JOURNAL OF

UKRAINIAN STUDIES

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The *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* is published semiannually in the summer and winter by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta. Annual subscription rates are $16.50 ($1.05 GST incl.) for individuals and $21.50 ($1.40 GST incl.) for libraries and institutions in Canada. Outside of Canada annual subscription rates are $15.00 for individuals and $20.00 for libraries and institutions. Subscribers outside of Canada should pay in US funds. Cheques and money orders are payable to the Journal of Ukrainian Studies. Please do not send cash.

The *Journal* publishes articles in Ukrainian and Ukrainian-Canadian studies. It also publishes discussions, book reviews, and journalistic articles of a controversial or problem-oriented nature. Ideally, those wishing to submit articles should first send a letter of inquiry, with a brief abstract of the article to the editor at CIUS, 352 Athabasca Hall, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, T6K 2E8. Fax (403) 492-4967.

Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in *Historical Abstracts* and *America: History and Life.*

Printed in Canada.
ISSN 0228-1635

VOLUME 18 NUMBERS 1-2 SUMMER-WINTER 1993

Contents

Articles

Review Articles

Book Reviews

Journal of Ukrainian Studies 18, nos. 1-2 (Summer-Winter 1993)

The Establishment of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta: A Personal Memoir*

Manoly R. Lupul

In the years after the Second World War, pressure for Ukrainian studies on government by Ukrainian Canadian community organizations stressed the importance of Ukrainian language at the senior-high-school and postsecondary levels. As a result, by the time Book IV of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (B&B Commission) appeared in April 1970, Ukrainian was not only an optional language of study for matriculation purposes in the secondary schools of the three prairie provinces, but Ukrainian programmes in language and literature were offered in several universities, most often in departments of Slavic studies. No university, however, housed a research centre or institute for Ukrainian studies financed out of public funds. This paper will discuss the steps taken to establish the first such institution, at the University of Alberta on 1 July 1976.

In the briefs to the B&B Commission submitted by Ukrainian Canadian organizations in the mid-1960s, academic studies were occasionally recommended but none specifically requested an institute or centre. Thus the brief from the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) in Edmonton, completed in July 1964, asked that "a comprehensive program of Ukrainian studies, including the study of Ukrainian language, literature, culture and history, as well as the contributions of the Ukrainian group to Canadian life" be developed in "at least one of the

* All documents quoted in this account are part of the private papers in the writer's residence in Calgary, Alberta.

leading Canadian universities." As a member of the committee that prepared the brief, I remember that the section was written by Bohdan Bociurkiw, then on the staff of the University of Alberta's Department of Political Science. A year later, the brief from the Ukrainian Canadian University Students' Union (UCUSU, or SUSK) declared that one of its objects was "To ensure the growth of Slavic studies and the study of the Ukrainian language, literature, culture and history in Canada's universities. Of special concern to the UCUSU is the teaching and study of the history of Ukraine and of the Ukrainian Canadians in the schools and universities of Canada." In its recommendations, however, only the teaching of Ukrainian was specifically singled out. Thus when Book IV finally appeared in 1970, its seventh recommendation—"that Canadian universities expand their studies in the fields of the humanities and the social sciences relating to particular areas other than those related to the English and French languages"—came as a pleasant surprise to most scholars in Ukrainian studies.

I was personally most impressed by Book IV and referred to it often as the "Magna Carta" of Canada's ethnocultural minorities. It encouraged the kind of involvement that soon became a national multicultural movement. It was not easy, however, to untangle ethnic issues in a society whose political elites had mastered well the clichés of the cultural mosaic, but whose institutions, especially in education, reflected mostly the cultural Anglo-Americanism of a large continent, where Canada's influence on that culture was minimal. An opportunity to affect that culture presented itself in 1970 in the form of the Commission on Educational Planning (Worth Commission), established by the government of Alberta in June 1969 and named after its chairman, Walter Worth, then head of the Department of Elementary Education, University of Alberta. By the summer of 1970 I had become close to the Ukrainian Language Association, a constituent of the Modern and Classical Language Council, Alberta Teachers' Association, and was soon on its committee to prepare a brief to the commission. Besides editing the brief, I wrote several of its sections, including "The University and Ukrainian Studies," which cited the seventh recommendation of Book IV and called upon the University of Alberta to (1) appoint a methods instructor in the Faculty of Education for Slavic languages in the public schools; (2) introduce courses in sociology, anthropology and psychology, especially at the first-year level, which discussed Canadian immigration policies and immigrants and their problems, including "the generation gap as it affects ethnic groups in particular"; (3) establish a chair in Ukrainian history and a course on the history of Ukrainians in Canada in the Department of History; and (4) create an Institute of Soviet and East European Studies,

"complete with director, staff, and secretarial help."

The reference to the institute was the result largely of the committee's view that pressure for a Ukrainian studies centre was too particularistic and bound to fail. At the university a poorly funded interdepartmental Committee of Soviet and East European Studies had existed since the early 1960s, and I had become familiar with its workings in 1968–9 as a temporary replacement for Metro Gulutsan, a colleague and friend in the Department of Educational Psychology who was on sabbatical leave to study educational psychology in Eastern Europe. "To judge by the shoddy manner in which it [the East European committee] has been obliged to operate," I wrote in the teachers' brief, "one would think it was located in Indonesia or Ceylon instead of in a province where the Ukrainian population alone constituted 7.95 per cent of the whole in 1961. If Carleton University, the University of Toronto, the University of British Columbia, and the University of Montreal, all in provinces where the percentage of Ukrainians in 1961 was only 2.05, 2.19 and .31 respectively, can establish institutes or centres of Soviet and East European studies, it is time indeed that the University of Alberta, with its rich library resources and demographic Slavic base, established an Institute of Soviet and East European Studies to serve not only Alberta but all of western Canada." During Gulutsan's absence our family had rented his house directly across from that of Orest Starchuk, then chairman of the Department of Slavic Languages, and our periodic meetings had confirmed me in the view that the university's resistance to an East European institute was as unreasonable as it was inexplicable, and only prejudice was keeping the university from recognizing the large potential for East European studies in western Canada.

Even before the brief was finished in December, I had begun to address anyone who would listen (on and off campus) about the importance of multiculturalism and a just language policy in Canada, to which I tied in the Ukrainian Canadians through their special cultural predicament—Anglo-Americanization at home and Russification abroad. (Our family had spent three months in Eastern Europe and Ukraine during a sabbatical leave in 1967–8, and I drew heavily on that experience in my remarks.) I had also begun to cultivate members of Edmonton's Ukrainian Professional and Businessmen's Club (P&B Club), who, I had concluded, were the best hope, along with the UCUSU, for seriously lobbying governments at all levels. To enlist the mass media, in mid-November I had contacted Fil Fraser, a black broadcaster on Edmonton's educational television station, who arranged for a one-hour presentation on multiculturalism and the Ukrainian Canadian predicament, followed next evening by a one-hour talk-back programme on CKUA, the provin-

cial radio station. Both considerably increased my credibility as a spokesman for multiculturalism and the Ukrainian position. Early in February Celestin Suchowersky, the university's specialist in East European library acquisitions, invited me to a meeting in his home attended by Starchuk and Gulutsan. Such were the modest origins of the Ukrainian Professors' Club, which held irregular sessions that I chaired as "president." The ambitious agenda for the first meeting (which I drew up at Suchowersky's request) ran to fifteen items and included three of special significance for Ukrainian studies: "1. Appointment in History Department—Professor Rudnitsky [sic]; i.e., Ivan Lysiak Rudnytsky; ... 3. Appointment to Faculty of Education—Ukrainian Section; ... 13. Location of Ukrainian Studies Centre—Edmonton or Winnipeg?" As the club kept no minutes, I cannot remember what was discussed regarding the centre. Gulutsan and I, however, had occasionally tossed around the idea of such a centre, since it was obvious that support for it among Ukrainian Canadians would be greater than for an East European institute.

Evidence of that support was soon forthcoming. In December 1970 the P&B Club had struck a committee to prepare a brief to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution about to tour the country. The club's committee was chaired by Peter Savaryn, a lawyer and ardent activist in the Ukrainian community, whom I had come to know on the UCC committee (which he had also chaired) that had prepared the brief to the B&B Commission in 1964, and with whom I was now frequently sharing ideas at P&B meetings. During its deliberations the committee had concluded that with a provincial election imminent, the local government should be approached immediately. Accordingly, on 3 April 1971, Savaryn enclosed the raw materials of a brief for editing and explained that since rights in education were a provincial responsibility, it was important that the government know "our stand" on minority rights before it attended the forthcoming federal-provincial conference on the constitution in Victoria. It was, he added, also "high time we asked for the establishment of a Ukrainian study centre at the U of A." The brief, presented to the government on 14 April, consisted of five parts, with the third, "The University and East European Studies" (drafted by Savaryn), devoting one page to an Institute of Soviet and East European Studies and three to a Ukrainian Studies Centre. "Specifically what is needed is a programme consisting of courses in Ukrainian history, literature, language, politics, and the history of Ukrainians in Canada, to which the economics, geography, anthropology, sociology and philosophy of the Ukraine could be added in time." Edmonton was proposed as the site of the centre because of the demographic base, the "wide demand" for such courses, and the existence of the "necessary climate" the

government's "belief in the doctrine of variety" had established through its White Paper on Human Resources Development (March 1967). The B&B Commission's seventh resolution favouring such programmes was also invoked on the centre's behalf. When the committee presented its brief to the Joint Parliamentary Committee two months later, an identical section on a "Ukrainian Studies Centre at the University of Alberta" was included, as was one that called for the establishment of institutes of East European studies by federal and provincial governments wherever the demand and "a significant number of people of East European origins" existed. No specific relationship to the constitution was drawn in either section, no doubt because the connection between academic studies and the constitution was, at best, remote.

Thereafter no serious consideration was given to a centre of Ukrainian studies for two whole years. No one in the Professors' Club, including Ivan Lysiak Rudnytsky, who became a member when he joined the Department of History in September 1971 to teach Ukrainian and East European history, took the matter seriously enough to write a proposal. The same held true for an East European institute, but there at least existed an interdepartmental committee of senior academics who not only taught about Eastern Europe but met regularly as an official academic body. The latter could easily function within an institute, should one emerge, and Metro Gulutsan's efforts with senior administrators on behalf (at least) of a Division East European Studies made him the logical choice as director. In Ukrainian studies there was no comparable leadership, especially once Orest Starchuk died suddenly in mid-February 1971, shortly after the first meeting of the Professors' Club. As a result the "New Cultural Policy for the Province of Alberta," which I drafted in 1971 as a consultant to the government of Alberta (May–July), referred only to the establishment of an Institute of Soviet and East European Studies at the University of Alberta.

The promotion of Ukrainian studies was also affected by the appearance in December 1971 of a "Discussion Paper on Canadian Ethnic Studies" by James Loubser, a sociologist in the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto. When Howard Palmer, then a consultant on contract in the Canadian Citizenship Branch, Department of the Secretary of State, requested a reaction, I informed him (14 December) that I agreed with Loubser's idea of a "National Institute for Canadian Ethnic Studies" in Ottawa, provided ethnic centres, whose work the institute would co-ordinate, were also established in Montreal, Toronto, Edmonton, and possibly Vancouver and Halifax. In that context, there was no need for centres of Italian studies in Toronto or Ukrainian studies in Edmonton. Thus East European studies, on the one hand, and

Canadian ethnic studies, on the other, offered me some opportunity in 1971–2 to ponder the relationship of centres to institutes and of both to the university at graduate and undergraduate levels. Two items on the agenda of the Professors' Club for 11 February 1972—"4. Ethnic Studies Centre; ... 9. Soviet and East European Studies Committee"—reflect this fact and indicate that Ukrainian studies at the time were still very much in the background. The same can be seen in the brief the P&B Club submitted to the new Lougheed government in May, in advance of the second major multicultural conference in Alberta in less than a year. It recommended "federal-provincial cooperation in the establishment of Canadian ethnic studies centres" and the establishment of an "Institute of East European and Soviet Studies." As the brief's editor, I was convinced that in terms at least of the *public* funds that appeared to be available, Ukrainian studies would have to make their way under such wider academic umbrellas as Slavic studies, East European studies, and Canadian ethnic studies, and this approach also coloured two very important political meetings early in 1973 in which education and academic studies figured prominently.

The first was on 12 February in Ottawa with Stanley Haidasz, the new minister of state for multiculturalism. It was organized at Haidasz's request by his friend and fellow-Torontonian, Stanley Frolick, a lawyer and president of the recently revived Ukrainian Canadian Professional and Business Federation (UCPBF). Although the nine-man delegation was supposedly "national," I was the sole member outside Ontario because of the federation's weak treasury. In the "Summary of Concerns and Recommendations ... Presented to the Government of Canada ... " drawn up by me (as the main spokesman) after the meeting, I termed "puzzling" the delay in establishing "an ethnic studies program or centre(s)" and then echoed the advice given to Palmer about the graduates of such studies being "employable":

> Since the Department of [the Secretary of] State and comparable provincial departments could not absorb all who would enrol, it was important to recognize that the schools and departments of education were badly in need of personnel who understood the extent to which the many variables associated with ethnicity in a society made up largely of former and recent immigrants and their children were frequently the cause of many learning difficulties. It seemed only logical therefore that at least one ethnic studies program or centre be established with a faculty of education in Canada. The location of such a centre was not the crucial factor; what was important was that it be established—and soon. The absence of such a program or centre in a faculty of education has meant that textbooks and school curricula as well as university programs of teacher education have been developed with a central dimension in

Canada's historical and contemporary experience missing.

As self-serving as the above may appear (a year earlier I had introduced a history course on the education of minority children in western Canada, and the University of Alberta's Faculty of Education and perhaps the newly opened OISE were the only institutions that could accommodate such a centre), I was quite convinced that because of the central place of education in the development of a multicultural society, ethnic studies in the academy had to be practical: they had to help children to acquire not only language skills (French but not necessarily only French), but also an understanding of what it meant to live in a culturally pluralistic society.

The second political meeting, on 12 March, involved the Alberta cabinet's education committee—Louis Hyndman, minister of education, James (Jim) Foster, minister of advanced education and manpower, and Albert (Bert) Hohol, minister of labour—and the P&B Club's multicultural committee—Savaryn and myself (co-chairmen), Laurence Decore, Roman Ostashewsky, William Kostash, and Yaroslaw Roslak (the president also of Edmonton's UCC). It was arranged by Decore and Foster, who were good friends from their days in the Canadian naval reserve. With education the primary focus of the formal presentation, I was again the main spokesman and concentrated on the implementation of a three-year bilingual (English-Ukrainian) pilot programme in the public schools and on the creation of an East European studies centre at the university, whose Canadian dimension would expand the opportunities to study the ethnic groups that had made Canada (and especially western Canada) their home.

Two important personal events in May 1973 turned the focus away from East European studies and led (as events proved) to a much heightened profile for Ukrainian studies in Canada. On 17 May I was appointed to the federal government's newly created Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism (CCCM) as an executive member responsible for the Prairies and North-West Territories region. The CCCM would advise Haidasz on the implementation of the federal government's policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework (introduced on 8 October 1971). Three days later I was elected president of the UCPBF at the latter's convention in Edmonton. Earlier I had agreed to address the national conference in Toronto of the Slovo Association of Ukrainian Writers in Exile on 2 June, and the occasion offered Rudnytsky, who attended the conference, an opportunity to introduce me to George Luckyj of the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures at the University of Toronto. I was impressed with Luckyj, and we discussed at great length his research and publication plans for academic textbooks and the possibility of establishing a centre of Ukrainian studies directed

by him at the University of Toronto. Although Rudnytsky had occasionally mentioned Luckyj during our discussions of the East European institute, neither of us had taken a Ukrainian centre seriously as long as the means to fund it were nebulous. Now, quite suddenly, the situation had changed. Not only had the federation to make its mark but the potential of the CCCM had to be tested. The latter quickly showed itself to be of little value for a Ukrainian centre. The federal government opted for visiting professorships under a newly created Canadian Ethnic Studies Advisory Committee, and the latter's university chairs programme was still some three years down the road.

The UCPBF, however, was a different matter. It was coming off an immensely successful convention and it was not identified with any major Ukrainian project. On 25 July 1973, after a meeting of its executive, I and Savaryn (an executive member and a member of the University of Alberta's Board of Governors and Senate since April 1972, with whom I had by then become very close and to whom I had relayed my favourable impressions of Luckyj and Toronto's possibilities) decided to convene an ad hoc committee on Ukrainian studies (the Professors' Club having expired) to consider the most appropriate follow-up to the discussions in Toronto. At the meeting Savaryn was convinced by Rudnytsky, Gulutsan, and me (the two other members, Suchowersky and Roslak, being unable to attend) that if a Ukrainian centre was at all viable, it could only develop in Toronto under Luckyj's direction. It was agreed to take initiatives on three fronts—Savaryn would request the national UCC in Winnipeg to help mobilize the Ukrainian community in the direction of Toronto, stressing that failure was certain should a falling out occur over location; and I would sound out Ottawa about the possibility of federal support and also urge Luckyj to begin contacting the university authorities at Toronto.

In Winnipeg Yaroslaw Kalba, the UCC's executive director, revived the UCC's grant application of April 1972 for federal funds ($9,000) to hold a three-day "National Conference on Ukrainian Academic Studies" in Toronto. (Kalba and Luckyj, I soon learned, were related and there was likely prior consultation, judging from the very comprehensive list of invitees.) I had also written to Frolick on Savaryn's advice and learned that Professor Volodymyr Kubijovyč, who headed the encyclopedia of Ukraine project at Sarcelles, France (near Paris), might be willing to move (or at least to have his library moved) to Toronto to strengthen the latter's case for a Ukrainian studies centre, but the whole matter was very much up in the air. However, it was Luckyj's letters (11 September and 5 October 1973) that were the most important. At Toronto there were already two related centres, one for international studies and the other for

Russian and East European studies, and the most that could be accommodated therefore was a Ukrainian ethnic research centre as part of the second but with "a different orientation". "It goes without saying, however, that such a centre would not only be devoted to the ethnic problems of Ukrainians in Canada." This surprised and disappointed Rudnytsky and me, but the fundamental problem was still financing. The ideal was to have the University of Toronto follow the precedent set by the University of Alberta during Rudnytsky's appointment in 1971. After the Ukrainian community had provided the $15,000 needed for the first year, the Department of History had simply absorbed the balance and integrated the new position into its budget. As a university's budget was very much larger, Toronto could do the same with a centre after the Ukrainians had furnished a mutually agreed upon initial amount.

> ... it would be fairly easy [I wrote Luckyj on 25 September] to go to the community on the understanding that the University of Toronto would absorb the full costs after no more than a year or two. Under this arrangement federal funds too would be difficult to deny to a prestigious University such as Toronto, seriously interested in establishing a permanent Centre of Ukrainian Studies. The idea of trying to collect $100,000 a year for five years [suggested by Luckyj on 11 September] for an operation with no possibility of becoming an integral part of the University on a permanent basis is unrealistic. And the thought of trying to raise two million dollars à la Harvard [suggested in the same letter] is positively mind boggling in the present 'uneducated' state of the Ukrainian community in Canada.

I described the situation to Frolick on 1 October in Ottawa:

> This concept of a Ukrainian centre *does not* tie in very closely with the multiculturalism program—that is the whole problem. The program has not even endorsed ethnic studies centres, let alone particularistic centres. The fear is that other groups will ride the coattails of the Ukrainians like we are trying to do with the French.

As for the academic conference,

> Kalba *has* moved ahead with the professors' conference *all too fast*. In fact, so much so, that the request for $9,000 for such a conference has already been refused. He re-submitted last year's request on his own initiative after Savaryn informed him that we intended to take the matter under our wing. Instead of allowing us to pursue the matter slowly through several contacts who owe me favours in the Department, the damn fool jumped in and we are worse than nowhere because the Department has not only been alerted to our plans by a letter from Luckij [sic] solicited by Kalba but has made a negative commitment, and you know how hard it is to reverse the decisions of petty minds to

whom regulations are a catechism.

With the University of Toronto only prepared to furnish an office and with only small grants available through Ottawa's modest multiculturalism programme, it was becoming increasingly clear that for a studies centre to exist, the Ukrainian community itself would have to finance it. As the UCPBF was still without a national project, perhaps its clubs might be persuaded to take Ukrainian studies under their wing. Accordingly, on 20 October 1973, at the annual meeting in Edmonton of the federation's executive council (the national executive plus as many club presidents as could attend), three projects were placed before it: (1) a Ukrainian studies centre in a Canadian university at an annual cost to the federation of $80,000; (2) an independent journal or newspaper in English for Ukrainians in Canada (suggested by Peter Kondra, president of the national UCC, at a meeting in Edmonton on 7 September) at the annual cost of $20–30,000; and (3) "a very strong, young, trilingual" executive director for the UCC (with a PhD degree and managerial, organizational and civil service experience) at a cost of $11–15,000 per year "for at least ten years," who would be assisted by three or four field workers maintained by the federation out of federal grants. Because of the UCC's chronic shortage of funds, its ineptitude was proverbial, and after a difficult two-hour discussion the council opted to increase the UCC's effectiveness through a "detailed plan and feasibility study" to be provided by the national executive before the next UCC congress in 1974. There was no great enthusiasm for a Ukrainian studies centre or, in fact, for any project that entailed financial commitment.

On 26 October, in between sessions of the first conference of the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association in Toronto, I met with Frolick, Luckyj, his colleague, Danylo Struk, and Jurij Darewych, a physics professor at York University, who, at Frolick's request, had earlier submitted a proposal for a "Ukrainian Research Institute" for the executive council's consideration, had it chosen that option. All now agreed that with the University of Toronto at least receptive to a centre, the latter should be established by 1975 as a low-key affair: the federation would raise $150,000 in 1974 to provide $30,000 per year for five years to cover one-third of the director's salary, a full-time bilingual secretary, and office supplies. The centre itself would then access an additional $50,000 annually for publications from, as Luckyj put it to Dean Robert Spencer of the University of Toronto's School of Graduate Studies on 9 November, "various private Ukrainian foundations and the Shevchenko Foundation in Winnipeg."

> It would also be possible to obtain some assistance from the federal government which has recently declared itself willing to support

> academic visiting appointments in ethnic studies. ... It is felt that on a total of $80,00 a year the research plans and other activities of the Centre could be effectively carried out. No large fund raising campaign for an endowment fund would be necessary.

Even so, Frolick, Struk, and Darewych had confidently maintained that sources for a modest endowment fund (approximately $350,000) were already readily available. All that was needed was a visible centre to attract them.

With the matter apparently settled, Luckyj, on 8 November 1973, informed Bociurkiw (at Carleton University in Ottawa since the fall of 1969) of Toronto's plans and learned from him that at the University of Ottawa Senator Paul Yuzyk and Constantine Bida, chairman of the Department of Slavic Studies, were also about to establish a Ukrainian studies centre out of a private endowment they had recently obtained. Nor was Ottawa alone ambitious. Earlier, on 2 August, in a personal letter from Peter Kondra, prominent in the Ukrainian Orthodox community, which had established St. Andrew's College on the campus of the University of Manitoba, it was suggested that because St. Andrew's already had a building, it was the logical place to concentrate Ukrainian studies in Canada and to develop nothing less than "a Ukrainian University." While no one in Edmonton or Toronto had taken Winnipeg seriously because of the recent retirement of Jaroslav B. Rudnyckyj, former head of Slavic studies at the University of Manitoba, Ottawa was another matter. The Slavic department there not only had a doctoral programme, but Ottawa was the country's capital in which Senator Yuzyk knew his way around the corridors of power and where he, as the foremost spokesman for multiculturalism in the 1960s, might locate funds within a young multicultural policy whose uncertain programme criteria were readily susceptible to political pressure. Should that happen, the damage to Ukrainian academic studies would be serious, for the bilingual University of Ottawa was in the first throes of shedding a narrow denominational Oblate Catholic past and had little of the prestige of the University of Toronto ("roughly Canada's Harvard," as I put it to Yuzyk in a letter of 14 December), and neither Bida, whose reputation in the academy was not Luckyj's, nor Yuzyk, who was a full-time politician and community leader some ten years removed from serious scholarly work, could furnish the kind of academic leadership that was needed. Accordingly, when Yuzyk rejected my appeal against a press release on the centre at Ottawa (it appeared before the year was out, "precipitated" by my mid-December letter to Yuzyk according to Bociurkiw), I decided that it was time for the federation to act.

At a meeting of the executive on 10 January 1974, the federation's

treasurer, Peter Oluk, a professional engineer who headed his own successful engineering construction firm in Edmonton, presented a financial plan that would give Toronto a Ukrainian studies centre by the end of May 1975, when the executive's term expired. The executive, which supported a Toronto centre but greatly resented the growing competition in "lesser" places, committed itself unhesitatingly, even eagerly, to a second national project (the first was the bilingual English-Ukrainian kindergarten classes that had just opened in five public and separate schools in Edmonton), visibly relieved to see an end to the seemingly interminable discussions on the subject. The kindergarten success was an important factor in moving the centre forward, for the kindergartens too had looked hopeless in September 1973 but through the combined efforts of many individuals had become an amazing reality. Perhaps the same would hold true for the centre. The strategy adopted was to seek support in principle for a Toronto centre from the federation's clubs (especially the three largest in Edmonton, Winnipeg, and Toronto) and from the national UCC and its branches in the same three cities, but to say nothing about finances, as Oluk's plan had still to be studied. It consisted of a "charity raffle" of a Cadillac at $100 per ticket to yield an immediate $25,000 and the sale of $500,00 of interest-free debentures through the clubs, with at least $300,000 from the three largest. A timetable for the collection and redemption of debentures and for the centre's establishment in stages was also provided.

Letters followed to the club presidents and to the UCC branches in Toronto, Winnipeg, and Edmonton, the national UCC, and the UCPBF representatives therein, John G. Karasevich, Jr. and Joseph Slogan. The latter were still to pursue the restructuring of the UCC, but, as Ottawa was forcing the UCPBF's hand, the issue of a centre could not be postponed. The UCC was asked to call the planned meeting of academics (with or without federal support) and to obtain "formal written approval" from the UCC Presidium (a term much criticized for its Soviet connotations by some executive members) for a studies centre in Toronto together with "an accompanying declaration of policy which would encourage the development of similar centres elsewhere only after consultation with the future director of the projected centre at Toronto to prevent overlapping of function and additional unnecessary costs to the Ukrainian community in Canada." Toronto and Edmonton endorsed the executive, but from Winnipeg the silence, not surprisingly, was deafening. To make matters worse, on 18 January Luckyj indicated that the administration in Toronto was now wary of a centre and favoured only a research project or programme in the Slavic department for two or three years preliminary to the possible establishment of a privately

endowed centre or institute.

Early in February I spoke to Orest Kruhlak, director of Ottawa's multiculturalism programme, who agreed to subsidize the conference in Winnipeg, scheduled for 6–7 April. Shortly thereafter Karasevich visited Edmonton to discuss the next UCPBF convention, and a terrible row ensued with some members of the executive when he defended the recommendation of the University of Manitoba Senate that St. Andrew's College become a Ukrainian studies centre. Exasperated, I informed Luckyj next day that with the federation now badly divided as to site, it was up to the academics to settle the matter: "I am frankly tired of playing God. If people want to look a gift horse in the mouth, that is up to them. To raise the sums required will not be easy and if the project is killed in Winnipeg, that will be most unfortunate but perhaps, as a people, we do not deserve any better, for we are a most fractious bunch." Luckyj, too, appeared to be losing heart, as his strangely wooden programme, drafted at Kalba's request, showed. It focused on the problems of Ukrainian studies by disciplines and allowed neither for a discussion of the centre he envisaged nor of the federation's plans for its support. Rudnytsky and I reworked it to allow only an hour for the problems, but Kalba's final, greatly enlarged "compromise" retained Luckyj's approach and added an evening dinner that I would address, followed next day by Luckyj's remarks on what a centre might do. This placed my cart before his horse, but it reflected well the UCC's convoluted and awkward style.

With the conference definitely on, the executive discussed Oluk's plan and adopted it on 13 March. Savaryn then agreed to look seriously, as a lawyer, into the federation's establishing a foundation for Ukrainian studies. The immediate priority, however, was to carry the Winnipeg conference for Toronto. This would not be easy, what with the conference in Winnipeg and with both Yuzyk and Bida present. To me the two key individuals among the academics were Bociurkiw and Walter Tarnopolsky, Faculty of Law, York University, who were both very influential within the Ukrainian community. Having learned that Tarnopolsky would not attend, I wrote Bociurkiw on 19 March. While on CCCM business in Ottawa 1–2 February, I had already learned from him of his support for a national centre in Toronto since that in Ottawa was modestly funded and would have only local significance. I now indicated that an early "diplomatic statement" by him to that effect in Winnipeg "would help to loosen the term 'Centre' and facilitate its transfer to Toronto." He agreed to help, convinced as he was that a first-rate, national centre did not necessarily preclude other local ones. I said nothing to him, however, about a development a day earlier full of

exciting but unknown possibilities. On 18 March Savaryn had informed me that William (Bill) Diachuk, an MLA and member of the UCPBF's executive, had discussed its plans over coffee with Jim Foster, minister of advanced education, who appeared interested in funding a Ukrainian centre if the three other western governments agreed to participate. I contacted Diachuk, who arranged a meeting for the twenty-first with Foster and Bert Hohol, two-thirds of the government's education committee, and Savaryn, Decore (Foster's "good friend"), Diachuk, and myself. The government, we learned, was indeed interested and would work to have the entire costs of a centre underwritten by the four western governments on a basis similar to some of their recent regional projects. Edmonton could be the centre, but the location was unimportant just as long as it was in the west and the four ministers supported it.

Thus an entirely new dimension was suddenly added to the address I was preparing for Winnipeg. To me the trouble with local centres was that, however well endowed, they tapped local loyalties and detracted greatly from the type of national fund-raising campaign on behalf of Ukrainian studies that the federation wished to undertake. A government-funded centre, on the other hand, not only obviated the need for a public campaign, but created a unique institution unrestricted by geography or by parochial support (religious or ideological), which, properly labelled, could co-ordinate under its distinctive wing all types of academic initiatives in Ukrainian studies—whether centres, programmes, projects, funds, or chairs. As a result, in my address, "Coordination and Financing of Ukrainian Academic Studies in Canada," the term centre was replaced by institute, and the federation's purpose was now to create an Institute of Ukrainian Studies, which "would not overshadow existing programs in Ukrainian studies, but merely give the latter greater visibility and strengthen their work through the publications, conferences, research, and teaching which it would organize." On 26 March the address with its financial alternatives—Oluk's plan and the government's proposition—was sent to Bociurkiw, Luckyj, and Frolick. Bociurkiw said nothing and Frolick very little; Luckyj, however, found the government's intervention "a shock," as it "practically wiped out" Toronto's chances for a centre. The decision as to site, he believed, should be made on academic rather than financial grounds. On 4 April Frolick, manifesting the first signs of possible east-west rivalry, phoned in a very attractive third alternative. A client in his late fifties in Toronto was immediately prepared to will the federation a $250,000 building, yielding $32,000 annually in rent, with an additional $100,000 at his death. The federation could either sell the building and establish a foundation, or it could collect the rent and treat the building as a foundation. The offer

was not necessarily contingent on the institute being in Toronto, but the donor was from Toronto and the implication was reasonable. This means, I concluded in a revised address "*that an Institute of Ukrainian Studies of the kind described earlier is now practically a certainty in Canada,*" however problematic its locale.

With all the eggs for an institute no longer in one basket, I now approached the meeting in Winnipeg with more confidence. The very idea of a single, overarching national scholarly institution encouraged generosity. As a result the mood in Winnipeg was accommodative and inclusive; no harsh words were exchanged and no rancour was evident. The conference, attended by forty-seven scholars in Ukrainian studies from eleven Canadian universities, passed resolutions that welcomed "the establishment of the Ukrainian Studies and Research Fund at the University of Ottawa and of the Research and Publications Project at the University of Toronto" and endorsed the initiative of the UCPBF to support Ukrainian studies and, in particular, its proposal "to create an Institute of Ukrainian Studies by the four Western Canadian Provincial Governments" that would "coordinate and support financially Ukrainian and Ukrainian-Canadian studies in Canada."

Back in Edmonton I contacted Foster's executive assistant on 8 April and was immediately advised to submit a proposal from the federation, which Foster could take to a ministerial meeting in Victoria on 16 April. Three days later a proposal for an "Institute of Ukrainian Studies in Western Canada Which Would Meet the Needs of Canada as a Whole" was on Foster's desk. Drawn up hastily, it was unfortunately the only document that various government and university authorities had before them during the next two years. On 10 April I received from a proud Kalba *Winnipeg Tribune* clippings that quoted quite extensively from the addresses by Luckyj and me and announced that Foster "is prepared not only to place the [institute] idea before his counterparts from the other provinces, but to solicit their financial support on a pro-rata population basis." With the *Edmonton Journal* also curious, I quickly called a meeting of the federation's executive, as the report implied that Foster, not the federation, was the project's initiator. When Decore called Foster at his home to apologize for the unfortunate leak, Foster accepted our explanations and did not seem to mind. This was, as Savaryn and I learned a year later, largely because he had no intention of establishing an institute.

Developments during the next two years fall roughly into two equal parts—those before and those after the provincial election of 25 March 1975 when Bert Hohol became the new minister of advanced education. In the meantime we learned from Foster that our proposal had been distributed at Victoria and that reactions would be solicited at the next

ministerial meeting on 16 June 1974. On the nineteenth, preliminary to seeing Foster again, the executive met with the MLAs of Ukrainian origin and briefed them on their plans. Present were Hohol, Catherine Chichak, Ken Paproski, Julian Koziak, and, of course, Diachuk. A day earlier I had a long meeting with a representative from the Department of Advanced Education, from which I had concluded that the ministers had discussed the proposal. On 29 June Hohol informed Diachuk that this was not so, and that it would be on the agenda of the next ministerial meeting on 9 September. Accordingly, on 21 August Savaryn and I saw Foster again, but the only new point to emerge was Foster's concern to head off "the multiplicity argument" (similar requests from other groups) through "a first-rate Centre of Ethnic Studies" that "would counter possible charges of favouritism," as I put it in a letter (11 September) to Alexander Malycky, Department of Germanic and Slavic Studies, University of Calgary, who had been prominent in the development of a poorly funded Research Centre for Canadian Ethnic Studies at that university in the late 1960s.

On 30 September Savaryn and I met Foster again and came away very hopeful. Not only did Walter Worth, now the deputy minister (who was present) favour the proposal, but Foster indicated that it had been sent to President Harry Gunning of the University of Alberta for a reaction. Savaryn, as a member of the Board of Governors, should now take it up with Gunning, and I should discuss it with Henry Kreisel, vice-president (academic), who chaired the all-important Academic Development Committee (ADC), whose recommendation would be crucial. As for the other provinces, Manitoba showed itself "very interested," Saskatchewan was "interested" (and even suggested that the institute be located there!), and British Columbia promised to study the proposal before the next meeting in January. "Foster is of the view," I wrote Rudnytsky on 22 October, "that the other provinces will come in with token support, perhaps only in principle, which Foster does not mind as he already indicated to his fellow ministers that Alberta is prepared to contribute the lion's share." Even so, because so much in western-Canadian postsecondary education was recently being developed on a regional basis, Foster wanted the other provinces on side and urged letters from the federation soliciting their support. Kondra had already discussed the matter with Ben Hanuschak, minister of education in Manitoba, as early as 10 April, and during the UCUSU congress in Winnipeg I raised the matter with Hanuschak on 31 August. Therefore only letters to Roy Romanow (Saskatchewan's attorney-general) and Eileen Dailly, British Columbia's minister of education, followed on 21 October. Both Hanuschak and Romanow supported the project; Dailly

sent only an acknowledgement.

With the proposal before the university, the scene now shifted to the closed quarters of the ADC as the major forum. Between 14 November 1974 and 15 May 1975 it held six lengthy meetings on the proposal, one of which Rudnytsky and I attended (9 January). A major difficulty was, of course, the proposal's sketchiness. The introduction referred to Ukrainians as an "'endangered species'" because of assimilation at home and abroad, and presented the institute as the cap on Ukrainian "efforts to establish an educational structure from nursery school through college and/or university to preserve and develop Ukrainian culture and ensure our survival as a people." But the institute's purposes and programmes, which shared equal billing with the results of the recent conference in Winnipeg, were poorly developed. As a result the institute's nature was as vague as was its budget, $310,500, a sum literally plucked out of the air. Slapped together to meet a short political deadline, the whole might have been dismissed out of hand but for Savaryn's political presence on the Board of Governors and Rudnytsky's and my own scholarly standing on campus. (The fact that I was a recognized spokesman for multiculturalism also did not hurt.) Even so, but for Henry Kreisel, none of that might have mattered. As a successful postwar émigré, Kreisel easily identified with Canada's multicultural reality and, as an ex officio member of the Board of Governors, he welcomed Savaryn's presence as an expression of that reality. Kreisel also remembered my being a student in his first undergraduate class in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English literature at the University of Alberta in 1949–50, and after I joined the staff in 1958 we met occasionally as colleagues and exchanged pleasantries, mutually cognizant of our Jewish and Ukrainian backgrounds. By the fall of 1974 we were on a friendly, first-name basis, and late in November I saw him and learned that he favoured the idea of an institute. We agreed that Rudnytsky and I should meet with the ADC early in January.

In the meantime, as a result of discussions Rudnytsky and I were having with Metro Gulutsan, director of the newly formed Division of East European and Soviet Studies, it was clear that Gulutsan, who often referred to the central place of Ukrainian studies in efforts to convert his small teaching division to a major research institute, was growing anxious about possible overlap between the division and a future Ukrainian institute. Accordingly, on 20 December at Gulutsan's request, I informed Willard Allen, associate vice-president (academic) and the division's immediate supervisory officer, that the Ukrainian institute would neither teach nor offer courses, and that it would "operate within the framework established for inter-disciplinary studies within the University." The

division and the institute, in short, would be "complementary bodies."

> As the development of Ukrainian specialists *per se* would not be wise occupationally, students with a major in Ukrainian studies would be required to round out their studies with courses dealing with eastern Europe. The existence of the Institute would thus heighten the value of the Division of East European and Soviet Studies, and the latter in turn would provide the Institute with a co-operative service locally which would render specialization in Ukrainian studies not only more meaningful but more marketable professionally. ... No duplication is intended and none will occur; the Division and the Institute will reinforce each other's work and in doing so will provide the University with two unique institutions which might well illustrate the ideal relationship between a specialized institution and a general area of study.

This made the division far more important than it could ever be, but at least the cry of duplication, the most serious that could be levelled against the institute, could not be raised on campus.

The appearance before the ADC on 9 January 1975 was uneventful. Rudnytsky presented the academic aspects of the proposal and stressed the importance of applied scholarship (the promotion of courses in the social sciences and history, the publication of academic textbooks, and the co-ordination of Ukrainian studies generally) to meet long-standing academic and community needs. I addressed the proposal's financial and political implications, minimizing the potential of federal multicultural funding and (with the Rudnytsky precedent in the Department of History in mind) emphasizing the importance of integrating the institute into the university as quickly as possible. Kreisel made it clear that if the government agreed to fund the institute, "the Committee could then report to GFC [General Faculties Council] and endorse its establishment." This again placed the ball squarely in the government's court, and with the next ministerial meeting slated for 21 January, Savaryn and I again prepared to see Foster, especially as, with an election imminent, Savaryn thought it wise to include all "our friends" on the government side in the delegation. Accordingly, a meeting was arranged for 3 February. When Foster learned that a dozen other MLAs would be present, he called off the meeting, and when Savaryn and I arrived at 5:30 p.m., Foster was nowhere to be found! Both of us saw him ten days later, but because the election was called next day (14 February), all we earned for our pains was an additional letter to Foster that indicated how the provinces of Manitoba and Saskatchewan would "specifically benefit" from whatever funds they "invested," an alleged concern we dismissed as a conversation piece, but one we could hardly ignore. In the circumstances, Gunning's

optimistic "progress report" to Savaryn (7 March) was most welcome. The ADC had discussed the proposal with Reno Bosetti, assistant deputy minister, Programme Services, Advanced Education, on 27 February, and discussions with the chairmen of the departments of Slavic Languages and History would follow, as "the relationship between the Institute and these two Departments is not clearly defined in the proposal."

The election on 26 March practically settled the all-important question of government funding. Not only did Hohol replace Foster, but Julian Koziak entered the cabinet as minister of education. Savaryn and Koziak were members of the same Ukrainian Catholic parish (St. Josaphat's) and, along with Hohol, were political colleagues. I had met Koziak on several occasions, but he was less well known to me than Hohol, with whom I had taught in Leduc in 1951–2. We hailed from the Ukrainian bloc settlement in east-central Alberta (he from the Two Hills area and I from nearby Willingdon), and we had often reminisced about life there in the late 1930s and early 1940s. We had never been close (he was five years older) and I knew that he did not belong to any Ukrainian Canadian organizations, but in our professional interest we had much in common, and our paths had crossed occasionally before his election in the Lougheed sweep of 1971. While Koziak's role in promoting the institute is not known to me, he was active in the Ukrainian community and his mere presence in cabinet was reassuring. After a decent waiting period, Savaryn arranged for a meeting with Hohol on 24 April, and it was a memorable one indeed. We were greeted warmly: "I have read the file," Hohol declared while still on his feet. "I like the institute idea and intend to implement it. But I'll need your help." He informed us that the department did not think much of the proposal ("Prognosis: Poor" read its evaluation form), that Worth had not favoured it, and that Foster did not intend to establish an institute. Hohol, however, intended to take it under his "personal wing," and I would have to help his assistant, Syeda Hameed, whose "special task" it was to take the proposal "through the department" before he presented it to cabinet.

With the UCPBF's biennial convention less than a month away, it was now possible to report real progress. But certain questions had to be answered. What would be the institute's name? With Edmonton now definitely the site (Hohol had rejected the regional approach), who would be its director? And with government funding assured, what was the point of a foundation? Savaryn, Rudnytsky, and I met twice (30 April, 5 May) to settle such matters. As its name, we adopted the *Canadian* Institute of Ukrainian Studies for its greater campus appeal and to differentiate it better from the *Ukrainian* Research Institute at Harvard, in existence since June 1973. We also agreed that Rudnytsky would direct

the future institute "on a part-time basis" (at his request) and I would be his associate. The subject was not an issue; I was not in Ukrainian studies and had no scholarly basis from which to head the institute. For its advisory council—representatives from those academic units that offered courses in Ukrainian studies—Gulutsan was certainly important, as was Tom Priestly, chairman of the Slavic department, who would help "neutralize," as Rudnytsky's minutes put it, "the opposition against the Institute which has been already voiced by some members" of that department. In considering new professorial positions, I vetoed George Shevelov (about to retire from Columbia University) for the University of Toronto because "money originating with the Alberta Government could under no circumstances be used for financing of teaching positions in other provinces." For the Department of Political Science, I suggested Bohdan Krawchenko, whom I met in 1970 while he was president of the UCUSU and whose progress as a graduate student I was then following. On the foundation, it was decided that Savaryn should continue his initiatives; that its headquarters (on Savaryn's advice) should be in Toronto because "Our well-to-do-people in the East, who belong to the 'new' immigration, show more understanding for Ukrainian cultural needs than their counterparts in the West"; that its chief function should be to subsidize institute publications, especially the English-language encyclopedia of Ukraine; and that Stan Frolick should be asked to be the foundation's first president. It was "unrealistic," we concluded, to think of an operational institute in 1975–6. "There was the matter of cabinet approval, General Faculties approval, and Board of Governors approval—all of which could not even appear to be rushed."

As the federation's outgoing president, it was easy for me to persuade the UCPBF convention in Winnipeg on 17–19 May to convert the outgoing executive into a standing committee on education to pursue the federation's three main projects—the bilingual programme, the institute, and the institute's foundation. The goal, as my president's report indicated, was to create four resource centres, with Edmonton continuing in education, Toronto concentrating on political dissent in Ukraine, Hamilton specializing in mass media, and Winnipeg monitoring immigration. In an address on the institute, I explained its "ultimate significance":

> It is my sincere belief that the Ukrainian community in Canada is rapidly approaching its fourth major crisis in leadership. The first crisis took place before the first world war and was met by the special teacher training schools for "Ruthenians" or "foreigners" established by the governments of the three prairie provinces. The second crisis emerged by 1918 after the training schools were closed and it was met by the

> establishment of Ukrainian residential institutes by the Ukrainians themselves. The third crisis was clearly evident by 1950 and it was met by the fortuitous immigration of over 30,000 Ukrainians to Canada between 1948 and 1952. We are now on the brink of the fourth crisis. ...
>
> To survive Anglo-Americanization at home and Russification abroad a new source of leaders is needed—leaders who are fluent in English and Ukrainian, and wherever possible, French; leaders who are aware of our history in Canada and in Ukraine; who are at home with Ukrainian arts and customs; and who are fully conversant with the state of Ukrainian life in Canada and abroad. If we truly are not a minority like most other minorities in Canada ... then we need leaders to articulate our case at all levels of society and in all forums that count. This the projected Institute and Foundation will provide. Like the teacher training schools, the residential institutes and the third immigration, the Institute as the cap on the educational ladder will hopefully carry us through the next crisis and perhaps even avert future ones. If it does not, I fear nothing else will. Much is at stake therefore, and what *you* think and what *you* do is now more important than ever.

As a clarion call for the foundation with fund-raising clearly in mind, the above aroused little enthusiasm. Compared to the 1973 convention in Edmonton, that in Winnipeg was poorly attended and the contingent from Toronto was especially small. There was little discussion and no debate, and one could sense considerable uneasiness about Edmonton's open moves to identify the aimless UCPBF with bilingual education and postsecondary academic studies and scholarship—in short, with Ukrainian studies. It did not help that the executive's frequent references to the institute and to its foundation, to educational projects like the Ukrainian encyclopedia and the bilingual classrooms, and to government and community funding often lacked specifics and were deliberately unaccompanied by press releases. Yet, until the government of Alberta actually voted the funds for an institute, the outgoing executive thought it best to avoid details and to discourage publicity.

On 24 May, scarcely a week after the convention and the UCPBF executive's transfer to Winnipeg, a new and unforeseen development occurred. At the annual P&B Club's spring ball in Toronto, (to thunderous applause) the guest speaker Ontario Premier William Davis, on the verge of calling an election, charged MPPs Nick Leluk (parliamentary assistant to culture minister Robert Welch) and John Yaremko (former provincial secretary and minister of citizenship), both of whom were present, to seek funds from the government's Treasury Board to "endow a chair of Ukrainian studies" at the University of Toronto. No sums were mentioned and no one was certain what the premier had in mind, but those close to the P&B Club, who had organized the ball with "Proceeds

Devoted towards the Canadian Institute for Ukrainian Studies," were elated, especially Frolick, Ihor Bardyn, the club's president, and Bohdan Onyschuk, the president of Ontario's UCC. I was surprised by the news, for on my way to Ottawa for a CCCM function to be held on 23 May I had asked Frolick to call an evening meeting at his home on the twenty-second to discuss the constitution and by-laws that Savaryn had drawn up for the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Foundation and to sell the idea that its first executive should come from Toronto. In my résumé of the meeting, which was attended by Bardyn, Darewych, Frolick, Luckyj, Onyschuk, and Edward Topper (Topornicki), the club's treasurer, I noted that "a decision from Alberta's government on the Institute before the end of June would help efforts (which will be made) to get Ontario government support for G. Luckyj's publication plan before the next election is called. Fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) was suggested." No chair of Ukrainian studies was mentioned, though references to the spring ball were made in passing, as was the fact that the much-discussed institute would be the beneficiary. On the ball's bilingual programme, however, which I received later, the University of Alberta was not mentioned as the institute's locale and the beneficiary was not the institute but the "Katedra ukrainskykh nauk u Kanadi" (Chair of Ukrainian Studies in Canada). This was, of course, a familiar expression with wide appeal especially to the postwar Ukrainian immigrants in eastern Canada, many of whom were still contributing generously to the establishment of three chairs (in Ukrainian history, literature, and language) and a research institute at Harvard. Before Davis spoke he was briefed by persons unknown: "Whoever briefed him on the Institute," I learned from Bardyn on the twenty-sixth, "may have inadvertently given him the wrong impression as he referred to the Chair of Ukrainian Studies at Harvard and the setting up of the same Chair at the University of Toronto."

But what was deemed inadvertent soon took on a life of its own. To me a chair signified little more than another academic position, of which there were already several in Slavic departments across Canada; it was definitely not the institute I understood we were developing. But as the confusion in Toronto over the foundation, the institute, and the chair thickened, enthusiasm for the chair grew—enthusiasm that could not be discouraged, for not only were details still lacking, but Edmonton, too, still awaited a definite government decision. Moreover, the foundation slated for Toronto was to be managed by the very people who now toasted the chair; they simply could not be alienated. As a result a race between Toronto and Edmonton gradually emerged, and in it Frolick and Savaryn (who had little regard for one another) were soon contending to

outdo each other. Both were prominent Conservatives with good government connections (Frolick had carried the Conservative colours unsuccessfully in three Ontario elections, Savaryn was practically a charter member in the Conservative party that Lougheed had revitalized, and their personal rivalry was soon joined by the traditional Canadian rivalry between the young and upstart West and the experienced and pretentious East. In the middle was the academic interest, represented in Toronto by George Luckyj, who now found himself in something of a no-man's-land, tailoring his valuable publications project to meet the requirements of the most recent political meeting or government offer.

One cannot follow here the negotiations between Toronto's club and the government of Ontario during the next twelve months. The sums bandied about were considerable—$1 million to $1.5 million at the first meeting with Welch on 30 May and $1.9 million in the proposal (drawn up by Bardyn) submitted on 12 August to Welch and James Auld, minister of colleges and universities, in the presence of their deputies and Leluk and Yaremko. On 27 August Malcolm Rowan, Welch's deputy, offered $600,000, which was deemed inadequate by the club's negotiators and refused pending further negotiations. In the negotiations Luckyj was almost always present, and I, of course, had his ear. Luckyj had little confidence in Toronto's negotiating team, believing that the prestigious symbolism the term "Chair" evoked, rather than a viable scholarly programme of research and publication, was what mainly motivated the club members. I agreed and encouraged Luckyj not only to play down the chair idea, but to seek instead an endowment to the institute's newly incorporated (24 June) foundation that was large enough (at least $1 million) to carry an annual budget of $100,000 for the English-language encyclopedia of Ukraine project, mentioned so often by Luckyj, Rudnytsky, and Savaryn. An endowment not only would give the foundation and the encyclopedia project the visibility needed to attract additional donors, but would lower the costs to the future institute (should it materialize) of what appeared to be a very expensive project. Neither Luckyj nor I, however, could get anyone in Toronto to take our advice (which had, of course, to be offered judiciously and without insistence), and in a letter from Frolick to Tarnopolsky (29 July 1975), Luckyj, for his pains, was judged "timid," with "no political sense or feel" and with a "tendency to think 'small' and play things down." To Frolick a chair was important because "the Premier had used the word 'Chair' himself and, of course, a prestigious sounding name would satisfy the emotional needs of our community and facilitate its financial support."

In its obsession with the chair the club soon came to pursue it as the equivalent of the east's institute or even as the institute itself. On 15

August Bardyn requested that "for purposes of our negotiations with the Ontario Government" reference in the foundation's constitution to western Canada as the institute's locale "be deleted or alternately an addition to be made to have these paragraphs read as follows: To assist in the establishment of the Institute of Ukrainian Studies in Canada at a site yet to be determined in western Canada; and to assist in the establishment of a Chair of Ukrainian Studies in Canada at a site yet to be determined in eastern Canada." The chair, like the institute, would serve the whole country, not just Toronto! And on 30 January 1976 Frolick, in a personal letter to Welch "Re: Canadian Institute for Ukrainian Studies," not only reminded the minister of his promised early decision "on the matter of funding the above Institute at the University of Toronto," but pointed to the elapsed time since the premier's "support for a chair or institute of Ukrainian Studies" and, to spur funding, referred to "the tremendous assistance given the Institute by the Government of Alberta for the Western anchor of the Institute's programme at the University of Alberta"! In the end, as Rowan had made clear on 27 August, the government saw the chair as the funding of "one Professor and one Secretary", for which an endowment grant to the foundation of $600,000 was available. The club's proposal, on the other hand, based as it was on the federation's proposal to Foster (which was sent to Bardyn on 30 July at his request), encompassed much more than the usual chair, and the entire drawn-out effort ultimately yielded no more than $76,000 for Luckyj's publications project to be matched by the foundation in so-called "sweat equity" on Luckyj's part.

In Edmonton, of course, consideration of the UCPBF's proposal by the University of Alberta continued apace. On 17 April the ADC met with the deans of arts and education, George Baldwin and Myer Horowitz, and with two departmental chairmen, Tom Priestly (Slavic languages) and Cedric Lowe (history). The minutes show that none opposed the proposal, but Horowitz and Lowe were the most supportive and Kreisel and Horowitz parried Baldwin's more critical remarks. When Baldwin observed that besides its academic dimension, the institute was concerned to preserve and develop Ukrainian culture, whereas "a liberal Arts Faculty preserved knowledge—he did not know that the Faculty had ever been dedicated to the preservation and development of a culture," Kreisel admitted that there were "elements" in the proposal "which went beyond the normal sphere of University activity. ... Were this not the case, there would be no need to propose the creation of an Institute of this kind." Horowitz was less diplomatic: the perpetuation of a culture at the university was "a central concern—the difference being that the perpetuation of a majority culture was taken as a matter of course." But this

meeting, like those on 15 and 29 May, inevitably returned to the central issue: the university's commitment to the proposal would depend on the government's commitment to funding it; once the latter was clear, the university would request the UCPBF to furnish a detailed proposal to facilitate implementation. And such, in essence, was President Gunning's response on 2 September to the government's earlier request for a university reaction.

With Hohol now obliged to act, on 30 September Savaryn and I briefed him, at his request, before next day's meeting with the government's Social Planning Committee. From an ecstatic Savaryn I learned next day that Hohol was "very, very successful"; he got the "go ahead" motion through a vote that was "spontaneous," "unanimous," and "not given grudgingly." Hohol, too, was pleased. In an earlier call to Savaryn he volunteered that "I can honestly say that this was my best performance"; the project was "Unique and different," and it was easy to identify with it. A week later Hohol's RFD (Request for Decision) passed the government's Finances and Priorities Committee, which was chaired by the premier (with whom Savaryn had discussed the project on several occasions), and on 21 October the cabinet assigned an additional $350,000 to the university's budget for the institute. Support for the idea, according to Savaryn, was "excellent"; there were questions and a discussion of implications, but "not one spoke against it." Next day I wrote Hohol an appreciative personal letter and set in motion the "gala celebration" mentioned therein. As a result, on 7 November the Hohols were fêted at a private dinner at the (Ukrainian) Troyanda Restaurant attended by about thirty people, mostly members of the federation's former executive, members of the P&B Club's multicultural committee, prominent politicians such as Koziak, and their wives. Savaryn was master of ceremonies, William Pidruchney, president of Edmonton's UCC, and Yaroslaw Roslak, president of the P&B Club, spoke on behalf of the community, and I related what I knew of Bert and Kay Hohol and of the goals of the future institute.

A few days later Horowitz, who had succeeded Kreisel as vice-president (academic) on 1 July, asked that I chair an ad hoc committee to prepare a detailed proposal for the university, and requested the names of others who might serve. To help me with the preparation, I met with Luckyj and Bociurkiw in Toronto on 15 November while on CCCM business. Among other things, they strongly urged that the institute's future budget be proportionate to the percentage $350,000 bore to the university's total budget in 1976–7. We agreed to postpone all publicity and dealt mainly with the plan of work in the first year, concentrating on Luckyj's "List of Proposed Publications" enclosed in his letter to me of

5 November. A meeting with Horowitz followed, at which he not only outlined the difficult route that still awaited the proposal, but stressed the need for one that "will have to be defended" on campus and underlined the value of meeting with certain "key people" important to its acceptance. We agreed that the following should constitute the ad hoc committee: Brian Evans, Department of History, who was interested in developing an Asian studies programme on campus; Madeline Monod, Department of Secondary Education, who was frustrated by her inability to meet the needs of Ukrainian-language teachers (especially in the elementary bilingual programme) in her curriculum and instruction (methods) classes for secondary-school teachers of French; and Metro Gulutsan and Tom Priestly. All agreed to serve, especially after they learned that they would only have to react to a proposal I would prepare.

In drawing up the new proposal, I benefited much from the minutes the ADC made available. From them it was clear that the Ukrainian Canadian dimension had to be more prominent; that the institute's inter-university function as a national institution required special attention; that the institute's relationship to other academic units on campus (especially regarding teaching and staff appointments) was troublesome; that the practical dimension of scholarly research and publication needed a higher profile; and that the relationship to bilingual education as a major community concern was a good place to begin. Among personal concerns, the institute (for political, pedagogical, and academic reasons) had to avoid publishing teaching materials for school use; undergraduate scholarships had to be both numerous and large enough to cover tuition and living costs from the first year; all research grants and graduate student support had to be tied to the publication of textbooks especially useful in college or university classrooms; and the compilation of inventories of scholars and scholarly needs in Ukrainian and Ukrainian Canadian studies was important. Finally, the significance of the encyclopedia of Ukraine project, including its budget, was spelled out, and its relationship to the University of Toronto and to the foundation was defined. The first draft of the new proposal was ready by mid-December, and the ad hoc committee considered it on the twenty-third. The reaction was very favourable, and the committee's many suggestions greatly strengthened the final draft.

One person who had no input into the new proposal's development was Rudnytsky, away in Europe on sabbatical leave since 24 September 1975. Before he left we had discussed his plans for the year, and I indicated for the first time that he might not necessarily become the institute's director. The government, I intimated, had raised the matter and assumed that because of the institute's overall importance, I would

accept the position. This was not strictly true, though the question had been raised in precisely those terms by Savaryn and by Luckyj and Bociurkiw at our meeting in November. I remained noncommittal, but once the time for a new proposal had arrived, a decision could not be postponed any longer, as the institute's administrative structure would certainly affect the budget. The decision was a difficult one. I still knew very little about Ukrainian studies and not really all that much more about the study of Ukrainians in Canada. Becoming director of a research and publications institute specializing in both was the last thing on my mind when I first met Luckyj over two years ago. Since then, however, much had changed. Not only was the institute now to be in Edmonton and to have a marked Canadian emphasis, but its ambitious inter-university nature and its close association with the bilingual programme and with the Ukrainian professional and business community (and its foundation) required scholarly interests and political skills on and off campus, which Rudnytsky did not possess. It was also clear that during the latter's sabbatical, most of the work had fallen on my shoulders (or so it appeared to my wife, who always thought I had quite enough to do in my own department without planting seeds for others to harvest). I gradually concluded that too much was at stake not to realize the institute's full potential, especially as Rudnytsky himself admitted to having no particular penchant for, or interest in, administration. This meant that even if Rudnytsky did become the director, I, as his associate, would have to do most of the work. This was certainly the view also of Metro Gulutsan, who knew Rudnytsky's strengths and weaknesses as well as I did, and with whom I occasionally discussed the matter.

Among my handicaps, a major one was a weak working knowledge of standard Ukrainian, which I spoke poorly, read very slowly, and had never learned to write. In canvassing the alternatives, I concluded that a part-time special assistant might make up the deficiency, and on 17 November I explored the possibility with Andrij Hornjatkevyč, whom I met socially. Hornjatkevyč had a PhD in Slavic languages, had briefly taught at Harvard, and was then on contract in the Department of Slavic Languages. He appeared to be an excellent candidate and was, of course, most eager to acquire permanent employment. I also decided, based on the heavy professional and community load I had been carrying since 1973, especially in the multiculturalism movement, where even then John Munro, the federal minister responsible for multiculturalism, was pressing me to become the national chairman of CCCM, I would have to be a full-time director to meet all that was expected of me. Accordingly, the first draft of the detailed proposal contained the following under "Structure":

> The director would have a special assistant, and both would be based in University departments. The Institute would be responsible for 2/3 of the special assistant's salary and all of the director's salary, at least initially. Both would teach (to a maximum of one full course each) and carry out administrative, publication and editorial responsibilities. There would be two non-salaried associate directors, one at the University of Alberta and the other at the University of Toronto.

When Rudnytsky, who had returned to Edmonton for the Christmas holidays en route to Harvard, read the above, he hit the roof, and our meeting at his place (with his wife present) was a most difficult one. He knew Hornjatkevyč much better than I did and was particularly incensed that I was contemplating a tenured appointment for him to meet needs he (and his wife) thought others could fill better. (Later, I often wished I had listened to them, for Hornjatkevyč failed to meet my expectations as an assistant, as subsequent difficulties showed.) Luckyj, too, was not too pleased to lose the one-third release time he had incorporated into his earlier budget. What I wished to avoid was a "salaries" item that appeared top-heavy, especially because it was difficult to know how well Luckyj or Rudnytsky would fulfil their plans. In the end they agreed to postpone release time for themselves provided mine was reduced by one-third and they were each given a full-time assistant.

Despite the above, the budget was never a problem in either proposal. The figure of $310,500 in the first was arrived at by my simply totalling up what I thought was most desirable, and there was never any discussion of the amount. It was politically saleable, and the fact that it was slightly more than the $250,00 occasionally mentioned earlier in private made it appear reasonable. No one had indicated any ceiling for the second proposal because that would have been too difficult to do, and though the $366,800 turned out to be quite unrealistic within two years of the institute's opening, it at least could be defended at the time. When the government drew the line at $350,000, it was not difficult to make the adjustment. A deeper concern was to ensure that whatever the budget, it did not remain frozen at the same amount. Thus, to obtain "a permanent support base" within the university's budget, the detailed proposal's first draft declared it "important the University accept the responsibility of committing annually to the Institute that percentage of the University budget which $363,500 [the amount at the time] bears to the total University budget for the academic year 1976–77." The ad hoc committee on 23 December thought that only the government could make such a commitment, a view confirmed by Lorne Leitch, vice-president (finance), whom I saw on 6 January 1976. I raised the matter with Savaryn, who assured me, after appropriate inquiries, that permanent,

incremental financing was no problem. Worried by a letter from Frolick, dated 19 December and drafted by him after a phone call to Hohol, which suggested some possible discrepancies in how we and the minister understood the matter of funding, I phoned Syeda Hameed in mid-January for her reaction to a revised passage that made the government responsible for incremental funding "without term." She requested a copy, which was forwarded without result. With time becoming a factor, I phoned Hohol on 2 February, read the revised passage to him, and was assured that the government would fund the institute "forever," the mechanism of funding "to be worked out by specialists." Ten days later the ad hoc committee approved the second draft (complete with the revised passage), and on the eighteenth I sent the detailed proposal to Horowitz for the ADC's consideration.

During the next two months the ADC discussed the proposal on three occasions, with the ad hoc committee present on 22 April. There were no mishaps or hitches. On 25 March the ADC decided to solicit comments from deans and chairmen of academic units affected by the proposal, a step that complemented my circularization a week earlier of some two dozen campus individuals for their reaction. Among the replies there were no reservations; uneventful also were my visits to John McGregor, dean of the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, on 16 March and to George Baldwin two days later. On 29 April the proposal passed the ADC with the following conditions: (1) that the institute operate on "strict observation" of the university policies governing staff, space and courses; (2) that the government understand that the university assumed no responsibility for the institute's budget; (3) that joint appointments with the institute "may" not be possible without additional departmental funding; (4) that there be "further examination" of the institute's proposed inter-university activities; and (5) that "the Director and Advisory Committee" report to the ADC after the first and second years, with "a more complete evaluation" at the end of the third year, the details to be determined by the director and vice-president (academic). "I'm very optimistic that the Ukrainian Canadian Institute will be supported," Horowitz reassured me in a personal letter of 30 April, and Savaryn's phone call after a Board of Governors meeting next day was just as encouraging: Horowitz had received letters from the Faculties of Arts and Education supporting the proposal.

On 13 May, three days after the proposal had passed the executive committee of the GFC, the *Edmonton Journal* carried a report critical of the institute's "backers" who, with government support, had challenged "the cumbersome methods" used to establish new university programmes and thereby presented the university with a "fait accompli," as Dean

McGregor put it. "It seems cynical," he added, "to fund so handsomely a program such as this when the legitimate research needs of the universities have been starved for funds during the past few years." It was, of course, true that the Conservative government had been financing universities much more stringently in recent years and its flank was therefore exposed. But McGregor's reference to "legitimate" research and to a possible "flood of ethnic institutes 'which in no way reflect the priorities of the university'" exposed well also the kind of resistance the proposal would have had to face had it come only from either one of the two traditional sources, namely, the outside community or a "recognized discipline, base or unit" within the university (to quote Baldwin as paraphrased in the ADC minutes, 17 April 1975). What confounded the authorities was that the UCPBF's proposal came from an outside community organization headed by an academic in close touch with other academics, which neither the government nor the university could easily dismiss.

On 31 May the GFC approved the proposal, complete with the conditions attached by the ADC. Savaryn and I attended as observers, and I shall never forget the sense of relief when the vote was finally taken. Senior administration had engineered the proposal's passage so skilfully that its acceptance was almost anticlimactic. There was no debate and no major questions as we awaited the dreaded fireworks that never came. (The fact that McGregor did not attend may have been a factor.) Savaryn and I retired to the Faculty Club, where we toasted the efforts of all with beer and tomato juice, Savaryn's "usual" (and the chit can be seen to this day!). On 18 June 1976 the Board of Governors approved the institute's establishment as of 1 July with the ADC's conditions, and on 13 August Hohol informed Eric Geddes, the board's chairman, that a $350,000 grant to support the institute would be transferred to the university's budget for 1976–7. "Separate budget submissions for the Institute should be made annually to my office along with the University of Alberta estimates." This meant that the institute technically was not on term funding, but its separate budget also signified that it was not yet an integral part of the university. That would depend on how well it met its objectives, as the ADC had, in fact, indicated.

Even before the board's decision, I had begun to attend to several items of unfinished business. The first involved my personal situation, which I discussed with Peter Miller, chairman of the Department of Educational Foundations, and Fred Enns, acting dean of the Faculty of Education, who readily agreed to a secondment for three years (I did not wish to be away longer). The department also provided space for the institute's first location (an office across from mine in Education Building

II) until it could be accommodated a year later in historic Athabasca Hall (the university's first building), then under renovation. Next I had a long meeting with Rudnytsky, who had recently returned from his sabbatical, and explained, among other things, that there were simply too many demands on my time for me to be a part-time director. He appeared to understand and raised no objections. Two days later, on 10 June, prompted by a letter from Luckyj (5 June) which commented on Frolick's continued chair negotiations and concluded that the apparent goal was to make Toronto "independent of Alberta," I sent Frolick "some basic guidelines" to "govern relations between the Foundation, the University of Toronto, and the Institute" and invited his reaction. The purpose was to impress upon Toronto once again that both the institute and the foundation were national institutions, that the latter existed to support the work of the former, and that an institute that was kept "fully informed" in the performance of its "inter-university, co-ordination, clearing house function" was "in the best position to indicate where the funds might be expended most profitably." It is significant, I think, that though no subject was ever off-limits during our long friendship, Frolick never commented on this letter orally or in writing. I would attribute this to his being as overwhelmed as the rest of us by the sheer magnitude of the achievement in the institute's establishment.

The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies was, at the time, the largest subsidy out of public funds that any Ukrainian community project had ever received outside Ukraine. To my mind, it was a richly deserved dividend to the first, pioneer settlers whose hard work had done so much to open up the prairie west. I know that to me personally the institute was an expression of the gratitude I felt to grandparents and parents who had taught me to love education and to value culture (Ukrainian and otherwise). But no matter how fortuitous for the institute's establishment may have been my own efforts, without the "immersion" in Ukrainian studies Bociurkiw, Rudnytsky, and Luckyj had provided, it would not have been possible to draw up the proposals. And in the same vein, if it had not been for Peter Savaryn's very large political influence with the government and within the university, the institute would not have come into being. For the institute, in the last analysis, was a political act—an act of *public* policy made possible by the public funds the government of Alberta, through Albert Hohol, deemed worthy to make available. Hohol's support was crucial, and if Savaryn and I may be considered the institute's godfathers, he was the presiding medic at the institute's birth whose gentle tap at precisely the right time gave the institute its first heartbeat.

Hryhorij Savyč Skovoroda

An anthology of critical articles

Edited by Richard H. Marshall, Jr. and Thomas E. Bird



Hryhorij Skovoroda (1722-1794) is a major figure in the history of Ukrainian and Russian literature and philosophy. Educated at the Kyiv Mohyla Academy, he served variously as music director of the Russian imperial mission in Hungary, private tutor, and instructor of ethics and poetics at the Xarkiv Collegium.

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Journal of Ukrainian Studies 18, nos. 1-2 (Summer-Winter 1993)

The Current State of Ukrainian Historiography*

Orest Subtelny

Today it is almost obligatory to use the word "crisis" in discussing most aspects of the former Soviet system. It certainly provides an accurate description of the current state of Ukrainian historiography, which, like Ukrainian history itself, has reached a crucial, dramatic turning point. Because the changes that are occurring in the field are vast and far-ranging, it is only appropriate that a correspondingly broad approach be applied this discussion of the topic. Therefore, instead of treating the subject in traditional fashion and focusing on shifts in historical interpretations, this paper will strive to survey the major aspects of Ukrainian historical scholarship as it is currently practiced, that is, to attempt an assessment of the state of the field.[1] I hope that this discussion of where

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* This article is a revised and expanded version of my "Die gegenwärtige Situation der ukrainischen Historiographie: Ein Überblick," which appeared in Guido Hausmann and Andreas Kappeler, eds., *Ukraine: Gegenwart und Geschichte eines neuen Staates* (Baden-Baden, 1993), 350–69. It is based on a paper presented at a conference held at Walberberg and Cologne University on 31 October–2 November, 1991.

[1] Post-World War II Soviet overviews of Ukrainian historiography are: M. I. Marchenko, *Ukrainska istoriohrafiia* (Kyiv, 1957); V. A. Diadychenko, F. E. Los, V. H. Sarbei, *Rozvytok istorychnoi nauky v Ukrainskii RSR* (Kyiv, 1970); I. O. Hurzhii, P. M. Kalenychenko, et al., eds., *Rozvytok istorychnoi nauky na Ukraini za roky radianskoi vlady* (Kyiv, 1973); L. A. Kovalenko, *Istoriohrafiia istorii Ukrainskoi RSR vid naidavnishykh chasiv do velykoi zhovtnevoi sotsialistychnoi revoliutsii* (Kyiv, 1983); and A. V. Santsevych, *Ukrainska radianska istoriohrafiia (1945–1982)* (Kyiv, 1984). See also L. M. Gudzenko, T. M. Sheliukh, "Bibliohrafiia ukrainskoi istoriohrafii," in *Istoriohrafichni doslidzhennia v Ukrainskii RSR*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1968), 239–73.

Overviews of Ukrainian historiography that appeared in the West are: Dmytro Doroshenko, "A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography," and Oleksander Ohloblyn, "Ukrainian Historiography, 1917–1956," vol. 5–6 (1957) of *Annals of the*

Ukrainian historians are now will aid them in deciding what direction to take in the future.

Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S. (henceforth *Annals*); Mykola Chubaty, *Ukrainska istorychna nauka: Ii rozvytok ta dosiahnennia* (Philadelphia, 1971); Nataliia Polonska-Vasylenko, *Ukrainska istoriohrafiia* (Munich, 1971); and Liubomyr Vynar [Lubomyr Wynar], "Dumky pro 'Ukrainskoho istoryka' i suchasnyi stan ukrainskoi istorychnoi nauky," *Ukrainskyi istoryk* (henceforth *UI*) 15 (1978): 5–29.

A distinct genre of historiographical surveys are Western analyses of Soviet Ukrainian historical writing and Soviet overviews of studies on Ukrainian history that appeared in the West. See Borys Krupnytsky, *Ukrainska istorychna nauka pid sovietamy, 1920–1950* (Munich, 1957); Nataliia Polonska-Vasylenko, "Istorychna nauka v Ukraini za sovietskoi doby ta dolia istorykiv," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* (henceforth *ZNTSh*) 173 (1962): 26–110; Oleksander Ohloblyn, *Dumky pro suchasnu ukrainsku sovietsku istoriohrafiiu* (New York, 1963); Jaroslaw Pelenski, "Soviet Ukrainian Historiography after World War II," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 12 (1964): 375–418; Stephan Horak, "Ukrainian Historiography, 1953–1963," *Slavic Review* (henceforth *SR*) 24 (1965): 258–72; Ivan Myhul, "Politics and History: A Study of Soviet Ukrainian Historiography," PhD diss., Columbia University, 1973; Lubomyr Wynar, "The Present State of Ukrainian Historiography in Soviet Ukraine: A Brief Overview," *Nationalities Papers* 7 (1979): 1–23; Teodor Mackiw, "Ukrainian Historiography in the Past and Present," *Ukrainian Quarterly* (henceforth *UQ*) 40 (1984): 269–88; Roman Szporluk, "National History as a Political Battleground: The Case of Ukraine and Belorussia," in *Russian Empire*, ed. Michael Pap (Cleveland, 1985), 131–50; Stephen Velychenko, "The Official Soviet View of Ukrainian Historiography," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 10, no. (1985), 81–93; idem, "Will Restructuring Change the Past?," in *Echoes of Glasnost in Ukraine*, ed. Romana M. Bahry (Toronto, 1989), 40–50; idem, "The Origins of the Current Official Soviet Interpretation of Eastern Slavic History: A Case Study of Policy Formulation," *Forschungen zur Osteuropäische Geschichte* 46 (1990): 221–53; and idem, *Shaping Identity in Eastern Europe and Russia: Soviet Russian and Polish Accounts of Ukrainian History* (New York, 1993).

Soviet treatments of Ukrainian historiography in the West were generally of the "rebuttal" variety. See, for example, R. H. Symonenko, *Proty suchasnykh zarubizhnykh falsyfikatsii istorii Ukrainy* (Kyiv, 1960); idem, *Chorne pero falsifikatoriv: Proty prekruchen istorii borotby za radiansku vladu na Ukraini* (Kyiv, 1968); V. H. Sarbei, "Burzhuazno-natsionalistychni falsifikatory ukrainskoi radianskoi istoriohrafii," in *Sotsialistychna diisnist i nationalistychni vyhadky* (Kyiv, 1968); M. F. Kotliar, "Istorychne mynule ukrainskoho narodu v interpretatsii burzhuazno-natsionalistychnoi istoriohrafii," in *Burzhuaznyi natsionalizm—znariaddia vorohiv sotsialnoho prohresu i mizhnarodnoi rozriadky* (Kyiv, 1979); L. A. Nahorna, *Proty suchasnoi burzhuaznoi i burzhuazno-natsionalistychnoi falsifikatsii istorii Zhovtnia na Ukraini* (Kyiv, 1971); M. M. Varvartsev, *Burzhuazne "ukrainoznavstvo"—znariaddia ideolohichnykh dyversii imperializmu* (Kyiv, 1976); idem, *Natsionalizm v oblychchi sovietolohii* (Kyiv, 1984); and I. S. Khmel, ed., *Pravda istorii: Protiv falsifikatorov* (Kyiv, 1982).

The General Context

With the collapse of the USSR and the disintegration of its ideological superstructure, the Soviet, class-oriented interpretation of the past—for generations the only tolerated version—also crumbled. Consequently the various nationalities of the former union discovered that their national histories were, to a greater or lesser extent, vast "white spots."

While the usefulness of history has long been a subject of debate, on one point there is general agreement: nations cannot do without it. And the sense of urgency with which the resurgent nations of the former USSR have been calling for the "rediscovery" of their national pasts clearly supports this view. What makes the difficult process of "rediscovering" a national past even more daunting is that currently it is occurring in a highly charged political and socio-economic context. Today it is almost as difficult to avoid mixing history and politics as it was during the Soviet period. But, of course, now the pressures emanate from very different sources, and they push historians toward very different conclusions than before. Moreover, a sense of haste is palpable as teachers, students and the general public clamour for a new, creditable version of the nation's history. Perhaps most worrisome is the fact that the professional historians who are expected to undertake the extremely responsible and demanding enterprise of rewriting history are woefully unprepared for the job. In short, one of the most debased scholarly disciplines in Ukraine is facing one of its most pressing scholarly tasks.

The causes of the catastrophic condition of the historical profession in the USSR have often been discussed. And it can be argued convincingly that all the characteristic defects of Soviet historiography—the dogmatism, vulgar sociologism, and primitive economism—was applied in Shcherbytsky's Ukraine to an even greater degree than, for example, in Russia, Armenia, or the Baltic republics. Even when compared to the hesitant reaction to *perestroika* of their colleagues in Moscow, the response of the historians in Kyiv was exceedingly tepid.[2] The damage done by

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[2] See Iu. Iu. Kondufor, "Aktualni problemy istoryko-partiinoi nauky: Perebudova, poshuky," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal* (henceforth *UIZh*), 1988, no. 2, 5–19; idem, "Zavdannia dalshoho rozvytku istorychnykh doslidzhen v Ukrainskii RSR u svitli rishen XXVII z'izdu KPRS," *UIZh*, 1988, no. 4, 5–20;; and V. I. Iurchuk, "Perebudova i pereosmyslennia istorychnoho dosvidu Kompartii Ukrainy," *UIZh*, 1988, no. 7, 9-18. For a critique of these responses, see Valerii Shevchuk, "Bez korenia krona mertva," *Kultura i zhyttia*, 7 February 1988; and Roman Ivanychuk, "Dukhovne zdorov'ia i nihilistychnyi virus," *Kyiv*, 1988, no. 4, 119–21. See also Velychenko, "Will Restructuring Change the Past?"

the Soviet system to Ukrainian historians was all the more debilitating because it was inflicted on a relatively weak base.[3] Because the Ukrainians were a de facto stateless people, they lacked, except for brief period in the 1920s, the institutional support that other national historiographies enjoyed throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Therefore, relative to its comparatively high level of socio-economic development, Ukraine has had a disproportionately weakly developed historiography.[4]

This condition has magnified the role of Ukrainian historians in the West, particularly in North America.[5] Indeed, an abnormal situation developed in the post-World War II period, wherein the several dozen specialists in the West were generally considered to be a more authoritative source of historical information about Ukraine than the thousands of historians in the homeland. This is a marked contrast to the state of affairs that exists in Polish or Russian historiography. And it was a telling reflection not so much of the talents of the Ukrainian historians in North America, but of the debased state of the profession in Soviet Ukraine.

Historians of Russia in the West are generally not of Russian origin. Almost all historians of Ukraine in the West, however, are of Ukrainian origin. To a greater or lesser degree they have sympathized with the principles of Ukrainian self-determination, and almost all of their scholarship has focused on topics related to Ukrainian nationhood. In terms of career opportunities, Ukrainian historians in North America have been, by and large, fortunate. Most entered the field at a time when

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[3] It is estimated that in the 1931–8 period, about ninety-five historians of Ukraine were repressed. See Polonska-Vasylenko, "Istorychna nauka." For the setbacks that Ukrainian historiography suffered in the early 1970s, see Myhul, "Politics and History in Soviet Ukraine."

