catholicisation, a Jesuit province had been created in Poland<sup>101</sup>, headed by a Spanish Jesuit official by the name of Sunyer. King Philip II of Spain was no less interested than Pope Gregory XIII in the realisation of Batory's plans because he wanted him to become the champion of the Counter-Reformation in Eastern Europe<sup>102</sup>. Consequently, the Jesuits also spread their activities into Ukraine, establishing their bases in major cities and towns such as Kyiv, Lviv, Lutsk, Ostrih, Vynnytsia, Kamianets-Podilskyi and others — twenty-three centres in all<sup>103</sup>. Since the superiors of the Jesuit Order were generally Spaniards and Italians, Spanish and Italian influence (in addition to Polish) on Ukrainian affairs must have been also significant. As one author aptly puts it: "The Society was like a sword whose blade was buried in Poland [and Ukraine], while its hilt was wielded by the hands of the Holy See and Spaniards"<sup>104</sup>. In addition to the Franciscans, Dominicans and Jesuits, the Basilian Order also contributed its efforts to further the Catholic cause in Ukraine. However, being an Eastern Order of Monks, they seem to have been less militant than the others. Among the Basilians who went to Ukraine there were also Spaniards, as we can see from a memorandum issued by their Congregation on March 15, 1644:

Per maggiore dell'Unione Santa [i.e. Union with the Holy See] di Ruteni [Ukrainians] propagatione et augmento della Religione di San Basilio, per la propagatione di detta Unione in quelle parti Russia [Ukraine] e Moschovia et altre necessarissima, ha spedito questa Sac. Congregazione diversi ordini opportuni. Adesso s'offerisce un'altra nuova occasione per utile della Religione e consequentemente di S. Unione. I Padri della medesima Religione della Provincia d'Italia e Spagna [emphasis added], dottissimi e Zelosissimi, si dichiarano essere prontissimi di volere non solamente unirsi, ma ancora aiutare quelli di Russia in tutti li modi possibili e principalmente insegnando la lingua greca, Teologia et altre scienze [emphasis added]<sup>105</sup>.

As the anti-Catholic and anti-Polish feelings in Ukraine intensified, especially during and after the Thirty Years War, so did the interest of the Protestant camp in the Cossacks as allies. Consequently, the Protestant states undertook a series of political and diplomatic moves to channel the Cossack military potential against Poland, in an effort to lay bare the Eastern flank of the Catholic alliance. The initiator of this plan was the Swedish King Gustav-

Adolph II (1611-1632)<sup>106</sup>. However, he was not alone in his efforts. The able Dutch diplomat in Constantinople, Cornelis Haga<sup>107</sup>, for instance, in his attempts to find allies against Spain, even worked on a daring plan to reform Eastern Christianity and then unite it with Western Protestantism. Haga was supported in his projects by his close friend, the influential Patriarch of Constantinople, Cyrillus Lucaris, and the British ambassador Thomas Roe<sup>108</sup>. Being staunch anti-Catholics, all of these personages did their best to organise in Eastern Europe a Christian Orthodox alliance, with the Cossacks as the main force, in order to draw them into the struggle against Poland, Austria and Spain. A good example of those machinations is a letter (Riga, June 25, 1631) on behalf of King Gustav-Adolph of Sweden, written by his secret counsellor and ambassador to Poland, Jacob Rousell, who proposed an alliance to the Cossacks. The alleged reason for such a move was that Gustav-Adolph considered them "enemies of the Pope, the true anti-Christ, and of the **Spanish King** [emphasis added] who wishes to deprive all the nations of their freedom"<sup>109</sup>. But Protestant attempts to attract the Ukrainians into their camp failed, for they, also being suspicious of the Protestants, continued to maintain a "middle of the road" policy. The Cossacks were, however, a constant factor on the battlefields of Europe during the entire war, since their troops were also recruited as mercenaries by the Catholic League and later in the war by the French as well<sup>110</sup>.

Spain, like Austria, was quite anxious to hire Ukrainian troops to fight on its side, an operation which involved considerable amounts of Spanish money and effort. Although some of Spain's attempts to do so failed, they do point to Spanish interest in that area. For example, in a secret communication that originated in Vienna on November 1, 1631, we read the following: "Si tratta di far venir in Germania il Principe di Polonia con m/20 Cosacchi, **offerendo i Spagnoli a quest'effetto ducento mila scudi** [emphasis added]"<sup>111</sup>. In 1635-36 a Cossack force of over six thousand cavalymen did join the army of the Cardinal Infante don Fernando, Governor of Flanders, and took part in successful actions on French territory<sup>112</sup>. Five years later, in a letter (Contrain, September 26, 1641) to the Duque de las Torres, Viceroy of Naples, the Cardinal Infante don Fernando discussed Spanish difficulties in the war, and expressed a hope of again securing Cossack troops to alleviate the situation on the French front: "... y si la venida desta gente [the Cossacks] fuesse cierta y sirviese y se empleasse como conviene, seria la herida más consideration que se podría dar a Francia". The issue at stake was "tres mil lanzas y 6 mil Cossacos"<sup>113</sup>. Another Cossack expeditionary force came in 1646, but this time it fought on the French side against the Spaniards. The main object of the French was to capture Dunkirk, a port on the Pas-de-Calais, and the centre of Spanish resistance in Flanders. Before the final assault, the Cossacks distinguished themselves by taking from the Spaniards a number of fortified towns on the approaches to Dunkirk, such as Mardick, Bergues and others. On October 11, 1646, Dunkirk fell, and the victors, including the Cossack corps, marched into the city<sup>114</sup>.

After the siege of Dunkirk, the Cossack force broke up. Some were sent to Lotaringia (Lorraine), others, angry with the French for not living up to the terms they had agreed upon for their services, went over to the Spanish side. But most of the surviving members of the expeditionary force were apparently recalled to Ukraine on the eve of the Ukrainian-Polish war that broke out in 1648. The remaining few who decided to stay behind, found a home in France, the Netherlands and Spain<sup>115</sup>.

The Ukrainian-Polish war also drew into the picture Muscovy, Sweden, Turkey and the Tartars, as each side sought military alliances against its enemy. Since this conflict placed Catholic gains in Ukraine in jeopardy, the Catholic camp obviously showed much active concern about the situation. In a letter from Warsaw (November 26, 1650) to Sig. Padrone Col. mo, Giovanni, Archbishop of Adrianople reported on the developments in Ukraine, as well as Polish attempts to secure help from the Catholic states — an operation in which Spain may have been also involved to some extent:

Hoggi Vien'spedito a Vienna con molta celerità e segretezza il P. Giovanni Battista Andriani, Preposto di questa casa professa della compagnia di Giesù perchè quanto più si può di nascosto e speditamente s'abbia da quella parte qualche soccorso di gente. Sua Maestà m'ha confidato questa missione et in oltre ha voluto, che lo **ricerchi Mons. Nuntio e l'Ambasciatore di Spagna, residenti in quella Corta, perchè vi cohooperino i loro ufficii** [emphasis added]. Io tanto più ho ubbidito volentieri a Sua Maestà, quanto vi conosco un espresso bisogno per la Religione Cattolica, poichè questo mostro infernale del Chimilinski <sup>116</sup> è necessario di combatterlo non meno co'g'li aiuti da implorarsi da Dio, che con le forze e sforzi maggiore della sue<sup>117</sup>.

Another document which originated in Vienna on December 12, 1650, provides still more information about Andriani's mission:

E'comparso in Corte Cesarea il Padre Antonio Andriani, Gesuita, destinato Ambasciatore dal Re di Polonia a Sua Maestà Cesarea [Ferdinand III], per dimandare aiuti contro le revolutioni di Cosacchi, cenfederati con Turchi, Tartari et Moscoviti, minacciando una gran ruina alla Polonia et a tutta la Christianità...Lunedì sera fu il detto Padre amesso all'audienza di Sua Maestà presentando le lettere credentiali et esposto la sua Ambasciata. Si discorre, che pochi aiuti potrà rivelare, sì per non irritare il Turco, di cui Sua Maestà trattiene l'Ambasciatore per concludere la pace, sì perchè Spagnoli vogliono per i loro bisogni la soldatesca assoldando fin' hora 3 reggimenti di fanteria per Italia, et il sudetto Padre Ambasciatore pare facci anco istanza, che il Duca Piccolomini vogli accettare il comando di quell'armata<sup>118</sup>.

This concern was not only expressed in feverish diplomatic activity, seeking intervention against Ukraine from Austria, Italy and Spain, but it had also manifested itself in numerous publications on the subject which were in circulation in Europe at the time of the conflict and later. Some of the said publications have been listed above (nn. 30, 31, 32).

Another avenue of possible relations between Ukrainians and Spain in the 16th and 17th century was commerce. Although Cossack Ukraine traded mainly with neighbouring countries and Asia Minor, there are certain indica-



tions that this had some effect on Spain. The Zaporozhian Cossack Host (the so-called "Cossack Republic"), having developed its own independent economic base, traded with many countries, including Italy, which had been regularly sending merchant vessels to Cossack shores in spring and summer<sup>119</sup>. Furthermore, the fact that the Zaporozhian Cossacks also had Spanish-made weapons in their arsenal<sup>120</sup> seems to indicate that trade in Spanish goods was either carried out through Italian merchants, or that there may have been direct trade contacts with the Spaniards — or both. Only in the early 19th century, however, can direct evidence be found regarding the presence of Spanish merchants on Ukrainian soil, namely in Odessa: "In questo centro del Mar Nero [Odessa] sono concorsi a stabilirsi come commercianti, **Spagnuoli** [emphasis added], Francesi, Italiani..."<sup>121</sup>.

Another item which established a commercial link between Ukraine and Spain was grain. By the middle of the 16th century, and still more in the second half, due to a troubled agriculture in Spain (and elsewhere), Ukrainian grain was in great demand. It was, therefore, shipped to the Baltic ports, and from there to Spain, France, the Netherlands and England<sup>122</sup>.

After the zenith of the Ukrainian realm in the 10th and 11th centuries, the 17th and part of the 18th century mark another peak period in Ukraine's status as an important factor in European affairs. With regard to the policies in the Black Sea basin, there were two dominant tendencies. One was to establish a balance of power with Turkey and the Tartars, and use their political and military assistance against Poland and Muscovy. The other, perhaps emotionally more appealing due to the deeply-rooted tradition of struggle against Islam, was the tendency to seek a radical solution to the Turkish-Tartar presence in the area which would secure Ukrainian access to the northern shores of the Black Sea. On the European front, there was the standing quarrel with Poland and opposition to the Catholic expansion towards the East, which was viewed within the context of the larger European conflict of Reformation versus Counter-Reformation. With regard to the first issue, Spain actively supported the Cossack policy of confrontation with Turkey for political and security reasons. But in the case of the Ukrainian conflict with Poland and Catholicism in general, it openly sided with Poland for ideological considerations. Ukraine, for its part, tacitly satisfied Spain's expectations by continuing hostilities against Turkey — the only area where Spanish and Ukrainian political interests met at the time.

During the initial stages of the so-called Northern War (1700-1721) against Sweden, Ukraine sided with Denmark, Saxony, Poland, Russia and Prussia. By 1708, however, in order to curb increasing Russian political influence, Ukraine switched sides when its ruler, Ivan Mazepa, struck an alliance with King Charles XII of Sweden. This led to the fateful Battle of Poltava in 1709, where the Swedish-Ukrainian forces were defeated by Peter I of Russia. Although these events were closely followed by the European countries, there is no evidence of any Spanish involvement with a "Ukrainian connection" which would be of interest to us.

