


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STALINISM in UKRAINE
in the 1940s

DAVID R. MARPLES



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— STALINISM in
UKRAINE
in the 1940s

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University of Alberta*



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_____ For Carlton and Keelan

May they live in less troubled times.

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PREFACE

SOME OF THE ARTICLES in this volume originated from my doctoral thesis, which was accepted by the University of Sheffield, England, in 1985. Others are new, and based on recent information in the period of glasnost in the Soviet Union, 1987–90. In the year 1987, I had prepared my original thesis for publication under the title “Soviet Rural Expansion: The Collectivization of Western Ukraine, 1944–50.” Although this manuscript had reached the camera-ready stage, I withdrew it from publication because of the spate of new information coming from the Soviet Union. My feeling was that the book would be badly outdated and would require immediate revisions. The present work is different in both form and content, for three reasons.

First, it has been modified and supplemented with more recent material in order to provide an examination of Ukraine from the perspective of Stalinism in the 1940s. Most of the valuable historical works produced in the USSR over the past several years have had as their basis the study of Stalin and Stalinism, which has become in a sense legitimized—though with limitations, since the purpose in almost every case has been to condemn Stalin. Nonetheless, it is Stalinism rather than collectivization that has provided the focus. But as the latter is part of that process, it is often included in these writings.

Second, it should be noted that to date, there is no full-length history of the collectivization process in Western Ukraine in English. This is a significant omission in Western historiography, since other

regions have been covered: Moldavia (E. Jacobs), Estonia (R. Taagepera), Latvia (J. Labsvirs), and Lithuania (K. Girnius). But neither Western Belorussia nor Western Ukraine have received monograph-length studies. There is no claim that this work is definitive, but it does represent the first major treatment of the subject in English.

Third, this volume is the forerunner of a detailed study in preparation about Ukraine in World War II, and specifically the question of collaboration and war criminals. That subject is highly controversial, and has been the subject of numerous articles and polemical writings. An examination of Ukraine in the 1940s therefore provides a portrait of the political setting in which the events of World War II took place. It was the period, according to the Ukrainian historian writing in the Khrushchev period, V.P. Stolyarenko, of "the darkest years of Stalinism."

If one examines existing works in this area, the Soviet output has been considerable, but rarely very reliable. The Lviv historian, M.K. Ivasyuta, has been the acknowledged expert in the field. In 1962, he published a major work entitled *Narysy istorii kolhospnoho budivnytstva v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainskoi RSR*, which followed by four years a more specialized study restricted to the Ternopil Oblast in particular. Ivasyuta was writing in relatively tolerant times, but quite often he takes a very hard line, especially on issues such as the kulak and Ukrainian national resistance in both the war and postwar years. He has also been the chief editor of two other studies of the period: *Pravdu ne zdolaty*, a polemic directed against Ukrainian nationalism; and the most valuable collection of documents published to date, *Z istorii kolektyvizatsii silskoho hospodarstva zakhidnykh oblasteri Ukrainskoi RSR (1939–1950)* (1976).

V.P. Stolyarenko has provided several significant studies, though also adhering closely to the official line of the period, i.e., that Stalin may have made some errors through the cult of personality, but essentially the party line on Western Ukraine and on collectivization was correct. His chief treatise pertains to Volyn Oblast: *Sotsialistychne peretvorennia silskoho hospodarstva na Volyni (1944–1950)*, published in 1958. In the Gorbachev period, O.V. Haran has produced several articles including a very valuable examination of the problems of the formation of national cadres in Western Ukraine in the 1940s and 1950s, published in *Ukrainskyi*

istorychnyi zhurnal (October 1989). The work of Stanislav Kulchytsky on the 1930s period of collectivization in Ukraine is also of relevance to the study of the postwar years in Western Ukraine. Essentially—as this present work argues—the policies applied were similar, and Kulchytsky has been one of the first to point out the fundamental errors of the same.

The most useful Western works remain John A. Armstrong's *Ukrainian Nationalism*, which was published in a revised edition late in 1989; and Yaroslav Bilinsky's 1964 study, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II*. R.W. Davies's two-volume study on collectivization in 1929–30 is also relevant, while on Ukraine, the most important socio-political study is that of Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (1985). In 1988, Orest Subtelny published a major English-language history of Ukraine, entitled *Ukraine: A History*, which represents a most welcome addition to the field. A major article on the assimilation of Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia was published in the first 1979 issue of *Soviet Studies* by Roman Szporluk.