[4] For an example of the increasingly self-critical evaluations of their field by establishment historians and their attempts to adjust to the new political situation, see "Respublikanska prohrama rozvytku istorychnykh doslidzhen, polipshennia vyvchennia i propahandy istorii Ukrainskoi RSR," *UIZh*, 1990, no. 11, 3–9; and Iu. Iu. Kondufor, "Sohodennia Instytutu istorii Ukrainy AN URSR," *UIZh*, 1991, no. 7, 57–60. For critiques by non-establishment historians during the glasnost period of Soviet Ukrainian historiography, see Shevchuk, "Bez korenia krona mertva"; and Serhii Bilokin, "Pro stanovyshche istorychnoi nauky v Ukraini," *UI* 27 (1990): 138–144.

[5] For a study of the post-World War II "displaced persons" emigration to which the older Ukrainian historians in the West belong, see Volodymyr Maruniak, *Ukrainska emihratsiia v Nimechchyni i Avstrii po druhii svitovii viini*, vol. 1, *Roky 1945* (Munich, 1985); and Lubomyr R. Wynar, "Ukrainian Scholarship in Postwar Germany, 1945–52," in *The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II*, ed. Wsevolod W. Isajiw et al (Edmonton, 1982), 311–37.

American and Canadian universities were expanding, and therefore they had greater access to university positions than would have been the case in another time or in Western Europe.

But specialists in Ukrainian history also experienced considerable difficulties in North America.[6] Throughout much of the postwar period, they encountered considerable scepticism among their colleagues in Russian and Soviet studies. Most American historians who were trained in the 1950s and 1960s by the influential Russian émigré historians Michael Florinsky, George Florovsky, Michael Karpovich, Anatole Mazour, Sergei Pushkarev, and George Vernadsky shared their teachers' "one and indivisible" view of East Slavic history. Meanwhile the left-leaning revisionists who appeared in the 1970s were also ideologically predisposed to downplay the history of the non-Russian nationalities. More often than not, both camps assumed that a historian of Ukraine was, almost by definition, a Ukrainian nationalist. Thus, well into the 1980s, Ukrainian history was considered not only a peripheral but even intellectually suspect area of specialization by many North American historians.[7]

Today this situation has changed dramatically. Ukrainian studies are finally being recognized as a bona fide field of scholarship. It should be

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[6] For comments about the dilemmas that confronted declassé Ukrainian émigré scholars, see Omelian Pritsak, *Chomu katedry ukrainoznavstva v Harvardi?* (Cambridge, Mass., and New York, 1973), esp. 3–6 and 121–35. A different perspective on the issue is Oleksander Dombrovsky, "Do pytannia ukrainskoi istorychnoi shkoly v diiaspori," *UI* 11 (1974): 74–84. See also see Vynar, "Dumky pro 'Ukrainskoho istoryka'," 13 ff.; and Alexander Sydorenko, "Ukrainians in American East European Studies," *Nationalities Papers* 4 (1976): 99–112. For comparisons, see the discussion of Russian émigré historians in Marc Raeff, *Russia Abroad* (Oxford, 1990), 156–86.

[7] A vitriolic response to the Russophile and pro-Soviet biases of some American academics and their "cynicism" toward émigré scholars can be found in Roman Smal-Stocki, *The Nationality Problem of the Soviet Union and Russian Communist Imperialism* (Milwaukee, 1952), 339–418. A recent example of an American scholar's perception of Ukrainian history as "special interest history" is Richard Hellie's review of Frank Sysyn's *Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600–1653* in the *Journal of Modern History* 62 (1990): 435–8. On the prevalence of Russocentric views in the study of East Slavic history, see also Stephan Horak, "Periodization and Terminology of the History of Eastern Slavs: Observations and Analyses," *SR* 31 (1972): 853–62; John Reshetar, Jr., "The Study of Ukrainian History in the U.S.: Perceptions and Misconceptions," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 1982, nos. 48–50 (28 November–12 December); and James Cracraft's introduction to *From Kievan Rus' to Modern Ukraine: Formation of the Ukrainian Nation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), i–ii.

stressed, however, that this is a result, first and foremost, of the recent political upheaval in the former USSR. Although the impact of Ukrainian scholarship in the West has steadily grown in the past few decades, the very recent upsurge in its relevance and recognition would have been unlikely without the unexpected emergence of a large, independent Ukrainian state.

Other changes are also under way. The once fiercely antagonistic relationship between historians in Ukraine and their counterparts in the Ukrainian diaspora has already shifted from confrontation to co-operation.[8] This should help to break down the isolation and parochialism that handicapped the work of Soviet Ukrainian scholars for generations. The opening of Ukraine's archives, which were even more inaccessible than those of Russia, is obviously of tremendous importance. But perhaps the most promising development is that now Ukraine's historians have reached a general consensus that major changes in the way history has been studied there are both needed and desirable. Clearly this is a field in flux, and hopefully a process of normalization is about to begin.[9]

The Conceptual Aspect

Compared to the great variety of views, themes and issues the have emerged in modern historiography in general in the postwar period, the central concepts in Ukrainian historiography have been limited in scope and number. Essentially two concepts—in Soviet Ukraine, that of "building socialism" (and its corollary, the "friendship of peoples)" in Soviet Ukraine and, in the diaspora, that of national self-determination—

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[8] Examples of such co-operation, especially since 1990, include the establishment of the International Association of Ukrainian Studies in 1990; the renewal in Lviv of the Shevchenko Scientific Society with the aid of the Western branches of the society; the publication in Western journals of Ukrainian studies of articles by scholars from Ukraine and vice versa; the publication in Kyiv and Lviv of histories of Ukraine by émigré authors; and the long- and short-term engagement of émigré historians to lecture in academic institutions in Ukraine and the invitation of Ukrainian historians and students of history to Western institutions. For the ties Kyiv's Institute of Ukraine's History has established with diaspora scholarly institutions, see Kondufor, "Sohodennia Instytutu istorii," 60.

[9] Recent discussions of the failings and needs of historiography in Ukraine are S. V. Kulchytsky, "Istoriia i chas: Rozdumy istoryka," *UIZh*, 1992, no. 4, 3–10; Serhii Bilokin, "Chy my maiemo istorychnu nauku?" *Nashe mynule* (Kyiv), no. 1 (1993), 4–16; and Iaroslav Hrytsak, "Inavguratsiina dopovid na vidkryttiu Instytutu istorychnykh doslidzhen Lvivskoho derzhavnoho universytetu," *Visnyk Instytutu istorychnykh doslidzhen*, no. 1 (1993), 3–7.

have served as the paradigms for almost all Ukrainian historical writing. With the recent decline of the former, the latter now appears to dominate the field. This means that Ukrainians have, at this point in time, a single-theme historiography.

It can be assumed that the collapse of the "building socialism" approach is an indication of Soviet historians' well-honed ability to adjust to political realities rather than to a critical rethinking of their conceptual positions. Given their habitual reticence about dealing with unconventional ideas, it is unlikely that historians trained in the Soviet system will generate major conceptual innovations in the near future. For many of them conceptual re-orientation consists primarily of acquainting themselves with the century-old views of Mykhailo Hrushevsky. The comparatively modern statist and elitist views of V'iacheslav Lypynsky are only now being introduced in Ukraine. Because most of Ukraine's historians have a limited knowledge of foreign languages other than Russian, and because they do not have access to foreign journals, they are unable to familiarize themselves with current trends in the West.

But political realities in newly independent Ukraine, and specifically the discussion revolving around its proposed constitution, have introduced a conceptual issue that is of direct relevance to historians. Put simply, it poses the question: whom does the constitution refers and the new state represent—the Ukrainian people or the people of Ukraine? For historians this means that they must decide whether they should will apply the ethnic approach to writing Ukrainian history and focus their attention on the fate of ethnic Ukrainians, or whether they should use a territorial approach and write the history of the various peoples who inhabit, or inhabited, the territory now called Ukraine. Although this issue may be new to Soviet-trained historians, it was already raised—and left unresolved—generations earlier by Hrushevsky, who utilized the ethnic approach, and especially by Lypynsky, who espoused the territorial approach.[10]

In the West, it is too early to tell whether recent changes will encourage innovative approaches to the study of Ukraine's history. Past performance in this area, however, has also not been encouraging. Conception-oriented discussions by Ukrainian specialists have been rare and short-lived. In the 1960s the discussion by Ivan L. Rudnytsky, Omeljan Pritsak, and John Reshetar, Jr. about Ukraine's position between East and West produced some interesting generalizations.[11] Several years

[10] For a recent statement of the problem see Hrytsak, "Inavguratsiina dopovid," 6.

[11] See Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "The Role of the Ukraine in Modern History," *SR* 22

later, Oleksander Ohloblyn proposed a well-grounded schema for the study of nineteenth- and twentieth-century history of Ukraine.[12] In an article ambitiously titled "What is Ukrainian History?" Pritsak criticized the Hrushevsky school's obsession with the "*narod*."[13] But the alternative approach he suggested was basically a reformulation of the statist views Lypynsky developed in the early twentieth century. The place of Ukrainians within the historical/ahistorical nations paradigm was discussed by George Grabowicz, Rudnytsky, and, recently, Andreas Kappeler.[14] I have questioned the applicability of the modern concept of statehood to the Cossack period.[15] And Roman Szporluk has applied social-science concepts to studies of Ukrainian national consciousness.[16] But none of these discussions produced major conceptual innovations for the study of Ukraine's past. Neither did the promisingly titled collection of articles *Rethinking Ukrainian History*.[17] Thus, Ukrainian historiography in the diaspora cannot boast of new interpretations that are comparable in importance to, for example, the interwar Eurasian school of Russian émigré historians.

One might propose a variety of explanations for this theoretical and

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(1963): 199–216; and Omeljan Pritsak and John Reshetar, Jr., "The Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building," *SR* 22 (1963): 224–55.

[12] Oleksander Ohloblyn, "Problema skhemy istorii Ukrainy 19–20 stolittia (do 1917 roku)," *UI* 8 (1971): 5–16.

[13] Omelian Pritsak, "Shcho take istoriia Ukrainy?" *Svoboda*, 1980, nos. 165–70 (29 July–5 August). For a critical commentary, see Oleksander Dombrovsky, "Shcho take istoriia Ukrainy," *UI* 19 (1982): 76–93.

[14] George Grabowicz, "Toward a History of Ukrainian Literature," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* (henceforth *HUS*) 1 (1977): 407–523; Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "Observations on the Problem of 'Historical' and 'Non-Historical' Nations," *HUS* 5 (1981): 358–68; and Andreas Kappeler, "Ein 'kleines Volk' von 25 Millionen: Die Ukrainer um 1900," in *Kleiner Völker in der Geschichte Osteuropas: Festschrift für Günther Stökl zum 75. Geburtstag*, ed. Manfred Alexander, Frank Kämpfer, and Andreas Kappeler (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1991), Neue Folge, Beiheft 5 of *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* (henceforth *JGO*), 33–42. [A translation appears in this issue of the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*—ed.]

[15] Orest Subtelny, "Mazepa, Peter I and the Question of Treason," *HUS* 2 (1978): 158–83; and idem, *Domination of Eastern Europe: Native Nobilities and Foreign Absolutism, 1500–1715* (Kingston and Montreal, 1986), 48–52, 156–66.

[16] Roman Szporluk, "West Ukraine and West Belorussia: Historical Tradition, Social Communication and Linguistic Assimilation," *Soviet Studies* 31 (1979): 752–68.

[17] Ivan L. Rudnytsky, ed., with the assistance of John-Paul Himka, *Rethinking Ukrainian History* (Edmonton, 1981).

conceptual weakness. The Soviet system obviously suffocated all unsanctioned efforts in this area. It might be argued that in the West there were too few scholars to generate innovative approaches. There is, however, a counter-argument. Its proponents maintain that Lypynsky brought about a major conceptual re-orientation in Ukrainian historiography at a time when the number of professional Ukrainian historians was smaller than it is in the West today.[18] Supporting this counter-argument is also the fact that it took only a small cohort of Russian émigré historians to produce the above-mentioned Eurasian school.[19] That Ukrainian émigré historians have not been innovative can probably be explained by the fact most of them felt compelled to conduct a "two-front war"—that is, to contest Soviet historical interpretations, on the one hand, and to react to Russocentric Western historiography, on the other—which left little time or energy for conceptual innovation. Moreover, the field has been plagued by huge gaps in basic research, which have impeded the ability to engage in generalizing interpretations.

Nonetheless, it seems that scholarly objectivity was the primary goal to which the better Ukrainian historians in the West aspired. To a certain extent, this was a response to the widespread view among their North American colleagues that they were a priori biased. There were, to be sure, examples of extremely nationalistic interpretations of Ukrainian history, especially among the older generation of historians.[20] But in recent decades, Ukrainian historians, particularly those trained in North America, have had notable success in producing balanced and highly competent studies. There is, however, a touch of irony in their achievement. Many of their American colleagues who once insisted on objectivity in historical studies have now concluded that attaining complete objectivity is impossible or, as one of them put it, only a "noble dream."[21]

It is likely that Ukrainian historiography, both in the West and in Ukraine, will continue to be conceptually underdeveloped. For Ukraine's historians, the disengagement from old Soviet views and exposure to the new and often contradictory Western approaches and concepts might, at least in short run, confuse more than enlighten. In the West there looms

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[18] See Ivan Kryvetsky, "Ukrainska istoriografiia na perelomi," *ZNTSh* 134–5 (1924): 161–84.

[19] Raeff, *Russia Abroad*, 156–86.

[20] A recent example is Nicholas L. Fr.-Chirovsky, *An Introduction to Ukrainian History*, 3 vols. (New York, 1981, 1985, 1986).

[21] See Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge, 1988).

a potential problem of a different order. For decades, the general thrust of diaspora historians has focused on building a historical case for Ukrainian self-determination. With the attainment of this goal, these historians might have a problem in finding something new to say.

The Methodological Aspect

It is generally recognized that historians in Ukraine, as in other republics of the former USSR, are in urgent need of methodological retooling. But does this mean that the Marxist approach, which is deeply ingrained in Weltanschauung of many historians there, needs to be totally abandoned? As the work of Edward Hobsbawn and his school in Britain or, closer to home, that of Roman Rozdolsky, demonstrates, it is possible to be a good historian *and* a Marxist. Rather than precipitately abandoning the Marxist methodology, which they know well, for unfamiliar Western approaches, it may be more fruitful for Ukraine's historians to concentrate instead on applying the Marxist approach more creatively. For example, those historians who dealt with classes, class struggle, and class consciousness throughout their careers could now apply their expertise to the study of labour history, urban and rural studies, or the history of women and the family. In other words, they might move into the currently popular new social history. Meanwhile, younger historians will most probably begin to familiarize themselves with the great variety of methodologies that are utilized in the West. Thus, rather than mechanically replacing one "correct" methodology with another, historians in Ukraine will, I hope, begin to apply a pluralistic approach to the study of the Ukrainian past.

The lack of conceptual innovation among historians of Ukraine in the West has been accompanied by their unwillingness to engage in methodological experimentation. Almost without exception they have utilized traditionalist, positivist approaches. Some have been adamant in stressing their adherence to the "documentary school."[22] On the one occasion when they did meet to "rethink" Ukrainian history, their discussion focused on periodization and terminology rather than on questions of interpretation and methodology. The widespread and often over-rated use of quantification in the 1970s and early 1980s had practically no influence on the field. The comparative approach—which could have been effective in placing "peripheral" Ukrainian topics into

[22] See Omelian Pritsak, "Harvardskyi tsentr ukrainoznavchykh studii i shkola Hrushevskoho," in his *Chomu katedry*, 91–107. See also Dombrovsky, "Do pytannia ukrainskoi istorychnoi shkoly v diiaspori."

a broader context—was almost totally ignored. And Ukrainian historians, particularly those belonging to the older generation, have been slow to utilize the interdisciplinary approach, with its reliance on the methods and concepts of sociology and anthropology. Although during the past decade there have been indications that younger scholars in the field are becoming methodologically more adventurous, the study of Ukraine's past is still dominated by the traditionalist "history from above," while the new "history from below" approach is practically ignored.[23]

Again, the lack of methodological innovation can be explained by the relative underdevelopment of Ukrainian historiography. For historians in the West, archival research in Ukraine and other Soviet republics, which might have encouraged new approaches, was, until recently, practically impossible. Even such basic research tools as bibliographies, specialized encyclopedias, biographical dictionaries, cartographic materials, and documentary publications are unavailable.[24] Simply put, it is difficult to write methodologically modern history with pre-modern tools.

Major Themes

Until the collapse of the USSR, topics associated with the "building of socialism" predominated in Soviet Ukrainian historiography. Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost* allowed several new categories of topics to emerge in the late 1980s. Indeed, it was the appearance of previously banned topics that constituted the most striking change in Soviet historical writing during its final years. In Ukraine, as elsewhere in the former USSR, the new topics could be divided into two categories. Appearing earlier and with great dramatic effect were topics of the

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[23] Examples of the application of social-science methods and concepts are Szporluk "West Ukraine and West Belorussia"; idem, "Kiev as the Ukraine's Primate City," *HUS* 3/4 (1979–80), pt. 2, 843–9; John-Paul Himka, *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century* (Edmonton, 1988); Christine Worobec, "Temptress or Virgin? The Precarious Sexual Position of Women in Post-Emancipation Ukrainian Peasant Society," *SR* 42 (1990): 227–38; Stella Hryniuk, *Peasants with Promise: Ukrainians in Southeastern Galicia, 1880–1890* (Edmonton, 1991); and George Liber, *Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923–1934* (Cambridge and New York, 1992). The comparative approach has been applied in Subtelny, *Domination of Eastern Europe*.

[24] Efforts are now being made to remedy the problem. Iaroslav Isaievych, director of the ANU Institute of Ukrainian Studies in Lviv, is spearheading the effort to create a Ukrainian historical bibliography. Meanwhile, members of the academy have discussed initiating a Ukrainian series modelled on Monumenta Germaniae Historica.

system (empire)-delegitimizing type. This category included sensationalist articles that examined the "white spots" of Soviet history. In Ukraine, this meant, first and foremost, the publication of materials dealing with the Famine of 1932–3. It also included revelations about the mass executions conducted by the NKVD in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Generally, it was not historians, but journalists and writers who first broached these topics in Ukraine. In response to the competition from non-historians and to public pressure, some of the more flexible members of Ukraine's historical establishment also turned to these subjects, but only after much hesitation and with great circumspection. By the early 1990s they had produced a number of solid treatments of the less savoury aspects of Soviet rule in Ukraine.[25]

The other new category of topics that appeared during the *glasnost* period was of the nation-building type. Less sensationalist and daring but requiring greater historical expertise, these topics were treated from the outset by historians, especially those who were not part of the scholarly establishment. Included in this category were the efforts to rehabilitate major figures in Ukrainian history and historiography such as Hetman Ivan Mazepa and Hrushevsky.[26]

Soon entire periods and subject areas, most notably the history of Cossack times, were "rehabilitated." Despite initial hesitation, even establishment historians joined in this effort. Not only did Cossack topics have great popular appeal, but they were viewed as a primary means of stressing the distinctiveness of the Ukrainian historical process. For establishment historians, Cossack topics were convenient because their treatment allowed them to be modishly patriotic while not necessarily challenging or rejecting the Soviet system and values. Not surprisingly, the outburst of interest in Cossack Ukraine was accompanied by a great deal of idealization and mythologizing: the Zaporizhian Sich was viewed as a cradle of democracy; Hetman Pylyp Orlyk's "constitution" was touted as a forerunner of the American Bill of Rights, and Mazepa was transformed from an epitome of treason to an incarnation of patriotism. After several years of euphoric celebrations of "Cossack glory," however, more balanced and sophisticated studies of the early-modern period that

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[25] See, for example, Iu. I. Shapoval, *Ukraina 20–50-kh rokiv: Storinky nenapysanoi istorii* (Kyiv 1993); S. V. Kulchytsky, et. al, eds. *Kolektyvizatsiia i holod na Ukraini, 1929–1933: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kyiv, 1992); and I. Bilas, *Represyvno-karalna systema v Ukraini, 1917–1953*, 2 vols. (Kyiv, forthcoming [1994]).

[26] See Bohdan W. Klid, "The Struggle over Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Recent Soviet Polemics," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 33 (1991): 32–45.

go beyond Cossack themes have appeared.[27]

Nation-building topics have also had a regional dimension to them. In western Ukraine, the popular press and non-establishment historians revived memories of the Sich Riflemen, the Ukrainian Galician Army, and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic. Even the anti-Soviet struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) has become a valid subject of research. Meanwhile, historians from central and eastern Ukraine have tended to address topics dealing with the Cossack period. Although they cannot be included in the nation-building category, studies of Nestor Makhno and his anarchism have aroused considerable interest in southern Ukraine.

The recent upsurge of interest in Ukrainian history has largely bypassed topics dealing with Kyivan Rus'. The perennial debate over the extent to which Rus' was Russian or Ukrainian has not, as yet, been revived. One reason might be that medieval history requires specialized training, which relatively few Ukrainian historians possess. In this regard Russian historians definitely have the advantage. But it is likely that sooner or later, as Ukrainians and Russians begin to "sort out" their national histories, this issue will flare up again.

Another major change is the growing exposure of the homeland to the historiography of the diaspora. Surveys of Ukrainian history by Dmytro Doroshenko, Nataliia Polonska-Vasylenko have been published in significant numbers in Ukraine, while my *Ukraine: A History* has been translated into Ukrainian and become a standard text in postsecondary institutions. Meanwhile, in Kyiv, the recently created Archeographic Commission of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (ANU) has plans to publish a series of translations of non-Soviet monographs on Ukrainian history that first appeared in the West. Even *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal* has recently added a regular section on "foreign historiography." Many of the non-Soviet works that are being republished in Ukraine are clearly dated by Western standards, however, and will do little to modernize historical studies there.

Taken as a whole, the most significant and least surprising development has been the new, greatly expanded emphasis that Ukraine's historical establishment has placed on topics related to Ukrainian national history. This is a predictable reaction to, on the one hand, the neglect and distortions of national history imposed during the Soviet period and, on the other, the emergence of an independent Ukrainian state. Iurii

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[27] A notable example is N. M. Iakovenko, *Ukrainska shliakhta z kintsia XIV do seredyny XVII st. (Volyn i Tsentralna Ukraina)* (Kyiv, 1993).

Kondufor, until recently the director of the ANU Institute of Ukraine's History in Kyiv, has described this shift in quantitative terms: topics in Ukrainian national history grew from 57 percent of all research being conducted by the institute's staff in 1986 to 90 percent in 1991.[28] It remains to be seen whether these quantitative changes will lead to qualitative improvements.

In the West there have not been, as yet, major shifts in topic selection. Like their colleagues in Ukraine, Western scholars have concentrated on the Soviet period, and they have dealt almost exclusively with political history, especially as it relates to the national question. Although these studies are essentially historical in nature, they have been produced more often by political scientists than historians. Next in popularity, if one may use the term, have been studies of the Cossack period, again with a focus on political issues. In sharp contrast to the recent popularity of this subject area in Ukraine, however, historians in the West, judging from the dissertations and publications that have appeared recently, seem to be losing interest in the period. Topics related to the growth of national consciousness in the nineteenth century are third on the list of favoured topics. Studies of the medieval period are a very distant fourth.[29]

At present two major factors are beginning to influence the selection of topics by Western specialists. One is the opening of former Soviet archives. Most probably this will greatly reinforce the tendency to study the Soviet period because of the many tantalizing, previously taboo issues

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[28] See Kondufor, "Sohodennia Instytutu istorii," 58; Hurzhii et al, *Rozvytok istorychnoi nauky v Ukraini*, 37–61; and *Pokazhchyk prats, opublikovanykh naukovymy spivrobitnykamy Instytutu istorii AN URSR (1956–1967)* (Kyiv, 1969). A list of approved doctoral and candidate-of-sciences dissertation topics are also available in the concluding sections of many issues of *UIZh*.

[29] For bibliographies of dissertations on Ukrainian history written in North America and Western Europe, see Oleksa Horbach, "Ukrainistychni pratsi po universytetakh Zakhidnoi Nimechchyny ta Avstrii v 1945–1957 rr.," *Ukrainskyi samostiinyk*, 1960, no. 11, 20–2, and no. 12, 17–20; Joseph Danko, "West European and American Doctoral Dissertations, 1945–1960," *Annals* 9 (1961): 313–33; Liubomyr Vynar, "Ukrainski dysertatsii v amerykanskykh unversytetakh," *UI* 5 (1968): 142–5; and Nicholas Bohatiuk, "Doctoral Dissertations on Topics Related to Ukraine Accepted by American, Canadian and British Universities, 1934–1986," *UQ* 42 (1986): 289–317. Most accurate are Bohdan Wynar, "Doctoral Dissertations on Ukrainian Topics in English Prepared during the Years 1928–1978," *UI* 16 (1979): 108–127; and idem, "Doctoral Dissertations on Ukrainian Topics in English Prepared during the Years 1928–1986, *UI* 25 (1988): 168–87, and 26 (1989): 124–35. According to Wynar, in the years 1928–86 about 235 dissertations, 75 of them in history, were written on Ukrainian topics in English.

that are now open to examination. The other is the impact of the various historiographical trends current in the West, which appear to be influencing younger historians to focus on social history and to draw on the concepts and methods of the social sciences.

A potential dilemma in terms of topic selection is linked to the question of whether Ukrainian historians should concentrate on filling the innumerable "white spots" in Ukrainian history, that is, on doing basic, traditional research that was carried out in other national historiographies generations ago; or whether they should turn to topics suggested by modern historiographical trends. If they choose the first option, they will remain conceptual and methodological traditionalists; if they opt for the latter alternative, they might find that they lack the research tools and data that the new approaches require. It would be desirable, of course, to be able move in both directions simultaneously. But resources are limited, and difficult choices undoubtedly lie ahead.

The Institutional Bases

The institutional and organizational changes that are now occurring in the historical profession in Ukraine are part and parcel of the general processes taking place everywhere in the former USSR. They can be described in a single word: fragmentation. Most dramatic and significant, of course, has been the collapse in 1991 of the centralized control that the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences in Moscow and the Communist party exerted over the profession.[30] But organizational fragmentation began in Ukraine even earlier. In 1990, a major split developed in the 170-member ANU Institute of History (now Institute of Ukraine's History) in Kyiv when the Archeographic Commission was formed from within its ranks with a mandate to focus on documentary publications related to Ukrainian national history. Within a year the commission had attracted so many members of the institute, especially those who were critical of the profession's establishment, that it became possible to transform it into a separate and rival institute. Meanwhile, the original Institute, after divesting itself of its once extensive Party links, is

[30] For a survey of the historical organizations and institutions in Soviet Ukraine, see N. V. Komarenko, *Ustanovy istorychnoi nauky v Ukrainskii RSR, 1917–1937* (Kyiv, 1973); and idem, "Naukovo-doslidni ta navchalni istorychni ustanovy URSR," in *Rozvytok istorychnoi nauky na Ukraini*, 64–73. The fact that the establishment historians continue to believe in the need for "co-ordination" is evident in Kondufor, "Sohodennia Instytutu istorii," 59; and in "Respublikanska prohrama rozvytku istorychnykh doslidzhen, polipshennia vyvchennia i propahandy istorii Ukrainskoi RSR," *UIZh*, 1990, no. 11, 3–9, and no. 12, 3–11.

now considering its own reorganization into several separate institutions.

Another reflection of centrifugal tendencies is the relative decline of Kyiv as the "co-ordinating centre" for historical study in Ukraine. Lviv, with its strong traditions in the field, is clearly coming into its own again. Historians there now have three autonomous institutional bases in which they can work—the ANU Institute of Social Studies, Lviv University, and the recently revived Shevchenko Scholarly Society. Somewhat unexpectedly, the Dnipropetrovsk University has developed into a strong centre for the study of the Cossack period. Other centres will undoubtedly develop in the near future, and it is highly unlikely that any of them will be willing to look to Kyiv for guidelines as much as they did in the past.

For a time it appeared that the Soviet-style organization of scholarship, based on Academy of Science-affiliated institutes that tended to be overstaffed and underproductive, might be altered because of economic pressures; and that historians at universities, who previously were expected to engage primarily in teaching, will probably demand research opportunities similar to those available to their colleagues in universities throughout the world. The creation, under leadership of Iaroslav Hrytsak, of an Institute of Historical Research at Lviv University in 1993 seems to indicate that the process of replacing the centralized, hierarchical structures associated with the ANU and its institutes with decentralized, university-related centres has already begun. The general sluggishness of reforms in post-Soviet Ukraine has helped to preserve the ANU institutes, however, and they continue to function as the primary centres of scholarly research.

In North America, Ukrainian historians have displayed a remarkable penchant for organization. Indeed, it is one of the outstanding features of their activity.[31] This is reflected in the fact that despite their small numbers, they have created a disproportionately large number of associations and centres. In the 1950s, members of the older, European-educated generation helped found the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S. (UVAN), which harked back to the traditions of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kyiv of the 1920s and attracted the leading historians of the diaspora. Other institutions created by the older, postwar émigré scholars are the Shevchenko Scientific Society (NTSh) in North America, Western Europe, and Australia, which traces its origins

[31] Examples of the oft expressed view that Ukrainian historical scholarship in the West should be planned and co-ordinated may be found in Pritsak, *Chomu katedry*, 14 ff.; and in Vynar, "Dumky pro 'Ukrainskoho istoryka'."

back to Lviv; the Ukrainian Historical Association (UIT); and the Lypynsky East European Research Institute in Philadelphia. Because many of their members have died, the activity of UVAN and NTSh has steadily declined in recent years. But the libraries and archives of the two New York-based institutions continue to attract researchers. Problems associated with declining membership are also evident in UIT, an association of professional and amateur historians, and the Lypynsky Institute, which has concentrated on publishing and popularizing the Lypynsky's works. All of these institutions have had a largely overlapping membership. Other noteworthy centres with constituencies and problems similar to those in North America are the Free Ukrainian University in Munich and the Ukrainian Catholic University in Rome. The latter institution has published an important series of documents pertaining to Ukrainian ecclesiastical history.

Many of the younger, American- and Canadian-trained historians have been associated with the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute (HURI) and the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS) at the University of Alberta. As envisaged by their organizers, the mission of the university-based centres of Ukrainian studies in North America was, first and foremost, to draw Ukrainian scholarship "out of the ghetto."[32] Other objectives were to legitimize Ukrainian scholarship by associating it with prestigious institutions, to train new specialists, and to provide them with academic positions. Undoubtedly, these centres, especially HURI, have had notable success in drawing Ukrainian studies closer to the mainstream of Slavic Studies. But as far as training of new historians is concerned, despite an initial flurry of PhDs in the 1970s, their achievements have been less impressive. Of the approximately fifty dissertations dealing with Ukrainian history that have been written since 1971, only four were completed at Harvard, and even fewer at the University of Alberta. Nonetheless, both HURI and CIUS have facilitated research, and recently they have been active in introducing visitors from Ukraine to North American scholarship.

Another noteworthy university-based program is the one associated with the University of Illinois at Urbana. Its main function has been the organization of annual conferences on Ukrainian studies, which have attracted numerous historians from North America, Western Europe and, recently, Ukraine.

There are almost as many periodicals in North America dealing with Ukrainian history as there are organizations. The Ukrainian-language

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[32] Pritsak, *Chomu katedry*.

Ukrainskyi istoryk, published by UIT, is the only journal that specializes in Ukrainian history.[33] But articles dealing with historical topics also appear in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, published by HURI, and in CIUS's *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*.[34] The former has concentrated on medieval and early-modern history, while the latter has dealt primarily with the modern period. In the 1950s and 1960s important historical materials appeared in the *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Science in the U.S.*, but this serial publication, like *Zapysky NTSh*, is now practically moribund. The fact that there is only one purely historical journal in all of Ukraine, *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, which, until very recently was copublished by the ANU Institute of History and the Institute of Party History of the Central Committee of the CPU, is an indication of both the pyramidal organization of Ukraine's historians and the low priority that Ukrainian history was accorded in the final decades of Soviet rule.[35]

All of the above-mentioned diaspora institutions have been active in publishing historical monographs and related materials, largely because most Western mainstream publishers and journals have, until recently, shown little or no interest in Ukrainian topics. A notable exception is the University of Toronto Press, which has produced a very impressive list of publications in Ukrainian studies. Finally, it should be noted that the relatively rich corpus of publications on Ukrainian history that have appeared in the West is the result not only of the efforts of historians, but also of the generous financial and moral support of the Ukrainian communities in the United States and Canada.

Cadres

In 1970 there were 3,347 professional historians in Ukraine; 138 had doctorates, and 1,199, candidate-of-sciences degrees.[36] By 1990 their

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[33] See Liubomyr Vynar, "Z perspektyvy desiatokh rokiv: 'Ukrainskyi istoryk', 1963–1973," *UI* 10 (1973): 5–29; and idem, "Na sluzhbi istorychnoi nauky: 25-littia 'Ukrainskoho istoryka', 1963–1988," *UI* 25 (1988): 5–42, and 26 (1989): 29–42. For a list of reviews of the journal, see *UI* 25 (1988): 32–3, n. 68–74.

[34] See Omeljan Pritsak and Ihor Ševčenko, "A Note from the Editors: The First Ten Years of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*," *HUS* 11 (1987): 5–7.

[35] For reviews of *UIZh*, see Orest Subtelny, "*Ukrajins'kyj Istorychnyj Žurnal*, 1969," *Recenzija: A Review of Soviet Ukrainian Scholarly Publications* 1, no. 1 (Fall 1970), 38–48; and Omeljan Pritsak, "*Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*," *HUS* 1 (1977): 568–75. For a comparison of *UIZh* and *UI*, see Stephan Horak, "Ukrains'kyi Istoryk," *UQ* 27 (1971): 189–91.

[36] See Hurzhii et al, *Rozvytok istorychnoi nauky*, 62; and Albrecht Martiny, "Das Verhältnis von Politik und Geschichts-Schreibung in der Historiographie der

number was probably twice as high. For well-known reasons, Ukraine's historians did not enjoy a particularly high scholarly reputation. Many used their training in this "ideological" field as a stepping-stone to careers in the Komsomol and Party apparats or the academic bureaucracy. Today, with the disappearance of these ideologically and politically-oriented occupations, an informal and self-initiated process of selection may be commencing among Ukraine's historians. Enlivened by new opportunities for research, those with a genuine scholarly interests will probably remain in the field. Those who have had ulterior motives for studying history will begin, in all likelihood, to leave it.

Enlivened by new opportunities for research, those with genuine scholarly interests will try to remain in the field (if they survive the drastically reduced standard of living that most members of the intelligentsia have experienced in the post-Soviet period). Certainly those who chose history for careerist reasons will be quick to abandon it. As a result, the number of historians might be fewer, but their commitment to genuine scholarship will be greater.

Popular interest in Ukrainian history, after reaching unprecedentedly high levels in 1989–91, seems to have peaked. Nonetheless, it can still be counted on as a way of attracting more highly motivated individuals into the field. There will also probably be a regional dimension to the recruitment of new historians: in view of their more developed national (and historical) consciousness, western Ukrainians may produce a disproportionately large number of them. And generational conflicts between those with Soviet and post-Soviet training will likely be unavoidable. But despite the difficulties of the current transition period, it is now clear that Ukraine's historians will soon assume their rightful place as leaders in the field.

Since World War II, about seventy-five historians of Ukraine (and of Ukrainian origin) have been active in North America.[37] About fifteen of them, who were relatively elderly and some quite prominent (e.g., Oleksander Ohloblyn, Roman Rozdolsky, and Mykola Chubaty), were

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sowjetischen Nationalitäten seit den sechziger Jahren," *JGO* 17 (1979): 238–72. According to Martiny, the percentage of historians in the total number of scholars and scientists in Ukraine gradually diminished: in 1960 it was 4.68 percent; in 1965, 3.1 percent; and in 1970, 2.1 percent. But the percentage of those with doctoral degrees increased during the same period, from 1.12 percent to 4.42 percent of all scholars and scientists.

[37] This figure is based on the lists in *American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies: Directory of Members, 1985–1987* (Stanford, 1987); *UI* 15 (1978): 26; and personal information.

unable to obtain university positions; almost all of them are deceased. Another twenty-five members of this cohort began their educations in Europe and completed them in North America; most of them obtained university positions, but most of them are now retired or about to retire. About thirty-five others received degrees in North American universities, generally during the 1970s and 1980s. This group has moved to the forefront of the field in the West. If one excludes the Kyivan period, fewer than ten historians of non-Ukrainian origin have worked in the field. By comparison, there are over 2,000 professional historians of Russia and the USSR in the United States alone.

The imminent passing of the "bridging generation"—those who began their educations in Ukraine and completed them in North America—will deprive the field of a highly motivated, energetic, and organizationally enterprising cohort. It was, in qualitative terms, a very polarized group, almost evenly divided between the above-average and the mediocre members. The succeeding cohort, which has benefited greatly from the organizational achievements of its predecessors, is more balanced qualitatively. Like its predecessors, this group has been relatively productive. But it lacks, for better or worse, their sense of mission. Nonetheless, it can be said that, taken as a whole, the historians of the diaspora have produced much of the significant work in Ukrainian historiography during the last four decades.

Prospects for the future are mixed. Some factors point to a decline in the number of North American-born specialists in the field. This is related, on the one hand, to the process of assimilation in the Ukrainian communities from which the overwhelming majority of the scholars were drawn, and, on the other, to contractions in the general area of Soviet and East European studies. But the growth in relevance and importance of Ukrainian-oriented topics might counteract these tendencies. Moreover, it might help to attract an increasing number of non-Ukrainians and thus add much needed heterogeneity to a field that has long been the preserve of a tightly-knit group of historians who are members of the Ukrainian diaspora in North America.

Recently there have been indications that interest in Ukrainian history is growing in Western Europe. Up to the 1980s no PhDs were granted in the field in England. But during the last decade, half a dozen have been awarded at the universities of Oxford and London, mostly to Ukrainian Canadians. Another encouraging development was the creation of a position in Ukrainian studies at the University of London in 1991. As the work of several younger historians and the 1991 conference in Walberberg have demonstrated, German scholarly interest in Ukraine, which traditionally has been the strongest in Western Europe, is reviving again

after a period of dormancy. A concrete reflection of this fact are the two recent histories of Ukraine by German scholars and the establishment of a chair of Ukrainian history at the University of Munich.[38]

The Role of the Historian

The traditional function of the Soviet historian was to affirm doctrine and justify policy. With the collapse of the USSR, this role, in all probability, will be altered fundamentally. But Ukraine's disoriented historians have not yet embarked on a serious discussion of what their new function in society ought to be. It is clear, nonetheless, that the scholarly tasks confronting them will be greater than before. They will be expected to establish, first of all, a creditable historical memory that can serve, as it does in other nations, as a basis for collective identity and action. For the Ukrainians, who have only recently gained self-rule and whose national and historical consciousness has long been incomplete, suppressed, and misshapen, this is an undertaking of vital importance. As Karl Deutsch has noted,

> Autonomy in the long run depends on memory. Where all memory is lost, where all past information and preferences have ceased to be effective, we are no longer dealing with a self-determining individual or social group but with a self-steering automation.... There is no will, no conation, without some operating memory.[39]

The task is as difficult as it is crucial. Like almost every other enterprise in the former Soviet Union, it involves building something with people who themselves need to be "rebuilt." Ukraine's historians will have to learn to act on their own: there will be—I hope—no more guidelines about what to write, no "laws" to prove, and no enemies to denounce. Instead, there is an endless series of questions to answer and a bewildering variety of ways to deal with them. Moreover, as was noted at the outset, society is pressing the historians for a new vision of the past. It is an open question whether this heightened public interest is a help or a hindrance to the historian. The dangers are clear: never noted for their willingness to withstand pressure, Ukraine's historians might write in line with public expectations. They might choose the easy way, painting everything white that was formerly black. And in response to widespread demands to know "who is to blame," some historians might

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[38] Frank Golczewski, ed., *Geschichte der Ukraine* (Göttingen, 1993); and Andreas Kappeler, *Kleine Geschichte der Ukraine* (Munich: forthcoming [1994]).

[39] Karl Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York and London, 1966), 128–9, as cited in Szporluk's "National History as a Political Battleground," 137.

slip into their accustomed role of "identifying and unmasking" the guilty.

As Ukraine's historians begin to peel way the layers of distortion that accumulated during the Soviet period and to fill in the gaps in their underdeveloped historiography, they should be expected to work according to the standards of modern scholarship. If they perform poorly, they will only add to the already confused sense of identity and the persistent feeling of inferiority that the Soviet system imposed on their compatriots. If they perform well in reconstructing a meaningful past, their efforts will have a significant impact on their society's ability to chart a course toward a promising future.

The "socio-ideological" role of Ukrainian historians in the West will also have change radically. Previously, they sought primarily to establish a historical argument for Ukrainian self-determination. This involved presenting a non-Soviet view of Ukraine's history and counteracting the Russocentric approach to East Slavic history that was prevalent in the West. Some went about it militantly, and the results were usually counter-productive. Others argued that these goals could best be achieved by adhering to the highest scholarly standards in their work.[40] Now that the views they propounded are becoming generally accepted, the motivating forces that fuelled many of the diaspora historians will probably diminish. And as conditions for historical research improve in Ukraine, it will become the centre of the most significant work. In the future it seems likely that the new function of diaspora historians, within the discipline as a whole, will be to act as intermediaries between their colleagues in Ukraine and Western scholarship. I hope they will show as much same energy and commitment in their new role as they did in their previous one. Finally, be they in the West or in Ukraine, historians will have to strive to make their enterprise an intellectually invigorating and edifying experience in and of itself.

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[40] An example of the militant approach of "defending Ukrainian historical truth" is Oleksander Dombrovsky, "Aktualni postuliaty na vidtynku ukrainskoi istorychnoi nauky," *UI* 1 (1963): 44–5; and idem, "Do pytannia ukrainskoi istoriohrafichnoi shkoly v diiaspori," *UI* 11 (1974): 74–84. Authors who stress the need to maintain scholarly standards and traditions are Oleksander Ohloblyn, in "Zavdannia ukrainskoi istoriohrafii na emihratsii," *UI* 1 (1963): 1–4, and in an updated version of this article in *UI* 15 (1978): 59–63; Pritsak, in *Chomu katedry,* esp. 63–74 and 147–59; and Ivan L. Rudnytsky, in "Problemy v navchanni ukrainskoi istorii," *UI* 12 (1975): 114–19. For a view on the study of Ukrainian history as a key means of preserving Ukrainian ethnic identity in the diaspora, see Bohdan Krawchenko, *Ukrainian Studies at Canadian Universities* (Edmonton, 1977), 13.

Journal of Ukrainian Studies 18, nos. 1-2 (Summer-Winter 1993)

The Deportation, Incarceration, and Forced Resettlement of Ukrainians in the Soviet Period

Ihor Vynnychenko

The legacy of Soviet rule presents contemporary historians and philosophers with a great deal of work, and it will continue to do so for years to come. We are faced with the task of cleansing each day of our "happy" life in the Soviet period, as well as more distant history, of the filth, lies, and distortions wrought by Soviet scholarship.

One of the most tragic "blank spots" in the history of Ukraine is the period from the beginning of the 1920s to Stalin's death—a period when millions of Ukrainians unwillingly wound up thousands of kilometres away from their homes. From the very beginning, the Soviet regime utilized repression as a method to convince people of the correctness and value of its actions. A necessary attribute of this method was the existence of concentration camps, which were initially called forced-labour camps. The creation of such camps was originally decreed by the All-Union Central Executive Committee on 15 January 1919 and again on 17 May. They were to be set up in each gubernia. From 1920 important political prisoners were deported to the concentration-camp system created on the Solovets Islands (popularly know as Solovki) in the White Sea. From 1920 through 1923 similar camps were created in the Pechora Basin north of the Urals, where inmates were engaged in logging, and in the goldfields of Siberia. Even more camp networks were created in the years 1928–34.

Initially, in 1920–3, the Ukrainians deported to such camps were primarily members of numerous anti-Soviet partisan forces, particularly the followers of the anarchist warlord Nestor Makhno.[1] In October 1923

[1] Ironically, Makhno had been awarded the Order of the Red Banner by

the chief justice of the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR and member of All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, Sergei Buzdalin, introduced a proposal on the *"necessity* of ... adopting a law by which the court would be granted the right ... to have the sentence it passed—*[death by] shooting—to be changed to exile to the Novaia Zemlia islands."*[2] Buzdalin justified such "concern" about the fate of people sentenced to the "highest measure of social defense" (a Bolshevik euphemism for capital punishment) as being in the state's interest, namely, a necessity for fulfilling the Party's colonization plans. In his letter he suggested increasing the maximum term of incarceration from ten to twenty years. His proposal was based on the fact that "individuals sentenced [to death] ... are [usually] of an age when they are most able to work—from 18 to 30 years old."[3]

In the mid-1920s many Nepmen, priests of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church (UAOC), and members of clandestine youth organizations were sent to the concentration camps. From 1922 through 1926, for example, the GPU arrested eighty-five young Mensheviks in Ukraine and sent them to the camps, and in 1925 four members of the Kharkiv Combat Group of the Leninist Communist Youth Association were incarcerated in Solovets camps.[4]

In 1928 the well-planned and well-organized persecution of the UAOC began. At the time, this church had the largest number of adherents of any church in Ukraine, 2,800 parishes, 10,657 priests, and 35 bishops.[5] Most of the clerics were arrested and tortured before being deported to the camps. The metropolitan of the UAOC, Vasyl Lypkivsky, perished in a Solovets camp. Lypkivsky's successor, Mykola Boretsky, was arrested in 1930 and sent to a prison in Iaroslavl. By 1933 he was also in a Solovets camp, and by 1934, in a psychiatric prison in Leningrad, where he died. Metropolitan Ivan Pavlovsky of the Ukrainian Orthodox church, the short-lived successor (1930–6) to the UAOC, was also arrested and deported to Kazakhstan, where he perished ca. 1938.

The fates of other UAOC hierarchs were no less tragic. Archbishop

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Kliment Voroshilov in the summer of 1919. See *Molod Ukrainy*, 10 December 1991.

[2] Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vlady Ukrainy (hereafter TsDAVOVU), f. 24 sp, op. 13, spr. 3, ark. 132; the italics are mine.

[3] Ibid.

[4] See V. I. Prylutsky, *Nebilshovytski molodizhni ob'iednannia v USRR v 20-i roky* (Kyiv, 1993), 27, 42.

[5] N. Polonska-Vasylenko and M. Chubaty, "Istoriia Tserkvy," in *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva v dvokh tomakh*, vol. 1, ed. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich, 1949), 617.

Iurii Zhevchenko died in a Karaganda camp. Archbishop Stepan Orlyk was sentenced in 1928 to ten years in Solovets camps; he died in a Zhytomyr prison. Archbishop Mykola Pyvovariv served ten years in a prison in the Siberian town of Iurga. Archbishop Feodosii Serhiiv was arrested in 1936 and perished in a Kolyma camp. Archbishop Oleksander Iareshchenko was arrested in 1926 and imprisoned in Moscow, Tashkent, and, in 1934, Kursk before perishing in a camp in the Far East. Archbishop Konstantyn Krotevych was imprisoned from 1924 in Alma-Ata, the Orenburg region, and elsewhere. Bishop Pylyp Buchylo died in the 1930s in a Siberian camp, as did Bishop Iakiv Chulaivsky. Bishop Mykola Karabinevych was arrested in 1932 and incarcerated in the Lubianka Prison in Moscow, where he was executed. Bishop Iurii Teslenko was arrested in 1931 and served ten years in camps in the Far North. Bishop Bishop Hryhorii Storozhenko was arrested in 1936 and deported from Ukraine.[6]

In the late 1920s the physical destruction of the wealthiest stratum of the Ukrainian peasantry—the "kulaks" (Ukrainian: *kurkuli*)—began. Robert Conquest has written that this "destruction ... was in part designed to decapitate the peasantry in its resistance to the imposition of the new order."[7] I would disagree only with "in part."

Because of the need to increase the Soviet export of agricultural products, much of which only the highly productive kulak farms could provide, in 1927 the Fifteenth Congress of the All-Union Bolshevik party proclaimed an "offensive against the kulak" by means of obligatory grain deliveries to the state and heavy taxes. n 1928, 33,000 kulaks were arrested and sent to the camps, and all or part of their property was confiscated and sold. From 1927 to the end of 1929 the percentage of kulak farms from 3.8 to 1.4 percent of the total number of farms.[8]

On 5 July 1929 the Politburo of Ukraine's Communist party passed a resolution "to compile a list of kulak–landed-gentry farms that [i.e., the owners and their families] actively opposed our measures in the realm of grain deliveries [to the state] for [purposes of their] banishment outside

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[6] Osyp Zinkevych and Oleksander Voronyn, comps. and eds. *Martyrolohiia ukrainskykh tserkov u chotyrokh tomakh*, vol. 1, *Ukrainska Pravoslavna Tserkva: Dokumenty, materiialy, khrystyianskyi samvydav Ukrainy* (Toronto and Baltimore, 1987), 942–9.

[7] Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror—Famine* (Edmonton and New York, 1986), 117.

[8] V. P. Danilov, "Kollektivizatsiia selskogo khoziaistva v SSSR," *Istoriia SSSR*, 1990, no. 5, 15.

the borders of Ukraine."[9] That same year the GPU in Ukraine reported that 8,139 of the kulaks arrested in Ukraine had been sent to concentration camps and 1,103 others had been deported from Ukraine.[10]

Official instructions regarding the dekulakization campaign arrived only on 30 January 1930, when the All-Union Politburo adopted and sent to all local Party organs a resolution "On Measures for Rooting Out Kulak Farms in the Raions of Total Collectivization." In accordance with this resolution, all kulaks and "half-gentry" who had opposed collectivization were subject to deportation to the northern and other distant regions of the USSR, that is, the Northern Krai, Siberia, the Urals, and Kazakhstan.[11]

TABLE 1
"KULAKS" DEPORTED FROM THE UKRAINIAN SSR
AS OF 9 MARCH 1930[12]

Okruha of origin	Families deported	Persons deported
Odessa	1,293	5,561
Mykolaiv	1,055	4,610
Kherson	1,134	5,683
Kryvyi Rih	1,163	5,747
Zinov'ivske (now Kirovohrad)	1,912	7,949
Tulchyn	126	447
Shevchenko (centre in Cherkasy)	1,430	6,197
Kharkiv	1,026	5,158
Dnipropetrovske	743	3,544
Melitopil	973	4,914
Zaporizhzhia	519	2,850
Total	11,374	52,660

To deal with the problems that arose during the dekulakization campaign in Ukraine, on 23 January 1930 a commission consisting of Stanislav Kosior (chairman), Vsevolod Balitsky (chief of the GPU in Ukraine), Vasyl Poraiko, Mykola Demchenko, and Pavel Postyshev was

[9] Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh ob'iednan Ukrainy (hereafter TsDAHOU), f. 1, op. 16, spr. 7, ark. 20.

[10] Arkhiv sluzhby bezpeky Ukrainy (hereafter ASBU), spr. 516, t. 1, ark. 113.

[11] N. A. Ivnitsky. *Klassovaia borba v derevne i likvidatsiia kulachestva kak klassa* (Moscow, 1972), 178, 180.

[12] Source: TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 20, spr. 3191, ark. 47.

created.[13] On 8 February the Ukrainian Politburo agreed "(a) to confirm the division by okruhas for banishment to the distant regions of the country [i.e, the USSR]; [and] (b) to consider it indispensable to complete ... the entire operation by 15 May."[14] On 27 February the deputy chief of the GPU in Ukraine, K. M. Karlson, reported that 10 transport trains with 17,294 dekulakized individuals (6,256 men, 5,718 women, and 5,320 children) had entered the territory of the RSFSR via the Bakhmach railway station.[15] In his next report, dated 9 March 1930, he stated that dekulakization had been completed in 11 Ukrainian okruhas (see table 1). According to my estimates, between 35,000 and 40,000 Ukrainians were deported to Soviet areas outside Ukraine.

Not only were "kulaks" deported, but also individuals caught up in the "process of cleansing [Ukraine's] border belt." Characteristically, Soviet documents do not refer only to resettlement, but also to "expulsion" (*vyluchennia*), a euphemism for death by shooting or incarceration in a concentration camp or deportation (see table 2).

There was more than one occurrence of peasants, driven to despair, resorting to opposition to this "expulsion." At that time the number of people being deported grew exponentially. Thus, in June 1931, after their uprising in the village of Mykhailivka in Podillia was suppressed, 300 men and 50 women who had rebelled against the way collectivization had been imposed upon them were deported to concentration camps.[16] Within one year—from mid-1930 to mid-1931—the number of kulak farms had been reduced by 55.7 percent.[17]

Ukrainians living in the Kuban and elsewhere in northern Caucasia, where they constituted nearly half of the population (according to the 1926 census), also did not escape the attention of the authorities. On 14 December 1932 the USSR Council of People's Commissars and the Bolshevik Central Committee (CC) passed a resolution to resettle all the inhabitants of Poltavskaia *stanitsa*, a former Kuban Cossack village, in the northern oblasts of the USSR as soon as possible for being "the most counterrevolutionary."[18] Soon after the North Caucasian Krai Committee

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[13] TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 16, spr. 7, ark. 116.

[14] Ibid., ark. 127.

[15] Ibid., op. 20, spr. 3191, ark. 17.

[16] I. E. Zelenin, "Osushchestvlenie politiki 'likvidatsii kulachestva kak klassa' (osen 1930–1932 gg.)," *Istoriia SSSR*, 1990, no. 6, 36.

[17] Tsentralnyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv narodnogo khoziaistva (Moscow), f. 7733, op. 9, spr. 95, ark. 18.

[18] "Kollektivizatsiia: Istoki, sushchnost, posledstviia," *Istoriia SSSR*, 1989, no. 3, 50.

Table 2
"Expellees" from the border belt of the Ukrainian SSR in 1930[19]

Organ responsible	Persons affected (no. of "kulaks" in parentheses)
Olevske Border Unit (BU)	56 (25)
Slavuta BU	122 (33)
Iampil BU	117 (33)
Volochyska BU	255 (103)
Kamianets-Podilskyi BU	437 (136)
Mohyliv-Podilskyi BU	279 (86)
Moldavian BU	337 (175)
Berdychiv Okruha Detachment (OD)	896 (491)
Korosten OD	335 (273)
Proskuriv (now Khmelnytskyi) OD	241 (134)
Tulchyn OD	196 (122)
Shepetivka OD	406 (242)
Vinnytsia OD	481 (241)
Zhytomyr OD	748 (351)
Total	4,906 (2,445)

decided to resettle the inhabitants of other *stanitsa*s (e.g., Medvedovskaia, Poltavskaia, Umanskaia) whose populations were predominantly Ukrainian. In a matter of several weeks nearly 50,000 peasants were deported to northern Russia.[20] Poltavskaia and Umanskaia *stanitsa*s, whose names derived from the Ukrainian towns of Poltava and Uman, were renamed Krasnoarmeiskaia (Red Army) and Leningradskaia respectively.

At the beginning of 1933 the USSR deputy people's commissar of the forest industry informed the government about the terrible state of the loggers in Siberia, a substantial proportion of whom were Ukrainians who had been deported: "Because of the undernourishment of the "special resettlers" and, in particular, their children, scurvy and typhoid, and typhus are raging, having acquired the form of an epidemic nature with [accompanying] mass mortality."[21]

[19] Source: ASBU, spr. 516, t. 1, ark. 114–15.

[20] Ibid., 51.

[21] Zelenin, "Osushchestvlenie," 39.

Evidence that the plans for dekulakization were devised by the leaders in the Kremlin, and were not based in any way on the primitive calculations and reports from local Party officials, is provided by the directive sent by the secretary of the Bolshevik CC, Postyshev, to the Ukrainian Communist leader Vlas Chubar on 29 May 1931. It stated: "In accordance with the CC resolution of 20 May of last year, 30,000 kulak families should be deported from your republic [Ukraine] to the Ural oblast."[22] The local executors of this directive were worthy of their masters. On 30 November 1930, for example, the leaders of the Dunaivtsi Raion Executive Committee in Kamianets-Podilskyi okruha reported that "the profiteers who had been dekulakized and designated for expulsion from the villages and exile *in our raion* were deported in the month of October along with their households to the Far North."[23]

On 7 August 1932 the USSR Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On the Protection of the Assets of State Enterprises, Collective Farms, and Cooperatives and the Strengthening of Social (Socialist) Property," which was commonly known as the "law on five grain spikes." It foresaw, in particular, "(2) Applying as judicial repression for the theft of collective-farm or cooperative property the highest measure of social defense—death by shooting accompanied by the confiscation of all assets, or, if changed under mitigating circumstances, the deprivation of freedom for a term of not less than ten years accompanied by the confiscation of all assets. (3) Not applying amnesty to criminals sentenced in cases dealing with the theft of collective-farm or cooperative property."[24] The resolution was adopted after the man-made Soviet famine of 1932–3 had already claimed the lives of millions of Ukrainian peasants. Not surprisingly, the "law on five grain spikes" was used to try and condemn thousands of others who, driven to insanity by the famine, had been forced to commit excesses to survive.

Many of the thousands of Ukrainians sent to concentration camps in the early 1930s were utilized as slave labourers during the construction of the White Sea-Baltic Canal, the hydroelectric power stations on the Svir and Niva rivers in Karelia, and the Kotlas-Ukhta, Baikal-Amur, and other railways.[25]

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[22] TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 16, spr. 8, ark. 86.

[23] TsDAVOVU, f. 27, op. 11, spr. 543, ark. 9. The emphasis is mine.

[24] *Kollektivizatsiia selskogo khoziaistva: Vazhneishie postanovleniia Kommunisticheskoi partii i Sovetskogo pravitelstva, 1927–1935* (Moscow, 1957), 423.

[25] A. Bilynsky and V. Holubnychy, "Kontsentratsiini tabory," in *Entsyklopediia*

At that time hundreds of cultural figures linked in any way with the Ukrainian People's Republic, or in general with the Ukrainian national movement, were also arrested by the NKVD and sent without trial to concentration camps.

From the end of the 1920s, when the territorial principle used to create Soviet military formations was abolished throughout the USSR in order to break the strong ties the military had with its own local population and to reinforce central control and the Russification of conscripts, graduates of Ukrainian officer-training schools were sent elsewhere in the USSR, particularly to Central Asia.[26]

The consequences of the 1930s terror for the Ukrainian intelligentsia are nearly impossible to grasp using mathematical concepts. Only in the last few years has it been possible to conduct and publish studies in Ukraine that provide some idea about the scale of the repressions.[27]

The approach of the Second World War was marked by the intensification of measures to stop potential renegades (e.g., introduction of a law on the internal exile of families of individuals who did not return from abroad). After the USSR annexed Western Ukraine in 1939, the Soviet courts faced a heavy work load in dealing with the many "counterrevolutionary organizations" that were "uncovered" there. In 1940 alone, the Ternopil Oblast Court passed 408 sentences: 58 sentences to death by firing squad and 350 to incarceration for various terms; the Drohobych Oblast Court passed 22 and 334 such sentences respectively; the Lviv Oblast Court, 63 and 333; and the Stanislav Oblast Court, 48 and 437.[28]

After the outbreak of the German-Soviet War, the ensuing wide-scale Soviet evacuation of citizens and industries to the Urals and Soviet Central Asia that ensued was, as a rule, chaotic and unplanned. The first to be evacuated were qualified workers in all branches of the economy. Particular attention was paid (for political reasons) to the forced evacuation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Members of the Academy of

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ukrainoznavstva: Slovnykova chastyna, vol. 3, ed. in chief Volodymyr Kubiiovych (Paris and New York, 1959), 1118.

[26] D. M. B., "Ukrainski zemli pid bolshevykamy," in *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva v dvokh tomakh*, vol. 1, ed. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich, 1949), 552.

[27] See, for example, H. V. Kasianov and V. M. Danylenko, *Stalinizm i ukrainska intelihentsiia (20–30-i roky)* (Kyiv, 1991); and H. Kasianov, *Ukrainska intelihentsiia 1920-kh–1930-kh rokiv: Sotsialnyi portret ta istorychna dolia* (Kyiv and Edmonton, 1992).

[28] TsDAVOVU, f. 24, op. 19, spr. 2, ark. 25, 33, 48, 58.

Sciences, writers, and many scholars, scientists, and actors were evacuated from Kyiv beginning in early July 1941, and from Kharkiv beginning in late September.[29]

The number of individuals forcibly resettled during and after the war is characteristically high. In the years 1944–52, 203,662 inhabitants of the annexed western oblasts of Ukraine were deported (see table 3). Among them were 182,543 family members of participants in "bands of the nationalist underground," "band accomplices," and members of their families; 12,135 kulaks and their family members; and 8,984 Jehovah's Witnesses and their family members.[30] Regarding the first group, an "Instruction on the Sequence of Exiling Family Members of OUNites and Active Insurgents to Remote Regions of the USSR" (adopted on 25 February 1944) stated that "subject to [internal] exile are all adult family members of OUNites and active insurgents, be they [the OUN members and insurgents] sentenced, arrested, [or] killed in clashes, as well as the families of the operatives [*aktyv*] and leading cadre [*kerivnyi sklad*] of the OUN-UPA who are [still] in hiding and are at the present time in an illegal position. Non-adult family members are to be exiled together with their kin."[31]

In accordance with Resolution No. 684 of the State Defense Committee adopted on 29 October 1944, OUN members and their families were to be exiled to the Komi ASSR and Arkhangelsk, Kirovsk, and Molotovsk (now Severodvinsk) oblasts in the Far North "for use as labour in the forest industry." The NKVD was directed to ensure that persons being exiled "took [with them] as much clothing and footwear as possible" because "their use as labour" depended on it.

As early as the end of September 1944, nearly 6,000 persons were deported from western Ukraine's Rivne, Volyn, Lviv, Ternopil, Stanislav, and Drohobych oblasts to Krasnoiarsk krai and Irkutsk oblast in Siberia.[32] In the months following, the deportations intensified, and by 1 March 1945, 17,900 persons had been exiled.[33]

Draft dodgers and conscientious objectors to Soviet military service were also deported to labour camps in the Karaganda coal fields in Kazakhstan and the Vorkuta mines in the Soviet Arctic. By 1 June 1945,

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[29] *Literaturna Ukraina*, 15 August 1991.

[30] Arkhiv Ministerstva vnutrishnikh sprav Ukrainy (henceforth AMVSU), f. 15, op. 1, spr. 21, ark. 111.

[31] Ibid., spr. 23, ark. 3.

[32] Ibid., spr. 32, ark. 70.

[33] Ibid., ark. 180.

TABLE 3
OUN MEMBERS, KULAKS, JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES, AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS
DEPORTED FROM THE SEVEN WESTERN OBLASTS OF UKRAINE, 1944–52

Oblast	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1944–52
Volyn	3,582	3,857	–	9,050	–	1,580	2,014	1,676	207	21,966
Drohobych	1,285	1,746	2,241	14,456	55	6,133	6,607	2,617	483	35,623
Lviv	2,586	1,576	1,765	15,937	406	6,314	9,343	3,781	1,175	42,883
Rivne	3,227	3,257	861	11,347	139	2,240	3,376	1,524	160	26,131
Stanislav	586	4,368	636	11,883	–	5,118	11,985	5,210	906	40,692
Ternopil	1,249	1,896	635	13,508	217	3,797	7,464	3,005	298	32,069
Chernivtsi	247	797	212	1,627	–	345	360	710	–	4,298
All seven oblasts	12,762	17,497	6,350	77,808	817	25,527	41,149	18,523	3,229	203,662

7,536 "evaders" had been incarcerated in the Karaganda camps.[34] In accordance with MVD Directive No. 97 issued on 20 April 1946, "former policemen, Vlasovites [members of the Russian Liberation Army, a German-organized, ant-Soviet military formation], and other persons who served in German uniformed formations" were also to be deported. By 20 May 1948 over 4,000 such persons had been deported from Ukraine to concentration camps elsewhere in the USSR (see table 4).[35]

In high-frequency message no. 5798 sent on 5 March 1945, the Ukrainian people's commissar of internal affairs, Vasyl Riasny, stated: "The deportation of families of participants in OUN bands in Chernivtsi oblast is being carried out extremely unsatisfactorily. In the most recent period [the local authorities] have completely halted the execution of these measures, and in February [they] did not deport any bandit family. I [therefore] command: to activate work immediately to uncover bandit families. [and] By 20 March to organize the dispatch of one transport train [*eshelon*] [of deportees to the camps]."[36]

Camps to which many Ukrainians were deported in the years 1945–54 included Rechlag in Vorkuta, Minlag in Inta-Abez, Dublag in Saransk-Potma, Kamyshlag in Omsk, Peschlag in Karaganda, Steplag (later amalgamated with Peschlag) in Kingir-Dzheskazgan, Ezerlag in Taishet, Gorlag in Norilsk, and Bereglag in Kolyma.[37]

As of 1 January 1955, the number of "special settlers"—"family members of OUNites and [nationalist] band accomplices with [their] families deported from Western Ukraine in the years 1945–52" (in accordance with the decisions of the MGB Special Council and the USSR Council of Ministers of 10 September 1947 and 4 October 1948)—totalled 137,578. They included 1,625 persons incarcerated in the camps; 1,148 members of "kulak families deported from Western Ukraine in 1951" in accordance with the Council of Ministers' resolution of 23 January 1951; and 843 "kulaks" deported from Izmail oblast in 1948 in accordance with the Council of Ministers' resolution of 16 October 1948.[38]

A 1955 report "On persons deported to special settlements from the western oblasts of Ukraine" stated that "The overwhelming majority of members of families of Ukrainian nationalists (OUNites), bandits, and

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[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid., ark. 101.

[36] AMVSU, f. 15, op. 1, spr. 37, ark. 135.

[37] Bilynsky and Holubnychy, "Kontsentratsiini tabory," 1119.

[38] Tsentralnyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, f. 9479s, op. 1s, spr. 896, ark. 55.

Table 4
Former Policemen, Vlasovites, and Other Persons Who Had Served in German Uniform Deported from Ukraine, 1946–8

Oblast	1946	1947	1948	1946–8
Vinnytsia	33	33	—	66
Luhansk	495	102	9	606
Volyn	60	16	—	76
Dnipropetrovsk	262	79	—	341
Drohobych	12	14	—	26
Zhytomyr	49	20	—	69
Kirovohrad	76	3	—	79
Kyiv	174	30	5	209
Lviv	19	20	—	39
Mykolaiv	37	9	—	46
Odessa	35	9	8	52
Kamianets-Podilskyi	38	36	5	79
Poltava	372	145	7	524
Izmail	12	—	—	12
Rivne	6	6	—	12
Transcarpathia	19	15	—	34
Zaporizhzhia	115	30	—	145
Staline (now Donetsk)	239	268	—	507
Sumy	304	43	9	356
Stanislav	27	62	17	106
Ternopil	3	37	—	40
Kharkiv	353	112	18	483
Kherson	53	7	—	60
Chernihiv	78	82	9	169
Chernivtsi	34	14	32	80
Total	2,905	1,192	119	4,216

band accomplices were deported without indication of the [length of their] terms [of incarceration or exile], while a part of them, in accordance with the decisions of the Special Council, received a term of exile of five years. By resolution no. 1398-508ss of the USSR Council of Ministers of 6 April 1950, the terms of deportation [incarceration or exile] of these persons were abolished, and it was confirmed that they had been

resettled in the remote regions of the country [the USSR] forever."[39]

By the beginning of 1951, 22,624 Ukrainians had been forcibly resettled in Kemerovo oblast; 19,703, in Khabarovsk krai; 15,260, in Irkutsk oblast; 13,613, in Krasnoiarsk krai; 10,152, in Omsk oblast; 8,881, in Tomsk oblast; 8,778, in Molotovsk oblast; 6,721, in Kazakhstan; 5,168, in Cheliabinsk oblast; 5,128, in Tiumen oblast; 4,342, in Amur oblast; 3,747, in Chita oblast; 3,256, in Arkhangelsk oblast; 2,769, in the Komi ASSR; 2,523, in the Yakut ASSR; 1,688, in the Buriat-Mongol ASSR; 1,528, in Kirovsk oblast; 759, in the Udmurt ASSR; 707, in Primorskii [Maritime] krai; and 442, in other oblasts. They worked mostly in agriculture, coal mines, and the forest industry. In Kemerovo oblast over 14,000 of the exiled Ukrainians were coal miners; in Irkutsk oblast, 2,289; and in Cheliabinsk oblast, over half.[40]

We now have some idea of how the lists of deportees were compiled from documents of the so-called competent organs, which until recently were inaccessible. Of particular interest is a letter dated May 1952 from the head of the MGB in Ukraine, M. Kovalchuk, to the heads of the MGB administrations in Ukraine's western oblasts. It states:

> The USSR Ministry of State Security in its letter no. 6690/r of 31 July 1952 draws attention [to the fact] that during the Special Council's review of the cases of family members of bandits and band accomplices who are being deported in response to the terrorist and diversionary acts committed by the bandits, it has been determined that a significant part of these cases has been constructed by MGB organs in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR in violation of the instructions on deportation.
>
> The majority of the deportation cases has been turned over to the Special Council [only] after a significant delay, and sometimes even a year after a band's uncovering.
>
> In cases regarding the deportation of families not from those inhabited localities where a band was uncovered, there is, as a rule, no evidence that the persons being deported are relatives or direct abettors of those bandits who committed a terrorist act. Separate organs of the USSR MGB have generally irresponsibly approached providing grounds for the legality of deporting the indicated families.[41]

In the following decades, right up to the second half of the 1980s, mostly members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, as well as Christians who actively defended their belief or church (particularly Baptists but also

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[39] Ibid., ark. 140–5.

[40] Ibid.

[41] ASBU, f. 2, op. 19, spr. 2, ark. 400.

Uniate Catholics), were deported from Ukraine to Soviet labour camps in the Far North and Siberia. At the turn of the 1980s almost all of the human-rights activists belonging to the Ukrainian Helsinki Group were incarcerated in such camps. A certain weakening of the Soviet system of repression occurred only in 1987, when, under pressure from democratic circles around the world, the Soviet government began releasing some dissidents from the camps and prisons. It delayed the release of all such prisoners, however, until December 1989.[42]

Translated by Roman Senkus

[42] For additional information, see A. Zhukovsky and O. Subtelny, *Narys istorii Ukrainy* (Lviv, 1992), 140–52.

Journal of Ukrainian Studies 18, nos. 1-2 (Summer-Winter 1993)

Oleksander Shumsky: His Last Thirteen Years

Iurii Shapoval

On 13 May 1933, at the resort of the All-Union Central Executive Committee (CEC) at Tolmachovo station in Luga raion, Leningrad oblast, Oleksander Iakovych Shumsky, the chairman of the Central Committee (CC) of the Union of Educational Workers, was arrested. That same day a dispatch signed by the head of the NKVD in the Leningrad Military District, Filipp Medved (the same Medved who was punched in the face by Stalin in December 1934 while the dictator was in Leningrad "investigating" Sergei Kirov's death), was sent to Georgii Molchanov, the chief of the NKVD Secret-Political Department. It stated:

> During the arrest of Shumsky O. Ia. were found Mauser revolver no. 300780 and eight bullets to it; passport no. 360131; a Central Committee of the Union of Educational Workers credential dated 31 January 1932; All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions credential no. 22 dated 2 June 1932; credential no. 455-31 of the USSR CEC; membership card no. 0011 of the Union of Educational Workers; Party membership card no. 0750725 issued by the CP(B)U [Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine] Kharkiv organization; [and] a notepad and pocketknife.
>
> On the same day arrestee Shumsky Oleksander Iakovych was dispatched on train no. 1 under the guard of a reinforced escort to your jurisdiction.

After arriving in Moscow, Shumsky filled out an "arrestee's questionnaire." It provides basic biographical information about him.

> *Date and place of birth:* I was born on 2 December 1890 in Kyiv oblast, Korosten raion, [in the] village Borova Rudnia.
>
> *Place of work and position or occupation:* Chairman of the Central Committee of the Union of Educational Workers.
>
> *State of property at the moment of arrest. Enumerate in detail movable and immovable property: buildings, complex and simple agricultural implements, the quantity of cultivated land, the number of animals, horses, etc; [and] total*

agricultural and personal tax paid. If you are a collective farmer, indicate your property before joining the kolkhoz, [and] the date of joining the kolkhoz: Domestic furnishings.

Service in the Red Army a)periods of service, b)military category: In 1920, during the autumn for 3 months. Member of the R[evolutionary] [Military] C[ouncil] of the [Soviet] 12th Army.

Social origins: Family of hired labourers.

Political past: From 1909 to 1917 [I belonged] to [small] revolutionary groups; from 1917 to the autumn of 1919, the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (Borotbists); from the spring of 1919 to 1920, the Ukrainian Communist party; [and] since 1920, the All-Union Communist party (of Bolsheviks).

Nationality and citizenship: Ukrainian, USSR.

Membership in the Party, since when, and [membership] card no.: Party status has been counted since 1918.

Education (underline and indicate exactly what you completed): Secondary.

Have you been tried in court or investigated, and what sentence, decision, or designation [did you receive]: Under Soviet rule, never. During the civil war, three times.

Family composition: specify your father, mother, sisters, brothers, sons, and daughters (their names, patronymics, place of employment and positions or type of occupation, and address: wife Ievdokiia Oleksiivna, 35; daughter Kateryna, 20; son Petro, 18; son Les, 16; son Iar, 11.

Shumsky was detained on the basis of arrest and search order no. 12294 signed by the USSR deputy people's commissar of the NKVD, Iakov Agranov. On 13 May 1933 Shumsky's apartment in Moscow, no. 371 at 2 Serafimovich Street, was searched. Nothing incriminating was found. Confiscated were an army identification card, three expired external passports and one current one, a pamphlet, an open letter regarding scholars' salaries written by Mykhailo Hrushevsky when Shumsky was the people's commissar of education in Soviet Ukraine, miscellaneous materials and letters, photographs, twenty-five books, and a portable Remington typewriter.

Shumsky was arrested primarily because of the accusation that he was a member of the clandestine, "counterrevolutionary" and "anti-Soviet" Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO). The accusation was based on confessions extracted from former members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU), Fedir Bei-Orlovsky, Karlo Maksymovych, and Roman Turiansky, and from an economist at a Moscow electric plant, Omelian Paliev, during their pre-trial incarceration and interrogations.

It must be stressed that such "evidence" was given under duress and

that the entire UVO affair was fabricated by the NKVD. (This was revealed after Stalin's death.) In May and June 1933 the deputy head of the NKVD Secret-Political Department, Genrikh Liushkov (in 1938 he escaped abroad and exposed there the dirty deeds of the NKVD), conducted group interrogations of Shumsky, Bei-Orlovsky, Turiansky, and Maksymovych. During them Shumsky denied all incriminations his former comrades and political supporters during the CP(B)U factional struggle now made against him. The protocol of one such interrogation provides the following exchange:

Question to Maksymovych: In your testimony of 21 June 1933 you stated: "After the Party and the Comintern liquidated Shumskyism and the KPZU split, Shumsky, who maintained his old positions, changed tactics and switched to illegal forms of struggle against the Party." Do you confirm this?
Maksymovych's reply: I confirm it.
Question to Shumsky: Do you confirm this?
Shumsky's reply: I deny it.
Question to Maksymovych: Do you confirm your testimony that Shumsky, after he moved to Moscow, and you both belonged to the centre of the counterrevolutionary Ukrainian Military Organization?
Maksymovych's reply: I confirm it.
Question to Shumsky: What do you have to say about this?
Shumsky's reply: I categorically deny it. I know nothing about any counterrevolutionary organization.
Question to Maksymovych: Do you confirm your testimony of 5-6 May of this year that "As a result ... of consultations the Moscow central group of the UVO concluded that it was necessary to prepare the beginning of an insurrection for the spring of 1933, after having reached agreement about this action with UVO foreign representatives, especially [Evhen] Konovalets. It had been decided there [abroad] that for [purposes of] direct leadership of the beginning of the insurrection and safeguarding the [fulfilment of the] designated plans, I had to move for permanent work to Ukraine. Help in this [regard] was to be provided by Vasyl Sirko through his contacts in the CP(B)U CC.
Maksymovych's reply: I confirm it.
Question to Shumsky: Do you confirm this?
Shumsky's reply: I deny all of it.
Question to Maksymovych: Regarding the fulfilment of the delineated plans to organize an insurrection in Ukraine, on 21 June you testified that "At the end of 1932, after the arrival from Kharkiv in Moscow of Volokh and his information about the preparation of an insurrection in Ukraine in the spring of 1933, [Petro] Solodub, at one of the conferences [held] at Shumsky's apartment, at which Shumsky, Solodub, and I were present, informed [us] about the practical work [done] in that regard." Do you confirm this?

Maksymovych's reply: I confirm it.
Question to Shumsky: What do you have to say about this?
Shumsky's reply: I categorically deny it.

Shumsky's steadfastness and consistency are striking, particularly if one considers that affidavits incriminating him were made not only by the above individuals, but also by many others implicated in the UVO affair, and if one considers by what methods such evidence was extracted. Mykhailo Tesliuk, a former member of the KPZU CC, testified in November 1956 that

> on 20 May 1933 I was arrested by organs of the GPU. At the investigation I was accused of belonging to a "Ukrainian military organization" ("UVO"), which was identified with the KPZU as a whole.
>
> I was threatened with [execution by] shooting; long interrogations were conducted without [allowing me] rest or sleep; [and] they tried to convince me that my testimony regarding membership in the "UVO" was of great importance for the struggle against the Ukrainian nationalists.
>
> It was under such conditions that I was forced to defame both myself and Shumsky.
>
> I said about Shumsky that he was one of the "UVO" leaders, that under his direction we carried out counterrevolutionary work and prepared an insurrection in Soviet Ukraine and other counterrevolutionary actions, as I had been instructed [to say] by the investigator. I do not know Shumsky as a counterrevolutionary, and I maligned him because of coercion by GPU personnel.

We can assume that coercive methods were applied not only to those testifying against Shumsky, but also to Shumsky himself. Nonetheless, he did not admit to any wrongdoing.

Why did the GPU "dramatists" who dreamed up the tragedy about the existence and activity of the UVO need evidence against Shumsky, and why did they later demand his isolation? The answer to this question should be sought first and foremost in Shumsky's political past, in the history of his conflict in the mid-1920s with the then CP(B)U secretary general, Lazar Kaganovich. Having arrived in Ukraine in April 1925, this henchman of Stalin quickly elicited dissatisfaction among local leaders through the style of his work. Among those who were the first to make their views known was Shumsky, then the people's commissar of education of Soviet Ukraine and a former Borotbist. During a meeting with Stalin in Moscow in October 1925, he spoke of the error of Kaganovich's ways and the need to remove and replace him as secretary general by a Ukrainian.

On 26 April 1926 Stalin wrote a letter to "Comrade Kaganovich and

other members of the Politburo of the CP(B)U CC." Although he expressed agreement with some of Shumsky's opinions regarding the Ukrainization policy and even reservedly criticized Kaganovich for "over-administrating," Stalin unequivocally indicated that the movement for Ukrainian culture and civil society was acquiring anti-Russian overtones and that "such a danger is becoming increasingly real in Ukraine." To support his view he cited the example of Mykola Khvylovy's public demands for the "immediate de-Russification of the proletariat" in Ukraine and that "from Russian literature and its style Ukrainian poetry should flee as quickly as possible." Stalin viewed these and other opinions of Khvylovy—who was a writer and not politician—as manifestations of the struggle "against Russian culture and its highest achievement—Leninism." He blamed Shumsky, as Ukraine's commissar of education, for the inadequacy of measures counteracting such tendencies, and gave Kaganovich carte blanche to root out what later became known as "Shumskyism," "Khvylovyism," and then "national-deviationism."