Due to changing historical fortunes in the second half of the 18th century, Ukraine, as an independent political entity, ceased to exist until the 20th century, because it was absorbed into the Russian and Austrian empires. Interest in Ukraine, however, continued in various degrees in different European countries throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. Thus, at the beginning of the 18th century there appeared a Spanish translation of John Harrison's *Navigatium atque itinerantium bibliotheca* or *A Complete Collection of Voyages and Travels* (London, 1705), in which the author also deals with Ukraine and the Cossacks<sup>123</sup>. Another very important work dealing with the subject was Voltaire's *Histoire de Charles XII* (Rouen, 1731), which went through nine Spanish editions in the 18th century alone, the first appearing under the title *Historia de Carlos XII, Rey de Suecia* (Madrid, 1734)<sup>124</sup>. There were, however, two important Spanish publications also containing an extensive coverage of Ukrainian history from medieval times up to the first decades of the 18th century. The accounts which are fairly accurate, are that written by Don Manuel de Villegas y Piñatelli (Secretary to King Philip V), entitled *Historia de Moscovia* (Madrid, 1736), 6 vols., and Luis del Castillo's *Compendio cronológico de la historia y del estado actual del imperio ruso* (Madrid, 1796)<sup>125</sup>.

With regard to *Historia de Moscovia* there are some indications in the text that the author might have been familiar, directly or indirectly with some Ukrainian sources in preparing his work. Villegas y Piñatelli, for instance, consistently uses transliterated forms of the Ukrainian spelling of the names of some tenth-century princes of the Kyivan realm. In one such case we read the following: "De los hijos the Svvatoslasy, y gobierno de **Volodomir** [emphasis added];" and elsewhere "De los hijos de **Vuolodomir** [emphasis added]..."<sup>126</sup>. The Russian version would have been **Vladimir**, and the Polish **Włodzimierz** or **Władysław**. The Spanish adaptation of this name is usually **Vladimiro**. The closest version to the one used by Villegas y Piñatelli, however, is the Ukrainian **Volodymyr**, where "y" corresponds to the English i as in "bit".

The French Revolution brought hope of change to the politically underprivileged nations of Europe, including Ukraine. Many Ukrainian youths and former soldiers of the Austrian armies, inspired by the vision of a "new Europe"<sup>127</sup>, joined the French armies, for the most part as members of the Polish legions which were formed in 1797<sup>128</sup>. The legions were eventually sent by the French to fight in Spain<sup>129</sup>. Other Ukrainians were likely recruited from the Ukrainian community in France<sup>130</sup>. Consequently, Ukrainians, either in the French ranks or as members of the Polish legions, also saw active service in Spain in the course of the Napoleonic wars. One such recorded case is that of Mykhailo Strilbytskyi, who, for reasons stated above, had joined the French army as a cavalry officer, and reportedly was stationed in Barcelona<sup>131</sup>.

At the end of the 20th century, a renewed interest in Ukraine became evident due to the political and social unrest which engulfed Eastern Europe. During World War I an interesting work appeared in Spain written by Pedro

Pellicena y Camacho, *Los Cosacos* (Madrid: Ediciones Kronos, 1916), reprinted two years later by "Mundo Latino"<sup>132</sup>. The book is a romanticised and not always accurate account of the history of the Cossacks. It also deals with the Cossacks as a literary theme.

World War I and the great revolutionary upheavals in Eastern Europe brought the formation of the Ukrainian National Republic in 1918. This event is of importance in Spanish-Ukrainian affairs since for the first time in modern history the two countries were finally able to begin the normalisation of their relations on a diplomatic level<sup>133</sup>. This development, however, was short lived, since Ukraine once again succumbed to external military and political pressures, and was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1922.

In 1936, the Spanish Civil War, which so deeply affected the minds and emotions of men everywhere, attracted many Ukrainians from around the world, who found themselves fighting on the Republican side. There were even separate Ukrainian troop formations, such as the "Taras Shevchenko" company, named after the great Ukrainian poet. The company also published its own Ukrainian newspaper entitled *Borotba* (Struggle)<sup>134</sup>. At the end of the Civil War a group of Spanish orphans were taken to Ukraine and settled in the city of Kharkiv, where the city authorities had even opened a special school to teach them the Ukrainian language. Before the occupation of Kharkiv during World War II, these children were evacuated eastward to an unknown destination<sup>135</sup>.

After World War II a small Ukrainian community settled in Spain, and became very active mainly in Madrid. One of its significant accomplishments was the establishment of a relationship with the "Centro de Estudios Orientales" (C. E. O.), founded in 1951 by the late Rev. Santiago Morillo, S. J. This resulted in a systematic publication of material on Ukrainian topics in its journal *Oriente*, which changed its title to *Oriente europeo* in 1956. The C. E. O., which has a Ukrainian section with a good library, has also published special issues of its journal entirely dedicated to Ukrainian matters<sup>136</sup>. The importance of the C. E. O. lies in that, to our knowledge, it is the first and only institution in Spain systematically engaged in Ukrainian studies. In this respect, it is interesting to note that its founder, Santiago Morillo, knew the Ukrainian language, was a student of Ukrainian history and culture, and had also lived and worked in Ukraine for many years<sup>137</sup>. We should also mention the existence of a Ukrainian radio programme in Madrid<sup>138</sup>, and of at least one Ukrainian periodic publication<sup>139</sup>. Last, but not least, is the publication of the Spanish-language quarterly journal entitled *Ucrania Libre*, which deals with historical, political and cultural issues. Although published in Buenos Aires, Argentina, by the "Instituto Informativo-Editorial Ucraino", the journal has wide circulation in Spain as well.

A Spanish-language bibliography of Ukrainian publications abroad, compiled by the late Professor Dmytro Buchynskyi (a resident of Madrid), contains a note which illustrates best the type and scope of the activities of the Spanish Ukrainians:

Esta bibliografía de la obra impresa ucraiana en el extranjero en los años 1945-1961, está preparada como catálogo de la exposición bibliográfica con ocasión del centenario de la muerte del más grande poeta y héroe ucraiano Taras Shevchenko. 1861-1961, que se ha celebrado bajo el patrocinio del Excmo. Sr. Ministro de Educación Nacional Don Jesús Rubio García-Mina, en las salas de la Biblioteca Nacional en Madrid, del 1 al 16 septiembre de 1961<sup>140</sup>.

The above account of historical contacts between Spaniards and Ukrainians is by no means exhaustive. It should, however, provide a good sampling of the background against which cultural and literary interrelations between the two nations can be more comprehensively pinpointed and interpreted.

#### NOTES:

72. Listings for Spanish editions of these works and others, can be found in Palau y Dulcet, *Manual del librero hispano-americano*.

73. Nalyvaiko, "Ukraïna v zakhidnoievropeïskykh...", *For Slovianske literaturoznavstvo i folklorystyka*, No. 5 (1970), p. 52; New York., Public Library, Slavonic Division, *Dictionary Catalog of the Slavonic Collection*, 2nd ed. rev. & enl. (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1974), VIII, 144; Gregorovich, "Basic Sources in the West European Languages on the Cossacks of Ukraine".

74. José Simón Díaz, *Impresos del siglo XVII*. Bibliografía selectiva por materias de 3.500 ediciones príncipes en lengua castellana (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1972), p. 266.

Bishop Joseph Kuntsevych had been killed in 1623 during religious strife between the Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox camps.

75. Palau y Dulcet, XXII, 340-41.

76. Simón Díaz, pp. 734, 752.

77. Russia, Publichnaia biblioteka [Public Library], Leningrad, *Otchet za 1855 g.* [Report for the Year 1855] (Petersburg, 1856), p. 39.

78. Arturo Cronia, *La conoscenza del mondo slavo in Italia* (Padova: Officine Grafiche Stediv, 1958), p. 242.

79. Pedro Cubero Sebastián, *Breve relación de la peregrinación que ha hecho de la mayor parte del mundo Don Pedro Cubero Sebastián* (Madrid: Juan García Infanzón, 1680), p. 176.

80. Hrushevskyi, *A history of Ukraine*, pp. 246-47.

81. D. Nalyvaiko, "Zakhidnoievropeïski avtory kintsia XVI-pochatku XVII st. pro rol' ukrainskykh kozakiv u borotbi z turetskoïu ahresiëiu" [West European Authors from the End of the Sixteenth and Beginning of the Seventeenth century about the Role of the Ukrainian Cossacks in the struggle against the Turkish Aggression], *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal* [The Ukrainian Historical Journal], No. 6 (June 1968), pp. 141-42; J. Tretiak, *Historja Wojny Chocimskiej 1621 r.* [The History of the War of Khotyn in 1621] (Lwów: Nakładem księgarni Seyfartha i Czajkowskiego, 1889), pp. 1-7.

82. P. A. Kulish, *Istoriia vozsoedineniia Rusy* [History of the Reunification of Ruś] (Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia Polza, 1874), II, 214.

83. Pietro della Valle, *Viaggi descritti in 54 lettere familiari* (Venetia, 1661), II, 258-59, cited by Nalyvaiko, "Zakhidnoievropeïski avtory...", "Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal, No. 5 (May 1968), p.147.

84. *Litterae nuntiorum apostolicorum historiam Ucrainae illustrantes*, IV, 313.

85. Ukraine as a partner of the European anti-Turkish coalition was even depicted in numerous pictures and engravings of a political and satirical nature, which were in circulation in Europe at the time. One such engraving that was made in 1650 in the Dutch city of Delft, was entitled "Foreign-European and also French-Dutch Meeting". It is a political caricature about the helplessness of Christian Europe in the face of the Turkish menace. Beside the figures representing Spain, England, France and other nations, there is a Cossack representing Ukraine, with the following inscription: "The Cossack is extremely angry...with great hatred [towards Turkey] he sharpens his sword anew...Ukraine trembles and thunders...". A reproduction of this engraving can be found in Volodymyr Sichynskyi's *Ukraine in Foreign Commentaries and Descriptions from the VIth to XXth century* (New York: U. C. C. A., 1953), pp. 92-93.

86. Some of the relevant documentation can be found reprinted in *Documenta Polonica ex Archivo Generali Hispanae in Simancas*.

87. Dmytro Nalyvaiko, "Zaporozhtsi v Zakhidnii Yevropi" [The Zaporozhian Cossacks in Western Europe], *Nauka i suspilstvo* [Learning and Society], January 1969, p. 47.

88. Lubomyr R. Wynar, "The Habsburg Relationship with the Zaporozhian Cossacks", section from the Introduction to *Habsburgs and Zaporozhian Cossacks: The Diary of Erich Lassota Von Steblau, 1594* (Littleton, Co.: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1975), pp. 26-57; George Gajecy and Alexander Baran, *The Cossacks in the Thirty Years War* Rome: pp. Basiliani, 1969), I; Lubomyr Wynar, "The Ukrainian Cossacks and the Vatican," *Ukrainian Quarterly*, 21 (1965), 64-78; P. Pirlingue, "Alberto Vimina: Snosheniia Venetsii z Ukrainoiu i Moskvoiu, 1650-1663 g." [Alberto Vimina: Relations between Venice, Ukraine and Muscovy, 1650-1663], *Russkaia starina* [Russian Antiquity], 109 (January 1902), 57-70; E. Borschak, "Early Relations between England and Ukraine," *The Slavonic and East European Review*, 10, No. 28-29 (1931), 138-160; et al.