Works on the OUN-UPA are quite numerous and of varying quality. The *Litopys UPA* collection, edited by Peter J. Potichnyj and Yevhen Shtendera, has provided some new perspectives on the Insurgent Army, as has the 1986 publication by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, entitled *Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground 1943–1951*, also edited by Potichnyj and Shtendera. Currently, there is no major English-language academic monograph specifically on the OUN, though at least two (by Taras Hunczak and Myroslav Yurkevich respectively) are in progress.

It should be noted that while the chapters in this book are roughly in chronological order, no attempt has been made to provide a historical narrative beginning in 1939 and ending in 1950–51. Rather, several specific questions are examined in depth, and on occasion there is some overlap because certain events form part of separate chapters which cannot be adequately explained without some detailed reference to them. Hence the general title of *Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s*. In this way, it was felt, it was possible to offer an in-depth analysis of some subjects—collectivization, for example—while in other cases, the goal was to offer some new insights or tentative answers to historical problems, such as the question of German-Ukrainian collaboration (the topic

of the separate volume in preparation). A new era is dawning in Soviet studies, but it is not easy to decide how best to approach it. One could await access to the most valuable documents and archival material for a decade or they could be made available tomorrow. The scholar, however, feels obliged to provide some analysis from the information currently offered.

It will be observed that my emphasis is primarily on Western Ukraine, the area that was subject to annexation, commencing with the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact and ending with the incorporation of Transcarpathian Ukraine from Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1945. However, policies enacted there can be closely compared with those in the eastern oblasts in the 1930s, especially since eastern personnel played the key role in the takeover of the new regions. The chapter on World War II, and that on Khrushchev and Kaganovich examine Ukraine as a whole. Thus it seemed pertinent to use "Ukraine" rather than simply "Western Ukraine" in the title. In addition, these latter regions comprise the heartland of what has been called "nationalist Ukraine." In 1939 national consciousness there was at a far higher level than in the heavily russified east. Quite often, in these studies, one sees that outsiders coming into Western Ukraine are regarded ipso facto as "Russians," and the annexation is perceived as a foreign occupation. Western Ukraine provided a stern test case for Stalin, but nonetheless he was wise or subtle enough to apply Ukrainian terms to the process: Western Ukraine's incorporation thus "reunited" Ukrainian territories. It should not therefore, in my view, be regarded as a separate region, but as part of the Ukrainian history of that period.

Since there is much current debate in the Soviet Union and in Ukraine specifically on the role of Lenin in the revolution and afterward, and as the harbinger of Stalinism, Chapter One reexamines this complex question. By and large, one can say that there have been two schools of thought among Western Sovietologists. That of Adam Ulam has been that Stalinism was the natural outgrowth of Leninism; that of Robert Tucker and Stephen Cohen has argued the opposite: that Stalinism itself was a deviation and that the course of Soviet history could have run quite differently had Stalinism not occurred. The discussion is important in Ukrainian history. There is no consensus on the subject. Lenin's statues have been taken down in Western Ukraine; most remain in place in East Ukrainian cities. While wishing to add no more than a footnote to the various works

already extant on this subject, it was felt that a brief treatment of the issue would be a useful background for what follows.

The incorporation of Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia, 1939–41, and the commencement of a rural revolution are examined in Chapter Two. The dominant urban populations—Poles and Jews—were largely replaced with Ukrainians, though all positions of real significance were held by reliable Eastern Ukrainians or Russians. It is argued that Soviet policy began by ostracizing the Polish officials and population, and turned against prominent Ukrainians only in the spring of 1940. At that time, deportations of Ukrainians began (deportations of Poles, as will be seen, occurred earlier) and collectivization got under way. In the subsequent chapter, which is closely related, we examine Ukraine during World War Two, focusing on occupation policies and partisan actions. The limited nature of partisan operations in Ukraine is emphasized, as is the parallel nature of the different branches of the German occupation regime.