Shumsky and Khvylovy both recanted after frenzied political campaigns were mounted against them, and at the June 1926 CP(B)U CC plenum Shumsky even acknowledged that his raising of the issue of Kaganovich's removal was "erroneous." Nonetheless the hounding continued. Influential forces, beginning with Stalin himself, did everything possible to ensure that the discussion surrounding "Shumskyism" and "Khvylovyism" did not end only with Shumsky and Khvylovy's recantations, but became a permanent political issue.

The reasons for this can be understood only if we examine the struggle against "national-deviationism" in the CP(B)U not as an isolated occurrence, but as an intrinsic phase in the actions manipulated by Stalin and his henchmen with the aim of abandoning the nationality policy of "indigenization." This was only a link in the chain of Stalin's struggle against several isms in various parts of the USSR, to all of which he ascribed nationalist underpinnings. This tendency had been defined by Stalin in the early 1920s, and all that remained was its realization. That is why Shumsky, Khvylovy, and other activists who did not toe the general Party line, but had their own views, were fated not only to experience obligatory removal from the public and political limelight, but to have a genetic link between them "discovered."

In 1933, when the active destruction of the Ukrainization policy had begun and when Pavel Postyshev, who had been sent from Moscow to "strengthen" the Ukrainian republican leadership and appointed second secretary of the CP(B)U CC, instigated a campaign to root out "nationalists," such a link was established between the "national-deviationist

"Shumsky and a new victim, Mykola Skrypnyk, who had replaced Shumsky as people's commissar of education in 1927.

Throughout 1933, republican leaders, in their public statements, and the press repeatedly mentioned the experience acquired in the 1920s under Kaganovich's leadership to fight "Shumskyism" and the "schismatics" in the KPZU (the majority of its CC) who openly supported Shumsky. Now the time had come not only to recall and utilize the lessons of that struggle, but also to settle scores with its principal incarnation because he was a potential enemy and magnet for oppositionists. That is why Shumsky, who had left Ukraine in 1927, attracted the attention of the NKVD, and on 5 September 1933 the latter's Collegium passed a resolution ordering his confinement in a corrective labour camp "for a period of ten years, including the time [spent in prison] since 13 May 1933. The case is [settled and is] to be submitted to the archive."

Interestingly enough, execution of that sentence was delayed subject to "special instructions" because an NKVD prosecutor, Katanian, entered a protest. Unfortunately, the text of this protest has not yet been found; it would, of course, clarify why Moscow hesitated to send Shumsky to "places not so distant." On 20 September 1933, however, special instructions were issued by Agranov, and by the beginning of October Shumsky was in the political prisoners' isolation block of the NKVD prison in Suzdal. Later he was transferred to the Solovets Islands, where he was kept in solitary confinement at the citadel-prison's special isolation block.

Within days of being imprisoned, Shumsky began campaigning for rehabilitation. He wrote petitions proving that the accusations made against him were groundless to the highest Soviet bodies and leaders, beginning with Stalin. Shumsky's letters clearly reflect his psychological state and contain unique information regarding the collisions that occurred around the former "leader" of the "national-deviationists" in Ukraine. In his letter to Stalin of 26 November 1934, for example, Shumsky wrote:

> Dear comrade Stalin! Although I do not know the fate of my letters, I have not yet lost hope of being heard and again turn [to you].
>
> In April 1934 I was brought to Moscow, where I had (almost word for word) the following conversation:
>
> "So you think you are sitting [in prison] for no reason?"
>
> "Yes," I replied, "and I feel that it's time for the investigators to be convinced of this."
>
> "That's why we brought you here—to reveal [the truth]."
>
> This statement, of course, could not but surprise me: they were [still] "revealing" [the truth] almost a year after [my] expulsion from the Party and [my] sentencing.

> For this [purpose] I was taken to Kharkiv, where I became even more astounded after finding out that I had been accused of belonging not to the UVO, but to a [so-called] National Bloc. "You are not being accused of membership in the UVO; you, it appears, were involved in creating the counterrevolutionary organization 'National Bloc'," said investigator comrade Sokolov to me. That I had been sentenced not because of the UVO I was also told by camp commandant comrade Alekseev, whom I had asked to allow me to read the verdict (which, by the way, I still have not read). I am stressing this predicament because I had been told last year that I had been accused of membership in the UVO and that for that [reason] I had been expelled from the Party.

From the above excerpt we can see that even after Shumsky had been sentenced, attempts were made to find new "evidence" that he had committed a crime because of his persistent protests and readiness to prove that the incriminations were fabricated. These attempts were made in an original manner, though they were typical of Stalinist jurisprudence: Shumsky was deprived of freedom for belonging to one "counterrevolutionary" organization, and only after was the old incrimination withdrawn and replaced by a new one, that of participating in the creation of a fictitious "National Bloc."

In the above letter to Stalin, Shumsky also convincingly showed how testimonies against him had been constructed. He cited the example of the former Borotbist Mykhailo Poloz, who had claimed that Shumsky had belonged to the "National Bloc" and had told him about contacts with the Germans and Poles. Shumsky wrote that he could not have met with Poloz on the day Poloz stated, because on that day he was on his way to Moscow. Further in the letter he wrote:

> This "discovery" ended with my acquaintance with Poloz's testimony. [Then] I was taken back to the camp, where I encountered Poloz. Naturally, my first question [to him] was whether it was true that he had given such a deposition.
>
> Through [his] tears and hysterical groans I heard the reply that he had "signed something like that." That same day I wrote about this conversation to the investigator to remind [sic] him about the quality of the "exposing" materials he had acquired (a copy of this letter is appended). Without a doubt, GPU employees themselves know well the nature and value of all this nonsense, but it is not in their interest to defend me.

Earlier in 1934, in August, Shumsky wrote a letter to the head of the Secret-Political Department of the Administration for State Security of the NKVD in Ukraine, Borys Kozelsky. This small document reveals much about Shumsky's character:

> The testimony by Poloz that you read out naturally elicited in me a

> reaction of outrage. And as much as in the circle of people who knew him Poloz enjoyed a reputation of being a particularly honourable person, I could not believe that he was involved in scribbling such filthy provocations. To put it another way, I believed that the "testimony" read out to me was an insinuation and that I was simply being blackmailed. But since encountering Poloz I should bring you my apologies. [My] brief conversation with him dispelled all doubts: Poloz confirmed to me that he "had signed something like that" and implored me not to make hasty conclusions until I had heard his explanation for how this had occurred. Nevertheless, his attempts by referring to the situation, conditions, state, and other "secrets of creative sufferings" to temper the loathsomeness of his deed—the signing of a provocative concoction—do [sic] not attain their goal. In the end it is not so important whether a person became a reprobate consciously and deliberately, that is, through internal inducement, or under the influence and pressure of external conditions. This is a significant fact.

During his incarceration on the Solovets Islands, Shumsky realized that he would have to wage a struggle not only for his political survival, but also for his life. Not being a person with a particularly strong constitution, he became seriously ill; his teeth began to fall out, and other medical consequences of his imprisonment became evident. Nonetheless, Shumsky continued demanding an objective review of his case and literally bombarded officials with his letters. His efforts achieved a result, though not the one he wanted: on 10 December 1936, by a decision of the Special Conference of the NKVD, his case was reexamined, and his prison confinement was replaced by internal exile to Krasnoiarsk for the remainder of his sentence.

Shumsky considered this decision clear proof of his rectitude, and it inspired him to continue his struggle for truth and vindication. While he was being transported to Krasnoiarsk by train, he began a hunger strike, demanding full rehabilitation and release from exile. On 17 December 1935 he arrived in Krasnoiarsk. There the state of his health worsened significantly, partly as a result of the hunger strike, but because of the latter he was initially denied medical treatment.

In Krasnoiarsk, Shumsky lived at 43 Red Army Street [ulitsa Krasnoi Armii], which was owned by a single woman. There he continued his hunger strike; initially he refused all food and liquids, but after a few days he began accepting water. On 8 January 1936 Shumsky's wife, Ievdokiia Honcharenko, arrived in Krasnoiarsk and submitted a special document regarding Shumsky's hunger strike to the authorities. On 13 January she submitted a declaration stating that she was leaving Krasnoiarsk, not wanting to assume responsibility for the consequences of her husband's actions, but that she would return with their son to

show him his "living or already deceased father." On 14 January Honcharenko left for Moscow, while Shumsky continued his hunger strike.

On 17 January 1936 Shumsky sent a telegram to Stalin and a copy to the head of the NKVD, Genrikh Iagoda. It stated, in particular, that

> Two arguments have been advanced against my behaviour.
>
> The first is: "You have been freed, and therefore your hunger strike makes no sense." To call exile freedom is possible only as part of an evil, mocking joke played on an arrestee. An exile's freedom is [the same as] the freedom of a chained dog. For me, however, the essence of the matter is not freedom but rehabilitation—in the withdrawal of slanderous accusations [against me] (membership in the UVO and so on). Without the withdrawal of these accusations I don't need any kind of freedom.
>
> The second is: "You consider yourself a Communist, yet you declare a hunger strike. This is an action [directed] against the Party. The Party is opposed to suicide, and hunger striking is [a form of] suicide and so on." They say I should write and request a review [of my case]. But I [already] wrote and requested [one]. I wrote for two and a half years and patiently waited [for a reply]. Nonetheless all of my letters seemed to disappear into a black hole, and [my] entreaties remained without a reply. But I, a Communist—an honourable person, have been portrayed, on the basis of scurrilous slander, a rogue in the eyes [sic] of public opinion. So what was left for me to do? To engage in Tolstoyan passivity toward evil or to continue striving for rehabilitation at any price? Understandably, [I chose] the second. But once entreaties do [sic] not work, then I was left with [only] one device—my life. And I was obligated to use it. After all, through these slanderous accusations I have been discarded into the camp of communism's foes. Communists consider me an enemy, while enemies exploit my name as a tool against communism. Understandably, I should remove my name from the list of communism's foes. [I should] remove it at the cost of [my] life, strike it out with my own blood.

At the end of the telegram Shumsky turned to Stalin: "Only your involvement in my question will save me from [my] ultimate demise. Therefore I beseech you, comrade Stalin, to intervene in my question and to give it a minute of [your] attention."

In fact, Shumsky's telegram attracted attention, although probably not Stalin's, and he received a telegram from the CC of the All-Union Communist party (VKP[b]). It proposed that he cease his hunger strike and engage instead in rectifying the accusations made against him. Consequently, on 1 February 1936 Shumsky sent Iagoda a telegram stating that he was ending his strike and expressing the hope that in two or three days he would be taken to Moscow for medical treatment.

Soon, however, it became clear to Shumsky that he was going nowhere. On 9 and 20 February and again on 11 March 1936 he sent telegrams to the NKVD and the VKP(b) CC. He received no reply, but the silence was eloquent. The fact of the matter was that most likely those who had fabricated Shumsky's case understood that a bit more effort by him would make it clear that he had been deprived of his freedom without just cause. Even the head of the NKVD in Ukraine, Vsevolod Balytsky, who had been one of the key initiators of the UVO affair, became somewhat nervous. On 7 March 1936 Balytsky sent Iagoda "investigative materials about the counterrevolutionary activity of Shumsky Oleksander Iakovych." They consisted of depositions that, as a rule, had been extracted by NKVD interrogators through illegal means. The list of persons who had provided such evidence was quite impressive (nearly thirty individuals), and Balytsky could not fail to prove his point: he had many testimonies that Shumsky was "dangerous" and did not deserve to be released. Meanwhile, the machine of the Great Terror was accelerating so quickly that there was simply no time to reexamine an already "resolved" case.

In 1936 Nikolai Ezhov replaced Iagoda as head of the NKVD. Although Shumsky was exhausted, he still hoped to see justice prevail and began a new round of struggle. In October he wrote a letter to Ezhov and Kaganovich:

> I did not want to write about such things. I thought [everything] would be arranged. [That these were] Trifles. But there is no way out. I am in an infirmary. [I have] polyneuritis [and] other complications. The doctors insist on my transfer from intensive care in the infirmary to sanatorium conditions with mud therapy and other [things] that the infirmary does not have. At worst they would allow [my] transfer to a peaceful domestic environment.
>
> The question has arisen of my family moving here. In the living conditions of Krasnoiarsk, however, this means that not only would I not receive that "peaceful domestic environment" the doctors spoke of, but that [my] family would be deprived of [its own] nook, which it [now] has in Saratov, as much as here [in Krasnoiarsk] it would not be given one. Besides, [there is] trouble with [my] son. The boy has been expelled from school [according to my] (wife's telegram).
>
> I am writing about this because I do not think that these persecutions are based on a political directive. But to be rid of them without your intervention is impossible.

Shumsky did not live to see the arrival of his family or an improvement in his medical treatment. At the beginning of 1937 the NKVD began a campaign against fabricated "clandestine counterrevolutionary activities among Ukrainian [internal] exiles and links of the Ukrainian exiles with

the counterrevolutionary underground of Ukraine." Among the "suspects" were Ukrainian figures serving their sentences in Saratov, Omsk, and Kursk. Shumsky was a primary suspect. As one NKVD document states,

> One must think that instructions regarding clandestine work along the [former] Borotbist axis can originate foremost from Shumsky O. Ia., a member of the UVO centre who is serving [his term of] exile in the city of Krasnoiarsk.
>
> According to our information, through Shumsky's wife—Honcharenko ([who] lives in the city of Saratov)—Shumsky's contacts with [those] active in the Ukrainian counterrevolutionary underground are realized.

This time not only was Shumsky being implicated, but also his wife.

Their situation became even more acute after the stentorian NKVD campaign to uncover the "bourgeois-nationalist anti-Soviet organization of former Borotbists" began in Ukraine in the summer of 1937. Among those incriminated were Ukrainian Bolsheviks such as Andrii Khvylia, Todos Taran, Iurii Voitsekhivsky, Oleksa Trylisky, and Vasyl Poraiko. During the review of this affair at the August 1937 CP(B)U CC plenum, Panas Liubchenko, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine and a former Borotbist and friend of Shumsky, committed suicide.

Shumsky's name was frequently mentioned in the testimonies of those who were interrogated during the Borotbist affair. As a result, on the basis of telegraphed instructions sent from the NKVD in Moscow on 9 October 1937, Shumsky was rearrested on 15 October and placed in the infirmary of the Krasnoiarsk prison. When in September 1938 officials there received instructions to bring Shumsky to Moscow, they sent a reply to a senior NKVD officer in Moscow, Bogdan Kobulov, stating that "Arrestee Shumsky can not be interrogated and transported to Moscow because of illness (paralysis)."

In October 1938 a "conclusion to the indictment" of Shumsky was issued. Signed by the chief USSR prosecutor Andrei Vyshinsky among others, its inanity is particularly striking. It stated:

> Organs of the NKVD have uncovered and liquidated a Ukrainian anti-Soviet fascist organization that was preparing, in a bloc with rightists, Trotskyists, and a military-fascist organization, the severance of Ukraine from the Soviet Union.
>
> One of the organizers and leaders of the Ukrainian anti-Soviet fascist organization was arrestee Shumsky O. Ia.
>
> On the basis of these data Shumsky O. Ia., who was serving [his term of] exile in Krasnoiarsk krai, was arrested in October 1937.
>
> Shumsky did not acknowledge his guilt.

He was uncovered by the testimonies of UVO members sentenced in 1933 and of members of the centre of the Ukrainian nationalist organization arrested in 1937.

On the basis of the above:

Shumsky O. Ia. is to be tried by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR in [accordance with the] application of the law of 1 December 1934.

The authors of this "conclusion" were not puzzled about how the ailing Shumsky could have directed an organization from the infirmary of the Krasnoiarsk prison. They were also not puzzled that he was going to be prosecuted once more on the basis of the very same testimonies that were used to incriminate and incarcerate him in 1933. But the most striking part of the "conclusion" is a small addendum to it: "Arrestee Shumsky has been held under guard in the Krasnoiarsk prison since October 1937. Material evidence regarding [his] case does not exist."

In June 1939 the Administration of State Security of the NKVD was approached to supply such evidence. But the latter was unable to find anything except obsolete and some new depositions. Meanwhile Shumsky's health grew increasingly worse. An October 1939 medical report stated that "He has been ill for 4 years. He has been lying in the infirmary nearly 2 years in the same state [of health]. ... Both legs are in a state of paralysis: he is unable to walk, he is unable to stand by himself, [and] while [he is] making movements acute pain in the legs and tremor of the entire body have been observed. The diagnosis is chronic polyneuritis."

A month after that diagnosis, on 22 November 1939, the chief NKVD investigator in Krasnoiarsk krai, Fraimanovich, ordered a halt to criminal proceedings against Shumsky because of the lack of material evidence and because Shumsky was ill. Only the decision of the NKVD Special Conference ordering Shumsky's internal exile until 1943 remained in force.

A different fate befell Shumsky's wife. She was arrested on 18 October 1937. Official documents indicate that she pleaded not guilty to the indictment that she was a member of an "anti-Soviet S[ocialist] R[evolutionary] nationalist group," disseminated "counterrevolutionary slander," and maintained contact with "Ukrainian SR nationalist elements who had been sentenced in [show trials of] the SVU [Union for the Liberation of Ukraine] affair [in 1930]." Nonetheless, this indictment sufficed for the NKVD judicial troika in Saratov oblast to pass a sentence on 8 December 1937 ordering Ievdokiia Honcharenko to be put to death by shooting. The unjust sentence was carried out late in the evening of that very day.

Shumsky did not know that his wife had been arrested and executed for a very long time. On 26 June 1940 he sent a letter from the Krasnoiarsk municipal hospital to Matvei Shkiriatov of the VKP(b) CC. In it he described how his case had been halted in 1939 and stressed that

> I, understandably, received some moral satisfaction, although my torments did not end with that [decision]. I have not only not been rehabilitated, but Iagoda's decision regarding [my] administrative exile continues to hang over me. I was told that I must write to the NKVD regarding revocation of this decision. I wrote [to them], but there has not yet been a reply. And that is not all. Some time after [my] release from prison ... I managed to find [my] son. He informed me that two days after my last arrest, in October 1937, that my wife, Honcharenko Ievdokiia Oleksiivna, was also arrested because she was the wife of "state criminal Shumsky" [and] for non-denouncement of and cooperation in his crimes. And yet I, this terrible "state criminal," have been released "because of the absence of [material] content of the crime," while my wife, for "non-denouncement" of my "crimes," has ended up for [a sentence of] ten years in a concentration camp [along] with confiscation [of her property] and strict isolation, so that it I not only am not able to correspond with her, but not able even to find out where she is. (According to my son's conjecture, she is in a concentration camp somewhere near the town of Tatma [sic; possibly Potma].
>
> My plea [to you] is to release [my] wife, who is suffering for nothing, to allow me the possibility of [receiving] medical treatment, and to free me from ridiculous administrative hitches. Perhaps it will still be possible for me to engage in something useful. I still have hope.

Shumsky not only hoped. He stubbornly continued doing everything he could so that his hopes would be realized. Again he corresponded with Moscow. Again he received distressing replies. In October 1940, for example, the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office stated that it did not oppose his transfer to a different place of exile, but that it did "not find [substantial] grounds for the repeal of the decision on his case and for [his] release" (soon thereafter Shumsky was moved to the city of Eniseisk). The last of such replies to Shumsky's petitions for rehabilitation arrived in July 1945 from the secretariat of the NKVD Special Conference.

After Nazi Germany invaded the USSR, Shumsky requested to be allowed to fight against fascism. On 31 March 1942, for example, he wrote a letter to Stalin:

> I consider myself obligated to again remind [you] about me and to proffer my services. I do this, of course, not because I consider myself indispensable, that [you] can not do without me. No. On the contrary, I am not of a very high opinion about my present physical abilities as a warrior. ... I am an old revolutionary and can not be calm when the

> cause to which my entire life was dedicated is mortally threatened. ... I declare my wish to be useful, while [it is] your job to indicate my place in the struggle.
>
> Of course, my appearance now within the ranks of the warriors of the revolution would be simultaneously a rejoinder to all those who defamed me in public. Public discreditation is [only] removed publicly by rehabilitation, and personal feelings have no importance [here]. Particularly now, when the tragic "to be or not to be" has confronted not a Danish prince but the Soviet order [and] the future of humankind.

Even this entreaty was disregarded, and Shumsky was given no possibility to break out of the grip outmoded accusations had place him in. He probably began to surmise the tragic fate of his wife, and in late 1942 he was notified that his youngest son, Iar, had been killed at the front. About the fate of his other sons and his daughter he had no information.

Shumsky's term of exile ended on 13 May 1943. He was unable, however, to go anywhere because his illness had become worse, and he remained for treatment in Eniseisk and Krasnoiarsk for another three long years. In 1945 Shumsky again began actively seeking rehabilitation. In April of that year he appealed to the Second Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and in a letter to Kaganovich he wrote to his former opponent that "Only you can attest that my 'Shumskyism' is not so dangerous a demon as it is made out to be, and only your support can help me climb out of the state of despair I have been in. I implore you [to give] it."

As far as it has been possible to ascertain, Kaganovich did not reply. Of course, he would not help a person whose political demise he himself had initiated two decades earlier.

In May 1945 Shumsky sent a letter to Lavrentii Beria, the NKVD chief since 1938, requesting his help in getting a permanent passport, which had been denied him even after he completed his term of exile. He also wrote that after the suicide of one of his sons, the housekeeper who had safeguarded the family's property in Saratov for many years, had stopped writing to him. According to Shumsky, "she had decided to appropriate my property thinking that I, being ill, would not have the ability to counteract her. That is the information I received from the residents of the apartment where my family [once] lived. It appears that I have even been deprived of the right to protection from robbery as one who was subject to unjust repressions."

Possibly that unconfirmed news, or perhaps desire to see the place where his wife and children lived, provoked Shumsky to travel to Saratov. On 8 June 1946, accompanied by a hospital worker, he left

Krasnoiarsk, and on 15 June he arrived in Saratov. A few days later, on 20 June, he wrote a brief but frightening document called "To the Investigators." Here are some excerpts:

> I made the decision to "end" [my life] still back in the autumn of 1945, but I did not want to die in Siberia—I hate it too much. I decided to die in [my] fatherland—"[my] land beckons."
>
> [First, however,] I decided to visit Saratov to find out from Zinaida Andreevna Mikhailova about the life of my close relatives without me and to thank her for her aid to them during [such] a difficult time.
>
> But here I sensed that I had completely weakened and that to reach my native places in [my] present condition I would not have enough strength. I would have to end [my] life here.
>
> I have not [just now] confronted the power [that is] with this fact, given that still back on 18 October 1945 in a letter addressed to Stalin I informed [him] about making this decision.

At that time Shumsky destroyed the manuscript of "Malorosy" (Little Russians), a 100-page monograph he had written. He had worked on it throughout his years of exile and called it the "best, the most reasoned achievement of my soul." A month passed before Shumsky tried to implement his decision. On 17 July 1946 he stabbed himself in the heart with a knife. The suicide attempt proved unsuccessful, however, and the next day he composed a note stating "I erred. The blade got stuck between [my] ribs and did not reach [my] heart. [My] hand did not err but there was little strength. I have weakened entirely. In that case it will be necessary to use other means today."

Shumsky did not try another way, however. Perhaps someone had convinced him not to, or perhaps there were other reasons. Shumsky survived, and it is possible to assume that he had been inspired to realize his previous goal—to die in Ukraine on his native soil. On 18 September 1946 he left Saratov for Kyiv. He was not fated to arrive, however. According to an official document, Shumsky died suddenly at the station of Kirsanov in Tambov oblast.

Forty-six years passed before the circumstances of Shumsky's death became known. He did not die suddenly nor did he commit suicide, as some scholars have speculated. In fact, he was murdered. In 1992 the newspaper *Moskovskie vedomosti* (no. 31) published the testimony of the principal organizer of this heinous act, the head (in 1946) of the diversion-and-terror service of the MGB, Pavel Sudoplatov. He stated that "In Saratov was annihilated the renowned enemy of the Party, Shumsky, by whose name was called one of the currents of Ukrainian nationalists—Shumskyism. [The MGB chief Viktor] Abakumov, [while] giving the order for this operation, referred to the instructions of Stalin and

Kaganovich."

Thus ended the life of the famous "national-deviationist." In 1958 he was posthumously rehabilitated, because of the "absence of [material] substance of [his] crime," by the same criminal system that had him destroyed.

Translated by Roman Senkus

Journal of Ukrainian Studies 18, nos. 1-2 (Summer-Winter 1993)

A "Small People" of Twenty-five Million: The Ukrainians circa 1900*

Andreas Kappeler

How can a nationality numbering twenty-five million in 1900 be considered a "small people"? In fact, such numbers would make the Ukrainians one of the larger peoples in Europe at that time and the second-largest Slavic people (after the Russians). But they can be considered a "small people" if this phrase is used in the technical sense, as employed by Miroslav Hroch and other historians of European national movements. In this sense, "small peoples" is used as a synonym for what used to be called "non-historic," "submerged" or "plebeian" peoples; but since the latter terms have negative connotations, the neutral term "small" has been chosen to designate a certain historical category of people, even though, as in the case of the Ukrainians, such a "small" people in fact might be quite large. The history of the distinction between large and small (historic and non-historic, old and young) nations includes many contributions by Ukrainian scholars (Mykhailo Drahomanov, Roman Rosdolsky, Ivan Lysiak Rudnytsky, George G. Grabowicz).

This article employs the definition of "small people" formulated by Hroch, which is based on three "deficits": 1) in the era of nation-building the "small peoples" lacked upper classes belonging to their own ethnic group, but were dominated by ruling classes of another nationality; their social structure was thus for a certain period "incomplete," not possess-

* This is an abridged translation of "Ein 'kleines Volk' von 25 Millionen: Die Ukrainer um 1900," which originally appeared in *Kleiner Völker in der Geschichte Osteuropas: Festschrift für Günther Stökl zum 75. Geburtstag*, ed. Manfred Alexander, Frank Kämpfer, and Andreas Kappeler (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1991), Neue Folge, Beiheft 5 of *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*.

ing all the elements typical for that historical situation; 2) the "small peoples" formed an ethnic unity, but not an independent political unit; and 3) the "small peoples" lacked a continuous tradition of their own literary language. Hroch meant his three deficits to be seen as an ideal type, which would be exhibited in varying intensity by different national groups. In his own work, Hroch did not include the Ukrainians among the "small peoples." With regard to the second deficit, Hroch made a distinction between those peoples who never had an independent state formation (e.g., Slovaks and Estonians) and those who had formed a political nation in the Middle Ages, but had lost the essential traits of political independence by the nineteenth century (e.g., the Czechs and Catalonians).

Even the relatively neutral term "small people" and the positing of Hroch's three deficits can imply that certain national groups are inferior, weak, or at the least immature. The whole categorization is reminiscent of the modernization model, which, not unjustly, can be considered an attempt to measure the entire world against a European standard. But like the concept of modernization, the bipolar categorization of nations is of heuristic value. Its proper application demands that the researcher keep in mind that he or she is working only with an ideal type, which does not do justice to the individuality of each historical case, and that many mixed and transitional forms exist. But until there is a better suggestion, Hroch's conception is a useful instrument to characterize and classify the Ukrainians among the other ethnic groups of Europe.

Before turning to an examination of the Ukrainians in light of the three deficits, several preliminary remarks are in order. Unlike most other ethnic groups of Eastern Europe, who lived for a long time within the borders of a single state, the Ukrainians were politically fragmented since at least the second half of the seventeenth century. In the nineteenth century they were divided among three states: the "Little Russians" of the Russian Empire, the "Ruthenians" of Austria, and the "Rusyns" of Hungary. The three groups of Ukrainians differed significantly from one another in language, religion, culture, historical tradition, and social structure; so much so that it was still an open question at the end of the nineteenth century not only whether Ukrainian nation-building would be accomplished, but even whether the three above-mentioned Ukrainian-language groups constituted a single ethnos. This analysis will concentrate on the largest group of Ukrainians, those of the Russian Empire, but even here one must make distinctions among regions with different historical traditions and social structures: the Left Bank (the former Hetmanate, which had been under Russian rule since the mid-seventeenth century), the Right Bank (which had been under Poland until the

partitions), Slobidska Ukraine (the colonized region in the east) and the South (another colonized region). In all four regions Ukrainians constituted the majority around 1900, ranging from 56 percent in the South to 81 percent in the Left Bank; significant minorities of Russians, Jews, Poles, and Germans were everywhere.

To what degree did the Ukrainians of the Russian Empire fit the concept of a qualitatively "small" people? Did they exhibit Hroch's three deficits in the epoch of their national formation?

In the nineteenth century, of course, the Ukrainians did not have their own state. The question, and it is a disputed one, is whether the Ukrainians had a state earlier, in the Middle Ages and early modern period. Ukrainian national historiography, particularly as represented by Mykhailo Hrushevsky, sees a continuity of statehood extending from Kyivan Rus' through the Galician-Volynian Principality and Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the Hetmanate of the Dnieper Cossacks. Although the medieval state formations were undoubtedly East Slavic and certainly more Ukrainian than Russian, one cannot speak of them as providing the basis for a continuing Ukrainian state tradition. But the Hetmanate is another matter; it became the most important focus of a national-Ukrainian historical consciousness. It retained its autonomy within the Russian empire until the late eighteenth century, and therefore one is justified in speaking of a continuity of Ukrainian statehood from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. At least this was true in reference to Left-Bank Ukraine and the city of Kyiv. In any event, the absence of statehood among Ukrainians was no absolute, as in the case of the Estonians or Slovaks.

As for the incomplete social structure, the absence of its own upper classes, Ukrainians fit the definition of a "small people" fairly well. In 1897 almost 95 percent of Russia's Ukrainians lived in the countryside, 87 percent engaged in agriculture, and 91 percent belonged to the legal estate of the peasantry. The proportion of Ukrainians in the nobility and urban population was correspondingly low. In the nobility and bureaucracy and among entrepreneurs and industrial workers, Russians and Poles were preponderant; in trade, Jews were. Ukrainians over ten years old were 81 percent illiterate, which constituted the second highest illiteracy rate among the peoples of the western Russian Empire (only the Moldavians were more illiterate).

According to social structure, then, Ukrainians were a "peasant nation." However, one must register some qualifications. There was a Ukrainian nobility, even if it was small. In the 1897 census, 67,066 persons (including family members) who belonged to the hereditary nobility listed Ukrainian as their mother tongue. To be sure, not all these

hereditary nobles still possessed land, but some did.

Regional differences also have to be taken into account. While in Right-Bank Ukraine the Polish and Russian and in the South just the Russian nobility dominated, the proportion of Ukrainian-speaking nobles was significant in the Left Bank. These were the descendants of the Hetmanate's ruling class who had been coopted into the Russian nobility. In the former Hetmanate Ukrainians also made up the majority in the (admittedly small) cities. In this region, then, at least in a limited way, Ukrainians exhibited a complete social structure. In Poltava gubernia, Ukrainian-speakers not only constituted 98 percent of the peasantry, but also two thirds of the hereditary nobility, 15 percent of the merchants, 51 percent of the "burghers" (*meshchane*), and 83 percent of the clergy.

As to the Ukrainian nobility, on the one hand there was integration into the Russian nobility and Russian high culture. In the nineteenth century Ukrainian nobles were no longer seeking the restoration of the Hetmanate, but recognition of their rights as nobles and careers in Russian society. On the other hand, part of the upper classes preserved autonomist traditions, a Little Russian regional patriotism, and thus formed a connecting link with the modern national movement. Even among the formerly East Slavic nobility of the Right Bank, which had long since been Polonized, a regional consciousness had been preserved and could be activated in individual cases; the most famous example was that of Volodymyr Antonovych. Thus some Ukrainian nobles in the nineteenth century had a double identity and loyalty, a phenomenon also observable in the largely assimilated nobilities of other "small peoples" such as the Czechs or Lithuanians.

In social structure too, then, the Ukrainians clearly belonged to the "small peoples," but again did not exhibit the ideal type without middle and upper classes of their own ethnic group; the Ukrainians formed rather a mixed type with considerable regional differences.

It is a similar story with the third deficit, the continuous tradition of literary language and high culture. In the seventeenth century Ukrainian culture flourished, turning Ukraine into the leading East Slavic cultural center. Indeed, Ukrainian culture had a formative influence on Russian culture in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Nonetheless, the newly emerging Russian literary language and high culture not only displaced the Church Slavonic literary language, but relegated the Ukrainian vernacular, formerly written, to the speech of the peasantry and Ukrainian culture to folklore. The modern Ukrainian literary language was created in the nineteenth century on the basis of the spoken vernacular. Its creation was complicated not only by the domination of Russian, but by the fragmentation of the Ukrainians. The competition

between the differing dialects of Eastern [i.e., Russian-ruled] Ukraine and [Austrian-ruled] Galicia retarded the formation of a standardized language.

Although in the area of literary language and high culture the past provided certain points of departure, continuity had been largely broken, and the modern national movement, as in the case of most other "small peoples," was connected with the folk vernacular and folk culture.

This survey of the three deficits makes clear that the Ukrainians did not belong to the ideal type of the "small people," but that they constituted a mixed type. In addition, one must take into account the Ukrainians' fragmentation and heterogeneity. What were the implications of these specific features for the Ukrainian national movement and nation-building?

The political fragmentation implied a national task untypical for the "small peoples," namely the unification of politically divided regions. If one employs the classification of Theodor Schieder, the Ukrainians belonged not only to the "secessionist" type predominant among the "small peoples" of Eastern Europe, but also to the "unifying" type characteristic of the Central European national movements, i.e., those of the Italians and Germans.

The Ukrainian national movement in Galicia was much more typical for the "small peoples." Here the peasants played the decisive role at the end of the nineteenth century, with ideological leadership from the Uniate clergy. It was characteristic of the "small peoples," with their weak social differentiation, that the upwardly mobile sons of peasants would become clergymen and teachers.

The Ukrainian national movement in the Russian Empire differed in several respects. It was difficult to mobilize the peasants for the national cause. The clergy was integrated into the Russian Orthodox church, and given the absence of a religious difference between Russians and Ukrainians, it was difficult to win them over to the national movement. The numerically weak secular intelligentsia was long on its own. National activists were to some extent the sons of priests, but more often of noble origin. The landed nobility rarely aided the national movement as activists and benefactors, the most notable exception being Evhen Chykalenko. For the most part, however, the nobles were too tightly connected to the Russian autocracy to openly join an oppositional movement. But through their sons and daughters they exercised an indirect influence on the national movement.

The program of the national movement was typical for a "small people" and reflected the Ukrainians' incomplete social structure. It was meant to appeal to the peasantry, the overwhelming majority of the

population, and it was directed primarily against the (Polish and Russian) nobility and the (Jewish and Russian) urban population. Social and national contradictions coincided and reinforced one another. Social aims were thus more important than political aims, and social-revolutionary parties had more adherents than liberal-democratic ones. Aside from the dominant populist tendency, however, there was also a weaker aristocratic-conservative current, which, aside from social and national concerns, emphasized the role of the state (its leading representative was V'iacheslav Lypynsky). Here lies the specific contribution of Ukrainian nobles to the national movement. Not only did they belong (together with their Polish and Russian counterparts) to the national awakeners of the early phase, but they brought the state traditions of the Hetmanate into the national movement.

This link to the traditions of the Hetmanate was of great significance for the Ukrainian national movement, and not just because of the state traditions inherited from the nobility. Wide strata of the population retained reminiscences of the Cossack era (e.g., the former rank-and-file Cossacks who had been reduced to state peasants). They idealized the political and social order of "the good old days." That the former Hetmanate was the decisive region of crystallization of the Ukrainian national movement is confirmed by the origin of the movement's activists: almost half came from Left-Bank Ukraine, over two thirds (and 85 percent of the real leaders) from the gubernias of Poltava, Chernihiv, and Kyiv. But a genuine crystallization point was lacking, since the city of Kyiv in the nineteenth century was at first dominated by Poles and Polish culture and later by Russians and their culture. In 1897 Ukrainian-speakers made up only 22 percent of the city's population. Nonetheless, the Ukrainian intellectuals of Kyiv constituted the leadership of the national movement.

In comparison with other "small peoples," the Ukrainians of the Russian Empire had relatively advantageous political traditions and social structure. How then is one to explain that the Ukrainian movement in Russia made such slow progress and had not become a mass movement by the outbreak of World War I?

The first factor to be taken into consideration is the political context of the Russian Empire. Russia's centralized autocracy, which until 1905 had no constitution, no guarantee of civic rights, no legal parties, and no free press, hindered the appearance of any autonomous social movement with a mass character. To this must be added the state's active repression of the Ukrainian movement, especially from the 1860s on. Up until World War I both the Russian government and Russian public opinion reacted very sensitively to any expressions of Ukrainian national feeling on the

part of the "Little Russians," who were regarded as a mere offshoot of the "Great Russian" people.

Connected with the political environment is the second factor, the pressure on Ukrainians to assimilate. This was not just a matter of the suppression of cultural separatism, but also a result of the attraction that Russian society and culture exercised on the Ukrainians. The Orthodox, linguistically related Ukrainians were regarded as Russians and suffered no discrimination as individuals if they assimilated into Russian society. Hence Russia offered socially mobile Ukrainians good possibilities for advancement and development. Not only official, but oppositional Russia exercised an attraction and assimilating influence on Ukrainians. A good part of the potential national elite thus entered Russian society. But just as in the case of the Hetmanate's elite, some of these socially mobile Ukrainians were not completely Russified, but retained a double loyalty, a Ukrainian as well as Russian identity, which could be reactivated after 1917.

The third retarding element was the heterogeneity and fragmentation of the Ukrainians. The great number, the large territory, the different social structures, and political and cultural traditions hindered the formation of a compact, effective national movement. The quantitative greatness of this people was a prime cause of its qualitative smallness.

The significance of the three aforenamed retarding factors becomes clear when we make a comparison with the Ukrainian movement in Galicia. Although the latter had less favourable conditions in terms of social structure and political and cultural tradition, unlike its counterpart in Russia, it succeeded in becoming a mass movement by World War I. The important differences were: the relatively small number and compact settlement of Ukrainian peasants and clergymen in Eastern Galicia; the clear confessional boundary separating Galician Ukrainians from the Polish ruling class and Austrian state, which impeded assimilation; the social mobilization and literacy promoted by Austrian rule; and above all the possibilities for development offered by the establishment of a rule of law and a constitution from the 1860s on.

Which other "small peoples" should be compared with the Ukrainians of the Russian Empire? In Eastern Europe the obvious cases are those of the Lithuanians and Belarusians, who lived under the same state structure, experienced similar repressive policies (including language prohibitions), were exposed to the assimilating influences of Polish or Russian society and culture, and whose national movements were also slow to develop. The data of the 1897 census show a number of parallels among the three nationalities. The Belarusians displayed the least social differentiation; the Lithuanians were more literate than both of the East

Slavic nationalities. The linguistically related Belarusians shared retarding factors with the Ukrainians, but lacked the latter's advantages of an upper class, political and cultural tradition, and existence of a regional nucleus like the Left Bank. These advantages were, however, shared by the Lithuanians, who had the additional advantages of low numbers, less fragmentation, and clear barriers to assimilation, both linguistic (vis-à-vis the Poles and Russians) and religious (vis-à-vis the Russians). These differences can explain why the Lithuanian movement, in spite of some delay, became a mass movement by the early twentieth century while the Belarusian movement developed even more slowly than the Ukrainian movement.

In the search for comparable "small peoples" one should also look beyond Eastern Europe. Ukrainian activists of the nineteenth century did this, comparing their movement with that of the Occitanians (Provençals), Bretons, or Catalonians. In spite of the different socioeconomic conditions and systems of government, a certain commonality can be discerned among the ethnic minorities of Eastern and Western Europe. Centralization and enforced linguistic-cultural integration had similar effects in constitutional and autocratic states. The attractive assimilatory effect of French or Spanish society and high culture on linguistically related ethnic groups also suggests comparison with the Ukrainians of the Russian Empire. These comparisons need development, but it should be clear that a comparative study of the polyethnic Russian Empire with multiethnic West European states would be a fruitful undertaking.

Translated by John-Paul Himka

Journal of Ukrainian Studies 18, nos. 1-2 (Summer-Winter 1993)

Tyt Myshkovsky: The Esteemed Russophile of the Lviv Greco-Catholic Theological Academy*

Peter Galadza

This sketch of the Rev. Dr. Tyt Myshkovsky (1861–1939), the dean of theology (1930–5) and first prorector (1936–7) of the Lviv Greco-Catholic Theological Academy and one of the modern Ukrainian Catholic church's most qualified liturgists and biblical scholars, is based primarily on archival materials from the recently declassified holdings of the Lviv Central State Historical Archive.[1] Very little has been published about

* The author thanks the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada for the grant enabling him to do research in Lviv; and the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies for awarding him the Darcovich Doctoral Fellowship, which he held during the writing of this article.

[1] "Greco-Catholic" is used because it is more accurate than "Greek Catholic." *Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies* (Sheptytsky Institute, St. Paul University, Ottawa) has officially adopted this term, because "Greek Catholic" is frequently construed by nonspecialists as referring to the Catholics of Greece or those of Greek heritage. In any case, the Ukrainian term is "hreko-katolyk" and not "hretskyi katolyk."

Until 1936 the position of prorector did not exist at the academy; see Pavlo Senytsia, ed., *Svitylnyk istyny: Dzherela do istorii Ukrainskoi katolytskoi bohoslovskoi akademii u Lvovi*, vol. 1 (Toronto and Chicago, 1973), 140–7 and 155.

The only Ukrainian Catholic liturgist of this period who could match Myshkovsky's qualifications was the Rev. Isydor Dolnytsky; for his biography, see I. Botsian, "O. prelat Isydor Dolnytsky, dukhovnyi otets, liturhist i pisnotvorets," *Bohosloviia* 2 (1924): 118–95.

Myshkovsky's only peers in biblical studies were the Rev. Drs. Tyt Halushchynsky and Vasyl Laba; their brief bio-bibliographies can be found in *Svitylnyk istyny*, 1: 217–20 and 243–44 respectively. For more on Halushchynsky,

this cleric and intellectual of Lemko birth.[2]

Among the things that make Myshkovsky so intriguing is the fact that through to his final years as professor at the academy—in the 1930s (!)—Myshkovsky lectured and corresponded in mildly Ukrainianized Russian. Yet, he maintained a good working relationship with and even the respect of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky and the academy's rector, the Rev. Dr. Iosyf Slipy (the future metropolitan and cardinal).

Although Myshkovsky is not a central figure in Galician history, he deserves our attention for several reasons. First, as prorector, he occupied a position at the academy second only to Slipy's. Second, his list of major publications is impressive for his time[3]; and he edited Sheptytsky's monumental *Trebnyk*[4] and many of the Lviv Stauropegial Institute's other works.[5] Third, Myshkovsky's life bears testimony to the multidimensional character of Ukrainian culture in Lviv: no history of a people is

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see I. Nazarko, "O. d-r. Teodosii Tyt Halushchynsky," *Lohos* 3 (1952): 168–74.

[2] Very brief biographical information has been published in *Svitylnyk istyny*, 1: 249–50 (the fullest); *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva: Slovnykova chastyna* (henceforth *EU*), vol. 4 (Paris and New York, 1962), 1564; and L. Hlynka and K. Chekhovych, eds., *Bohoslovske naukove tovarystvo u Lvovi v pershim desiatylittiu svoho isnuvannia, 1923–1933* (Lviv, 1934), 53–4. All three sources are different redactions of the same material. See also Myshkovsky's necrology in *Bohosloviia* 17 (1939): 77–8.

[3] His major works were published by the Lviv Stauropegial Institute: *Chronologico-historica introductio in Novum Testamentum* (1892); *De ratione litterarum A. T. in Cantico Mariae conspicua* (1901); *Dvî nauky—istyna edyna: V" otvît" na stattiu "Dvî nauky" z zhurnalu "Zhyvaia mysl'"* (1904); *Isaiae liber in versionibus Graeca LXX et Latina Vulgata et Palaeoslavica exhibitus et explicatus* (1907); *Nash obriad" y oblatynenie eho, s" dobavleniem: Zhalkaia zashchyta oblatyneniia*, offprint from *Tserkovnyi vostok"* (1913); and *Yzlozhenie tsarehradskoi lyturhiy (sv. Vasyliia Velykoho y sv. Ioana Zlatoustoho) po ieia drevnomu smyslu y dukhu* (1926). He also contributed articles and notes to *Bohoslovskii vîstnyk"* (1900–2) and *Tserkovnyi vostok"* (1911–14). Myshkovsky's *Vzhliad" sv. Ioanna Zlatoustoho na verkhovnuiu vlast' sv. ap. Petra* (1908) is mentioned only in his CV, and I have not been able to find a copy of it. The fact that it was never listed in any published bibliography suggests that it might have contained "inappropriate" views on papal primacy.

[4] *Evkholohion" yly Trebnyk"* (Lviv, 1925).

[5] For example, the 1914 (fifth) edition of its *Izbornyk*; and at least several issues of the annual *Ustav* [Ordo for the liturgical year]. He was called upon to edit a *sluzhebnyk* (liturgicon) and Gospel book. See Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv m. Lvova (henceforth TsDIAML), 201/4b/1684, fol. 247; 129/2/998, fol. 4; and 129/2/997, fols. 2, 14. The Gospel never appeared, and the *sluzhebnyk* was edited by Dionysii Dorozhynsky, while Myshkovsky was a member of the commission overseeing the work.

complete without a study of its fringes, and a staunch Russophile in the Greco-Catholic establishment of 1930s Galicia was certainly a marginal figure, even though Russophilism was not quite dead yet.[6] Finally, Myshkovsky's autobiography, though devoid of crucial revelations, presents us with a "micro-history" of Galicia for the period spanning his life. It shows how the great events of the "New Era," World War I, and the Polish takeover of Galicia affected one intellectual's career. Scholars interested in details of the Galician educational system will appreciate his description of academic practices.

The main sources for Myshkovsky's life are two documents he submitted to the Lviv Metropolitan Ordinariate on 22 March 1934 upon the request of the latter dicastery. The first is his "Curriculum vitae" (hereafter CV); it comprises four legal-size folios, with text on both sides. The second is a very amplified expansion of the CV entitled "Avtobiohrafiia" (Autobiography); it consists of thirteen folios also written on both sides in Russian but with a number of Ukrainianisms (discussed below).[7]

These sources naturally have their limitations. Besides being relatively short, they have the disadvantage of having been written by the subject himself: having prepared them for his superiors, Myshkovsky would have likely been circumspect in his remarks.[8] Consequently this article

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[6] The most objective treatments of Russophilism are Mykola Andrusiak's *Narysy z istorii halytskoho moskofilstva* (Lviv, 1935) and *Geneza i kharakter halytskoho rusofilstva v XIX–XX st.* (Prague, 1941). See also Paul R. Magocsi, "Old Ruthenianism and Russophilism: A New Conceptual Framework for Analyzing National Ideologies in Late 19th-Century Eastern Galicia," in Paul Debreczeny, ed., *American Contributions to the Ninth International Congress of Slavists*, vol. 2 (Columbus, Ohio, 1983), 305–24, which only treats developments up to World War I.

As its influence waned in the 1930s, the Stauropegial Institute adopted an increasingly Russophile stance; see the two-volume *Iubileinyi sbornik" v pamiat' 350-lîtiia L'vovskaho Stavropigiona* (Lviv, 1936, 1937), edited by A. Kopystiansky and V. R. Vavryk respectively. Likewise, the Society of Ruthenian Ladies started requiring the use of Russian in its Lviv girl's dormitory in 1930; see Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, *Feminists Despite Themselves: Women in Ukrainian Community Life, 1884–1939* (Edmonton, 1988), 182.

[7] TsDIAML, 201/5/184, fols. 16–31. The heading of the file is "Biographical data for the priests-canons Voinarovsky, Pisetsky, Buchko, Slipy Iosyf, Myshkovsky, Lytsyniak, and Others" (my trans.) Myshkovsky's material accounts for almost a third of the file's contents.

[8] Although nothing in the documents suggests that this may have been the case, it is possible that the ordinariate was required to forward a translation of the biography to Rome. On occasion, the Vatican still requests information on certain persons, institutions, or events from local church bodies. Ostensibly the CV was

can only be a preliminary sketch, fleshed out with facts gleaned from other archival sources, scattered publications, and short interviews with two former students of Myshkovsky after summarizing Myshkovsky's CV and "Avtobiohrafiia." The summary usually follows Myshkovsky's texts sequentially and reflects his own emphases. Because the "Avtobiohrafiia" is much fuller, it has served as the base text. References to folios in the text (in braces), are from the "Avtobiohrafiia" unless marked CV.

Although the autobiographer's text leads at times to the presentation of material that is of secondary importance, I have included such material to remain faithful to Myshkovsky's narrative and the nature of "micro-history," and to avoid overly subjective redaction. Occasionally, when clarification is needed, I have added my own remarks in square brackets.

Early Years

Tyt Myshkovsky was born the seventh of eight children on 4 October 1861 in the village of Perehrymka, Dukla deanery, Peremyshl eparchy—"na lemkakh" [in the Lemko region] {19, r.}. His father, Ioann,[9] was the village pastor. Tyt's mother, Ioanna, was the daughter of Petr Durkot, the pastor of Izby, Mushyna deanery. (The more prominent leaders of the Lemko "Russka Narodna Respublika" of 1918 hailed from these same areas; initially they allied with the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, but after the latter's demise, in 1920, they advocated union with Soviet Russia.[10])

Myshkovsky notes that during his childhood only male children received a full education. Girls [in clerical families] were taught the domestic arts and the basics of reading and writing at home. Then they were usually sent for one or two years to a primary school (*horodskoie narodnoie uchylyshche).*[11] Lemko priests, according to Myshkovsky,

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intended for the capitular church registry, and the "Avtobiohrafiia" for the metropoly's or capitular archives.

[9] Myshkovsky uses Church Slavonic forms of names throughout his writings. Except for noted figures, his forms have been retained, even though most of the persons mentioned, especially non-clerics, would have used modern Ukrainian spellings.

[10] See Andrusiak, *Narysy*, 61.

[11] In keeping with Myshkovsky's approach to Russian (discussed below), "*r*" has been transliterated as "h." In keeping with the style preference of the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies,* the soft sign has not been transliterated in words or titles written in standard Ukrainian. I have chosen, however, to transliterate the soft and hard signs (as ' and " respectively) in all words and titles written in Russian or non-standard Ukrainian.

usually sent their daughters to a German convent school in "the Slovak town of Bardov [Bardejov]." {ibid.}

Tyt and his two brothers (the other siblings were girls) finished gymnasium in Peremyshl. In fact, he was sent to Peremyshl even for his primary education, because his two brothers were already living there. Our autobiographer makes a point of mentioning that though a gymnasium was located "in Polish Nowy Sącz" sixty km. from Perehrymka, his father, like other Lemko priests, took pains to send his sons sixty-five km. farther to Peremyshl—by horse, because as there was no railway connection—so that they might grow up "in a Ruthenian milieu."

Myshkovsky writes that the salary of a village priest was insufficient for supporting three sons at the gymnasium. Working the parish fields provided a supplement, but because they were located in mountainous country, the profit from them was meagre. The solution many priests sought was to provide a landlady-cook in Peremyshl with abundant food from the parish fields as payment for their services and as groceries for the students themselves. At the beginning of the school year the Myshkovsky brothers would arrive in the city loaded down with enough wheat, butter, and other food to last them until Christmas, at which time another load would be sent. Because of the distance, they did not travel home for Christmas or Easter.

Presumably in order to stress his anti-socialist views,[12] Myshkovsky notes that although many of his fellow students ate better than he, he never envied them. "And regarding my situation, neither from my parents at home, nor in Peremyshl from my older brothers, did I ever hear complaints about any kind of social injustice. It would never even have occurred to me that my situation should be better." {20, r.}[13]

In his "Avtobiohrafiia" Myshkovsky inserted a two-page addendum to draw attention to what he considered interesting aspects of elementary and gymnasium education of his day. He started school the year after the Habsburgs had granted effective control over most institutions in Galicia to the Poles, and notes that only Lviv and Brody still had German gymnasia (one in each city). In the first semester of grade one, pupils were taught to syllabify and read Polish. Only in the second semester was "Ruthenian reading" taught; it was mandatory for all pupils, even

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[12] Myshkovsky was apparently something of a monarchist, as is evident from his (very lonely) efforts to retain in the Liturgy the commemoration of some kind of royalty. See the Minutes of the Inter-Eparchial Liturgical Commission, TsDIAML, 406/1/16, fol. 4, r.

[13] Myshkovsky had relatively little to complain about, because even a member of a poor clerical family fared better than the average peasant.

Poles. Instruction in Ruthenian (i.e., Ukrainian) continued to the very end of grade four. In grade three the pupils were introduced to German. Myshkovsky writes that national consciousness among the Ruthenian children was very vibrant: "In class and among ourselves we always spoke Ruthenian. Whenever our teacher read the roll call (which actually occurred rarely), we demonstratively responded *'iesm'* [in Ruthenian] and not *'jestem'* [in Polish]. Our teacher, the director of the school Mykh[ailo] Kropyvnytsky, was also a Ruthenian and didn't oppose this." {21, r.}

Myshkovsky notes a particularity [of the school or of the time?] in the teaching of religion: grade three and four Ruthenian pupils assembled during the last period on Saturdays with copies of the booklet *Apostolŷ i Evanheliia*, and led by the catechist would translate the Church Slavonic text of next day's gospel. In gymnasium the study of liturgical texts and chants was expanded. Even though not officially mandated to do so, the catechist, Fr. Iustyn Zhelekhovsky,[14] would gather the students of the lower grades every Saturday after school and teach them the troparion/kontakion of the next day (to be sung before and after the homily), as well as the troparion/kontakion of any feast occurring during the coming week. Other ecclesiastical chants were also taught and translated. The catechist demanded strict attendance, even though he actually had no right to do so.

Another unofficial but consistent practice at Myshkovsky's gymnasium was attendance at daily [read] Liturgy during the warmer months, from Easter to the middle of October. The service began at 7:30 AM and was over by 8:00. Both the Polish and Greco-Catholic catechists had agreed to introduce the Liturgy; attendance required little effort because Polish and Greco-Catholic churches were both around the corner from the gymnasium. The students sang various chants during the low Mass [as was customary at the time under Latin influence]. What strikes the contemporary reader is the large number of canonical chants the students knew. They not only sang parts of the ordinary of the Liturgy, but, on Saturdays [sic] and Sundays during Liturgy [sic], the ordinary of Sunday Matins and the hirmoi of the canon in tone six. During paschaltide they sang the canon of Resurrection Matins, "Plotiiu," and the paschal aposticha. They even knew the *parastas*. Any modern-day pedagogue will wonder at the ability of an instructor to teach children

[14] Zhelekhovsky was a scholar in his own right, and wrote a study of the scholar, bishop of Peremyshl, and former dean of Vienna University's theology faculty, *Ioann Snihursky, eho zhyzn' i diiatelnost v Halytskoi Rusy* (Lviv, 1894). It was not uncommon for Galician gymnasium teachers to engage in higher academic pursuits.

such difficult, unmetrical pieces. Myshkovsky especially notes that paraliturgical music (various hymns) was reserved for the final part of the Liturgy, after the Lord's Prayer.

Myshkovsky mentions with pleasure that catechism in grades three and four—devoted to the New Testament and liturgics respectively—had a very practical orientation. In grade three the catechist would assign finding passages in the Church Slavonic scripture (some of the students had British Bible Society editions) and would then translate them with the class. The liturgics class was similar; there the ordinary psalms of Vespers and Matins were translated.

Myshkovsky mentions approvingly that this approach fostered the sense among the Ruthenian students that Church Slavonic was also *their* language and not a foreign tongue; he states that the latter notion "is unfortunately sometimes the case [today]." Even the punishment for whispering during class involved the use of a Church Slavonic liturgical or biblical text: students who were caught had to copy the phrase "Lord, set a guard on my mouth and a strong door about my lips [LXX Ps. 140: 3]." Our author opines that the system of education at the time was good: "Anyone willing to learn benefitted greatly." {21, v.}

Myshkovsky's attitude towards Church Slavonic deserves comment. From other sources we learn that he was a leading member of the pre-World War I clerical Society of St. John Chrysostom (Obshchestvo sv. Ioanna Zlatoustaho), which fought against the introduction of prayers in the vernacular, arguing that vernacular use would mean Greco-Catholics would be rejecting their heritage. A Lviv archive contains a twelve-page protest in Russian sent to Sheptytsky and dated 14 December 1910; signed by almost 100 priests belonging to the society, it complains that the Populists want to introduce a vernacular version of the Lord's Prayer into public use, and notes that in some schools the continued use of Church Slavonic is being criticized by teachers.[15]

Theology at the Barbareum

In 1880 Myshkovsky began theological studies at the Greco-Catholic Central Seminary attached to St. Barbara's Church in Vienna.[16] At the time the program accepted twenty-six "theologians": twelve students each from Lviv and Peremyshl eparchies, and two from Križevci eparchy

[15] See TsDIAML, 358/2/38.

[16] For a history of this institution, see W. Plöchl, *St. Barbara zu Wien: Die Geschichte der griechisch-katholischen Kirche und Zentralpfarre St. Barbara*, 2 vols. (Vienna, 1975).

[Croatia]. Two additional places were also funded for doctoral students from the Lviv and Peremyshl sees respectively, but they were not filled at the time. The rector during most of Myshkovsky's stay was the noted church historian Iuliian Pelesh (Julian Pelesz).[17]

Myshkovsky notes with pleasure that the seminarians were free to attend lectures in other faculties. Only the rector's permission was required. Having obtained credits for courses in philosophy, for example, some theology students (the author mentions Onyshkevych and Ohonovsky) were then qualified to occupy university chairs in both theology and philosophy. Some seminarians avoided ordination and took up teaching these subjects.

Myshkovsky took full advantage of other courses. He was particularly interested in history and languages, and studied Italian, French, English, Arabic, and "Babylonian cuneiform writing." He even attended classes in astronomy. During some semesters his "index" would list up to forty hours of lectures per week. All of the courses included a practicum.

The "Avtobiohrafiia" is not without humour. In his fourth year, for example, Myshkovsky enrolled in English, and was the only theology student in the entire university to do so. The first semester was devoted to grammar. In the second, the lecturer, an Englishman named Begster [Baxter?] taught literature only in English. On several occasions Myshkovsky was the only student present: "Not embarrassed [by the empty room], Mr. Begster would mount the podium intently and read his lecture to the end. I sat there listening, giving the impression that I understood everything, while in fact I understood nothing. Lecture concluded, Mr. Begster would exit just as serious as he entered, and I [would follow] after him. Both of us were satisfied: I because I had performed my obligation, he because at least one student was there to hear him." {22, r.}

Regarding his enrolment in a wide range of courses, Myshkovsky exhibits something of his intellectual character when he writes: "I did this without any definite goal—'just in case,' as it were. Who knows how it might come in handy some day, so why not study when the opportunity exists." {ibid.}

Myshkovsky then describes the seminary's atmosphere. He notes with satisfaction that *inner* discipline characterized it during most of his stay. Even though, de jure, the rules were identical to those of any

[17] Author of *Geschichte der Union der ruthenishen Kirche mit Rom von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart*, 2 vols. (Vienna, 1878, 1880).

Catholic seminary at the time, de facto the students were trusted to maintain good order on their own. The seminary building adjoined the university, and many outsiders passed through it to enter the latter's precincts. As a result, the seminary effectively had no cloister. Also, one could come in after 10:00 PM. While students could receive permission to go to the opera on occasion, they never bothered with the formality because of the open-door policy. Myshkovsky notes that Pelesh and the spiritual director, Fr. [Teodor] Piurko, were fully cognizant of the situation, having been students at the Barbareum themselves.[18] Had they wished, they could have expelled many a student for infringement of rules. During Myshkovsky's four years there, however, Pelesh only once conducted a nocturnal inspection of the students' rooms.

Myshkovsky notes that during his stay at the Barbareum there were no scandals, no one ever came home the least bit inebriated, and there were no informants. He muses that while one cannot dismiss the possibility that certain seminarians behaved inappropriately, "nevertheless such behavior remains the secret of anyone [who may have been] guilty. In fact, such behavior was probably rare." {30, r.}

Myshkovsky paints a rather idyllic portrait. "The point was to make sure that our freedom didn't adversely affect our studies. Our best candidates—when possible *emynentysty* who always excelled in their work—were sent to Vienna. Our institution enjoyed a very good reputation among the professors, much like the students of the Hungarian seminary, the Frintaneum. We were called 'Greeks.' A traditional pride compelled our students to avoid being shamed[. ...] Never did a 'Greek' fail an exam." {30, v.} He notes that another reason that his fellow students avoided failure was fear of being sent back to Lviv. (Below we shall see his criticism of the Lviv seminary.

This idyllic situation was suddenly marred in 1883 when Pelesh was transferred to Lviv and was replaced by Metropolitan Sylvester Sembratovych's thirty-year-old cousin, the Rev. Dr. Teofil Sembratovych—"a new example of ecclesiastical nepotism." Even though he considered him a "good man," Myshkovsky believed that the new rector was not up to his important post. "He did not enjoy the respect of the seminarians, and his short stature even reinforced this." {ibid.} Sembratovych's failings contributed to a decline in academic standards. "The theology professors

[18] Myshkovsky's places quotations marks around "Barbareum" because this was the proper name of the Viennese institution only from 1774 to 1783. When an imperial seminary and residence for Greco-Catholics was reopened in 1803, it was named a *Konvikt*.

noticed that these were no longer the 'Greeks' of former times. The seminary's old prestige had faded." {ibid.}

Adding to the problem was the relocation of Vienna University in 1885 to a new site one and a half km. away from the "Barbareum." The need to walk this distance to class apparently diminished the students' fervor. One year later the seminary even lost its attractive site and imposing garden when it was also moved to the opposite end of the former university complex.

In 1893 the Barbareum was closed down permanently. On this point Myshkovsky's text merits full citation:

> This institution had been a great boon for our people from the Austrian government, [designated] especially for the education of our young clergy. The Poles didn't enjoy such an opportunity. In 1889, using monies from the Religious Fund, the government built a large new edifice for the Greco-Catholic seminary in Lviv intended for students from all three Galician eparchies. Apparently at that time no one even thought of building separate eparchial seminaries in Peremyshl and Stanyslaviv.
>
> Second, after the inauguration of the New Era, they [the Ruthenians' foes] realized that the Vienna seminary was simply too much of a kindness to the Ruthenians; and they wished to end it. In order to keep up appearances, however, they sought the agreement of Metropolitan Sylvester [Sembratovych].
>
> After the inauguration of the New Era the metropolitan considered himself an important man; and besides he was already dreaming of the cardinal's purple. Thus he obsequiously agreed. The negotiations were conducted in the greatest secrecy. Entirely unexpectedly, like lightning from the blue, an imperial decree was communicated regarding the closing of the Vienna institution [the Barbareum] and the opening of eparchial seminaries in Peremyshl and Stanyslaviv. This happened in 1893. Negotiations were held in such secrecy that the metropolitan hadn't even said a word about the change to his own cousin, Fr. Teofil Sembratovych, who, as rector, naturally was directly interested in the issue. Just like everyone else, Fr. Teofil was taken entirely unawares by the fait accompli. The closing of the seminary occurred as soon as the school year was over; and yet they were not very quick to open the new eparchial seminaries in Peremyshl and Stanyslaviv. In Stanyslaviv the opening followed relatively soon. But in Peremyshl it wasn't until the beginning of the world war in 1914 that this happened. {31, r.}

The New Era mentioned here was a failed attempt, inaugurated in 1890, to forge an alliance between Poles and Ukrainians in Galicia. It was supported on the Ukrainian side by the Populists and was immediately opposed by the Russophiles. While most secular politicians repudiated

the alliance by 1894, Sembratovych attempted to remain faithful to it.[19]

Doctoral Studies

In 1884 Myshkovsky completed his basic theological studies and decided to remain celibate. That year he began doctoral studies and was ordained a priest in December. He writes that the late Bishop Ioann Stupnytsky of Peremyshl was pleased with his decision to pursue further studies, because in the preceding ten years only three Galician seminarians had completed doctoral degrees: Fr. [Iosyf] Komarnytsky [in Vienna] and Frs. [Nykolai] Malyniak and [Teofil] Sembratovych in Rome.

Myshkovsky wanted to reside at the "Barbareum," and writes that Stupnytsky was happy to oblige. After his ordination, however, he was informed by the bishop that he would have to live instead at the Augustineum, which housed doctoral candidates from all of the dioceses of Austria-Hungary. The change was due to a warning presented to Stupnytsky from Vienna by the imperial minister Florian Zemiałkowski.[20] The letter stated that "Myshkovsky conspicuously uses the Russian language." Myshkovsky writes: "By the way I should remark that I did I did not yet know Russian, I was not personally acquainted with Zemiałkowski; and in general, as a theology student I hadn't moved in Polish circles." {22, v.}

Nonetheless, in March 1885 our author found himself at the Augustineum. Initially he was embittered by the inability to remain "among [his] own at St. Barbara's." Eventually, however, he came to appreciate the Augustineum because the encounter there with students from various parts of the empire broadened his horizons. Even East Galician Poles resided there, and Myshkovsky notes that "in the foreign land we got along fine." Among his fellow students was the future archbishop Józef Bilczewski, whose surname at the time was still Biba. (As the Roman-rite archbishop of Lviv [1900–23], Bilczewski was one of Sheptytsky's greatest opponents.[21])

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[19] See Kost Levytsky, *Istoriia politychnoi dumky halytskykh ukraintsiv, 1848–1914*, vol. 2 (Lviv, 1927), 235–43; and Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule," in his *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History* (Edmonton, 1987), 339–41.

[20] Myshkovsky notes that the text of this warning was published in *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka*, vol. 85, which also contains all of Zemiałkowski's correspondence with Stupnytsky.

[21] See Andrzej A. Zięba, "Sheptyts'kyi in Polish Public Opinion," in Paul R. Magocsi, ed., *Morality and Reality: The Life and Times of Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Edmonton, 1989), 380–1.

Myshkovsky mentions that eight places were reserved at the Augustineum for Galician students, irrespective of rite. It is possible that he was the only Greco-Catholic there at the time, as he does not mention any co-ritualists.

Seminary Prefecture and Teaching in Lviv

Myshkovsky received his doctorate in June 1889. He returned to Peremyshl, but then moved to the Lviv seminary to fill one of four prefectures (the Peremyshl and Lviv sees were each allocated two such positions). Metropolitan Sembratovych received Myshkovsky very warmly (we shall see later how dramatically this changed), and Stupnytsky did not place any obstacles in the way. Myshkovsky arrived at the beginning of the school year just as the seminary was moving into its new, impressive complex. The rector then was the Rev. Dr. [Oleksander] Bachynsky.

In addition to his post as prefect of studies until 1894, Myshkovsky received a position as adjunct professor in Lviv University's theology faculty. The university had two such adjuncts, one Greco-Catholic, the other Roman-rite, who replaced instructors wherever needed. Such a professor received 105 guldens per year even if he never once substituted for anyone. Myshkovsky's two-year appointment was renewed twice, and he thus served in this capacity until 1895.

Regarding the seminary, Myshkovsky writes:

> At the "spiritual institution" I encountered attitudes that were not exactly spiritual. The system was that of the old Josephine model: a barrack, except without the order and discipline of a barrack.[22] All that was expected was that the seminarian get through the four years of theology and pass his exams. On this basis he was considered a fully qualified candidate for a religious vocation. As for the rest, [e.g.,] the priestly spirit, the prevailing attitude was, "All these things shall be added unto you."
>
> Expulsions from the seminary occurred easily, for [both] greater or lesser infractions. Within several months, however, once the new school year had begun, those expelled invariably would be accepted back into the seminary.
>
> A noteworthy phenomenon in the institution at this time was the constant opposition of the students to the rector, Fr. Bachynsky. Sometimes actual revolts ensued. His treatment of the seminarians

[22] According to the system introduced by Emperor Joseph II, clergy were to be good citizens first; their primary task was to enlighten the emperor's subjects, and spiritual formation was secondary.

> lacked a fatherly appeal. Usually the seminarians rebelled because of the quality of the food. Sometimes, bitterness about [the use of] student informants was an additional factor. {23, r.}

In a supplement to his narrative, Myshkovsky writes:

> Even beyond the walls of the seminary people generally knew of the disorder there. The students themselves spoke of it to everyone. Thus seminarians were viewed badly even in government circles, and even gave the latter grounds for interference. When, in April 1890, another protest was organized by the second-year students, who demonstratively vacated the building, the ministry informed the metropolitan through an official decree that it would refuse to acquiesce to these students' ordination, and would not provide monies from the Religious Fund for their upkeep at the seminary. Also, the ministry insisted that should any of these students finish theology after all, they would not be granted the *titulus mensae* required for ordination. Those expelled were specifically named. Among them were Hryhorii Khomyshyn (later a bishop), Vasylii Kozohon (subsequently Tomovych, a canon of the Lviv cathedral), and Ioann Rudii (subsequently Rudovych, a Lviv catechist). The ministry's decision was not implemented, however. {31, v.}

The reference to Khomyshyn is noteworthy.[23] As a Russophile, Myshkovsky would have taken pleasure in indicating any of Khomyshyn's flaws. Myshkovsky remarks that opposition to the rector was so great that it distracted the seminarians from their own divisions into "hard" and "soft" Ruthenians. Even though the two groups frowned upon each other, their antipathy never erupted into open conflict. Myshkovsky adds: "Even though I myself was of the hard persuasion, I never got involved in any discussions with students over this issue. And yet this was precisely at the time that the Metropolitan and members of the Sejm had declared the New Era. As an adjunct in the theology faculty I was substituting for the New Testament professor, Dr. [Iliarii] Vatsyk, in the first semester of the 1890–1 academic year. During exams in February 1891 it so happened that I failed a fair number of our students, and of these, significantly more 'hard' ones. Consequently the students jokingly suggested to me that I myself had introduced the New Era at exams." {23, v.}

Only once was Myshkovsky compelled to indicate his Ruthenian "hardness." In July 1893, during a meeting of the rectorate regarding certification for graduation, the prefect, Fr. [Ioann] Chapelsky, proposed

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[23] Petro Melnychuk's quasi-hagiographic *Vladyka Hryhorii Khomyshyn: Patriot, misionar, muchenyk* (Rome and Philadelphia, 1979), the only book about Khomyshyn, does not refer to this incident.

that in the certificate of the student Iuliian Dzerovych a note be attached to the effect that at the seminary he had been an agitator and leader of the "hard" party. "The two of us engaged in a bitter exchange," writes Myshkovsky of his reaction to Chapelsky's proposal. "The only one to support Chapelsky's motion was the prefect, [the Rev.] Dr. [Stefan] Iuryk. In the end, after much wavering, no remark was appended to Dzerovych's certificate after all." {ibid.} From other sources we know that Dzerovych went on to become a respected catechetics professor of Populist persuasion at the Lviv Theological Academy.[24]

Returning to the question of disorder at the seminary, Myshkovsky comments that in his conversations with Sembratovych he frankly proffered the following suggestion: "After a comprehensive analysis of the situation, remove every cause (at times justified) of bitterness. Once this has been done, never again allow the seminarians to get away with any mutinous behavior." {ibid.} Myshkovsky believed there should be no half-measures. On one occasion he told the metropolitan: "We've sunk into the mud so deep with our seminary that it will be hard to get out of it without getting dirty. In my opinion, the options are either to retreat or to proceed decisively and without looking about. We will either make it through the mud, or drown in it." {ibid.}

To Myshkovsky's dismay, however, after the protest of 1890 (which involved Khomyshyn) Sembratovych again displayed indecisiveness. The metropolitan wanted some students to be expelled for good and others to be readmitted after an eight-day retreat. Sembratovych asked the seminary staff to vote on the case of each seminarian individually. Myshkovsky objected that all the students should be treated equally; thus he voted to readmit all of them. While this did not please Sembratovych, the latter still maintained good relations with Myshkovsky.

Tensions with Sembratovych

Myshkovsky's rift with Sembratovych—a menacing breach that was to last to the latter's death in 1898—occurred in conjunction with the inauguration of the New Era. Sembratovych had addressed the Sejm in support of the new Polish-Ruthenian alliance, and according to Myshkovsky, he began pressuring clergy of the "hard" party to support this policy. The metropolitan personally tried to sway Myshkovsky on several occasions, but the latter "politely, yet firmly, defended [my own] point of view." This was the beginning of the estrangement.

Myshkovsky writes that "all of these conversations with the

[24] See *Svitylnyk istyny*, 1: 224–5.

metropolitan were carefully recorded in my notes" {24, r.}, which is the first indication that Myshkovsky kept such records.[25] He makes reference to them to emphasize that they were the only place where he unburdened his soul. "If anyone else knew of these conversations, then it could only have been from the metropolitan." {ibid.}

The consequences of Sembratovych's antipathy toward Myshkovsky emerged gradually. In 1891 the metropolitan appointed Myshkovsky to a teaching position at a technical institute in Lviv that no other catechist was willing to accept because it did not include a salary. Twenty students were required for government funding of the position, and until then the quota had never been met. But that year, at the last minute, enough students did enrol. Suddenly other priests were volunteering for the job, but, oddly enough, Sembratovych retained Myshkovsky in spite of mounting tensions between them.

The director of the technical institute was a certain Gerstmann, who was also a member of the Galician school administration. He took a liking to Myshkovsky, and when a good catechetical position opened at a gymnasium in Ternopil, Gerstmann recommended him for the job. It seems other authorities within the school administration were also backing Myshkovsky. But when the appointment was submitted to Sembratovych for approval, he refused to give it. Instead, the metropolitan proposed the Rev. Dr. [Dionysii] Dorozhynsky, the son-in-law of one of his mitred archpriests, [Andrei] Biletsky.

Myshkovsky was notified through a third party that the metropolitan wanted him to apply for a position as professor of pastoral theology in Peremyshl, "because there will be no place for him in Lviv." Later Sembratovych told Myshkovsky that even should he not receive the job in Peremyshl, he would not be able to stay on at the Lviv seminary. Among the reasons Sembratovych gave was the fact that Myshkovsky had applied for the position in Ternopil against his will.

Myshkovsky's application for the professorship in Peremyshl was accepted. He had several interviews with Pelesh, placed first in the qualifying exam, and at the beginning of 1894 received the charter for the position from Pelesh's ordinariate. This time, however, it was the viceroy of Galicia himself, Kazimierz Badeni, who blocked the appointment. Myshkovsky writes that Pelesh was so annoyed by Badeni's action that he refused to fill the position, and it was not filled until after Pelesh's death in 1896.

According to Myshkovsky, Badeni succumbed to "agitation against

[25] I did not come across any such notes in the Lviv archives.

[Myshkovsky] by the pillar of the New Era, Oleksander Barvinsky.[26] For the first time in his entire "Avtobiohrafiia" Myshkovsky switches from Russian to Ukrainian to quote Barvinsky's attack on him in the June 1893 issue of the latter's monthly, *Pravda*, which Myshkovsky says the Radicals called a *Polizeiblatt*. There Barvinsky wrote: "It is commonly known that when Dr. Myshkovsky, the prefect of the [Lviv] seminary, who conspicuously acknowledges his common-Russian [*obshcherusski*] beliefs, was summoned by the metropolitan and asked to reject his views and begin using the vernacular [*narodna mova*], he [Myshkovsky] declared decisively that he would not. And what happened? Behold, he is to be transferred as a professor of theology to Peremyshl, where he will be training young clergy. This is the kind of 'punishment' that Myshkovsky will be receiving for his obstinacy." {25, r.} As a result a controversy erupted over Myshkovsky's appointment, and Gerstmann also changed his attitude toward him.

In March 1894 Sembratovych came to the seminary to notify Myshkovsky of Badeni's decision. In the presence of the rector, the metropolitan repeatedly reproached him, insisting that he had brought this fate upon himself. Sembratovych also stated that he had told Badeni that in light of the controversy in the periodical, as metropolitan he was obliged to remove Myshkovsky from the seminary.

Just before Myshkovsky began experiencing problems because of his Russophilism, the seminary's rector, Oleksander Bachynsky, was dismissed and replaced by Canon Lev Turkevych. Myshkovsky writes, presumably referring to his earlier complaints about Bachynsky's lack of fatherly appeal, "Previously Sembratovych had defended Bachynsky so insistently. Was Sembratovych now admitting his previous mistake? Probably not, as this would not have been in line with his character. Instead he was probably giving in to public opinion and its demands, or more precisely, to the higher demands of the policies related to the currents of his New Era." {ibid.} He then writes: "During the paschal festivities at St. George's Cathedral, the former rector Bachynsky approached me and said [quoting scripture in Church Slavonic]: 'If they expelled me, they shall expel you also'." {ibid.} Myshkovsky thus indicates that Bachynsky was also removed for his Russophilism.

One must distinguish, however, between the two men's orientations. While Myshkovsky was a linguistic and cultural Russophile, Bachynsky was more of a staunch "Old Ruthenian." Even though Bachynsky headed

[26] Barvinsky was a renowned civic leader and educator. See *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 1 (Toronto, 1984), 180–1.

the Society of St. John Chrysostom for some time, he wrote in *iazychiie* (bookish Ruthenian) or pre-standard Galician Ukrainian, and never in Russian. In fact, he remained a prominent figure in the Greco-Catholic establishment even after his demotion, and Sembratovych made him his chancellor. Upon his death in 1933 he received an effusive eulogy from Slipy himself.[27]

Demotion and Transfer to St. George's Complex

At the end of the 1894 school year Myshkovsky left the seminary to take up residence in far more modest quarters at St. George's complex. Later his mother and two sisters moved in with him, and a kitchen was added to their three small rooms on the top floor of the complex.

Myshkovsky interrupts his narrative to draw attention to another sign of Sembratovych's antipathy. Upon his arrival in Lviv five years earlier, Myshkovsky immediately began the process of being habilitated as docent of biblical studies at the Lviv theological faculty. The professors there received him warmly, and in 1892 he published his habilitation dissertation, *Chronologico-historica i introductio in Novum Testamentum,* which was approved by the college of professors and reviewed favorably in the journals *Przegląd Powszechny, Stimmen von Maria Laach, Literarischer Handweiser, Duhovy pastir* (Ljubljana), and *Folium periodicum archidioecesis Goritiensis.* He passed the necessary colloquium and successfully delivered a trial lecture, and in 1893 the faculty recommended to the ministry that he be hired. In accordance with the formality of the time, the ministry turned to the ordinariate for approval. The approval was not forthcoming. Instead, Sembratovych filed away the form in his desk, where it remained until his death. Thus Myshkovsky was not given a full-time university position until 1899. Also because of Sembratovych's opposition, Myshkovsky's contract as adjunct was not renewed in 1896. Having been relieved of his duties at the seminary, Myshkovsky was given the far less prominent positions of registrar at the Lviv Metropolitan Consistory, chaplain of a women's prison, and secretary of the marriage tribunal. He also continued his work as catechist at the technical institute.