89. *Litterae nuntiorum...*, IV, 190.

90. *Litterae nuntiorum...*, IV, 191.

91. Ivan Krypiakevych, "Kozachchyna v politychnykh kombinatsiakh 1620-1630 rr." [The Cossack State in the Political Scheming of 1620-1630], in *Naukove tovarystvo imeni Shevchenka, Zapysky* [Shevchenko Scientific Society, *Proceedings*], 117-18 (1914), 91-92.

92. *Litterae nuntiorum...*, VI, 184.

93. *Litterae nuntiorum...*, VI, 214-15.

94. M. Hrushevskyi *Materialy do istorii ukrainskoï kozachchyny* [Materials for the History of the Ukrainian Cossack State] (Lviv: Naukove tovarystvo imeni Shevchenka, 1911), V, 180.

95. *Litterae nuntiorum...*, IV, 324.

96. *Litterae nuntiorum...*, V, 191.

97. Cited by Doroshenko, pp. 195-96.
98. Dmytro Buchynskyi, *Espanskyi svidok nashoi muzychnoi kultury* ("Testis hispanus nostrae culturae musicae") (Yorkton, Sask.: The Redeemer's Voice Press, 1958), p. 3; Hinnenbusch, p. 114.
99. *Litterae nuntiorum...*, VI, 257.
100. For a full discussion of this question in its various aspects see William K. Medlin and Christos G. Patrinelis, "Greek and West European Influences in Orthodox Ruthenia (Southern-Western Rus) on Church, School and Society", in *Renaissance Influences and Religious Reform in Russia: Western and Post-Byzantine Impacts on Culture and Education (16th-17th Centuries)* (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1971), pp. 71-149.
101. At that time, the Polish Commonwealth comprised Poland Proper, Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania.
102. Eduard Winter, *Russland und das Papsttum* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1960), I, 224.
103. Ivan Vlasovskyi, *Narys istorii Ukraïnkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy* [An Outline History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church] (New York: Ukraïnska Pravoslavna Tserkva v ZDA, 1955), II, 225; B. Krawciw, "Education and Schools", *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), II, 303.
104. A. F. Pollard, *The Jesuits in Poland. The Lothian Essay* (Oxford, 1892; rpt. New York: Haskell House, 1971), p. 46.
105. *Analecta Oridinis S. Basilii Magni*, ser. 2, sectio 3, *Documenta romana Ecclesiae Catholicae in terris Ucrainae et Bielarusjae*, *Litterae nuntiorum*, *secretariatuum*, *offitiorum*, etc., *Supplicationes Ecclesiae Unitae Ucrainae et Bielarusjae* (Romae: PP. Basiliani, 1960), I, 133-34.
106. Dmytro Nalyvaiko, "Vidhomin borotby ukraïnskykh kozakiv z shliakhetskokatolytskoïu ekspansiieiu na pry kintsi XVI i pershiï polovyni XVII st. u Zakhidniï Ievropi" [The Struggle of the Ukrainian Cossacks against the Expansion of Catholicism and the Polish Nobility at the end of the Sixteenth and the First Half of the Seventeenth Century in West European Sources], *Seredni viky na Ukraïni* [The Middle Ages in Ukraine], No. 1 (1971), pp. 49-50.
107. For details of Haga's long diplomatic career see Hermann Wätjen, *Die Niederländer im Mittelmeergebiet zur Zeit ihrer höchsten Machtstellung* (Berlin: Karl Curtius, 1909), pp. 57-81; Krypiakievych, p. 79.
108. Krypiakievych, pp. 71-73, 79.
109. For a full text of the letter see Krypiakievych, pp. 107-110; Sergei M. Solovev, *Istoria Rossii s drevnieishikh vremen* [The History of Russia From Ancient Times] (Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia Polza, 1890), II, 1171.
110. Gajecky and Baran, *The Cossacks in the Thirty Years War*, I; Alexander Baran, "Kozaky na imperatorskii sluzhbi n rokakh 1635-1636" [The Cossacks in the emperor's service in 1635-1636], *Ukraïnskyi istoryk* [The Ukrainian Historian], No. 1-3 (1974), pp. 5-22; Nalyvaiko "Zaporozhtsi v Zakhidniï Ievropi" [The Zaporozhians in Western Europe], *Nauka i suspilstvo* [Learning and Society], January 1969, pp. 46-51; et al.
111. *Litterae nuntiorum...*, V, 77.
112. Baran, pp. 5-9, 12, 18-20.

113. *Documenta Polonica...*, VII Pars, XXI, 73-75.
114. Pierre Chevalier, *Histoire de la guerre des Cosaques contre la Pologne* (Paris: C. Barbin, 1663), dedication to the Count de Brégy, n. pag.; Pierre Chevalier, *Istoria Viiny Kozakiv proty Polshchi* ("Histoire de la guerre des Cosaques contre la Pologne") (Kyiv: Akademiia Nauk Ukraïnskoï RSR, 1960), n. 1, pp. 161-62; Philip Longworth, *The Cossacks* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 42; Nalyvaiko, "Zaporozhtsi v Zakhidii Ievropi," pp. 50-51; Ivan Krypiakievych, *Bohdan Khmelnytskyi* (Kyiv: Akademiia Nauk Ukraïnskoï RSR, 1954), pp. 75-77; et al.
115. Krypiakievych, *Bohdan Khmelnytskyi*, p. 51; A Polovtsov, "O malorossiiskikh kazakakh na frantsuzkoï sluzhbe v 1646 g." [On Ukrainian Cossacks in the French Service in 1646], *Arkheologicheskii Siezd, 11-oï, Kiev, 1899* [Archaeological Congress, 11th, Kiev, 1899] (Moscow, 1901-1902), II, 123.
116. Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, ruler of Ukraine and Cossack General (1648-1657).
117. *Litterae nuntiorum...*, VII, 206-207.
118. *Litterae nuntiorum...*, VII, 216-17.
119. Yavornytskyi, "Yak zhylo slavne Zaporozhske Nyzove Viïsko" [The Life of the Zaporozhian Host], p. 21.
120. Yavornytskyi, *Ya k zhylo...*, p. 18.
121. "Relatio informativa R.mi Bernetti Leoni XII P. M. porrecta. a. 1826. De statu Ecclesiae Catholicae in imperio Russico," in Andreas Sheptytskyi, comp., *Monumenta Ucrainae Historica* (Romae: Editiones Universitatis Catholicae Ucrainorum, 1970), VIII, 130.
122. Doroshenko, p. 132; Hrushevskyi, *A History of Ukraine*, p. 173.
123. Palau y Dulcet, VI, 519.
124. Palau y Dulcet, XXVII, 468-69.
125. Luis del Castillo also wrote a pamphlet of interest to us entitled *Observaciones sobre el comercio del Mar Negro, con especificación del que los Españoles pueden hacer allí ventajosamente* (Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1828). Palau y Dulcet, VI, 519.
126. Manuel de Villegas y Piñateli, *Historia de Moscovia* (Madrid: Imprenta del Convento de la Merced, 1736), I, 45, 47.
127. Élie Borschak, *Napoleon i Ukraïna* [Napoleon and Ukraine] (Lviv: Dilo, 1937), pp. 65-75; Marian Kukiel, *Dzieje oręża polskiego w epoce napoleońskiej* [The History of the Polish Arms in Napoleonic Times] (Poznań: Nakładem Zdźisława Rzepeckiego, 1912), pp. 42-46.
128. Kukiel, pp. 16, 18-19, 21 32.
129. Kukiel, pp. 193-222.
130. Many Ukrainians in France achieved prominence, especially in the armed forces. Such was the case of Count Hryhor Orlyk (1702-1759), able diplomat and Lieutenant General of the French army, Cavalier of the Swedish Order of the Sword and the Order of St. Louis, who had under his command a unit of Ukrainian Cossack Guards serving in the French army. He died on active service in the Battle of Bergen in 1759. For details see Élie Borschak, *Hryhor Orlyk, France's Cossack General* (Toronto: Burns and MacEachen, 1956).
131. Mykhailo Lomatskyi, *Narysy z Hutsulshchyny* [Sketches From Ukrainian Highlands] (New York: Howerla, 1960), p. 22.

132. Palau y Dulcet, XII, 425.

133. V. Markus, "International Legal Status of the Ukrainian State," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, II, 68.

134. P. P. Shevchenko, "Rota im. Tarasa Shevchenka v boiakh proty fashyzmu v Ispanii [The Shevchenko Company in the Struggle Against Fascism in Spain], *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal* [The Ukrainian Historical Journal], No. 1 (January-February 1961), pp. 101-114.

135. Letter from Anatoly Hak, Philadelphia, March 23, 1976. Mr. Hak (pen name) is a Ukrainian writer who personally met those children in Kharkiv before the war.

136. For example: Oriente europeo, No. 26 (Abril-Junio 1957).

Yaroslav Rudnytskyi, *Z podorozhi navkolo svitu* ("From My European Diary") (Winipeg: Ivan Tyktor, 1955), pp. 15, 18-19. Santiago Morillo was one of the Spanish Jesuits working in Ukraine.

138. V. Pastuschuk, "Espaniia na shliakhu demokratyzatsii" [Spain on the road towards Democratisation], *Homin Ukrainy* [Ukrainian Echo], February 7, 1976, pp. 2, 6.

139. Demetrio Doroshenko, *Historia de Ucrania*, trans. R. C. U. (Buenos Aires: R. C. U., 1962), p. 674.

140. Dmytro Buchynskyi, *Bibliografia ucraniana, 1945-1961* (Madrid: Ministerio de Educación Nacional, 1962), p. 3.

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## News from Ukraine

*Martin SIEFF*

The Washington Times

### **VISION OF VIRGIN MARY DRAWS MILLIONS TO UKRAINIAN VILLAGE**

Since 1981, reported appearances by the Virgin Mary have drawn millions of people to a village in Yugoslavia. Now she is believed by many to have turned up in the Soviet Union.

As many as 80,000 people have been gathering daily in a Western Ukrainian village after reported appearances of the Virgin Mary that began on the anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster, according to reports reaching the West.

Soviet authorities have been taking the events so seriously that they have launched a news media campaign against them. But under the new policy of *glasnost*, or openness, they are finding their efforts counterproductive.

According to the dissident *Chronicle of the Ukrainian Catholic Church*, an image of the Virgin first appeared to an 11-year-old Ukrainian girl — Marina Kizyn — in the village of Hrushiv on April 26 — the first anniversary of the explosion at Chernobyl Reactor No. 4 and the first Sunday after Easter.

Miss Kizyn had her vision in the belfry of an abandoned chapel behind her family house on the outskirts of the village. Many neighbours also saw the apparition, which remained for several days, it said.

Word soon spread through Western Ukraine, to Moscow and even to Central Asia, according to the reports.

“Every day a mass of people comes here to Hrushiv by foot, by private and company car, by bus and by train. . .so that they may personally see the face of the Virgin Mary”, the official Soviet newspaper *Lvovskaya Pravda* reported on May 15.

On May 13 — the anniversary of the 1917 appearance at Fatima in Portugal — there was a local Ukrainian television broadcast on the phenomenon, but this proved to be a disaster for the Soviet authorities. An image of the Virgin reportedly appeared on screens in the area during it.

The affair has caused great embarrassment to the authorities, who appear at a loss how to deal with it. The *Lvovskaya Pravda* article blamed foreign at-

tempts to sabotage Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of *perestroika*, or reconstruction.