“Wartime Collaboration in Ukraine” takes what is termed a “preliminary” look at the question of collaboration, relying on several recent works from Soviet historians. It examines the official Soviet interpretation that persisted for some four decades, and then provides a new analysis of the events in the light of glasnost in the USSR. The question is particularly pertinent because of recent efforts in the West to track down alleged war criminals. The Office of Special Investigations in the United States (OSI) and the Deschenes Commission in Canada operate on different levels, and both have engendered ethnic tensions between the Jewish and Ukrainian communities. This chapter tries to offer some new conclusions on this very controversial issue.

The volume then turns to Khrushchev and Kaganovich, and it should be recalled that Khrushchev remained party leader in Ukraine for most of the period under study. In March 1947, he was suddenly removed from his position and replaced by Lazar Kaganovich. The question is why, and several possible answers are provided. Work on this chapter was enhanced by some new Soviet insights into the question. Kaganovich was the last major figure from Stalin’s regime to remain alive in the Soviet Union, but died in 1991 at the age of ninety-seven. A biography of him recently appeared in the West by Stuart Kahan, but he has remained a figure of some mystery. In Ukraine, he is still recalled as “the butcher,” the man who brought about the end of Ukrainization in the 1920s.

Here, it is argued that the comparative malevolence of Kaganovich and benevolence of Khrushchev have been much exaggerated. Both carried out similar policies, but Kaganovich was used for specific and ruthless tasks.

The later chapters turn to the collectivization process in more detail. First, the question of the kulak is analyzed, using as the basis an original piece by Moshe Lewin that appeared in *Soviet Studies*. The chapter addresses the question: was the kulak in Western Ukraine the same as his Eastern Ukrainian counterpart in the 1930s? If not, what distinctions were made in the later period? Second, we document the completion of collectivization in depth, and compare the situation in Western Ukraine to that of the other western borderlands in the same period. A coordinated campaign began in the spring of 1948 to collectivize lands not only within the Soviet Union, but also in the adjacent territories of Eastern Europe. Although the latter campaign was a failure, the timing of the process was significant. Khrushchev's post-collectivization schemes to develop agrarian cities and to amalgamate collective farms are also regarded in their Ukrainian context, as are purges among village personnel and the establishment of Machine-Tractor Stations and their political sections. Finally, the Conclusion assesses collectivization and the period of Stalinist rule in the 1940s.

Several questions form the underlying theme of this book. How successful was the process of incorporation of Western Ukraine? What were the main goals of the oppositionists, i.e., to form an independent Ukrainian state, to struggle against Fascism (or with the Germans), or to resist Soviet occupation in the hope that eventually conflict would occur between the former wartime allies: USA and Britain on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other? How was the class war created in the Ukrainian villages? How was collectivization completed, and was the process purely coercive? Were there any benefits to be gained by the peasants from entering collective farms? What was Nikita Khrushchev's role in the process and in the agrarian reforms that followed? How was the Western Ukrainian party organization established, and how stable was it? Above all, what were the main features of the Stalinist system as it was applied to Western Ukraine?

Thanks to Robert Conquest's monumental book, *The Harvest of Sorrow* (1986), and the work of James E. Mace and other scholars on the 1930s period, that decade has now become all too familiar

to us. In the period of glasnost, it was also one of the first historical periods to be the subject of new analyses. Thus far, there have been few detailed reappraisals of the 1940s. However, the most recent evidence suggests that such studies are under way. The disputes over the role of nationalist insurgency and whether the Ukrainian guerrillas should be regarded as heroic fighters against Stalinism or German agents continue. In the spring of 1990, the Ukrainian KGB held an unprecedented press conference in Kiev in an effort to discredit the nationalists by providing journalists with original and photocopied documentary evidence of their alleged crimes. There is clearly room therefore for an impartial work that offers some analysis of these questions.