On occasion various individuals, both acquaintances and virtual strangers, would offer their sympathy to Myshkovsky. He records the

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[27] See Ivan Khoma and Iurii Fedoriv, comps., *Tvory Kyr Iosyfa, verkhovnoho arkhyiepyskopa i kardynala,* vols. 3–4 (Rome, 1970), 755–7. Bachynsky's textbooks in theology and canon law were used by at least two, if not three, generations of seminarians.

humourous remarks of a canon, Karachevsky, who had the habit of speaking Polish, even though, according to Myshkovsky, he was not a "*poliakuiushchyi.*" The canon appeared at Myshkovsky's desk one day and consoled him in Polish: "Don't get down about the fact that they've made you, a doctor of theology, the registrar. You shouldn't think, as some do, that this job is so low. Not at all! Remember, a registrar must have his head about him. It's not everyone who can be a good secretary. On the other hand, anyone can be a bishop; if you don't know something, you get others to do the job for you. But with a registrar it just isn't that way." {25, v.}

Our autobiographer notes that he could never complain about any monotony in his work. Everyday he was out of bed by 5:30 AM. As a "magister universalis" he was teaching everyone, "from the lowliest to the most exalted, from elementary level to university." {26, r.} He notes that at the prison for women a school had been established for illiterate young offenders, presumably with his help.

Myshkovsky also became general *referent* (reviewer) and secretary for marriage cases. He mentions, however, that during his entire tenure in the position the marriage tribunal never met, and not a single annulment case was ever reviewed. He nonetheless was required to record other proceedings, and notes that before *mitrat* [mitred priest] Biletsky would sign the documents, Myshkovsky's orthography and expressions were always corrected by the *mitrat* "according to the official system."

Myshkovsky's moving out of the seminary did not change Sembratovych's attitude towards him:

> Having taken up my new duties I went to present myself to the metropolitan. He said to me, "I did what I had threatened to do, but not to punish you, but only because I couldn't keep you at the seminary." Two weeks later, on the eve of [Fr.] Mykhail Synhalevych's nameday at the latter's archpresbytery, I approached the metropolitan to kiss his hand, at which point he removed it and only stared at me intently. But it was at the end of that month that he really got angry when I submitted my salary requisition form not in the official school language [etymological orthography], but also not in Russian.[28] The discussion heated up until he asserted: "I will suspend you." At that point I said: "In that case I request that you put the suspension in writing so that I might submit the matter to the Apostolic See [Rome]." To this the metropolitan retorted angrily: "And what if I don't feel like it?!" {26, r.}

Subsequently Myshkovsky was excluded from the assisting clergy (as

[28] This is only the second (and last) time that Myshkovsky uses the word "*rossyiskyi.*"

deacon [according to the Latinized custom of the time]) at solemn cathedral services. When, in March 1895, Myshkovsky submitted a request to read literature listed in the *Index of Forbidden Books*, he received the reply: "The applicant has not earned the necessary trust." {ibid.} Shortly afterwards he was notified by Biletsky on behalf of the vacationing Sembratovych that in addition to not being recommended for a renewal of his position as adjunct, he would also be removed from his teaching job at the technical institute. But the latter never occurred. In 1895 Dr. Skrokhovsky, the church-history professor at Lviv University, died. The college of professors proposed Myshkovsky as an interim replacement. Sembratovych again withheld his consent.

Myshkovsky mentions that as secretary of the marriage tribunal he noticed that in the past many dispensations had been granted improperly. According to him, this was a result of mismanagement and ignorance. Consequently, after two years at his post, Myshkovsky prepared a report to the Roman Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith on behalf of the ordinariate listing all of the marriages requiring a *sanatio in radice*. The Congregation was so pleased with this display of conscientiousness that it responded with high praises for the metropolitan. Sembratovych accepted the praise without, however, even thanking Myshkovsky.

Our autobiographer then writes that he tried to keep his distance from Sembratovych. He absented himself from the latter's cardinalate investiture festivities in 1896, and stopped attending the dinners given by the metropolitan for the Feasts of the Holy Protectress, Theophany, Holy Eucharist, and St. George. Myshkovsky writes that he presumed that Sembratovych would not even notice his absence. Evidently he did, however, because after a while he gave the order to stop inviting him.

When, in 1896, Bishop Pelesh died, Myshkovsky again applied for the pastoral-theology professorship in Peremyshl. But the new bishop, Konstantyn Chekhovych, appointed the Rev. Dr. [Mykhail] Liudkevych, who had been substituting during the interim. After a delay in the appeal process in Lviv, Myshkovsky decided to plead his case with authorities in Rome. The Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith requested an opinion from Chekhovych, who wrote that "Myshkovsky is a sympathizer of the Schism and dangerous to the Catholic Church." {27, r} Consequently the response from Rome in 1898 stated that "the bishop [Chekhovych] had used his [legitimate] right in rejecting Myshkovsky." {ibid.} It was not until Chekhovych's death in 1916 that Myshkovsky learned of the latter's accusation. The Rev. [Vasylii] Romanovsky, sworn to secrecy, had reviewed the opinion sent to the Congregation; he considered himself released from his oath upon the bishop's death and told Myshkovsky about Chekhovych's accusations.

During my research, I found nothing that would indicate that there was any substance to Chekhovych's accusations. (Myshkovsky's brother, Fr. Ivan, might have had Orthodox leanings, however. In 1912 he wrote to Myshkovsky from his parish in Pennsylvania complaining, inter alia, that in a recent pastoral letter Sheptytsky had forcefully defended the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, the person of St. Josaphat, the maximalist interpretation of papal primacy, and the Church Union of Brest.[29])

Myshkovsky writes that he also tried other ways to get out of Sembratovych's sight. In 1897 he applied (unsuccessfully) for the newly opened position of canon of the Peremyshl cathedral. After being turned down, he requested assignment to a village church near Mostyska, Peremyshl eparchy, but Chekhovych would not accept him into his jurisdiction. Finally he asked to become assistant at the Lviv Dormition Church [the famous "Wallachian Church"]. Not only did Sembratovych reject the request, but the pastor, Fr. [Teofil] Pavlykiv, told Myshkovsky: "I am old, my days are numbered, and I would like to have an assistant whom I could rely on in perfect peace, and not someone who would poison my last days." {ibid.} This is certainly ironic given that Pavlykiv had been a leading member of the Ruthenian Council, an organization founded to continue the legacy of the Supreme Ruthenian Council that, in Pavlykiv's time, had become Russophile.[30]

Change of Fortune and Return to Academe

In a single paragraph Myshkovsky mentions Sembratovych's death (August 1898) and the succession from Metropolitan Iuliian Kuilovsky (1899–1900) to Sheptytsky. He then returns to academic matters. "Immediately after the death of Cardinal Sembratovych the theology faculty recalled me as its adjunct. Also, [after] retrieving my habilitation [certificate] from Sembratovych's files, the case was quickly expedited. The ministry received the papers and within eight months I was hired as privat-docent in New Testament. In 1902 the appointment was extended to include the Old Testament." [The CV adds 'and Semitic dialects.'] {17, v.} In the latter year I was also appointed a consultor and *referent* [in various areas of competence] of the Lviv Metropolitan Consistory." {27, r.}

This latter appointment, of course, signalled a radical change in Myshkovsky's relations with the metropoly's bureaucracy, but he proffers

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[29] See TsDIAML, 201/4b/169, fol. 16, r.

[30] See *EU*, 5 (1966): 1917; and 7 (1973): 2657.

no comments about it. In 1902 he was appointed interim professor at Lviv University, replacing the deceased Rev. Dr. Klymentii Sarnytsky, and one year later he became extraordinary [associate] professor of biblical studies. Myshkovsky notes that usually extraordinary professors were promoted to ordinary [full professor] status within three years, but his promotion did not take place until 1908. He does not state any reasons for the delay.

In that year, as an ordinary professor, Myshkovsky was required to swear an oath of allegiance to the crown in the presence of the imperial viceroy, Count Andrzej Potocki. Myshkovsky writes that the count was put into a disconcerting position when Myshkovsky requested that the oath be administered "in Ruthenian." Potocki replied that no one had ever asked to take the oath in that language, and a text in Ruthenian was nowhere to be found.[31] Myshkovsky was told to return home and that he would be notified once such a text was located. The new professor was never recalled, however, and so remained unsworn to the very collapse of the Habsburg Empire. Myshkovsky notes: "This in no way reflected on my unfailing loyalty to the emperor and the state." {27, v.} Incidentally, he says nothing about the assassination of Potocki, which took place very shortly after their meeting.

Confinement during World War I

The reader will naturally wonder how such an unabashed Russophile fared during the war, when 30,000 Galician Ukrainians were interned, and hundreds hanged, by Austrian authorities from 1914 through 1917 for suspected pro-Russian sympathies and activities. Surprisingly, Myshkovsky survived the war almost unscathed. He was vacationing at his summer cottage in Luhy (Dolyna county) at the outbreak of fighting, and knew next to nothing about it because of the absence of newspapers at the summer lodging. It was the morning of 28 August (the Feast of the Dormition) when he first heard artillery shelling in the distance. Except for occasional patrols, however, Russian [he uses "*russki*," not "*rossiiski*"] troops never even made their way to Myshkovsky's cottage, and lived there peacefully with his two sisters until 21 February 1915, when the Austrian army regained Luhy and immediately arrested him. He was led, initially on foot, by three German-speaking soldiers to the military court

[31] It is hard to determine which language Myshkovsky has in mind. If by "*po russki*" he means the Galician Ukrainian vernacular, then it is surprising that no one had asked to use that language before. If he means Russian, then the absence of a text in that language would have been in keeping with Austrian policy, because Russian was not a recognized language of the Habsburg Empire.

in nearby Perehonsko [Perehinske]. Myshkovsky notes that the soldiers were very polite; in fact, when he developed influenza halfway to Perehonsko, they allowed him to ride the rest of the way. Only occasionally did bystanders jeer him as he was led along. Surprisingly, the judges in Perehonsko were not only polite; they were actually friendly. The military court ruled that Myshkovsky should simply be confined to the borders of the empire. Thus he was first taken to Marmaroschsiget [now Sighetul Marmaţiei in Romania] for several days, then moved to Erlau [now Eger] for six weeks, and finally transported alone, without a convoy, to "the beautiful mountain village of Faistenau near Salzburg." Here he was only required to report to the gendarmerie twice daily and remain within the vicinity. He was lodged at an inn close to the village church and rectory. "My confinement transpired peacefully, without any incidents whatsoever." {28, r.}

Immediately upon arriving in Faistenau, Myshkovsky paid a visit to the local priest, a middle-aged man named Bäumer, who welcomed him warmly and invited him to use his library and approach him with any needs. Bäumer then returned the visit. Three days later, however, when the two met on the street and engaged in a long conversation, the chief of the gendarmerie passed by, at which point the Austrian priest suggested that they should not be seen together again because earlier in the war the same chief had upbraided him for entering into cordial relations with Czech intellectuals interned there. After this Myshkovsky and Bäumer stopped meeting privately, but remained extremely friendly during their chance encounters. Later, when Myshkovsky's confinement order was lifted, Bäumer immediately visited him and invited him to lunch.

Myshkovsky spent his time reading (e.g., *Linzer Quartalschrift* and the notices of the *Universal-Bibliothek*) and strolling through the countryside. Being without vestments, liturgical books, and *litterae testimoniales*, he did not serve Liturgy for the longest time. When he eventually received these items, Bäumer was very happy to assist him; he even procured special flour for the *prosphora*. Myshkovsky received no mail from anyone in Galicia until after the Russian retreat in July 1915. His first communication was a card from *mitrat* Biletsky, who informed him of his two sisters' flight to Rostov-na-Donu. (Most Galicians who retreated with the Russian army settled in the vicinity of Rostov, at least temporarily.[32]) Also included in the card was a note, which while hardly humorous—as Myshkovsky insists—nonetheless made him smile because of Biletsky's

[32] See *EU*, 5: 1654.

telegraphic style and infamous lack of punctuation. The note, in German, read: "With God's grace everything here is going very well[.] M. Szeptycki [Metropolitan Sheptytsky] is in Kursk[.] Czechowicz [Chekhovych] died 28. IV."

End of Confinement

In 1916 Myshkovsky was put on Lviv University's reclamation list, and in March of that year Vienna's Kriegsüberwachungsamt issued permission for him to return to Lviv. He notes that it was common for the latter office to seek the consent of the [representative] Central "Ukrainian" [Myshkovsky's punctuation] Committee [the General Ukrainian Council] in Vienna. Myshkovsky writes that this did not occur in his case apparently because people at the committee thought that the University "was reclaiming some Pole." {28, v.}

On his way back to Lviv, Myshkovsky stopped briefly at Thalerhof [near Graz] to visit interned relatives [thousands of Galicians were held in an internment camp there]. He says that he was not allowed to stay longer. After celebrating Easter in Vienna, he arrived at the beginning of May in Lviv, where he "took up his obligations." Here Myshkovsky notes that during his internment he had kept a journal. (A fragment of the latter was published on p. 151 of the 1932 *Talerhofskii al'manakh* [Lviv].)

Upon his return to Lviv a new problem faced Myshkovsky. From 1904 to 1914 he had lived in an apartment at the Narodnyi Dim society's building. After the Russian retreat the Austrians closed the latter establishment and appointed a certain Smulka to administer the society's property. By court order Smulka managed to prevent Myshkovsky from reclaiming the apartment and thus compelled him to seek lodging elsewhere. Myshkovsky writes: "Smulka really didn't have any need of my quarters; apparently someone else had put him up to this." {29, r.}

Harassment by Polish Authorities

Just as Austria collapsed in 1918, Myshkovsky was granted his second five-year contract as full professor. He writes: "When Poland occupied Eastern Galicia in the spring of 1919, that May the Polish administration immediately asked us university professors (as well as others) for an oath of loyalty and obedience to the Polish State without waiting for the decision of the international congress [Paris Peace Conference] regarding Poland's eastern borders." {ibid.} Myshkovsky did not take the oath. On a theology faculty form he wrote in Polish that while his refusal to swear allegiance was not categorical, he nonetheless considered it premature until such time as the border was definitively settled.

No doubt as a result of this, on 12 June 1919 Myshkovsky was relieved of all duties at the university without pay for that month. He writes that Prof. [Kyrylo] Studynsky of the philosophy faculty met the same fate. (Later this will be important.) After several months both of them were reinstated, but only as employees awaiting further assignment and not as full-time instructors. From December 1919 they received ninety percent of their entitlement.

In October 1921, writes Myshkovsky, "our theological lyceum at the seminary" was opened. In his CV he uses the more common term "theological faculty." {18, r.}] Myshkovsky started lecturing on the Old Testament there, but received only a token salary because his entitlement from the university was sufficient for his needs. In his CV he states that during the first year of the faculty's existence, he formally served as dean, although duties were actually carried out by the seminary's rector, the Rev. Dr. Tyt Halushchynsky. Regarding his purely formal deanship, Myshkovsky adds in parentheses the somewhat cryptic note that he still considered himself a professor of the university.

Myshkovsky then adds the following information regarding the way in which he was finally deprived of his university entitlement.

> In 1929 Dr. Studynsky decided to show off his Bolshevik sentiments in front of the Bolsheviks themselves. He went to Kharkiv, where he befriended the latter and started making appearances as a "professor of Lviv University." The Polish consul there reported this to Warsaw. There [in Warsaw] they looked into the case of this "professor from the university" and found both of us listed together [because of the identical entitlement arrangement]. They then immediately halted [both of our] entitlements. I then requested a pension [being 68 at the time] but was denied it by the ministry because, in their words, they couldn't consider me an Austrian pensioner because I had not received a pension from the latter state; and could not view me as a Polish pensioner because I had never worked under Poland. My grievance before the administrative tribunal was unsuccessful. Then at the seminary they started paying me a full salary according to the in-house rate. This now is all I get. I'm entering my seventy-third year. How much longer will it be? Grant, O Lord, that the remainder of my life be spent in peace and repentance. {29, v.}

With this quotation from the liturgy Myshkovsky concludes his "Avtobiohrafiia," having noted laconically on the previous page that in 1924 he was made an honorary canon of the Lviv cathedral. Also, in the last paragraph of the CV {18, r.} he mentions that when the seminary's theology faculty became a full-fledged academy [in 1928], he was hired with the rights of a founding professor. He also notes that at the present time he is serving his third year as dean of the theology faculty.

The "Avtobiohrafiia" leaves at least one important question unanswered: where Myshkovsky learned Russian. Without more evidence, speculation would probably be futile. Regarding Myshkovsky's narrative, any future researcher will certainly want to determine whether Myshkovsky told the whole story of his interaction with Sembratovych. Were there other factors, either personal ones or ones resulting from intrigues, that influenced the cardinal in his treatment of Myshkovsky?

Analysis

Myshkovsky remained a linguistic and cultural Russophile to his death—which occurred in Lviv on 4 February 1939—and yet, according to reliable sources, he enjoyed the unfeigned respect and admiration of many Ukrainophile Catholics. Before elucidating this paradox, let us examine his Russophilism.

It is significant that as late as 1934 Myshkovsky still placed the word "Ukrainian" in quotation marks, as we saw in his reference to the Ukrainian Central Committee in Vienna. Also, Myshkovsky remained a favourite with the Stauropegial Institute even after other clergy had begun turning their backs on it because of its increasingly tenacious Russophilism. A letter from the institute's *senor* to Metropolitan Sheptytsky dated 11 April 1925 reads:

> The annual gathering of our Institute will take place this year as usual on Thomas Sunday with a *moleben* and distribution of *artos*. For hundreds of years a secular priest has been present to perform these rites. Last year, for political reasons, the clergy ignored our gathering—in spite of the fact that the good of the church mandates their presence. In the past Fr. Vasylii Davydiak always attended this annual event regardless of who was the head of our institute. This year, in order to assure that a priest will be present, we request that the Rev. Dr. Tyt Myshkovsky be given permission to attend this gathering.[33]

In addition, at the 1936 celebrations of the 350th anniversary of stauropegion described in the institute's *Russian*-language *Iubileinyi sbornik*" cited above, Myshkovsky is listed as the only concelebrating priest at the commemorative Liturgy and *moleben*.[34] Finally, as previously mentioned, Myshkovsky not only wrote in Russian; he also lectured in that language. This information was provided by a former student of Myshkovsky, the Rev. Mykola Prystai.[35]

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[33] TsDIAML, 129/2/998, fol. 10, r.

[34] Vol. 2, 32.

[35] Personal interview with Fr. Mykola Prystai in Rudno near Lviv in early

How then did Myshkovsky manage to avoid the problems that had beset him under Sembratovych? Starting with the particular and moving to the general, we note that Myshkovsky's spoken Russian was apparently less jarring to the Ukrainian ear than might otherwise have been the case because he consistently pronounced the letter г as "h," not "g," and the letter ѣ (prerevolutionary orthography) as "i," not "e." Thus, for example, he addressed his students as *"hospodin"* [Mister; cf. Russian *gospodin*]. Also, in his written Russian, and presumably his spoken Russian, he did not use the standard forms *"kak"* and *"chto."* Everywhere in his autobiography we find instead the Ukrainian forms *"iak"* and *"shcho"* even though everything else is in standard Russian. (The "Ruthenian" pronunciation of Russian had been espoused earlier by the grand old man of Galician Old Ruthenianism and Russophilism, Bohdan Didytsky.[36])

When asked about Myshkovsky's Russophilism, Fr. Prystai replied: "Oh yes, we all knew he was a *katsap*, but no seminarian would ever have thought of disparaging him. He was an elderly scholar whom everyone admired for his achievements." This attitude was confirmed by another former student, who later taught at the academy, Dr. Bohdan Kazymyra.[37] According to him, respect and admiration were accorded Myshkovsky not only because of his age and scholarly accomplishments, but also because he was an excellent teacher and fine person. "His lectures and *skrypty* were superb, and he never talked down to students. He was delighted to field questions and engage in discussion, and he always had references and facts at his fingertips. He inspired a mutual respect between student and professor. And in considering his Russophilism, we always took into account his Lemko background."[38] As regards any potential grumbling about his Russophilism on the part of students, Kazymyra stated: "Slipy would not have allowed it. The rector was interested in scholarship. Sheptytsky also influenced the situation."

Another important factor explaining Myshkovsky's ability to survive

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February 1992. Fr. Prystai served as one of the prefects at the academy during the years 1941–4; see *Svitylnyk istyny*, 1: 162. During the German occupation he was Slipy's personal secretary.

[36] See Didytsky's *Svoezhyt'evŷy zapysky*, part 1 (Lviv, 1906), 10–14, 64–5.

[37] Telephone interview with Dr. Bohdan Kazymyra of Regina, Saskatchewan, 3 July 1993. Kazymyra taught sociology at the academy; see *Svitylnyk istyny*, 1: 283–6.

[38] The Lemko region was noted for its Russophilism, which in the 1930s became even more pronounced. See *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 3 (Toronto, 1993), 79.

at the academy is his apparent avoidance of Russophile politics. This is suggested in his "Avtobiohrafiia," and is unquestionably confirmed by the fact that he was able to avoid incarceration at Thalerhof even when, for example, someone as innocent as the Rev. Isydor Dolnytsky was confined there for more than a year on charges of pro-Russian espionage![39] The fact that the General Ukrainian Council in Vienna thought that Myshkovsky was a Pole also suggests that he was unknown—or at least forgotten—in more prominent political circles (even though he did encounter problems in reclaiming his apartment). Myshkovsky never propagated his Russophilism. Fr. Prystai mentions that when occasionally a seminarian would attempt to pose a question in class using the same language as Myshkovsky, the professor would respond in Russian: "No, no, sir. Don't speak like me. Speak your way." And when one considers that, according to Kazymyra, Myshkovsky was the only conspicuous Russophile among all the professors, his presence at the academy may have been less threatening.

In addition, Myshkovsky's lack of deference for Polish rule in Galicia would have endeared him to patriotic Ukrainians while also distancing him politically from the Stauropegial Institute and Narodnyi Dim society. During the 1930s both institutions adopted a thoroughly accommodationist stance towards the Polish government in order to maintain their property against possible "encroachments" by "Ukrainians."[40] Kazymyra notes that Myshkovsky reacted angrily when nationalist Polish students vandalized the Lviv Greco-Catholic seminary in the mid-1930s.[41] According to Kazymyra, it was because of such reactions that many people viewed Myshkovsky as somewhat of a Ukrainian patriot, in spite of everything stated above.

Finally, we must assert that Myshkovsky's rehabilitation under Sheptytsky was total. Archival documents indicate that the Russophile was restored to prominence in various solemnities at St. George's Cathedral,[42] and, what is more important for our purposes, not only was he named prorector of the academy, but was relied upon by Sheptytsky to provide official counsel in the fields of liturgics and scripture. In 1933

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[39] See *Bohosloviia* 2 (1924): 144.

[40] See Andrusiak, *Narysy*, 65, and *Geneza i kharakter*, 17.

[41] I have not been able to pinpoint the exact date of this incident.

[42] To cite just some examples, he was invited to read the gospel in Hebrew at the Easter Liturgy there in 1911, and was among the select concelebrants of the celebrations of the Feast of St. George in 1913 and 1914 and the Feast of the Holy Protectress in 1925. See TsDIAML, 201/1–5456/138, fols. 1, 6, 15; and 451/2/253, fol. 5.

the metropolitan called upon Myshkovsky to compose a memorandum (in Latin) to the Vatican's Congregation for Eastern Churches in response to the latter's request for clarification concerning Sheptytsky's attempts to rid his church of various liturgical Latinisms.[43] The archives have also preserved a magnificent review of a manuscript handbook in biblical studies submitted in 1928 by a Ievhen Bachynsky to Sheptytsky for approval.[44] The review, written by Myshkovsky upon *Kyr* Andrei's request, demonstrates a superb knowledge of biblical theology, history, languages, and contemporary literature in the field.

This brings us to the question of Sheptytsky's tolerance for Russophiles. In Cyrille Korolevskij's biography of the metropolitan, we read the following:

> What was the attitude of *Kyr* Andrei in the conflict between Russophiles and Ukrainophiles? Allow me to quote him again: "I have compelled myself to avoid ever taking sides among my faithful in favour of one party against the other. This is indeed very difficult because these parties are divided over the very conception of the national idea (Ukrainian and Russophile). Consequently I have had to use great circumspection to avoid offending either group in an area that does not involve moral evil. It took me years of work before my nation understood that the motive of my actions was love for the entire nation."[45]

Some might be inclined to suspect this citation of certain tendentiousness, especially as Korolevskij was himself a Russophile.[46] Nonetheless,

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[43] TsDIAML, 358/3/199, fols. 1–5. The memorandum is an excellent analysis of the question.

[44] A Ievhen Bachynsky (Evhen Batchinsky) later became a bishop of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church (see *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, 1: 185), but I have not been able to ascertain whether it was he who sought Sheptytsky's sponsorship for the publication of his handbook. The manuscript comprises 380 pages and is entitled "Handbook for the Text of the Greek Old Testament" (my trans.). Myshkovsky's review is ten single-spaced pages. The manuscript was rejected, partly as a result of Myshkovsky's thorough and incisive criticism. See TsDIAML, 408/1/883.

[45] Cyrille Korolevskij, *Métropolite André Szeptyckyj, 1865–1944* (Rome, 1964), 69 (my trans.). Korolevskij is probably quoting a conversation with Sheptytsky held prior to World War I, as this is the general context of the chapter.

[46] See, for example, his *Votum* for the Sacred Congregation for Eastern Churches, where he actually suggests that Ukrainians, while "preserving and possibly even developing the popular idiom ... should consider adopting Russian as a language of great culture and communication." Sacra Congregazione per la Chiesa Orientale, Prot. no. 1219/28, *La Liturgia ed il Rito Praticati dai Ruteni: Voto del P. Cirillo Korolevskij* (Rome, 1936), 53.

here Korolevskij is on the mark. Students of Sheptytsky recall the famous incident in which the metropolitan banned priests from getting involved in the life of other parishes, with the result that younger Populist priests were prevented from setting up reading rooms in the jurisdictions of older Russophile clerics. This led to the publication of a scathing attack on Sheptytsky by Lonhyn Tsehelsky, the editor of the Populist newspaper *Dilo*. Tsehelsky was forced to resign, but Sheptytsky never retracted the ban.[47] Also, even as late as 1931 Sheptytsky visited the Stauropegial Institute and offered paeans in praise of its work without even obliquely criticizing its cultural orientation.[48] Thus, one must insist that before World War II the metropolitan tended to be wary of Russophilism primarily in so far as it fostered a proclivity toward "schism."[49] Russophiles without schismatic inclinations could actually be cultivated for their usefulness in Sheptytsky's renowned campaign to "convert Russia."[50]

In 1941, in his famous pastoral letter on nation building composed after two years of Soviet occupation, Sheptytsky finally did speak directly on the issue of Russophilism as a national problem. There we read: "No one has yet produced any serious scholarly studies of a phenomenon that can be called a deep wound or ulcer [in the national psyche]: *Russophilism* [emphasis in the original]."[51] While the comment is made en passant, without detailed reflection, it suggests that by 1941, if not earlier,

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[47] See Levytsky, *Istoriia politychnoi dumky*, 2: 495.

[48] See his address, "Virnist tradytsii," on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the Dormition Church's consecration, in his Tvory: *Moralno-pastoralni*, ed. Stefan Harvanko (Rome, 1983), 97–103. In light of this, as well as everything else that has been stated here, a remark by Paul R. Magocsi in his *Galicia: A Historical Survey and Bibliographic Guide* (Toronto, 1983), n. 184, p. 160, requires reevaluation. There we read: "Sheptyts'kyi was also forced to take sides between the competing Ukrainophile and Russophile intelligentsia. He chose the Ukrainian cause." Magocsi then refers to Sheptytsky's 1905 controversy with the Russophile Halytsko-Russkaia Matytsia society. It is true that in that year the society was so angered by Sheptytsky's support for phonetic orthography that it rejected the traditional patronage of the Lviv metropolitan. But this did not yet cause Sheptytsky to align himself with the Ukrainophiles in an exclusive way.

[49] See his letter to Pius XI dated 18 November 1928 in vol. 1 of the materials collected by the Postulator's office in Rome for the beatification and canonization of Sheptytsky, *Epistola et Relationes ad Sanctam Sedem Lingua Gallica Exaratae*, fol. 231 (p. 4 of the original letter).

[50] See Korolevskij, 338.

[51] Andrei Sheptytsky, "Za iednist sv. viry, tserkvy i natsii," *Lohos* 2 (1951): 86. The pastoral is more generally known under the title "Iak buduvaty ridnu khatu."

Sheptytsky no longer viewed the political aspect of Russophilism as morally neutral.[52]

It would seem, however, that it was primarily the horrors of Soviet oppression, and not any absolute a priori supposition, that caused Sheptytsky to change his views. But change they did. Consequently, had a younger Myshkovsky and Sheptytsky survived World War II, the events of 1893 might have repeated themselves. The fact that Myshkovsky, along with other Russophiles, was rehabilitated by the metropolitan in 1902, however, reminds Ukrainian historians of the need to avoid anachronistic analyses of Galician Russophilism. It also reminds us that leaders such as Sheptytsky, governed by Christian principles, were constrained to make decisions grounded in criteria far transcending national ideology. Ultimately Sheptytsky was indeed a committed Ukrainophile. But his love of neighbour compelled him to embrace all of Ukraine's people—including its Tyt Myshkovskys.

[52] A similar criticism can be found in Sheptytsky's 1943 "Dekret soboru 'Pro iednist'," published in *Pysma-poslannia Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptytskoho z chasiv nimetskoi okupatsii* (Yorkton, 1969), 409. Here, in addition to referring to Russophilism as a "national ulcer," Sheptytsky speaks of it as a "terrifying phenomenon."

Journal of Ukrainian Studies 18, nos. 1-2 (Summer-Winter 1993)

The Workers' and National-Democratic Movements in Contemporary Ukraine

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The workers' and national-democratic movements have been the most important political forces in the revolutionary transformation that has occurred in Ukraine in recent years. This article will examine the general, primary aspects of their relations and interaction from 1989 to the end of 1993.

The summer of 1989 was characterized by the process of the organization of a broadly based political opposition in Ukraine—the Popular Movement of Ukraine (NRU), or Rukh. Simultaneously, in July, a powerful wave of miners' strikes swept through Ukraine. Naturally, such an event attracted the political opposition's attention. Representatives of Rukh and the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU) in various cities offered the strikers political and financial aid and distributed leaflets and issues of *Holos Rukhu* with articles in support of the strikers.[1] Because the strike also turned out to be an extremely powerful source of support for the political opposition, the latter tried to imbue it with a political content. Proposals were made to remove the Soviet flag atop the Building of Soviets in Donetsk and to incorporate into the list of miners' demands an item on changing the constitution of the USSR, especially the articles dealing with the role of the Communist party in society; and calls were made to spread the strike to enterprises in other cities (e.g., Pavlohrad) and for the strike committee to publish its own newspapers there.[2]

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[1] *Sotsialisticheskii Donbass* (Donetsk), 23 July 1989; *Znamia pobedy* (Shakhtarsk, Donetsk oblast), 24 July 1989; *Radianska Ukraina*, 10 August 1989.

[2] See *Sotsialisticheskii Donbas*, 25 July 1989; *Narodnaia tribuna* (Perevalsk, Luhansk oblast), 10 August 1989; and *Dneprovskaia pravda* (Dnipropetrovsk), 23 July 1989.

The most noticeable activity in all the coal regions of Ukraine during the strike was that of UHU members, who, as their leader Lev Lukianenko later remarked, tried to influence the strike movement to introduce political demands.[3] UHU representatives also manifested the greatest efficiency of any political group: on the first day of the strike they were already at the first Donbas mine that was shut down.[4]

Nevertheless, almost everywhere—except for two mines in Chervonohrad in Lviv oblast—the attempts by oppositional groups to attract miners' support were ineffectual. The miners responded that their strike was essentially economic despite the fact that they voiced realistic political demands.[5]

The great difficulties the national-democratic forces encountered in trying to reach an understanding with the organized workers' movement at that time, and still today encounter, can be explained, in this author's opinion, first and foremost by the significant denationalization processes that have occurred in Ukraine's cities and towns and within the working class as a whole, particularly in Left-Bank and southern Ukraine. In the cities of the Donbas (Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts and Pavlohrad raion of Dnipropetrovsk oblast) there were practically no schools where teaching was conducted in Ukrainian. In many ethnic Ukrainian villages in the Donbas, schools had switched over to the use of Russian in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Thus it is not surprising that the number of Ukrainians in those oblasts increasingly diminished with each population census that was conducted during the Soviet period. Although ethnic Ukrainians still constitute more than half of the Donbas's population—51.8 percent in Luhansk oblast and 50.7 percent in Donetsk oblast according to the 1989 census[6]—the number of Ukrainians and Russians in the urban population is almost equal, and in a number of cities, e.g., Luhansk and Krasnodon, there are significantly more Russians than Ukrainians.[7] It appears that the growth of the Russian population in Ukraine since 1970, particularly in urban centres, has occurred not so much because of a natural or mechanical increase in the number of Russians, but because many Ukrainians have changed their ethnic

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[3] See Lukianenko's report to the UHU congress in *Holos vidrodzhennia* (Kyiv), no. 6 (15) (May 1990).

[4] *Makeevskii rabochii* (Makiivka, Donetsk oblast), 5 August 1989.

[5] For further information, see A. N. Rusnachenko, "Stachka shakhterov na Ukraine v iiule 1989 goda," *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, 1993, no. 1, 66–77.

[6] *Naselenie Luganskoi oblasti (po dannym Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 goda)* (Luhansk, 1991), 9; *Za mekhanizovannyi zaboi* (Horlivka), 20 September 1990.

[7] *Naselenie Luganskoi oblasti*, 142, 144.

identification, or, to put it more simply, because of Russification. In the 1989 census, for example, only 30.7 percent and 34.8 percent of Donetsk oblast's and Luhansk oblast's inhabitants respectively indicated that Ukrainian was their native language.[8]

Already at the turn of the 1970s, Ukrainians constituted only 60 percent of the workers in Ukraine's ferrous metallurgy and 55 percent of the workers in its coal industry, both of which are based primarily in the Donbas.[9] In that region there is still virtually no nationally conscious intelligentsia. Such factors have hindered the participation of the Donbas workers in the Ukrainian national-democratic movement.

Because the workers who took part in the July 1989 strike knew very little about the programs and activities of Rukh, the UHU, and other oppositionial parties, they responded to them with great caution. Misunderstandings also arose, to a large extent because in the summer of 1989 the national-democratic movement consisted overwhelmingly of members of the ethnic Ukrainian intelligentsia. Many workers already mistrusted the intelligentsia, and among many of them this mistrust only increased.

As a result, strikers in the central and western regions of Ukraine, where the national-democratic movement was more influential, voiced demands for political power, while the strikers in the Donbas and elsewhere in the eastern regions made only socio-economic demands. The latter demands did, however, have a clearly political purpose. One could expect an understanding to be reached between the national-democratic and workers' movements only in struggle against their common foe, the Soviet system of power and government, and it was in the direction of democratic transformations in the USSR and in Ukraine that co-operation between the workers' and national-democratic movements became particularly fruitful.

Soon after the July 1989 strike, two members of the USSR Supreme Soviet who were prominent Rukh figures—Volodymyr Iavorivsky and Volodymyr Cherniak—visited Donetsk and Makiivka. In his speech at the Zasiadko mine, Cherniak stated that "the centre of political life in Ukraine has shifted here, to the Donbas." The two visitors tried to ascertain whether there was a possibility of a common front between miners and Rukh. They agreed that it was possible, but more difficult to

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[8] Petro Lavriv, "Natsionalna svidomist robitnytstva na Donechchyni," *Suchasnist*, 1992, no. 6, 103, 107.

[9] A. V. Likholat, et al., eds. *Razvitie sotsialno-klassovoi struktury naseleniia Ukrainskoi SSR (60–80-e gody)* (Kyiv, 1988), 97.

accomplish than elsewhere.[10]

By early September both the workers' movement and Rukh had acquired distinct organizational forms. The strike committees had become stronger and more influential, and on 17 August they formed a Regional Union of Strike Committees of the Donbas.[11] Meanwhile, the first Rukh national convention confirmed that Rukh was a broad coalition of national-democratic forces that rejected the Communist party's political monopoly.

In August members of the miners' strike committees took part in the founding convention of the Rukh branch in Donetsk oblast.[12] Nevertheless, contacts between the miners and Rukh remained sporadic until the workers' movement acquired an organizational structure and became politicized at the end of August. The workers and the national-democratic opposition appeared to have the same aims and slogans, particularly vis-à-vis the law on future elections and the elections themselves.[13] The drafts of the election law promulgated in Kyiv were disseminated among the strike committees in the Donbas.[14]

At that time the workers' and national-democratic movements entered a second stage in their relations. They were no longer only phenomena and events, but two organized oppositional forces, both of which expressed increasingly greater non-acceptance of the existing system of state control and government, responded to the economic crisis, and sought partnerlike relations.

Rukh leaders considered the Donbas strike committees so important that they invited members to participate in the first Rukh congress. Before responding to the invitation, workers sought advice from Party city committees[15]; this indicates that those who sent out invitations did not know very much about the people they invited, and that the views of many strike-committee members were underdeveloped. At the Rukh

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[10] *Za peredovu shakhtu* (Donetsk), 3 August 1989.

[11] "Deklaratsiia Regionalnogo soiuza stachechnykh (zabastovochnykh) komitetov Donetskogo ugolnogo basseina (Donbassa)"; copy in the author's possession.

[12] *Vechernii Donetsk*, 22 August 1989.

[13] *Za peredovu shakhtu*, 13 September 1989; *Vechernii Donetsk*, 31 August 1989; "Zakon pro narodovladdia (proekt)," *Literaturna Ukraina*, 13 September 1989; "Pro maibutni vybory v respublitsi: Rezoliutsiia I z'izdu NRU," *Literaturna Ukraina*, 12 October 1989.

[14] *Literaturna Ukraina*, 12 October 1989. This author found such drafts together with documents of the strike committee in an archive in Krasnoarmiisk.

[15] *Voroshilovgradskaia pravda*, 17 September 1989.

congress one representative of the Donbas miners, Petro Poberezhny, spoke about the situation in the Donbas after the July strike and called for rapprochement between the intelligentsia and workers, the two groups the Party apparat was trying to pit against each other.[16]

Regardless of the rapprochement that occurred between the strike committees and Rukh on various political questions, many miners, and even the majority, particularly in the eastern Donbas, viewed Rukh as an enemy and a threat to their interests. Communist party newspapers hastened to exploit this sentiment.[17] Nevertheless, under the influence of what their delegates saw and heard at the Rukh congress, the miners' views changed significantly. Their delegates pointed out the democratic nature of the Rukh program and of the speeches delivered at the congress by members of the USSR Supreme Soviet, but they were alarmed by the speeches made by radical participants such as Lukianenko and G. Gitis.

By sharing their impressions with their workmates, the miners who attended the Rukh congress upset, to some degree, attempts by local Communist authorities to sow mistrust of Rukh within the strike committees.[18] Unfortunately, the technical intelligentsia in the Donbas facilitated the dissemination of such mistrust because it feared that it would lose its sway among the workers. At a meeting of the influential Donetsk Strike Committee, for example, it was not workers who publicly denigrated and distorted the ideas of Rukh, but a candidate of sciences and engineer.[19] At the same time, a group within the Donetsk Strike Committee was ready to join Rukh or at least have close contact with it.[20] But this unique opportunity for both movements to move closer and even consolidate their activities did not occur because of mutual suspicions.

In the autumn of 1989 the differences between the strike-committee leaders and Rukh were particularly evident in their evaluation of the

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[16] "Materialy z ustanovchoho z'izdu NRU," *Dosvitni vohni* (Kyiv), no. 3 (November 1989).

[17] "Vidkrytyi lyst hrupy predstavnykiv Voroshylovhradshchyny do z'izdu Narodnoho Rukhu Ukrainy za perebudovu," *Radianska Ukraina*, 14 September 1989; the open letter was reprinted in *Voroshilovgradskaia pravda* on 16 September 1989.

[18] See, e.g., *Stakhanovskoe znamia*, 29 September 1989.

[19] Protokol No. 9 sobraniia gorodskogo stachkoma ot 20.10.89 g., Derzhavnyi arkhiv Donetskoi oblasti (hereafter DADO), Fond Otraslevoi rabochii komitet PO "Donetskugol."

[20] Ibid. See also Protokol zasedaniia gorodskogo rabochego (stachechnogo) komiteta ot 6.12.89 g., DADO.

future official language of Ukraine and of its state symbols. The Regional Union of Strike Committees of the Donbas (RSSKD) stood for the immutability of the status quo. Pointing to the miners' lack of sympathy for the Ukrainian language, Iavorivsky remarked that this was not their fault, but their plight.[21]

At that time, relations between the national-democratic opposition and the workers' movement were much closer in western Ukraine. In the autumn of 1989 strike committees were formed at many enterprises there, particularly in Lviv. Under their leadership a strike was organized as a political protest against the dispersal of a demonstration that occurred at various enterprises in Lviv on 1 October.[22] By that time miners who had joined Rukh had much influence within the miners' union of the Lviv-Volynian Coal Basin.[23] At the beginning of 1990 Rukh branches were formed in cities of the Donbas, including Donetsk.[24] There can be no doubt that miners and the national-democratic opposition there jointly conducted and, in certain places, prepared the urban "revolutions" that were initiated by the strike committees and, in some places, resulted in the removal of the most senior local Party leaders.[25]

Rukh representatives were invited to attend the first USSR miners' congress. There the policies of Nikolai Rizhkov's government were severely criticized, and the congress delegates voted in favour of his immediate removal from office and that thenceforth the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) could not be considered the representative of workers' interests. Compared to subsequent declarations made there, at the congress the speech of the Rukh representative, Mykola Porovsky, even seemed moderate. Porovsky stated that Rukh defends the principles of social justice and that the question of Ukraine's sovereignty should not be viewed as meaning separation from the USSR. "The principal task is the unification of all democratic forces, [the creation of] a movement for the social renewal of workers' movements."[26] It seems that Porovsky

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[21] See Iavorivsky's speech at the first Rukh congress, published in *Literaturna Ukraina*, 21 September 1989.

[22] *Vilna Ukraina* (Lviv), 5 November 1989.

[23] Derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh obiednan Ukrainy, f. 1, op. 32, d. 185, Informatsiia Volynskogo OK KPU Kachure B. o provedenii IX profsoiuznoi otchetno-vybornoi konferentsii Lvovsko-Volynskogo komiteta profsoiuza rabochikh ugolnoi promyshlennosti.

[24] *Za peredovu shakhtu*, 17 January 1990, 18 April 1990.

[25] See, for example, Protokol No. 4 i No. 5 zasedanii rabochego komiteta Novovolynskoi gruppy shakht, Arkhiv Novovolynskoho robitnychoho komitetu.

[26] *I sezd shakhterov SSSR*, pt. 1 (Donetsk, 1990), 10.

was trying to find a way to reach an understanding with the miners because they were a real political force in eastern Ukraine. Such an understanding was important for the national-democratic movement because of the question of the future agreement governing the entire USSR and because of attempts by the Communist government in Kyiv to rely on local strike committees, inasmuch as the constituent members of Rukh in Donetsk oblast had split into two independent formations.

Rukh members, the Ukrainian Republican party (URP), and parliamentary deputies belonging to the Popular Council, the opposition in Ukraine's Supreme Soviet, took an active part in the July 1990 strike.[27] It was they who influenced the miners to include in their resolutions demands such as "accelerating the adoption of the law on republican sovereignty" and "guaranteeing precedence for republican laws over Union ones," and to demand full sovereignty for Ukraine[28] and consolidation of members of parliament who were CPSU members with the Popular Council.[29] The strikers in Pervomaisk, Luhansk oblast, also spoke out against the divide between Ukraine's western and eastern oblasts.[30] The strikers' demands were fully supported by the Rukh Council of Luhansk oblast.[31]

The national-democratic opposition helped organize short strikes and public meetings on 11 July in a number of other cities, first and foremost in Ternopil and Lviv. Local branches of political parties and other anti-regime organizations sent telegrams expressing their solidarity with the strikers. In other words, the national-democratic movement supported the workers' actions and tried to impart to them an all-Ukrainian character. To a large degree they succeeded.

The radical nature of the demands of 11 July should not be exaggerated, however. In a number of cities the demands to accelerate the adoption of the law on Ukraine's sovereignty were issued in response to the adoption of a corresponding law in Russia. In addition, analysis of the demands indicates that almost nowhere did the adopted resolutions

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[27] *Enakievskii rabochii*, 14 July 1990; *Luganskaia pravda*, 13 July 1990; *Dosvitni vohni*, no. 6 (September 1990).

[28] "Obrashchenie k deputatam Verkhovnogo Soveta USSR uchastnikov politicheskogo mitinga 11 iiulia 1990 g. v g. Donetsk," *Vechernii Donetsk*, 13 July 1990; "Rezoliutsiia mitinga, sostoiavshegosia v g. Torez," *Gorniak* (Torez), 14 July 1990; *Vilna Ukraina*, 12 July 1990.

[29] *Vechernii Donetsk*, 13 July 1990.

[30] *Hvardiiets pratsi* (Pervomaisk), 20 July 1990.

[31] "K bastuiushchim shakhteram Luganshchiny: Pismo chlenov Koordinatsionnogo soveta NRU Luganskoi obl.," Arkhiv Stakhanovskoho straikovoho komitetu.

signify support for the full state independence of Ukraine. This conclusion is supported by the results of a sociological survey conducted among workers at enterprises in Donetsk oblast in the middle of 1990. Only 24.2 percent of the respondents indicated that they wanted an independent Ukraine. Even among the most politicized respondents, only a minority—44.6 percent—voiced support for independence.[32] At that time the national-democratic movement did not have one person who could be recognized as the leader if it acquired power. Many members of the strike committees in 1990 recognized Boris Eltsin as a much greater authority.

At the end of July the leaders of the workers' committees met with the members of the Popular Council in the Supreme Soviet,[33] and in the middle of 1990 we see the beginning of certain joint actions by the workers' and national-democratic movements. In their opposition to the CPSU and in their struggle for the democratization of society, both they and other movements should have sought each other out as natural, necessary allies. When it became clear that the USSR government in Moscow was incapable of fulfilling its obligations, the miners should have turned their gaze toward Kyiv, where the national-democratic leaders had better access to and influence on the state structures than they did. Meanwhile, at such an important juncture, the national-democratic movement—particularly Rukh and the URP, which did not have great influence in eastern Ukraine—should have relied more on the workers' movement because it had the most widespread support and organizational structure.

Various democratic parties and Rukh aspired to unite their efforts and the workers against the idea of a new Union agreement and the Communist party's monopoly on power during the national political strike of 1 October 1990.[34] The RSSKD supported the strike and added its own concerns.[35] Although the strike did not attract widespread support, its participants were united under the same slogans throughout the republic.[36] The strike did not affect eastern Ukraine, but public meetings expressing support for it did take place there.

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[32] DADO, fond Haluzevyi robitnychyi komitet v/o "Donetskvuhillia," spr. Rezultaty oprosa trudiashchikhsia na promyshlennykh predpriiatiiakh otrasli i g. Donetska o liderakh, partiiakh i budushchem Ukrainy, l. 13.

[33] "Ukrainu naiblyzhchym chasom chekaiut duzhe znachni zminy: Interv'iu z V. Chornovolom," *Visti z Ukrainy*, 1990, no. 35.

[34] *Novyny Prybuzhzhia* (Chervonohrad, Lviv oblast), 27 September 1990.

[35] *Za ugol* (Donetsk), 28 September 1990.

[36] *Zakhidnyi kur'ier* (Ivano-Frankivsk), 4 October 1990.

A more important development was the Donbas strike committees' opposition to the regime's campaign aimed at neutralizing Rukh on the local level and garnering support for the group of "239," i.e., the pro-regime majority in the Supreme Soviet. In this way the committees again manifested their anti-Communist and democratic leanings.[37]

Significant progress was achieved at both the Rukh and miners' congresses that were held almost simultaneously in October 1990. The second all-Ukrainian Rukh congress proclaimed Rukh's intentions to fight for an independent Ukrainian state. At its sessions the problems of the workers' movement and the Donbas were discussed from that perspective; Porovsky characterized the position of the Donetsk strike committee as centrist.[38] Participants emphasized that one of the subjective factors hindering positive dialogue between Rukh and the workers' movement, particularly in the Donbas, was the denationalization of the region's population. Yet Ukraine's dilapidated coal industry could only be restored in a free state, according to the Rukh leader, Ivan Drach.[39]

Thenceforth the determining factor in relations between Rukh and the workers' movement was the latter's unconditional recognition of the idea of Ukraine's state independence. The Rukh congress wholly supported the growing workers' movement; it considered the Donbas miners' demands to be just and demanded their swiftest realization. Unfortunately, not everything went smoothly at the congress. The well-known leader of the strike committees, Iurii Boldyrev, called his speech a proposal to enter into a constructive dialogue, but emphasized that Rukh could count on the miners' support only if it offered them a realistic economic program.[40] In the audience other miners with more radical views regarding co-operation defused the atmosphere their colleague's words had brought about. This incident made it clear that among the workers' leaders were individuals who were only prepared to cooperate with the national-democratic movement under the pressure of political circumstances. As events unfolded, their line would lead to major political complications and misunderstandings.

Purposeful contacts generally continued, however. The strike

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[37] *Za peredovyi dosvid* (Makiivka), 15 December 1990; *Put shakhtera* (Rovenky), 5 December 1990.

[38] "Vystup Mykoly Porovskoho," *II Vseukrainski zbory NRU: Stenohrafichnyi zvit* (Kyiv, 1991), Arkhiv Sekretariatu NRU, 56–60.

[39] Ivan Drach, "Politychna sytuatsiia na Ukraini i zavdannia Rukhu: Dopovid na II Vseukrainskykh zborakh NRU," *Visnyk NRU* (Kyiv), 1990, no. 7, 8–14.

[40] "Vystup Iu. Boldyrieva," *II Vseukrainski zbory Rukhu: Stenohrafichnyi zvit*, Arkhiv Sekretariatu NRU.

committees reacted quite cooly to the creation of the so-called International Movement of the Donbas (Russian: Internatsionalnoe dvizhenie Donbassa), or Interrukh, which voiced openly anti-Ukrainian and anti-democratic slogans and poorly disguised the support it received from local Communist bodies.[41] From a different perspective, very interesting was the desire by the largest anti-regime force—Rukh—to build on the strike committees' experience in its own activities. This indicates that, to a certain degree, the national-democratic and workers' movements had assimilated each other's means of struggle. Thus, at the session of Rukh's Coordinating Council held on 10 November 1990, the question of links with the workers' movement was primary in the discussions defining Rukh's tactics.[42] The council decided to form strike committees at enterprises and corresponding councils within Rukh's regional organizations.

During the spring and summer of the following year, 1991, close co-operation between the two movements was affirmed during the weeks leading up to the 17 March referendum on the future of the USSR and during the strike that began around that time. Rukh rejected the referendum formula proposed by the USSR Supreme Soviet. Instead, it called on citizens of Ukraine to vote against it and to support as a compromise a republican referendum on the entry of Ukraine into a Union of Sovereign States on the basis of the declaration on Ukraine's state sovereignty.[43] At that time the URP called for a boycott of the USSR referendum. In the Donbas, most workers' leaders and strike committees took a very critical stand on the way the referendum had been formulated; stating that it was much too vague, they called for a vote in favour of an independent Ukraine.[44] Meanwhile, the strike committee in Donetsk called for a general boycott of the referendum.[45]

The proposed referendum took place during another strike in Ukraine. It considerably helped the strikers to formulate political demands, particularly ones pertaining to Ukraine. The workers of the three Galician oblasts—Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Ternopil—voted in favour of the third question asked on 17 March, on the total, uncondi-

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[41] "Natsionalnoi rozni—net! Obrashchenie uchreditelnoi konferentsii Internatsionalnogo dvizheniia Donbassa," *Znamia Oktiabria* (Donetsk), 22 November 1990.

[42] Zasidannia Koordynatsiinoi rady Rukhu vid 10 lystopada 1990 r., Kyiv, Arkhiv Sekretariatu NRU.

[43] *Holos Ukrainy*, 13 March 1991.

[44] *Maiak* (Krasnoarmiisk), 20 March 1991.

[45] *Molod Ukrainy*, 6 February 1991.

tional independence of Ukraine.

After the 1991 spring strike began on 1 March, meetings and contacts between the workers of eastern and western Ukraine increased. It appears that, to a certain extent, the workers of western Ukraine led the way in formulating and voicing general political and national ideas. Workers elsewhere accepted such ideas much more readily if they heard them from other workers than from agitators representing political parties. The political demands put forth by the miners of the Lviv-Volynian Coal Basin—including ones in March and April for the Supreme Soviet to grant the declaration on state sovereignty the status of a constitutional law, to formulate a new draft constitution for Ukraine, and to release Stepan Khmara, one of the most radical members of the national-democratic opposition and a member of the Supreme Soviet who had been arrested[46]—received support from the Donbas workers.[47]

The 1991 strike was the longest in Soviet history. Its roots went back to previous years; in addition, the political situation in the USSR could not but call forth the most massive movements, inasmuch as existing democratic parties and movements still did not have enough power to alter their conflict with the Communists in their favour. The strike continued until 3 May. Work stoppages at enterprises (primarily coal mines) occurred slowly, and initially the strikes only voiced socio-economic demands.

From the strike's outset, when the situation was still not very clear, the most active of all the democratic organizations was the URP. Local URP members took part in formulating the miners' political demands and became members of the strike committees. At the Rossiia mine the entire strike committee joined the URP.[48] Representatives of Rukh, the URP, the Party of Ukraine's Democratic Rebirth (PDVU), and the People's Party of Ukraine (NPU) spoke at meetings, met with the miners, and agitated in support of the strikers.[49] Yellow-and-azure flags were a common sight on the city streets of the Donbas, and at the end of March miners raised the national flag atop the administrative building of the Zaperevalna mine in Donetsk.[50] On the initiative of local democratic organizations,

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[46] *Narodna rada* (Novovolynsk), 18 March 1991.

[47] Protokol No. 27 vid 21.03.91 r. zasidannia Chervonohradskoho robitnychoho komitetu, Arkhiv Chervonohradskoho robitnychoho komitetu.

[48] "Vystup Marii Oliinyk," *Druhyi z'izd Ukrainskoi respublikanskoi partii (stenohrama)* (Ternopil, 1991), 93.

[49] *Nasha zoria* (Selydove, Donetsk oblast), 21 April 1991; *Leninskym shliakhom*, 30 March 1991.

[50] *Ohliadach* (Kyiv), 1991, no. 1 (April).

again primarily branches of the URP and Rukh, aid for the strikers in the form of cash and food donations was organized.[51] The largest amount of aid came from Ternopil oblast.

Certain national-democratic leaders, however—not only in Kyiv but elsewhere—took a cautious stand on the strike. Thus, for example, the Rukh deputy leader Oles Lavrynovych remarked on 3 April that although the Rukh leadership supported the strikers' demands, under existing conditions the strikes could hinder the Supreme Soviet's attainment of all the institutions of statehood.[52] This was also the position of the Lviv Oblast Council of People's Deputies, which was headed by the prominent Rukh figure V'iacheslav Chornovil.[53]

The principal reason for such fears, it seems, was that control over both Ukraine's coal industry (which the strike was mostly affecting) and its metallurgical industry had been transferred from Moscow to the Ukrainian government on the eve of the strike. In addition, some viewed the strike itself as a provocation inspired from Moscow. From the beginning of April the strikers turned their attention primarily to political demands, and the Council of Representatives of the Striking Coal Enterprises decided to consolidate its efforts with those of the democratic parties and movements.[54]

As the strikers' political demands increased and focused on Ukraine's problems as a whole, the position of the democratic organizations' leaders changed. A centralized collection of material aid for the strikers was begun, and appropriate declarations were made by a number of local Rukh and URP organizations. Strikers' delegations travelled to the cities and villages of central and western Ukraine to agitate for solidarity with the strikers. There they completely lost their fear of the "nationalism" of those regions, a stereotype widespread in eastern Ukraine. The national-democratic parties, including the smaller Democratic Party of Ukraine (DemPU) and Ukrainian Inter-Party Assembly (UMA), continued giving substantial aid to the miners and representatives of other enterprises where work stoppages had occurred.[55]

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[51] Ibid.; *Vidrodzhennia* (Ternopil), 4 April 1991; *Gorniatskoe slovo* (Donetsk), 21 March 1991.

[52] *Holos Ukrainy*, 5 April 1991.

[53] "Zvernennia do shakhtariv Lvivsko-Volynskoho baseinu Lvivskoi oblasnoi rady narodnykh deputativ," *Za vilnu Ukrainu* (Lviv), 14 March 1991.

[54] Protokol zasedaniia Soveta predstavitelei bastuiushchykh ugolnykh predpriatii Ukrainy ot 3 aprelia 1991 g., Arkhiv Dymytrivskoho robitnychoho komitetu.

[55] *Vidrodzhennia* (Ternopil), 4 April 1991; *Rukh-pres* (Kyiv), 28 April 1991.

Among the demands the strikers' delegations presented when they came to Kyiv to negotiate with the Supreme Soviet and government, the demand "to adopt a Constitution of the Independent State of Ukraine on the basis of the Declaration on Sovereignty" was at the top of their list.[56] By that time the strike had spread to all industries and cities of Ukraine.

On 15 April Rukh publicly declared its support for the political demands of the strike, and soon after a similar declaration was issued by the Popular Council in parliament.[57] In those declarations the strikers' demands were included as part of the broader political problems of Ukraine. The political opposition's strategic aim was clear: to prevent, through the strike, the signing of the new Union agreement. On 16 April, under the influence of Rukh's declaration and personal contacts with Rukh leaders, the strikers in Kyiv and elsewhere issued demands for depoliticizing the military and police, nationalizing Communist party property, military service by Ukrainian conscripts only within Ukraine, and nonacceptance of the Union agreement until a new Ukrainian constitution had been adopted.[58] These and other demands reflect the significant radicalization of the workers' movement and a convergence of its positions with those of the national-democratic movement, including, in many cases, the latter's radical wing.

In the end, the request to adopt a new constitution before the signing of the Union agreement became part of the protocol mutually agreed to by the miners, parliament, and the government.[59] This article placed certain obligations on both the Supreme Soviet and the strikers themselves vis-à-vis the idea of Ukraine's independence. Thus the national-democratic movement received the support of the workers' movement. This support signified a turning point in the struggle for Ukrainian statehood, which none of the sides could alter. The role of the strikers in this regard was undeniable. Nevertheless, Rukh, the oppositionist parties, and the workers' leaders were unable to organize wide-scale actions throughout Ukraine in support of the strike, that is, a national political

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[56] Verkhovnomu Sovetu USSR: Trebovaniia kollektivov bastuiushchikh predpriiatii Ukrainy ot 15.04.91 g. g. Kiev (copy), Arkhiv Donetskoho robitnychoho (straikovoho) komitetu.

[57] "Zaiava do Tsentralnoho provodu Narodnoho Rukhu Ukrainy vid 15 kvitnia 1991 r. do Verkhovnoi Rady," Arkhiv Sekretariatu NRU, 15 April 1991, vykh. no. 865; "Zaiava Narodnoi rady vid 24 kvitnia 1991 r.," *Halychyna*, 27 April 1991.

[58] *Holos Ukrainy*, 17 April 1991.

[59] Vzaimosoglasovannyi protokol Parlamentskoi komissii Verkhovnogo Soveta USSR, Pravitelstva respubliki i predstavitelei Soveta bastuiushchikh kollektivov 17–18 aprelia 1991 g. g. Kiev, Arkhiv Selidovskoho straikovoho komitetu.

strike, and the deadlock between the opposition, on one side, and the Communist party and government in Ukraine, on the other, continued.[60]

Dissatisfied by this state of affairs, the more radical leaders of the strike committees opted for closer links between their ranks and the national-democratic movement and parties. This initiative was supported by a number of local Rukh organizations. After the strike ended, a joint conference of representatives of the strike committees, civic organizations, and democratic political parties was held in May in Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Almost all of the workers' and national-democratic organizations were represented, particularly Rukh and the URP, DemPU, PDVU, and NPU. At the conference it was obvious that the parties relied on the workers' and trade-union movements, given the political and economic crisis in Ukraine. Because the strike had not been completely successful, it was clear that neither the workers nor the parties would be able to achieve their aims alone, and that close co-operation and common action was necessary. This conference was an attempt at such co-operation, as was a subsequent congress of strike committees in June, where an All-Ukrainian Alliance of Labour Solidarity (VOST) was organized. The documents adopted at both the conference and the congress indicate that the new organization would be significantly politicized. They called for Ukraine not to sign the new Union agreement, for the adoption of a new electoral law, for the transfer of all property on the territory of Ukraine into the hands of the people, and for the fall of the Supreme Soviet.[61] By creating VOST, the opposition succeeded to some extent in asserting its influence within the trade-union movement. On the whole, judging from the documents, VOST was conceived an organization that, in time and under certain conditions, could be transformed into a purely trade-union organization.

Initially the greatest influence on that wing of the trade-union movement that joined VOST was exerted by radical members of the national-democratic movement, such as Stepan Khmara, Larysa Skoryk, and Anatolii Lupynis. Their radicalism was unacceptable, however, to working-class leaders who had helped found the workers' movement. They feared the influence of the authorities in Kyiv and were still

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[60] O. V. Haran, *Vid stvorennia Rukhu—do bahatopartiinosti* (Kyiv, 1992), 46.

[61] Rezoliutsiia konferentsii predstavnykiv robitnychykh i straikovykh komitetiv, hromadskykh orhanizatsii i politychnykh partii demokratychnoi oriientatsii ta narodnykh deputativ Ukrainy, m. Pavlohrad, 9–11 travnia 1991 roku, Arkhiv VOSTu; Zaiava Pershoho z'izdu Vseukrainskoho ob'iednannia solidarnosti trudivnykiv pro diialnist Verkhovnoi Rady, copy in the author's possession.

oriented on Moscow. They were also afraid of losing their authority and the direct links they had forged with opposition circles in Moscow. In addition, a number of new political organizations were inter-republican in their composition, for example, the Independent Miners' Trade Union and RSSKD. Naturally, their character was facilitated by the fact that most of Ukraine's workers were alienated from their ethnic roots. The above fears were most widespread in the Donbas. Already at the May conference in Pavlohrad and the strike committees' congress in June, it was obvious that many delegates and guests were alienated from the fundamental Ukrainian problems raised there. This author himself heard Iurii Boldyrev say, in the lobby of the building where the congress was held, that at present the miners had only one goal in common with the national-democratic opposition—the defeat of the Communist party. Thus it is no surprise that relations between VOST and certain strike committees in eastern Ukraine were quite cool, particularly in the beginning.

What has been stated above explains why it is impossible to say, as some commentators have, that the national-democratic and workers' movements in Ukraine converged as a result of the 1991 spring strike and after it. Instead, one should speak of their co-operation and of rapprochement between the positions of the national-democratic movement and a certain part of the workers' movement. In addition, the democrats' attempts to reform existing trade unions in western Ukraine elicited strong opposition from several free trade unions and from the political parties close to the UMA. In the end, however, a Coordinating Council of Trade Unions of the Western Region of Ukraine was created in Lviv to transform the existing trade-union structures into ones suited to the state of affairs in Ukraine. Until 1 December 1991 political issues were more important in these attempts than purely trade-union problems, although, of course, new approaches to solving the latter were being developed. This explains to some extent why the largest new, independent trade unions were created in eastern and central Ukraine, even though, it would seem, conditions for doing so were not conducive there.

In general, the period from the spring 1991 conflict between the opposition and the state until 1 December and well into the first half of 1992 can be viewed as a time of searching for a way out of various crises, including ideological and organizational ones, by Rukh, the URP, and DemPU, and the workers' movement. A serious test for them was the attempted coup in Moscow in August 1991. Not only the democratic political parties, but also the workers' strike committees and other groups opposed to the Communist party came out resolutely against the

putsch.[62] In response to the coup, many enterprises, under the influence of the strike committees, announced that they were preparing to strike, and the VOST presidium took upon itself the functions of a republican strike committee and declared that if the coup succeeded, a strike that would affect Ukraine indefinitely.[63]

The overwhelming majority of Ukraine's workers supported the proclamation of Ukraine's independence for various reasons. During the Ukrainian presidential election campaign the workers' committees supported various candidates, among them V'iacheslav Chornovil, Volodymyr Hrynov (Vladimir Grinev), and Lev Lukianenko. It was clear that the presidential candidates needed and wanted to secure the support of the large industrial cities in the Donbas, along the Dnieper, and in the south for their programs.

The attainment of independence and the presidential elections altered the configuration of political forces in Ukraine and the direction of their activities. The URP and DemPU favoured the resolution of Ukraine's problems by the government of the new nation-state, while Rukh remained part of the national-democratic opposition, which was joined by the Nova Ukraina caucus in parliament. In its new program, the URP indicated its willingness to cooperate with all workers' groups that accepted the principles of consolidating Ukraine's statehood and the building of a market economy.[64] It took an active part in organizing new chapters of the free trade unions as counterweights to the existing ones, and in the future it planned to create a Ukrainian Confederation of Labour.[65] On this question Rukh's program differed very little. It also spoke about the reorganization of the trade unions and facilitating their development.[66] But the URP program dealt with this issue in greater detail in a separate section devoted to it, while the Rukh program discussed it more generally in its section on "social justice." The Rukh program was less activist in nature, and for some reason it did not present a conceptualization of the workers' movement.

The above theoretical principles, however, were not always applied in practice. The last big workers' strike, on 2–3 September 1992, irritated

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[62] *Zhizn* (Donetsk), 24 August 1991; *Shakhter* (Dymytrove), 4 September 1991; *Hvardiiets pratsi* (Pervomaisk), 30 August 1991.

[63] Protokol No. 120 Koordynatsiinoi rady VOSTu vid 20 serpnia 1991 r. m. Kyiv, Arkhiv VOSTu.

[64] "Prohrama dii Ukrainskoi respublikanskoi partii," *Materialy Tretoho z'izdu Ukrainskoi respublikanskoi partii* (Ternopil, 1992), 52.

[65] Ibid.

[66] *Prohrama i statut Narodnoho Rukhu Ukrainy* (Kyiv, 1992), 11.

both the government and the opposition. The government's annoyance was understandable, but Rukh's was not. Rukh issued a declaration stating that the strike was inopportune and calling on railway and air-transportation workers to accept what had already been achieved and to return to work.[67] Similar declarations were issued by the Congress of National-Democratic Forces of Ukraine.[68] As far as can be ascertained, the opposition's leaders were dissatisfied that the strike had begun earlier than they expected, that their support had not been solicited, and that the strikers did not immediately issue timely political demands such as removal of the Cabinet of Ministers and Prime Minister Vitold Fokin, dissolution of the Supreme Council, and new parliamentary elections. Within the URP there were even those who felt that the government should proclaim the strike illegal and punish its perpetrators.

In other words, the national-democratic and workers' movements' united front had split. This is not surprising, given that Ukraine had attained independence and the Communist party was exiting from the political stage. It is surprising however, given that the national-democratic opposition, and the anti-Communist opposition in general, had not yet attained political power.

The question arose: with which camp should the workers' movement align? Alarming symptoms already existed. The Donetsk Municipal Workers' Committee and certain people in similar groups supported the Civic Congress of Ukraine, which stood for federalism with Russia and the other former Soviet republics, official bilingualism, and the primacy of human rights before national rights. In its declarations to the public and the press the Donetsk committee expressed practically the same positions as the Civic Congress, but only after they had been approved in the directives issued by the managers of Donetsk's industrial enterprises. Such views were expressed in a very sharp manner bordering on abuse; revealing a total ignorance of Ukrainian history, they expressed a willingness to engage in a witch-hunt of Ukrainian "nationalists" and "fascists."[69]

In this author's opinion, these views reflected the desire of certain forces to exploit the workers for their own political ends; that is, a turn toward new political unions, Donbas separatism, or possibly even worse

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[67] "Zaiava Narodnoho Rukhu Ukrainy z pryvodu straiku pratsivnykiv aviatsiinoho ta zaliznychnoho transportu," *Vechirnii Kyiv*, 4 September 1992.

[68] *Za vilnu Ukrainu* (Lviv), 5 September 1992.

[69] See, for example, the Donetsk Strike Committee's paper, *Novosti i sobytiia*, no. 18 (September 1992).

variants. This situation arose because the national-democratic movement neglected to engage in purposeful, persistent political work within the workers' movement and the independent trade unions, and because it had no program for the economic and political transformation of Ukraine.

On the whole, it is understandable why particular professional or occupational groups have their own interests and why they try to satisfy them in any way they can. Nonetheless, the national-democratic opposition should have understood that only if the national-democratic forces that had as their aim a Ukrainian nation-state aligned, and in certain cases united, with the Russified or ethnic-Russian workers and trade unions of Ukraine's cities and towns—particularly the new, independent trade unions—would the idea of a Ukrainian nation be supported by these structures and the population at large. Only then could Ukraine's independence as a state be guaranteed. In this regard much of the responsibility for failure fell on the government, which should have immediately begun intensive cultural and educational work among the masses to popularize the idea of an independent Ukrainian state.

By 1991 relations between the national-democratic and workers' movements had gone through three identifiable stages. (1) Initially, during the July 1989 strike and immediately after it, the two movements were far from having reached a mutual understanding. (2) As the workers' movement became increasingly politicized, however, the slogans and goals of the workers and the national-democratic opposition converged to a large extent. (3) Finally, by July 1990 a certain degree of interaction had been attained, and by the spring of 1991 it grew into political co-operation during the days of the strike against the Communist party and government in support of Ukraine's independence. At that time rapprochement between part of the most radically oriented workers' circles and the national-democratic movement occurred.

On the whole, these two movements have developed as the largest, independent political forces of the opposition in Ukraine. Their interaction was one of the principal factors in the defeat of the Communist monopoly on political power and in the attainment of Ukraine's independence. Just as importantly, it also facilitated interethnic harmony within the Ukrainian state.

In 1992 interaction between the national-democratic and workers' movements diminished somewhat as a result of growing political differentiation within the workers' movement and the trade unions. On the whole, however, their broad interaction was maintained, more because of the impact of sufficiently menacing objective factors than of subjective ones.

Primary among these factors was the state of the Ukrainian economy. According to one prominent Ukrainian economist, the economy changed from stagnation in 1988–9 into crisis in 1991–2, and by the end of 1992 signs of economic catastrophe were evident.[70] Yet, the decline in production was not of a structural nature. In 1992–3 the production of food products declined by 27 percent, and that of industrial goods, by 13.4 percent.[71]

In such conditions, it is not surprising that the living standard of Ukraine's inhabitants dropped and there were four price increases. From the beginning of 1992 to the end of 1993 the purchasing power of people with fixed incomes declined eightfold to tenfold, while prices on products increased five-hundredfold to a thousandfold.[72] Inflation continued to increase, yet the government did not introduce economic reforms, but only inconsequential half-measures.

Ukraine's political situation as an independent state remained complicated. Most of the people in positions of power were those who had belonged to the Soviet *nomenklatura*. Separatist tendencies intensified, particularly in the Crimea, the Donbas, and Transcarpathia. The "party in power" (*partiia vlady*) grew stronger, while membership in the oppositional democratic parties rose slowly. Meanwhile the population's political apathy intensified, as did its anger and bitterness over its socio-economic plight. With the decline in production, the threat of unemployment became more real, and shortened workdays and involuntary, unpaid days became common. Altogether, the situation was such that there was a threat of social upheaval, a widespread loss of hope that economic and political reforms would ever take place, and fear that Ukraine would lose its independence.

The first indicator of how threatening the situation was the strike of Kyiv's public transportation workers in February 1993. Their principal demand was raising their wages to the equivalent of ten minimum wages. The strike raised the ire of Kyiv's inhabitants, and their dissatisfaction was fanned further by the authorities and the mass media. The overwhelming majority of Ukraine's political parties reacted extremely negatively to the strike. Only the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN) and the Kyiv regional organization of Rukh tried to penetrate into the heart of the matter and to evaluate events objectively. It was probably

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[70] Valerii Popovkin, "Suchasna katastrofa ukrainskoi ekonomiky (Vytoky i shliakhy podolannia)," *Suchasnist*, 1993, no. 9, 94–106.

[71] Ibid., 95.

[72] Calculations do not include the December 1993 price increases.

not without the latter two organizations' influence, as well as that of VOST, that the strikers began voicing political demands, but by that time the strike had been practically defeated. With time, however, it became clear that the authorities had gained a Pyrrhic victory.

Deep and widespread dissatisfaction and trade-union conferences and gatherings, both by the officially recognized and free trade unions, to discuss the state's socioeconomic development and the policies of the Ukrainian parliament and President Leonid Kravchuk continued from the end of 1992. At that time the national-democratic opposition was preoccupied with trying to collect signatures in support of a referendum on the dissolution of parliament. All they achieved was a change in government in October 1992 from that under Fokin to one under Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma. The democratic parties, beginning with Rukh, also actively elaborated the problem of state-building in Ukraine. As for implementing economic reforms, their program supported accelerated privatization, but viewed pushing workers to buy out the shares of the enterprises where they worked as dangerous given the threat of bankruptcy, which would leave the workers with nothing. Vis-à-vis state-building, Rukh foresaw the introduction of a series of measures to neutralize the consequences of such bankruptcies and of widespread unemployment.[73] At the fourth Rukh national congress in December 1992, however, nothing else was said about the trade unions and hired labour.

The DemPU did not have better positions. In the section on "Social Policies" in its new program, for example, it stated that human rights in the sphere of labour relations were defended by "laws as well as the trade unions and other civic organizations." It justified unemployment even more openly, while the measures it proposed for fighting bankruptcies and unemployment essentially did not differ from Rukh's.[74] The state's social policies were carefully elaborated, however, in the state-building program of a group of experts affiliated with the Congress of National-Democratic Forces.[75] But their perspective was more that of forces close to those in power or about to attain it than that of political parties struggling for power, and more significantly, they did not define the mechanism for realizing their plans. Meanwhile, according to

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[73] "Kontseptsiia derzhavotvorennia v Ukraini," *Chetverti vseukrainski zbory Narodnoho Rukhu Ukrainy, Kyiv, 4–6 hrudnia 1992 r.*, 10.

[74] *Statut i prohramy Demokratychnoi partii Ukrainy* (Svitlovodsk, 1993), 27.

[75] "Prohrama kompleksnoi sotsialno-ekonomichnoi reformy Ukrainy," *Rozbudova derzhavy*, 1993, no. 4, 42–7.

Mykhailo Horyn, the URP considered the threat of strikes to be one of the causes of the destabilization of the Ukrainian state and of its territorial integrity.[76]

Under different conditions these documents might possibly have been correct. But even though they made a positive impression on politicians and even on part of the public, in no way did they contribute to understanding the premature socio-political changes taking place in Ukraine, particularly given the existing degree of apathy within the national-democratic movement caused by the compromising of a number of politicians and the absence of appropriate preparatory work. Until the summer of 1993 the national democrats and trade unions again went their separate ways.[77] Both had major problems, and neither expended much effort to reach an understanding. This situation was exploited by a third party for its own benefit.

On 7 June 1993 the miners of several shafts in Donetsk laid down their tools. Soon they were joined by miners from other shafts and industrial workers from outside Donetsk and even the Donbas. The strike spread quickly to other branches of industry throughout Ukraine. It should be stressed that at the time the largest and most organized pro-Communist and pro-Russian parties and other organizations—from the Civic Congress to the new Communist Party of Ukraine, whose constituent congress took place during the same days as the strike—were active in the Donbas.

The summer 1993 strike was in many ways similar to the July 1989 strike, but it had its own particularities. First, it was one of the longest strikes in Ukrainian history, lasting well into early July (in Krasnodon). Secondly, and more importantly, political demands were at its fore virtually from the beginning. The strikers demanded (1) regional independence (autonomy) for Donetsk oblast; (2) a referendum on public confidence in the Supreme Council and all oblast, raion, and municipal councils in Ukraine; and (3) a referendum on public confidence in the president of Ukraine.[78]

By my calculations, the workers of 228 mine shafts, 36 shafts of building associations, 16 enrichment plants, and over 100 other large enterprises took part in the strike. The workers of the Kryvyi Rih Iron-ore

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[76] Mykhailo Horyn, "Politychna sytuatsiia v Ukraini i zavdannia URP na suchasnomu etapi," *Respublikanets*, 1993, no. 4, 4.

[77] The URP did, however, confirm its readiness to cooperate with the workers and trade unions. See *IV z'izd URP* (1993), 91.

[78] *Aktsent*, 9 June 1993.

Basin participated, and there were attempts to shut down plants in Kharkiv, Odessa, and other cities. As a result, on 17 June the Supreme Council and President Kravchuk were forced to make concessions and to accept the strikers' demands for referendums on the Supreme Council and the president, to be held in September (the strikers withdrew their demand for regional independence of the Donbas). The strikers continued negotiations with the government on economic problems. Many of their economic demands were essentially political in that they were directed toward greater integration with the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States or toward the strengthening of regional separatism, or were simply anti-Ukrainian in content.[79]

Not all of the strikers supported these radical demands, however. Their representatives in Shakhtarsk, Dymytrove, and other cities of the Donbas spoke out vehemently against the demand for regional independence, and similar sentiments were voiced by the Independent Trade Union of Miners.[80] First and foremost these workers supported the dissolution of the existing Supreme Council.

It is understandable that the fundamental reason for the strike were Ukraine's socio-economic crisis and, more directly, the price increases that the government introduced at the beginning of June. Nonetheless, there is enough to indicate that the strike was provoked by a third force—the "Red directors," possibly in tandem with the Labour party.[81] In fact, that the directors of the basic branches of industry and the military-industrial complex and representatives of the old, Soviet *nomenklatura*, on the whole, participated in the organization of the strike was its third particularity. As a result of their participation, the positions of Ukraine's leaders were weakened during their negotiations with Russia that very June.

This situation caused great unease inside the national-democratic camp. According to unofficial data, before the strike and at its height Rukh's leaders intensively consulted with the leaders of the workers' movement in an attempt to find a way to diminish Ukraine's economic losses. None of Ukraine's political parties publicly supported the strike. Rukh came out in support of the government's implementation of the strikers' realistic demands, but at the same time it declared that autonomy would not help the Donbas to solve its problems. It supported the strikers' demands for new elections to the Supreme Council, but under

[79] See, for example, *Luganskaia pravda*, 15 June 1993; and *Makeevskii rabochii*, 15 and 17 June 1993.

[80] *Aktsent*, 11 June 1993.

[81] See *Nezavisimost*, 23 June 1993; and *Post-Postup*, 22–8 June 1993, 2, 5.

existing conditions it considered the recall of the president to be impossible.[82] A harshly negative evaluation of the strike was made by the leaders of the DemPU and URP,[83] and the KUN publicly appealed for an end to the strike for political reasons, although it stressed the need for new elections to the Supreme Council.[84] Meanwhile, the Narodna Rada opposition in the Supreme Council branded parliament's agreement to the last of the strikers' political demands as political games and the beginning of the overthrow of the state. It called for immediate elections to parliament and local governments and a referendum on confidence in the president.[85]

Thus it appears that both the national democrats and the "party in power" were quite frightened and totally unprepared. Social upheaval, which had been long discussed, had become a reality, and the national-democratic forces were, by and large, confused as to what to do. Be as it may, the summer strike accomplished what the national-democrats themselves could not: it placed on the practical agenda the fate of the Supreme Council. As a result of the strike, many national-democrats came to understand that Ukraine's social problems were primary and that if the workers-and-trade-union movement was not aligned with them, it would enter into an alliance with other political parties. Thus, for example, after the strike the Liberal Party of Ukraine and members of the Donetsk Strike Committee—Igor Merkulov, Iurii Makarov, and Mikhail Krylov—signed an agreement to work jointly toward realizing the program of the "Rebirth of the Donbas."[86] It also became clear to the national democrats and the trade-union leaders that neither side alone could organize a national general strike or effect political changes.