The writers of the article even quoted the Gospel of Matthew in warning genuine believers against false prophets — ironic behaviour for representatives of the self-proclaimed atheist Soviet Communist Party.

On more familiar ground, they also blamed local party and police authorities for letting matters get out of hand at the cost of law and order.

An article in the publication *Vilna Ukraina* on May 13 complained that by diverting masses of workers from their jobs, the "miracle" was harming local agricultural productivity and even public health.

Journalist S. Kurpil — writing in the official publication *Leninska Molod* on May 19 — revealed the strength of faith the apparitions had already generated. "Just try saying out loud in the Kizyns' yard that you don't see anything out of the ordinary on the chapel", he wrote. "The fanatics may call you godless, an atheist, a district committee man — even a journalist!"

The authorities attempted a conventional response. In the first half of May, a Hrushiv village meeting was called in which the residents "demanded" that the local district executive committee "allow them to live and work in peace and clear the village of religious fanatics, extremists and tramps", *Lvovskaya Pravda* reported on May 19.

So far, at least eight articles in the local press and a number of radio commentaries have addressed the phenomenon.

The editors of the *Chronicle* suggested that this coverage was inspired by a group of entrenched local Communist Party bureaucrats who wanted to embarrass their new area secretary, Y. P. Pohrebnyak — an appointee of the Gorbachev establishment — and hoped it would prevent him taking action against him.

However, the *Chronicle's* editors also suggested that the press coverage may have been intended to provide a pretext for renewed persecution of the outlawed Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church.

Reports of visitations by the Virgin are not uncommon in the devoutly Roman Catholic Western Ukraine. One in the early 1950s was taken as a sign that the Ukrainian Catholic Church would continue to exist and served as the rallying cry for its renewed underground organisation.

More recent reported sightings in 1967 and 1986 were also viewed by believers as signs of God's special favour on the persecuted faithful. However, in all these earlier affairs, the Soviet press reported them only long afterward.

The Hrushiv shrine already had a long history of reported miraculous occurrences, according to Andrew Sorokowski, a Ukrainian researcher at Keston College in Britain, a respected centre for monitoring religious activities and persecution in Eastern Europe.

An earlier apparition of the Virgin was reported there in 1806, and 50 years

later, after a cholera epidemic reportedly was miraculously averted, a chapel was built over a spring at the sight. It was declared a shrine in 1901.

The current apparitions come at a time of increasing religious awareness in Ukraine. Pope John Paul II has declared this year a Marian year in honour of the Virgin, and the 1,000th anniversary of the Christianisation of the Ukraine comes next year.

It also comes after six years of reported continuous, daily appearances of the Virgin to a group of local believers — with attendant apparitions seen by many thousands of people — at Medjugorje, Yugoslavia.

According to press accounts, several million pilgrims pour in annually, mostly Americans, Europeans and Yugoslavs, with some from Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South America.

The story of the visions divided the Yugoslav Catholic community and angered communist authorities, who encouraged atheism and, initially wary of the phenomenon, arrested local priests.

But now official controls have been relaxed, and Medjugorje has been transformed into a bustling pilgrim centre to rival the shrines of Lourdes in France, Fatima in Portugal or Guadalupe in Mexico.

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## RIOTS AND UNOFFICIAL YOUTH GROUPS IN UKRAINE

**“Freedom, freedom, we want freedom”.**

These words were chanted after a rock concert by the group “Avgust” during the Kyiv city festival, it was revealed in a recent issue of *Literaturna Ukraina*. The Soviet Ukrainian press has continued to write about unofficial youth groups and has revealed that they exist on a large scale. In the light of the large scale football hooliganism experienced in Kyiv over the weekend after the local side lost to a Moscow team, it would be appropriate to see this event within the context of unofficial youth groups and their activities.

*Radyanska Ukraina*, the major Ukrainian party daily, reported that these groups are being studied by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and central committee of the Komsomol who have questioned 5000 people in a survey. They are researching into the “mechanism of the formation of civic consciousness among young people during the current phase of restructuring”. *Radyanska Ukraina* called for increased cooperation between sociologists and these unofficial groups and for greater publicity. Aware that among these unofficial groups are young people that have dropped out of society, a call was made for further discussions with them in order to try and re-integrate them into society.

*Literaturna Ukraina*, a newspaper in the forefront of the campaign for glas-

nost in Ukraine, has gone further in describing these groups. One group called "Metalisty" sport mohawk haircuts, chain bracelets and spike collars. On a recent tour of Ukraine the heavy metal band "Kryez" created an uproar in Ivano-Frankivsk when patrons went on the rampage and destroyed cars. Officials in Kyiv were more prepared and sent out the internal security forces. Similar events took place in Kherson earlier this year where during a concert patrons tore upholstery from the seats and set fire to the stadium leaving it in a shambles. During the Kyiv city festival groups of youths after a concert chanted: "Freedom, freedom, we want freedom".

When asked why heavy metal music has so overwhelmed Ukrainian youth, when it has declined in the West, one replied: "We don't care what's going on there, we are metalists here". The typical "metalist" comes from a working class family. During one counseling session with 12 of them they were asked why have they chosen to be rebels and non-conformists? : "We see everything, we see who eats what, who stands in line and who doesn't and who speculates during shortages and ask ourselves why do these inequalities exist? There are 12 of us here and we all agree that these people should be put up against the wall and shot". When they began to discuss economics he replied that "we should have an open capitalist market as in the West". When the conversations turned to the West and nuclear weapons they voiced support for star wars as a deterrent to nuclear war.

In a survey in Moscow of members of these unofficial youth groups it was found that sixty per cent of those questioned were members of the Komsomol, a worrying sign for the authorities. A further breakdown was given as such:

Engineers and technicians:	52.7%
Factory workers:	65.1%
University students:	71.7%
High school students:	89.4%

Another article in *Pravda Ukrainy* on these youth groups described the "alien influences" at work and was critical of the fact that: "Many of us are, frankly spanning surprise that negative phenomena among the young people have suddenly only now become visible. As if phenomena such as alcoholism, lack of sexual restraint, drug addiction, passion for Western music and so forth only emerged yesterday". The newspaper believed that the "facts attesting to young people's ideological immaturity are abundant". Many of them have no, or little, "Marxist-Leninist world outlook" and "informal youth associations are frequently politically unaligned in their activity". A majority do not see the need to evaluate music from a "class position", whilst "religion and religious attributes are socially and ideologically harmless and Komsomol... badges are out of fashion".

*Pravda Ukrainy* believed that their efforts to cultivate among young people "a resistance to the attempts of our ideological adversaries" were "very ineffective". Education in schools and the Komsomol "remain futile" because

(Soviet) ideals are expounded in "such a dull and academic manner that they lose their attractiveness and consequently their mobilising impact weakens".

*Kultura i Zhyttia*, the organ of the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture, has also recently covered the "heavy metal" cult and the problems they face with the militia after a discotheque they frequented was closed down in the Kyiv region. The militia closed the discotheque down because they claimed all one could hear was foreign music of an "ideologically-pernicious" content. This music activated groups of young people who are organised in an "anti-social" basis and call themselves "rockers", "metalisty". The newspaper asked the militia major if, after closing down the discotheque, these groups have disappeared? No, instead, they continue their activities not in the Palace of Culture, but in somebody's home, on the streets or listen to radio stations.

In a letter to *Prapor Kommunism* 17 members of the "metal group Heng" wrote that the authorities criticise and accuse them of being aggressive and intolerant to those that do not belong to their groups. They accused the older generation of "intolerance to them" and of wanting to quash their groups. To this they state: "I would like to say in the name of all 'metalists' that you will not be successful". Others were quoted as saying: "We are trying to separate ourselves from the crowd. One thing that bothers us: why are you interfering with us? This is a fashion, and fashions cannot be halted. You try and frighten us with the militia. But we are not timid rabbits. We exist and will not cease to exist until it becomes unfashionable".

These articles all testify to the widespread problem of unofficial youth groups and activity in Ukraine, and throughout the USSR. All the articles reflect serious official concern over this problem and how to overcome it. It is difficult to gauge to what extent these unofficial groups have become political, but there is some evidence to suggest that this is increasingly becoming the case. What is clear is that they do not become involved in the Soviet way of life, dislike their elders and refuse to be cajoled into doing things they do not want to do. (UPA).

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## UKRAINIAN WRITER CALLS FOR UKRAINISATION AND REHABILITATION OF WRITERS UNDER STALIN

A local (oblast) newspaper from Lviv, unobtainable outside the USSR, called *Leninska Molod* (7 July 1987) published an interview with the acclaimed writer and historian Roman Ivanychuk. He considers the reconstruction of Soviet society under Gorbachev to be a belated but necessary step towards building a better society: "It's a complicated process, which will take many years. A new generation must be brought up, which will think in a totally different way". In his opinion there cannot be economic democracy

without political democracy. It is now time, he states, to discuss the "white marks" in Ukraine's history. Poems and novels, which have never before been published should now be made available for everyone to read. Ivanychuk mentions the case of Mykola Khvylovyi (a Ukrainian writer in the forefront of Ukrainisation policies in the 1920s, who committed suicide at the height of the artificial famine in 1933). Who knows, Ivanychuk argues, that Khvylovyi died after writing "Long live Soviet power" with his party card in his hand? Although Khvylovyi has not been rehabilitated in Ukraine, there are indications that his works (hitherto only available in the West) may soon appear in a Moscow journal.

Under Gorbachev some Ukrainian writers from the 1960s such as Vasyly Holoborodko, Lina Kostenko, Ivan Dzyuba and Oles Honchar's novel *Sobor* (last published officially in 1969) have all been rehabilitated. This is in marked contrast to the Ukrainian writers and cultural figures of the 1930s, who, it seems, are too controversial even for Gorbachev's policy of glasnost. In June this year the director of the Institute of Party History in Kyiv, Vasyly I. Yurchuk, ruled out in *Pravda Ukrainy* the rehabilitation of those from the 1930s, such as Mykola Khvylovyi and Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi. At the same time, controversial Russian figures, such as Kluichevsky and Soloviev, are being rehabilitated whilst calls to rehabilitate Mykola Kostomarov, Mykhailo Drahomanov and Volodymyr Vynnychenko have fallen on deaf ears (see *Zhovten*, no. 3 1987).

However, one of the most important aspects of reconstruction, according to Ivanychuk, is the revival of the Ukrainian language. He cites the recent plenum of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, where one of the main topics of discussion was the role of the Ukrainian language. He criticises the trend of teaching in the Russian language in the republic's universities and colleges, just because there are some "foreigners" (i.e. overseas students) present in the class. Ivanychuk asks: "why can't they learn Ukrainian if they are studying in Ukraine?". Such pronouncements would have meant a jail sentence only a few years ago on charges of "bourgeois nationalism".

He goes on further to question such practices as putting up signs in both Russian and Ukrainian in Ukraine's cities and towns. He is also critical of the practice whereby the official language in government establishments in Ukraine is in Russian. "Is it because Russians living in Ukraine would be offended?", Ivanychuk sardonically asks.

When asked what he considered his role as a writer was in the period of reconstruction, he answered that the accident in Chernobyl had grieved him. It was made worse by the fact that despite the accident still more nuclear power plants were being built in Ukraine. Ivanychuk is not alone among the Ukrainian intelligentsia in opposing the further expansion of nuclear power in the republic (see *Literaturna Ukraina*, 6 August 1987).