It should be emphasized that this author recognizes only too well the savagery and atrocities that took place in the war years (though he was born well after that war ended). The late Ivan L. Rudnytsky, a native of Western Ukraine who ended his career as professor of Ukrainian history at the University of Alberta until his untimely death in 1984, once told me that the real victim in these years was the average citizen, caught between two unyielding and ruthless forces. To refuse to join one side was to be accused of supporting the other, which meant (in most cases) almost certain death. Society, then, was polarized. We have also learned over the past two years, that in the first postwar years, the number of fatalities on each side exceeded 50,000, and may well have been much higher. This bloodthirsty struggle forms the background to most of the chapters in this book. My view is that the Soviet failure to resolve it, and the evident colonization of Western Ukraine that followed, lie behind many of the disputes in this region today, as it leads the movement toward a separate, independent Ukraine.

Edmonton, Canada
July 1991

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THIS BOOK HAS INVOLVED extensive travel, consultation and study in libraries and institutions across the world, and has been recently revised heavily because of new information made available in the Soviet Union. Providing the usual thanks is thus an especially difficult task, and it would be impossible to name all those who have helped over a number of years. But first and foremost must be the members of the Executive of the Ukrainian National Association, Jersey City, New Jersey, who once again have helped to fund one of my publications, the first of two projected volumes in this subject area.

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Several of the chapters are derived from my doctoral thesis. I have long been indebted to my supervisor and good friend, Everett Jacobs of the University of Sheffield, England, whose encouragement through some difficult times was always appreciated. Dr. Jacobs's own study of Moldavia was very important to my own work. He was able to provide insights and comparisons with the situation in neighboring Ukraine. The late Ivan L. Rudnytsky of the University of Alberta supervised my M.A. thesis (from which Chapter Two is derived); and Anthony Sutcliffe, now of the University of Leicester, England, supervised my doctoral thesis in the latter stages.

Two chapters here appeared originally in scholarly journals, though they have been significantly updated and revised. I express thanks to *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow) for permission to reproduce the chapter on "The Kulak in Western Ukraine" (originally published in volume XXXVI, no. 4, October 1984, pp. 560-70) and to *Nationalities Papers* for Chapter Seven on "Collectivization in Western Ukraine, 1948-1949" (originally published in volume XIII, Spring 1985, pp. 24-44).

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TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

bidnyak—poor peasant (bednyak in Russian)
CC—Central Committee
CPP—Communist Party of Poland
CPSU—Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CPU—Communist Party of Ukraine
CPWU/KPZU—Communist Party of Western Ukraine
centner—100 kilograms (metric measurement)
KGB—Committee of State Security
khutor—farmstead, separated farm
kolkhoz—collective farm
kolkhoznik—collective farmer
Komsomol—young communist league
kulak—rich peasant
MGB—Soviet Ministry of State Security
MTS—Machine-Tractor Station
MVD—Ministry of Internal Affairs
NKVD—People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs
oblast—province
OUN—Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
politotdel—political section
raion—district/county
serednyak—middle peasant
sovkhoz—state farm
trudoden—labor day
ukaz—decree, edict
UPA—Ukrainian Insurgent Army

--- 1 The Foundations of Stalinism in Ukraine

LENINISM AND STALINISM

LENIN'S KEY ROLE IN the Russian Revolution of November 1917 has been, until recently, unquestioned inside the Soviet Union. Lenin was the genius and architect of that revolution, the only person with the ability to coordinate the activities of the working class and the peasantry, and with the foresight to devise two policies that ensured the longevity of the Soviet regime: putting an end to Russia's participation in the First World War; and devising a nationalities policy that took into consideration the national aspirations of the subject peoples of the former Russian empire, such as Finns, Poles, Ukrainians and Georgians. At the same time, the role of Trotsky in the revolution, principally as the president of the Soviet (Council) of the Russian capital city, then called Petrograd (formerly and currently St. Petersburg) was downplayed. Under Stalin, Soviet history was rewritten, and Trotsky's part defined as that of an oppositionist, while his portrait was removed from various photographs depicting the events of the revolutionary era.

In 1987, as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, history stopped. All school textbooks were withdrawn and examinations in history were suspended, pending the publication of new books. In itself, this was hardly a new phenomenon. With each change of leader—assuming that the new leader remained in office long enough to consolidate power, at least two years—new historical in-

terpretations were generally commissioned. In Brezhnev's time, historians were ordered to highlight the hitherto unheralded activities of Brezhnev during the Second World War, when he was in Moldavia. The Soviet film on the battle of Stalingrad featured a determined Nikita Khrushchev amid the height of the struggle, largely because the film was made in the time of Khrushchev's ascendancy. There are grounds for suggesting, however, that the change pioneered after 1987 was a significant departure from the past.