When the government reneged on its agreement to hold a September referendum, on 13 August the representatives of eighteen parties, civic organizations, and trade unions issued a joint declaration to the Supreme Council demanding adoption of a new electoral law in September and an end to the people's deputies' mandates no later than the beginning of 1994. The head of the Independent Trade Union of Coal Miners of Ukraine (NPHU), Oleksii Mril, said shortly thereafter: "We are talking

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[82] Zaiava Narodnoho Rukhu Ukrainy z pryvodu sytuatsii v Donbasi vid 11 chervnia 1993 roku, Arkhiv Sekretariatu NRU.

[83] See *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 12 June 1993.

[84] Do podii v Donechchyni — zvernennia KUN vid 15. 06. 1993 r., Arkhiv Sekretariatu KUN.

[85] *Holos Ukrainy*, 19 June 1993.

[86] *Holos Ukrainy*, 20 August 1993; *Post-Postup*, 25–30 August 1993.

about a joint action of Rukh, [political] parties, and trade unions with a single demand—parliamentary elections. This demand was supported by the west, by the east, and by the south of Ukraine."[87] Even the leader of the Federation of Trade Unions of Ukraine, who generally supported the positions of the "party in power" and did not sign the joint declaration, informed Rukh's leaders that he supported the demand to hold parliamentary elections in early 1994.

At the end of August the miners' groups held stormy discussions of the Supreme Council's decision regarding their strike. The railway workers of Mykolaiv, however, preferred actions to words, and announced a strike on 1 September. In addition to new parliamentary elections, they demanded the introduction of wages indexed at the level of not less than half of the increase in prices. The Free Trade Union of Railway Engineers expected to spread their strike to another depot and then to disrupt all passenger service.[88] The railway strike in Mykolaiv and the threat of its spread was an attempt at forcing the Supreme Council to be more tractable on the issue of new elections. Of course, Rukh was involved in this action to some extent.[89] Another political group, the Labour Congress of Ukraine, which had gained some political influence, showed interest in the workers' movement, having recognized its power.[90] Somewhat earlier, at the beginning of July, presentations on the problems of the workers' and trade-union movement were presented at the First All-Ukrainian Congress of KUN, and its leaders also indicated a keen interest in them.

The desire to unite the efforts of the entire opposition became possible on 9 September 1993, when, after lengthy consultations, a Congress of Political Parties, Civic Organizations, Trade-Union Federations, and Workers' and Strike Committees was established. The congress united ten political parties, eight civic organizations, and ten trade unions. Its founding declaration expressed nonconfidence in President Kravchuk, the government, and the Supreme Council, and announced its intention to organize a one-day political general strike on 28 September and other acts of civil disobedience.[91] The congress also demanded new parliamentary elections (in accordance with the new

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[87] *Literaturna Ukraina*, 19 August 1993.

[88] A flyer to this effect is in my possession.

[89] *Holos Ukrainy*, 3 September 1993.

[90] Anatolii Sadovenko, "Stoimo ... Robitnychyi rukh na rozdorizhzhi," *Holos Ukrainy*, 12 August 1993.

[91] *Nezavisimost*, 15 September 1993.

electoral laws), a referendum on election day to determine public confidence in President Kravchuk, and his impeachment by the Supreme Council within a month's time. It asked the public to indicate its support for these demands by blaring automobile and train horns on the opening day of the next session of parliament.

Analysis of the congress's demands and the parties and organizations that signed its declaration indicates that this document and the congress itself were the result of political compromise. In the summer of 1993 most parties were still opposed to expressing nonconfidence in Kravchuk and to his removal, and many people were sceptical as to the possibility and effectiveness of new elections. The URP did not sign the congress's declaration, and the association engendered by the congress was not readily accepted by the NPHU. The various parties and trade unions had differing views on the reform of the system of power. Trade-union leaders, for example, suggested creating a constituent assembly as a parallel power structure, and the trade unions called on deputies belonging to the parliamentary opposition to convince the public that their intentions were genuine through personal example, that is, by resigning from the Supreme Council.[92] Differences of opinion were also expressed on economic union with Russia and the other former Soviet republics, on the individual branches of power, and on other matters. Under the influence of the trade unions the final draft of the congress's declaration was much more radical than the original draft. On the whole, parties and organizations that propounded or tended toward national-democratic ideas participated in the congress.

The congress and its planned actions were another consequence of the July strike and the government's reluctance to introduce reforms. It was the first real attempt by the majority of the political opposition to reach an understanding since the Pavlohrad conference. Unfortunately, however, the URP, which headed the Congress of National-Democratic Forces, refused to participate in any joint actions, probably because it feared their initiator was Rukh, and called for a strike on 20 September.

The need for a strike disappeared after the Supreme Council finally agreed to new elections. But the experience gained in organizing the Congress of Political Parties, Civic Organizations, Trade-Union Federations, and Workers' and Strike Committees allowed its participants (though with the support of a far smaller number of trade unions than before) to sign a joint declaration regarding co-operation during the election campaign. The greatest threat they feared was the victory of the

[92] *Post-Postup*, 14–21 September 1993, 4.

former Communist forces in the elections, which were to be held on 27 March 1994.[93]

By December 1993 almost all prominent politicians understood that the Ukrainian state and society were in crisis after another price hike occurred without a compensating wage increase. In response, the members of the parties and movements increased pressure on their leaders to do something to prevent widespread impoverishment. Thus it is not surprising that social security became a popular theme in political speeches, particularly during Rukh's Fifth All-Ukrainian Congress held from 10 through 12 December 1993. In his report to the congress, V'iacheslav Chornovil, the head of Rukh, spoke out in favour of further contacts with the trade unions. In response, Volodymyr Cherniak, a member of Rukh's central leadership, was very blunt: he foresaw an authoritarian, anti-Communist government installed as result of a general strike organized by the trade unions and political parties with the aim of the recall of all authorities and the transfer of power to a committee for national salvation. Cherniak stressed the necessity and immediacy of joint action with the trade unions and free enterprises. In addition to such speeches by its leaders, Rukh introduced a special chapter in its electoral platform titled "Protection of Employees Is a Necessary Condition for Social Partnership and Social Harmony," in which it promised to introduce a law on collective labour agreements.[94]

Thus, in 1993 all of the politically divided national-democratic forces directed their attention toward preventing the restoration of the Communist party to power and the signing of a new economic agreement with the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and toward the fate of the Black Sea Fleet. In fact, more mundane socio-economic problems had begun attracting less attention already at the end of 1992. Both the population at large and the political parties expressed a certain optimism regarding the new cabinet headed by Prime Minister Kuchma.

The already established trade unions and those that are still being formed have been engaged in strengthening and building their ranks. Generally the workers' movement has retained its political character and a certain coolness toward the national-democratic movement. Nonetheless, the acute worsening of Ukraine's economic situation, the decline in living standards, and the threat of the restoration of the Communists to power has again brought these two movements closer. Under present

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[93] *Holos Ukrainy*, 18 October 1993.

[94] *Dobrobut narodu i sotsialni haranty (Peredvyborna platforma Rukhu)*. Copy in the author's possession.

conditions, their co-operation is an absolute necessity. The experience of the 1917–21 struggle for independence has shown that a disregard for or lack of understanding of social problems and the inability to solve them has a marked impact on the outcome of such struggles.

The present-day workers' movement and trade-union activity in Ukraine are an expression of the social and national revolutions occurring there. If these revolutions develop into parallel processes or, even worse, come into conflict, the future of Ukraine's independence will be very uncertain. In Ukraine people who are employed constitute the absolute majority of the population, and ethnic Ukrainians predominate among them. The solution of current problems faced by the employed depends on the ability of the government to effect real reforms, which the workers' movement and trade unions of 1992 and 1993 demanded. Similar demands were also made by the national-democratic forces, and objective conditions for a coalition of the workers' and national-democratic movements remain. Possibly the means such a coalition chooses to achieve the reformation of power in Ukraine will be a national general strike. It could also prevent separatism in the Donbas and elsewhere from advancing. Much opportunity for co-operation between the workers' and national-democratic movements is provided by the conservative law on elections to the Supreme Council, which, irony of ironies, is oriented on labour collectives as the basis for selecting parliamentary candidates.

In general, Rukh has the best future prospects in its relations with workers and trade unions, given that it already has the support of the trade unions in Lviv oblast and Galicia as a whole and good links with the free trade unions. The KUN is also paying close attention to workers and already has a section dedicated to everyday work with them. The social democrats might also have certain possibilities, but probably not soon. One should not overestimate the recent attainment of understanding and the possibility of further co-operation, however. Although there are enough objective factors for uniting the two leading forces of the political opposition, subjective factors have already prevented such unity more than once. Continuing joint action will depend on the ability of both sides to see the real fruits of their co-operation, and no less on the existence of cadres qualified to deal with the problems of labour while pursuing the goal of an independent, democratic Ukraine.

Translated by Roman Senkus

Church Studies Programme at CIUS

In 1994 the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies initiated a Church Studies Programme to prepare a scholarly assessment of the Ukrainian religious experience on the eve of the second millennium of Christianity. The programme's research base is being provided by Dr. Bohdan Bociurkiw, professor emeritus of Carleton University in Ottawa, well known as a leading authority on the history of the Ukrainian churches. Professor Bociurkiw has donated his entire library and archive, containing unique documents from Communist party and KGB records, to CIUS.

Initially, the programme will consist of conference sponsorship and participation, as well as publications. Four CIUS associates gave papers at a conference on "Freedom of Religion, Church and State in Ukraine" in Kyiv in late September 1994. A major conference on Ukrainian church history is being planned for September 1995 in Edmonton. Among the publications to be issued are the following: a collection of essays on the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church by Professor Bociurkiw (in Ukrainian, to be published in Ukraine); a book on the Ukrainian Catholic Church from liquidation to legalization by Professor Bociurkiw (in English); and a monograph on the social and political ethics of Metropolitan Sheptycky by Dr. Andrii Krawchuk.

The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies appeals to Ukrainians of every denomination to help sustain and develop this research programme with their generous contributions. All donations to CIUS are tax-deductible in Canada and the United States, and may be paid in installments.

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Journal of Ukrainian Studies 18, nos. 1-2 (Summer-Winter 1993)

A Novel about Human Destiny, or the Andiievska Chronicle

Danylo Husar Struk

Emma Andiievska's third and latest novel, *Roman pro liudske pryznachennia* (A Novel about Human Destiny, 1982; hereafter *RLP*) forms a thematic and structural diptych with her preceding novel, *Roman pro dobru liudynu* (A Novel about a Good Person, 1973). Both novels concern themselves with the Ukrainians displaced by World War II, and both are written in the centrifugal episodic narrative, which will be discussed later. Yet there is a fundamental difference between the two works. *Roman pro dobru liudynu* is not only shorter by half; it is also much narrower in scope. In that novel Andiievska limits herself to describing the experiences of one displaced persons camp in Germany after the war. *Roman pro dobru liudynu* is an examination of the uprooted Ukrainians' rites of passage to a new life—a sort of purgatorial existence in the camp. The heroes of the novel are all fugitives from Stalin's terror (Andiievska's term is "*m'iasorubka*", "meat grinder"), and the episodes described by the author are firmly anchored in the reality of camp life, with flashbacks to life in Ukraine.

In *RLP* Andiievska has broadened her thematic scope to include not only the life of the émigrés in their respective new homelands, but also the life of their children born outside Ukraine, i.e., the entire Ukrainian diaspora. The real mobility of these characters (travelling from one continent to another) and the philosophical concept of "round time" permit Andiievska to construct her novel on episodes experienced by Ukrainians since World War II to the present. She moves freely in time from one decade to another and mixes various episodes from the destinies of her characters to produce what may best be termed a chronicle of the collective experience of the Ukrainian diaspora.

That *RLP* is a chronicle of the Ukrainian collective is further supported by the epigraph to the book. Citing from Shevchenko's "Podrazhaniie 11 psalmu" the line "Vozvelychu/ Malykh otykh rabiv

nimykh," Andiievska attempts to do just that (glorify small mute slaves), for, as one of her characters remarks in the novel,

> "he could not endure with folded arms that inhuman oppression, that endless horror that has befallen the Ukrainian people, whose misfortune, in the general rat race for a place under the sun, was of no concern to anyone, forcing him for the umpteenth time to remind the soft-hearted, much too unvengeful, much too unclever 'buckwheat-sowers-simpletons' ['*hrechkosii-selepky*'] that it is only through the sword that we have rights" (p. 104).[1]

I believe these sentiments are shared by Andiievska herself; lest Ukrainians never learn this lesson, lest they remain forever small, mute slaves, lest the world remain forever indifferent to the plight of Ukraine, Andiievska sets forth her chronicle. Another reason for seeing the novel as a chronicle is the constant and recurring presence of real persons (Valentyn Moroz, Hryhorii Kruk, Jacques Hnizdovsky, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Mariia Dolnytska, Ivanna Vynnykiv, Volodymyr Kubijovyč, Dariia Siiak, Vasyl Barka, and others) who take no part in the novel but are mentioned as existing in the world of the fictional characters.

The reader might assume that because I have designated *RLP* a chronicle, it is a sequential recording of events. This is not the case. The novel is a chronicle of simultaneous episodes that the omniscient narrator records for us. To understand this one must first of all understand the notion of round time (*kruhlyi chas*). Since Einstein's discovery we have been aware of the fact that time is not a constant, but relative phenomenon. Yet we insist on dealing with time, and this is especially true in works of fiction, in a linear and progressive fashion from the past to the present and into the future. If an author destroys this linear progression, we are sure to note it and describe it as flashback or foreshadowing. Andiievska refuses to follow this convention and insists on the fluidity of time, where past, present, and future events intermingle freely. Andiievska describes this phenomenon through Nesterenko, the guardian of the "spindles of time" ("*kotushky chasu*"), when he explains to Maryna, who is to be the next guardian of these spindles: "the fact that she, Maryna, sees simultaneously the distant and the near comes from the fact that distances rush headlong, cutting across one another, and they rush headlong for the simple reason that space is one of the derivatives of time, which contracts and expands depending on the force with which

[1] This and all further translations of passages from the novel are by the author of this article. Page references are to *Roman pro liudske pryznachennia* ([Munich]: Suchasnist, 1982).

the spindles of time turn" (p. 386).

Let us see how Andiievska utilizes the concept of round time in her novel. *RLP* is framed by a short prologue and even shorter epilogue. Both consist of a dialogue between two unnamed entities, whom I choose to see as the author and the omniscient narrator (muse). The prologue ends with an exhortation by the narrator to listen: "Open your ears and listen. Well?" After a brief dialogue between Fedir and Ivan Dymytrovych Bezruchko (five pages), the narrator tunes in on the thoughts and reminiscences of Fedir and others, all of whom are linked by a great chain of acquaintance, until the last page of the novel, where Fedir again speaks to Bezruchko—some 450 pages in an instant of time. The epilogue begins with the narrator asking "Well? Are you convinced?" Within round time all that occurs in Fedir's mind and in the minds of the other major characters happens simultaneously, despite the fact that it takes 450 pages to present all of their recollections and musings. They are joined into one narrative chain of approximately forty-three interconnected centrifugal spheres corresponding to the major characters in the novel.

Iurii Sherekh, in writing about Teodosii Osmachka's *Poet*, describes Osmachka's exposition as a "system of chain linkages" (*"systema lantsiuhovykh zshcheplen"*) by which the poet creates a narrative poem whose parts are not a "simple union of a taut ribbon whose fibres ... stretch from end to end. Rather, this is more like the connection of a chain, where each link is coupled with another, yet there is not one thread but an endless alternation of links that simultaneously form a strict system."[2] Although Sherekh is describing the structure of a narrative poem, his description can be applied to Andiievska's prose. One need but visualize the links not as round metal loops but as open-ended, centrifugal spheres in which a character rotates, as it were, outwardly, as if compelled by a centrifugal force, until his path of activity (rotation) crosses the path of the next major character, thus producing a linkage or "hook-up." When this occurs the centre of gravity shifts immediately to the new character, and the new "character-fugal" sphere begins.

To illustrate this character-fugal structure, let us examine in detail the first two *major* linkages. I stress "major," because the major linkages are separated by innumerable smaller links. Thus when Fedir catches up with Bezruchko, he invites him to come to his house with the chest in which Bezruchko discovered the cure "for the spiritual rejuvenation of humankind and the resurrection of Ukraine," and with Iunona, the goose that,

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[2] Iurii Sherekh, *Ne dlia ditei: Literaturno-krytychni statti i esei* ([Munich:] Proloh, 1964), 290.

at least in Fedir's mind, serves as the live catalyst for Bezruchko's discovery (similar to the cow in *Roman pro dobru liudynu* that served as a catalyst for Dmytryk's conversion). Fedir hears the goose speak to him about Dzyndra's theory of mirrors and thus starts the first character-fugal sphere of the narrative.

Before isolating the elements of the first major sphere, I should cite a small passage to show how intricately the texture of the major sphere is interwoven with minor links.

> FEDIR GOT READY TO CONTRADICT the fact that Antin could in any way have cured Vsevolod from paralysis since, even before Antin returned from Africa, Vsevolod, ensnared by the Soviets, who hunted down with particular diligence all unassimilated Ukrainians (this was later divulged to Fedir by Tymko Riaboshapka, Reshetynets's most intimate friend, who left home one morning and was never seen again), committed suicide exactly in the same way as did much later Ihor Kamianetsky, and probably Bezruchko is thinking not of Vsevolod but of Iuras Perehuda, who was really threatened by paralysis, but, in any case, what relevance did this have to Dzyndra's theory of mirrors, about whom Palyvoda previously spoke? BUT BECAUSE THE GOOSE, which Bezruchko was intermittently treating to cognac from his own glass and which was chasing it down with reheated borshch that, in accordance with an old bachelor's habit, Fedir always kept in stock (a whole pot) in the refrigerator, being used to cook for itself, GAVE AN AFFECTED LAUGH, having run up and down [the scale of] two octaves in coloratura staccato (it was then that Fedir finally accepted the notion that perhaps the goose constituted a transitory but nonetheless important link in Bezruchko's discovery—something akin to a live catalyst, even though Bezruchko remained silent on questions posed several times [on this subject])—FEDIR SIMULTANEOUSLY REMEMBERED, having become angry at his own inattentiveness: [while] rushing to treat his guest (in recent times Fedir really had developed a habit of rushing, even when there was nowhere to rush to) THAT HE FORGOT—and Bezruchko, out of politeness, did not remind him of it—TO PREPARE A BATH AND GIVE THE MAN CLEAN CLOTHES before sitting the guest down at the table. (Pp. 13–14.)

Let us now isolate the major link (in capital letters in the above quotation) of the narrative character sphere and join this isolated sphere to the point of linkage with the second narrative character-fugal sphere.

> Fedir got ready to contradict ... but because the goose ... gave an affected laugh ... Fedir simultaneously remembered ... he forgot ... to prepare him a bath and to give the man clean clothes ... and having remembered about the bath for Bezruchko Fedir recalled [suddenly] that waiting for him in "Under the Green Rosemary" is Mariika, about whom he had totally forgotten because they had arranged [to meet] a week ago

> ... and that now for him, Fedir, it would be impolite either to let Mariika down or to abandon Bezruchko alone in the house after he himself had dragged him there out of a yearning for company.
>
> Most probably because of [this] anxiety Fedir's brain mistakenly produced such a surplus of brain energy ... and although he did not let a word drop to betray these thoughts, they managed, en masse, to get into the guest's head, for when Bezruchko's wet voice ... reached Fedir's ... hearing, Fedir concluded with surprise that he, God knows when, managed to arrange it so that after bathing all of them together will go to [meet] Mariika in the café ... "Under the Green Rosemary," where Fedir was first brought by Perekotyhora after the performance of *Oedipus* that then completely ruined Fedir's mood. (Pp. 13–16.)

Here the second part of the first major character sphere begins, for with the introduction of Perekotyhora, Andiievska sets the scene for the transition to the second major character-fugal sphere, which will start some pages later. Nonetheless, the first major character-fugal sphere, with Fedir as the main protagonist, continues and resumes after ten pages.

> It was then that Fedir noticed ... that Ilko's eyes were phosphorescing exactly in the same way as the eyes of Taras Nahirny when the latter and Fedir, having barely managed to shove Mariika, Oryshka Kozelets, and Bezruchko, with his extract-containing drum and goose, into the only available taxi ... themselves jumped into an underground garage behind the corner, from which ... they came out in front of the Ukrainian Catholic church. (P. 26.)

Then, returning to a minor sub-link that joins Fedir and Perekotyhora at the police station where they were giving evidence in the death of Ihor Kamianetsky (p. 23), Andiievska sets up the transfer into the second character-fugal narrative sphere.

> ... that then at the police [station] Perekotyhora was suffering, but not so much for himself, as it seemed to Fedir, but for him, Fedir, so that in the end he would not break down and explain details about Ihor that could be told only by someone who saw the deceased during the last minute [of his life].
>
> Actually then, when Perekotyhora noticed that Fedir was not himself ... he struggled to signal Fedir that he, Perekotyhora, would testify in such a way as to nullify all the other ... witnesses ... but Fedir was stunned and did not see anything and did not listen, *just as Slavko Bezborodko had not seen and had not listened when Perekotyhora, together with Lelko Pohoretsky, was painting the murals in the subterranean restaurant The Crescent Moon in Schwabing.* (Pp. 38–9.)

With the introduction of Slavko Bezborodko, Fedir disappears from the narrative (he appears again only at the end of the novel). A new major character sphere commences. The character for the character-fugal

sphere is now Slavko, and the linkage with Fedir's sphere is accomplished through Perekotyhora, who is common to both. As can be imagined from the passages cited above from pages 13 to 39 of the novel—the duration of the first character-fugal sphere—many minor links form the fabric of the narrative and fill it with innumerable secondary characters. They appear sometimes only as names; at other times the names are linked with whole episodes from their lives.

This is especially true if the secondary characters interact in any way with the major sphere-centred characters, or if they, as is the case with Perekotyhora, serve as transitions from one character sphere to another. Their presence in the text is a Gogolian feature,[3] which enables Andiievska to fill out her chronicle of the Ukrainian collective experience and to give the broadest picture with the utmost economy. Andiievska covers the gamut of experiences: political, social, aesthetic, marital, philosophical, and spiritual. The scope of *RLP* is so enormous it could never fit into 450 pages of a conventional novel. Only the concept of round time and the narrative manner based on the linkages of character-fugal spheres permit Andiievska to accomplish this design.

Returning to Sherekh's observations about Osmachka's *Poet*, we see that they are once again applicable to Andiievska. Sherekh notes that "We have become more accustomed to works with a linear composition. But the chain-like [manner] has its own indisputable advantages for a work of a complicated philosophical nature."[4] *RLP* certainly is such a work.

The basic philosophical underpinnings of *RLP* are Zoroastrian. Evil and good are equally present in the world and in constant struggle with each other. Herein lies the "destiny" of the characters in the novel. In the most general terms Andiievska introduces this notion in the very first pages of *RLP*: "it is precisely in this striving—battering [with] one's head through walls to the unattainable—that human destiny is contained" (p.10). This statement receives individual and particular clarification throughout the novel; this can be seen, for example, in the Naumyk sphere, where Naumyk, the organ player, is suddenly possessed by devils that intrude into his music. He explains this as his "destiny," his personal struggle with the forces of evil:

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[3] See the excellent passage on Gogol's homunculi in Vladimir Nabokov's *Nikolai Gogol* (New York: New Directions, 1944), 43–8. Gogolian features in Andiievska's works deserve special study. It is interesting to note, however, that the Gogolian humorous elements present in *Roman pro dobru liudynu* are conspicuously absent in *RLP*.

[4] Sherekh, 290.

> these were the results of his, Naumyk's, fight with the devil, who is trying fruitlessly by [means of] disgrace and infamy to break Naumyk's will, which, however—be it in the most circuitous way, according to a sign from the most merciful Almighty—slowly but resolutely leads him, Iurko [Naumyk] to the light he is finally beginning to see before him. (P. 146.)

Andiievska transforms the personal destiny of individual characters into the collective destiny of all Ukrainians. In that system of duality, Ukraine is the suffering good that is being constantly attacked by the ever-present "meat grinder" (*"m'iasorubka"*), "backbone pulverizer" (*"khrebtotroshchylnia"*), "bully Moloch" (*"derzhymordnyi molokh"*), "gravestone cast-iron Black-Hundreds all-Russianism" (*"mohylna plyta, chavunnochornosotenna vserosiishchyna"*), and so on (Andiievska does not lack epithets), whose main aim is to obliterate the Ukrainians and Ukraine. It is therefore the duty and destiny of every righteous Ukrainian to "duel with evil" (p. 30). Andiievska does not limit herself only to Ukrainians. Her philosophy is universal. Only in the struggle against evil do flesh and spirit undergo an anthropomorphosis.

Related to this Zoroastrian worldview and to the evil-fighting destiny of humankind are several leitmotifs that crisscross the novel and unify it. Two of the leitmotifs are related. The first is the notion that Soviet agents are everywhere and are trying to ensnare Ukrainian émigrés. The second consists of the idea that Russia and Russians, whether tsarist or Soviet, wanted and still want to destroy all traces of Ukraine, its culture, its history, and its people. A third leitmotif is an extension of the second: it consists of the antimaterialistic stance of the narrator, who sees in the high living standard and wealth enjoyed by the children of émigrés the causes of the disappearance of interest in Ukraine's plight.

All three leitmotifs run through the novel. They appear in the various links of the narrative and thus serve to strengthen the notion of a collective chronicle and to unify the novel. Another unifying element is found in the character of Ivan Dymytrovych Bezruchko, a sort of reincarnation of the People's Malakhii without, however, the humorous messianism with which Mykola Kulish invests his character. The resemblance rests only in that both characters have "patents" for reforming humankind. One is not quite sure from the novel what to make of Bezruchko. Is he a saint, an incarnation of all that is good in humans, or a saintly fool? Most likely he is the latter. He appears at the start of the novel with Iunona the goose and his "extract for reforming humankind and reinstituting Ukraine." (For Andiievska the second goal is impossible without the first.) He reappears several times throughout the novel.

First Bezruchko materializes in Tadzo's character-fugal sphere to assist (more precisely to cut the umbilical cord) at the sudden birth of Lina Babatiuk's child in Rome after she and her husband are attacked by a crowd of juvenile delinquents. In the same sphere Bezruchko is seen by Tadzo as the keeper of round time, which is ensconced in the urn containing the ashes of Bezruchko's wife and son.

Bezruchko is also the one who reveals to Tadzo human destiny (another clarification of the aforementioned): that is, to accept "one's cross so that from a pile of meat the spirit can emerge" (p.71). Bezruchko next appears in the character-fugal sphere of Ivan Dolynnyk, a character who is run down by the horse of his wife, who prefers horseback riding to being with him. Bezruchko visits him in the hospital and agrees to spin his wheel of fate. Next Bezruchko steps forth into the life of Lyzhny, who has been miraculously extracted from the POW camp in Rimini by an uncle who emigrated to Great Britain before the war and whose daughter Bezruchko supposedly married. Bezruchko tests Lyzhny's sight by changing the colour of his own eyes to see if Lyzhny notices things others do not. Lyzhny wonders if Bezruchko is not an incarnation of Hermes (p. 283)! Finally Bezruchko is there to console Fedir after Fedir is stabbed by a hooligan in a restaurant while defending Olha at the very end of the novel.

> "I always knew you were my last source of help," whispers Fedir closing his eyes, but Bezruchko does not allow him to close them, blowing so comically into his pupils that Fedir quite easily jumps to his feet and notices that Bezruchko is twisting the horizon into a rope similar to one kids use for jumping, and laughing invites Fedir to step across it, which the latter, hesitating somewhat because of lack of experience, does, [and is] suddenly filled with the conviction that from today on he will walk only forward in Bezruchko's footsteps. (P. 454.)

Bezruchko's sudden appearances and disappearances quite outside the normal character-fugal spheres, his almost supernatural powers, make him an enigmatic character, to say the least. Is he, perhaps, Andiievska's version of the *kozak-kharakternyk*, whose strange and ascetic behavior in a rather materialistic world makes him appear to the other characters, and hence to the reader, as an extraordinary man?[5] Andiievska uses Bezruchko as a unifying exemplar of the nonmaterialistic spiritual qualities of individuals in tune with their destinies and therefore at peace

[5] A separate study should be made of Andiievska's *kharakternyky*, for there are other such characters, though not as ubiquitous as Bezruchko, in the novel: e.g., Dzyndra, Pylypenchykha, Viktor Platonovych Kentaur, and Nesterenko.

with themselves—a state of being as close, perhaps, to the divine as mortals are capable of achieving.

Another unifying element in *RLP* is the narrative voice. Except for the short dialogue at the start of the novel between Bezruchko and Fedir and the two-page folkloristic dialogue (pp. 164–6) between Tsyzo and the one who dwells in the sea, *RLP* is a virtually uninterrupted third-person narrative. It is not narrated, however, in the usual third-person manner: the narrator does not make any distinction between the characters' actions, words, or thoughts. To put it another way, the narration is once-removed; it is a retelling. The narrator heard the episodes from the various characters—their statements, thoughts, and deeds—and is now retelling them in a uniform manner. Furthermore, the narrator is omniscient; acting within the concept of round time, he/she knows everything about the characters' past, present, and future from any point in their lives. It is as if the narrator were an omniscient, omnipresent, and eternal god who knows everything—not only what happened, was thought, or was said, but also what will happen, be thought, or be said by any character at any time.

As interesting and as useful this device is for narrative unity, it has serious drawbacks. The problem with the narrative voice in *RLP* is that it has homogenized all of the characters. Though their names change, with the exception of Bezruchko any one character could be any other. They have their own episodes, but not their own personalities. Moreover, the narrator's language is uniform for all of the characters. Finally, the narrator is by no means a neutral observer, but has very strong personal convictions that are imparted to all of the characters. Thus it is not surprising that the Zoroastrian philosophy or leitmotifs mentioned above occur throughout the novel. They form part of the worldview of the narrator, who in turn imparts them to his characters.

One can bemoan this fact or one can see it as supporting the initial idea of the nature of *RLP*: it is after all, a chronicle of the *collective* experience. But it is also a novel by an author who is first and foremost a poet and who, moreover, does not use poetry as a vehicle for social commentary (with very few exceptions). To express her opinions freely about ethics, aesthetics, mores, politics, national aspirations, and the like, Andiievska has turned to prose. By ascribing these views to her alter-ego—her narrator, and through the latter to her characters, she manages to express her views yet stand outside the conflict that these views might produce. There are moments when the narrator's voice is a bit too shrill. For example, one senses in the extreme anger levied against Ukrainian youth—"a spoiled piece of heartless meat" (*"rozvezenyi kusen bezserdechnoho m'iasa"*, p. 17)—who have chosen the easy, materialistic

path and do not care about what happened or happens to Ukraine, that the narrator is trying to proselytize the reader. In moments such as this, despite the fact that the sentiments seem to be those of a character, the reader is left with the impression that he or she is reading a scorching social pamphlet instead of a novel. The same may be said of the various versions of the meat-grinder leitmotif.

Other views imparted by Andiievska to her narrator are much more stimulating. There is the concept of "long and short roots of words" (pp. 333–4), Dzyndra's theory of mirrors (pp. 114–15), the philosophy of landscapes (p. 380), cosmogony (p. 403), and the rococo garden and notion that humankind's control over nature is a necessity of culture and a weapon against chaos (p. 430). There is also an excellent fairy tale (so like Andiievska's earlier fanciful, morally didactic tales) about the egg that grows heavier and heavier (pp. 360–1). And there is a great power of visual observation, to which we have already become accustomed in Andiievska's poetry, and her supreme control, use, and wealth of language.[6]

Andiievska's last two novels show that she has mastered a new narrative manner, at least in Ukrainian literature. Her narrative style based on interlinked character-fugal spheres is well suited for dealing with her extremely broad subject matter. She is the first author to have created a full chronicle—the Andiievska Chronicle—of the collective experience of the postwar Ukrainian diaspora. By writing *RLP* and recording therein the fates of various Ukrainians, she has produced a fascinating work of fiction.

[6] Andiievska likes to have her prose read out loud, for it is then that her extremely fine instrumentation, not only alliterative but also syntactic, can truly be appreciated. Once again, this aspect of her creativity is a topic that requires a separate study.

Journal of Ukrainian Studies 18, nos. 1-2 (Summer-Winter 1993)

Productive Deverbal Derivation in Modern Ukrainian

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Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to establish the characteristics of deverbal derivation in modern Ukrainian. By deverbal derivation, I refer to the process whereby new words are produced from verbs. In particular, I will concentrate on those deverbal derivatives that are made by the addition of derivational suffixes. Because a verb motivates the formation of other words by adding suffixes, it is also referred to as the motivating word or stem. As an example of a motivating stem, let us take the verb *pereklada(ty)* "to translate." If the derivational formant *-nn-ja* is added to it, a noun is produced with the meaning of action, i.e., *perekladannja* "translating"; if the suffix *-ač* is added, a noun is produced with the meaning of performer or agent of the action, i.e., *perekladač* "translator". If the suffix *-n-* is added, an adjective, *perekladnyj* "pertaining to translation," is produced. Finally, if the -# suffix (which truncates the verbal suffix or replaces it with "nothing") is added, the product is the noun *pereklad* "translation (both action and result)."[1]

[1] In the literature, the term "suffix" is not always used with the same meaning. In some linguistic work, "suffix" is used as a label for both inflectional and derivational morphemes. In English, for example, the -s in "bakes" and the -r in "baker" would both be classified as suffixes even though the function of the former is inflectional, i.e., to produce the third person singular present tense of the verb "bake," while the function of the latter is derivational, i.e., to create a noun from a verb.

In much of Slavic linguistics, however, and in this paper as well, the term suffix is used only to designate derivational morphemes. Derivational suffixes, along with the prefix and the root, comprise the stem of a word. Inflectional morphemes, which are added to the stem, are referred to as endings. In the adjective *perekladnyj*, for example, the stem consists of the prefix *pere-*, the root

In the literature, one can find at least two approaches to the study of derivational suffixes. One method involves analyzing and describing individual suffixes and is therefore called descriptive or syntagmatic. The other method utilizes the results of descriptive analysis in trying to determine how these suffixes interact with each other in a system and is therefore referred to as systemic. One type of systemic analysis seeks to determine the relationship of suffixes that form derivatives from a common motivating stem to that stem and also to each other. A complex of a stem and its derivatives is referred to as a derivational group (Ukrainian *slovotvirne hnizdo*). Since such a group also constitutes a derivational paradigm, this particular type of systemic approach is referred to as paradigmatic. The systemic/paradigmatic approach, therefore, analyzes the relationships between a motivating verb such as *perekladaty* and its derivatives *pereklad*, *perekladač*, *perekladannja* and *perekladnyj*. The derivatives in this and other such groups may have either a formal, a semantic or both a formal and semantic relationship to each other.

The concept of a derivational group itself is not, of course, entirely new and there has been some research about Ukrainian devoted to this question. A number of these studies have examined all the derivatives (both prefixal and suffixal) that can be formed from a single root or word. For example, Kovalyk (1983) treated all derivatives of the root *rob-*, Vereščak examined derivatives based on the word *moroz* (1975) and the root *torop-* (1983), Vasylevyč (1983) treated derivatives made from *mysl-*, and Lesjuk (1983) wrote about the derived forms of *bih-*. None of these studies, however, used as its point of departure an entire part of speech, such as the noun or the verb. Perhaps the most comprehensive work on a part of speech derived from a verb in Ukrainian is Pinčuk"s dissertation on the deverbal noun and several articles (1975abc) based on it. While

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-klad-, and the (derivational) suffix *-n-*. The inflectional ending, represented here by the dictionary citation form *-yj*, can of course change depending on the noun with which the adjective agrees. Slavic linguistics terminology sometimes refers to the complex of derivational suffix and ending as a "formant" (Hanyč and Olijnyk 1985, 323). For example, the *-nn-ja* in *perekladannja* is, strictly speaking, a formant that consists phonetically of the derivational suffix */-n'n'-/* and the ending */-a/* (Poljuha 1983, 385). Graphically, however, this sequence of sounds is represented as *"nnja."* Here we use the same convention as the *Morfemnyj slovnyk* (Poljuha 1983) and write this formant as *-nn-ja* with the understanding that it represents the complex of suffix and ending mentioned above. This is done because the literature almost universally cites *-nn-ja* in its formant form rather than as a suffix *-nn-*. All remaining suffixes, e.g., *-#*, *-n-*, *-nyk*, are given in purely suffixal form.

thorough in its analysis of individual suffixes, it includes little of the type of systemic analysis described here. The paradigmatic approach has, however, been applied to other Slavic languages; for example, to Russian by Zenkov (1969) and Revzina (1969), and in particular to the Russian substantive by Schupbach (1975).

To my knowledge, the existing research has not, however, undertaken a systemic analysis of deverbal derivation in Ukrainian. The goals of this paper, then, will be (1) to establish and analyze the most productive deverbal derivational groups in Ukrainian; (2) to compare and contrast the characteristics of these groups; and (3) to examine the results in light of derivational theory. The corpus of data includes derivatives made from verbs beginning with the prefixes *pere-*, *pid-*, and *roz-* as they are attested in the eleven-volume Academy of Sciences *Slovnyk ukrajins'koji movy* (hereafter *SUM*, 1970–80). *Inversijnyj slovnyk ukrajins'koji movy* (1985), a reverse dictionary based on *SUM*, was used as a cross-reference.

Deverbal Derivational Groups

An examination of the corpus shows that in modern Ukrainian there are three basic productive groups of deverbal derivatives. By definition, a productive derivational group consists of productive suffixes, that is, those that are regularly used to produce new words. At the very least, each group consists of suffixes that form an action noun, an agent noun and an adjective.

Deverbal Derivational Group 1. Group 1 consists mainly of the action noun formed by the suffix -#, the adjective made with the suffix *-n-*, and the agent noun derived with the suffix *-nyk*.

The suffix -#- forms the second largest number of deverbal nouns in modern Ukrainian, both in the corpus (311) and in the language in general.[2] In addition to the term *pereklad* already given, one can also cite examples such as *pereviz* "transporting; ferry" < *perevozyty* "to transport, ferry," *peretyn* "intersecting; point of intersection" < *peretynaty* "to intersect," *perexid* "crossing, transition" < *perexodyty* "to cross over, change into."

The suffix *-n-* is the most numerous adjective-forming derivational morpheme in the corpus, where it produces 150 examples. The relationship of *-n-* adjectives to their motivating verb and to the deverbal noun

[2] Pinčuk's study (1975b), based on the older six-volume *Ukrajins'ko-rosijs'kyj slovnyk* (1953–63), yielded a total of 1,945 nouns in -# if derivatives made with all variants of this suffix are added together. This was second only to the number of nouns in *-nn-ja* and its variant *-tt-ja*, which altogether numbered 6,041.

in -# can be more precisely established by examining a subset of the corpus, for example, verbs made with the prefix *pere-*. Of the 54 deverbal adjectives in *-n-* made with this prefix, nearly half (23) are defined as pertaining to the meaning(s) of or serving as the adjective for the deverbal noun in -#- —for example, *perebirnyj* "adjective to *perebir* (a type of artistic embroidery)," *perevidnyj* "pertaining to *perevid* 'transition'," *perekladnyj* < "pertaining to pereklad 'translation'," *perestijnyj* "adjective to *perestij* 'overripeness'"—thereby indicating that there is a strong semantic connection between the two derivational types and suggesting that in some cases the adjective in *-n-* may have been formed from the intermediary -# noun and not directly from the verb (see below).

In other cases, however, *-n-* adjectives are derived directly from the verb; for instance, *perevantažnyj* "reloading" < *perevantažyty* "to reload," *perenosnyj* "figurative" < *perenosyty* "to carry over," and *perestavnyj* "portable" < *perestavyty* "to place elsewhere." These derivatives are unambiguously deverbal because there are no such -# nouns as **perevantaž*, **perenos*, or **perestav/a* in the dictionary that could hypothetically serve as intermediate links in a derivational chain.

Nouns in -# and adjectives in *-n-* made directly from a motivating stem are known as first-level or first-order derivatives. Words that are produced from first-level derivatives are, therefore, known as second-level or second-order derivatives. As examples, let us consider two second-level derivatives made from the *-n-* adjective. The first is the adverb derived by means of the suffix *-o*. Eighteen such adverbs were found in the corpus; e.g., *perenosno* "figuratively" < *perenosnyj*, *pidstupno* "deceitfully, treacherously" < *pidstupnyj* "deceitful, treacherous," *rozbižno* "divergently" < *rozbižnyj* "divergent." Semantically they were all defined as being motivated by the adjective in question; e.g., *peremožno* "victoriously, triumphantly": adjective to *peremožnyj* "victorious, triumphant." Eighteen adverbs were formed from a pool of 150 adjectives; thus the rate of occurrence for adverbs is 12 percent. In this paper, as in Schupbach's (1975) work on Russian desubstantival derivation, any derivative that occurs with 10 percent or more of its potential motivating stems is considered common and represents a significant derivational relationship. Adverbs in *-o*, therefore, are considered common.

The second significant derivative stemming from the *-n-* adjective is the noun made with the suffix *-ist'*. In the corpus there are 24 such derivatives; thus their rate of occurrence (from *-n-* adjectives) is 16 percent (24/150). Nearly all of these nouns (23 of 24) are not only formally derived from the adjective but are also described semantically by *SUM* in terms of the motivating adjective; e.g., *pereminnist'* "characteristic of *pereminnyj* 'variable', i.e., 'variability'," *peresičnist'* "abstract noun

to *peresičnyj* 'average', i.e., 'averageness'." As indicated by their definitions, these nominal derivatives typically have a general, abstract meaning (*perenosnist'* "figurativeness" < *perenosnyj*, *pidstupnist'* "treachery" < *pidstupnyj*, *rozbižnist'* "divergence" < *rozbižnyj* "divergent"). Both the noun in *-ist'* and the adverb in *-o* are, therefore, second-level derivatives that represent a productive link in a derivational chain.

The third first-level derivational morpheme in group 1 is the agent noun suffix *-nyk*, which is represented by 62 derivatives. These nouns can refer to persons (*pereminnyk* "replacement (at work)" < *pereminyty* "to replace," *pidhotovnyk* "preparer" < *pidhotovyty* "to prepare," *rozstanovnyk* "arranger" < *rozstanovyty* "to arrange") and to inanimate nouns (*perepusknyk* "admitting room" < *perepuskaty* "to admit, let by," *pidihrivnyk* "heater" < *pidihrivaty* "to heat," *rozdil'nyk* "separator, separating apparatus" < *rozdilyty* "to separate"). (Because of their semantics, suffixes such as *-nyk* could be more precisely labelled as agent/instrument. Here "agent" will be used as a general term to express both notions unless it becomes necessary to treat the meanings individually.) The relationship between *-nyk* and the other two elements in this group, -# and *-n-*, can be varied and complex. We will only touch on two aspects of this relationship, each of which illustrates a source of motivation for nouns in *-nyk*.

On the one hand, it is possible to show that in some cases the noun in *-nyk*, the adjective in *-n-*, or both are derived not directly from the verb, but through mediation by a noun in -#. For example, let us consider the verb *pidstupyty*, which has only the meanings of "to walk up to, approach." The noun in -# derived from it, namely *pidstup*, not only has the predictable meaning of "approach (both the action and the means of approach or 'path')," but also the figurative meaning of "treachery, deceit," a semantic notion not overtly expressed by the verb. Significantly, only the latter meaning is clearly reflected in both the adjective *pidstupnyj* "treacherous, deceitful" and the noun *pidstupnyk* "deceiver (*'ljudyna zdatna do pidstupu'*)." Because the latter two forms have meanings related to the noun in -# but not to the verb, they were in all likelihood derived from the -# noun and not from the verb.

On the other hand, it should be noted that nouns in *-nyk* can be derived directly from a verb even when no accompanying -# noun or *-n-* adjective exists. For example, consider the nouns *rozklepnyk* "riveter" < *rozklepaty* "to rivet," *rozmitnyk* "marker" < *rozmityty* "to mark," *rozfasovnyk* "packer" < *rozfasuvaty* "to pack." These derivatives in *-nyk* were formed even though no nouns in -# or adjectives in *-n-* made from the same motivating verbs are listed in *SUM*, i.e., **rozklep*, **rozklepnyj*, **rozmit*, and the like are unattested. In other words, the existence of a noun in -# or an adjective in *-n-* is in no way a prerequisite for the formation of a noun

in *-nyk*.

Derivatives of *-nyk* are not very common, but some do exist. The first is an adjective made with the suffix *-s'k-* (historically *-nyk* + *-sk-* > *-nyck-*)[3]; e.g., *rozbijnyc'kyj* "robbing, criminal" < *rozbijnyk* "robber, criminal," *rozvidnyc'kyj* "scouting, intelligence" < *rozvidnyk* "scout, intelligence agent," and *rozkol'nyc'kyj* "dissenting, schismatic" < *rozkol'nyk* "dissenter, schismatic." Altogether, there are six such adjectives in the corpus. There are 62 nouns in *-nyk;* thus the rate of occurrence for these denominal adjectives is 9.7 percent, a rate so close to 10 percent that it can be considered significant.

The second and less common derivative is the abstract noun made with the suffix *-stv-* (historically *-nyk* + *-stv-* > *-nyctv-*), which describes the behaviour or actions of the agent defined by the *-nyk* noun; for example, *rozbijnyctvo* "robbery, banditry" < *rozbijnyk* and *rozkol'nyctvo* "dissension, sectarianism" < *rozkol'nyk*. Four such examples were found in the corpus; thus their rate of occurrence is only 6.5 percent, which is not high enough to be considered common.[4] One of the nouns, however,

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[3] The historical processes that underlie this and related sound changes, which are discussed later (*-nyk-* + *-stv-* > *-nyctv-*; *-ač* + *-sk-* > *-actv-*; *-ač* + *-stv-* > *-actv-*), began in the Common Slavic period with the first palatalization of the velars. This phonological development caused the velars */k'/*, */g'/*, */x'/*, when followed by a front vowel (including the reduced front vowel "ъ"), to become the palatals */č'/*, */ž'/*, */š'/* respectively. Because the suffixes *-ьsk-* and *-ьstv-* historically began with a reduced front vowel or "jer," all velar stems to which they were added underwent the change to palatals; e.g., the old East Slavic forms *Bogъ* "God," *božьskъ* "godly, divine"; *grekъ* "Greek" (noun), *grečьskъ* "Greek" (adjective); *mučenikъ* "martyr," *mučeničьskъ* "martyr's," *mučeničьstvo* "martyrdom"; *tkač* < **tkak-j-* "weaver," *tkačьskъ* "weaver's," *tkačьstvo* "weaving."

After the loss of the weak jers, many new consonant clusters appeared, some of which were difficult to pronounce, e.g., *-čs-*. In order to ease their articulation, numerous clusters were simplified, e.g., *-čs-* > *-c-*. Consider, for example, the modern Ukrainian forms *hrec'kyj*, *mučenyc'kyj*, *mučenyctvo*, *tkac'kyj*, and *tkactvo*. For more information see Kiparskij 1972; Kolomijec' 1966, 90, 127; and Shevelov 1979, 335–43.

[4] Two pairs of adjectives containing *-nyc'k-* and nouns containing *-nyctv-* have not been included because the *-nyk* nouns from which they are derived lack motivating verbs in *SUM* and are not, strictly speaking, synchronically verifiable examples of deverbal derivation. The noun *peredvyžnyk* (a member of the Peredvizhniki movement of Russian realist painters) is a Russian loanword that was borrowed without its motivating verb (*peredvigat'* "to move"), although the Ukrainian forms *peredvyžnyc'kyj* and *peredvyžnyctvo* do exist. The words *pidpryjemnyc'kyj* "entrepreneurial" and *pidpryjemnyctvo* "entrepreneurship" are clearly associated with *pidpryjemec'/pidpryjemnycja* "entrepreneur," but once again

pidstupnyctvo "deceit," forms part of the derivational group for the verb *pidstupyty*. In general, this verb and its derivatives provide a good example of group 1.





The top portion of the above chart illustrates all possible types of motivation found in group 1; the lower portion shows the patterns of motivation specifically for the derivatives of the verb *pidstupyty*.

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the latter's motivating verb is unattested in modern Ukrainian. Nevertheless, the existence of such forms further attests to the active use of *-s'k-* and *-stv-* with *-nyk*.

Deverbal Derivational Group 2. The second group of productive derivatives consists of the action noun made with *-nn-ja*, the adjective made with the suffix *-l'n-*, and the noun made with the suffix *-l'nyk*. Nouns in *-nn-ja* (such as *perevantažuvannja* "reloading" < *perevantažuvaty* "to reload," *pidv'jazuvannja* "tying, binding" < *pidv'jazuvaty* "to tie, bind," and *rozdavannja* "distribution" < *rozdavaty*" "to distribute") are by far the most numerous deverbal derivatives in the corpus (where there are 1,038 examples) and in the language in general (see note 2). Admittedly, they do not appear to share formal features with the other two suffixes, but we shall see that they have close semantic ties and have been included in this group for that reason. Despite the great numbers of nouns in *-nn-ja*, there is a strong tendency not to produce derivatives from them. In fact, there are no formal derivatives of nouns in *-nn-ja* in the entire corpus.[5]

The derivational morpheme *-l'n-* is the second most common suffix from which deverbal adjectives are formed in modern Ukrainian. There are 64 such derivatives in the corpus. Formally they are derived directly from the verb stem. Semantically the vast majority are defined in terms of the noun in *-nn-ja*; for example, *perevantažuval'nyj* "pertaining to *perevantažuvannja*," *pidv'jazuval'nyj* "designated for *pidv'jazuvannja*," *rozdaval'nyj* "pertaining to or designated for *rozdavannja*"). For this reason adjectives in *-l'n-* and nouns in *-nn-ja* have been included in the same group.

The third element in group 2 is the agentive suffix *-l'nyk*, which forms twenty derivatives in the corpus.[6] In ten of these derivatives, the noun in *-l'nyk* is derived from the same stem as an *-l'n-* adjective and is therefore at the very least formally correlated with it; e.g., *rozdaval'nyk* "distributor: person occupied with *rozdavannja* / appliance for *rozda-*

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[5] In Ukrainian in general, derivatives from nouns in *-nn-ja* or its variant *-tt-ja* are extremely rare. Derived adjectives are limited to ten terms in *-s'k-* (e.g., *pravlins'kyj* "governmental, administrative" < *pravlinnja* "rule, reign, elected governmental or administrative body," *xreščens'kyj* "baptismal" < *xreščennja* "baptism, christening"), to several terms in *-ov-/-ev-* (e.g., *žyttjevyj/žyttjovyj* "vital, life" < *žyttja* "life", *značennjevyj* "semantic, meaning" < *značennja* "meaning"), and two terms in *-n-* (e.g., *žytijnyj* "hagiographic" < *žytije* "vita, saint's life"). The number of derived nouns in *-stv-* is limited to ten (e.g., *obnovlenstvo* "renewal" < *obnovlennja, sproščenstvo* "oversimplification" < *sproščennja*). Even if all the attested derivatives of *-nn-ja* in the entire language are added together, their rate of occurrence still does not exceed one percent.

[6] One derivative, *peremyval'nycja* "washer woman" is listed in *SUM* only with the feminine variant of the suffix *-l'nyk*, that is, *-l'nycja*.

vannja" and *rozdaval'nyj* "designated for, pertaining to *rozdavannja*" < *rozdavaty*; *rozlyval'nyk* "pourer: specialist in *rozlyvannja* 'pouring'" and *rozlyval'nyj* "designated for *rozlyvannja*" < *rozlyvaty* "to pour"; and *roztočuval'nyj* "designated for *roztočuvannja* 'drilling'" < *roztočuvaty* "to drill" and *roztočuval'nyk* "driller: specialist in *roztočuvannja*." Note that in all three cases both the noun in *-l'nyk* and the adjective in *-l'n-* are defined in terms of the third member of the group, the noun in *-nn-ja*, a semantic connection we will return to later. In the ten remaining derivatives, however, nouns in *-l'nyk* are derived from verbs that are not listed in the dictionary as producing an adjective in *-l'n-*; e.g., *perebyval'nyk* "reupholsterer," *peresuval'nyk* "mover," *rozsypal'nyk* "pourer" are formed in the absence of **perebyval'nyj*, **peresuval'nyj*, **rozsypal'nyj*. As with *-nyk*, then, we can produce derivatives using the suffix *-l'nyk* without an adjective as an intermediary link.



Because derivatives of *-l'n-* and *-l'nyk* can be formed directly from the stem, and because *-l'n-* and *-l'nyk* can be first-level derivatives, we can determine whether these terms produce new words themselves.

Somewhat surprisingly, derivatives of *-l'n-* adjectives are quite rare. In the corpus there is only one adverb in *-o* made from this type of adjectival stem (*pidoxočuval'no* "encouragingly" < *pidoxočuval'nyj* "encouraging") and only two abstract nouns with the suffix *-ist'* (*peresikal'nist'* "capability or possibility of intersecting" < *peresikal'nyj* "intersecting," *rozvažal'nist'* "amusement, entertainment" < *rozvažal'nyj* "amusing, entertaining"), resulting in rates of occurrence of 1.6 percent and 3.1 percent respectively. Moreover, there is not a single derivative of any kind in the corpus that is formed from an *-l'nyk* noun. If we recall that there are no derivatives from nouns in *-nn-ja* in the corpus, then we

can conclude that no second-level derivatives are produced regularly from the first-level derivatives in group 2. The form of group 2, therefore, is a derivational cluster composed strictly of first-level terms rather than a collection of extended derivational chains.

Deverbal Derivational Group 3. Group 3 consists of the action noun formant *-nn-ja*,[7] the adjective suffix *-l'n-*, and the agent noun suffix *-ač*. The first two have already been discussed as members of group 2. The third is commonly used to form deverbal nouns meaning agent or instrument; for example, *perekladač* "translator" < *perekladaty* "to translate," *pidsyljuvač* "amplifier" < *pidsyljuvaty* "to amplify," and *rozcinjuvač* "evaluator, appraiser" < *rozcinjuvaty* "to evaluate, to appraise."[8] In fact, in the corpus more agent/instrument nouns (101) are formed with *-ač* than with any other suffix. Once again, this grouping of what appear to be formally unrelated suffixes is motivated by semantic considerations. In addition to being commonly defined as the agents performing the action of related verbs (e.g., *perehljadač* "one who reviews, inspects (reviewer, inspector)" < *perehljadaty* "to review, inspect," *pidburjuvač* "one who incites, instigates (inciter, instigator)" < *pidburjuvaty* "to incite, instigate"), nouns in *-ač* are also frequently defined in terms of related nouns in *-nn-ja*; e.g., *perevantažuvač* "reloader (mechanism for *perevantažuvannja*)," *rozmykač* "electrical switch (appliance for *rozmykannja* 'switching on' of an electric circuit)," *rozmyvač* "washer (appliance for *rozmyvannja* 'washing')." Although no formal similarity may exist between *-ač* and

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[7] The third most productive suffix from which action nouns are formed in Ukrainian, namely, *-k-a*, is not treated here because its role in the formation of a derivational group is not the same as that of the suffixes -# and *-nn-ja*. The position of this suffix in modern Ukrainian and Russian is examined by Lychyk (1991).

[8] Because all the verb stem types from which derivatives in *-ač* are formed end graphically in *-a-* (*-a-*, *-a-*(underlying *-aj-*), *-va-*, *-uva-*, *-ovuva-*), Pinčuk (1975b, 51–2) has proposed that the suffix should be reformulated as *-č*. (In the case of *-aj-*, *-č* presumably truncates the stem final *-j-*, e.g., *čytaj-* + *-č* > *čytač* "reader.") There are only two exceptions to this rule, namely, *sikač* "cutting hammer" < *sik-* "chop up, thrash" (infinitive *sikty*) and *hljadač* "observer" < *hljadi(ty)* "to observe." Olijnyk (1975, 34) argues, however, that with *-ač* the entire stem suffix is simply truncated, and he cites denominal forms made with the same suffix and with the meaning of personal agent that do not end in *-a-* (*cyrkač* "circus performer" < *cyrk* "circus") to show that the suffix is indeed *-ač*. For this latter reason, the traditional form of this suffix will generally be used in this paper. Within the realm of deverbal derivation, however, Pinčuk's point about the shape of the suffix as *-č* is convincing, and I found it useful to utilize this suffix form in the analysis section.

-nn-ja, the fact that derivatives made with the former suffix are often defined in terms of the latter suggests that there is a semantic relationship between them. Another element of the group, the adjectival suffix *-l'n-*, has been included because the derivatives it forms are frequently made from the same stem as *-ač* nouns and, as we have already seen, are also frequently defined in terms of *-nn-ja*. In fact, the corpus contains 14 instances of derivatives in *-ač* and *-l'n-* derived from the same verb stem (e.g., *perevantažuvač*, *perevantažuval'nyj* < *perevantažuvaty*; *rozpyljuvač* "sprayer, atomizer," *rozpyljuval'nyj* "designated for *rozpyljuvannja* 'spraying'" < *rozpyljuvaty* "to spray,to atomize"; *rozvažuvač* "weigher," *rozvažuval'nyj* "pertaining to *rozvažuvannja* 'weighing (out)'" < *rozvažuvaty* "to weigh (out)." Such frequency of concurrence is significant enough to place the suffixes *-ač* and *-l'n-* in the same group.

While nouns in *-ač* are very numerous in Ukrainian, their derivatives are not. In fact, there is only one derivative of *-ač* in the entire corpus, namely, an adjective made with the suffix *-s'k-* (historically *-ač* + *-sk-* > *-ack-*), *perekladac'kyj* "pertaining to *perekladač* and to *pereklad*." An even less common derivative of *-ač* is the abstract noun in *-stvo* (historically *-ač* + *-stv-* > *-actv-*) that refers to the behaviour or activity of the agent noun. There are no examples of these derivatives in the corpus and only three in the entire *SUM* (*rvactvo* "selfishness," *spožyvactvo* "consumption," *tkactvo* "weaving"). The derivatives of *-ač* that do exist are so rare that the suffixes with which they are produced cannot be considered productive elements of a derivational chain. As can be seen in the chart below, group 3, like group 2, consists only of first-level suffixes that form a derivational cluster.



Comparison and Analysis of Deverbal Derivational Groups

With regard to derivational capacity, the first-level derivatives of group 1 are all noteworthy because further derivatives can be created from them. We can recall, for example, that from the adjective in *-n-* both adverbs in *-o* and abstract nouns in *-ist'* are derived at a significant rate, while from the agent noun made with *-nyk* adjectives in *-s'k-*(*-c'k-*) are produced.

Unlike in group 1, further derivatives of the first-level derivatives of group 2 made with the suffixes *-nn-ja*, *-l'n-*, and *-l'nyk* are very seldom produced. The same lack of derivation applies to the first-level derivatives in group 3. In part, this is because two of the three component suffixes of groups 2 and 3 are the same, namely, *-nn-ja* and *-l'n-*. But we have seen that from the agent noun in *-ač*, which is unique to group 3, derivatives are also rarely produced. In summary, a significant number of second-level derivatives are produced from the first-level derivatives of group 1, while almost none are produced from the first-level derivatives in groups 2 and 3.

The second, or formal, parameter for comparison concerns the way that first-level derivatives are made. In group 1, words are formed with all three first-level derivational suffixes by truncating the suffix of their motivating stem. As an example, let us take the verb *rozlyvaty* (stem *rozlyva-*) "to pour." When derivatives in *-#*, *-n-*, and *-nyk* are derived from it, in each case the verbal suffix *-a-* is truncated.

rozlyva + -# > rozlyv
rozlyva + -n-yj > rozlyvnyj
rozlyva + -nyk > rozlyvnyk (glosses appear below)

On the other hand, when first-level derivatives in groups 2 and 3 are made, the verbal suffix is retained. For example, if derivatives are produced with *-nn-ja*, *-l'n-*, *-l'nyk* and *-ač/-č* (see note 8) from the very same verb stem *rozlyva-*, in each case the suffix *-a-* is preserved.

rozlyva + -nn-ja > rozlyvannja
rozlyva + -l'n- > rozlyval'nyj
rozlyva + -l'nyk > rozlyval'nyk
rozlyva + -č > rozlyvač

The question arises as to whether the ability to produce derivatives at a significant rate from the first-level derivatives in group 1 is somehow connected to the fact that in all of them the suffix of the motivating stem is truncated, and, conversely, whether the apparent inability to make new words from the first-level derivatives in groups 2 and 3 is related to the

fact that in these derivatives the suffix of the motivating verb is preserved. In other words, is derivational capability related to the formal processes that occur during derivative formation and their possible repercussions?

To answer this question, two preliminary issues must be addressed. First, could the retention or truncation of the suffix of the motivating verb in some way alter the meaning of the derivative so that the latter would, in turn, affect the derivational potential of the newly created word? In her classification of certain derivational suffixes in Russian, Xoxlačeva (1969) uses as her main criterion the retention or loss of the deriving verb's aspectual marker (verbal suffix) in the derivative and proposes that the history of certain derivational models that preserve the marker differs from the development of those that do not.

The data from the corpus of the present study indicate that there is also a certain semantic difference in Ukrainian between these two formally different classes of derivatives; namely, retention of the verbal suffix in form is accompanied by a greater retention of verbal meaning in the derivative, while truncation of the verbal suffix implies a greater reduction of verbal meaning or verbality (Ukrainian: *dijeslivnist'*) in the derivative. To illustrate this principle, let us consider the verb *rozlyva(ty)* and its derivatives.

First let us examine deverbal action nouns. If an action noun is derived from *rozlyvaty* using *-nn-ja*, then the verbal suffix *-a-* is retained in the derivative and the resulting word *rozlyvannja* "pouring" has only one meaning, namely, the process denoted by the verb *rozlyvaty*. In general, Pinčuk (1975c, 26) has observed that nouns in *-nn-ja* (especially those made from imperfective verbs) that retain their aspectual markers also partially preserve the meaning of an unfolding and incomplete process. A similar tendency has been noted in other Slavic languages for the Ukrainian counterparts of *-nn-ja*, such as Russian *-nie*. Summarizing and commenting on Xoxlačeva's work regarding Russian action nouns, Schupbach (1984, 45) writes that

> Nominal forms which preserve no aspectual marker, e.g., those in *-ka* and those in *-nie* based on prefixal perfectives, provide relatively concrete views of the
> verbal action. The productive forms in *-nie*, which preserve imperfective-*iva-/-va*, bear no aspectual meaning per se but rather convey a more "processual" view of the action. In other words the productive neuter nomina actionis provide an abstract view that is close in meaning to that of the deriving verb.

If, however, a noun is derived from the verb stem *rozlyva-* using the formant *-#*, then the verbal suffix *-a-* is truncated, and the derivative

rozlyv has not only the meaning of verbal process, but also several concrete or figurative meanings (e.g., "flood, overflow; broad expanse covered by something; pleasant, resonant sounds; ruddiness.").[9] So whereas the derivative that retains the full stem of the verb *rozlyvannja* possesses only the meaning of verbal action, the derivative that truncates the verbal stem contains and appears much more likely to develop resultative, concrete, or even figurative meanings.

The same principle can be applied to adjectives. For example, an adjective made from *rozlyva-* with a suffix that preserves the entire verb stem, namely *-l'n-*, produces the derivative *rozlyval'nyj*, which has only the meaning of "designated for *rozlyvannja*." But the adjective in *-n-*, *rozlyvnyj*, in which the suffix of the verb stem is truncated, not only pertains to the action of the verb, but also means "[a beverage] served for consumption on the premises (e.g., *rozlyvne pyvo*); flooding, flooded; resonant, loud."[10] (The clear similarity of the meanings of the adjective in *-n-* to the noun in *-#* reinforces their placement in the same derivational group and even suggests that the adjective may very well have been derived from the noun.)

A similar difference in meaning has been noted among certain deverbal agent/instrument nouns. In particular, Mamrak (1983) proposes that instrument nouns in *-l'nyk* tend to encompass a broader range of activities and have a high level of verbality (*"vysoka dijeslivnist'"*) while instrument nouns in *-nyk* pertain to more narrowly focused activities. He states that a noun such as *rozčynjal'nyk* can refer to any instrumental meaning of the motivating verb (*rozčynjaty* "to dissolve"), while *rozčynnyk* "(dis)solvent" applies specifically to a chemical solution (Mamrak 1983, 133). Such an observation is consistent with our expectation that derivatives retaining the verbal suffix, e.g., nouns in *-l'nyk* such as *rozčynjal'nyk*, should have more verbal meaning than derivatives that lose it, e.g., nouns in *-nyk* such as *rozčynnyk*. Because no other instances of two instrumental nouns differing only in the suffixes *-nyk* and *-l'nyk* were found in the corpus, however, this claim could not be verified.[11] The

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[9] In Ukrainian, the definitions are *"dija za znač[ennjam] rozlyty/rozlyvaty; vyxid ričky, ozera iz berehiv; poverxnja, prostir zalyti vodoju; prostir zalytyj svitlom, tumanom i t. d.; mylozvučni, perelyočasti zvuky; velykyj, šyrokyj rum'janec'."*

[10] The Ukrainian definitions are *"pryzn[ačenyj] dlja rozlyvu; jakyj prodajet'sja na rozlyv; jakyj šyroko rozlyvajet'sja, zapovnjujučys' vodoju; duže dzvinkyj, holosnyj."*

[11] The distinction drawn by Mamrak is, admittedly, a personal one. Both *SUM* and *URS* distinguish between these two words, but in a different way; namely, *rozčynjal'nyk* "one who makes solutions" refers to a personal agent, whereas

two suffixes occasionally produced nouns with different meanings: *-l'nyk* typically referred to a personal agent, while *-nyk* referred to an instrument (e.g., *rozsival'nyk* "sifter (person)," *rozsijnyk* "apparatus for sifting flour or grain"). At the same time, however, there are nouns in *-nyk* and *-l'nyk* that are synonymous (e.g., *rozkrijnyk, rozkrojuval'nyk* "cutter"; *rozlyvnyk, rozlyval'nyk* "pourer"; *roztočnyk, roztočuval'nyk* "drill operator"). Clearly the derivational field of deverbal agent nouns has its complexities, but a comprehensive examination of it lies outside the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it is significant that a semantic difference between instrumental nominalizations that can be correlated with the retention or loss of the motivating stem's suffix has been noted in the literature.

To summarize, it appears that because of their formal resemblance, group 1 adjectives in *-n-* (*rozlyvnyj*) and nouns in *-nyk* (*rozlyvnyk*) can psychologically be associated either with the structurally similar noun in *-#* (*rozlyv*) or the motivating verb (*rozlyva-*), while group 2 and 3 adjectives in *-l'n-* (*rozlyval'nyj*) and nouns in *-l'nyk* (*rozlyval'nyk*) and *-č* (*rozlyvač*) are far more likely to be associated only with the formally similar verbal stem (*rozlyva-*).

Now we can address our second preliminary issue: that is, whether preservation or loss of a certain degree of verbal meaning in the derivative somehow affects its ability to produce new words. To answer this question, it is useful to apply the categorization of derivational types used by Schupbach (1975) in his work on Russian desubstantival derivation. According to his theory, the central quality of a derivative is the degree to which it retains or alters the meaning of its motivating stem. On the one hand, a derivative that changes only the grammatical category of a word but does not change its basic meaning is called categorial. Examples of categorial derivatives include participles made from verbs and adverbs made from adjectives. For instance, when the form *perečytanyj* "read, reread" is derived from the word *perečytaty* "to read, reread," the part of speech (or grammatical category) changes from verb to (past passive) participle, but the essential meaning of the verb remains constant. Similarly, when *rozvažno* "judiciously" is derived from *rozvažnyj* "judicious," the part of speech changes from adjective to adverb, but once again the basic meaning of the motivating adjective is retained in its adverbial derivative. According to Schupbach (1975, 1984), Russian deverbal nouns coined with *-nie* (the approximate Ukrainian equivalent of *-nn-ja*) are also categorial because they maximally retain verbal

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rozčynnyk refers to a substance. Nevertheless, because he is a native speaker, Mamrak's observation must be taken into account.

meaning by portraying the action as unfolding and abstract. By contrast, Ukrainian -# nouns may be used to convey semelfactive meaning; e.g., Ukrainian *perevorot* "half roll (an airplane maneuver), sharp change, coup," *perevert* "somersault."

Schupbach points out that the productive type of Russian nouns in *-nie* (with abstract meaning and singular form) "can be said to produce nominal transforms of the verb in much the same way that the participle can be said to represent the adjectival transform of its deriving base. ... Just as the participle retains the meaning of the verb ... nouns in *-nie* are for all intents and purposes synonymous with the verb" (1984, 29).[12] This statement can also be applied to the productive Ukrainian nouns in *-nn-ja*. Because, as a rule, nouns in *-nn-ja* can be treated as nominal transforms of the verb, the aforementioned fact that some Ukrainian deverbal agent nouns are defined in terms of the verb while others are defined in terms of *-nn-ja* is really more a reflection of syntactic convenience or preference than of an underlying semantic distinction.[13] One can, for instance, find personal agent nouns such as the verb-defined *perehljadač* "reviewer: *'toj, xto perehljadaje ščo-nebud'*," the *-nn-ja*-defined *rozšyfrovuvač* "decoder: *'faxivec' z rozšyfrovuvannja'*," and even occasional instances of nouns defined both ways; e.g., *peresuval'nyk* "mover: *'toj, xto peresuvaje ščo-nebud', zajmajet'sja peresuvannjam'*."

On the other hand, there are suffixes that alter not only the grammatical category of the derivative, but also its lexical meaning. For example, I would suggest that deverbal nouns in -# should be classified as lexical because of their tendency to develop concrete meanings, because a number of these nouns exist with concrete meanings only (see Lychyk 1989, 117, 119), and because they can present verbal action in a fundamentally different (semelfactive) way than nouns in *-nn-ja* (processual).

A key difference between lexical and categorial derivatives pertains to their deriving capability. On the one hand, categorial derivatives, while very numerous, almost never have derivatives of their own and, as a rule, stop the formation of a derivational chain. On the other hand, lexical derivatives, while perhaps not as numerous, are very productive as

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[12] For a discussion of how Russian participles and deverbal nouns in *-en-* also resemble each other in terms of theta-theoretic analysis, see Babby (1993).

[13] In time some nouns in *-nn-ja* undergo a process of lexicalization and acquire a concrete meaning in addition to their original, processual one; e.g., *perekonannja* "(action of) convincing, persuading; belief; conviction," and *perekručennja* "(action of) distorting; distortion, misconception." In general, however, the rate of lexicalization of *-nn-ja* nouns in the corpus is quite low (about five percent).

deriving bases (Schupbach 1975, 21).

This system of classification can be applied to the derivatives in the Ukrainian deverbal groups. Because first-level derivatives made with the suffixes of group 1 are produced by truncating the verbal stem (suffix), and because the level of verbal meaning in the derivatives is therefore reduced, these words should be treated as relatively lexical. Because derivatives made with the suffixes of groups 2 and 3 are created by retaining the verbal suffix and thereby preserving a higher level of verbality, they should be treated as relatively categorial. The fact that first-level derivatives in group 1 are lexical would explain their significant capacity for producing derivatives of their own. Conversely, the fact that derivatives in groups 2 and 3 are categorial would explain why so few derivatives are formed from them.

Although she uses somewhat different terminology, Ermakova (1984) has also observed that the derivational capacity of categorial derivatives (in Russian) is more restricted than the derivational capacity of lexical derivatives. She offers an explanation for this tendency. As a point of departure, she uses Panov's (1966, 74) concept of the derivational cycle. This term refers to a derivational chain where a second-level derivative belonging to the same part of speech is ultimately produced from a motivating stem belonging to a particular part of speech (or "form-class") through an intermediary first-level derivative of a different form-class. As an example, she cites a Russian derivational chain where an adjective, *celyj* "whole," produces a noun, *celost'* "wholeness, totality," which in turn forms another adjective, *celostnyj* "complete, integral" (compare Ukrainian *cilyj* > *cilist'* > *cilisnyj*). We can represent this chain of motivation as Adj > N > Adj.

A derivational cycle may also represent a semantic cycle (Russian *smyslovoj krug*), in which the meaning of the second-level derivative coincides with the meaning of the chain's motivating stem. According to Ermakova (1984, 46), in the derivational chain noted above, both the deriving adjective *celyj* and the derived adjective *celostnyj* have the same meaning and therefore create a semantic cycle. Whether the meaning of these adjectives is truly identical in Russian is not my focus. Rather, I will concentrate on the implications the concept itself has for derivational productivity; namely, that the appearance (or, I would add, potential appearance) of a semantic cycle is a major reason for the weak deriving capacity of categorial derivatives (Ermakova 1984, 50).

To show the relevance of this hypothesis to our data, let us apply it to the two most widely occurring deverbal suffixes in Ukrainian, *-nn-ja* and -#. On the one hand, nouns in *-nn-ja* have been classified as categorial derivatives because, although they alter the form-class of their

deriving verb, they retain its essential meaning. Because the verbal meaning is preserved in the nominal derivative, it would serve no purpose to derive a verb from a noun in *-nn-ja*, for this verb would inherit the same meaning as the verb from which the *-nn-ja* noun was created and, in addition, would restore the verbal categories lost during nominalization. There is no reason, then, to form a hypothetical verb such as **rozlyvannjuvaty* from the noun *rozlyvannja*, because this new word would merely duplicate the meaning and form-class of the already existing verb *rozlyvaty*. In other words, its formation would result in a semantic cycle, the potential formation of which stops the derivational chain. Furthermore, a new verb (with an additional suffix) from a noun in *-nn-ja* not only would be semantically redundant, but would be longer and therefore uneconomical in form. For these reasons, derivational chains of the type $*V_1 > N_{-nn-ja} > V_2$, where N_{-nn-ja} is a categorial derivative, are unattested in the corpus and, to my knowledge, in modern Ukrainian in general.

Why, then, are words belonging to a part of speech other than the one from which they were derived not produced from categorial derivatives in *-nn-ja*; i.e., why are chains of the type $*V > N_{-nn-ja} >$ Adj and $*V > N_{-nn-ja} > N_{agent}$ also not found? The answer, it seems, is that there is no advantage to forming an adjective or an agentive noun from a deverbal noun in *-nn-ja* when such derivatives can be made directly from the primary verb. (We know, for instance, that by using relatively categorial suffixes such as adjectival *-l'n-* and agentive nominal *-l'nyk* or *-(a)č*, derivatives are produced directly from the verb stem.) Given that both the primary verb (*rozlyvaty*) and its deverbal noun (*rozlyvannja*) have essentially the same lexical meaning, the production of adjectives and agentive nouns from the latter would only result in forms (**rozlyvann-l'-n-yj*, **rozlyvann-l'nyk*, **rozlyvannač*) that are longer and more cumbersome than those made directly from the verb (*rozlyval'nyj*, *rozlyval'nyk*, *rozlyvač*).

Because of these semantic and formal derivational constraints, no derivatives, be they verbal, nominal or adjectival, are produced from categorial nouns in *-nn-ja*. Another word can be produced from a noun in *-nn-ja* (and this is true for categorial derivatives in general [Schupbach 1975, 21, 193-4]) when its categorial meaning has been altered or "lexicalized"; that is, when its semantics are no longer merely a reflection of its motivating stem. For example, from *pravlinnja* "rule, reign, elected governmental or administrative body" (< *pravyty* "to rule, govern") the adjective *pravlins'kyj* "pertaining to a governmental or administrative body" is produced. Clearly the adjective is derived not from a processual meaning of the noun but from a lexicalized or concrete one. But such

derivatives are very rare (see note 5).

Nouns in -#, however, have been found to be relatively lexical, and therefore it is possible to form derivatives from them (see above). Although it has been noted that the relationships between suffixes in the derivational complex to which -# belongs (group 1) can be diverse and complicated, it should also be noted that under certain circumstances the derivation of adjectives in *-n-* and agent nouns in *-nyk* via -# becomes essential. This can occur either (1) when the noun in -# contains a meaning that its motivating verb does not, or (2) when the noun in -# reflects only one or a subset of a polysemantic verb's meanings. The first situation was exemplified by the derivation of *pidstupnyj* and *pidstupnyk* from *pidstup* rather than from *pidstupyty*. The second situation can be exemplified by the derivational chain that proceeds from the verb *rozbyty* "to break, smash, destroy, etc." Altogether, *rozbyty* has 18 meanings. Its deverbal noun in -# (*rozbij* "robbery, pillage"), however, has essentially only one (associated with meaning 14 of the verb *rozbyty* "to rob"). All of the other numerous derivatives in this chain reflect only the form and meaning of *rozbij*; e.g., *rozbijnyj* "robbing (*'stosujet'sja do rozboju'*)," *rozbijnyk* "robber, bandit, marauder (*'toj, xto zajmajet'sja rozbojem'*)," *rozbijnyc'kyj* "robber's, bandit's" *rozbijnyctvo* "robbing, banditry (as a regular activity)."[14] For these reasons the formation of chains with the structure V > $N_{-\#}$ > Adj and V > $N_{-\#}$ > N_{agent} is plausible and, in some cases, essential. (By contrast, the noun in *-nn-ja rozbyvannja*, which is made from the imperfective member of the verb pair *rozbyvaty*, is defined as designating action pertaining to 16 of the verb's 18 meanings, and has no derivatives.)

To summarize, the key semantic feature of categorial derivatives in *-nn-ja*, namely, the preservation of the motivating stem's verbal meaning, prevents the creation of (1) derivative verbs, because it would create a semantic cycle (*V_1 > N_{-nn-ja} > V_2), where V_2 would redundantly duplicate the meaning and form-class of V_1; and (2) derivatives belonging to other parts of speech (*V > N_{-nn-ja} > Adj and *V > N_{-nn-ja} > N_{agent}), because such adjectival and nominal agentive derivatives are more easily and economically produced directly from the verb (V > $Adj_{-l'n-}$, V > $N_{-l'nyk}$, and V > $N_{-ač}$). This accounts for the single-tiered structure of both derivational

[14] Derivatives also include the verb *rozbijnyčaty* "to rob, maraud, engage in banditry (regularly)," thereby producing a derivational chain of the type V > N-# > N_{-nyk} > V. Here the production of another verb is permissible and does not result in a semantic cycle because the meanings of *rozbyty* and *rozbijnyčaty* are so different. In general, however, verbs formed from nouns in *-nyk* are rare in Ukrainian.

groups 2 and 3.

Lexical derivatives in -#, however, because they frequently either alter, lexicalize, or do not preserve all meaning(s) of the motivating verb, make the production of further derivatives possible because these new words inherit only the meanings of the noun in -# and not (at least in their entirety) those of the ultimate motivating verb. This explains the multi-tiered structure of group 1. As we have seen, such structures as V > $N_{-\#}$ > Adj and V > $N_{-\#}$ > $N_{agent(-nyk)}$ are well attested, and chains such as V > $N_{-\#}$ > N_{agent} > Adj_{-sk-} and V > $N_{-\#}$ > N_{agent} > N_{-stv-} are not at all uncommon.