More importantly, he saw his role as upholding the campaign in support of Ukrainian culture. Ivanychuk wonders why in Lviv, the birthplace of the Ukrainian poet, Ivan Franko, there isn't a faculty of Franko studies at the

University? He stresses the need for a specialised dictionary on Franko and declares his support for the establishment of a museum in honour of the Ukrainian singer, S. Krushelnytska. Although the decision to establish a museum has already been taken there has been considerable opposition to the plans. Ivanychuk, in a warning to those people who are opposed to the idea, speculates that the time is approaching when such people will be named publicly. He adds that there was also opposition to the celebrations of one of Western Ukraine's greatest writers — Markian Shashkevych.

Dmytro Pavlychko, one of Ukraine's most popular contemporary poets, has also criticised the fifty volume edition of Ivan Franko's works as representing only two-thirds of his work in *Literaturna Ukraina* last year. Pavlychko attacked the censorship of Franko's work (which in the text is given as "stop, brackets enclosing three dots") and looked forward to the year 2016, on the hundredth anniversary of his death, when a complete edition might appear?

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## **UNOFFICIAL GROUP FOR THE RELEASE OF UKRAINIAN PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE FORMED IN UKRAINE**

On Saturday, 3 October, an unofficial "Initiative Group for the Release of Ukrainian Prisoners of Conscience" was formed in Ukraine. They issued an appeal calling upon the Soviet authorities to release all Ukrainians currently imprisoned on political charges. The appeal was signed by Ukrainian former political prisoners: Vyacheslav Chornovil, Mykhailo Horyn, Zorian Popadiuk and Vasyl Barladyanu.

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## **UNOFFICIAL PEACE DEMONSTRATION BROKEN UP IN LVIV, UKRAINE**

According to information released by the Frankfurt-based International Society for Human Rights, a demonstration recently took place by 30 members of an unofficial peace movement in Lviv, Western Ukraine. The demonstrators carried placards calling for "Glasnost" and "Nuclear disarmament by the USSR and USA". Many passers-by mingled with and joined the demonstration.

Despite the attempts by the militia to disperse the demonstration, destroy the placards and threaten the participants with dire consequences, the demonstration continued for one hour.

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### Documents & Reports

## IVAN SOKULSKYI'S LETTER TO GORBACHEV

Ivan Sokulskyi wrote his letter to Gorbachev in 1986. Miraculously, the letter somehow got beyond the concentration camp and into the West. Born in 1940, Ivan Sokulskyi was sentenced in 1980 to 10 years' imprisonment and 5 years' exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda". In 1983 he agreed to give an interview to a correspondent of *Vechirne Dnipro*, a newspaper from Dnipropetrovsk. The article was falsified and published under the title "Prozrinnya" (enlightenment). Finding out about the falsification, Sokulskyi protested and he was once again sent off to the Chystopol prison. Later, three additional years of imprisonment were added to his sentence, accusing him of a criminal deed. The KGB proposed a pardon for Sokulskyi, if he admitted to the "facts" in the "Prozrinnya" article. Sokulskyi did not agree to the KGB's proposition, that is why he is now serving his sentence in one of the severest of concentration camps. Gorbachev's "amnesty" did not include Ivan Sokulskyi.

May-June, 1986

Esteemed General Secretary!

Forgive the awkward address. The contemporary Russian language does not have a form of polite address to an official person.

As probably the majority of people, I diligently follow your efforts at creating peace. As the majority, I, certainly, also would wish that they end in success. But at the same time, I can understand those who view your peaceful initiatives with mistrust, seeing in them propagandist recourse. Insofar as it is my misfortune to reside within the borders of a country headed by you, I think that I have the right to turn to you with my reflections on the same.

The reason for the mistrust of the USSR is well known. It is the internal politics conducted by the government headed by you. It is no secret that it is the internal politics of a country which designate its true face in the international arena. When the national-socialist government came to power in Germany and enforced its political terror, it smelled of war throughout the world. This was a challenge to the peo-



ple of the world. Therefore, taught by recent history, the world cannot believe the so-called "love of peace" of the Soviet government, if in its position towards dissent, unofficial parties and convictions it is exactly the same, if not more ruthless, than that of Hitler's Germany.

For example, Hryhoriy Prykhodko and I were sentenced only for our patriotic, nationalistic convictions, with a complete lack of any factual evidence of anti-Soviet activity. In exactly the same manner, almost all patriotically inclined persons in Ukraine were sentenced in 1950-1960 and earlier to maximum terms of imprisonment. They were completely eradicated. But even this was not enough for the organs of the KGB.

In the special regimen VS-389-36 camps, the KGB has organised and fully unleashed a series of political murders under the guise of the so-called "regime of maintenance". In this manner, about 20% of prisoners in the special regimen camps were killed.

Having arrived to a VS-389-36 camp from the Chystopol prison where I had served 5 years, I noticed that the regimen here was ten times more severe than the prison regimen at Chystopol. Not so much the regimen, but the entire willful, intentional, premeditated murder. In this way, immediately upon my arrival from Chystopol formally relying on the fact that I was not able to complete the required work quota — I was gravely ill, suffering from an acute form of osteochondrosis — I was thrown into an isolation cell for 67 days. In isolation, aside from the wasting away from hunger and cold approved by the regimen, I was constantly subjected to inhuman torment by the guards. To qualify their treatment of me as sadistic, would be putting it mildly.

It is impossible to say to what extent a human being can go, if completely turned over to the rule of another, and particularly if the ruler's authoritarianism cannot be charged, such instances do not exist. All charges come back to the authorities of camps for state criminals, from which the standard reply is "punish for slander". The real power over the prisoners is not the camp administration, but V. I. Vasylenko, who is completely authorised by the KGB. The administration as well as the military guards are only the executors of Vasylenko's secret instructions. In his conversations with prisoners, he openly speaks about his principles in his work: "If the enemy does not submit, he must be eliminated". The death penalty cannot be given for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda", but Vasylenko gives each prisoner his own secret sentence, which is carried out under the guise of punishment for "violation of the regimen". They will add up as many acts of "violation" as necessary for them to constantly terrorise people. In this way Vasylenko summoned the Estonian Tarto to his office and threatened him, unless Tarto admits himself guilty and writes a petition for

pardon, he will be sentenced to a further five years' imprisonment. Vasylenko also talked with me frankly: if I don't cooperate with the KGB, in a matter of time I will be carried out feet first, i.e., killed. And obviously, this is not simple blackmail.

They began to destroy me systematically immediately upon my arrival in the camp. If I am alive until now, it is only because Vasylenko granted a "retreat" for a period of time, so that I would have the opportunity to think and choose death or cooperation with the KGB. As Vasylenko said, I have no other choice. Last year, 1985, Taraban arrived in Chystopol from Dnipropetrovsk. He gave me an ultimatum from his superiors: either I admit to guilt in something which I did not do, as the case was fabricated, and publish an announcement in the press that I was the author of the interview done in my name by the correspondent Homolskyi and published in the newspaper *Vechirne Dnipro*, June 12-14, 1983, or I will be sentenced for a criminal deed.

I was sentenced to three years of the regime which I now have. The conditions in the special regimen surpass Buchenwald and Majdanek in their cruelty.

I will give several examples. With the purpose of torment, they did the following to me: three times a day I was made to undress and told to turn my socks inside out, after which they wrote me up for turning my socks inside out too slowly. As it was winter, they removed my therapeutic belt, I was allowed only my underclothes. The prison food consists of 450 grams of bread, every other day we get something warm. Despite this, I had to work. My cell has a steel door on which the guards constantly pounded with a hammer. I was kept in a solitary cell for almost a year. Despite the fact that during the working hours I worked to fulfil the required quota, every three or four minutes the overseer would open the window and shout abusively: "Sokulskyi! Why aren't you working?!", calling me abominable, censorable names. When I complained to higher authorities, their response was "You must fulfil your quota".

I was gravely ill and could only fulfil about 80% of the work quota. However, for two months I was able to meet the quota, except for singular days, but the authorities continued to write in their reports that I "intentionally do not fulfil the work quota". Again and again I was thrown into isolation cells, or my terms in them were extended.

By some miracle, despite the inhuman conditions, my illness eased a little and I began to systematically fulfil the work quota, otherwise I would still be in isolation today, if alive at all. The guards would walk into my cell and threaten me with murder, or mock me, "Now you're reaching the quota, I'll kill you yet".

A camp administrator often annulled the doctor's instructions, using the excuse that I was not fulfilling the quota. Snyedovskiy, a camp division official, contradicting the doctor, wrote in a report that I was simulating illness. As I had a cold, I went to the doctor who gave me medication for gargling. When Snyedovskiy learned that I had the medicine, he instructed the guard to get rid of it, which the guard did.

Almost every day, and at that several times a day, I was summoned to either Dolmatov, an administration official or a camp division official who branded me as "spitefully not fulfilling the work norm". They called me lazy, a hooligan and other derogatory names.

My conviction is love for Ukraine, with all the consequences which stem from that love. I believe that Ukrainians have the same right to an independent state as do the Russians or Africans. National interests can only be safeguarded by having our own state. Our own state is the only thing that can rescue Ukrainians from total Russification and from their disappearance as a nation by the year 2000.

The Ukrainian SSR is pointed out to us. But this is only an administrative unit of the "one and indivisible Russia". The USSR does not have equality of rights, not even formally. The communists of Russia, RSFSR, stand above all national party organisations. When speaking of national republics, all national republics are borne in mind, except the RSFSR. Russia is formally a supranation. Is it possible that Ukrainians must agree with Russification because they live in the so-called "most progressive and most just order"?

It seems to me that there is no greater despotism nor iniquity in all the world. Can it be otherwise if the powers that be are certain that they have captured and mastered the most objective course of history? If there is an objective course of history, then what mortal can know of it beforehand? Who can really know in what societies mankind will live in fifty years? No one, except for those cabinet scholars who know the course of history in advance as well as those who identify their deeds with the course of history.

As for myself, I don't divide countries into capitalist and socialist. The principle of economics — the basis of mankind — is but one, as there is only one nature of man. I divide countries into free ones and despotic ones. As far as the regime under which I have been forced to live is concerned, I have been convinced by my own bitter experience that there is no place here for human individuality; the party has usurped everything. If you have any claims to being an individual, your place is in prison. And here you can be killed at any time by the secret sentence of a chekist reeducator, in this case Vasylenko.

If we considered freedom of the individual and of nations overall as

the main goal of the revolution, then communists-Leninists are counterrevolutionaries rather than revolutionaries. After the fall of tsarist rule, during the time of the Provisional Government, Russia had many political freedoms — freedom of political activity, political parties, meetings, demonstrations, strikes. There was freedom of speech, press, and so on. As I understand it, at that time, Russia was seeking its own national form of rule, therefore the government was modestly called “Provisional”.

Ukrainians, taking advantage of the democratisation and the right of secession, created their own independent state — the Ukrainian National Republic. But the Bolsheviks, usurping power with the help of subversion, did not look for forms of rule suitable to the people, did not adapt it to the people, but quite the contrary, began to conform the people to an abstract, conceived in advance form of rule. What did not fit in, they cut off.

This is how entire classes and strata of society began to be liquidated. State terror was enforced within the country, terror which has lasted until today, and which is now applied to individual persons. The first internally political deed of the Bolshevik government, after pronouncing its “love of peace”, was an attack upon the independent Ukrainian state. With time, they came to restore the “one and indivisible”, “where from the Moldavian to the Finn, all is silent on all tongues”. I have no pretensions to the infallibility of my thoughts, but this is what my convictions are comprised of, for which I am being killed.