For one thing, the introduction of glasnost (frankness) elsewhere in Soviet society had begun to reveal some of the harsh policies of the past. Stalin and Brezhnev were condemned outright as party leaders, though research work on these periods has continued. Central and provincial (oblast) archives began to be opened for domestic and occasionally even foreign historians. To date, only a very small percentage of Soviet archival material has been made available, but the subject matter in such instances has almost always been extremely controversial. And second, in Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union for the first time had a leader with an avowed policy of dispensing with a personality cult. Instead, and this is the reason for the digression into the modern period, Gorbachev has reverted back to the example of Lenin. Lenin, it is maintained, followed the correct path, whereas his successors were guilty of deviations and significant mistakes in interpreting party policy.¹

Such a policy direction had dangerous implications and has caused quite a few headaches for the Soviet authorities. By hailing Lenin as the only "cult" figure, Gorbachev was not repeating traditional policy. Rather he was ultimately focusing (almost certainly by accident) new attention on the founder of the Soviet state. Moreover, he was doing so at the very time when historical analyses were based on frankness rather than expediency, or whatever party line was in vogue at the time. While no one could have predicted the course of events, with hindsight, it seems rather self-evident that sooner or later, some intrepid historian might entertain the notion that Lenin was in fact mortal and made errors, i.e., that he was not infallible. For sixty-five years he had been akin to a Soviet icon, grossly embalmed in Red Square for the view of Soviet citizens and tourists, who lined up daily for the privilege of seeing him. His portrait has appeared regularly on banners beside two men whom he revered, but who in all likelihood would not have had much time

for him, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Suddenly the subject of Lenin is, to use a colloquialism, "up for review."

He is up for review because the path taken by Soviet history appears to have trailed off into nothingness, a journey of—as one banner in a 1990 Moscow demonstration put it—"seventy years on the road to nowhere." Gone are the rash promises of overtaking the United States in output of meat per capita, made by Khrushchev, along with assertions about the superiority of the socialist system. Revolutionary fervor, insofar as it existed outside official circles, has been replaced by cynicism and disillusionment, economic decline and a rise in crime. In the 1930s, it is sometimes overlooked, the Soviet Union was the undisputed leader of world communism, and Stalin the patron saint, revered by millions outside the country. While Stalin prepared the mass purges within the country, Cambridge University undergraduates like Kim Philby and Guy Burgess had already begun the road that was to render them master spies for the Soviet cause. But with the onset of glasnost, past myths began to crumble almost daily. It is appropriate therefore first to review Lenin and his role in the revolution, and to try to assess whether what became Stalinism was really the natural outgrowth of Leninism, before discussing Stalinism in Ukraine.

The subject is hardly new to Western scholars. Indeed there has been a lengthy debate initiated among others by Professor Stephen Cohen of Princeton University, who has assailed what he perceives as the traditional theory that Leninism was a direct precursor of Stalinism. In a long historiographical essay,² Cohen concludes that Stalinism was something quite unique and different, a result of particular attributes of personality and peculiar twists and deviations from any path that might have been trodden by Lenin. Cohen's article was written before the onset of glasnost, but it is one that has been supported both by prominent Soviet historians, such as Roy Medvedev, and by the Gorbachev regime itself. Until 1990, the figure of Lenin was held up as a model by Mikhail Gorbachev. Lenin's New Economic Policy, which may have been a genuine manifestation of Bolshevik beliefs or a temporary retreat from communism enforced by economic difficulties and the consequences of seven years of almost constant warfare, has been perceived as a basis for economic reform in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In short, conclusions reached by an eminent western scholar

through personal research have coincided with those of a regime in search of an identity; "it is no accident," as Stalin might have said, that Professor Cohen has become so popular in the Soviet Union.