Summary and Conclusion

The most productive deverbal derivational suffixes in modern Ukrainian can be divided into three groups on the basis of their formal and semantic relationships to each other and to their motivating stem. [15]Each group contains a suffix that produces an action noun, an agent noun, and an adjective. The key features of group 1 are: (1) formally, all its derivatives are produced by truncating the suffix of the motivating stem; and (2) derivationally, a significant number of second-level derivatives are produced from all first-level terms. The key features of groups 2 and 3 are: (1) formally, all derivatives are made by retaining the full verb stem; and (2) derivationally, almost no derivatives are produced from the first-level terms.

The explanation proposed for the correlation of these features in groups 2 and 3 is that retention of greater verbal form (in shape of the verbal suffix) in the derivatives preserves a higher degree of verbal meaning of the motivating verb, which makes these derivatives more categorial and makes it considerably less likely that new words will be produced from them. In group 1 the loss of the verbal suffix in the derivative results in a greater loss of verbal meaning, thereby making these derivatives more lexical and much more productive of second-level forms.

Finally, in establishing three deverbal derivational groups for modern Ukrainian, it has been noted that in groups 2 and 3, two of the suffixes, -nn-ja and *-l'n-*, are the same. The different components are the agentive suffixes *-l'nyk* (group 2) and -ač (group 3). If the similar formal and derivational behaviour of all four of these latter suffixes is kept in mind,

[15] While these conclusions must necessarily be limited to the corpus, the data base used was large and diverse and therefore permits certain generalizations to be drawn.

then an alternative system of classification can be proposed; namely, that in modern Ukrainian there are two sets of productive deverbal derivational suffixes, one relatively lexical (*-#, -n-, -nyk*) and the other relatively categorial (*-nn-ja, -l'n-, -l'nyk, -č*). The set of categorial derivatives expresses the nominal view of concepts such as action and agency and the adjectival concepts of quality and relativity by retaining a maximum of verbal meaning, while the set of lexical derivatives expresses these notions in such a way that the semantics of the derivatives can evolve away from their verbal base, express additional meanings, and come to serve as the foundation for derivational activity.

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Ukraine and Russia in their Historical Encounter

Edited by Peter J. Potichnyj, Marc Raeff, Jaroslaw Pelenski, Gleb N. Žekulin



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Journal of Ukrainian Studies 18, nos. 1-2 (Summer-Winter 1993)

Review Article

Anatomizing Melancholy: The Poetry of Ihor Kalynets

Marko Pavlyshyn

Ihor Kalynets. *Koronuvannia opudala: Iz promovlian do sumlinnia u Lvovi 1968–1969 rr. / Crowning the Scarecrow: Appeals to Conscience in Lviv, 1968–1969.* Translated by Marco Carynnyk. Toronto: Exile Editions, 1990. 123 pp.

———. *Nevolnycha muza: Virshi 1973–1981 rokiv.* Introduction by Danylo Husar Struk. Baltimore and Toronto: V. Symonenko Ukrainian Independent Publishers, Smoloskyp. 1991. 452 pp.

———. *Probudzhena muza: Poezii.* [Edited by Olia Hnatiuk.] Warsaw: Ob'iednannia ukraintsiv u Polshchi and Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1991. 462 pp.

The publication of these three books—and especially of the latter two, which, together, constitute the de facto complete works of a major poet—is a substantial event in Ukrainian literature. It is, however, symptomatic of the Ukrainian cultural situation, both past and present, that they should continue the lamentable tradition of the belated or otherwise abnormal presentation of Ihor Kalynets's poetry to his readers.

Koronuvannia opudala, written in the late 1960s and chronologically the third of Kalynets's seventeen collections of verse, circulated in *samvydav* form in Ukraine before its first publication in New York in 1972. The 1990 parallel text edition, which incorporates Marco Carynnyk's impeccable translation, was published to coincide with Kalynets's participation in the International Festival of Authors at the Toronto Harbourfront. The poems were at that time more than twenty years old, and for almost ten years Kalynets had not written poetry at all. In a statement prepared for the festival, Kalynets adopted a distanced, indeed dismissive, attitude to the

fruits of a period in his creative life that he now regarded as remote:

> The aim of this little book was to dramatize trivial amorous discontents as universal tragedies in the spirit of existentialism, which I had at that time (1969) belatedly discovered for myself, and also to look for various free forms of poetic expression. And no more.[1]

Furthermore, the republication and Carynnyk's translation of *Koronuvannia opudala* and the very fact of the poet's appearance at the Harbourfront festival were not the reflection of an international reputation, and still less of public recognition in Ukraine, where his poems, officially unprintable since 1968, had only just begun to reappear in literary journals. Rather, they were the consequence of the reception of Kalynets in the Ukrainian diaspora. The invitation came at the urging of the Toronto-based Ukrainian poet Lydia Palij, whose support for Kalynets reflected the judgment, based on the four collections of Kalynets's early verse that had been published in the West in the 1970s,[2] that Kalynets is a poet of considerable stature, that his poetry, while intimately linked to Ukrainian literary and folk tradition, is generalist in its appeal, and that its philosophical dimension and modernist (or, less controversially, nontraditional) formal voice could render it intelligible and, perhaps, attractive to a Western audience.

The question of the modernism, or otherwise, of Kalynets is one to which we shall return. But much of Kalynets's verse, including *Koronuvannia opudala*, is modernist at least in the popular sense that its language resists the transparency of conventional syntax and confronts the reader with the challenge of interpretation. Carynnyk's translation draws attention to a feature of most (not all)[3] of Kalynets's "difficult" poetry that will prove important in my own analysis: unpunctuated and syntactically opaque, this verse does nevertheless resolve itself into

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[1] Ihor Kalynets, "Nevyholoshene perednie slovo," *Novi dni*, 1990, no. 12, 35. This and all further translations into English are mine.

[2] *Poezii z Ukrainy: Druha zbirka poezii*, introduction by Roman Semkovych (Brussels: Literatura i mystetstvo, 1970); *Pidsumovuiuchy movchannia: Knyha aktualnoi liryky* (Munich: Suchasnist, 1971); *Koronuvannia opudala: Iz promovlian do sumlinnia u Lvovi 1968–69 rr.* (New York: Vydavnytstvo Niu-Iurkskoi hrupy, 1972); and *Vohon Kupala: Poezii*, introduction by Larysa Z. Onyshkevych (Paris, Baltimore, and Toronto: Smoloskyp, 1975).

[3] See, e.g., his collection "Trynadtsiat alohii" and the discussion of its "alogical" quality in Zenovii Huzar, "Lohos Ihoria Kalyntsia: Ukraina i universum," in *Druhyi mizhnarodnyi konhres ukrainistiv, Lviv 22–28 serpnia 1993 r.: Dopovidi i povidomlennia, literaturoznavstvo* (Lviv: Mizhnarodna asotsiatsiia ukrainistiv and Akademiia nauk Ukrainy, 1993), 236–41, here 240.

coherent units, indeed sentences, with unique meaning, at least at the level of grammar.[4] This tension between the inaccessibility of meaning on the one hand, and of its precision on the other, Carynnyk has scrupulously reproduced. Indeed, as may be judged from those of Carynnyk's translations that are quoted in this study, he has produced a translation that is in high degree faithful, achieving remarkable stylistic equivalence and introducing no dimensions foreign to the original. In this, admittedly, Carynnyk is assisted by the dominance in *Koronuvannia opudala* of free verse and by the fact that in the collection Kalynets makes sparing use of difficult-to-render technical devices and of culturally specific allusions.

The publication of *Probudzhena muza* (The Awakened Muse) and *Nevolnycha muza* (The Captive Muse)—cited hereafter as *PM* and *NM* respectively—likewise focuses attention on the distortion of Kalynets's relationship with his readers, first through the excesses of a totalitarian regime, and more recently through the peculiar exigencies of a post-colonial situation. Only the first of Kalynets's collections was published and reviewed in his homeland. His subsequent readers and critics in Ukraine belonged to two small and highly specialized audiences: fellow dissenters, and the KGB and their collaborating experts. Even after independence the bulk of Kalynets's opus has remained unknown in Ukraine, where only one book of verse, *Trynadtsiat alohii* (Thirteen Alogies) was published in 1991. The fact that the volumes that comprise his complete works appeared in Poland (copublished with a Western institution) and the United States reflect, on the one hand, the profundity of an economic crisis that has all but annihilated the domestic publication of "high" literature, and, on the other, the waywardness of a cultural situation in which Vasyl Stus has been canonized while Kalynets is largely unread, despite the evolving critical opinion that they are poets of equal stature.[5]

PM and *NM* reflect Kalynets's own division of his works into two parts.[6] The first contains nine collections and encompasses the poetry

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[4] In general, where Kalynets is not deliberately practising "alogism"," his poetry is "polysemantic" (Olia Hnatiuk's term) only in the sense that, like all poetic (and, indeed, other) texts, it stimulates different associations among different readers. Struk's observation that "in its most characteristic free-verse poems [Kalynets's] poetry is incompletely comprehensible, beckoning like a beautiful woman from behind a veil" (*Nevolnycha muza*, 12) does justice to the hermetic style of the poetry, but not to its rationality.

[5] See Hnatiuk, PM, 27.

[6] See "Kalyntsevi doli: Druha—naklykana," part two of Roman Halan's three-

Kalynets wrote before his arrest in August 1972; the second—the eight collections he wrote in prison and exile. The latest of these is dated 1980–1. We have Kalynets's own assurance that, prison-camp conditions notwithstanding, practically none of his poems has been lost (*PM*, 460).

PM contains addenda of considerable historical interest: Ivan Dziuba's favourable review, written for a publishing house, of an early collection; Roman Khorkavy's review, circulated in *samvydav* in 1970, of the collection "Vidchynennia vertepu" (The Opening of the Vertep); the spine-chilling elaboration of charges against Kalynets, prepared by Lviv oblast prosecutor's office; a bibliography; and an "Autobiographical Note" by Kalynets, first published in the bilingual edition of *Koronuvannia opudala*. Especially fascinating as evidence of the view of literature adopted by the organs of Soviet justice is the prosecution document, from which the following is a characteristic excerpt:

> In the collection "Vidchynennia vertepu," written in 1967, KALYNETS libels Soviet reality, depicting our life as grim and uninviting and Soviet people as desperate. In the poem "Kam'iani baby" [Stone Women] he issues a veiled appeal to struggle against the Soviet government. The poem "Chorty pid buzynoiu ... " [Devils Under the Elder] openly mocks the historical events of September 1939, when Western Ukraine united with Soviet Ukraine. In the poem "Arkhitektura" [Architecture] KALYNETS calls for a revival of the Uniate church. In the poem "Budynok" [Building] KALYNETS covertly presents the idea that the Ukrainian people is oppressed by the Soviet government. In the poems "Shchastia" [Happiness], "Krynytsia" [The Well], "Strikha" [Eaves of Thatch] and "Dytynstvo" [Childhood] KALYNETS articulates a nationalist ideology as well as nostalgia for the past and for an independent state. (*PM*, 441).

The bibliography lists Kalynets's journal publications in Ukraine predating his first book publication,[7] journal publications of his complete cycles, his separate book publications of individual collections, translations of his works, and critical studies of Kalynets other than introductions or afterwords to the collections. It should, more properly, be called

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part interview with Kalynets, in *Nashe slovo* (Warsaw), 8 July 1990. The other parts are "Kalyntsevi doli: Persha—kamerna," *Nashe slovo*, 1 July 1990; and "Kalyntsevi doli: Tretia—synie nebo," *Nashe slovo*, 15 July 1990.

[7] According to contemporary Soviet reviews, *Vohon Kupala* was published in Kiev by Molod in 1967. The bibliography follows a tradition, perhaps originating with the 1975 reprint of *Vohon Kupala*, of dating this edition 1966, as does Struk in his introductory article to *NM* (p. 8). In her introduction to *PM*, Olia Hnatiuk mysteriously gives 1965–6 as the publication date (p. 5).

a select bibliography, as it omits the published reviews of *Vohon Kupala* (Kupalo's Fire),[8] and some diaspora criticism.[9] More irritatingly, it continues the tradition of locating Kalynets's first journal publication in 1964,[10] whereas he had published at least as early as 1959.[11]

A comparison of the text of *PM* with the texts of the previously published books reveals very few changes other than those that correct the errors of diaspora editors, who had to work with *samvydav* typescripts and did not have the advantage of consultations with the author (poems inadvertently split into two or joined to other poems, for example). A few poems have been relocated, none has been added, and only two have been deleted.[12] The texts of "Trynadsiat alohii," "Mif pro kozaka Mamaia" (The Myth of Cossack Mamai, 1976), and "Ladi i Mareni" (To Lada and Marena, 1977, 1980), the only collections in *NM* that had already appeared in a separate publication,[13] are practically identical to the text of that edition. It is regrettable, in the case of such an important book, that the proofreading of *PM* is defective, often to the point of being misleading.[14]

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[8] See, e.g., Volodymyr Ivanyshyn, "Na lezi dumky: Lyst chytacha," *Vitchyzna*, 1968, no. 4, 202–04 and Vasyl Hlynchak, "Na svit kriz vitrazhi," *Dnipro*, 1968, no. 10, 149–51.

[9] E.g., Volodymyr Ianiv's thoughtful study, "Sotsiolohichnyi aspekt tvorchosty Ihoria Kalyntsia v ioho 'Poeziiakh z Ukrainy'," in *Almanakh Ukrainskoho narodnoho soiuzu na rik 1973: Richnyk 63-ii*, 113–28; and Uliana Pelekh, "Ihor Kalynets—poet tradytsionalizmu," *Novi dni*, 1983, no. 9 (403), 9–12, and no. 10 (404), 3–4.

[10] Thus also in Danylo Husar Struk, "The Summing-up of Silence: The Poetry of Ihor Kalynets," *Slavic Review*, 1979, no. 1, 17–29, here 17; and in Bohdan Nahaylo, "Profile: Ihor Kalynets," *Index on Censorship*, 1981, no. 1, 42–7, here 46.

[11] The poem "Iaroslavna," not included in any subsequent publications, appeared in *Zhovten*, 1959, no. 6, 30. "Nove misto," "Probudzhennia (bilia kartyny Novakivskoho)" (*PM*, 73) and "Inna" (*PM*, 38) were first published in *Zhovten*, 1962, no. 10, 7–8.

[12] "Smert kozaka" (Death of a Cossack) in *Vohon Kupala*, 23; and "'Uryvok z perestorohy' nevidomoho avtora (1606 r.)" ("Excerpt From a Warning" by an Unknown Author [1606]) in *Poezii z Ukrainy*, 104. The first is a heroic representation of a revolutionary event; the second reflects on confessional conflict in seventeenth-century Ukraine and includes a negative account of Ipatii Potii, an Orthodox hierarch who promoted the Union of Brest and the establishment of Uniate Catholicism in Ukraine.

[13] Ihor Kalynets, *Trynadtsiat alohii: Poezii* (Kyiv: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1991).

[14] I have a copy of *PM* on which Kalynets has marked the following corrections (the text as printed precedes the text as it should be): p. 67, l. 24, *khashchiv, khashchi*; p. 78, l. 26, *khryshchennia, khreshchennia*; p. 79, l. 3, *vymovleno, vymoleno*; p. 79, l. 15, *slatoslove, slastoslove*; p. 80, l. 2, *vulychky, vulyky*; p. 80, l. 4,

Between the introductions to the two volumes[15] there is a good deal of agreement. Both offer, in the first instance, sensitive readings of Kalynets's poetry as a whole and of the content of their volume in particular. Both seek to describe the nature of Kalynets's poetry through discussions of its intellectual and emotional dimensions, its style, structures, and imagery, and its poetic genealogy (both highlight the importance of Bohdan Ihor Antonych, especially for the early poetry; both remark that Kalynets's verse resonates with that of other younger poets of the 1960s generation; Struk speaks of echoes of Tychyna and Bazhan). Hnatiuk and Struk each discuss—in ways with which I shall take issue—Kalynets's poetic silence since 1981 and the extent to which the terms "modern" and (in Hnatiuk's case) "postmodern" may be applied to Kalynets's opus. Hnatiuk offers a useful periodization of Kalynets's poetic output: (1) 1966–70: the collections up to "Spohad pro svit" (Memoir Concerning the World, 1970), in which the dominant tone is that of the confessional lyric and the major concern is the rejection of an excessively ideologized world; (2) from the transitional "Spohad pro svit" to "Realii" (Everyday Realities, 1972), where "Kalynets's poetry attains civic voice" (*PM*, 10) and becomes "a chronicle of the spiritual life of the dissidents" (*PM*, 11); (3) the eight collections of *NM*, very different in form and style, but linked by a common nostalgia for things lost; and (4) the period of silence. Struk finds that the newly published poetry confirms his thesis, articulated in 1979, that three thematic headings under which Kalynets's poems may be grouped are the celebration of culture, erotic desire and love, and social protest.[16] Struk's perspective is that of a subjectively responding reader who derives pleasure from the "contemplative apprehension" of Kalynets's poetry (*NM*, 13).

The appearance of Kalynets's published works, complete and ordered according to his intentions, has established a firmer basis for synthetic, summative interpretation than has previously been available. The critical

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vulyk, vuhlyk; p. 81, l. 24, *ledashcho, lezhydashcho*; p. 109, l. 20, *liudska, liadska*; p. 151, l. 14, *prostuvav, prostupav*; p. 151, l. 23, *proimetsia, poimetsia*; p. 182, l. 5, *ikh, iz*; p. 277, l. 21, *stin, stip*; p. 279, l. 4, *iakykh, iakym*; p. 280, l. 16, *vysvitlyvshy, vysiiavshy*; p. 281, l. 14, *De zhdav, Ne zhadav*; p. 285, l. 22, *botsi, boli*; p. 286, l. 12, *pesokha, posokha*; p. 305, l. 2, *potocheni, potochenim*; p. 310, l. 21, *liudyna, liudyno*; p. 310, l. 23, *iakoho, iakohos*; p. 318, l. 17, *shepne, shepnesh*; p. 411, l. 17, *dvovii, dvobii*; p. 413, l. 24, *ochi, pered ochi*; p. 439, l. 8, *zakrytymy u, zakrytymy sudamy u*; p. 439, l. 27, *Spiltsi pysmennykiv, Sopiltsi pysmennyk*.

[15] Hnatiuk, "Vid uporiadnyka zbirky," *PM*, 3–27; and Struk, "Nevolnycha muza, abo iak 'oraty metelykamy'," *NM*, 7–31.

[16] Struk, "The Summing-up of Silence," 20.

inclination to examine Kalynets's opus as a poetry of intellectual reflection and to read it seriously as the expression of a systematizable worldview is encouraged by Kalynets's own attitude to poetry. "A poet must have a coherent philosophical outlook," he claimed in a 1991 interview, identifying this as among the main lessons that he learnt from reading Antonych.[17] In the same interview he emphasized the thought-through and unified structure of his poetic work: "A book itself constitutes a whole. As a unit, a work, not as individual poems written on this or that occasion and then mechanically gathered into books."[18] Thus the remainder of this discussion proposes an account of Kalynets's poetry as the formulation of an evolving but intellectually and aesthetically coherent view of, and attitude to, the world. More specifically, it offers a reading of Kalynets's works as religious poetry underpinned by intellectual and aesthetic premises that I may justifiably call "baroque" and animated by a species of inner experience that people of the Renaissance and the Baroque knew as melancholia.

The project of such a systematic interpretation today may seem scarcely sustainable in the light of post-structuralist scepticism concerning unique explanations and stable meanings. I embark on it nevertheless, for in the interpretive engagement I pay tribute to a poet and a poetic opus whose dignity to me seems profound.

Critical awareness of the religious dimension of Kalynets's works has grown in recent years, and is most clearly manifest in the excellent study by the Lviv critic Taras Salyha. Yet even Salyha speaks of "the motif of religiosity" and the "religious, Christian foundation of Kalynets's poetry"[19] as only one aspect of the content of the poetry, whereas practically any dimension of it that critics have hitherto addressed—its argument structure, language and tone, politics, erotics, and view of humankind—can be modelled in an integrated way if we choose to focus upon Kalynets as a religious poet.

"Religious poet" is not a designation that Kalynets applies to himself, despite his insistence that he "could never forget that [he] had been baptized into the Greek Catholic rite"[20] and despite, in recent years, his public commitment to the Ukrainian Catholic church.[21] His poetry is not

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[17] Ihor Kalynets, "Pidsumovuiuchy movchannia" (interview with Serhii Kozak), *Literaturna Ukraina*, 5 September 1991.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Taras Salyha,"Ioho ternovyi vohon: Shtrykhy do literaturnoi sylvety Ihoria Kalyntsia," *Dzvin*, 1992, no. 9–10, 147.

[20] "Avtobiohrafichna prymitka," *PM*, 459.

[21] In 1993 Kalynets read from his poetry at the celebrations following the

the mouthpiece of a particular set of theological propositions. It is religious in that it declines the secular focus on this world as the sole intelligible context of the human. It is Christian in that it comes to be informed by the idea of salvation through Christ, and it sustains interpretation as prayer (either of praise or of supplication).[22]

But the poetry of Kalynets is not uniformly religious. Its religious dimension evolves, and the episodes of this evolution closely parallel the unfolding of events in Kalynets's life. Kalynets began his poetic career in the mid-1960s by writing at the borderline of official approval. After the publication of *Vohon Kupala* he became a persona non grata, a status confirmed by the publication of some of his *samvydav* collections in the West. Official pressure upon him and Iryna Stasiv-Kalynets, his wife, culminated in her arrest in January 1972 and his in August of that year. Nine years of imprisonment and exile followed. The years 1970–2, prior to the poet's arrest, were the most replete with anguish and anxiety. They were marked by the emergence in Kalynets's poetry of the most forthright notes of political protest. This was also the critical period in the crystallization of Kalynets's poetry as religious poetry. The entire process I see as passing through four phases corresponding to those proposed by Olia Hnatiuk, but identified by different distinctive features: (a) an early phase of secular nativism (1965–70), where religion is one among many elements of a valuable past used in constructing a dignified personal and national identity (from "Vohon Kupala" to "Spohad pro svit"); (b) a relatively brief period (1970–2) of struggle with basic philosophical issues and articles of religious faith (from "Pidsumovuiuchy movchannia" to "Realii"); (c) a decade (1972–81) of writing poetry consistent with a Christian outlook (to the end of *NM*); and, finally, (d) a phase of silence open to interpretation in religious terms.

The contours of the early, nativist poetry are already well known to critics, who have understood the celebration of icons, stained-glass windows, Easter eggs, the Christmas *vertep*, Christmas itself, and the custom of carolling at Christmas in "Vohon Kupala" and "Vidchynennia vertepu"[23] to be no different in tone or purpose from Kalynets's

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consecration of a site for the Ukrainian Catholic cathedral in Kyiv.

[22] Salyha overstates the case when he claims that "thanks to Kalynets, the prayer as a poetic genre is enjoying a renaissance in Ukrainian poetry of the second half of the twentieth century" (*Dzvin*, 1992, no. 9–10, 150). It is only in individual cases that strictly generic markers of prayer—the second-person address to God, for example—are evident. The way in which the poems may, indeed, be regarded as prayerlike will be described below.

[23] *PM*, 41, 42, 44, 59, 63, and 65 respectively.

celebration of pagan relics and beliefs. The theme of these collections is the value of personal identity, which is presented as bound up with, and emanating equally from, history, custom, and personal predecessors. The Christian is present here only in its ritual aspects, and is neither more nor less valuable than the pre-Christian. The poem "Rizdvo" (Christmas, 1967) is characteristic:

> Я сьогодні новонароджений,
> я відцурався брезклого віку.
> Починаю в яслах із козами
> румигати кометні віники,
> смакувати молошне літепло
> незайманопервісної цноти.
> Очищений від поліпів політики,
> перебираю зоряні чотки.
>
> Я знайшов себе у країні колядок
> на шорсткім солом'янім килимі. [...] (*PM*, 63)

(Today I am newborn, / I have renounced this bloated age. / With the goats in the manger I begin / to chew the cud of comets' brooms, / to taste the milky tepidity / of pristine and primal chastity. / Cleansed of the polyps of politics, / I tell the beads of the stars. // I have found myself in the country of carols/ on a coarse straw mat.)

The reflection is a secular one: the poetic persona, seeking self-definition, casts aside the political (like the polyp, it is merely a surface growth) and gains access to the spiritual (celestial) self through the customs and stories of a Ukrainian rural Christmas (the tradition of feeding the domestic animals before the Christmas Eve meal; the Biblical story of the three wise men, guided to Bethlehem by a star; the custom of carolling). The poem thus maps a journey familiar to the national romanticisms of Europe: to the essential self through the spiritual wealth of one's own people. Christmas is not, here, a Christian festival, but a point of intersection of nation and subjectivity. If the saints depicted in the icons of a wooden church gaze upon the world "*ne vizantiiskymy ochyma, / a maliariv is Zhovkvy*" (not through Byzantine eyes, / but those of painters from Zhovkva; *PM*, 41), it is because the universal is less essential than the native. The destruction of churches elicits not horror at an act of sacrilege, nor anger that places of worship are wrested violently from Christian believers, but romantic regret at the passing of historical and aesthetic treasures: "*tse umyraly stolittia, / tse pomyralo prekrasne*" (these were centuries perishing, / this was the beautiful perishing; *PM*,

64). This is not Christian poetry—yet.[24] Kalynets's poetry does not remain for long in this romantic mode, whose resources soon prove inadequate to cope with the political and philosophical challenges that confront it. As the state increases its pressure upon Kalynets the citizen, so the issue of injustice presents itself more and more acutely in his poetry, where it begins to jostle with the question, perhaps stimulated by the encounter with existentialism, concerning the location of the self in a predominantly hostile world. Integrated with these questions, and made acute through reflection on love and the erotic, is the question of the relationship between the self and the other. In a poem from the collection "Vino dlia kniazhny" (A Dowry for the Princess, 1971), the question concerning identity is not answered, but asked, and there is no comforting array of nativist props for guidance:

> [...] хто ти
> у сьому мороці
> з душею
> що скупо як молодик
> пробилася
> на вустах (*PM*, 293)

(who are you / in this darkness / with a soul / that meanly as a young moon / has broken through / on your lips).

That identity is embroiled in complicated questions of politics and of epistemology is evident in "Pidsumovuiuchy movchannia," especially in

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[24] Early Soviet critics of *Vohon Kupala* perceived this point quite clearly. Ivan Zub, writing of the poem "Pysanky" (Easter Eggs), finds in it "recollections of childhood and mature reflection upon customs," which, he gleefully asserts, "in the worldview of the people [*narod*] are bereft of religious meaning" ("Iak nerv, tryvozhna (Notatky pro poeziiu)," *Radianske literaturoznavstvo*, 1968, no. 1, 3–18, here 6). Zub is right about the early Kalynets, if merely speculative about the *narod*. Volodymyr Ivanyshyn selects not a Christian, but a pagan metaphor in his characterization of Kalynets in this period as a "pantheist and youthful fire-worshipper"; it is the pagan motifs of Kalynets's poetry that he interprets as national activism pure and simple, insofar as they exhibit "the inextinguishable spirit of the people in its struggle for bright ideals" (*Vitchyzna*, 1968, no. 4, 203). The émigré critic Volodymyr Ianiv, troubled by the fact that "initially one might wonder what exactly Christianity is for Kalynets—faith or merely tradition," tries hard, but unconvincingly, to argue that the poetry of this period is about "the maintenance of faith in its purest and most dignified form" ("Sotsiolohichnyi aspekt," 118, 119). It is, finally, Salyha who forthrightly insists on the need to distinguish religiosity in Kalynets's poetry from its veneration of customs linked to religious festivals ("Ioho ternovyi vinok," 147).

the symbol of rain that appears in this collection. Struk has interpreted it as reflecting upon morality in politics: just as, having ventured into the rain, it is impossible to remain dry, so, having compromised with the powers that be, it is impossible to be innocent.[25] But the political division of the world into the pure of heart and the collaborators runs parallel to the Kantian gulf between the self and the world in general:

> [...] ділений і переділений світ
> відколи світ тепер поділений
> на сей бік дощу і на той бік (*PM*, 232)

(divided and redivided is the world / since the world has now been divided / into this side of the rain and that side)

Tautology gives a finality to this subject-object division (the world is divided *because* it is divided) that previously, in the poems of *Koronuvannia opudala*, the poetic persona had hoped to escape through love:

> [...] на сей раз переступив з тобою межу усвідомлюючи
> що все заховане за поверхнею десь
> мусило причаєне тривати через цілий час
> відчинив двері і коли б ми мали у руках
> квіт яблуні не залишився б квітом а став
> би у наших руках яблуком або зерням [...]

(this time I stepped over the boundary with you / realizing that whatever was concealed beneath the surface / existed somewhere lurking through all time / I opened the door and if we had apple blossoms / in our hands they would not remain blossoms but would become / an apple or a seed in our hands.)[26]

It is in the context of such turbulence in the philosophical, erotic, and political worlds that a new tonality enters into Kalynets's poetry—that of melancholy, and the term "melancholy" itself is introduced into the vocabulary of the poetic persona's self-reflection:

> а щодень
> на одно сонце меншає
>
> а щоніч
> на одну зорю більшає

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[25] Struk, "The Summing-up of Silence," 27.

[26] The original and translation are quoted from *Koronuvannia opudala / Crowning the Scarecrow*, 12 and 13.

а щодень і щоніч
меншає більшає

та незмінно
на чолі кожен несе
обов'язку герби

навіть не підозріваючи

тільки я Митусо
мушу знати

про свій герб неприкаяний
герб *меланхолії* (*PM*, 260)

(and every day / there is one sun fewer // and every night there is one star more // and every day and every night / one fewer one more // but invariably / each carries upon the forehead / the emblems of duty // without even suspecting it // only I, O Mytusa / must know // of my implacable emblem / the emblem of *melancholy* [Kalynets's emphasis.])

Melancholy, then, is the mark of those who grasp the cosmic dimensions of the processes that are in progress and cannot be distracted from an awareness of their magnitude by the day-to-day chores of life. This sense of being existentially overwhelmed by the world the poetic persona confesses to Mytusa—of whom we know from the entry in the Volynian Chronicle under the year 1241, as well as from the preceding poems of Kalynets's cycle, that he was the bard who refused to serve Prince Danylo. It is Mytusa, punished for his silence when ordered to praise his ruler, and those like him—Kalynets names his own contemporaries, the poets Vasyl Holoborodko and Mykola Vorobiov—who are competent to sympathize with the melancholic. This is because, as other poems of this period demonstrate, another of the major causes of melancholy is distress in the realm of the political.

Before discussing melancholy as delineated by Kalynets, it is useful to call to mind the tradition of melancholy in European cultural history. To the educated person of the Renaissance and the Baroque, melancholy was far more than merely a state of sadness or nostalgia. It was considered, on the basis of ancient authorities, to be a complex of inclinations of the body and mind resulting from the preponderance in the organism of one of the four bodily fluids, black gall. Especially susceptible to the affliction of melancholy were members of professions given to much thinking and reading (scholars and monks, but also

artists), as well as lovers whose passion remained unconsummated. Whole social groups could become melancholic, as noted in the classical text on the subject by Robert Burton (1621)[27] and as echoed in our own century by Wolf Lepenies.[28] The melancholic tended toward such negative qualities as sadness, miserliness, shyness, and cowardice, and stood in danger of the sin of acedia—a slothfulness of the soul in its relationship with God that might lead to despair. On the other hand, in the sixteenth century and later, a tradition of the dignity of melancholy also evolved: melancholy came to be regarded as an attribute of genius and a privileged state of mind, before which the vanity of earthly things seemed particularly transparent. Indeed, "holy melancholy" in some works by seventeenth-century poets (John Donne, Henry Vaughan, and John Milton in "Il Penseroso") is a condition of special piety. One scholar writes that melancholy for the contemporaries of Robert Burton, "like other diseases, is part of the condition of mortality brought upon us by original sin. Religion also offers a cure. ... [It] is at once a 'real' thing—a disease—and a metaphor for—as well as the result and symptom of—the fallen state of man."[29]

Whether Kalynets was aware of the historical tradition of melancholy is not, in principle, of importance to my enquiry, though this seems likely, given the familiarity with Baroque genres, personalities, and

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[27] Robert Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy, What It Is: With All the Kinds, Causes, Symptoms, Prognostics, and Several Cures of It, in Three Partions with Their Several Sections, Members and Subsections, Philosophically, Medically, Historically, Opened and Cut up, By Democritus Junior* (London: T. Tegg, 1845), 16: "you will find that kingdoms and provinces are melancholy, cities and families, all creatures, vegetal, sensible, and rational, and that all sorts, sects, ages, conditions are out of tune. ... "

[28] Wolf Lepenies, in his *Melancholie und Gesellschaft* ([Frankfurt am Main]: Suhrkamp, [1969]), considers the melancholy born of a sense of political ineffectiveness that beset the French aristocracy on the eve of the reign of Louis XIV, and the German bourgeoisie of the Enlightenment.

[29] E. Patricia Vicari, *The View From Minerva's Tower: Learning and Imagination in the Anatomy of Melancholy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 5 and 8. On melancholy see also Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, History, Religion, and Art* (London: Nelson, 1964); Lawrence Babb, *The Elizabethan Malady: A Study of Melancholia in English Literature from 1580 to 1642* (East Lansing: Michigan State College Press, 1951); Klara Obermüller, *Studien zur Melancholie in der deutschen Lyrik des Barock* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1974); and Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, *Melancholie und die melancholische Landschaft: Ein Beitrag zur Geistesgeschichte des 17. Jahrhunderts* (Bern: Francke, 1978).

preoccupations to which his verse attests. What is of interest is the fact that there exists in cultural tradition a powerful prototype of that complex malaise, enervating yet dignified, condemning its victims to inner discomfort yet marking them as members of an elite of cognoscenti, which we discover in the poetry of Ihor Kalynets. We will not be surprised, therefore, if the melancholy of Kalynets's poetry occurs in a context analogous to that which prevailed in melancholy's heyday: that of a Baroque worldview in which Christian belief was the central tenet. The mind-set of melancholy could arise only if two fundamental Christian doctrines were firmly accepted: first, that the world is irreparably blemished by original sin (and, therefore, that secular optimism is a form of self-delusion); and, second, that the individual human being is, potentially, saved (and, therefore, that there is no ground for despair and every ground for hope and perseverance in virtue).

It is this kind of melancholy that takes shape in the second period of Kalynets's poetry—in the years 1970–2, when formulations of emotional anguish, political anger, and philosophical uncertainty become a dominant feature of the verse. The turmoil and pain of the poetic persona begins to resolve itself, gradually, not into despair, but into a Christian Baroque worldview, in which the universe, grasped as unified totality existing through God, presents a context in which melancholy may be endured.[30] At this time, however, the religious perspective for Kalynets is still experimental: it is affirmed in some poems, challenged in others, and ambiguous in others still.

Of such ambiguous works, the best known is, perhaps, the cycle "Trenos nad shche odniieiu khresnoiu dorohoiu" (Threnos over Yet Another *Via Dolorosa*) in "Pidsumovuiuchy movchannia." Given Kalynets's early nativism and the Ukrainian dissident movement's orientation toward national liberation, it is tempting to read the renarration of the Passion of Christ in "Trenos" as a political allegory and to translate the promise of salvation into a prophecy of national renascence:

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[30] The literature on the Baroque as a worldview and artistic style following Heinrich Wölffin's classic study, *Renaissance und Barock: Eine Untersuchung über Wesen und Entstehung des Barockstils in Italien* ([1888], 6th ed. (Basel: Schwabe, [1965]), is very extensive. Among more recent studies, see Peter N. Skirne, *The Baroque: Literature and Culture in Seventeenth-Century Europe* (London: Methuen, 1978); and José Antonio Maravall, *Culture of the Baroque: Analysis of a Historical Structure*, trans. Terry Cochran (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, [1986]).

[...] Вероніко
ти хотіла обтерти
окривавлене лице

ногами шматують
полотно

що стане
стягом (*PM*, 248)

(Veronica / you sought to wipe / this bloodied face // their feet rend / the cloth // that will become / a banner)

But it is not necessary to secularize the poem to make sense of it. It may be read, simultaneously, as a reflection on the central narrative of Christian salvation through the death and resurrection of Christ. The concluding section of the cycle, its "Tenth Passion," is explicit about this:

з любові до нас
прийняв на себе
таку страшну
кару

щоб спасти нас
від найбільшого
гріха

байдужості
до *вогню* (*PM*, 249)

(out of love for us / [You] took upon yourself / such a terrible / punishment // in order to save us / from the greatest / sin // of indifference / to the *fire* [Kalynets's emphasis])

A secular reading would interpret fire, perhaps, as that spirit of resistance and sign of emphatic identity that is familiar to us from "Vohon Kupala." A religious reading would see here the flames of damnation. The two interpretations do not exclude each other: indifference is a bad thing in religious faith no less than in politics.

It is in this period, in the cycle "Kraievyd z elehiiamy" (Landscape with Elegies) of the collection "Vino dlia kniazhny" (1971), that the stoic virtues of perseverance are for the first time discovered as guidelines for behaviour, and the elegy is identified as the genre appropriate to the melancholic worldview:

довкола заліг
пустельний краєвид
і тільки елегії
як верби
значили
непримітну для ока
дорогу

сподівання
страждання
виправдання
прощання
вигнання
зрозуміння
вінування
підготовлення
терпіння
тривання
стояла уповні
осінь 1971 року (*PM*, 298)

(all around stretched / a desert landscape / and only elegies / like willows / marked / the road / imperceptible to the eye // *expectation / anguish / justification / farewell / expulsion / understanding / endowment / preparation / suffering* // it was the high autumn / of 1971) [Kalynets's emphasis])

An exemplary personage emerges, upon whom a behaviour of resistance to the criminally secular and of piety within the world can be modelled: Hryhorii Skovoroda, the itinerant eighteenth-century philosopher. Unlike his contemporaries Lomonosov and Voltaire, Skovoroda refuses complicity with the state: *"ia sam sobi volodar / v imperii sertsia / a dlia inshoi / paltsem ne rushu"* (I am my own ruler / in the empire of the heart / and for any other / I will not lift a finger, *PM*, 337). Skovoroda venerates the Lord by being attuned to the multifariousness of God's presence in the world—a multifariousness expressed in the notion of *"alfavit svitu"* (the alphabet of the world, *PM*, 339)—and by carrying in his soul the instruments of divine praise:

[...] сад божественних пісень
царство боже
в собі ношу [...] (*PM*, 338)

(a garden of divine songs / the kingdom of God / I carry within me)

But the religious model of the world is not, at this stage, uncontested. A poem that initially appears to celebrate the "alphabet of the world" by pointing out the interrelatedness of the human and the natural—the closeness of ourselves to "the cloud in the sky," to "the blue field / baroquely framed by the forest," to night and day, life and death—ends by regretting that all this does not amount to salvation:

> [...] і які ми близькі
> до вічності
> тільки нема кому
> з-поміж нас
> розіпнятися (*PM*, 334)

(and how close we are / to eternity / only there is nobody / among us / who would crucify himself)

In the collection "Dodatky do biohrafii" (Addenda to a Biography, 1972) we encounter occasions where melancholy leads to acedia, and where despair threatens to negate the promise of salvation. There is a sinister appeal addressed to Darkness not to abandon those of God's creatures that, "saturated with the poison of immortality," are impervious to decomposition (*PM*, 402); the poetic persona, closing the door of a triptych, is aware that behind it "there is neither the elbow of a human being or of God" (*PM*, 402); and a reflection upon original sin and its ubiquity in the history of human evolution ("we surely do penance not only / for Eve's forbidden apple / [...] but for the appearance of new / folds on the human brain," *PM*, 410) is capped by a negation of the efficacy of Christ's mission and by its demotion, through an analogy with Shevchenko, to a merely secular, romantic aspiration:

> [...] немає добрих геніїв є
> тільки злі навіть Христос
> і Шевченко в стражданні
> зрадили ідеали задля
> незчисленних мук у нескінченність (*PM*, 410)

(there are no good geniuses there are / only evil ones even Christ / and Shevchenko in their anguish / betrayed [their] ideals for the sake of / innumerable agonies into endlessness)

Yet these notes disappear from Kalynets's poetry. The spirit of the whole of *NM* follows that already sounded in the collection "Realii" (1972), which begins with the cycle "Proponuvannia" (Propositions),

consisting of fourteen poems explicitly formulated as prayers. The first of these, eleven of its verse paragraphs beginning with the word "usvidomliuiuchy" (in the knowledge that), reads like a creed:

> Усвідомлюючи що Він відійшов по піску
> по морю аж до червоного обрію [...]
> усвідомлюючи що моя нога без Нього
> стала камінною і земля
> западається під нею [...]
> хочу виблагати в Нього всього-навсього
> зійди до мого серця об'явити
> йому нову філософію серця [...] (*PM*, 364)

(In the knowledge that He walked the sand / the sea as far as the red horizon / [...] in the knowledge that without Him my foot / has become stone and the earth / yields beneath it / [...] I wish merely to beg of Him / come into my heart and reveal / to it the new philosophy of the heart ...)

The second poem is a supplication that prays for strength to live in melancholy, but in faith:

> Допоможи живим в жалобі,
> в жалобі жити поможи [...]
>
> Допоможи живим в молитві, [...]
>
> Допоможи живим в печалі
> повчання вгледіти ужин,
> і їхні голови звінчалі
> Ти від розвінчань бережи. (*PM*, 365)

(Assist the living in their mourning, / in their mourning help them live [...] // Assist the living in their prayers [...] . // Assist the living in their sadness / to glimpse the harvest of [your] teachings, / and protect their crowned heads / from discrowning.)

NM, whose first collection is dated 1973, may be read as an extended elaboration of the principles of belief and practice that are implicit in these two prayer-poems. The new religiosity has been established; the poetry of Kalynets's prison years explores its consequences in detail. This exploration involves a reinterpretation of the pagan motifs of the early collections; the evolution of a poetry of emotional and intellectual serenity; and the burgeoning of baroque formal structures that match a Baroque worldview.

The revision of paganism in Kalynets's third period is decisive. It draws theological distinctions where the first period had seen none:

> [...] наївні там
> унизу
> що населяють
> ліси і води
> чугайстрами і нявками
>
> маленькими божками
>
> тут повстає
> єдиний
> і всемогутній [...] (*NM*, 39–40)

(naive are those / below / who populate / the forests and waters / with sprites and wood nymphs // little gods // here emerges / the one / and omnipotent)

But the process is one of sublimation and transcendence rather than of outright negation. Thus, "Rizdviane alohiine" (A Christmas Alogy), the first of the "Thirteen Alogies," corrects the earlier poem "Rizdvo" not by deleting the ethnographic elements—they are even more opulently represented than previously—but by relating them to the theological substance of the Christmas festival. The whimsical and informal tone that the poetry affects allows the intimacy and familiarity of folk custom to extend to this theological content. The mystery of the Trinity, for example, is enunciated as follows:

> [...] була собі трійця-пані,
> в одну дуду грала [...] (*NM*, 205)

(once upon a time there was a lady, the trinity, / she played a single pipe)

The purpose of the Christmas customs, too, is now defined as promoting salvation:

> [...] віншувальники на стовпчику
> хаті небо прихилюють [...] (*NM*, 208)

(mummers reciting Christmas greetings from their stands / bring heaven closer to the house)

The pre-Christian prehistory of the Ukrainian lands is now viewed, with no less sympathy than previously, as a preparation for, or preemption of, Christianity. The excavation of a representation of

Sviatovyt, the Slavic deity with four faces, each looking in one of four directions, in the collection "Svitohliad Sviatovyta" (Sviatovyt's Worldview) becomes the occasion for a review of the dignity of pagan ritual, but from the perspective of the Primary Chronicle's account of the visitation of the site of Kyiv by St. Andrew the Apostle:

> [...] коли символом віри у землю
> в її щолітній політок
> стали два золоті колоски
> лагідний герб черняхівський
> ще до нині найпишніші книші
> достигають там у черені печі
> і ритуальні хлібці зі знаменням христа
> чи не тому так легко ступав
> землею дулібів бужан волинян
> ще й інших полянських племен
> апостол прозваний первозванним (*NM*, 55)

([...] when two golden ears of grain / the gentle Cherniakhiv emblem / became the symbol of faith in the earth / [and] in its yearly ransom / to this day the most sumptuous breads / ripen there in the oven's glow / and ritual loaves with the mark of the cross / was this not why it was so easy to walk / through the land of the Dulibians the Buzhanians the Volynians / and other Polianian tribes / for the apostle named the first-called)

On the other hand, expressions of the most mainstream Christian piety—as in the veneration of the Virgin—may contain reminiscences of the pre-Christian Slavic world. Thus, in "Akafist do Bohorodytsi iz Krasova" (Acathistus to the Krasiv Mother of God), the "Voice, sometimes doubting, of the twentieth century" enumerates the features of the icons as it prays—the colours, the lines, the "melodic unison of the hand" (*NM*, 182), and even the wood of the icon itself: "*smoliastomu dukhovi perekhreshchenykh derevyn*" (the tarry scent of crossed timbers, *NM*, 183). The direct reference is probably to the technique of strengthening the plank of an icon with transverse slats, and the primary allusion is certainly to the timbers of Christ's cross. But the tarry scent may also be a relic of the days when images of pagan idols were carved from trees. The timbers are, after all, "*perekhreshcheni*"—not merely placed at right angles, but "re-christened."

The poetry of *NM* is serene. The notes of political outrage that punctuated the collections that preceded the poet's arrest are absent. As Kalynets himself points out, these later poems were not intended as a

record of prison-camp life.[31] *"Vchat snihu ianholy / nas / intonatsii tyshi"* (The snow's angels teach / us / the intonations of quietude, *NM*, 47), observes a poem of 1973. The lines could well be the motto for the later poetry.[32] The calm tones of the later poetry are in keeping with a vision of the world as rich in variety, but unified and intelligible in terms of its relationship with God—a view characteristic of pre-Enlightenment Christian Europe and fundamental to the Baroque experience. It is this Baroque view of the world as inhabited in the large, as in the small, by God that is formulated in the cycle "Shche odyn kraievyd z elehiiamy" (Yet Another Landscape with Elegies), and especially in its first poem, "Elehiia z upimnenniam":

> [...] жив собі *бог* у нашому домі
> у книжечці на сторінці такій-то
> кохався у птахах і звірях кохавсь
> у водах прісних і солоних у хмарах
> в аеродромах небес в зодіаках усяких [...]
> я маю сьогодні від *бога* знамення
> він щіпочку слова відважив як золотар
> хоч має сторінку простору і книжку
> усі книгозбірні і всі словники
> хоч знає всі знаки усяке каміння
> кожну пилину і кожну зорю [...] (*NM*, 48)

(*god* lived in our house / in a little book on page so-and-so / he loved birds and animals he loved / waters fresh and salty [he loved] clouds / and the aerodromes of the skies and all kinds of zodiacs [...] / today I have from *god* a sign / he has weighted out a pinch of a word like a goldsmith / though his is the spacious page and the book / all libraries and all dictionaries / though he knows all signs all stones / each speck of dust and every star [Kalynets's emphasis])

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[31] *Nashe slovo*, 8 July 1990.

[32] Already in 1968 Ivan Svitlychny had made the point that "the emotions [of Kalynets's poetic persona] are calm, balanced, thought through. Here there is nothing of the poetic tumult of Ivan Drach, of the fierce and merciless invectives of Mykola Vinhranovsky or Vasyl Symonenko, and less still of that fussy nervousness, exaltation and extremism that so easily betray talents that are trivial or lack seriousness" ("Na kalyni klynom svit ziishovsia," *Slovo i chas*, 1990, no. 7, 30–5, here 33). This observation, not quite appropriate for the poetry of the years of stress that followed Svitlychny's review, certainly applies to the later poetry, written, as Kalynets attests, in constant discussion with Svitlychny (*Nashe slovo*, 1 July 1990).

In this world the poet, too, receives the bounty of God: the "pinch of a word," which is valid even in the shadow of God's "libraries" and "dictionaries." Just the speck of dust is no less known to God than the star.

Given the salvatory framework of religious belief, two emotional stances are available to the poetic persona: joy, as in the passage quoted above, or at least stoic acceptance; or, if there is to be sadness, then it must be the elegiac sadness of "holy melancholy"—sadness transcended. "Nostalgia for everything that is one's own" ("*za ridnym*"), Kalynets calls it, focusing on its secular dimension.[33] Olia Hnatiuk's paraphrase—"yearning for what is lost" ("*tuha za vtrachenym*," *PM*, 13) is, perhaps, less fortunate, as loss in a Christian worldview is only ever relative.

The consistent profession of a Christian worldview has its consequences for poetic form. The elements of the world may be organized into poems for the purposes of prayer. To review the world—to take stock of its contents and features—is to praise its Creator. Hence the poem collections become exercises: they rehearse a given topic under subheadings (cycles) and paragraphs (poems). Struk, while recognizing that the exercise quality of some of the later poetry links it to the versificatory practices of the Baroque, disapproves (*NM*, 16 and 23) on the basis of an implicit (romantic) preference for spontaneity and expressiveness. But such criteria no longer match the (baroque) internal logic of the poetry.

What I identify as the general "Baroqueness" of Kalynets's verse, while most in evidence in the poetry of his third period, may be discerned in his opus as a whole. In coming to a Baroque self-consciousness, the poetry enters a new phase in a philosophical sense, but in much else it remains the same. It is as though the evolution in worldview brings the poetry into closer correspondence with what was already implicit in its form.

Critics, most notably Iurii Sherekh, have attended to many of the features of Kalynets's poetry that are reminiscent of the Baroque.[34]

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[33] *Nashe slovo*, 8 July 1990.

[34] Roman Semkovych in "Cherhova nespodivanka," his introduction to Kalynets's *Poezii z Ukrainy*, v–xiv, notes the similarities and differences between this collection (Kalynets's title "Vidchynennia vertepu") and the Ukrainian *vertep* drama. Huzar has identified figures and tropes that he connects to Kalynets's "neo-Baroqueness" ("Lohos Ihoria Kalyntsia," 239). Salyha draws attention to the ease with which Kalynets works within various systems of versification and sees this as part of his "restoration of the 'magnificent style' of the Baroque" ("Ioho ternovyi vohon," 151). The most thorough exposition of Kalynets as "wholly

Cycles of poems, encyclopaedic in character, treat topics from botany, astrology, mineralogy, and numerology. Kalynets makes wide use of amplification—the organizational principle, well-known to pre-Enlightenment rhetoric as a device of invention, of arranging like items in long series. There are groups of poems on colours, sounds, letters of the alphabet, regions of Ukraine, and months of the year. Like many poets of the Baroque, Kalynets writes laudatory verse, most often honouring his friends in the dissident movement. One respect in which he is especially close to the Baroque tradition is his acute awareness of form and his readiness to use it both seriously and playfully. On the one hand, his entire corpus is tightly structured and adheres to the principle of strict hierarchical subordination, reminiscent of the hierarchies that Europeans of the Renaissance and the Baroque liked to detect in the various domains of nature and human affairs: the opus as a whole divides into two volumes, which in turn comprise seventeen collections divided into 83 cycles that contain some 1,130 poems. On the other hand, Kalynets can be as whimsical about structure as Ioan Velychkovsky or any other Baroque poet. The thirteenth collection contains no more and no fewer than thirteen "alogies"—for the sake, simply, of creating a numerical coincidence. Kalynets does not write acrostics, but in "Mii azbukovnyk" (My Alphabetarion) each poem is dedicated to one letter of his Christian name and surname. Such structural games, characteristic of the Baroque and well documented in Ukrainian verse of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, are not expressions of a philosophical scepticism. They do not mock the world for the randomness of meaning within it. On the contrary, they reflect the interrelatedness of its parts, a consequence of the unity of the world in God's plan.

The presence of such structural whimsy against a background of profound organization is consistent with the religious meta-argument: the accidental is only seemingly so; in everything a higher order prevails. It is this factor that may explain the perplexing variety of forms with which Kalynets experiments (he himself confesses that the collections of *NM* differ so much from each other that they might have been written by five

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Baroque" is that of Iurii Sherekh (George Y. Shevelov) in "Pro dvokh poetiv z kniazhymy imenamy," *Suchasnist*, 1992, no. 4, 105–19. Sherekh not only discusses the presence of such formal devices and conventions as the self-portrait, the dialogue with the muses and the structuring of poems in cycles, but, alone among the commentators, notes that "the baroque quality of Kalynets's poetry is manifest not in external imitation of seventeenth-century poets, but in its correspondence with their worldview, in its linking the objective with the subjective, and in the alchemy of its transitions from the external to the inner" (p. 114).

or six different poets),[35] and, in particular, his seemingly unproblematic oscillation between "modernist" and "traditionalist" forms. Kalynets writes free verse, complicated by absence of punctuation and obscure vocabulary, and is "difficult" in the way that we expect a "modern" poet to be. But he also writes innumerable poems in a traditionalist three-quatrain form, and exercises himself in such archaic forms as the ritournelle, the triolet, terza rima, and the acutely difficult ring of sonnets. This paradoxical variety seems puzzling, unless we accept that neither modernism nor traditionalism (or, more precisely, their stylistic markers) are essential to Kalynets's project. They are merely techniques of versification that are available to a poet who writes poetry as an exercise in piety. Since the point of exercise is to maintain and develop competence in an area of activity, no aspect of that activity may be neglected. The prosodic variety of Kalynets's verse we may see as a dutifully Christian insurance against burying a God-given talent.

A similar construction may be placed upon Kalynets's use of language. Some of his verse is skeletally lean and devoid of poetic tropes or technical devices other than the line break (as in the passages from "Trenos" quoted above). Other poems are richly embellished, especially with assonances, alliterations and onomatopoeias (*"Os nasha vulytsia, vill vutli vulychky," PM*, 80; *"dzvonyt hulkymy hlekamy," NM*, 192; *"Ia Dub Pyshnyi / ta do pykhy nepryvyshnyi: /* [...] *Bohunam ia Boh, / a Khortytsia — khram," NM*, 275; *"Vikamy viddavaly Bohovi Bozhe," NM*, 423), as critics have noted.[36] Such phenomena might be interpreted from a romantic perspective as an outcome of the intrinsic omnipotence of language: the genius of the poet activates the magical resources of language, allowing it to act upon the senses of the recipient in unexpected ways. In the case of Kalynets, however, linguistic virtuosity is more fruitfully viewed as decoration, as the skilful craftsman's response to the fact that ornateness is an aesthetic virtue: this poetry makes more sense if viewed as ingeniously *made* in the spirit of the Baroque, than as *inspired* in the spirit of romanticism. Not the spontaneous creativity of genius, but the diligent labour of the qualified professional is consistent with the worldview developed in Kalynets's works. The corresponding image is that of the poetic persona luxuriating in Pamvo Berynda's *Leksikon slavenorosskii* (1627) (*"Lasuiu v stilnykovi slovnyka"*—I gourmandize in the honeycomb of a dictionary—*PM*, 110) with the ultimate aim of pursuing poetry's spiritual obligations:

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[35] *Nashe slovo*, 8 July 1991.

[36] See especially Ianiv, 127.

> [...] Здвигаймо далі над словами бані титлів,
> вершім самотньо храм (ще буде повен)! (*PM*, 110)

(Let us further raise over words the cupolas of titles, / in solitude let us finish the temple [It will yet be filled!])

The model of Kalynets's poetry as a vehicle for the exercise of a Baroque piety allows us to conceive of its form, style, and language as accidental to its purpose and, therefore, as subject to unproblematic variation. The same is true of the thematic occasions chosen for the composition of cycles or whole collections. In such a scheme of things, there is no reason why some cycles of poems should not be presented as series of paraphrases of the sights or paintings represented on postcards, others as rhymed greetings to women political prisoners, others still as elaborations upon the ancient graffiti on the walls of the St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv; or why some cycles should not be worded as abstruse philosophical discourses, others as fables or rhymes for children. Since all the world is a creature of God, the imitation of, or reflection upon, any part of it is an act of worship.

Thus, unlike the personae of Shevchenko and Stus, the persona of Kalynets's poetry does not stand in danger of the hubris of self-glorification. Kalynets's poetic voice is self-ironic: it is that of the Cossack Mamai who surprises Pegasus by preferring to climb Parnassus on foot (*"na parnas / pishky perty," PM*, 97), or of the socially and culturally peripheral itinerant tutor (*"mandrivnykh diakiv," PM*, 103). This self-effacing modesty (characteristic of Kalynets as a commentator of his own works)[37] has certain advantages over the self-assertiveness of the "inspired" Romantic poet. Inspiration imposes the imperative of constant self-expression as the act through which the identity of the poet as a creator is affirmed and revalidated. It therefore also makes necessary an ongoing quest for an audience that registers and responds to such self-expression. Remoteness from the audience, a consequence of imprisonment or exile, becomes tragic and a source of despair. *"Nema slov / V dalekii nevoli! / Nemaie slov, nemaie sloz, / Nemaie nichoho. Nema navit kruhom tebe / Velykoho Boha"* (There are no words / In this distant imprisonment— / No words, no tears, / Nothing. / Even the great God / Is not around you),[38] laments Shevchenko, while Stus develops the motif of the barred window as the symbol of a solipsistic world-as-prison. On the other hand, the effect of

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[37] *Nashe slovo*, 15 July 1990.

[38] "Lichu v nevoli dni i nochi," in Taras Shevchenko, *Povne zibrannia tvoriv u shesty tomakh*, vol. 2 (Kyiv: Akademiia nauk URSR, 1964), 235–7, here 235.

poetry upon an audience becomes a major criterion of its success. Hence its tendency to prophesy and to politics. Hence also, accordingly, the danger to the poetry of being apprehended as a political sign while its other attributes are overlooked. Such is the case, for example, with the reception of Vasyl Stus in the 1990s.[39]

For the poet-as-craftsman-and-believer in a Baroque world, by contrast, the audience is not a problem. Regardless of who forms the human audience, the main addressee is God. Thus, the fact of imprisonment and exile does not threaten the identity of the poet as a poet. In *NM* the fact of captivity is scarcely made an issue, and the poetry of this period is free of the threat of despair. It is even remarkably free of the tonality of complaint. Because self-expression is not the major issue in Kalynets's poetry, *not* writing poetry is no very grave problem. Kalynets's choice of silence, unusual and almost sensational among the secular and expression-oriented poets to whom we have become accustomed in the last two centuries, has caused critics to speculate on possible causes. Struk, encouraged by Kalynets's own statements,[40] speaks of an exhaustion of the urge to write that had fed on personal suffering and on pain caused by the persecution of Ukraine (*NM*, 11). Olia Hnatiuk also psychologizes and romanticizes the issue when she connects Kalynets's silence to a disillusionment with the public (*PM*, 15). But if we read Kalynets as a Baroque poet, other hypotheses suggest themselves. In the first instance, there is no point in continuing writing if the task is finished. Kalynets's poetry is now available as a unified, finely wrought, tightly structured, and complete entity. To write more would mean modifying the work as crafted. This—and not the "silence" following the completion of a job—would be problematic in terms of the inner logic of the whole opus. In the second place—and Hnatiuk has hinted at this by referring to the period of silence as the fourth period in Kalynets's poetic development—silence may be interpreted as yet another mode of piety. If in 1972–81 Kalynets's poetry had been organized as prayers, then perhaps abstinence from versifying is another pious exercise, directly analogous to the silence required as preparation for certain kinds of mystical experience.[41] "*Iak nam nelehko / nav'iazaty kontakty z movchanniam*" (How difficult it is for us / to make contact with silence, *NM*, 52),

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[39] See my "Kvadratura kruha: Prolehomeny do otsinky Vasylia Stusa," *Vsesvit*, 1993, no. 11–12, 157–61.

[40] *Nashe slovo*, 8 July 1990.

[41] Cf. Leonard Angel, *The Silence of the Mystic* (Toronto: Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy, 1983).

observes the poetic persona in the first collection of *NM*. Perhaps the poet has overcome this difficulty. There is yet a third "baroque" theory concerning Kalynets's choice of silence, which I reserve for the conclusion of this discussion.

The structure of Kalynets's poetry, then, appears especially rational and purposeful if examined as the corollary of a Christian and Baroque orientation. A detailed discussion could demonstrate the same about Kalynets's treatment of eros, nation, and politics. Love between human beings, sexual no less than familial, is in Kalynets's poetry a phenomenon able to bridge the potentially agonizing gulfs between self and other (as in "Koronuvannia opudala"), between exile and homeland (as in the poems addressed to his daughter Zvenyslava in *NM*). Love, even in its profane and erotic form, as a force of attraction is analogous to the divine unifying principle of the world. Nation, for the early Kalynets the source of a nativist personal identity, survives the transition to baroque universalism as a positive value. Because in the baroque world-system every subdivision may stand as part for the whole, all levels of community to which the individual belongs are valuable. Kalynets, Galicia, Ukraine, the world—all are equally part of the divine plan and equally endowed with dignity. In the chain of parts that signify the whole, the local plays a significant part: Kalynets's universalism and Ukrainianness are also encapsulated in his special sympathy for Lviv (with its buildings, art works, and personalities) and Galicia (with its village and river names, but also its linguistic specificities).

Politics—the science and practice of swaying people to action in the service of particular ends—in Kalynets's poetry is subject, like everything else in the world, to the divine and must be judged by universal Christian moral principles. From this viewpoint, all injustice and oppression is sin, as is passive nonresistance to evil. In the sense that it always insists on this perspective, Kalynets's poetry is always, in the most general way, political, even when it is free of overt political themes. But it can also be (and, in the second period, often is) political in detail. Satire aimed at artists who abide by socialist-realist guidelines (*PM*, 190), at official poets (*PM*, 210), at friends who have become collaborators (*PM*, 379) is political according to the part-for-the-whole, microcosm-for-macrocosm synechdochical principle appropriate to the world understood as a set of correspondences. But there is no general critique of the Soviet system (such as may be encountered in Vasyl Symonenko), no symbolism of the world as a prison (as in Stus's poetry), and no call to rebellion and revenge (as in Shevchenko), for all of these stances would reflect a prioritization of the secular and a claim to authority that are foreign to Kalynets. Thus, no political programme and no nationalism of declar-

ations, complaints, and demands may be abstracted from Kalynets.[42] Nor does his biography lend itself to as heroic a reading as that of Stus. These may well be among the reasons for the relatively indifferent reception of Kalynets in Ukraine even in the years of the national awakening after 1989.

The political dimension of Kalynets's poetry does not call for an expulsion of the moneylenders from the temple. On the whole, as though mindful of the precept "judge not, lest ye be judged," it avoids issuing resonant verdicts against political villains. And yet, a Christian world-view does offer an explanation of the presence of evil in the world—including political evil. The ultimate cause of all human suffering is original sin. Even as one suffers, one is guilty; and the one form of evildoing that Christians must condemn is their own. Kalynets practises this form of self-criticism on behalf of one of the groups to which he belongs: his nation. In "Pidsumovuiuchy movchannia" the feature of this group that Kalynets identifies as especially worthy of condemnation is its provinciality. "Nasha provintsiika" (our little province, *PM*, 240) and "iurodyvyi narodtsiu" (our crazy little people; *PM*, 247) are among the tags he invents for this subject-as-nation; "Zahuminkovi grotesky" (Backwater grotesques) is the name of the cycle dedicated to the depiction of its behavioural perversities. Provinciality does not, however, figure here in its usual secular meaning as the inferior term in the metropolis-province opposition, but is opposed rather to the universal: to God and the kingdom of God. For provinciality consists of the petty crimes and betrayals resulting from self-centredness, narrow-mindedness, and blindness that were and are the cause of the Crucifixion—whether in its direct, religious, or allegorical, political sense.

At the end of my endeavour to describe Ihor Kalynets as a poet who is religious in the integral and all-encompassing manner of poets in the pre-secular age of the Baroque, we may return to a question that I earlier pended: the question of the traditionalism, modernism, or even post-modernism of Kalynets. Struk and Hnatiuk have taken these categories to signify different sets of stylistic features and thematic concerns. Struk has concluded that Kalynets is a modern poet (*NM*, 12–13), while Hnatiuk argues that none of these labels adequately describe him, for he possesses attributes associated with all three (*PM*, 24–25). If, on the other

[42] Despite the best efforts of Viktor Kaminsky's oratorio "Ukraina: Khresna doroha" (Ukraine: *Via Dolorosa*, 1993), whose text comprises excerpts from Kalynets's most Ukraine-oriented verse and an abridged version of the cycle "Skovoroda."

hand, we regard these three terms as names for different responses to a problemization of the past, we are likely to deny that any of them describes Kalynets's poetry. Modernity as a project of separation from the past in order to proceed, through the exercise of human will and rationality, along a path of secular progress, however defined, is remote from Kalynets's interests or concerns. So is any "modernist" art that imagines itself as participating in this project. Modernism contradicts the view, essential to Kalynets's poetry, of a Baroque world, irreversibly fallen and therefore the source of insuperable melancholy, but at the same time in the hand of God and subject to His, not human, designs. The traditionalist's favourable reception of the past as a romantic source of identity is also, as I have argued, not for the mature Kalynets, though this is the position from which he begins. And if, finally, doubt concerning the validity of universals is a necessary component of any perspective upon reality that we may call postmodern, then postmodernism is antithetical to the religious position adopted by Kalynets's poetry. In the light of the foregoing description it makes sense to regard Kalynets as premodern. His paradigm for knowledge of the world as reposing in an endless play of meaningful correspondences and similitudes guaranteed by the unity of creation in God is identical to the archaic, pre-Enlightenment model of knowledge outlined by Foucault.[43] Kalynets's ideas of the nature and purpose of poetry, indeed of the nature and purpose of human activity and of humankind itself, is nonsecular and therefore not reconcilable with modernity.

The statement that Kalynets, a contemporary poet, is premodern implies that this poet has adopted a radically polemical position with respect to his own times. It implies that he enacts and therefore, by example, advocates a return to a way of being that prevailed before the world went askew. For Kalynets the locus of such a premodernity—intellectually sustainable, aesthetically sympathetic, and in harmony with native tradition—is the period of the Christian Baroque. In Ukrainian culture of recent times others than Kalynets have constructed similar arguments. Mykola Rudenko, in his fictional and economic writings, promotes a step back in time to a point behind the source of the Marxist experiment, Smith's labour theory of value. Valerii Shevchuk, in the most elaborate of his historical novels, conceives of the last normal episodes of Ukrainian history as preceding the beginnings of the canker of colonialism.[44] Like Kalynets, Rudenko and Shevchuk point to the Baroque as the

[43] See Michel Foucault, *Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences modernes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), 45.

[44] See my articles "Honchar's *Sobor* and Rudenko's *Orlova balka*: Environmental

last episode in cultural and intellectual history still unaffected by the deformations that, in their view, led directly to the catastrophe of the present.

The question must be asked: Is Kalynets's premodernism a sustainable position? The answer can be affirmative if this position is the expression of firmly held belief. It is a universalism that is robust within its own parameters and self-sustaining, providing its foundation principles are upheld by faith. It is tenable as a religious position, as a lived and contemporary Baroque. On the other hand, if the self-same premodernism is a utopia projected into the past, a historicist *yearning* for the wholeness and dignity of a distant Baroque, then the entire system degenerates into yet another romanticism—another generalized complaint about secular modernity from within secular modernity. The opus of the mature Kalynets as I have described it is an attempt at resisting such a romanticism. It may be—and here I return to my promised third hypothesis—that the perceived inevitability of the encroachment of romanticism is the reason for the self-imposed silence that closes the poetry of Kalynets. The romanticism of complaint has been the anticolonial mainstream of Ukrainian poetry since the nineteenth century. For a poet who cannot bear to repeat himself,[45] let alone others, and who winces when a well-meaning admirer compares him to Shevchenko,[46] silence may well seem preferable to a reentry into the all-too-familiar romantic mode. Perhaps it is no accident that a poem dated 1978, which seems to celebrate the romantic stereotype of the Poet and to proclaim the arrival of that hallmark of romanticism, the secular yearning for an otherworldly ideal, is positioned as the very last poem of the collected works:

> [... «]Для Вас я радісно здоймив
> житейські із душі окови —
> для Вас священнодіяв знову
> і сльози в звуки перелив.
>
> Крилом безсмертним прихистив

Conservation as Theme and Argument in Two Recent Ukrainian Novels," in *Slavic Themes: Papers from Two Hemispheres*, ed. Boris Christa et al. (Neuried: Hieronymus, 1988), 271–88; and "Thaws, Literature and the Nationalities Discussion in Ukraine: The Prose of Valerii Shevchuk," in *Glasnost in Context: Recurrences in Central and East European Literatures and Cultures*, ed. Marko Pavlyshyn (New York: Berg, 1990, 49–68.

[45] See Kalynets, "Vidchynennia vertepu," *Ukraina*, 1991, no. 23, 15–17, here 16.

[46] *Nashe slovo*, 1 July 1990.

мене Ваш Ангел нелукавий
і тихоплинними словами
за раєм мрії пробудив» (*NM*, 449)

("For you I joyfully discarded / the mundane chains that bound my soul— / for you I became a celebrant again / and poured my tears into sounds. // Your Benevolent Angel / shielded me with his immortal wing / and with his softly flowing words / awakened dreams of paradise.")

These words are not Kalynets's own, but a translation—and therefore a repetition—of part of the dedicatory epigraph, addressed to Varvara Repnina, of Shevchenko's Russian-language poem *Trizna* (1843). Struk sees in the translation a correction of Shevchenko, a nativization of his text in keeping with Kalynets's own "roots in [Ukrainian] culture."[47] Yet the quotation sustains another reading. The passage catches Shevchenko at a bad moment. Repnina's feelings have been hurt as a result of her socially impossible affection for the poet. Trying to placate the princess, Shevchenko expresses himself in the uncharacteristically conventional, sentimentally high-flown terms he knows she appreciates.[48] The poem illustrates the danger of convention and of a loving public, even to Shevchenko. This is not a danger to which Kalynets wishes to succumb. Kalynets's persona has rejected the role of high priest at the altar of subjectivity that Shevchenko's here embraces. Furthermore, the romantic commonplace about a yearning for the Other, the Transcendental, is a much weaker position than Kalynets's poetry has already occupied: that of *certainty* concerning the Other, and of *knowledge* concerning the Whole. I might conclude that, rather than risk contaminating this remarkable accomplishment, Kalynets stops writing poetry and becomes, as he puts it in his autobiographical note, the "impresario of the former poet Ihor Kalynets" (*PM*, 460). He becomes an impresario in the technical sense, editing the poems and administrating their presentation to the public. But he also becomes the keeper, the archivist, of the vision that the poetic corpus embodies in its present form. To speak again would be to alter and, perhaps, endanger its hard-won totality.

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[47] D. H. Struk, "Vstupne slovo na vechori Ihoria Kalyntsia," *Novi dni*, 1991, no. 1, 39.

[48] Cf. the tone of Repnina's letter to Charles Eynard, dated March 1844, in *Russkie propilei*, vol. 2, ed. M. Gershenson (Moscow: M. and S. Sabashnikov, 1916), 187–203; and of her "Povest," ibid., 221–44.

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Vol. XXXVI, Nos. 1-2
March-June 1994
(appearing February 1995)

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Journal of Ukrainian Studies 18, nos. 1-2 (Summer-Winter 1993)

Review Article

"There is no Rus', there is only Poland and Muscovy": The Muddying of Stereotypes in Andrzej Kępiński's *Lach i Moskal*

Frank E. Sysyn

Any observer of contemporary Polish affairs realizes how important a reevaluation of the Poles' stereotypes of their neighbours—the Germans, Ukrainians, Czechs, Jews, Lithuanians, and Russians—is for the future of Poland. To understand why, how, and when attitudes, most of them negative, were formed, we must turn the miasma of clichés and emotion into a historical and analytical enquiry—and thereby dissipate the potency of the stereotypes. Of course, just as important is the Poles' study of an even less known field—their neighbours' sterotypes of them and how they were formed. In this process it is hoped that the neighbouring cultures will begin similar undertakings. In German and, to some degree, Jewish circles the process has already begun, but it is much less advanced among Poland's eastern neighbours. Above all, the explosive topic of Russian-Polish relations has been little examined even though it is a central question for the two cultures, for East European history of the last few hundred years, and for the future of the new European order. It also greatly influences the development of the Poles' relations with their immediate eastern neighbours—the Lithuanians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians—and has had considerable significance for the evolution of Jewish-Polish relations.

I approached Andrzej Kępiński's *Lach i Moskal: Z dziejów stereotypu* (Warsaw and Cracow: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1990) with great expectation that the volume would bring clarity and method to the

difficult topic of how views were formed and transmitted. Fully accepting the author's comment that he has only outlined basic questions, I found a richness of topics and a diversity of views rather than a thorough exposition of topics. It is not, however, a study that is methodologically precise and exhaustive in its examination of sources. Rather, it is a collection of essays, with more emphasis on Polish views of Russians than of Russian views of Poles. The chapter on Polish Romantic literature takes up almost forty percent of the text, given the centrality of that literature for Polish thought. But earlier Polish development and Russian stereotypes are not fully treated. In general, the essay nature of the book does not lend itself well to tracing the transmission of ideas over the centuries. The lack of an index further impedes the reader in drawing the material together.

For a reader who is a specialist in Ukrainian studies, Kępiński seems to have considered as specialized a topic that is, in reality, central to Russian and Polish stereotypes—that of the Ukrainians and Belarusians. Given the current political context and the influence this book may have in forming Polish-elite public opinion, I inevitably pay attention to how Ukrainian and Belarusian issues are treated. As I read the book, the old Endek negation of these peoples' existence rings out—"Nie ma Rusi, jest tylko Polska albo Moskwa." Does this have anything to say about Kępiński's political views? Of course not. But it does suggest that the book, however innocently, will strengthen a certain Polish political tradition and set of stereotypes. Let us leave the political implications of the book aside. More important is its flawed conception and failure to explore the Ruthenian (Ukrainian-Belarusian) question as an essential factor in the formation of Polish-Russian mutual stereotypes.

Kępiński points out that Poles frequently used "Rusin" as a synonym for "*Rosjanin*" and "*Moskal*" and that many Polish authors and popular sayings lumped Ruthenians (Ukrainians and Belarusians) and Russians together. For these reasons he does not try to distinguish in his selection of materials. In practice this means that before the nineteenth century many of his examples refer to Ruthenians, and that even for the nineteenth century a few Ukrainian references are cited. In examining Russian stereotypes he follows a similar aggregation principle. As further justification of this practice he maintains that many Russian authors considered Ukrainians and Belarusians part of one Russian people, and that since he has used Polish proverbs referring to Ukrainians, he should use Ukrainian proverbs about Poles. As in the Polish case, this means that he uses a great deal of Ukrainian and Belarusian material from before the nineteenth century. Nineteenth-century authors who wrote in Ukrainian are not cited, but the Ukrainian Gogol, who wrote frequently in Russian

on Polish topics, is given considerable attention.

Kępiński mentions the Ukrainian-Belarusian issue laconically throughout the book. While some Polish authors and proverbs did not distinguish between Ruthenians and Russians, he never considers the significance that others did. Indeed, from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries some Poles based their cultural and political views on this distinction, and even some of those who lumped the two together saw the differences between them. In a similar manner, Kępiński does not discuss the question that many Russians viewed Ukrainians and Belarusians as quite different and alien and that not all views about Poles among Ukrainians and Belarusians were transferred to Russians.

Had Kępiński merely missed the opportunity to discuss the interrelation of stereotypes among Poles, Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, I could accept that perhaps exploration of the Ukrainian-Belarusian issue might have overloaded an already immense topic. The question is, however, much more serious. By omitting the Ukrainian-Belarusian dimension, Kępiński has distorted his entire discussion of the Poles' and Russians' stereotypes of each other. Only extensive research can decide the nature and interchange of stereotypes among Poles, Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians. Without deciding the issues, however, we can examine those that Kępiński failed to address.

In examining Poles' stereotypes of Russians, the degree to which Poles viewed Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russians as one and how much they viewed Russians as a distinct group must be examined. This issue is, after all, very different from how Czechs or Germans viewed these groups. From the fourteenth century on, substantial numbers of Ukrainians lived in the Kingdom of Poland, while even greater numbers of Ukrainians and Belarusians inhabited the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which after 1386 was dynastically and later culturally closely connected with Poland. After 1569 most Ukrainians lived in the Polish component of the Commonwealth of the Two Nations, while most Belarusians resided in the Lithuanian part of this state; the latter was, however, controlled by an increasingly homogeneous Polish Catholic nobility. Polish political thought viewed Belarus and Ukraine (at least up to the Dnieper) as its own territory not only until Poland's partitions, but throughout the nineteenth century, when Ruthenians were often viewed as merely a branch of a greater Polish community.

Without discussing the extremely complex and intricate issues of political, cultural, and national relations and the Poles' views of Ukrainians and Belarusians as both "other" and "one's own," one can maintain that the Poles' attitude toward these two peoples was essentially different than towards the Russians, who were politically and culturally

clearly other. For centuries large parts of Polish society, from peasants to kings, came into contact with Ruthenians and formed impressions and stereotypes from immediate and intimate contact with them. In contrast, until the sixteenth century Polish contacts with Russians were few and confined to limited strata—the court, diplomats, and soldiers.

Before and even after the Union of Lublin it was primarily the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, with its overwhelmingly Lithuanian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian population, that had most direct and frequent contacts with Muscovy. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries these contacts were sporadic if more frequent, and only after the partitions did large numbers of Poles come into everyday contact with Russians, even in territories where Poles were the majority. Indeed, only after the partitions can it be said that Russian-Polish contacts were more intense than Polish-Ukrainian-Belarusian contacts. Only then did the Polish inhabitants of Congress Poland (except for its eastern periphery), but not the eastern territories of the former Commonwealth, come into contact with Russians more frequently than with Ukrainians and Belarusians. Only then and there did Russian institutions and language came to play an even more important role.

The political and social history of Polish-Belarusian-Ukrainian and Polish-Russian relations also diverged greatly. Ukrainians and Belarusians and their cultures were dominant or significant for political entities that came into contact with the Poles after the thirteenth century (I leave aside the issue of Kyivan Rus' for the moment)—the Principality of Galicia-Volynia, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Cossack Hetmanate, and the Zaporozhian Sich. Although Poles already lived in Galicia-Volynia in Rurikide times, it was only after the mid-fourteenth-century annexation of their lands by the Kingdom of Poland that Poles and later Polish culture became dominant there. If from the start, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania constituted a nationally mixed state in which the Ruthenian and Lithuanian elites shared dominance, beginning with Lithuania's dynastic union with Poland and its rulers' conversion to Catholicism in 1386, the Ruthenian position declined. With the partial dismemberment of the Grand Duchy and the formation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the duchy's autonomous political culture was greatly weakened, while its elite's Ruthenian association declined rapidly. Unlike the Grand Duchy, in which many Poles lived, in which Polish language and culture became dominant, and which merged with a Polish political entity, the Cossack Hetmanate and Zaporozhian Sich of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were formed in a revolt against the Polish state and evolved towards having ever fewer contacts with Poles just as the Polish inhabitants and the influence of Polish culture in Ukraine declined. But

because the Hetmanate and Sich did not evolve into fully independent states—even though they constituted political entities that were clearly not Russian and were even specifically Ukrainian—and were abolished in the late eighteenth century, they had only limited influence on the Poles' attitudes and stereotypes.