*Ivan Sokulskyi*

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## **ABN AT THE 20th WACL CONFERENCE**

The 20th conference of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL) took place in Taiwan, Republic of China, from August 15-26, 1987. Within the framework of the WACL conference, three other conferences were incorporated, namely, the 3rd conference of the World Youth Freedom League (WYFL); the 33rd conference of the Asian Pacific Anti-Communist League (APACL) and the 7th conference of the Asian Pacific Youth Freedom League (APYFL). 471 representatives from 113 nations participated in the conference.

WACL was founded in 1967 under the initiative of the ABN president Yaroslav Stetsko, the president of the Asian Anti-Communist Lea-

gue, Dr. Ku Cheng-kang, and the chairman of the Confederacy of Latin America Dr. Prieto Lorenzo. Yaroslav Stetsko, the Prime Minister of the Ukrainian National Government was a long time member of the WACL Executive Board. After his death, Mrs. Slava Stetsko, the current ABN president, was elected a member of the Executive Board at the 19th WACL conference in Luxembourg.

The ABN has been a long time member organisation of WACL, and has been represented at all the previous 19 WACL conferences. The ABN delegation at the 20th conference was headed by its president, Slava Stetsko, and represented the following subjugated nations: Byelorussia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Rumania and Ukraine.

The opening ceremonies took place on August 17th. Senator Jose Desmarets of Belgium, the chairman of the 19th WACL Council opened the ceremonies, followed by Dr. Osami Kuboki of Japan, the chairman of the 32nd APACL Council and by Dr. Ku Cheng-kang, chairman of the 20th WACL and 33rd APACL conferences. Premier Yu Kuo-Hwa of the Republic of China welcomed the conference participants. Congratulatory messages were read from President Ronald Reagan, His Excellency Chiang Ching-kuo, President of the ROC, and from President Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay.

Guest speeches were delivered by Congressman Earl Hutto from the USA, the Hon. Dieter Weirich from the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hon. Georges Apélété Creppy from the Ivory Coast, Mr. Ahmed Mohammed Jamal from Saudi Arabia and the Hon. Daso de Oliveira Coimbra from Brazil. The same day, the second session consisted of reports on Council action, reports from WACL regions and youth activities. Mrs. Stetsko reported on the activities of the ABN and on the current status in the subjugated nations.

On August 18, a wreath laying ceremony was conducted at the Martyr's Shrine. The programme of the conference was a multifaceted one. Youth delegates participated in an all day meeting with the Chinese youth "China Corps". WACL and APACL delegates participated in three forums:

- 1) Forum on Mainland China and the Soviet Union;
- 2) Forum on Free World Security;
- 3) Forum on International Cooperation in the Cause of Freedom.

ABN delegates actively participated in the discussion sessions of all forums. The day ended with a concert of Chinese folk and classical music and dance performed by schoolchildren and youth.

The conference continued with separate meetings of the WACL regions. ABN sponsored a workshop on common strategy approaches in

combatting communism. The workshop was chaired by Mrs. Stetsko. ABN youth delegates actively participated in the WYFL meeting.

On August 20, the Captive Nations Rally was held at the China Sports Cultural Activities Centre. Honorary WACL chairman Dr. Ku Cheng-kang addressed the rally. Other addresses were delivered by Congressman Charles Wilson of the USA, the Hon. Ortwin Lowack, member of the West German Parliament, the Hon. Antonio Ortezturcios of the Honduras, the Hon. Jong-Woor Hong of Korea, the Hon. Takeo Hiranuma of Japan, Professor Abdul Sattar Sirat of Afghanistan, and the Hon. Jacques Teuira of French Polynesia. Mrs. Stetsko addressed the rally from ABN.

The joint closing ceremonies featured speeches by the following statesmen: Governor of the State of Arizona of the USA, Evan Mecham; Mr. Lic Bernal Urbina Pinto, a political activist from Costa Rica, General Luis A. Villa-Real of the Philippines, the Hon. John Wilkinson, member of the British Parliament and president of the European Freedom Council and Mr. Pierre Schifferli from Switzerland, which will host the 21st WACL conference. The conference ended with a farewell dinner hosted by Dr. and Mrs. Ku Cheng-kang.

The conference issued a final joint communique assessing the world situation, contrasting the success of the Free World with the ever increasing failures of communism. The communique urges free nations to strive for unity as part of a global anti-communist strategy, and calls upon them to "provide moral, political, and logistical military support for all anti-communist freedom fighters. . . The Free World should support the heroic struggles for national independence of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain in Mainland China, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Caucasasia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Croatia. We must never accept as final the division of the world into half slave — half free".

During the course of the conference, in official capacity as delegates and in private conversations, representatives of the ABN were able to promote the struggle for freedom of the subjugated nations. Literature in several languages was distributed to the conference participants and old contacts were strengthened and new contacts were made. The high level and overall success of the conference, in which the subjugated nations were able to promote their cause and generally inform the Free World of their plight, prove the importance and necessity of such conferences and our participation in them.

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## **20th WACL CONFERENCE**

**TAIPEI, TAIWAN, REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

**(August 15-23, 1987)**

### **JOINT COMMUNIQUE**

**20th WACL, 33rd APACL, 3rd WYFL and 7th APYFL Conferences  
Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China, August 21, 1987**

The 20th Conference of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL), the 33rd Conference of the Asian Pacific Anti-Communist League (APACL), the 3rd Conference of the World Youth Freedom League (WYFL) and the 7th Conference of the Asian Pacific Youth Freedom League (APYFL) convened in Taipei, Republic of China, from August 15-23, 1987, to deliberate effective ways to achieve common security through freedom.

President Chiang Ching-kuo, President Ronald Reagan, and President Alfredo Stroessner sent messages of congratulations and support, for which we are grateful.

The participants reviewed the world situation with respect to:

1. The Free World's success of political democracy and free market economies, contrasted with the growing failures of the Communist World.
2. The Free World objective of defending freedom and national independence has helped to check the Communist goal of unlimited expansionism.
3. The attempt to use Peking as a counterweight to Moscow has not prevented rapprochement between the two Communist powers and could lead to serious consequences.

The Conference reaffirmed the Free World goal of peace with justice, national independence, economic freedom and prosperity, and social progress.

With these concerns in mind, the Conference resolved to urge all freedom-loving peoples to:

Draw a line between democracies and Communist systems. An example of this is Communist China's support of Iran and the sending of Silkworm missiles into the Persian Gulf. Free nations should strive for unity as part of a global anti-Communist strategy.

Strive for the expansion of freedom through national, regional and global channels. Common security systems should be adopted to achieve this goal.

Expand political, economic, cultural, sci-tech, information and other exchanges within the Free World (recognising the constraints of security).

Deter Communist attacks through the retention of credible nuclear retaliatory forces, increased conventional forces, and defence of Free World assets through the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Even if nuclear weapons could be abolished with guarantees of verification, it would only make the Free World more vulnerable to Massive Soviet Bloc conventional forces.

Stop arms sales and technology transfers to the Communist World.

Work to resolve racial and religious conflicts so that internecine acts do not threaten freedom and encourage the Communist World to divide and conquer the Free World through infiltration and subversion.

Support all activities to prevent the betrayal of Hong Kong and Macao residents under Communist China's fraudulent "one country, two systems" ploy. Every positive and effective step should be taken to prevent the further enslavement of free peoples.

Stand behind the peoples of the Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, and other divided nations to insure national reunification consonant with freedom and national independence.

Most importantly, provide moral, political, and logistical military support for all anti-Communist freedom fighters, with emphasis on existing resistance movements in Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, the Seychelles, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Care should be taken to reject one-sided "peace" proposals which block U.S. support to resistance movements (as in Nicaragua) while allowing Soviet and Cuban aid to continue to the Sandinistas. Moreover, the Free World should support the heroic struggles for national independence of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain in Mainland China, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Caucasia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Croatia. We must never accept as final the division of the world into half slave — half free. Hanoi's attempt to Vietnamise the peoples of Cambodia and Laos must be vigorously opposed and stopped.

The World Anti-Communist League decided to hold its 21st Conference in Switzerland at an appropriate date, in 1988. The 1987 Conference expressed special gratitude to the host country for its warm hospitality.



## ADDENDUM

This communique recognises the following areas of conflict between the Free World and Communist totalitarianism and applies its principles to those conflicts:

1. Recent election results in New Zealand reveal a further drift of that country in the direction of Soviet influence, with the apparent determination of Prime Minister Lange to reduce Western influence from the area through the extension of so-called nuclear-free zones.

2. Four "peace" plans for Nicaragua could result in the elimination of the Democratic Resistance (or Contras) and the consolidation of the Soviet-backed Sandinista regime, in violation of the Monroe Doctrine and the RIO and OAS treaties.

3. The USSR and Iran have strengthened their political economic ties, while Communist China supplies military aid, including Silkworm missiles.

4. The Communist threat to the Philippines continues in spite of increased efforts by the Aquino government to contain it. The increased strength of the New People's Army (Communist guerillas) and its political arm, the National Democratic Front, has led to increased infiltration, including the Administration itself.

5. Sri Lanka, a non-aligned country with cordial relations with the West, has been besieged by an insurgency backed by India and the USSR, endangering the survival of the strategic naval base at Trincomalee.

6. The division in the ranks of the Burmese resistance forces has played into the hands of Soviet and Chinese Communist influences.

7. Continuing conflict and turmoil in the Middle East has led to growing Soviet influence in the area.

8. Western sanctions and disinvestment against South Africa have proven counterproductive, and have severely harmed the black population economically. Increased Soviet influence threatens Western access to the minerals of this strategic country.

9. Free World interests would be served if North Korea would cease and desist in its threat to interfere with the 1988 Olympic Games.

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## UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC BISHOPS PREPARE MILLENNIUM SUPPLEMENT FOR *USA TODAY*

*New York* — The Ukrainian Catholic dioceses of Stamford and Parma prepared a four-page advertising supplement about the millennium of Christianity in Ukraine which appeared in the Sept. 18 edition of *USA Today*.

Titled "Ukrainian Catholics Celebrate 1,000 Years of Christianity", the section, appearing in the front of the newspaper beginning on page 5, encapsulated Ukrainian Christian history from 988 to today. It pointed out that the Ukrainian nation consists of Catholic, Orthodox and Protestants and that under the current Russian regime, all forms of religious belief are persecuted.

The supplement included articles by William F. Buckley, who discussed why "Americans Should Celebrate Millennium with Ukrainians". In it he wrote, "That they [Russians] should seek to focus such celebrations as they plan in Moscow, offends deeply the Ukrainians who were born and will die — many of them prematurely — celebrating the distinctness between their cultures — their religion — and that of the Ukrainian state first enslaved by the Bolshevik revolutionaries, and then desecralised by them.

Men and women of all faiths should join the Ukrainians in celebrating the great millennium, in appropriate ways, and in declining to cooperate in the sacrilege contemplated by the men who preside over the Kremlin, tyrannise over what they call the socialist republics, and export hunger and tyranny to so many parts of the world".

Accompanied by colour illustrations, the section also contained the text of Pope John Paul II's statement to Ukrainian Catholics on the millennium as well as an appeal by Bishops Basil Losten and Robert Moskal, urging Ukrainians who might have fallen away from the Ukrainian Catholic Church to return to it.