In contrast, from the late fifteenth century, Poles' experience with Russians were with a distinct Muscovite political entity that had united the lands in which Russians lived, including Novgorod and Pskov. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania's inability to deal with the pressure of the Muscovite state was a major impetus for the Union of Lublin. Muscovy regulated foreign contacts with Russians; consequently, except during the Time of Troubles, Polish images of Russians were based on a limited view of an exotic society through carefully regulated official channels. In the eighteenth century the increasing powers of the Russian Empire continued the state's centrality in how Poles viewed Russians. The partitions of the Commonwealth, the tsar's claims to Poland, and the role of the Russian administration furthered this process in the nineteenth century.

Varying social developments also made for differences between the Polish-Ruthenian and Polish-Russian relationship. If initially the Polish elite had intense relations with a Ruthenian elite of princes and warrior groups, who took on the characteristics of the Polish nobility, by the seventeenth century Polish religious conversion and cultural assimilation had removed this Russian-elite component. As the landowning nobility of Ukraine and Belarus, whatever its origin, came to be Polish in culture and identity, the Polish-Ruthenian relationship came to be that between lords and plebes despite the overwhelming peasant composition of Polish speakers, and in part because Polish peasants and members of other lower Polish orders who came to these territories quickly became Ukrainianized and Belarusianized.

In the Ukrainian case, but not the Belarusian, the social relationship was more complicated than just that between lord and peasant. For the political and social system of the Commonwealth, Ukraine was above all the land of the "insubordinates," the social groupings that refused to fit into the noble-burgher-peasant order. However much Polish political, cultural, and social theory sought to dismiss or denigrate these groupings in Ukraine—primarily, but not exclusively, represented by the Cossacks—their warrior character and political-cultural sophistication made it impossible merely to treat them as "*chłopy*." The opposition "*Kozak*"-"*Polak*" that formed in the early seventeenth century, in which "*Rusyn*" became an attribute of the "*Kozak*" and "*szlachcić*" an attribute of "*Polak*," has never been studied systematically. In particular, we have not

begun to deal with stereotypes of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the Hetmanate developed elite social groupings and a political-social-cultural system distinct from Poland.

Obviously, Poland's social relations with Muscovy-Russia developed very differently. However derisive the Polish *szlachta* might have been of the rights and cultural level of the Russian elite, they clearly saw in Russia a stable society controlled by men of power and influence. After the Europeanization of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, these groups were men of more similar civilization who increasingly dominated the fate of the Commonwealth.

The topics of culture and religion are more generally known. If Ruthenian literature and arts were equal to and in some ways superior to their Polish equivalents until the fifteenth century, in the period from 1400 to 1700 Polish models proved to be increasingly dominant and almost engulfed Ruthenian culture. Yet, Ruthenian culture did respond to this challenge and, at least in the Hetmanate, developed an indigenous tradition strongly akin, but distinct, from Polish influences. Indeed, in the period of Polish cultural eclipse of the early eighteenth century, Ukrainian cultural developments may be seen as more vibrant. The Ukrainian adaptation ultimately served as one of the components of the transformation and formation of the new Russian culture that emerged from the European challenge in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Yet the Russian synthesis emerged not so closely related to Polish models, and much more rapidly.

The divide between Western and Eastern Christianity constitutes the fundamental division of premodern societies. From the fourteenth to the end of the eighteenth century the Orthodox church in Ukraine was in a defensive position in cultural, political, and organizational terms. Yet along the long and porous line of Polish and Ruthenian contact, where the designation of *"Lach"* and *"Rusyn"* often coincided with "Roman Catholic" and "Orthodox," the two communities had direct and intimate knowledge of each other. Despite the elements of religious war and hatred, the Orthodox church went through a profound occidentalization. For the *Lachy* of the borderland and for almost all *Rusyny*, except for those of the Hetmanate, the coexistence of the Rus' faith and holidays and the *"Lach"* faith and holidays were a fact of life. The most complex and ultimately troubling shift in this relationship was the formation of the Uniate church. Clearly, in its own definition, that church was Ruthenian in the seventeenth century, but in the eighteenth century its cultural and national affiliation hung in the balance. Its "other" and "our" relationship to Orthodox Ruthenians and *Lachy* has never been fully examined. This religious pattern was clearly so different form that of Orthodox Muscovy

and its relations with the *Lachy* and their faith. Once again the Ukrainians and Belarusians both served to buffer and to convey influences.

How then should we approach the triangle of stereotypes of *Lach-Moskal-Rusyn*? Let me suggest that generally they must be seen as varying combinations in which the Ukrainians and Belarusians frequently played a seminal role in shaping perceptions. At times, as Kępiński suggests, the Poles' stereotypes are formed by seeing the Ruthenians and Russians as an entity, and Russians' stereotypes of the Poles are formed by both the Ukrainians and Russians, though even in these cases the separate components should be examined. At other times, however, the Ruthenians-Ukrainians, or Little Russians, were a fully independent component of the triangle. Certainly Kępiński's discussion of Poles' stereotypes of Russia as a land of the "north" and "autocracy" seems ludicrous when applied to Ukraine. There is, however, a fascinating blurring to be examined. At times the Ukrainians shifted on a continuum so that they appeared to the Poles as a bloc with the Russians, or the Russians as a bloc with the Poles. These shifting relations of the three communities can only be understood by precise and detailed examinations of terms, categories, and influences.

I will give just one example of how such an examination may change our preconceptions. "*Khokhol*" must be a basic term in any discussion of Russian-Ukrainian relations. Yet Prof. Boris Floria has recently asserted that it was originally used by Russians to describe Latin-rite Catholic Poles and only later applied to Ukrainians who had begun to take on the practices of shaving beards and cutting hair that pious Orthodox Muscovites abhorred.

Where our study of stereotypes will take us cannot be known. Certainly, however, by tracing the mutual views of Eastern Europe's three largest nations in the sixteenth to early nineteenth centuries, we can begin to understand their present affairs.

Book Reviews

Danylo Husar Struk, editor in chief. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine.* Volumes 3–5. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993. x, 872 pp.; viii, 864 pp.; viii, 886 pp. $480.00.

Ukrainian scholarship can be a fractious business, but the *Encyclopedia* appears to have won the admiration, indeed the enthusiastic endorsement, of almost all reviewers. These final three volumes complete a major achievement of émigré scholarship and Canadian publishing. The project represents the culmination of work by several generations of researchers, whose work was funded by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. An extensive fund-raising campaign by the Canadian Foundation for Ukrainian Studies raised the monies to pay for the publication of the volumes.

Under the leadership of Volodymyr Kubijovyč, scholars who emigrated to the West after the Second World War prepared and published the twelve-volume *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva* (begun in 1948 and completed in 1984), which served as the basis for the two-volume *Ukraine: A Concise Encylopaedia* (1964, 1971) and for the present five-volume set. During the Second World War some of the country's most productive intellectuals had fled to the West (mostly to the US and British Allied zones in Germany), where they became displaced persons (DPs). There the idea of producing the *Entsyklopediia* was conceived by them in what would appear to be unpropitious circumstances.

These origins are important for an understanding of the current *Encyclopedia*'s initial purpose and character: it was seen as part of the Ukrainian postwar political emigration's mission to bear witness to a history and culture the world had denied. In the aftermath of the war most Western scholars were not interested in lost causes or concerned with the identity claims of East Europeans. For many, in fact, it was not until Ukraine's 1991 declaration of independence that its claim to nationhood and scholarly demands for cultural and political reassessments of what was taken for accepted wisdom were taken seriously. In the face of Soviet disinformation and Allied indifference, but guided by a strong sense of collective responsibility, from 1945 to 1947 Ukrainian émigré scholars assumed "a leading role in the cultural life of the DP camps and were instrumental in assisting the émigré community to organize schools, professional organizations, libraries, newspapers and periodicals, and art and library clubs. However, their major accomplishment was the establishment of learned societies, research centres, and Ukrainian institutions of higher learning. Their initiative resulted in a unique renaissance of Ukrainian scholarship during the DP period."[1] In 1947–8

[1] Lubomyr R. Wynar, "Ukrainian Scholarship in Postwar Germany, 1945–52," in *The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II*, ed.

the DP camps were producing textbooks, often mimeographed, covering all subjects in all grades and undertaking adult-education programs. This push to publish "the facts" in the face of intellectual indifference and political hostility gave birth to the far-sighted plan for an encyclopedia; faith in the national future sustained it. A measure of the project's importance was the immediate, corresponding Soviet directive to produce a competing encyclopedia.

Professor Kubijovyč was listed as the editor in chief of the first two volumes (1984, 1988); Danylo Husar Struk, who was managing editor of the first two, is listed as editor in chief of the last three. Developments since the first two volumes appeared, such as computerization, allowed the simultaneous publication and updating of the last three volumes. Although some new materials dealing with the drama surrounding Ukraine's emergence as an independent state were incorporated, the articles were mostly already written by then. The preface by Struk in volume 3 acknowledges the process begun in 1948 in Munich and the debt to the pioneering work of Kubijovyč and his generation, who mobilized the émigré community to direct its intellectual and material resources toward publishing a major reference work. This preface echoes Kubijovyč's original aims expressed in the first volume, and reaffirms principles to "preserve the facts" by presenting them "accurately and objectively," and to "maintain, if not improve upon, the features, scope, and quality of the first two volumes." It goes on, somewhat cryptically, to mention the "introduction of a new perspective" following Professor Kubijovyč's death in 1985—perhaps a reference to the fact that many of the articles published in the previous encyclopedias were revised and updated by younger scholars (mostly from North America but also some from Ukraine and Eastern Europe), who added new information and interpretations. Where this has occurred, the names of both original author and reviser follow the article. The fact that a similar deference was not shown Kubijovyč by listing him posthumously as a joint editor of the last three volumes has been criticized by some contributors.[2]

It needs to be said from the beginning that the last three volumes of the *Encyclopedia* are an enormously impressive and important achievement that brings together a wealth of information, enhanced by illustrations, maps, and painstaking editing. There are some 3,000 articles per volume, and they range from short, unsigned contributions to lengthier signed essays. Biographies, history, science, and geography, and the economic, social, political, and cultural life of Ukrainians are all covered with an eye for balanced and accurate presentation. Many articles by postwar émigré scholars (e.g., Ohloblyn, Koshelivets, Kravtsiv, Kubijovyč, Zhukovsky, Markus, Holubnychy) have been translated into English

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Wsevolod W. Isajiw et al. (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992), 315.

[2] See "Zaiava spivpratsivnykiv Entsyklopedii ukrainoznavstva ta prykhylnykiv bl. p. prof. V. Kubiiovycha u spravi anhlomovnoi entsyklopedii ukrainoznavstva (Encyclopedia of Ukraine)," *Novyi shliakh*, 8–15 January 1994; and the reply by Zenon Kohut, *Novyi shliakh*, 26 February 1994.

for the first time. It is a measure of the stature and integrity of their scholarship that these contributions have often been reprinted unchanged. New articles and those that have been substantially rewritten by younger scholars often present materials dealing with life in North America and recent political events. The blending of expertise has resulted in the best work of reference on Ukraine in any language—one that will for many years remain the standard against which ideas, issues, and their interpretation are measured.

Danylo Husar Struk is to be commended for responding quickly to the challenge presented by the new political situation in Ukraine, which, among other things, necessitated a complete revamping of terminology as states, institutions, and organizations changed their names. The Ukrainian SSR became Ukraine; the AN URSR (Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR) became ANU (Academy of Sciences of Ukraine); Moldavia, Moldova; Belorussia, Belarus; Leningrad, once again St. Petersburg; and so on. These changes have been handled sensibly and inconspicuously by introducing a "now ANU" or similar reference.

The articles are succinct, lucidly written, and readable. The modified Library of Congress transliteration scheme used in the text, which allows a nonspecialist English-speaking audience to approximate the pronunciation of words, is a user-friendly feature, while the fuller Library of Congress scheme used in the bibliographies adequately serves the needs of researchers. The illustrations and avoidance of excessive abbreviation, generous margins, and high-quality reproductions also contribute to making the volumes attractive and easy to use. A comprehensive name index, an enormously valuable research resource, is also being prepared with the promised publication date given by the preface as "within two years."

Contentious materials have been handled with a circumspection and care that makes for an informative and generally acceptable, if occasionally rather tame, presentation (e.g., "Nazi War Crimes in Ukraine," "Operation Wisła," "Petliura," "Schwartzbard Trial"). Even topics that have provoked the most explosive debates are treated in an appropriately cerebral tone. This accords with the stated desire to deal in facts, to shed light rather than provide heat on subjects that have suffered from an excessive focus on the latter. Many of the longer survey articles have long been standard works of reference in the field and are presented unchanged: among them are Lysiak-Rudnytsky on "Nationalism," Kravtsiv et al. on "Poles in Ukraine" and "Russians in Ukraine," and Kubijovyč on the "Ukrainian Central Committee." The longer articles—and many of the shorter ones—contain extremely valuable bibliographies.

In spite of the editors' best efforts, some of the information is already outdated. Kostiantyn Morozov is still given as Ukraine's defense minister, for example. Montreal's population statistics are dated 1981, which is surprising since most Ukrainian and Russian population data are from the 1989 Soviet census.

Inevitably, in a project of this magnitude, there will be questions concerning selection and emphasis, as well as regrets that recent information could not find its way into the data base. Viktor Petrenko, the ice-skating world champion, fails to get an entry, but Vladimir Tretiak, the Soviet hockey player, does. (Both Petrenko and Oksana Baiul, however, get a mention under "Skating"). Viktor

Neborak, a leading Ukrainian postmodernist poet, arrived on the scene in the late 1980s—too late to receive his own entry. Ivan Pliushch, the former chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council and Leonid Kravchuk's challenger for the presidency, is also not to be found. The Ukrainian Socialist party, which might win the next election, is also missing. And the "eastern diaspora"—the millions of Ukrainians living in Russia proper and the other former Soviet republics (a far more numerous group than those living in the West), who have recently begun organizing themselves politically—is probably another area that will in retrospect be seen as having received insufficient emphasis. Oleksander Rudenko-Desniak, who edited Moscow's *Druzhba narodov* for twenty-five years and is now a leader of the Organization of Ukrainians of Russia, does not get a mention. It is a measure of how much the world has changed in the last few years that we should be sensitive to such signifiers.

Russian figures seem to be included based on their connection with or influence on Ukrainian writing. Pushkin is in, but Lermontov, surprisingly, is out; Akhmatova made the first volume on the strength of her Ukrainian origins, but Tsvetaeva missed the later ones. Some of this could be questioned. If Viktor Nekrasov, the Russian writer from Kyiv, has been given space, then why not Yurii Olesha from Odessa?

The lost generation of the 1920s, information on whom has only recently emerged and slowly continues to filter out of Ukraine, share a similar patchy fate as contemporaries. A check for biographical data on members of Mykhailo Boichuk's monumentalist art school of the those years revealed a number of lacunae. There are no articles on Oleksander Mordan, Ielyzaveta Piskorska, Kharytyna Omelchenko, Oleksander Ruban, Bela Sandomyrska, Hryhorii Synytsia, Maria Trubetska, Mykola Tsivchynsky, or Volodymyr Veiland. Serhii Steshenko's date (20 March 1973) and place (Lviv) of death is missing. A search under monumentalism failed to turn up an entry. Another search for "Neo-Byzantinism" turned up a brief article that directed the reader to the article on Boichuk, written by Hordynsky, which mentions only eight artists associated with the school. The researcher would, therefore, draw a blank on all the names being searched for above. Their "facts," sadly, have not been preserved. To be sure, they were not major figures, but no lesser than many whose biographies are recorded.

Naturally, these are questions of judgment and perception, and it would be tedious to carry the argument for inclusivity far. The articles provide snapshots of Ukrainian scholarship at a given point in history and reflect generational and geographical biases. There are plans to publish updated volumes at three-year intervals in order to keep pace with changes, and doubtless many of the inevitable omission-related complaints will gradually be dealt with there.

The interpretations and formulations presented in these volumes will stimulate researchers who wish to correct a given picture or redress a perceived imbalance. This will be one more demonstration of their value to the scholarly community. Nevertheless, some of the interpretive articles could better represent contemporary scholarship and could be better co-ordinated with related pieces. The entry on "Modernism" appears quite inadequate: it offers no definition, deals with art, but ends with a brief, unenlightening paragraph on literature. "Symbol-

ism," a short-lived flowering, merits a long entry that deals exclusively with literature. "Realism," a dominant nineteenth-century trend, receives a short article that speaks exclusively about art. The article on "Sentimentalism" talks strictly about literature and informs us that Chyzhevsky did not think this style prominent in Ukrainian literature. Why, then, should it merit a separate article? Who has the overall picture here?

"Romanticism," readers will be relieved to learn, receives a substantial, updated entry that covers literature, art, and music. It is also the only one of the above-mentioned isms that has a bibliography. This is unfortunate, as is the fact that bibliographies were not added for the writers Oleksander Oles, Valeriian Pidmohylny, Vasyl Stus, Olena Teliha, Mykola Vorony, and Mykola Zerov, for the critic Hryhorii Syvokin, and for other more prominent figures.

It is always a judgment call, and for the most part the editors get it right, but some secondary facts would have added greatly to the interpretive value of entries. It makes a lot more sense when you know that the executed writer Lev Skrypnyk was a relative of Mykola Skrypnyk, the Ukrainian Bolshevik leader who committed suicide in 1933; or that Ivan Lypkivsky, the painter executed in the late 1930s, was the son of the metropolitan of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church.

The collapse of the USSR and the corresponding surge of interest in the formerly "invisible" countries of the Soviet empire, particularly in Ukraine, the second-largest Slavic nation and one with large and influential émigré communities around the globe, have generated a thirst for reliable information about its people, history, and culture. It is therefore fortuitous that the last volumes were completed shortly after Ukraine achieved independence and that considerable last-minute updating could still be done. The *Encyclopedia* does more, however, than fill in some gaps and distortions of Soviet scholarship. It reshapes the interpretive context, and by doing so it challenges readers to see the world from an anti-imperial perspective. "Facts on the ground," as Professor Kubijovyč's generation realized when they initiated this project, are related to facts in print. Opinion makers in government, the press, and the academic community, who have frequently seen events exclusively through the eyes of Moscow and who now have to deal with a new and—for many—unfamiliar entity, urgently require the new perspective that this splendid publication provides.

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Michael F. Hamm. *Kiev: A Portrait, 1800–1917*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. xviii, 304 pp. $29.95.

This book aims to tell the story of the physical, political, social, cultural, and ethnic development of Kyiv during the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth century. After a brief outline of Kyiv's early history, Professor Hamm outlines the growth of metropolitan Kyiv during the nineteenth century.

Beginning as three loosely connected settlements, Kyiv steadily grew throughout the century from what one visitor claimed "could barely be called a city at all" into an administrative, educational, and commercial centre that, by 1914, was a prosperous and growing metropolis of some 626,000 inhabitants. It was transformed from a forgotten backwater inhabited primarily by Poles and Ukrainians into a great Russian-speaking city with modern amenities and modern problems.

Early in the nineteenth century, many of the ancient Kyivan institutions left over from the days of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were still well preserved. The guilds still existed, the burghers had their autonomy as originally granted under the terms of Magdeburg law, the police still wore their Ukrainian Cossack dress, and most of the inhabitants spoke "Little Russian," as the Ukrainian language was then called. Moreover, during the first third of the nineteenth century Polish influences on Kyivan culture remained strong. This was especially true during the reign of Alexander I, when the Poles Adam Czartoryski and Tadeusz Czacki controlled much of the imperial Russian education system and methodically spread Polish influences throughout the eastern lands of the former Commonwealth. Polish was the language of educated Kyivans and the medium of most commerce, and Polish gentry from the surrounding countryside dominated Kyiv's annual contract fair.

The suppression of the Polish national uprising of 1830–1 led to far-reaching changes in Kyivan society. Nicholas I set about to systematically extinguish Polish culture in the "western borderlands" and made Kyiv his showpiece. Polish learning was repressed, and Russian became the language of education. The burghers lost their autonomy, the police their Ukrainian costumes, and the insurgent nobles their estates. Kyiv University was founded as an instrument of Russification, and the city became the principal Russian administrative centre in the southwestern region of the empire. Kyiv continued to grow.

In the midst of these changes, the Ukrainian national awakening got under way. The Cyrilo-Methodian Brotherhood in the 1840s and the Kyiv Hromada of the 1860s and 1870s were high points in this movement. But another Polish uprising, followed by the anti-Ukrainian moves of 1863 and 1876 that banned printing in Ukrainian and the public use of that language, drove the Ukrainians underground and took the wind out of their sails. At the same time, Alexander II opened Kyiv to Jewish immigration from the neighbouring Pale of Settlement, and Kyiv's Jewish community quickly grew to the size of several tens of thousands. The end of the century saw commercial and industrial development, railroad expansion, and civic improvements of various sorts.

Rapid urban growth in the 1880s and 1890s was followed by worker unrest and socialist agitation. City hall, like its autocratic master in Saint Petersburg, was unresponsive to popular needs and demands. (The franchise was extremely narrow.) Clashes ensued and reached a climax during the war with Japan. Finally, the Manifesto of October 1905 introduced a measure of parliamentary government to Russia.

But the old order did not die easily. The extreme right—Russian nationalist supporters of the monarchy—struck back. There was a pogrom that, says Hamm,

"claimed between 47 and 100 lives" (p. 191). Kyiv and the surrounding countryside remained under martial law for several years afterward. The promise of the October Manifesto was "shattered," and the stage was set for the revolutionary upheavals of 1917–20. This is the general story told in *Kiev: A Portrait*, and it is more or less accurate.

There are, however, a number of problems with the book. Firstly, in a book that lays much stress on its presentation of ethnic and national developments, there is great asymmetry in its treatment of the various groups in question, namely, Poles, Ukrainians, Russians, and Jews. The problem lies in the superficial and unsympathetic narrative on the Poles, the cursory treatment of the Ukrainians, and the contrasting sympathy and detail given the Jews. Thus much space is accorded to pogroms and other anti-Jewish actions, including an entire chapter on the pogrom of 1905, while the suppression of Polish culture following the insurrections of 1830–1 and 1863 is dismissed in a couple of pages and the suppression of the Ukrainian movement following the Ems ukase of 1876 is given barely two paragraphs. It is undoubtedly true that the anti-Jewish pogrom of 1905 involved more actual physical violence, but it is equally true that the partial destruction of the Ukrainian movement had a far greater long-term effect upon the direction and development of national culture in Kyiv and, indeed, in all Ukraine. The two events are of at least of parallel historical importance and should have been so treated.

Secondly, the book suffers from awkward and misleading language and factual errors. Shevchenko did not "form a circle" to pursue the ideas of Mykola Kostomarov (p. 68), nor was the Cyrilo-Methodian Brotherhood "organized by Kulish" (p. 95), but rather whatever formal organization existed—and this was nipped in the bud—congealed haphazardly around Kostomarov himself. Shevchenko was not sentenced to "ten years in a Siberian labour battalion" (p. 95), but rather to life service as a common soldier in the Orenburg Corps. The Hromada movement was not "disbanded until the 1870s" (p. 17), but, rather, the Ukrainian movement went temporarily underground to resurface whenever the opportunity arose; and it did arise from time to time right until the outbreak of war in 1914. There was no school or theatre in prerevolutionary Kyiv named "after the Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky" (p. 115), but rather a school funded and named after his father Serhii, a well-known pedagogue and author of a widely-used textbook of Church Slavonic. The term Ukrainian did not increasingly become associated with "newly arrived peasants who hung around bazaars" (p. 170) or an "unproductive urban underclass" (p. 226), but, rather, was used very infrequently throughout the nineteenth century, and principally as a literary term at that. This is underlined by the fact that in 1917 Hrushevsky had to actually write an entire brochure explaining to the general population who the Ukrainians are and what they want (*Khto taki ukraintsi i choho vony khochut?*). In general, Ukrainians actually began calling themselves Ukrainians only after the revolution of 1917.

The book also contains parallel infelicities in its presentation of the Polish contribution to Kyivan culture. For example, Hamm seems overly credulous when he, following Soviet authors, asserts that the revolutionary Russian thinker

Alexander Herzen was so influential among the dissatisfied Poles (p. 70). Surely the writings of the radical historian Joachim Lelewel (1786–1861) were more important, as were the poetry and polemics of Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855). But these two figures, both originally from Poland's eastern borderlands, hardly deserve a mention in our author's narrative. In fact, Hamm's narrative on Polish Kyiv seems to be based almost entirely on the lonely books of Leszek Podhorodecki and Jan Tabiś. It should be pointed out that over the course of several years, Polish émigrés from central Ukraine published in London an informative, in fact encyclopedic, four-volume collection of materials entitled *Pamiętnik Kijowski*, and its omission from Hamm's bibliography is difficult to understand.

It is only in his treatment of the Jews and of the stormy years of the new century that Hamm seems to warm to his subject. But even here he falters, for his treatment of Jewish history falls too neatly into the martyrological tradition of Jewish scholarship. Little effort is made to moderate this view. In fact, his references to "the hatred spawned by anti-Semitism" (p. 229), "the deeply entrenched anti-Semitism of Ukraine" (p. 228), and "the Judeophobia which was deeply imbedded in the culture of Kiev and Ukraine" (p. 54) seem almost metaphysical in the way he has stated them; that is, without much examination of who held such feelings, where they came from, and what they meant.

The city of Kyiv requires a detailed general history from its beginnings and great days in Kyivan Rus', through its decline with the Mongol invasions, its transformation during the years of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, its temporary and partial Russification during the nineteenth century, and its further development into the capital of modern Ukraine. It requires a more complete, more balanced, and more generous history than the one we have here.

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Andreas Kappeler. *Russland als Vielvölkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall*. Munich: Beck, 1992. 395 pp.

Gerhard Simon. *Nationalism and Policy toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society*. Translated by Karen and Oswald Forster. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. xvii, 483 pp. Originally published in German as *Nationalismus und Nationalitätenpolitik in der Sowjetunion* (1986).

The collapse of the Soviet Union has made it more difficult than ever to deny the multiethnic character of the last major world empire. Now in place of one very large multiethnic state, the world community is faced with fifteen new largely multiethnic states and several other candidates for sovereignty among the former autonomous republics. In all these post-Soviet societies, politicians and intellec-

tuals are grappling with the dilemmas of ethnic, religious, and national conflicts that have quickly replaced the artificially enforced "friendship of nations" of Soviet ideology. Partly as a refusal of the long-dominant orthodoxy of "friendship of peoples" and partly in response to the perceived demands for national histories for all the successor states, historians are rejecting versions of their nations' histories that emphasize their subordination to or integration with the Russian Empire and Soviet Union. Moreover, they are operating within the structures and intellectual cultures of the long-standing Soviet division of academic labor, which assigned each union republic's history to the historical branch of its own academy of sciences and which thereby reinforced the provincialization of all non-Russian histories. In the academic environment of post-Soviet history writing, a turn toward narrowly nationalist historical narratives has begun to emerge. Now Russian historians focus ever more exclusively on the history of the ethnic Russians, and Ukrainian historians on the history of the ethnic Ukrainians, all at the risk of ignoring the centuries of imperial rule and of reading backward in history largely modern nationalist agendas of nation-state autonomy for all the successor peoples. Ironically, it appears that it will fall to foreign scholars to keep alive the memory of other historical paths that focus on the multiethnic character of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and nearly all the successor states.

But foreign scholars are curiously ill-prepared for this challenge, because, by and large, we too have lived within a division of academic labor that, perhaps unwittingly, paralleled that of the former Soviet Union. The disciplines that made up Soviet studies were preoccupied overwhelmingly with the history, politics, and culture of the Russian majority and its capitals, Moscow and St. Petersburg. For the most part the fates of non-Russian peoples were relegated to "professional ethnics" who wrote and taught at the less than respectable margins of the academic world. With remarkably few exceptions, both communities of scholars made no attempt to integrate the relations of Russians and non-Russians into the histories of imperial Russia and the Soviet Union; in other words, they ignored to a very large degree the specifically imperial aspects of those two historical polities.

The two books under review offer fundamental challenges to the decades of neglect of this imperial aspect and should be welcomed by both historians of the Russians and of the other peoples who made up the empires. Gerhard Simon, a senior researcher at the German Federal Institute for Soviet and International Studies in Köln, acknowledges that in the 1970s Soviet area specialists began paying more attention to ethnic and national concerns, but he indicates that few major Sovietologists assigned ethnopolitics a major place in their explanatory models of change or system-maintenance. Expanding on Simon's arguments, Andreas Kappeler, the holder of the chair in East European history at the University of Köln, asserts that even while political scientists and the occasional sociologist may have studied elite politics or migration patterns among the non-Russians, historians of imperial Russia remained far more firmly wedded to their convictions that empire was really a nation-state and that research on Russian society, culture, and politics was adequate for understanding the dynamics of its history. Historians have been held in thrall to the dominant model of the

European nation-state that emerged in the nineteenth century and "triumphed" in the aftermath of World War I. Academic departments have exhibited little sympathy for the study of multinational empires and have treated the history of the Russian Empire and the USSR as a subspecies—albeit with qualifications—of the European nation-state model.

In response to these criticisms of the writing of "Russian" history, Kappeler has written a provocative history of the empire from Ivan IV's conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan through 1917 and an epilogue on Soviet developments that largely follows the account in Simon's book. Kappeler explains historians' predilection for the nation-state model as a consequence of the persistent legacy of nineteenth-century Russian historians and their émigré successors; this legacy began with Nikolai Karamzin, was developed by the State School of Sergei Solovev and Boris Chicherin, and culminated in the national social and cultural history of Vasilii Kliuchevsky. (In remarkable contrast to the nineteenth-century historians' portrait of Russia as a nation-state or, in the case of Solovev, as perhaps an anational state, French and German historians and travellers in the eighteenth century were fascinated by the polyethnic character of the Russian Empire.) Historians in the Soviet Union, after a little more than a decade of rejecting the Russian national interpretation, returned to it under Stalin and have continued the traditions of their nineteenth-century predecessors with few qualifications.

Kappeler offers his survey in an effort to set the contemporary nationalities question and collapse of the USSR in a greater historical context, to expand our understanding of the history of Russia, and to contribute to a universal history of multiethnic empires. He focuses on the methods and instruments of expansion and incorporation, the reactions of the conquered and annexed peoples and most especially their elites, the character of the multiethnic empire, and the changes in the empire under the influences of modernization, focusing in the latter case on the rise of national movements and the relations between social revolution and national liberation. In constructing his courageously comprehensive narrative, Kappeler makes use of a large Russian and non-Russian base of primary and secondary sources. His long-standing interest in these matters dates from his first major book on the conquests of Kazan and Astrakhan, events that, in his opinion, set the pattern for Russian imperial politics and served as a touchstone for imperial consciousness.

The book is so full of provocative and suggestive insights that this review, in highlighting only a few moments, will inevitably fail to convey the overall richness of the findings. One of the central innovations is Kappeler's comparative approach, which, in contrast to national histories, does not focus as much on the unique fates of the nations as on commonalities and differences among them. He acknowledges that the only justification for writing about all these peoples is their relationship to the Russian state and that many of them otherwise had hardly anything to do with one another. Nonetheless, he tries not to treat the ethnes of the periphery merely as objects of state policy, but rather attempts to chart their historical development in interaction with Russian state policies. Overall, Kappeler characterizes three and a half centuries of Russian imperial policy as "pragmatic and flexible." The exceptions to this general characterization are the

religious intolerance under Ivan IV, the brutal measures of Peter I, and then late imperial developments after the Great Reforms.

Kappeler identifies an important change in imperial policy that occurs at some time between the reigns of Catherine II and Alexander I. Earlier expansion had generally entailed repressive military conquest and occupation followed by reliance on local elites and then cooptation of those elites into the Russian imperial ruling class; most often local custom and existing social structures were allowed to stand. This policy was pursued as long as the geographic, historical, and social distance between the Russians and non-Russian ethnes remained small. After all, the Russians did not "discover" colonies as the Europeans had, because the East Slavs had had centuries-long contacts with, for example, Tatar elites, who were also subjects of the Golden Horde. What happened during the course of the eighteenth century was the annexation of more and more peoples who did not share the historical experience of the East Slavs and were farther and farther removed from the Russian core, both geographically and in terms of their social structures. This coincided, according to Kappeler, with an emerging consciousness among the imperial ruling strata that they were European in some essential sense; an important document that fixes this new consciousness is Mikhail Speransky's 1822 regulations for the *inorodtsy* (mostly nomadic tribes) of Siberia. Although Speransky drafted the document to safeguard the Siberian natives from the depredations of arbitrary imperial authorities, the absorption of Enlightenment and later Romantic notions of backward and advanced peoples served as an organizing principle for later imperial policy toward non-Russian ethnes. In comparison with pre-Catherinian patterns of conquest and annexation, Russia's expansion in the nineteenth century was far more similar to European overseas expansion; telling here was the refusal to admit local elites into the imperial hereditary nobility after the conquest of Turkestan in the mid-1800s.

A further complicating matter, and one that makes characterization and comparison of the Russian Empire particularly difficult, is the status of the western borderlands—the Baltic provinces, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth after the partitions, and, to a lesser degree, Little Russia (Left-Bank Ukraine). The annexed lands differed considerably from Russia in social structures; local elites defended strong corporatist organizations and regional traditions. In other words, in sociopolitical organization, economy, and culture the peripheries were more highly developed than the metropolis. Especially the western borderlands kept alive a fundamental contradiction in the empire between occasional impulses toward greater integration into the autocratic state and centralization, on the one hand, and a desire to view these provinces as models for social and political reform, on the other.

Kappeler charts the emergence and evolution of Russian imperial and national consciousness as far as the literature allows (here is a very promising area of future research) and assigns Congress Poland a central role in the crystallization of those forms of consciousness during the nineteenth century. But he also draws attention to the role that non-Russians, including many Poles, but especially the more loyal peoples of the empire, the Ukrainians, Baltic Germans, and Finns, played in shaping imperial consciousness. As long as the empire's

educational networks failed to train enough ethnic Russians to fill the leading administrative and military posts, this cosmopolitan elite ruled with little resistance; but by the mid-nineteenth century the rise of an ethnically Russian bureaucratic cadre coincided with the emergence of heightened Russian national consciousness and other non-Russian national movements to challenge that cosmopolitan principle and what Kappeler characterizes as the "flexible, pragmatic nationality policy." These trends emerged in the context of the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War and its expansion into Central Asia and the Far East; the farther from the historical center that Russia extended its imperial rule, the more that rule evolved away from "pragmatic paternalism" in the direction of European colonial practice.

In a related development that coincided with the Great Reforms initiated by Alexander II, the metropolis indulged in a new wave of centralizing and systematizing efforts that had varying consequences for the status and conditions of non-Russians in the empire. Kappeler prefers not to call the new measures "Russification" and to insist instead on the phrase "nationality policy." In part he asserts this distinction because, despite all the concessions the autocracy made toward the emerging Russian national consciousness, it tried to assure the dynastic-estate foundation of its rule; after all, the modern ideology of nationalism was too closely linked with republican demands for popular sovereignty in nineteenth-century Europe. But Kappeler also asserts that Russification is too crude a term for the chronologically and regionally differentiated effects of the policies that were followed primarily from the reign of Alexander II (but some dating back to his predecessor Nicholas I). Some examples make Kappeler's distinction more clear. Following the Polish uprising of 1863, Alexander II turned to a policy of forced integration of the Polish nation into the Russian Empire. Repression was directed against the Catholic church; and linguistic Russification set back Polish educational achievements by several decades. Elsewhere in the western borderlands, the privileges of the Baltic nobility suffered erosion; Alexander III and State Secretary Konstantin Pobedonostsev pursued a policy of unification in the Baltic provinces and even in Finland, and aggressive assimilation in Ukraine and Belarus. But a significant contrast is offered by the treatment of Jews, who were not encouraged to assimilate, but rather were subjected to new discriminatory provisions and a policy of segregation from the east Slavic lower classes. Judeophobic tendencies reached to the highest levels of the imperial government. Finally, missionary activity among the Tatars and other Muslim peoples was conducted in their native languages, not in Russian. Kappeler underlines the complexity of the evolving nationality policies and links the divergent treatments of various peoples to foreign policy factors (the proximity of the Habsburg, Ottoman and German empires especially), the social structures of the peoples, the intensity of anti-imperial resistance, and the attitudes of the imperial elite toward the viability of integrating various peoples (Ukrainians and Belarusians, for example, were perceived as apostates from the Russian nation and subjected to particularly intense assimilationist pressures).

In the final chapters of his book, Kappeler offers much material for a re-evaluation of the role of ethnic and national issues in the revolutions that

eventually brought down the autocracy in the early twentieth century. Even as mass opposition movements emerged to challenge the autocracy, they too reflected the diversity of the imperial legacy; several important political parties, notably the Social Democrats and Kadets, forged supra-ethnic platforms that continued the cosmopolitan traditions of the imperial ruling elites but also reinforced a Russocentric orientation. Other parties, especially those founded by Poles, Jews, and Armenians, rejected the cosmopolitan orientation in favour of the national cause. The range of responses to the transformation of the Russian Empire in its final decades derived from a multitude of factors: the literacy rates and emergence of national intelligentsias; urbanization and industrialization with resulting social differentiation; earlier patterns of interethnic relations in the peripheries; and the resources of diaspora populations outside the empire. These factors contributed in some instances to greater homogenization, elsewhere to greater diversity.

Kappeler acknowledges the broad scope of demands that shaped the 1905 Revolution, but he calls it the "springtime of the nations." Most research on the 1905 Revolution, both inside and outside the USSR, has focused on social and political factors and thereby subordinated national and ethnic issues to that agenda. Nonetheless, at various times during the revolutionary years the level of unrest and violence in the peripheries, especially in Poland, Transcaucasia, and the Baltic provinces, far exceeded that in the Russian heartland. Kappeler concludes that overall the role of the non-Russian ethnes was more significant than both Western and Soviet historiography have assumed. In addition to the higher level of worker participation in the general strike movement in the non-Russian periphery, Kappeler offers evidence of a considerably more fierce state repressive policy against non-Russian rebels in the aftermath of the unrest. But even here, after an initial demonstration of repressive power, the imperial autocracy briefly turned back to more traditional flexible pragmatism with concessions to the non-Orthodox religions and the lifting of censorship and language bans for several peoples.

During the Duma period, against a backdrop of worsening relations with Austria-Hungary and Germany, a new reactionary turn dealt a setback to the recently won gains. The outbreak of the World War destabilized the fragile balance of power in the multiethnic state; the worst uprising of the wartime period occurred in 1916 in Central Asia after the proclamation of a decree drafting *inorodtsy*. The 1917 revolutions started in Petrograd, and this time Petrograd played a more important role than the non-Russians when compared with 1905; partially, Kappeler explains, this was because of the occupation of Poland and Kurland, where the workers' movement had been particularly militant in 1905, by the Germans. But once again, the revolutionary situation was particularly explosive where social and national factors overlapped. The Provisional Government that assumed authority over the empire following the abdication of the tsar underestimated the seriousness of the national question and gradually lost the confidence of the non-Russians. The role of the national question as a precondition of the October Revolution remains controversial, but it is virtually impossible to isolate the national element from other factors. Certainly the

autonomist movements in the peripheries weakened the position of the Provisional Government, and the latter's intransigence contributed to the alienation of the center from the outlying regions.

Kappeler's main narrative ends with the Bolshevik seizure of power, but he sees the nationality policy of the 1920s as following the tradition of tsarism's flexibility in its genuine but flawed attempt to restructure the multiethnic state along federalist lines. The new regime, like its predecessor, was faced with a shortage of personnel that led it to seek collaboration with local elites and mobile diasporas. With Stalin's triumph, however, the Soviet state reverted to the worst colonialist and Russification policies of the late Imperial period.

Here Gerhard Simon picks up the narrative thread and focuses on the tremendous transformation of the socioeconomic order that the Stalin revolution unleashed from above. His account too, like Kappeler's, is informed by the collapse of the "Soviet empire"; he sees processes of decolonization underway beneath the surface that date back to Stalin's rule. Simon adheres to the view that nationalism is a by-product of the emergence of national intelligentsias in the outlying republics. For him the most significant change in the USSR was the expansion of educational opportunities in the 1930s and especially after World War II that promoted the growth of national intelligentsias. Before the Stalin-led modernization drive, only Jews, Armenians, Georgians, and Tatars had somewhat broad secular intelligentsias. Simon's argument recalls Moshe Lewin's in *The Gorbachev Phenomenon* that social and political processes set in motion by the Stalin regime almost inexorably led to the demise of the Stalinist system by providing new educated classes who would push the system toward substantial reform, or at least offer support to any reformer at the top. The new intelligentsias demanded ever more roles in their local governments; these demands triggered mixed responses from Moscow and led to a "participation crisis" that exacerbated other crises of the post-Stalinist regime. Simon takes issue with the major conclusions of an earlier generation of social-science theorists who posited that modernization would entail a melting-pot effect of political integration. On the contrary, Soviet sociologists found that ethnic and national self-consciousness actually grew in large multinational settlement centres where populations typically had high levels of education. Instead of achieving the party-state's desired goal of assimilation, the long-festering crisis of the old regime's legitimacy triggered, among other responses, nationalisms. Simon also departs from a major trend among European and American "nationalities" specialists, perhaps most articulately represented by the French scholar Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, who saw the origins of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the Asian republics and in Islam; on the contrary, as in the tsarist empire, it was the nations of the western periphery, this time in particular the Baltic nations, that led the way.

Although Simon would certainly not characterize Soviet nationality policy as "flexible and pragmatic" as Kappeler did the tsarist policy, he too sees an "unprecedented and surprisingly successful" balance between force and concessions. The period of greatest concessions was the 1920s, when the Soviet leadership tolerated a policy of "nation-building" for the non-Russian peoples, including the appointment of native elites to administrative positions (*koreni-*

zatsiia) and the encouragement of native cultures and languages in schools and other institutions. This policy clearly went much further than the autocracy had in making concessions to the nationalist movements that emerged in the early twentieth century. On the other hand, when that policy changed the Soviet state, during forced collectivization, industrialization, and the terror, also went much further than had the autocracy in assaulting the non-Russian peoples' traditional social structures and eliminating established elites.

Simon has chosen to focus on the 1930s and the years from 1960 to 1985 on the debatable grounds that existing studies of the civil war, the NEP, and World War II adequately treat nationality issues. He also has attempted to cast his scholarly gaze widely and employ a comparative all-Soviet perspective while devoting special attention to Ukraine and Central Asia; here he claims that most Western scholars have overly specialized in the history of one non-Russian people and do not treat occurrences in neighbouring territories or nationality policies pursued within the framework of the whole Soviet state. Simon argues that such a perspective frequently causes serious distortions in assessing the situation; even authors who have attempted syntheses of the literature on nationalities have more often than not approached nationalities in an additive manner. Finally, he combines various methodological perspectives—social history, the history of ideology, and traditional Kremlinology—and all without the benefit of the opening of archives in the former Soviet republics. Indeed, Simon has set an ambitious historiographical agenda for future scholars, who can now take advantage of the much expanded access to source materials. His considerable achievement is marred only by the irresponsible translation from the German; too many passages are incorrectly translated into virtually incomprehensible English, and footnotes were left in German, even when English-language originals exist.

Taken together, Kappeler's and Simon's studies demonstrate the centrality of nationality policy in modern Russian and Soviet history. Such policy affected half of the empires' population from the nineteenth century, as well as the relationships between Russians and non-Russians. Scholars who have studied such fundamental processes and periods as the Catherinian reforms, the Great Reforms, industrialization, the 1905 and 1917 revolutions, the Stalin revolution, World War II, and the Khrushchev reforms have typically limited their focus to the ethnic Russian heartland. By extending their researches to the non-Russian peripheries or to non-Russian peoples within the Russian core, future scholars may challenge some of the earlier findings, and they certainly will enrich the historical literature with more complex pictures of the dynamics of these two multinational state structures. This does not mean rewriting history according to the agendas of nationalist historians, but it does demand some considerable rethinking about the ways in which we write and train students to think about the Russian imperial and Soviet pasts. As one possible reform, knowledge of the Russian language alone (even together with the traditional additional two European languages of French and German) will be inadequate for many future scholars; and once we start thinking about the empires as multinational states, we might benefit from a more comparative approach to empires and consider the histories of at least the two most proximate land-based empires, those of the Habsburgs and Ottomans.

The two works under review can serve as a starting point for this reorientation of our thinking; a publisher would do well to publish Kappeler's book in English translation and Westview would do well to retranslate Simon's book to bring them before a wider audience.

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Sophia Senyk. *A History of the Church in Ukraine.* Vol. 1. *To the End of the Thirteenth Century.* Vol. 243 of Orientalia Christiana Analecta. Edited by Robert F. Taft. Rome: Pontificio Istituto Orientale, 1993. xvi, 471 pp.

Sophia Senyk describes this volume as "the first of a work planned to cover in four volumes the entire history of the Church in Ukraine." This important work is not only the first general survey of the Kyivan Rus' church to the end of the thirteenth century in English, but also the most exhaustive study since 1911, when the last volume of E. E. Golubinsky's history of that church appeared.

Two problems Senyk has had to deal with should be mentioned at the start, namely, terminology and dating. In her preface she notes that the present volume is "on the Church in Kievan Rus'." In the next sentence she explains that "from the founding of the Church in Ukraine its centre was the metropolitan see of Kiev." Kyivan Rus' and Ukraine were not synonymous. What later became known as Ukraine, at an earlier date formed a part of Kyivan Rus'; therefore, it is impossible to examine the history of the church in the Ukrainian part of Kyivan Rus' in isolation. Senyk acknowledges this when she speaks of "the Church in Kievan Rus'" and explains that, when possible, she will direct her attention primarily to developments in the territory of Ukraine.

Periodization also creates a problem. Most historians agree that Kyivan Rus' ceased to exist as a political entity after the Mongol invasion of the mid-thirteenth century. This could also be deemed a logical terminus for the history of the Kyiv metropolitanate. After the invasion the role of the metropolitan changed significantly. The importance of Kyiv as the metropolitan see waned because, in addition to other reasons, the metropolitan frequently absented himself to visit the various districts under his jurisdiction. Nevertheless, Senyk has chosen the year 1300 as her terminus because at that time the metropolitanate officially moved from Kyiv to the northeast.

The book is broken up into eight chapters, each with numerous subdivisions. The first three chapters examine the introduction of Christianity to Rus'. Chapter four is devoted to church organization. The next chapter examines the acceptance of the new faith and how this was reflected in daily and public life. Monasticism and, in particular, the Kyivan Caves Monastery are examined in chapter six. The next and longest chapter discusses the religious culture of Kyivan Rus', including contacts with Latin Christendom. The final chapter investigates the history of the

church in the thirteenth century, during which it suffered the catastrophic Mongol invasion. The book ends with a short appendix on the canonization of SS Borys and Hlib and with an index.

The author, interpreting church history in its widest sense, presents a balanced point of view in her analysis. The first three chapters are refreshing and well argued. Askold, one is persuaded to concede, died a pagan and not, as some would have it, a Christian. The questions concerning the time and place of Olha's baptism and her quest for a church hierarchy, although not resolved, are examined critically, as are the accounts of Volodymyr's conversion of Rus'. She argues convincingly that Christianity came to Rus' through Constantinople and not through Bulgaria. Moreover, her examination of the quality of Christian instruction in Rus', of early spirituality, of religious practices and how these were adapted by Slavic pagans, is most rewarding. Where Slavic sources are silent Senyk fills in the gaps by basing her observations on Greek documents; she draws useful parallels and conclusions with Rus' church administration, law, architecture, art, prayers, sacraments, and liturgy. Concerning the latter she opines that "the Slavic liturgy, which made it possible to dispense with a knowledge of Greek, by depriving Rus' of access to a language of an advanced civilization deprived Rus' culture of the fertile impulses that can come only from intellectual contact with other cultures" (p. 419).

Senyk has used Latin, Greek, and Arabic sources to evaluate the relationship of the church in Rus' with the Latins and the Greeks. For example, she correctly observes that the alleged schism of 1054 meant very little to the princes of Rus', who continued to maintain relations with Rome. And the Kyivan church, even though it was closely bound to the Greek patriarchate, did not harbour motives of prejudice and hostility to all things Roman. She also traces Kyivan monasticism to its Byzantine roots. Her observation that the Caves Monastery in Kyiv introduced the Studite liturgical rule rather than the full Studite rule is persuasive. One weakness in her examination of monasticism is her failure to examine the role of demonology in the spirituality of the Caves Monastery.

The work, however, must be read with caution. The author does not always explain the reliability of her sources, so one does not know whether she is aware of their shortcomings. Her historical method also suffers in that she frequently fails, in my view, to document disputable assertions and direct quotations adequately. Moreover, Senyk's use of secondary works is selective. Dated books and articles are referred to when more recent studies could be cited profitably. For example, there is no evidence that relevant works by authors such as J. T. Fuhrmann, J. Meyendorff, E. Honigman, I. Smolitsch, and J. Fennell have been consulted. Indeed, it is impossible for the reader to learn the literature on the topic from Senyk's book because she fails to include a bibliography; she provides only a limited list of abbreviations.

Although her presentation of religious life, spirituality, and monasticism can be very enlightening, on occasion the author falls short of the mark in her historical analysis. Granted, the paucity of evidence frequently forces her to make assumptions, and insofar as her approach is synthetic she makes generalizations that invite inaccuracies. Nevertheless, the work has avoidable factual errors. A

few examples will suffice. Prince Volodymyr did not rule a "kingdom" (p. 82); in speaking of the Rus' efforts to Christianize the Finnic peoples the author claims there was no Byzantine example to spur the Rus' church on to such efforts (p. 202), evidently forgetting the work of SS Cyril and Methodius; Senyk accuses Ihor of trying to "usurp the Kievan throne" in 1146 (p. 293) despite the chronicle evidence that his brother Vsevolod designated him his successor and the princes of Rus' and the Kyivans swore allegiance to him before his accession.

The appendix is based on an inadequate knowledge of the history of the subject and therefore fails to convince. Senyk argues that Borys and Hlib were canonized at the same time, namely, when their relics were translated during the reign of Iaroslav the Wise. Her arguments have two weaknesses. First, she ignores the evidence that suggests that Hlib was probably venerated as a saint and canonized before Borys (this is suggested by the information that before 1072 Hlib's body was laid in a stone sarcophagus while that of Borys was placed in a wooden casket). One of Senyk's strongest arguments in support of the canonization taking place before the translation of 1072, in her view, rests on her assertion that the church on the Lta River, where Borys was killed, existed before that date (p. 451). The Hypatian Chronicle clearly states that the church was built in 1117 by Volodymyr Monomakh (*Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*, vol. 2, col. 285).

In the preface Senyk gives us her *modus operandi*. Concerning the transliteration of proper names she writes: "I have not striven to apply uniformly a set of rules; a strict observance of one norm would simply be pedantic." Later she adds: "I do not claim to be consistent, but I hope that at least I have successfully avoided ... 'sounding like a fool'." She is true to her word; the book lacks uniformity and consistency not only in the transliteration of Slavic words, but also in the presentation of dates (i.e., January, March, or September years), in terminology, in footnotes, and in the index. Uniformity and consistency need not be pedantic; on the contrary, they reflect a professionalism that has as its objective clarity of expression. The book contains an unusually large number of distracting printing errors. Finally, lists of metropolitans, genealogical tables of princes, maps of eparchies, and a glossary of liturgical and other technical terms added at the back of the book would have served as useful aids to the reader.

Despite its weaknesses, the book has many strengths and makes a significant contribution to learning. It will serve as an indispensable guide to all English-speaking students studying the history of the church in Rus'.

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Giovanna Brogi Bercoff, editor. *Ricerche Slavistiche.* Vol. 37. *La percezione del Medioevo nell'epoca del Barocco: Polonia, Ucraina, Russia; Atti del Congresso tenutosi a Urbino 3-8 luglio 1989.* Rome: Carucci Editore, 1990, 606 pp. US. $125.00.

The July 1989 Urbino conference devoted to the problem expressed in this volume' subtitle addressed a truly complex problem. The Baroque is a term most closely associated with the countries connected with Western or Latin Christianity and its culture, and with the Renaissance. Its application to countries and cultures not directly part of this cultural-religious tradition is problematic. Furthermore, the evaluation of the Middle Ages and its heritage differed even in those countries (France, Germany, the Venetian Republic) identified with the generally accepted scheme of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Baroque. The papers presented in this volume (in Italian, French, English, Polish, and Russian) fully reflect this complex state of affairs. They present a challenging and stimulating body of writing on a variety of problems.

The three papers in the section "Il contesto Europeo" treat the reception of the *Medioevo* in Venetian and German historiography and in seventeen-century France. Alberto Teneti points to an almost complete absence of the notion of the Middle Ages in Venetian historical writing. He asserts that while this is understandable in terms of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the later lack of attention to this period is "conscious and, in a certain manner, deliberate." Concerning the role of the *Mittelälter* in German historiography from the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, Uwe Neddermeyer points out that "In contrast to Italy and other nations that saw their political and cultural fundaments in antiquity, the Germans had to find and tried to find positive elements in the Middle Ages—where a major part of their own culture and political existence originated. As a consequence the *'dark'* character of the[ir] own past was denied by many German scholars even before the Romanticism" (p. 81). Writing of the medieval tradition in seventeenth-century France, Michael S. Koppisch notes that the general disdain for medieval mores and culture was tempered by an admiration for the outstanding strong historical and literary figures of the epoch. Comparing the personalities and values of the protagonists of the medieval *Le Vilain mire* and Molière's *Le Medecin malgré lui* provides Koppisch with a vehicle for comparing the two ages and comprehending that which unites and, more importantly, divides them.

The ten papers devoted to "Il Medioevo nella cultura e nella letteratura polacca del Seicento" provide a stimulating discussion of a wide variety of problems. Janusz Tazbir considers the reception of the Middle Ages in Poland by the Polish intellectual elite of the Baroque. The noted Polish historian notes that heraldic legends of the age refer most often to the kings and princes of tenth through twelfth centuries whose knightly virtues and great Christian piety later generations were supposed to emulate. Hans Rothe argues that the terms *"rossiiski"* and *"Rossiia"* entered the Muscovite ideological vocabulary not from Greek-language chancery documents from Constantinople, but from Polish humanist historians (e.g., Maciej Stryjkowski) via Ukrainian intellectual writings

(e.g., by Stepan Zyzanii, Meletii Smotrytsky, Zakhariia Kopystensky, and especially Innokentii Gizel's *Sinopsis*). Originally devised by humanist historians to designate all the East Slavs, these terms eventually acquired an eschatological meaning. Together with other elements of the *translatio imperii* they were applied to the increasing powerful Muscovite state. Hanna Dziechińska connects Piotr Skarga's immensely popular *Żywoty Świętych* to the medieval hagiographic tradition and to the Renaissance panegyrical historical biography. To the Middle Ages she connects Skarga's love of the miraculous and the propagation of obedience, charity, and generosity to the Church; to the Renaissance she traces the composition of the fabula and the highly rhetorical style of narration.

Paulina Buchwald-Pelc discusses the history of the publication of Wincenty Kadłubek and Jan Długosz's historical works and the role of "ancient" hymns and devotional songs in building the myth of a golden age in Poland's medieval past. Karolina Targosz examines travel accounts as a source for the seventeenth-century Polish sensibility to medieval West European art and architecture. She notes that Polish travellers in western Europe expressed their amazement and admiration for the "old-world" (*staroświecki*) art of the Middle Ages, which they described in detail and contrasted with the "modern" art of the Renaissance and Baroque. Giovanna Tomassucci demonstrates concretely how the Polish reading public of the seventeenth century was initiated into the devotional literature of western Europe. She traces *Nauka umierania chrześciańskiego* (Cracow, 1604) translated by Jan Januszowski to *Dottrina del ben morire* by Pietro Ritta (d. 1522), a preacher in Lucca. She analyzes Januszowski's translation and compares it to other works on the same theme.

In her exploration of late-Baroque funeral songs, Alicia Nowicka-Jeżowa traces the medieval themes they contain (the *ars moriendi*, disputes between soul and body, meditations on ubi sunt themes, *vanitas*, *fortuna*, and so on) and their transformation to reconstruct attitudes toward life, nature, and culture in late seventeenth-century Poland. Luigi Marinelli theorizes that the rhythmico-versificatory element in Szymon Zimorowic's *Roxolanki* ... is part of a literary polemic between the author and Jan Kochanowski and that this polemic forms the background to Zimorowic's entire poem. Marinelli convincingly argues that certain strophic and metric forms in Zimorowic's idyllic epithalamium reflect Middle Latin liturgical and para-liturgical poetry and the Polish translations of such texts (e.g., by Stanisław Grochowski). Jacek Sokolski provides further evidence of the influence of medieval Latin non-liturgical or goliardic lyrics in Poland and surveys the peregrination of west European texts and their transformation into Polish translations in sources as disparate as Jakub T. Trembecki's *Wirydarz poetycki* (1675–1719) and Oskar Kolberg's folkloric compendia (1859–60). Krzysztof Mrowcewicz considers the medieval weltanschauung of the poet Mikołaj Sęp-Szarzyński. He points out that the concept of man and the cosmos, certain images, and even phrases found in Sęp's poetry stem ultimately from such sources as Boethius, Pseudo-Dionysius the Aeropagate, and Thomas Aquinas.

Five papers address "La Tradizione Medievale nell'ideologia e nella cultura Ucraina fra la fine del XVIe il XVIII secolo." Iaroslav Isaievych succinctly and informatively compares the Orthodox confraternities (*bratstva*) of Ukraine and

Belarus with similar organizations in western Europe, which undoubtedly served as their model. He notes that the East Slavic confraternities arose in a period of rapid social and cultural change and were formed by burghers vitally interested in effecting and directing that change and in defending the interests of their particular community in an organized and demonstrative manner. In subsequent centuries there arose another type of confraternity, comprised of persons imbued with a spirit of Baroque piety and humility and not inclined to take an active role in changing their society or culture. Ryszard Łużny outlines the role of the Byzantine-influenced culture of medieval Rus'-Ukraine in forming a sense of national and religious identity during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He also notes the role of the Latin, west European culture in this process; for example, the authors of the Hustynia Chronicle and Gizel, in his *Sinopsis*, depended upon Polish historians such as Marcin Kromer or Stryjkowski for their information about Rus'-Ukraine's past as much as they did on Rus' chronicles. In the contemporary polemical literature, historiography, poetry, and princely biographies Łużny detects the use of the heritage of Kyivan Rus' in addressing contemporary concerns. Paulina Lewin points out that the deeply spiritual Orthodox "medieval" culture, which was imbued with a love of symbol and allegory, and the dramatic or theatrical nature of its liturgical tradition well prepared the seventeenth-century Ukrainian churchgoer to accept the "modern" Baroque school genre. As proof Lewin discloses the close correspondence between the texts of services on Great Thursday, Great Friday, and Great Saturday and two Kyivan plays, "The Act Composed to Summon Christ's Passion" and "The Triumph of Human Nature." Aleksander Naumow demonstrates how the hagiographic writings and hymnography of seventeenth-century Ukraine and Muscovy were used as political propaganda against enemies (Poles, Germans, Uniates, Orthodox) or to gain support for certain friends (e.g., for Georgia against the Turks) or theological beliefs (e.g., for the Nikonian reforms or the Old Belief). Gianfranco Giraudo uses the figure of Gizel to illustrate the dilemma of an intellect nurtured by one culture that was yet the battleground of two opposing political and cultural systems. In his writings Gizel employed a pan-Slavic patriotism that was originally invented by Polish humanist historians to exalt the mission of the Muscovite tsars; in supporting Muscovite political aspirations, Gizel often employed Muscovite political terminology (e.g., *kesar/tsar, gosudarstvo, kniazhenie, samoderzhets*) inconsistently and incoherently.

The last group of papers (seven) address the issue "La cultura russa fra Medieovo e Barocco: Continuita e innovazione." Jan Dębski writes of the image of man and the world in Russian Baroque poetry, asserting that although Russian Baroque poets used such themes as *vanitas* and *memento mori*, their vision tended to emphasize the eternal moral order. Rather than propounding *carpe diem* as a solution to *vanitas*, these poets advised their readers to flee the world (*fuga mundi*) and to espouse an ascetic life that leads to the Godhead. V. K. Bylinin centres his stimulating discussion of seventeenth-century verse paraphrases of Church Slavonic liturgical texts around Simeon Polatsky's Polish-language akathistos service; an example of a widespread phenomenon in seventeenth-century Muscovy, this text illustrates a unique synthesis by which a traditional medieval

Byzantine/Slavonic liturgical text was reworked in a sophisticated Western/Latin poetic form and idiom.

L. I. Sazonova points out that the literature of the Russian Baroque was in the tradition of rhetorical literature and was similar to the medieval period in the importance it attached to such devices as amplification, anaphora, *gradatio*, *repetitio*, and other tropes, to the significance of the expressiveness and melliflu-ousness of language, and to the principle of *imitatio* (including the borrowing of textual material) as an artistic principle. On the other hand, such a complex work as *Kniga liubvy znak vo chesten brak* (1689), an emblematic declamation, demonstrates the manner in which a newly introduced genre could treat a theme well known in medieval literature: the human body and the emotions. In her discussion of the Russian medieval and Baroque theatre, L. A. Sofronova argues that although a theatrical tradition did not develop in medieval Rus', there did exist a folk theater and a dramatic element in the Byzantine liturgical tradition in which symbolism, allegory, and abstraction were significant components. All these features were also present in Baroque theatre, and they eased the acceptance of the new form in Russia. On the other hand, the tendency of Baroque theatre to incorporate the everyday and comic into otherwise serious moralistic works (whether in intermedes or directly into texts) blurred the hitherto well-drawn boundary between the sacred and profane, between what could and could not be depicted in theatre. The conflict engendered by the Nikonian church reforms was a watershed in Russia's cultural history. B. Uspenskij interprets this as a conflict engendered by opposing views of the semantic sign. In his view, the Old Believers represented the Muscovite traditional, conventional view of the semantic sign, whereas the adherents of the Nikonian reforms (all of whom were influenced by Polish Baroque culture) represented the Western intellectual and philosophical approach.

In the final two papers, T. F. Vladyševskaja outlines the process by which Russia abandoned traditional Muscovite monophonic singing in favour of Western polyphony; while Jean Blankoff discusses the diary of Petr Potemkin's 1668 mission to the French court and argues that the "window to Europe" was open long before Peter I hacked out one more on the Baltic littoral. Blankoff asserts that the seventeenth-century Russian attitude to west European culture was not as uniformly negative as Olearius and other west European travellers have reported.

This review presents only the main points of each paper. Many of them deserve more extensive discussion, for they treat issues and problems of importance to the serious student of Polish and East Slavic Baroque culture, history, and political thought. Readers who rise to the challenge of these essays will come away well rewarded.

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George S. N. Luckyj. *Young Ukraine: The Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius, 1845–1847.* Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1991. vi, 119 pp. $14.00.

Professor emeritus George Luckyj is well known as the author, editor, and translator of numerous writings on Taras Shevchenko and Panteleimon Kulish. Among them are his classic study *Between Gogol and Ševčenko: Polarity in the Literary Ukraine: 1798–1847* (1971) and *Panteleimon Kulish: A Sketch of His Life and Times* (1983). The former work includes a chapter in which Luckyj discusses the activities and ideology of the Brotherhood of SS Cyril and Methodius. This new study continues the work he has already published on this topic.

The strength of George Luckyj's works is that they are lucidly written. This study is no exception. In addition to a main text, it provides appendices containing a few of the brotherhood's programmatic documents and excerpts from the report on the brotherhood of the chief of the Third Section, Count A. F. Orlov, to Nicholas I. Two of the book's drawbacks, however, are that the first names of many of the people mentioned in the text are found only in the index, and in most cases no explanation of who they were is provided.

Luckyj concludes that the brotherhood's ideology was based largely on romantic notions (p. 29); that its programmatic document "Zakon Bozhyi" (written by Mykola Kostomarov) was utopian, messianic and millenarian, universalist yet nationalist, Christian, and political (pp. 50–1); and that the Cyrilo-Methodians were the first group of conscious Ukrainian intellectuals, who set a pattern for intellectuals to follow that was romantic, populist, and nationalist (p. 80). For the most part his conclusions on the ideology of the brotherhood and its members' place in Ukrainian intellectual history are sound. Yet, he contradicts himself and exaggerates when he writes that "The central idea of the Brotherhood—a Slavic federation—was crushed and extirpated from their minds." (p. 73). In many of his later historical and publicistic writings, for example, Kostomarov continued to promote federalist ideas. Also, Luckyj's conclusion that "the federalist aspect of Cyrilo-Methodian ideology, rather than its Christian, millenarian, or nationalist elements ... survived the longest" (p. 81) is confusing. Counterposing federalism with nationalism in the Ukrainian context of the mid- to late nineteenth century is anachronistic. Federalist ideas, for the most part, can be regarded as early nationalist thought in nineteenth-century Ukraine. One can find many cases in the brotherhood's programmatic documents, some of which Luckyj points to, where seemingly contradictory concepts are blended, such as separateness and union.

The one major negative feature of this study is that it is too brief. The main text is just over eighty pages in length. It is particularly disappointing that many of the brotherhood's members, including Vasyl Bilozersky, receive such short shrift—no more than one paragraph. Some of the translations of documents are problematic. For instance, in the brotherhood's "Appeal to Brother Ukrainians" the author (once again Kostomarov) wrote that all Slavs should unite, but in such a way that "each [Slavic] people would form its own republic and govern itself apart from the others" (my translation). Kostomarov's emphasis was on

separateness. Luckyj's translation does not convey this meaning well and may give the impression that Kostomarov emphasized similarity: "each people would form its own republic and govern itself like the others" (p. 100).

Finally, Luckyj's study does not emphasize certain elements of the programmatic documents that should be stressed: the Cyrilo-Methodians advocated the destruction of autocracy, the introduction of popular rule, the creation of a Slavic federation (or confederation) of republics, the abolition of serfdom, the elimination of the division of society into estates, and the introduction of universal elementary education. Emphasizing these elements would tend to give a more balanced view of the brotherhood's ideology. Luckyj tends to stress more the religious underpinnings and utopian character of the programmatic documents.

In 1990, just before the appearance of this study, the long-awaited and formerly suppressed collection of documents on and by the Cyrilo-Methodian brethren was published in Kyiv in three volumes as *Kyrylo-Mefodiivske tovarystvo*. A year after *Young Ukraine* was published, Iu. A. Pinchuk's *Mykola Ivanovych Kostomarov* appeared in Kyiv. Anyone attempting to write a study today on the Cyrilo-Methodians would certainly have to utilize these sources, especially the former, which contains previously unpublished documents. For example, one would now have to consider discussing Heorhii (not Yurii) Andruzky's two constitutional projects and Mykola Savych's brief notes on philosophy, religion, and the emancipation of women. Andruzky's constitutional proposals—especially the second, which deals with many practical questions, including economic and social issues—could lead one to revise Luckyj's conclusion about the overbearing utopianism in the brethren's ideology (pp. 50–1). Pinchuk notes that Kostomarov's ancestors on his father's side were descendants of Ukrainian Cossacks, one of whom fought for Khmelnytsky. Thus the version of Kostomarov's father being Russian, which Luckyj repeats, has to be modified.

George Luckyj's study is a good but brief introductory work in English. Now that new documents by and on the brotherhood have been published, however, I hope he will undertake a more thorough and complete study of this first truly Ukrainian political group in modern times.

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István Deák. *Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848–1918*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. xv, 273 pp.

"The Austro-Hungarian Army constituted a uniform, homogeneous body in an Empire composed of a very large number of nations and races. Unlike his English, French, and even German confrère, the Austrian officer was not allowed to wear mufti when off duty, and military regulations prescribed that in his

private life he should always act '*standesgemäss*', that is, in accordance with the special etiquette and code of honour of the Austrian military caste. Among themselves officers of the same rank, even those who were not personally acquainted, never addressed each other in the formal third person plural, '*Sie*', but in the familiar second person singular, '*Du*', and thereby the fraternity of all members of the caste and the gulf separating them from civilians were emphasized. The final criterion of an officer's behaviour was invariably not the moral code of society in general, but the special moral code of his caste, and this frequently led to mental conflicts."

These words of Stefan Zweig, penned over fifty years ago as an "author's note" to the readers of his *Beware of Pity*, distil the essence of what István Deák explores in detail in this excellent monograph. On the basis of wide-ranging secondary literature, a voluminous corpus of published and unpublished memoirs, and a prosopographical analysis of a representative sample of 1,003 officers, Deák reconstructs the history of the Habsburg officer corps in the last seven decades of the monarchy's existence. Three chapters (the first two and last) review the history of the monarchy from the Turkish wars through the Great War with reference to, and from the vantage point of, the military. These are strong chapters well worth reading even by those who think they already know Habsburg history. Sandwiched between the chapters on the empire to 1914 and the chapter on World War I are thematic chapters that discuss the education of officers, regimental life, pay, the caste's "special moral code," the officers' intimate life, pensions and provisions for widows and orphans, the nobility and near-nobility in the corps, and religion, nationality, and other factors that might have affected advancement. A discursive essay on Habsburg officers in the successor states and World War II serves as an epilogue. A bibliographical essay, a list of place names in various languages and a comprehensive index end and enhance the utility of the volume. *Beyond Nationalism* is one of the best written scholarly monographs in the East Central European field, and it will be read with pleasure and interest by the graduate students to whom it should be assigned.

Deák's study of the officers often makes points that have much broader significance for understanding the general history of the monarchy. To take but one example, his monograph confirms the view of a growing consensus of historians of just how critical and formative was the reign of the too often and unfairly maligned Maria Theresa. He shows that it was she who radically reformed the payment of officers, initiating regular and rational salaries; established the first state-supported military academies; "stipulated that the rank and file be treated with dignity" (p. 107); and established the first publicly supported school for women in Austria, specifically for the daughters of impoverished or deceased officers. It was also Maria Theresa who first officially granted officers admission to the annual court ball.

The Habsburg monarchy was notoriously complex, and those who have ventured to study it in its entirety should not be taken to task for the occasional slip that specialists in a particular region or problem can ferret out. From a few such trifling slips one can deduce that Deák is not most at home in Galicia. But then, can one blame him? Strongly sympathetic with the officers he writes about,

Deák may have been unconsciously influenced by their perception of the place, which he describes thus: "Galicia, it was purported, contained the highest number of muddy and dusty roads, flies, and lice, as well as the greatest incidence of venereal disease, drunken peasants and cunning Jews. ... Galicia was a place to get drunk and to stay drunk; to spend the night in shabby cafés, gambling and whoring; to long for civilization; and to make pilgrimages to the railroad station to watch the passing through of the Lemberg-Cracow-Vienna express" (p. 109). On one point, however, the Galician-specialist perspective may add something to Deák's account. He is puzzled why Poles seem to be underrepresented in the Habsburg joint army (p. 179). In 1910 they made up 9.7 percent of the monarchy's total population, but only 7.9 percent of the army (for comparison, the Ukrainians constituted respectively 7.8 and 7.6 percent). At least a partial answer to the riddle of Polish underrepresentation is that Poles here are counted by language, and in 1910 that meant that a significant percentage of the Poles were Galician Jews. Jews, however, *were* underrepresented in the army (4.4 percent of the general population, but only 3.0 percent of the rank and file), a phenomenon that Deák explores in some detail in a sensible and sensitive manner (pp. 171–8).

The Habsburg monarchy was also notoriously contentious, and it is almost impossible to write about it without taking one side or another in the various disputes between nationalities. Deák has done a remarkable job in preserving his overall objectivity, taking extra care to examine critically the Hungarian national views on the Habsburg experience in general and on the joint army in particular. Once in a while a statement can be jarring (e.g.: "the last thing Austria-Hungary needed was more Slavs within its boundaries" [p. 73]), but on the whole Deák has been conscientiously evenhanded.

There is one questionable moment, however, that deserves further comment, since it raises a problem that so far has eluded serious scholarly research. Warning against a tendency to exaggerate the national conflicts and atrocities that accompanied World War I in Austria-Hungary, Deák states that "the brutality and hangings, gleefully attributed by some Austrian military writers to the Hungarian National Guards, were probably no worse than the atrocities committed by the Germans in Belgium or by the Russians on the eastern front" (p. 197). Deák is unable to back this opinion up with either an argument or a source (the note only refers one to an unpublished manuscript which Deák says describes "the alleged brutality of honvéd units vis-à-vis the Ukrainian population"). Yet in the Austrian parliament in 1917, the Ukrainian deputy (and future president of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic) Evhen Petrushevych spoke of "tens of thousands of innocent people murdered," and another deputy, Illia Semaka of Bukovyna, said that "according to information from officers in eastern Galicia, more than 30,000 persons fell victim" to execution. (*Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeorgneten des österreichischen Reichsrates im Jahre 1917. XXII. Session*, vol. 1 [Vienna 1917], pp. 367, 652; see also pp. 613, 905-6, and vol. 2 [Vienna 1918], p. 1709.) The Polish social democrat Ignacy Daszyński mentioned 60,000 victims. It is quite possible that these accusations of mass murder are mistaken or grossly exaggerated, but the matter deserves scrupulous scholarly investigation. Rather than blame Deák for expressing his unsupported opinion, I would charge the

offense to Ukrainian historians, who have not paid anywhere near sufficient attention to researching the events of the Great War on the territory of Ukraine.

Deák has some things to say that will particularly interest, if not surprise, historians of Ukraine. Few Ukrainians became officers. In the elite Theresian Military Academy at Wiener Neustadt, out of a total of 438 students only one, as late as 1912–13, was Ukrainian; for comparison, there were 2 Chinese, 3 Romanian and 277 German students (p. 93). According to the somewhat questionable official statistics for 1897, 1900, and 1910, Ukrainians only made up 0.2 percent of the joint army's officer corps in each of these years; according to Deák's own calculations, based on a sample of 516 lieutenants in active service in 1900, the percentage was only slightly higher: 0.4 percent (pp. 183, 185). The 34 Ukrainian reserve officers in 1910 only accounted for 0.3 percent of all reserve officers.

Deák offers the following explanation of why Ukrainians and certain other nationalities were so poorly represented in the reserve officer corps: "(1) the eagerness of the educated elite among the Ruthenes to 'pass' as Poles in Galicia, and among the Romanians and Serbs to 'pass' as Magyars in Hungary; (2) the great advantage enjoyed by Jews and Czechs—almost all of whom spoke German—over educated Ruthenes, Croats, Serbs, and Romanians, whose second language was likely to be Hungarian, Czech, or Polish; (3) the increasingly dynamic nationalism, by 1910–1911, of the Slavic, Romanian, and Italian social elites, which led them to shun military service or, if that could not be avoided, to shun a reserve officer's commission" (p. 181). These are plausible-sounding arguments, but they point to the need for further study of the mind-set of the Galician Ukrainian elite in the early twentieth century.

In sum, this is a stimulating book that can be studied by the scholar or even perused for pleasure, as a sort of companion to Austrian and East Central European literature. Thought-provoking and informative, well crafted and diligently researched, it furnishes a model well worthy of imitation.

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Daniel Beauvois. *La bataille de la terre en Ukraine, 1863–1914: Les Polonais et les conflits socio-ethniques*. Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille, 1993. 346 pp. 110 F.

After the 1863 uprising, the Russian government renewed its efforts to destroy the Polish gentry as a social group in the three provinces of Right-Bank Ukraine. There were roughly 300,000 Poles living on these territories. By the 1860s only 70,000 were legally registered as nobles, and ninety percent of them owned very little or no land. By 1914 thousands more Polish families had disappeared into the peasantry; roughly 3,000 managed to hold on to almost half of all private estate land, however, and the regional rate of noble land loss was the lowest in the Russian Empire. Beauvois describes what happened to these people and the

interrelationship between commercialization, national identities, political allegiances, and class loyalties in this part of the empire. His book will be useful for students of modern Polish and Ukrainian history, comparative social history, and tsarist nationality policy.

Chapter one reviews Russian policy. Although no more than five percent of the convicted rebels came from the three examined provinces, the government decided to punish the gentry collectively by dispossessing as many of them as possible and settling Russians in their place. From 1865 until 1905 Poles were legally prohibited from buying land. But because of corruption, inefficiency, and legal loopholes, the failure of Russians to settle en masse, and the tendency of Russian nobles who did buy estates in the region not to reside on them, the Poles managed to retain their social and economic predominance. During the 1880s, moreover, the need to deal with Russian terrorists obliged the government to temper its repression of Polish landowners. Chapter two examines the relationship of these policies to the Emancipation of 1861 and the land hunger of the Ukrainian peasantry. Beauvois reminds us that very few of the almost four million peasants, whose numbers had doubled by 1914, had enough land for subsistence, and that they owned the same acreage as the 3,000 richest Polish families. He also stresses that neither the lives of these peasants, too poor to purchase land and forbidden to emigrate to the Far East until 1911, nor their relations with Polish landowners were as idyllic as portrayed in Polish literature and memoirs. Chapter three points out that a small minority of noblemen benefitted from agricultural commercialization to become successful capitalist landowners, and that they abetted the government's implementation of its anti-Polish policies. Seeking maximum profits, these well-born, rich Catholic Poles did not hesitate to use tsarist troops to evict tens of thousands of poor, Catholic Polish noble tenants from their estates in order to make room for Germans or Jews who could pay higher rents.

The author explains that during the 1870s the dissatisfaction of the poor Polish nobles and Ukrainian peasants often expressed itself in violent reclamations of land, and that some feared that a possible alliance between these two groups could be exploited by "Ukrainophile" intellectuals! Such thinking made Russian nationalist claims that moderate scholars and writers in Kyiv were politically dangerous more credible, and it finally did persuade the minister of the interior to impose restrictions on printing in Ukrainian and on Ukrainian culture to forestall the imagined threat. The last chapter looks in detail at the economy of Right-Bank Ukraine, which was based on the export of grain, sugar, and wood to European markets, and notes that at the turn of the century the total monetary value of production in this agrarian region was greater than that of Ukraine's southeastern industrial region. Particularly interesting is Beauvois's examination of each nationality's place in the local division of labour. Rich Poles dominated economic life, and although they usually hired educated Poles as technicians and specialists, they treated these professionals as mere domestics. The arrogant condescension displayed by wealthy, landed Catholic employers towards their hired, landless Catholic compatriots, argues the author, explains why Polish nationalists found few recruits among the latter in Right-Bank Ukraine. Whereas

the educated Polish nobleman who was employed bore insults to his dignity, a shortage of jobs meant that many of his peers remained unemployed. Both groups provided recruits for radical Russian organizations. Because Polish estate owners avoided selling land to Russians and the circle of Polish buyers was tiny after 1905, Poles sold or leased land to Germans and Jews, thereby fanning the fires of resentment among their poorer compatriots. To keep wages as low as possible, estate owners imported Russian seasonal workers and avoided hiring exclusively among the local Ukrainian peasantry. This limited the wage labour available to the latter, while their rivalry with outsiders for jobs heightened their awareness of national differences and identities.

On the basis of Polish and Soviet monographs, unpublished memoirs, the contemporary press, and the archives of the Kyiv General-Governor's Office, Beauvois has written a study that complements the work of Robert Edelman on the same region. Although Beauvois fails to examine the relationship between personalities, court factions, and shifts in policies towards the Poles, he has nevertheless made an important contribution to Western historiography about Poland, Russia, and Ukraine. Regrettably, the book has no bibliography and does not compare the commercialization of agriculture, concentration of ownership, and polarization within the nobility going on in this part of Europe to similar changes occurring on the rest of the continent.

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Romana Bahrii [Bahry]. *Шлях Сера Вальтера Скотта на Україну («Тарас Бульба» М. Гоголя і «Чорна Рада» П. Куліша в світлі історичної романістики Вальтера Скотта).* Translated by Liudmyla Sharinova. Kyiv: Redaktsiia zhurnalu "Vsesvit" 1993. 292 pp.

This translation of Romana Bahry's 1978 doctoral dissertation constitutes its first publication as well as its first guaranteed international audience—a felicitous combination of exposure and acclaim, albeit fifteen years after the fact. Copiously annotated (in keeping with the earnestly overwritten genre that is the dissertation), but with all notes now thankfully relegated to the back, this text is immediately more accessible in translation than in its original form. There is, however, no specific preface to this later edition by the author or little or no evidence of any editing effort to bring past work done up to date with present research (the most recent scholarly reference remains 1977)—which suggests minimal collaboration between author and translator, leaving the latter free to pursue a largely perfunctory linguistic exercise. It also suggests that a contemporary Ukrainian audience need not benefit from more recent critical additions to a largely dated text—a troubling assumption in itself.

Unlike some comparative studies that arbitrarily graft disparate texts and

traditions together, Bahry's work traces an almost organic connection between three writers—a connection in fact voiced by one of them, Panteleimon Kulish, who proclaimed his novel *Chorna rada* to be the more effective heir to the narrative legacy of Sir Walter Scott than Nikolai Gogol's *Taras Bulba*. One could hardly wish for a clearer articulation of a thesis statement, and Bahry marshals an exhaustive array of sources to test Kulish's claim. But in the course of three long and cumbersome "chapters" devoted to each writer in turn, which do no more than report on a perceived "adherence to or divergence from" the same five components of Scott's formula (historical framework, narrative structure, characterization, theme, and genre), the study ultimately suffers from too much description and not enough analysis. Voluminous passages from various fictional works by all three writers appear, often side by side, in an awkward attempt at providing "parallel texts" for uncertain and largely unspoken comparative purposes. Bahry seems content to let these frequent and lengthy excerpts speak for themselves, and to a certain degree their juxtapositions do reveal some similar deployments of voice, atmosphere, or plot device. But they are left as similarities, without further comment or integration into the body of the study as a whole, such that their presence seems less a demonstration of a principle than a distraction from it. A typical paragraph between such marathon quotation sessions begins, "Ще один мотив, не сюжетний, а скоріш описовий" (p. 167), which betrays the underlying problem: in the rush to enumerate each and every happy coincidence of "plot motif" between a Scott text and a Kulish or Gogol text, Bahry lets slip that they are all merely "descriptive" motifs—a decidedly *un*happy catchall that stands to blur all of her findings into a tautology.

Indeed, instead of developing the potential of interesting dissonances, Bahry sticks to an unproblematical acceptance of certain categories, such as "facts," "objectivity," "science," and (perhaps most disturbingly) "progress"—concepts initially associated with Scott and his method, but which swell into a curiously positivist discourse for the rest of the dissertation as a whole. After all, if Bahry accepts Scott's novels as a "form of history" (p. 19), in spite of evidence suggesting he was never a "slave to pedantic accuracy" (p. 21), she must also recognize how the boundaries between history, ethnography, literature, and myth are necessarily fluid and problematic in themselves. A good dose of Hayden White's insights into the interdependence of these disciplines would come in handy here. Instead, she continues to ascribe a pristine "objectivity" to Scott, which Gogol, of course, never emulated (his first concern was with the myth rather than the evidence), and that Kulish, of course, *did* emulate (his first concern was with the evidence, then the embroidery). So if Kulish "adheres" to Scott's example (surprise!), Gogol naturally "diverges" from it because the contest was never an even one in the first place: Gogol never cared to answer Kulish's "challenge" nor to faithfully follow Scott's rules. In a sense, any connection between them at all is purely of Kulish's making and thus fatally one-sided—a forced comparison after all. And Gogol turns out to be such a red herring about following in Scott's footsteps that one wonders what business he has being in this study at all, aside from serving as a foil to the more conscientious Kulish. Scott recedes quickly into the background as the pretext for a showdown between

Gogol and Kulish for artistic and historic supremacy as well as overall nice-guy "authenticity."

Small wonder, then, that textual details (however dutifully compiled) go without closer theoretical attention: the real concern of this study is polemical. Bahry consistently tries to make Kulish look good by making Gogol look bad, so that by the time she draws her "conclusions" in the final pages, one is not surprised to see Kulish trumpeted quite explicitly as the deserving victor. The problem with this enthusiasm is that it resolutely ignores Gogol's undeniable gifts while magnifying his flaws, such as his anti-Semitic caricatures (see pp. 69, 135, and 145), but leaves Kulish's own little gratuitous anti-Semitic remarks conveniently in shadow (see p. 170). What passes for an allowable portion of folksy verisimilitude in Kulish becomes an outrageous offence of excess in Gogol. Bahry approvingly quotes Kulish's opinion that Gogol is deficient in both historical and artistic truth (pp. 114, 147), but neither she nor Kulish want to recognize the artistically greater service Gogol performed for the historical novel just by *breaking* all the rules of the genre and pushing it into the realm of myth. Behind both Bahry's and Kulish's quarrel with Gogol is a struggle for the custodianship of the Cossack myth, which Russian and Ukrainian culture (among others) each regards as its own. Since Gogol wrote the most definitive and influential version of the Cossack myth, and with epic disregard for historical accuracy besides, Kulish sought to rewrite this myth in rational, responsible terms. In a Scottian historical novel one expects that the Cossacks will lend the local colour to more modest protagonists (as in Kulish) instead of running away with the whole narrative (as in Gogol). Not too surprisingly, the disobedient version had the capacity to appeal to more imaginative possibilities than the orthodox one, and the "model" of Scott's own Cossack-like Highlanders have little or nothing to do with any of it. Largely as a result of *Taras Bulba*, which was critically central to Gogol's writing as a whole, either in direct thematic echoes or inversions, Gogol became (and still remains) a property hotly guarded by both Russian and Ukrainian custodians of literature.

Interestingly, Bahry's translator betrays this Ukrainian possessiveness by choosing to translate into Ukrainian her citations of Gogol (which she sensibly quoted in the original Russian in her dissertation), thus departing from Bahry's original text in an attempt to capture Gogol (once again) for a Ukrainian audience. (No attempt was made by the translator to Ukrainianize Kulish's many Russian excerpts, however, presumably because Kulish's Ukrainian identity is assured; but the inconvenience of having to adapt to myriad proofs of Kulish's Russian fluency, unannounced throughout a Ukrainian text, seems either a peculiarly conscious inconsistency or an editing oversight.) But since Bahry's translator already "diverged" from the script, this reader confesses to having hoped that a bit of levity might be introduced in a Ukrainian pun or two (or simple misspelling) of Sir Walter's surname, as in the opportunity (alas, missed) of the discussion of the Scotsman's baneful influence abroad: "молоді письменники стали подумувати, що, зібравши оті жахи [т.є. моторошну поезію шибениць, ешафотів, страт, різанини, п'яної гульні та *диких* пристрастей] ... до однієї книжки, напхавши їх ще щільніше, урізноманітивши ще більше, вони стануть *удвічі чи втричі*

скот(т)ами" (p. 62)! A little "beastly" allusion could not be better placed (or more forgivably mis-) placed.

In the end, Bahry, too, can be forgiven the lapses listed here, for she clearly kept herself within the perimeters she defined for her study at the outset. A contemporary desire to read a stronger theoretical base into the argument may be an anachronism imposed on a text from what was, after all, a less adventurous era of scholarship. Similarly, a spirited defense of Kulish against the encroaching shadow of Gogol may be seen as a necessary recuperation for literary history. If anything, it is history and its many guises of narrative—both official and mythic—that she hopes to redress with the present study.

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Nevrlyi, Mikulash [Nevrlý, Mikuláš]. *Ukrainska radianska poeziia 20-kh rokiv: Mikroportrety v khudozhnikh styliakh i napriamakh.* Translated from the Slovak by Olha and Hryhorii Bulakhiv. Kyiv: Vyshcha shkola, 1991. 271 pp.

This volume sets out to rehabilitate Soviet Ukrainian literature of the 1920s and the Czech scholar who studied this period but whose work was little known in Ukraine. In this sense it is a testament to a man and a period. In the introduction ("A Czech with a Ukrainian Heart") Mykola Zhulynsky provides a sketch of Nevrlý's writings and person. This is a genuinely warm assessment of the author, which also voices a few critical reservations about the book. Zhulynsky states that Nevrlý's work was written more than twenty years ago (p. 9), but there are clear signs that it was updated just before publication.

The subtitle of the book ("Micro-portraits [realized] through artistic styles and movements") is a fairly accurate description of its contents, which are broadly chronological but organized around the concept of styles and movements [*napriamy*]. The book has seven primary sections, an introduction and a conclusion. The heart of the book consists of chapters on impressionism, symbolism and expressionism, futurism, constructive dynamism, the "school of Kyiv Neoclassicists," neoromanticism, and the proletarian poets. For those who know the literature and scholarship of the 1920s, the book will not be a huge revelation. For those who do not, Nevrlý provides a very readable, sometimes folksy ("zminyty styl tse ne ie te same, shcho pereminyty sorochku") overview.

Although the book's focus is on "styles," there is plenty of biographical and historical material here as well. Nevrlý offers close readings of some poems and a discussion of their formal attributes. He touches on subjects, works, and personalities that in the late 1980s and even 1991 were still controversial and relatively unstudied in Ukraine (e.g., Mykola Khvylovy, futurism, the Borotbisty, Stalinism). In those instances where he notes the shortcomings and obfuscations of Soviet Ukrainian scholarship, his tone and approach are reminiscent of the

glasnost period.

While Nevrlý's narrative is refreshingly revisionist (in the Soviet context), he does occasionally betray some old-fashioned prejudices. He speaks of the "negative characteristics" of symbolism (i.e., "decadence in content and mood, isolation from life, aestheticism, a tendency toward 'pure art'", p. 91). He condemns futurism for its "formalist tricks" (*formalne shtukarstvo*, pp. 27, 57), makes several dubious statements about the movement (e.g., "The New Generation was an attempt to unite Ukrainian and Russian futurism," p. 103), and naively phrases some complex issues (e.g., futurism's purported contempt for Ukrainian patriotism, Mykhail Semenko's attack on Shevchenko [p. 95]). In the conclusion, Nevrlý offers a generally positive assessment of both futurism and symbolism, and it is possible that the stereotypical attacks in his text may simply have been remnants of the old orthodoxy that slipped past the editors and author. The book also contains minor editorial problems, mainly in the form of repetitions. Some of Nevrlý's remarks on Mykola Bazhan, for example, appear almost verbatim in two different parts (cf. pp. 164, 186, and 191).

Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the book is its central focus—"styles and movements." Because most studies of the 1920s have emphasized literary politics and history, there is certainly reason to welcome a book that sets out to describe the artistic phenomena from a stylistic perspective. Unfortunately Nevrlý's book does not really live up to the task. In using the various terms enumerated above, Nevrlý sets up equivalencies among them that do not really exist. Impressionism and expressionism, for example, were not "movements" in Ukrainian literature in the same sense that futurism was. The Ukrainian futurists were an organized, self-professed group of closely knit writers who espoused a coherent aesthetic ideology and had their own publications. None of this holds true for Ukrainian impressionism, expressionism, or neoromanticism, which, at best, were terms of literary criticism that had a short-lived popularity in Ukrainian literature or else the private stylistic preferences of some authors. There should be some way of identifying the difference between writers who betrayed symbolist traits and those who consciously fashioned an artistic ideology and style; a distinction should be made between impressionistic features in literature and impressionism as a movement. Yet Nevrlý tends to speak of all these "isms" as if they had the same kind of presence in the Ukrainian literary process.

Another problem is that Nevrlý treats styles and movements as if they were realities separate from the literary works themselves. Styles and movements, it appears, come into existence (usually in foreign lands) as sets of universal characteristics. They usually arrive "late" in Ukrainian literature, where they begin to mature. Styles evolve from one another, but some styles generate others: "From symbolism came almost all other movements" (pp. 231–2). Earlier Nevrlý writes: "[M]ature symbolists, futurists, neoromantics and neoclassicists, etc. grew up from the Ukrainian pre-symbolists" (p. 67). He uses terms and concepts such as "stylistically vague" and "strengthening of symbolism" (p. 82) to suggest that writers work toward some optimal manifestation of an ideal style. But clearly it is not styles that achieve perfection, but authors in their works. Nevertheless, for Nevrlý the life and work of artists is a movement through a universe of styles:

"Expressionism found its strongest manifestation in Ukrainian poetry in the work of Todos Osmachka, who began as a symbolist" (p. 88). Elsewhere he writes that "neoromanticism became a kind of lifeboat for all those who experienced defeat in other movements and schools" (p. 162). He goes on to say that the "former symbolists" "'worked'" most in neoromanticism. He also considers as neoromantics the so-called "'red' impressionists" (p. 162).

Nevrlý's work contains a proliferation of "isms." Besides "'red' impressionists," Ukrainian literature had "'red' symbolists." Elsewhere he writes: "In the poetics of Ukrainian neoromanticism there was an organic fusion of ... native folklore with the bold quest of West European modern poetry. A brilliant example of this [can be found] in the impressionistic poems of V[asyl] Chumak, in the neobaroque poems of the young M. Bazhan, and in the wilful [*volovykh*] poems of O[leksa] Vlyzko." In a brief aside about Bohdan Ihor Antonych, Nevrlý calls him a "late imagist" and the "first Ukrainian surrealist" (p. 67).

Any historian will want to account for the diversity of literary styles and movements during the 1920s. But the solution is not to raise every artistic mannerism to the category of a historical style or movement. The danger of this approach is that the true originality and complexity of poets and works will melt away under the sweeping generalizations of an ism. Nevrlý has clearly made a bold attempt to undo the stultifying effects of socialist-realist criticism. He has not succeeded altogether, but his book should be read.

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V. M. Danylenko, H. V. Kasianov, and S. V. Kulchytsky. *Stalinizm na Ukraini: 20–30-ti roky*. Kyiv and Edmonton: Lybid and Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1991. 342 pp. $19.95.

This work is a significant example of Soviet Ukrainian historiography in the late *glasnost* period of Gorbachev's disintegrating empire, but it also represents a substantial measure of independent thought and stands on its own merits.

It is largely devoid of Marxism-Leninism, and the authors succeeded in overcoming the strictures imposed by Gorbachev. Their concessions to Soviet historiography include repeated references to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict of 1917–20 as a "civil war," and the authors express deference and even reverence toward Lenin while conceding that he was not without error.

This is not a chronologically integrated account of Stalinism in Ukraine. The authors approach the historical record in terms of three quasi-Marxist spheres or categories: economic, ideology (its impact on "social consciousness"), and culture. Nearly half of the volume deals with Stalin's economic policies, especially their origins and impact. This portion of the volume reflects a vestigial Soviet scholasticism in its rather involved account of the evolution of Lenin's War

Communism into the NEP; at times preoccupation with general Soviet developments overshadows the Ukrainian subject matter.

Stalin's economic policies are viewed as a reversion to War Communism, especially in agriculture, based on the lack of an "equivalent exchange" between town and country with the liquidation of any market relationship, because the peasantry could not refuse to sell to the state if dissatisfied with state-imposed prices. Allocation was substituted for trade, and the government was expropriating grain rather than buying it.

Stalinism is defined as a "deformed socio-political phenomenon" and as the "Soviet form of totalitarianism" (pp. 6 and 56). In discussing the ideological manifestations of Stalinism, the authors are critical of the Soviet "class approach" and its preoccupation with coercion that caused the ideological struggle to degenerate into political terror. The "total uniformity" of Stalin's ideology was used to justify "great-power coercive methods" (p. 204). In totally reversing Lenin's tolerance toward the nationalism of oppressed nationalities and Lenin's condemnation of Russian great-power chauvinism, Stalin laid the groundwork for the psychological and moral deformation that characterized his system of rule.

In the sixteen pages devoted to nationalism in the ideological context, "national deviation" and "bourgeois nationalism" are viewed as a bugbear (*zhupel*) used by Stalinists to bait and bully political opponents. The use of some to destroy others—as when Volodymyr Zatonsky and Andrii Khvylia were used to attack Mykola Skrypnyk (who had earlier attacked Oleksander Shumsky and Mykhailo Volobuiev), with all perishing in the end—is termed the "domino principle" (p. 202).

Culture is characterized as "the last 'oasis' of republic independence" that came under attack in the conditions of "economic and political super-centralization" (p. 217). Cultural standards were based on the Stalinist "cult of personality," which, the authors contend, was made possible by party dictatorship and the dominance of a single ideology that banned all independent views and critical thought. "Ideological commitment" replaced professionalism and promoted the "virus of accommodation and careerism." In the atmosphere of "mass psychosis and blind faith" Stalinism became a substitute for religion (pp. 270 and 278). Significantly, while all religious denominations experienced repression, only the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church suffered a total ban.

Stalinism is said to have "collectivized" culture and to have promoted an officialdom of low quality in terms of its education, arbitrariness, arrogance, moral qualities, and general competence (p. 247). If the low level of competence took hold originally under Stalin, so did the corruption of officials as the Communist party sought to conceal cases of bribery, theft, and embezzlement, dealing with them behind closed doors and not really punishing offenders—a practice that led to widespread moral decay.

The section entitled "The Life and Death of Ukrainization" (pp. 250–69) outlines the principal forces in the effort to make Soviet rule more "Ukrainian." The authors conclude that neither Stalin nor Lazar Kaganovich was committed to Ukrainization and that it served as a pretext for waging a campaign against "national deviation" and the rapidly growing Ukrainian intelligentsia, which was

an impediment to totalitarianism. The authors demonstrate that Ukrainization was beneficial to other nationalities in Ukraine and had many positive consequences.

The authors emphasize the deintellectualization and dehumanization of culture under Stalinism. They present extended lists of writers, historians, scientists, and artists—apart from numerous teachers and professional persons—who were victims of vain and ignorant officials who sought to dictate aesthetics and "truth" and to root out "wrecking" (*shkidnytstvo*). An incomplete study documents the repression of nearly 500 Ukrainian literary figures, of whom nearly 150 perished (p. 280)—a loss probably unparalleled in the literary history of any nation. It is apparent that just as Stalin sought to destroy the independent Ukrainian agriculturalists by means of the man-made famine, his campaign of terror in the 1930s was also designed to decimate the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

The work describes the ravages of Stalinism, although the brevity with which it treats certain crimes and events prompts the reader to seek more information. While the cumulative impact is compelling, certain salient questions remain unanswered or only partly answered. The authors were unable to address directly the taboo question of what in the Russian scale of values bred and nurtured Stalinism and why so many Russians found it acceptable. They approach the problem obliquely by citing the monarchical tradition in Russia (pp. 219 and 270) and the "powerful bureaucratic traditions" in Russia (p. 220). They also allude to Russia as "a country in which there existed a tradition of religious schism [and] in which the official ideology gradually acquired certain traits of religious consciousness" (p. 229).

The authors do not confront the question of Stalin's apparent Ukrainophobia—something testified to by Nikita Khrushchev in his assertion that Stalin would have deported all Ukrainians had that been physically possible. They neglect the fact that Stalin would not entrust the party leadership in Ukraine to any ethnic Ukrainian and relied, instead, on such figures as Kaganovich, Pavel Postyshev, Stanislav Kosior, and Khrushchev. If Stalin's psychopathic personality is not examined by the authors, they can hardly be expected to define the personalities of other figures. Thus we learn nothing about Dmytro Maniulsky (said to have been described by Stalin as a "sham Ukrainian"), who was the type of Ukrainian Stalin preferred and whose life he spared. The reader will look in vain for personality profiles of Skrypnyk, Zatonsky, Shumsky, Emmanuil Kviring, and others.

Other lacunae include the dramatic events surrounding the selection and imposition of Khrushchev as party leader of Ukraine. Indeed, Khrushchev is hardly mentioned, and his role as prototypical Russifier of Ukrainians is only hinted at. The massacres and mass graves at Vinnytsia and Bykivnia are not even mentioned. All too frequently great power chauvinism is not identified as Russian, but is, instead, made ethnically anonymous. The authors fail to explain why the Ukrainian language was subjected to greater discrimination by Stalin's successors. Certain sources are omitted, for example the monographs of Robert Sullivant and James Mace (although Robert Conquest and Arthur Koestler are cited). Less understandable are the omission of Titus Hewryk's *Lost Architecture of Kiev* (1983) and Hryhory Kostiuk's *Stalinist Rule in Ukraine* (1960)—a historical

work of special importance because of Kostiuk's role as observer and victim of Stalin's terror.

Yet, this work is unique because the authors have utilized evidence from Communist Party of Ukraine archives. Included are secret decisions and directives, memoranda, and excerpts from unpublished speeches. Examples include Khristian Rakovsky's statement of resignation, a Politburo report on corruption (p. 247), and statements by Kaganovich on Ukrainization. It is revealed that Shumsky met with Stalin in October 1925 and April 1926 and requested that Kaganovich be removed as party chief and replaced by Vlas Chubar (p. 260). Among other revelations is Matvii Yavorsky's defiance, which led to his execution (p. 216).

Despite certain shortcomings, this is a significant work that is more than a painful chronicle of horrific crimes perpetrated against the Ukrainian people. It is a calm and detailed indictment of Stalinism and its administrative command system, whose effects persisted for decades following the dictator's death. This work reflects the very real grievances of Ukrainians resulting from the long-range consequence of the pathology of Stalinism. It explains the origins and extent of the massive deformation of values, morals, psychic traits, and institutions that the Soviet political order inflicted upon Ukraine.

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Roman Solchanyk, editor. *Ukraine: From Chernobyl' to Sovereignty: A Collection of Interviews*. Foreword by Norman Stone. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, University of Alberta, 1992. xxvi, 174 pp. $19.95.

This book provides a valuable collection of fifteen interviews with prominent intellectuals and political figures undertaken during 1989 and 1990 by Roman Solchanyk, David Marples, and Chrystia Freeland. It contains useful insights and personal perspectives on important topics such as democratization and the development of Rukh, the divisions within the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), national identity, ethnic relations, and the goal and methods of obtaining political independence. Most of these issues, in one form or another, will continue to be relevant for Ukraine during the 1990s and beyond.

Poet and Rukh activist Pavlo Movchan describes how the CPU sought to coopt Rukh and its intelligentsia via provision of a cultural microprogram so as to detract Rukh from pressing for broader political, economic, and social changes. Another tactic was an official and organized campaign of condemnation that generated a backlash of intensified interest in Rukh. Movchan notes that the Baltic popular fronts served as an example for Ukraine and that he struggled to ensure that Rukh be a popular movement rather than merely a party movement.

Rukh leader and poet Ivan Drach underscores the need and benefits of cooperation with people like Leonid Kravchuk, who helped to have published 100,000 additional copies of the *Literaturna Ukraina* issue containing Rukh's program. Drach emphasizes that ecological, economic, and social welfare issues rather than cultural/ethnic matters needed top priority in eastern Ukraine. He describes Gorbachev as a leader with a positive outlook and feeling toward Ukraine.

Literary critic Anatolii Pohribny observes that the CPU was differentiated and could be seen by 1990 as comprised of two or more "parties." He notes the popular apathy and indifference on the eve of Ukraine's parliamentary elections of 1990 and that the average person was preoccupied with material concerns rather than civic consciousness. Problems with the law establishing Ukrainian as the state language include the lack of sufficient funding to promote implementation and lack of penalties for violations. He cautions, however, that efforts to accelerate Ukrainization could prove counterproductive.

Poet and politician Dmytro Pavlychko explains that some people joined the CPU to maximize "opportunities to work for the preservation of the Ukrainian language and the Ukrainian culture" (p. 118). But his appraisal of Stanislav Hurenko as a Gorbachev-type leader seems unpersuasive. Pavlychko argues that political independence should be pursued in a gradual and peaceful manner to avoid bloodshed. He observes, moreover, that given the large numbers of Russified Ukrainians, "we are not yet mature enough as a people for complete independence" (p. 121). The Soviet language-choice law was anti-national, according to Pavlychko, as no one asks parents in Moscow what language their children will be taught in.

Stanislav Hurenko, head of the CPU, criticizes the anti-Communist stance of Rukh and other new political parties. He argues that the CPU was now completely independent of the CPSU in the areas of organization, finances, and cadres. But he undercuts his own claim when he emphasizes that the CPU "will not have any fundamental differences with the Statute and Program of the CPSU" (p. 153) and depicts Volodymyr Ivashko's defection to Moscow as a matter of duty for a CPSU member. Hurenko's defense of Shcherbytsky's record in Ukraine is unconvincing.

Aleksander Tsipko, a Soviet scholar of mixed ethnic background, argues against the falling apart of the USSR. He considers it as resorting to a mechanical solution to a delicate ethnic problem, and he fears violent ethnic conflict. Because of the ethnic make-up and consciousness of the Crimea, Donbas, and Odessa, Tsipko concludes that there could be no "complete detachment of Ukraine within its present borders" (p. 131). Therefore he "saw no real historical possibility whatsoever for the creation of a Ukrainian state in Europe at this juncture" (p. 135).

American historian Roman Szporluk and Russian historian Valerii Tishkov debate modern Russian nationalism in terms of the search for Russian national identity and the choice Russia has between exercising a special role or seeing itself as a normal country. Szporluk observes that Russia's imperial tradition and its desire for a special role could impede normalization and democratization. He

also notes that Ukrainian nationhood is being defined not in ethnic terms, as it was during the early part of the twentieth century, but more pluralistically in state terms.

Poet and politician Rostyslav Bratun observes that despite distinct characteristics, western and eastern Ukrainians belong to one nation and there exists mutual diffusion between the areas. He notes that Ukraine's adversaries seek to play off Ukraine's geographic divisions and thus weaken Ukraine.

Oleksandr Burakovsky, a Rukh member and Jewish activist, writes that "the situation today is that Ukraine is now virtually the only place in the Soviet Union where Jews can live peacefully" (p. 161). He credits Rukh for its vocal support and defense of Jews. Burakovsky criticizes Soviet authorities who, on the grounds of lack of demand, were not inclined to promote Jewish cultural revival. Official policies had often shown little respect for the Jewish and other non-Russian cultures.

Adam Michnik, Polish Solidarity leader, notes various differences between Solidarity and Ukraine's opposition movement. He emphasizes the need for mutual understanding between Poles and Ukrainians to overcome historical stereotypes and ethnic tensions.

Writer Iurii Pokalchuk notes that Ukrainian literature needs to draw on Ukraine's national experience and more universal themes to be relevant. His Ukrainian hero is an non-ideological patriot. Vitalii Karpenko, editor of *Vechirnii Kyiv*, highlights the important role of the liberal media in exposing official corruption and Communist party privileges.

Historian Stanislav Kulchytsky discusses the Ukrainian famine of 1932–3 as an important blank spot in the history of the Soviet era. The various commemorations and studies of the famine in the West put increased pressure on Soviet authorities to address the issue. Ukrainian scholars, however, need fuller access to archives to explore that historical tragedy in more depth.

Iurii Risovanny discusses various problems stemming from the Chornobyl accident. He notes that even if the Chornobyl power plant was shut down, it would still take ten to fifteen years to decommission the reactor. The loss of energy, rather than the loss of jobs, was the key cost of closing the Chornobyl plant. Risovanny tells of protective measures his children took after the Chornobyl accident. Still, his children registered higher gamma ray readings in the thyroid glands when local Dnipropetrovsk authorities checked them.

This book has two shortcomings: its chronologically-based organization of the interviews and the lack of a concluding essay. A thematic organization of the interviews would have provided more intellectual cohesion. Indeed, this reviewer felt it necessary to adopt a more thematic presentation of the selections. While Solchanyk's introduction does provide useful historical and topical background to the subsequent interviews, particularly for the non-Ukrainian area specialists, a concluding essay drawing on the individual selections and themes would have strengthened the impact of this book.

Despite its shortcomings, *Ukraine: From Chernobyl' to Sovereignty* is a solid book that provides diverse perspectives on Ukrainian politics, nationalism, ethnic relations, and select problems. The quality of the interviews owes much to the

quality of the questions raised by Solchanyk, Marples, and Freeland and to the responses given by the cultural and political figures interviewed. This book is highly recommended for scholars, students, and others interested in understanding the challenges facing Ukraine and its people.

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Frances Swyripa. *Wedded to the Cause: Ukrainian-Canadian Women and Ethnic Identity, 1891–1991.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993. xiv, 330 pp. $19.95 paper, $50.00 cloth.

The study of women provides an excellent opportunity for analyzing the historical development of the Ukrainian people in Ukraine and in the various areas they settled. In this well-written revised dissertation, Frances Swyripa, demonstrates the advantages of the approach. Although the focus of her study is clearly the Canadian experience of Ukrainian women, much of that experience was fashioned by the situation in which Ukrainians found themselves in their homeland. It is a measure of the competence of the author that the transition from one continent to the other is meaningful and smooth. Yet, the major strength of the work lies in an even more sophisticated transition, from the study of the formation of the myth of the ideal Ukrainian-Canadian woman to the impact that continually changing myth had upon the community of Ukrainians in Canada. As such, this work is useful for history, women's, and ethnic-studies courses. It can also be useful for group discussions in local libraries.

The book is a seamless weave of a number of threads: the story of the Ukrainian settlers in Canada that includes the women; their image within the Canadian framework; the manner in which the Ukrainian intelligentsia viewed the women; the imperceptible way in which the Ukrainian intelligentsia became the Ukrainian-Canadian intelligentsia; the formation of the myth of the ideal patriotic woman; the manner in which that myth evolved; and an analysis of the role of myth in general in the historical development of a population. The study of women perforce shifts into the study of community organizations and the shades of class structure within the Ukrainian subgroups in the home country and in Canada. It thus provides a deeper look into the history of Ukrainian communities than had been possible earlier. I only hope that the younger generation of scholars, who, in contrast to so many of their elders, see women not as a marginalized and unimportant segment of society, but as an opportunity for further study, build upon this work.

Swyripa shifts the borders of historical study of the Ukrainian immigrant community in Canada from the margins to the centre of Canadian and Ukrainian history. Her study includes the story of Ukrainian women in Canada as part of the Canadian and Ukrainian experience, and she is not afraid to look beyond the surface of the embroidery to describe the pricked fingers that produced it.

Focusing upon the expectations heaped upon Ukrainian women especially after the loss of hope for an independent Ukraine, Swyripa contributes significantly to the study of modern Ukrainian nationalist ideology, especially in its émigré variant.

As difficult as it is, Swyripa attempts to define her terms: "ethnic" refers to the non-British, non-French, and non-aboriginal population of Canada; "community," to the organized Ukrainian-Canadian population; and "group," "to all Canadians of Ukrainian origin ... in whose name [the community] presumes to speak." It is the "voice" of the organized community, in newspapers, commentaries, speeches, songs, artifacts and photographs, that provides much of the structure of the book and some its best insights. To a large degree this is a work about the Ukrainian-Canadian intelligentsia as much as it is a book about women.

Well-written, at times even witty, *Wedded to the Cause* takes the reader from the traumatic journey that originated in the Ukrainian village to the rocky soil of the Canadian prairies, from the peasant women in sheepskin coats to their granddaughters who put on the "national costume" for solemn and representational occasions only. Swyripa's story of the first generation of Canadian-born Ukrainian ethnics is especially interesting, as is her description of Canadian Protestant proselytization among the Ukrainian women. By being all-inclusive in her story, Swyripa is able to chart the similarities in the expectations for women in both the "progressive" and "nationalist" blocs. For both the woman, as mother and keeper of the faith, played an important social role that saw the mother as the key to the organized life of the society. The justification and some of the external symbols may have been different, but both the pro-Communist and nationalist camps imposed upon women a largely male-articulated vision of the female in their society.

Attempts at the creation of an independent women's organization succeeded as long as the women did not assert their independence too openly. When that happened, especially in the political sphere, the result was the same as in the homeland—the independent women were accused of anti-group sentiment and selfishness, and counter-organizations of other women were developed. The nationalist women, however, had to go beyond the group in their attempts to make the Ukrainian cause better known. Because they had the international ties the Ukrainian men's organizations lacked, it was precisely in going outside of the group that they best served the community.

Contact with the outside world, combined with professional and educational opportunities, brought women to the dilemma of choosing between ethnicity and personhood. This was particularly evident for ethnic Canadian women in the 1970s, who were able to unearth the independent feminist strain within the Ukrainian community and to establish, if not an organization, a meaningful discussion of women's relationship to the community. But they did not capture the attention of the whole Ukrainian-Canadian community, which continued to define women according to the time-honoured principles of woman within the confines of the family. Mainstream Ukrainian-Canadian women continued to play the affiliate, supporting role they considered to be the traditional function of the good woman.

As Ukrainian Canadians prepared to celebrate the centenary of their settlement in Canada, the women, who had marked the UN decade of women as well as the centenary of the first secular Ukrainian women's organization, participated in the articulation of the new image of the active family female head—the *baba*—that tamed the Canadian prairie and preserved the Ukrainian heritage. This is an openly mythical symbol well removed from the present to be non-threatening to both males and females, Ukrainian-Canadian or simply Canadian. The Ukrainian Easter egg plays the same role—"apolitical and inoffensive," to quote Swyripa. Although the organized Ukrainian women in Canada did not, by their own admission, participate actively in the articulation of the policy of the whole society, their handicrafts and their fund-raising ensured for them a place in accepted Canadian society as well as in Ukrainian self-perception.

In summing up her work, Swyripa recapitulates:

> At issue in the case of Ukrainians in Canada was the effect of statelessness and national oppression in the homeland, coupled with low status and a negative stereotype in he new country, on perceptions of women and thus the place assigned to them in he collective experience and consciousness.... Being 'Ukrainian' meant commitment to the cause of an independent and united Ukrainian state and to linguistic and cultural survival in Canada. But it also meant being accepted in the Canadian community. Ukrainian women in Canada by their individual and group achievements contributed to the higher status of Ukrainians in that country and to the gradual whiting out of the negative stereotypes of the people in sheepskins. What the Ukrainian community failed to address was the contradiction between encouraging women to pursue their career goals while at the same time expecting them to continue living up to the icon of the maternal domestic hearth keeper that the intelligentsia devised for her.

Swyripa has written a thought-provoking and useful work. By bringing the story up to the present, she confronts the Ukrainian diaspora community with its image of women, and—even more significantly—with the existence of women in its midst. Will this community look at the mirror held in front of it, or will it, as in the past, hide behind reverse glass painting and take its stylized representation for the real thing? Be as it may, Swyripa's work is not, and should not be, limited to Ukrainians. It marks a significant contribution to immigration, women's, and community history. It is another welcome proof that it is in English that the best works on Ukrainian history are produced, and that the best of them are not exclusively circumscribed by their topic. I know this book will have readers outside the Ukrainian community. I just hope that the community whose heritage forms the focus of the work will also read it.

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Zonia Keywan. *A Turbulent Life: Biography of Josaphat Jean, O.S.B.M (1885–1972).* Verdun, Quebec: Clio Editions, 1990. 156 pp., 16 plates, appendices. $12.95.

The stories about Francophone priests who served Ukrainian immigrants to Canada are not only fascinating historical narratives; they also offer a unique perspective on the national psychology of the immigrant community and of those who were drawn to it across ethnic boundaries. The present book, by Montreal writer Zonia Keywan, recounts the life and work of one of the most remarkable of these individuals.

In the introductory chapters, Keywan lays out the context in which, just after the turn of the century, a young French Canadian priest from the village of St. Fabien, Quebec felt and responded to a call to serve the "Ruthenian" immigrants to Canada. Joseph Jean, whose life would be transformed forever after he travelled to Galicia and transferred to the Eastern rite, was but one exceptional participant in a veritable movement that was taking place within the French Canadian Catholic church at the beginning of this century. We learn, for example, that the seed of Jean's special vocation was planted during a rousing sermon delivered in 1901 by Bishop Emile Légal of St. Albert at the Minor Seminary in Rimouski, and that it was brought to fruition with the reading in November 1908 of Achille Delaere's brochure *Mémoire sur les tentatives de schisme et d'hérésie au milieu des Ruthènes de l'ouest canadien.* No less importantly, Fr. Jean had the benefit of ongoing, full-fledged encouragement from Roman Catholic bishops such as Légal and Adélard Langevin and the compelling example of trailblazing missionaries such as Delaere, Joseph-Adonias Sabourin and Désiré Claveloux. All of this made it possible for Jean to take the steps that would lead to a first meeting with Archbishop Andrei Sheptytsky at the Montreal Eucharistic Congress (1910) and, shortly thereafter, a voyage with two other French Canadian priests to Austrian-ruled Galicia.

The description of Fr. Jean's two-year sojourn in Galicia provides interesting information on the commitment of the Basilian order to preparing non-Ukrainian priests for pastoral ministry among the emigrants to Canada. Upon arriving in Galicia, the Canadian priests were received at the monasteries in Krekhiv and Lavriv. The Basilians taught them the Ukrainian language and introduced them to Old Church Slavonic, liturgical chant, and the Byzantine liturgy. A process of cultural adaptation also took place, and the missionary trainees became sensitive to the prevailing Polish-Ukrainian tensions as well as to the hotly contested issues of liturgical ritual. No doubt influenced by his "westernizing" Basilian hosts, Fr. Jean, who would later characterize himself as combative, once took the liberty of criticizing Metropolitan Sheptytsky for allegedly allowing Russophiles to enrol in the Lviv Greek Catholic Theological Seminary. Archbishop Langevin intervened from Canada, warning Jean to know his place: "Be on your guard. The Basilians themselves must speak out ... but you are foreigners and you must keep silent" (p. 36). Although there certainly was wisdom in the cautionary advice (Ukrainian Canadian opposition to non-Ukrainian priests was well-known), the bishop could hardly have imagined that Jean's own sense of ethnic identity was shifting. While

he would, of course, always remain a French Canadian, Jean's integration into Ukrainian life was so far-reaching that, in letters to his parents, he began employing the very telling expression, "We, Ukrainians." And in 1911 Joseph changed from the Latin to the Eastern rite.

In 1912 Joseph returned to Canada to help other Francophone priests establish a minor seminary in Sifton, Manitoba. At this time Francophone priests constituted the majority of Ukrainian-rite priests in Canada, a state of affairs that the Ukrainian community opposed so vehemently that the priests felt alienated. Not even the new bishop from Ukraine, Nykyta Budka, could overcome that opposition and alienation. The Sifton school faltered, and by 1913, one after another, the disillusioned Francophone clerics began returning to the Latin rite. But Joseph stayed on, thanks perhaps to a better appreciation of Budka's predicament—that having permitted Belgian Redemptorists to found a novitiate for Ukrainians in Canada, he was hardly in a position to accept yet another non-Ukrainian society without placing the Redemptorist project at risk (p. 50). In October 1913, still determined to find his niche within the Ukrainian church, Jean set sail a second time for Galicia.

In Galicia he joined the Basilian order. In the course of his novitiate at Krekhiv, Joseph became the Basilian monk Josaphat. With the outbreak of the Great War, Josaphat was assigned a variety of rapidly mounting responsibilities: taking charge of the monastery at Lavriv after the Ukrainian Basilians had fled from the Russian advance; serving as assistant pastor in Zhovkva; and running a Basilian boarding school for boys at Buchach. It was in Buchach (1918–19) that Josaphat would meet Archduke Wilhelm von Habsburg and Russian Orthodox hierarchs who had been arrested by the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR), among them Antonii Khrapovitsky and Evlogii Georgievsky.

When the ZUNR government moved to the Basilian monastery in Buchach in May, 1919, Josaphat was recruited as a translator and interpreter. He would continue to serve in that capacity until 1923, translating most of the ZUNR's communications with its delegation in Paris. Josaphat was also a military chaplain in the Ukrainian Galician Army during its withdrawal to Kamianets-Podilskyi. In August 1919 he accompanied Foreign Affairs Ministers Andrii Livytsky of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) and Stepan Vytvytsky of the ZUNR on their diplomatic mission to Warsaw. There he developed a good rapport with Nuncio Achille Ratti and appealed to Marshal Józef Piłsudski to release Ukrainian priests and monks held by the Poles as prisoners of war. After the UNR's treaty with the Poles, Josaphat stayed on in Warsaw at the request of Metropolitan Sheptytsky to monitor and report on developments. He met the apostolic delegate Giovanni Genocchi, who was passing through Warsaw on his way to Ukraine. In August 1920 the UNR diplomatic mission was evacuated to Tarnów, Poland, and Josaphat was assigned further translation work for the ZUNR Government-in-exile in Vienna.

Josaphat accompanied ZUNR delegates Kost Levytsky, Osyp Nazaruk, and an Vytvytsky to the Polish-Soviet peace negotiations at Riga, to the Assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva, and to London in efforts to win international support for the cause of Galicia. In 1922 Josaphat was in Paris, where he was

entrusted with the task of making representations before Marshal Ferdinand Foch and the office of Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré. After the decision of the Council of Ambassadors in Paris (14 March 1923) left ZUNR President Evhen Petrushevych distraught to the point of becoming suicidal, Josaphat may have saved his life when he called Metropolitan Sheptytsky, who was also in Paris at the time, to console the president. As the ZUNR prepared to dissolve itself, its foreign- affairs minister, Kost Levytsky, wrote to thank Jean for his "dedicated work for the liberation of our motherland" (p. 87).

In the summer of 1923 Josaphat was sent to Kamenica in Bosnia with the task of renewing the religious life of the Studite monastery there. He became the pastor of Kamenica and its vicinity and set up a school in the area. He was, however, obstructed in his efforts by Orthodox and state opponents, and consequently left in March 1925 for Canada, where he would try to set up a Studite monastery to serve recent immigrants. Jean chose Abitibi in northwestern Quebec as the location for the monastery, but beyond the three Studite monks who were sent from Galicia, the project failed to draw many people because the land was infertile and there were neither schools nor medical services there. Josaphat returned to the Basilian order; after a second novitiate and second temporal vows (in Mundare, Alberta in 1932), he was assigned to pastoral duties in Montreal and Ottawa.

The Soviet entry into the World War II on the side of the Allies in 1941 placed Josaphat at odds with the prevailing political opinion in Canada. Throughout the war he had kept his silence, but the concessions to Stalin at Teheran and Yalta were the last straw. Josaphat's scathing critique of the "sell-out to Stalin" caused a stir in Canada and cost him his parish posting in Ottawa.

With the end of the war, as the fate of many of the estimated two million Ukrainian refugees in Western Europe hung in the balance (between repatriation in the USSR vs. resettlement elsewhere), Jean was again summoned for assistance. The Ukrainian Canadian bishops Vasyl Ladyka and Nil Savaryn sent Josaphat to Europe as a delegate of the Ukrainian Catholic Committee to Aid Ukrainian Refugees. While directing special attention to the situation of refugee priests and believers, Josaphat was instrumental, among other things, in arranging for the transportation of Basilian monks and sisters as emigrants to the United States, Brazil, and Argentina. Josaphat then served as a parish priest in London (1947–8) before returning to Canada, where he would spend the remainder of his life.

The transfer from London was not without its controversial side. In ritual matters, Josaphat toed the Basilian line: he opposed as "Muscophile" and "schismatic" the three-barred cross, the iconostasis, the Julian calendar, married clergy, and the liturgical use of the word "*pravoslavni*" (orthodox) in reference to Ukrainian Catholics (p. 130). Along with his strongly held convictions on that subject, Josaphat was capable of literary colour when he excoriated Cardinal Eugène Tisserant (prefect of the Congregation for the Eastern Churches) and the Jesuit order for their role in publishing an easternizing missal for use by Ukrainian Catholics and, in doing so, allegedly ignoring matters that "cry to heaven for vengeance." In a personal meeting with Tisserant in Rome, Josaphat accused the cardinal of being nothing less than an accessory to the 1946 pseudo-

synod of Lviv: in Josaphat's expression, that repudiation of the Union of Brest had occurred because Tisserant had "laid the egg and Fr. Kostelnyk sat on it until it hatched." As for the new missal, the hands of those who had produced it were "stained with the blood of the martyrs," and their souls, "with the apostasy of millions of Greek Catholics" (pp. 130, 142). Tisserant apparently took the comments in stride, but Josaphat's fiery letter to the superior general of the Jesuit order in Rome brought about his dismissal from the London parish.

Keywan's book is a well-told story focusing not only on the central figure, but also fleshing out the social and political contexts within which Josaphat lived and worked, including Western Ukraine during and after World War I, the ZUNR Government-in-exile in Western Europe in 1919–23, Bosnia in the mid-1920s, Montreal during the Great Depression, Canada's capital during World War II, and postwar Europe in the time of repatriation.

Keywan's book is also valuable for future research in the questions that it begs. For example, a number of questions may be raised about Josaphat Jean's membership in and relationship with the Basilian and Studite communities and with the Ukrainian episcopate. By what provision of canon law did Sheptytsky "name" Josaphat Jean, O.S.B.M., a Studite in 1923 (p. 90)? What was the significance of Josaphat's temporal vows as a Studite, pronounced in November 1924 (p. 95)? Why did Clement Sheptytsky blame Jean's "lack of experience as a Studite" in the decision to disband the community in Abitibi (p. 106)? Why did Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky write in 1929 to Budka's successor, Bishop Ladyka, that "Father Jean is not a Studite" (p. 110)? Why did Ladyka instruct Josaphat to attempt to return to the Basilian order (p. 111)? And when he left for Mundare in May 1931 at the age of 46, why was Josaphat required to undergo the novitiate a second time (p. 111) and to repeat the temporal vows (first pronounced in Krekhiv in 1917)? Keywan suggests (p. 113) that his departure from the Basilian order to become a Studite in 1924 may have put into question his "stability" (i.e., monastic loyalty?), but this does not account for Metropolitan Sheptytsky's about-face on Josaphat's Studite membership.

A minor correction concerns the year of Sheptytsky's appointment as metropolitan of Lviv. The event took place in October 1900 (not in 1899, as we read on p. 14, n. 5), five months after the death of Metropolitan Iuliian Sas-Kuilovsky. His installation took place in January 1901. Typographical errors are very few. The reference to the Book of Ruth in the final quotation (p. 148) should read 1:16, not 16:1.

More information about the unpublished memoirs on which this book is based (in particular, their location) would have been helpful to future researchers. Similarly, information about Fr. Jean's personal papers and correspondence would have been a useful lead for future work. The bibliography of works consulted does not mention Delaere's *Mémoire sur les tentatives de schisme* and Paul Yuzyk's unpublished MA thesis on the Ukrainian Catholic church in Canada. Considering the sheer number of significant historical figures with whom Josaphat crossed paths, an index of names would have been welcome, though the chronological table at the end of the book compensates in part for that lack. The photo plates, many of them rare, supplement the story line remarkably well.

As with the lives of other Francophone missionaries who adopted the Ukrainian Canadian immigrants' rite, the life of Josaphat Jean sheds light on the nature of the Ukrainian community's ethnic self-awareness and exclusivism. Despite his French Canadian origin, *père* Joseph became the fervently patriotic Basilian Josaphat, a man with a remarkable record of service and dedication to the cause of the Ukrainian people who represented their interests in historically pivotal moments. For their own reasons, many Ukrainians chose to reject him (much as they had others before him), and in 1971 he marked in solitude the sixtieth anniversary of his transfer of rite. But Josaphat Jean is not forgotten. Keywan's biography is an important contribution that weaves the many facets of Josaphat's extraordinary and truly turbulent life together with the larger social and political story of which it was a part—that of twentieth-century Ukraine in the international scene.

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Keith P. Dyrud. *The Quest for the Rusyn Soul: The Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europe and in America, 1890–World War I.* Philadelphia: Balch Institute Press; London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1992. 157 pp.

In recent years scholarly interest in regional cultures has grown. This book is an outgrowth of such interest. The Rusyns—until recently widely known in English-language publications as the Ruthenians, i.e., the ethnic Ukrainian population of Austria-Hungary—lived on a compact territory that was strategically important for both the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. To attain their strategic goals, both empires found it necessary to exert influence not only on the Rusyns in their homeland, but also on those who had emigrated to the New World.

Various means of spreading such influence were used, among them the Rusyns' level of national consciousness, which, vis-à-vis other national groups in Austria-Hungary, was retarded and yet not homogeneous. The Rusyns of Galicia, for example, were more advanced than those of Transcarpathia, and Hungarian ruling circles in the latter region prevented any possible co-operation between them. In analyzing why Rusyns identified themselves variously and why relatively few of them considered themselves Ukrainians, Keith Dyrud exhibits a deep understanding of his subject. Influential here, although they did not apply to the Austro-Hungarian realm, were the tsarist Valuev circular (1863) and Ems Ukase (1876) banning the printing, importation, and distribution of Ukrainian-language publications in the Russian Empire, as well as the non-existence of a Rusyn or Ukrainian state.

Dyrud touches on various problems that are necessary for creating and understanding the complex picture of Rusyn life in the period under discussion. Opposing forces competed for the Rusyns, and Dyrud shows how important

events—for example the Russian military suppression of the Hungarian revolution of 1849—influenced the Rusyns and made them pro-Russian. Of course, Rusyn-Russian linguistic and religious affinities played a significant part. Nevertheless, this reviewer can not fully agree with the author's statement that "These earlier efforts in both Galicia and Subcarpathia [i.e., Transcarpathia] to identify Rusyn culture with Great Russian culture were primarily indigenous efforts. There is no evidence that Russian propaganda played a significant role in its genesis other than the significant but indirect role played by the Russian occupation of Hungary" (p. 32).

Already before that revolution, the influence in the Austrian Empire of the activity of an exceptionally gifted Russian conspirator, Mikhail Raevsky, made itself felt. For many years Raevsky worked as a Russian diplomat, and from 1842 to his death in 1884 he was also the superior of the church of the Russian embassy in Vienna. Using various means, he distributed tsarist funds to Slavic newspapers throughout the empire. He maintained close ties first and foremost with Transcarpathian Rusyn leaders, and in the process he greatly influenced their national-cultural orientation. Somewhat later the Russians Vasilii Voitkovsky and Konstantin Kustodiev influenced the Transcarpathian revival to such an extent that its leaders became Russophiles. Both of them—Voitkovsky in 1850–70 and Kustodiev in 1870–5—served as the superior of the Russian Orthodox church-mausoleum at the graveside of the Russian princess Aleksandra Pavlovna near Pest. This post was a diplomatic one, and the superiors served also as secret agents of the tsarist government, particularly when it came to spreading influence among the Orthodox and Slavic population of the Hungarian realm. In addition to the various ways that Dyrud indicates that such influence was spread, it also occurred through personal contacts throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. For example, the president of the "Galician Russian Benevolent Society" in St. Petersburg, the openly anti-Ukrainian activist and linguist Anton Budilovich, was the son-in-law of the Transcarpathian leader Adolf Dobriansky. The two often met, and Budilovich no doubt influenced Dobriansky's views and activities.

Dyrud ably and scrupulously examines the various ideological positions the first Rusyn immigrants from Galicia and Transcarpathia brought to the United States. They emigrated too soon to witness directly the evolution of Ukrainian national consciousness in their homeland, but they brought with them their own historical experience, which was reflected in their immigrant activity. Galician and Transcarpathian Rusyn efforts at unification and joint activity were successful only during the initial years of immigrant life. In discussing them, Dyrud focuses on a very important psychological aspect: on group behaviour in a new economic, cultural, and political environment. He contrasts religious traditions and language with freedom, democracy, and voluntary ties, i.e., the possibility of deciding one's fate according to one's own desires. Those phenomena, as well as an ambiguous sense of national belonging, complicated the process of national identification.

Dyrud discusses the public and clandestine activities of the highest government circles interested in the Rusyns and shows the concrete forms and methods they used to influence them. Utilizing exceptionally rich and valuable sources, he compares the distinct conditions for development of the Rusyns in

Galicia and Transcarpathia and draws parallels between the various influences on them both in Europe and in America. A leading influence remained the Russian Orthodox church, which already had a reputation and tradition in North America, catered to the immigrants' social, cultural, and spiritual needs, systematically influenced them through moral instruction and education, and trained church cadres who influenced many Greek Catholic immigrants to convert. His conclusions are based on an evaluation of the activity of representative immigrant Rusyn leaders, newspapers, and secular and religious organizations.

Dyrud focuses on a relatively brief but important period in Rusyn history that has long merited a substantial study. He has utilized a great number of little-known and hitherto unknown facts, and has analyzed events in their wider context; unfortunately, he did not evaluate the activity of the Society of St. John the Baptist (est. in 1862 in Prešov) or the Society of St. Basil the Great (est. 1866 in Uzhhorod). In individual chapters Dyrud develops specific aspects, thereby enhancing the general picture of his subject.

This book is not without inaccuracies or typographical errors, but they do not significantly mar its scholarly value. This reviewer finds it difficult to agree with the statement that "Dukhnovych was against elevating ... a dialect to a literary language" (p. 31). Dukhnovych's views on the literary language changed; proof of this is his grammar, which he based on the Transcarpathian vernacular and which Ivan Rakovsky translated into Russian without Dukhnovych's approval and had published. Obvious errors include the names Denis Zubritsko (p. 26), instead of Denys Zubrytsky, and Iosif Levitsko (p. 27), instead of Iosyf Levytsky. Mykhailo Kachkovsky was born in Dubne, not Dubn (p. 26), and the newspaper *Karpat* first appeared in 1873, not 1872 (p. 39). By modern standards it would be impossible to say that Dmitrii Vergun (Dmytro Verhun) was a "Carpatho-Rusyn (Galician) poet" (p. 41). Rather, he was a Galician Russophile who worked in Prague and wrote about Transcarpathian literature.

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Wsevolod W. Isajiw, Yury Boshyk, and Roman Senkus, editors. *The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II*. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992. xxiv, 517 pp. $29.95.

In recent years, both refugee and Ukrainian studies have been moving closer towards the academic mainstream. The growing number of refugees in the world and the recent appearance of a Ukrainian state on the map of Europe have stimulated scholarly interest in these two interdisciplinary fields. *The Refugee Experience* is a valuable contribution to both. It is the first comprehensive compilation of information on Ukrainian postwar refugees. The collection is

important for the study of international protection of involuntarily displaced people and of twentieth-century Ukrainian history.

Because the Second World War produced such a large number of refugees who were mainly located in the areas of Allied occupation at the end of the war, the governments of the victorious powers were forced to address this problem, and it was in the years immediately after 1945 that international institutions defining and protecting the rights of refugees were created. The unique situation of Ukrainian refugees played an important role in this process.

An increasing number of Ukrainian historical studies have appeared in recent years. The period surrounding World War II, however, remains a subject clouded in controversy. Analysis of the activities of the Ukrainians who became involuntarily displaced because of the war provides important insight into the dilemmas of a nation that did not have a state until recently.

The collection is organized in twelve sections and makes a large quantity of information easily accessible to the reader. The introduction places the history of the displaced Ukrainians within the general context of the postwar refugee situation, while the second part explains the specifics of Ukrainian migration both before and after the war. The next six sections describe the various aspects of the lives of Ukrainian refugees during this period, including the economic and organizational structure of the displaced-persons camps, the political and religious life of the refugees, and their educational, women's, literary, scholarly, and cultural activities. The seventh section addresses perhaps the most sensitive dimension of this history, Soviet repatriation efforts and the Allied response. The eighth section draws the story to its conclusion by describing the resettlement of the refugees to the two countries which admitted the largest numbers, Canada and the United States. The final section returns to broader themes, describing the refugee experience as a social and psychological reality.

Particularly interesting are the memoirs in the appendix at the end of the book. They offer a personal perspective from two different angles: that of two Ukrainians who found themselves refugees because of the country they happened to be born in, and two Ukrainians born in Canada who felt compelled to assist strangers because they happened to be members of the same ethnos.

This book will be of interest to a wide audience. Those with a scholarly interest in refugee studies will find a detailed case study of one group of refugees during their period of displacement. Most of the contributions on the life of the refugees in internment camps use archival materials, maps, charts, and statistical tables never before assembled in one volume. Contemporary historians and scholars dealing with issues of national identity will find an engaging description of the events and processes that shaped the lives of a group of people caught in an unusual situation, where their national identity played an important role in determining their future. Former refugees who lived through this experience will find it interesting to read about their past examined in an academic manner. Ukrainians in Ukraine will find this book useful in helping to understand a part of their history to which they had no access until recently.

One understandable weakness of the book is that it is based almost exclusively on Western sources. At the time when it was prepared, access to

Soviet sources was severely limited. Furthermore, a number of the contributions in this volume—though originally commissioned for it—have appeared in slightly different form in previous publications. Although this detracts from the originality of the book, it is useful to have such a broad compilation on the subject in one volume.

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John D. Klier and Shlomo Lambroza. *Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. xx, 393 pp.

This valuable collection of essays focuses on the three major waves of pogroms that took place almost exclusively on Ukrainian ethnolinguistic territory during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, specifically in 1881–4, 1903–6, and 1917–21. Several themes run through the entire work, most significantly the reevaluation of the role of the tsarist government in the organization of the pogroms. Secondary sources have been dominated for decades by a "conspiracy thesis," most ably articulated by Shimon Dubnow (1860–1941), which argued that the tsarist regime saw some profit in diverting popular discontent with their policies by artificially creating anti-Jewish riots. This thesis has been rejected by recent scholarship, and some of the most prominent researchers of this topic are represented in this volume.

The strongest part of the collection are the essays on the first pogrom wave; roughly half of the entire text is devoted to this period, which is widely regarded as a watershed in the history of the Jews of the Russian Empire. I. Michael Aronson provides a comprehensive description of these pogroms, their nature, and extent, while Moshe Meshkinsky and Erich Haberer discuss the role or lack thereof of socialist groups in the pogroms. Alexander Orbach provides a particularly interesting discussion of pogroms' social, economic, and religious impact on the Jewish population, and a challenging article by Michael Ochs based on considerable archival research reevaluates the little-researched pogroms in Congress Poland.

Shlomo Lambroza and Robert Weinberg contribute important essays on the pogroms of 1903–6, which previously have received little scholarly attention. Weinberg's article, a case study of the brutal 1905 Odessa pogrom, is particularly valuable for its detailed analysis of the socio-economic background of the pogrom's perpetrators and its sophisticated grasp of the underlying causes of the violence.

The editors have also provided considerable theoretical and pedagogical materials. John Klier introduces the volume with a brief discussion of the demographic, economic, social, and political status of the Jews in the Russian Empire on the eve of the first pogrom wave, and follows this with a summary of

the history of anti-Jewish violence in the region since the first recorded attack on Kyiv's Jewish quarter in the twelfth century. Hans Rogger's masterly "Conclusion and Overview" attempts to place the pogroms in the context of general scholarship on communal violence, with a fascinating comparison with anti-black riots in the United States. The editors have also added helpful two- to three-page introductions to each of the volume's sections; they provide basic information on the pogrom waves and serve to preface the scholarly essays that follow. Avraham Greenbaum's bibliographic essay is an excellent research tool.

Two aspects of this work render it somewhat less valuable than it might have been. Firstly, the question of nationality is not treated in a comprehensive manner, and when it does figure briefly in the articles, it is often in the form of unhelpful and unsupported clichés. Among the worst is Peter Kenez's remark that "It is safe to say that up to this point [1919] no nation on earth had a record comparable to the Ukrainians in killing and abusing Jews" (p. 293). The almost total absence of discussion of the nationality dimension is baffling, given that the overwhelming majority of these pogroms occurred on Ukrainian ethno-linguistic territory, notwithstanding the fact that the cities where most of the violence of the first two waves took place were predominantly populated by non-Ukrainians. Aronson's paper is one of the exceptions in this regard, as he has examined the nationality question in somewhat more detail in his recent monograph, where he identifies Russian migrants to the Ukrainian cities as being particularly prone to instigating pogroms.[1] Nevertheless, whether the pogroms are an expression of "perennial Ukrainian antisemitism" or of more sophisticated socioeconomic factors, the nationality question deserves greater attention.

A final problem with the work is the brief and unsatisfying treatment of the third (1917–21) pogrom wave. In fact, there are many reasons to consider that this section could profitably have been eliminated from the collection. This is not to say that the pogroms of the revolutionary era are not worthy of attention. Rather, they do not fit the "paradigm" discussed in one of the introductory papers for three basic reasons. First, there is the question of scale. While reasonable estimates of those murdered in the 1881–4 pogroms are numbered in the tens and low hundreds, and those of the 1903–6 wave in the low thousands, estimates for 1917–21 run in the tens of thousands and even hundreds of thousands. Secondly, the political climate was entirely different. While the earlier waves occurred during periods of social unrest, the government remained basically intact throughout, therefore justifying the focus of the rest of the work on official responsibility. During the revolutionary period no authority of any permanence held power, and the entire region was given over to complete lawlessness, particularly during the bloody months of 1919. Finally, the social climate was radically different. Whereas the earlier pogrom waves were either widespread, smaller acts of violence (1881–4) or isolated acts of more brutal violence (1903–6), by 1919 the population of Ukrainian territories had already grown accustomed to

[1] I. Michael Aronson, *Troubled Waters: The Origins of the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 107, 112–15.

a culture of violence. After three years of a World War, two revolutions in the empire's centre, foreign occupation, and an ongoing civil war, the exceptionally horrible and virtually ubiquitous nature of that era's pogroms was in part a reflection of the zeitgeist.

To this last period *Pogroms* devotes only one article, that is, twenty out of some four hundred pages. This is somewhat akin to preparing a collection of articles on famine in Ukraine with only one short paper on the Great Famine of 1932–3 and the remainder looking closely at the much smaller and qualitatively different crises of 1891–2 and 1921–2. Moreover, while Kenez's article on the third pogrom wave provides some important information on the ideology of the White pogromists—which he erroneously identifies as the perpetrators of most of the pogroms[2]—he does not take advantage of the considerable scholarship on this topic in Yiddish. While Kenez's paper has much merit, the volume would not have suffered by limiting its focus to the prerevolutionary era.

Despite these caveats, the collection represents a very positive contribution to the scholarship on this topic, and will be appreciated by specialists in the history of the Jews of the region as well as researchers involved in broader issues.

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J. Hoberman. *Bridge of Light: Yiddish Film between Two Worlds.* New York: The Museum of Modern Art and Schocken Books, 1991. ix, 401 pp. $50.00.

This book was published on the occasion of the exhibition "Yiddish Film between Two Worlds," which ran at the Museum of Modern Art from 14 November 1991 to 11 January 1992. In scope the book surpasses the expectations one may have of a text intended to accompany an exhibition. It is also one of the first attempts at writing the history of a national-minority cinema encompassing several countries and two continents. The book focuses on Jewish settlements in Eastern Europe and the United States between the two world wars. During that time Jewish filmmakers managed to produce and successfully exhibit a great number of films intended for Jewish viewers. *Bridge of Light* describes the silent films of the 1920s, the transition to sound, and the Yiddish-language features of the 1930s. Although marginalized by the histories of their host countries' national cinemas, these films represent an absorbing body of work that constitutes a "national" cinema without borders.

For scholars of Ukraine, this book is an invaluable source of information about the cultural processes that took place there in general and in its cinema in

[2] A brief discussion of pogrom statistics is provided in my "Jewish Representation in the Independent Ukrainian Governments of 1917–1920," *Slavic Review* 50, no. 3 (Fall 1991), 547–9.

particular. The chapter "Once Upon a Time in the Ukraine" is devoted to the development of Yiddish cinema on Ukrainian territory. It recounts how VUFKU (The All-Ukrainian Photo-Cinema Administration) became the major producer of Jewish-interest films during the 1920s. References to people, places, and institutions associated with Ukrainian culture appear throughout this work. This book provides an account of episodes often omitted or excluded in the history of Ukrainian cinema but that should be included in a yet-to-be-written history of that cinema. The co-operation between Jews and Ukrainians in the Soviet Ukrainian film industry of the 1920s included Ukrainian screen adaptations of Jewish literary masterpieces and Ukrainian actors playing Jewish roles. Some Jewish directors were equally competent with Ukrainian and Yiddish themes. For example, G. Gricher-Cherikover shot Jewish pictures based on Babel and Sholom-Aleichem as well as the Ukrainian screen adaptation of Gogol's "Sorochinskaia iarmarka." After all, this was the period of the "Ukrainization" of culture in Ukraine and of the search for a Ukrainian national identity. At that time the development of minority cultures was supported and encouraged by the Soviet Ukrainian government.

The Ukrainian and Jewish cinemas in the USSR shared the same fate in 1929, when VUFKU became Ukrainfilm, merely a branch of Moscow's Goskino. Accusations of Ukrainian nationalism were extended even to Jewish filmmakers. Jewish-Ukrainian cinematic relations did not end in the old country. Attempts to make Jewish and Ukrainian pictures in America brought the two groups together there in the 1930s. The productions of *Zaporozhets za Dunaiem* and *Yankl der Shmid* shared some sets and technical personnel in New Jersey.

Bridge of Light provides a solid overview of its subject matter and is useful to both the general reader interested in Yiddish cinema and to the film-studies specialist. Its twenty-four chapters are richly illustrated with film stills that make it readily accessible to a wide range of readers. Captivating stories and vivid details about individuals and historical settings are expertly blended with well-documented factual material. Hoberman's book is an important contribution to film studies, Ukrainian studies, and the cultural histories of many countries.

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Shirin Rai, Hilary Pilkington, and Annie Phizacklea, eds. *Women in the Face of Change: The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China.* London and New York: Routledge, 1992. x, 227 pp.

In thirteen essays British, Russian, and Chinese political scientists, anthropologists, and sociologists analyze women's experiences as they relate to the major economic reforms in post-Mao China and the dramatic political and economic changes of 1989 and 1990 that led to the disintegration of the Communist bloc. The August 1991 coup in Moscow and dissolution of the Soviet empire lie outside

their purview. Consequently the pieces that deal with the Soviet Union are traditionally Russian-centred; they lack insight into the lives of women of the non-Russian nationalities and are necessarily dated by their appraisal of a time when economic despair had not yet assumed its subsequent dimension. Nonetheless, the comparative analysis of issues relating to gender within Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China reveal some of the dangers of economic dislocation and capitalism for women. The authors hope for the creation of fully democratized and non-patriarchal states in which women can participate equally with men in all spheres of life.

The first of the book's three sections deals with the repercussions of economic reform. Articles on the Soviet Union, China, and Poland generally agree that modernization has had immediate deleterious effects on women. Natalia Rimashevskaia and Shirin Rai point to increasing unemployment among women in both the Soviet Union and China. Women in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe did not necessary react negatively to unemployment, and they expressed the sentiment that they would prefer to remain at home with their children than continue with their double burdens. Yet, as Frances Pine argues in the case of Poland, the idealization of the family sphere is misplaced, given the chronic shortage of domestic appliances and housing in the cities, male alcohol abuse, and domestic violence. She notes that it is too easy to blame socialist governments for failing to change women's positions radically when the same charge can be levied at capitalist countries. Rimashevskaia and Rai see a positive role for government in bettering women's positions. Rimashevskaia points to the 14 April 1990 Soviet decree providing for liberal maternity and child-care leave for a mother or other family relative as being ahead of public opinion, while Rai argues that only the Chinese state can subvert the resurgence of traditional patriarchal values among its citizens.

Part Two examines "the construction and reconstruction of gendered identities" by focusing on such disparate topics as contraception and abortion in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China, Soviet youth culture, and sexuality in the Soviet Union and China. Delia Davin argues that the revolutions in Eastern Europe and the USSR have generally been positive with regard to women's control over reproduction, dismantling as they have the socialist programs to stimulate population growth and encouraging the use of contraception over abortion as a means of limiting fertility. At the same time, however, the unification of the Germanies threatens to limit East German women's access to abortion, and the ascendancy of the Catholic church in Poland and (now former) Czechoslovakia will no doubt negatively affect women's reproductive choices. Davin's observation about the mandate that factories maintain public charts of their women workers' menstrual cycles underscores the insidious nature of the Chinese pro-natalist policy. Hilary Pilkington, in a somewhat disorganized piece, looks for signals within the Russian youth culture during perestroika as a way of predicting what the future of democratization holds. While the new political arena is dominated by males, Pilkington argues that not all women are content to stand on the sidelines. Girls who identify themselves as *stiliagi*, for example, dress in a masculine fashion and occupy their time with rock and roll, shunning male

companionship and permanent male relationships. Clearly more work needs to be done on the Russian youth culture before generalizations about the future can be made. In assessing the impact of the pornography explosion that objectifies women in the former Soviet Union, Rosamund Shreeves cautions against the reimposition of censorship which will deny women the opportunity to explore their sexuality and sexual pleasures. Harriet Evans presents the Chinese government as wedded to the traditional notion that a woman who chooses to indulge in deviant sexual behavior "has only herself to blame for her anguish" (p. 158). In this light, Shirin Rai's earlier conclusion that only the state can stem the resurgence of patriarchal values in the countryside seems misplaced.

Part Three examines the development of women's consciousness in Hungary and the Soviet Union. Chris Corrin welcomes the belated emergence in 1991 of a feminist debate in Hungary as a result of a few women protesting antiabortion groups. In a highly polemical piece Marina Malysheva contrasts nineteenth-century Russian feminism with Bolshevism, idealizing the former as progressive and open to all classes and castigating the latter as having vulgarized feminism. Her belief that only contemporary feminism can reassert women's personality and individuality is welcome, but her distortion of the historical past to suit her ideology is unfortunate. Lastly, Valentina Konstantinova perceptively cautions that the women's question in the USSR may not be able to overcome the challenges that politics present.

This collection clearly identifies economic, social, and political questions for women in revolutionary Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China. But the dated nature of much of the analysis and the unevenness of its scholarship militate against its use in the classroom.

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A Select Index to Svoboda: Official Publication of the Ukrainian National Association, Inc., a Fraternal Association. Volume 1: *1893-1899.* Compiled by Walter Anastas and Maria Woroby. Saint Paul: Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota, 1990. xix, 387 pp. Volume 2: *1900 to 1907.* Compiled by Walter Anastazievsky with the assistance of Roman Stepchuk. 1991. xlvi, 410 pp. Volume 3: *January 1908 to July 1914.* Compiled by Walter Anastazievsky and Roman Stepchuk. 1993. xlv, 407 pp.

In 1994 the Ukrainian National Association (UNA) will be celebrating its centenary. A fitting tribute to this founding event, truly a milestone in American Ukrainian history, is the completion of three volumes of an index to *Svoboda*, the daily organ sponsored by the UNA, spanning the years 1893–1914.

Researchers have long realized the utility of indexes, and the compilers and publishers of these three volumes appear to have adeptly fulfilled the mandate set by their sponsor, the UNA, in providing an impressive and indispensable reference tool.

In his introduction to volume 1, Leonid Rudnytzky correctly recognizes one value of the index when he notes that "although the Index is that to a Ukrainian newspaper in the United States, it would be wrong to limit its importance to Ukrainians in the United States, for *Svoboda*, we should add, also reported on Ukrainian life in Canada and South America." Indeed, it was for some time the only Ukrainian-language newspaper in the Americas, for the first Ukrainian newspaper in Canada, *Kanadiiskyi farmer*, appeared a full decade later, in 1903, and the first Ukrainian paper in Brazil, *Zoria*, fourteen years later, in 1907.

Thus, in the early critical years of immigration and settlement in the New World *Svoboda* performed the vital role of uniting the disparate Ukrainian immigrant communities in the Americas and elsewhere. In so doing, the newspaper served to fuel a "diaspora" consciousness long before the widespread use and misuse of the term. I say "misuse," because even though the Ukrainian communities are more widely distributed and numerous now than they were during the first wave of Ukrainian mass emigration, they know far less now about each other than they did then. There is no longer a regular, mass-circulating forum that reports periodically on the life and issues facing these communities akin to the *Svoboda* of old.

The gaping holes in our knowledge of the Ukrainian experience abroad are glaringly obvious when we leaf through the pages of the index and compare the attention devoted to selected topics. For instance, in the three volumes there are 348 entries on Brazil and 267 on Canada. This surely attests to the importance of the subject of the less numerous Ukrainian community in Brazil. But the output of scholarly works dealing with the first wave of Ukrainian immigration to both countries does not reflect this: there has not been a single monograph analyzing the "Brazilian fever" phenomenon, its implication for the Ukrainian immigrants in South America on the one hand, and its relationship to Ukrainian settlement in Canada on the other.

There are other issues, too, to which students can turn as subjects for research papers, and here the possibilities are infinite. The index, arranged alphabetically and thematically, has headings on topics ranging from interethnic relations to developments in Ukraine. Given that the *Svoboda* editorial office subscribed to a variety of newspapers and periodicals, represented an American-based institution, and could draw on correspondents in a number of countries, there is little doubt that a researcher will confirm Rudnytzky's assessment of *Svoboda* as a "treasury of information." Finally, of no less value are *Svoboda's* interpretations of the events reported in its pages.

The sponsors and participants of this pioneering index project are to be commended for their efforts in initiating and successfully bringing to fruition the first three volumes. It now remains for scholars to be encouraged and supported to use this handy and comprehensive index and to tap *Svoboda*. It is also hoped that there will be those in Ukraine and abroad who will take heed of the example

set by the UNA and will begin compiling similar broad-ranging indexes to other Ukrainian newspapers.

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Kleine Völker in der Geschichte Osteuropas: Festschrift für Günther Stökl zum 75. Geburtstag. Edited by Manfred Alexander, Frank Kämpfer and Andreas Kappeler. *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, Neue Folge, Beiheft 5. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991. 158 pp.

This festschrift for Professor Günther Stökl contains three articles directly concerning Ukrainian history and several others relating tangentially to the field.

The most significant contribution is an incisive essay on the Ukrainians as a "small people" by Andreas Kappeler of Cologne ("Ein 'kleines Volk' von 25 Millionen: Die Ukrainer um 1900," pp. 33–42). Kappeler interprets the development of the Ukrainian nation in the Russian Empire in terms of Miroslav Hroch's conception of the national movements of "small peoples." The Ukrainians were not small numerically, but they exhibited the essential features of a "small people" as defined by Hroch; i.e., they lacked an upper class of their own nationality as well as continuous traditions of high culture and statehood. But Kappeler points to some significant regional variations: the Ukrainians of Galicia best fit the profile of a "small people," while the Ukrainians of Left-Bank Ukraine, with their Hetmanate traditions and native gentry, diverged from the model significantly. These divergences gave the Ukrainian movement in the Russian Empire certain advantages over the otherwise comparable Belarusian movement, which developed much more slowly. But compared to the Lithuanian movement, the Ukrainian movement was hampered by regional fragmentation and the lack of clear confessional and linguistic barriers separating Ukrainians from Russians. Also, the sheer size of the Ukrainian nation made it difficult to develop an effective national movement. As Kappeler remarks, "the quantitative greatness of this people was a primary cause of its qualitative smallness." Kappeler also identifies the political environment of the Russian autocracy as a major factor retarding the development of the Ukrainian movement in Russia. This point is driven home by comparison with the Ukrainian movement under constitutional Austria; although the Ukrainians of Galicia lacked the more favourable social structure and state traditions of the Left Bank, they, unlike their counterparts in Russian-ruled Ukraine, were able to develop a strong mass movement in support of the national cause before the outbreak of World War I.

Kappeler's essay, which places nineteenth-century Ukrainian history in a broad theoretical and comparative context, deserves to become a "classic" in the historiography of Ukraine and required reading for all students of the history of the Ukrainian national movement. The other two articles on Ukrainian history in this volume are not only much narrower in focus, but also much weaker as works

of scholarship. Both fail to make use of the Ukrainian literature and sources on their topics.

Frank Golczewski of Hamburg contributed an article on Ukrainian-German relations during the last year and aftermath of World War I ("Zur deutschen Ukraine-Politik 1918–1926," pp. 119–29). After a brief characterization of the Skoropadsky regime as a puppet government of the German occupation authorities, Golczewski discusses episodes in the history of Ukrainian exiles in Germany and Germans interested in Ukraine in the 1920s (particularly Paul Rohrbach and the Deutsch-Ukrainische Gesellschaft). Germany retained some diplomatic relations with the Ukrainian government in exile, represented chiefly by Roman Smal-Stotsky in Berlin, until Germany entered into the Rapallo agreement with the Soviets in 1922. From that point on German-Ukrainian contacts had an unofficial character. The former hetman, Skoropadsky, enjoyed the favour of some senior figures in the German military and foreign office. In the later 1920s and 1930s Germany was primarily interested in informal contacts with Ukrainian emigrants in order to pursue activities directed against Poland. From the purely informative side, Golczewski's investigation of German-Ukrainian contacts in the 1920s, which have not thus far been well researched, may prove useful to future historians of these relations. His own study, however, leaves something to be desired; Golczewski relies almost entirely on German sources and makes no effort to understand these relations from the Ukrainian side.

Jerzy Kozeński of Poznań discusses the place of Carpatho-Ukraine in the diplomatic crisis of 1938 ("Die Karpaten-Ukraine im Jahre 1938," pp. 130–41). Over a third of his contribution sketches the historical background of Transcarpathia (unfortunately, this section is marred by errors); the rest focuses very narrowly on the fall of 1938, with special attention to the Polish factor in the diplomatic negotiations. There is not much new here, except for some citations from the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Bonn. Kozeński criticizes Ukrainian historiography in the West on his subject "on account of its idealization of the tragic past," although it is clear he enjoys only a superficial knowledge of this historiography. (Stercho's monograph is cited once, and then only as an unpublished doctoral dissertation; Magocsi's major study of the region is not cited at all; no literature in the Ukrainian language is cited.) On the other hand, Kozeński singles out for praise "the Polish scholarly literature on Ukraine," even though it has had difficulties with access to sources and has struggled against impediments "of a political and interpretive sort." As might be expected, this uneven knowledge of the relevant historical literature has resulted in a less than balanced presentation.

Apart from the three articles specifically devoted to Ukrainian history, several other contributions to the Stökl festschrift will be of interest to historians of Ukraine. Jacob Goldberg has an article here on Jewish estate-lessees (*orendari*) in Poland-Lithuania in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (pp. 13–21). Ilona Reinert-Tárnoky contributed a magisterial survey, extending from the Middle Ages to the Communist era, of the evolution of the Hungarians' conception of their nationhood (pp. 93–104); she includes a discussion of the place of national minorities in Hungarian national thinking. Uwe Halbach's essay on the image of

the northern Caucasian peoples in Russian public opinion during their resistance to Russian rule ca. 1800–64 (pp. 52–65) also contains something for Ukrainian historians; while even oppositional Russian writers evinced at best an "enlightened colonialist" position with regard to the insurgent mountain folk, "only the Ukrainian Taras Shevchenko broke radically with this attitude" in his poem *Kavkaz* (p. 61). Much else in this festschrift is also worth reading. All in all, the editors have put together an interesting and illuminating collection of articles on "small" East European peoples.

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Contributions should be submitted in two copies, double-spaced throughout, with notes at the end of the manuscript. A copy of the article or review should also be provided on an IBM or Macintosh compatible disc, in either WordPerfect or MS Word format. The *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* uses the modified Library of Congress transliteration system shown below. Articles should be from five to twenty-five double-spaced pages in length (2,000-10,000 words), and authors should include a brief biography with their submissions. The *Journal* does not consider articles that have been published or are being considered for publication elsewhere. The editors reserve the right to edit all submissions.

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