"Ukrainian Catholics have been chosen by God as living symbols of how people can survive by their devotion to Him. We in the free world can accomplish this task with the rights that should be accorded to every man and woman. Yet, just as our brethren who are denied those freedoms, we must stand firm and united. Our Church, through its survival, stands as a testament to God's love for all mankind", they wrote.

Other articles discuss the history of Ukrainians in the United States, the State Department report on the persecution of Ukrainian Catholics in Ukraine, a brief history of Ukrainians by Dr. Lubomyr Hajda of

Harvard University, Soviet Russian misrepresentations about the millennium, as well as information about Patriarch Josyf Slipyj.

"We hope that our fellow Americans will join with us in this joyous celebration. Freedom of religion is a gift with which we, Americans, are blessed. It is good that we celebrate together and fitting that we pray for those who do not have our same freedoms", said Bishop Moskal in the supplement.

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## **NGO's BRIEFED ON VIENNA, U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL ISSUES**

*Washington, Sept. 10* — Several State Department officials here briefed close to 50 non-governmental organisation (NGO) representatives of the U.S. government's position with respect to the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the September meeting between U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze.

The State Department officials stressed that the concluding document of the current Vienna session must be "hard-hitting" and demonstrate performance in all areas of the Helsinki Accords. Ambassador Warren Zimmerman, head of the U.S. delegation in Vienna, stated that many NATO allies have now consolidated their unity and are placing increased pressure on the Soviet Union seeking better performance in the areas of human, religious, and national rights.

The Vienna Follow-Up Meeting is the latest in a series of scheduled multilateral meetings between state signatories of the 1975 Helsinki Accords.

Discussion had also centred on the Soviet proposal of holding a human rights conference in Moscow. Ambassador Zimmerman stated that in order for the U.S. to agree to such a meeting, the Soviet government would have to dramatically improve their human rights record and would have to allow for conditions similar to those enjoyed by conference participants in Western countries. Mention was made of the restrictive nature in which the Hungarian government behaved demonstrating its intolerance to activities engaged in by governmental and non-governmental conference participants during a CSCE meeting in Budapest.

Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgway briefed the audience on the meeting between U.S. and Soviet officials which was scheduled

to take place in Washington in mid-September. She stressed that the U.S. would continue to put forth an agenda highlighting the areas of human rights, regional conflicts, and arms control.

Assistant Secretary of State Richard Schifter told of his recent trip to the Soviet Union and Poland summarising his observations of the current state of religion in those two states. He noted that the Soviet Union is particularly sensitive to the religious situation in Ukraine due to the interwoven ties between religion and Ukrainian nationalism.

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## STATE DEPT SILENCES RADIO PROJECT

(UNIS) Citing budgetary constraints, Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead has blocked the long awaited construction plans of a radio transmitter in Israel that would allow the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to increase their broadcasting to the Soviet Union.

The \$300 million project, initiated in 1984 and formally approved by the U.S. and Israeli governments in an agreement signed at the White House on June 18, 1987, is a major component of President Reagan's radio modernisation plan for the radios.

In a letter of protest to Deputy Secretary Whitehead, Malcolm Forbes, Jr., chairman of the Board for International Broadcasting said "the Israeli project is the linchpin of a transmitter modernisation programme that will enable the United States to reach tens of millions of new listeners in the USSR, Eastern Europe and elsewhere", adding that the project would "contribute enormously to overcome Soviet jamming".

The proposed Israeli transmitter would have freed many radio frequencies enabling increased radio broadcasts to Ukraine. Current Radio Liberty broadcasts to Ukraine originate in Munich, West Germany, and are subject to heavy jamming by the Soviet Union.

According to recent studies, RFE/RL reached a daily audience in the Soviet Union of about 8-12 million persons. Ukrainians account for a significant proportion of the radio's listenership not only in Ukraine, but also in Siberia, where there is a large concentration of displaced Ukrainians, mostly former prisoners.

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## SOVIETS' HUMAN RIGHTS "LIBERALISATION" LIMITED

(*UNIS Analysis*) Following a week of discussions and negotiations between top level U.S. and Soviet officials, prospects for a more liberalised human rights policy in the USSR appear to be very limited in scope and relevance to imprisoned Ukrainian nationals.

The *New York Times* reported that Soviet officials told the United States that several practices used to prevent Soviet Jews from emigrating were being eased, and that an amnesty was possible for some political and religious prisoners.

Ambassador Richard Schifter, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs, reported that the Soviet Union plans a repeal of Article 190-1 of the criminal code on "anti-Soviet defamation", often used against dissidents. However, Article 70 of the same code on "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda", a much harsher measure which is often used against Ukrainians, would stay on the books with no changes expected.

In the area of religious rights, Amb. Schifter stated that the Kremlin was repealing a law curbing the unauthorised practice of religion, however, restrictions on teaching religion would not be lifted. This alleged change would have little effect on the Ukrainian Catholic movement and Ukrainian Orthodox believers, as well as all the other banned religious denominations.

Amb. Schifter also announced that the Soviet authorities have transferred psychiatric hospitals, now under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (also in charge of the KGB), to the Ministry of Health, where it is hoped that the hospitals may be less useful for incarcerating dissidents. The Soviet Union has had a long record of using psychiatry in treating political dissidents who are opposed to the communist system.

These cosmetic changes are indeed a gesture by the Soviet authorities to demonstrate that they are making serious improvements in their human rights record, thus, trying to defuse Western criticism of the Soviet government. Indeed, at the resumption of the 35-state Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, being held in Vienna, the Soviet delegation extended an invitation to the International Helsinki Federation on Human Rights to visit Moscow. The Soviet Union is also making inroads towards gaining Western acceptance of a proposal to hold the CSCE follow-up conference on human rights in Moscow. Such a proposal, put forth by the Soviet Delegation, is intended to demonstrate the Kremlin's increased democratisation and respect for human rights.

In a *New York Times* article, Amb. Schifter was quoted as saying that "you can see both the movement and the limits of the movement", currently taking place in the Soviet Union. However, Mr. Schifter disassociated himself from the notion that Mr. Gorbachev was engaging in a revolution of democratisation.

While the West has noted the release of several prominent dissidents and political prisoners from the USSR, such as Natan Scharansky, Anatoly Koryagin, Iryna Ratushynska, Danylo Shumuk, and most recently Josyp Terelya, discussion of national rights matters and the release of national rights activists has been very limited due to the Soviets' sensitivity to the subject. Indeed, to counter the nationalist demonstrations in the Baltic states and Kazakhstan, the Soviet press has carried numerous articles in various nationality newspapers stressing the unity and brotherhood between the Soviet peoples. Furthermore, discussions on the topic between Western observers and Soviet officials usually conclude with accusations that the United States is inducing behavior intended to topple the Soviet government.

The number of Ukrainians imprisoned in the Soviet Union is still highly disproportionate to the number of Ukrainians that constitute the entire population of the USSR. While Ukrainians constitute just under 20 per cent of the Soviet Union's total population, more than 40 per cent of all political prisoners in the USSR are Ukrainian. With the large prisoner releases announced in early 1987 and the code revisions expected shortly, little change is expected for Ukrainians on the whole.

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## TERELYA, SHUMUK TESTIFY IN CONGRESS

### Testimony paints grim picture of "glasnost" for Ukrainians

*Washington, DC* — Ukrainian Catholic activist Josyp Terelya and prisoner of conscience Danylo Shumuk, both recent arrivals from the Soviet Union, provided a very grim interpretation of "glasnost" and its effects for Ukrainians, before a hearing of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Also appearing with Terelya and Shumuk were Tengiz and Eduard Gudava, both members of the Georgian Helsinki Monitoring Group.

In his testimony, Josyp Terelya stated that since December 1986, repression against church activists as well as Ukrainian nationalists has increased in the Soviet Union. Terelya cited that in the period beginning with December 1986 and ending in June 1987, "at least 150

churches have been burned or bulldozed" by orders of the KGB. Even with the popularisation of "glasnost" in the West, Terelya stated that prison camps "are still home for many faithful" including Vasyl Kobryn, head of the Initiative Group to Defend the Rights of Believers and the Church.

In comparing Khrushchev to Gorbachev, Terelya stated that when Khrushchev came to power, he granted amnesty and political rehabilitation to political prisoners in the USSR. Terelya noted that the Gorbachev regime has not yet taken such a step.

Following Terelya's remarks, long-time prisoner of conscience Danylo Shumuk, 73, testified movingly that "the terror of Russification of my people has reached a culmination point". Shumuk pointed out that in Kyiv, capital of Ukraine, there are only 34 Ukrainian-language schools compared to 152 Russian-language schools, while in the cities of Donetsk, Voroshilovhrad, Mykolaiv and Chernihiv there exist no Ukrainian-language schools. Shumuk also pointed out that in historically significant Ukrainian centres such as Zaporizhia and Kharkiv there are one and two Ukrainian-language schools respectively, compared to 95 and 156 Russian-language schools.

In his remarks, Shumuk said he considers "glasnost" a "deception of public opinion in the USSR and to a greater extent here in the West". He asked, "can one seriously accept this 'glasnost' and these 'reforms' when the organisation of the man-made famine of 1933 in Ukraine still remains a secret and uncondemned by the government of the USSR"?

Shumuk also cited the banned Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches as well as those confined for writing about the famine and Ukrainian secession from the USSR as examples of "glasnost's" limits.

Eduard and Tengiz Gudava, in a joint statement, said that "glasnost" and democratisation were essential goals of the human rights movement in the Soviet Union long before the arrival of the Gorbachev regime. They stated that "the present exclusion of the human rights movement from the process of glasnost" makes "glasnost" a mockery.

The Gudava brothers stated that Gorbachev's human rights policy is "based on the exploitation of propaganda from the release or emigration of each dissident or refusenik separately" along with "extensive marketing of sensationally democratic announcements and hints". The Gudavas believe that Gorbachev is playing on the desires of the West to discover a "human face in the image of the Soviet beast", concluding that the regime is "creating an image visible to everybody" based on the "extent of his or her impressionability".

Responding to questions about the Soviet proposal to host a human

rights conference in Moscow, most of the panelists had similar responses. Shumuk put forth six conditions which the Soviet Russians would have to meet in order for a Human Rights Conference to take place in Moscow: the release and rehabilitation of those persecuted for their political and religious beliefs; justice to those who led repressions against innocent people; an end to jamming of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe; the introduction of native language use in all Soviet republic schools and institutions; the withdrawal of all occupying forces from Afghanistan; and the legalisation of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches in Ukraine.

Terelya added that the Soviet Russians should guarantee national rights based on self determination as well as the free emigration of those who wished to leave the Soviet Union. Amplifying the comments of Terelya and Shumuk, Eduard Gudava stated that the West should take advantage of "perestroika" using the opportunity to better conditions for national liberation struggles and assist efforts to coordinate various national movements.

Each person testifying underscored the need and importance in understanding the national component of the human rights struggle in the Soviet Union, especially among those movements outside the Russian SFSR. All four panelists made specific mention of the national rights issue in the Soviet Union, attesting to the fact that much of the human and religious rights activities are expressions of desires for national self-determination.

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## **"TO EVERYONE WHO IS CAPABLE OF HEARING THE CRY OF HUMAN SUFFERING"**

**Yuriy Badzio's appeal to the world  
reveals Soviets' psychological terror**

*Yuriy Badzio, a Ukrainian national rights activist currently serving a term of exile outside Ukraine, recently wrote an appeal "To everyone who is capable of hearing the cry of human suffering".*

*Dated August 31, the appeal has been received in the West by the External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group and is now being circulated in an English-language translation.*



*In his appeal, Mr. Badzio recounts the psychological terror being used by the Soviet authorities who refused him permission to visit his ailing 82-year-old mother in the village of Kopynivtsi, Transcarpathian region. Mr. Badzio's mother, whom he has not seen for eight years, suffered a stroke on August 10 which left her paralysed on one side and causes her to lose consciousness.*

*"The authorities of this country have refused to hear my cries for help, have refused to respond to the deathbed pleas of a mother and have subjected an 82-year-old woman to physical and psychological torture that poses a direct threat to her life. My wife, my children and I also feel as if we were in a torture chamber", Mr. Badzio wrote in his appeal.*

*Mr. Badzio also discusses the tragic plight of Ukraine, noting that "The reaction of the world to our situation has been and remains outrageously indifferent and self-seeking".*

*And he goes on to cite the real reason he was deprived of his freedom: "my public statement in defence of the rights and interests of the Ukrainian people".*

*Mr. Badzio, 51, a philologist and journalist, was arrested in April 1979 and was subsequently sentenced to seven years' imprisonment and five years' exile for "anti-Soviet" activity.*

*The full text of Mr. Badzio's letter follows.*

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I had not intended to use the occasion of my coming to Ukraine to visit my mother for making public statements of any kind. My world outlook, political conduct and emotional reactions to circumstances are far from extremist, and I am not prone to immoderate responses to situations. I already knew and now have new confirmation of the sad truth that, in terms of the historical needs and prospects of the Ukrainian people, today's world is blind and deaf to our fate.

However, the manner in which I have been treated recently is so exceptional and, in my opinion, so significant in moral, political and legal terms that I feel compelled to speak out.

I was given permission to take leave from exile and spend one month in the village of Kopynivtsi in the Transcarpathian region visiting my 82-year-old mother, who has not seen me for more than eight years.

The travel document that I was issued in Khandyga [the village in the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, where Mr. Badzio is serving his term of exile] specified my itinerary only as far as Kyiv, but it noted that the purpose of my trip was "to see my sick mother". When I insisted that the Khandyga authorities specify my itinerary to my final destination, that is to the village of Kopynivtsi, the militia inspector explained to me that the Kyiv authorities knew all the details and they would issue me the necessary documents designating the remainder of my itinerary.

Upon my arrival in Kyiv, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR gave me permission to spend only seven days with my mother. But a day later, citing an order from Moscow, the ministry revoked even this permission, claiming that the Khandyga militia had informed them that I myself had chosen Kyiv and had refused to visit my mother. This is patently untrue as proven by my written requests to the chief of the Khandyga militia for permission to visit my mother in the village of Kopynivtsi and to the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR for permission to travel to my mother's home through Kyiv.

The falsehood of this claim is further attested by my announcement of my visit to Kopynivtsi in letters to family and friends, as well as by my conduct in Kyiv. The situation is simple and unambiguous, justifiable on both legal and moral grounds, and there are no procedural obstacles in the law to prevent the resolution of this issue. This matter does not pertain to me alone; it also affects my wife and, above all, my mother — an old woman and a mother being deprived of what is almost certainly her last chance to see her son and bid him good-bye forever.

I have been requesting permission to visit my mother since the day I arrived in Kyiv. In addition to the request I submitted to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, I sent similar requests to the highest government authorities in the land: a statement and a telegram to the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Aleksander Vlasov; a telegram to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Nikolai Ryzhkov; a telegram to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Andrei Gromyko; two telegrams to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev; a telegram and a statement to the Procurator General of the USSR, Alexander Rekunkov. I also telephoned the reception office of the Central Committee of the CPSU, where they spoke with me in a rude and vulgar manner. My brothers and sisters, who had gathered at my mother's home, also appealed to the authorities, in particular, to the chairman of the KGB, Viktor Chebrikov, asking that I not be detained in Kyiv.

There has been no response from anyone. Meanwhile, the moral aspects of the case, which were already exceptional, have become even more grave: my mother, who had been waiting for my arrival in a state of considerable stress and anxiety, **suffered a stroke on August 10 which has left her paralysed on one side.** She has been bedridden for three weeks and frequently loses consciousness and the ability to speak. Whenever she does regain consciousness, the first thing she asks is when will I arrive.

For more than 20 days, the authorities of this country — the highest representatives of the government at that — have refused to hear my cries for help, have refused to respond to the deathbed pleas of a mother, and have subjected an 82-year-old woman to physical and psychological torture that poses a direct threat to her life. My wife, my children, and I also feel as if we were in a torture chamber.

I have spent a considerable portion of my life amidst a thick fog of official lies, demagoguery, oppression and abuse. But even I was taken completely by surprise and astonished by the diabolical spectacle that has been staged for me on this occasion. Even if there were no high-sounding declarations by the government about the revolutionary restructuring and democratisation of Soviet society, I would regard the conduct of people responsible for creating and maintaining this terrible repressive situation as a cynical violation of the most elementary universal norms of humanity and morality.

I find it difficult to imagine why and for what purpose the authorities have decided to exact such a high price — this so-called prophylactic [preventive] torture that is so familiar to political prisoners who refuse to yield. But I am not the only one being tortured; it is my mother, above all, who is being tortured. Is this being done in revenge for my attitude to the government's initiative with respect to political prisoners in January and February of this year, for my attitude to the government's attempts to remove the problem from the agenda for a time at least by means of a devious manoeuvre designed to capitalise on its results? The situation is especially serious, because it falls within a political context that bears directly on the very essence of the government's proclamations about reforms.

Of course, what we have here is not the stupid arbitrary act of some petty functionary. I am now convinced that everything was planned in advance, and there is a definite operational or political design behind what has happened. But I also know that no government considerations, be they broad or narrow, can exculpate those responsible for these repressions: their conduct is barbaric and its inhumanity and immorality are tantamount to sacrilege and robbing the wounded and the dead.

I interpret what the government has done as serious proof of its true ideological and moral nature, of the real intentions of the initiators of restructuring, and of the possibility and prospects of a revolution from above.

Such a flagrant disregard for the law and for moral principles, especially in the light of the widely advertised policy of reform, is possible only when public opinion does not exist, or when the authorities know that there will be no reaction from world public opinion. It would appear that they were certain about the latter circumstance.

And we Ukrainians have learned once again that politicians and the political public in the West, and in particular the Western media, treat us as no more than material to be used for propaganda purposes. They "forget that we are a nation, a separate and selfcontained subject of history, with our own legitimate historical needs and interests. Ukraine of the 1960s-1980s has proved itself in a fitting and honourable manner; it has suffered perhaps the harshest repressions and the largest human losses. The reaction of the world to our situation has been and remains outrageously indifferent and self-seeking. National-political (great power) and ethnic egoism reigns in the attitude towards us where one might expect simple human sympathy to have produced active solidarity with our plight. Disregard of the Ukrainian problem and Ukrainophobia cannot but have their historical consequences, even in the sphere of private human relations.

All of this requires a separate and detailed discussion. I will confine myself here to a single point, a single syllogism: the lasting and sound betterment of international life on the principles of stable peaceful co-existence and cooperation cannot occur without a complete and genuinely revolutionary democratisation of the Soviet Union, and the democratisation of the Soviet Union is impossible without democracy for Ukraine, without a democratic resolution of the Ukrainian question, that is, in practical terms, without the attainment by the Ukrainian people of national independence of real and complete control over its historical existence.

Vasyl Stus [a prominent Ukrainian poet and human rights activist, who died of medical neglect in a Soviet labour camp in 1985 at the age of 47] once told the story of a beggar who asked for alms in this way: "Give! Give!! Give!!!" (in other words, he demanded rather than pleaded). Intending to continue the fight for my release, I want to assume the role of such a beggar.

Ukraine is a member of the United Nations, one of the founding members of this international organisation. **The real national-political and cultural situation of the Ukrainian SSR as a formally separate state**

**entity of the USSR is the subject of my treatise, "The Right to Live", for which I was deprived of my freedom.** [The full text of the treatise was confiscated from Mr. Badzio at the time of his arrest and only his theses, in the form of "An Open Letter to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU", are available in the West. An English translation of this letter was published by the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* (University of Toronto), 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984) and 9, No. 2 (Winter 1984).] I place upon you, Secretary General of the United Nations Javier Perez de Cuellar, the moral responsibility for taking up my defence in person and through UNESCO and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.

I know that some time after I was imprisoned certain members of the US Congress spoke out in my defence. I wish to express my sincere gratitude to them and ask that the US Congress continue to keep my fate within the sphere of its official attention. As a matter of fact, during those August days when I was knocking hopelessly on the doors of the highest government offices, including those of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, crying for help, **the deputies to the Supreme Soviet were hosting an American delegation led by Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan.** I therefore address the appeal in this letter to you in particular, **Sen. Moynihan.**

At the heart of the social and political ideology of my treatise, "The Right to Live," lies the concept of democratic socialism. I appeal to the leadership of the Socialist International to speak out for my release.

**The ideas of democracy, freedom and cooperation are the keynote of all my public statements.** The participants of the Vienna Conference on the Helsinki Accords cannot ignore the criminal treatment to which I have been subjected. I appeal, in particular, to the delegations of the **United States, Canada, Great Britain, France and West Germany, in the belief that the representatives of these countries have not fallen prey to the euphoria brought on by the liberal changes in Soviet policy and have retained the ability to comprehend reality soberly.**

The absence of criminality in the texts and actions cited in the charges brought against me is obvious even in accordance with the logic of Soviet law (in principle, of course). I therefore appeal to all international jurists' organisations to demand that the Soviet authorities submit my case to an objective review with the participation of Western lawyers.

**The real reason why I was deprived of my freedom is my public statement in defence of the rights and interests of the Ukrainian people.** I appeal to the lawyers of Leonard Peltier to become my defenders as well before the government of the Soviet Union, which is actively concerned with the fate of Leonard Peltier. I wish to inform you and Leo-

nard Peltier that as a political prisoner, on December 10, 1984, I submitted to the Soviet authorities a declaration on the occasion of International Human Rights Day, in which I also appealed to the government of the United States to turn its attention to the fate of Leonard Peltier and ensure an objective and just examination of his case. As punishment for my statement, I was held for 12 days in a special punishment cell, where conditions were such that they constituted daily torture.

A writer is the symbol of moral conscience of humanity. The first such writer to come to mind is you, Gabriel Garcia Marquez. I therefore appeal to you for assistance. Perhaps it was your recent meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev that has prompted me to turn to you.

My mother is a woman of deep religious conviction and intense and pure Christian feeling. **During the third week of August, when our Soviet Peace Committee welcomed Mother Theresa in Kyiv, the torture of my sick 82-year-old mother reached its apogee.** I appeal to you, Mother Theresa, to your heart, which feels pain at the absence of love and goodness in the world. Before you, I pass harsh moral judgement on those people who did not find a drop of compassion for my old, half-paralysed mother. Your response to their cruelty, Mother Theresa, would diminish some of the evil in human life.

I take this opportunity to thank all people of good will abroad who have spoken and continue to speak out in defence of all Soviet prisoners of conscience, including me.

I ask the representatives of organised groups and individual members of the Ukrainian community abroad to ensure that this appeal, as well as other evidence of my fate, reaches the people I have named here.

*Yuriy Badzio, Kyiv, August 31, 1987*

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