Looking at the case from the perspective of Ukraine in 1990, the republic was divided on the issue of Lenin. To many, the presence of Lenin's statue in major Ukrainian cities, such as Kiev and Lviv, had become anomalous. In the latter case in particular, it appeared to be irrelevant. Lviv was neither under Russian nor Soviet control in Lenin's time. Consequently, in September 1990, Lenin's statue in the main square of the city was disassembled.³ There was an outcry from the stalwarts in the Communist Party, mainly through the vehicle of the daily Kiev newspaper, *Pravda Ukrainy*, but it was of little avail. Lviv and Western Ukraine in general had already elected noncommunist governments. The most powerful political force in the city and oblast was the Ukrainian Republican Party, led by Lev Lukyanenko, openly separatist and anti-Lenin in sentiment. One could perceive a strong current of feeling against the veneration of Lenin; indeed, a current that opposed any role for Lenin in Ukraine. While such opinions may to some extent have been based on emotions rather than rationality, there are grounds to suggest that many Ukrainians equate Lenin's policies with those of Stalin.⁴

In particular, Lenin's nationality policy (also written up by Stalin in 1912, during the latter's period as a devoted disciple) appeared to sanction self-determination for all nations, including (eastern) Ukraine, at that time part of the Russian Empire.⁵ The reality, though implemented by Lenin's followers rather than Lenin himself, appeared to be otherwise and the result was a serious division between Bolshevik Communism and "Borotbism" or national communism of a Ukrainian variety. Subsequently, Ukraine was subjected to severe russification, a man-made famine, purges that were somewhat more severe than other parts of the Soviet Union, and the major conflicts of World War II. The Leninist legacy was thus a savage one. Even in the Gorbachev period, the "rehabilitation" of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in 1990 resulted in a polemical article advocating the breakup of the Soviet Union, but the preservation of a Russian-dominated Slavic kingdom of Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia.⁶ Ukrainians have seen such agreements before. The first was the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654 between Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, whereby Ukraine in

practice fell under Russian domination for the purposes of an alliance against the Poles.⁷ There is thus a wide gap in the Soviet Union today on the importance and position of Lenin: in more mundane terms, it might be characterized as one between Lenin the “liberator” and Lenin the “oppressor.” For our purposes, what is more important is whether Lenin was the originator of the system of Stalinism that is today universally condemned, and was eventually introduced into Ukraine in a very severe form.

Of Lenin’s background, little is in doubt.⁸ He grew up in a middle class family—his father was granted the status of nobleman at the end of a civil service career, his mother was believed to have been of German origin—and his elder brother was executed for his part in an attempted assassination of Tsar Aleksandr III. Lenin, it is known, was an exceptionally able student, as his writings suggest, and he studied law at Kazan University. However, his studies were interrupted by political activity which resulted in expulsion from university and subsequent exile. Many of Lenin’s views and opinions were formed outside the heartland of European Russia, and also outside the Russian Empire. Like many contemporaries, Lenin led a relatively privileged life as a revolutionary, in marked contrast to the more insular, less cosmopolitan and more violent Stalin, who experienced much of tsarist jails, but rarely left the country during his time as a revolutionary activist.

Lenin’s mentors were Marx and the noted Russian marxist, Georgii Plekhanov. There is also much in the quasi-Jacobin Pyotr Tkachev that would have attracted Lenin, though it is not clear whether Lenin ever read Tkachev’s writings, which favored a replacement of the tsarist regime with a minority dictatorship. What differentiated Lenin from his contemporaries was his practicality, his feeling for the current situation and the means to turn it to the advantage of his party, the Social Democratic Workers’ Party. The rift between the more orthodox marxist line advocated by his colleague Yulii Martov and that of Lenin caused a split in the party at the London Congress of 1903, and it was typical of Lenin that he forced through a vote only after Martov and his supporters had left the meeting hall, thereby ensuring that he and his adherents could lay claim to the name “Bolsheviki” or majority. In the same way, though less successfully, he felt that the angry mood of the workers in July 1917, which had culminated in riots and strikes in Petrograd

against the Provisional Government, must be utilized by the Bolsheviks, even though, in theory, the time was not yet ripe for a proletarian revolution.

Lenin was naturally authoritarian, incisive and shrewd. He was physically quite striking: small, stocky, with red hair that soon receded as he grew older to reveal the famous bald pate. He dominated his comrades by sheer force of personality. He was not gifted enough to predict the course of history. Thus while he recognized the potential of Russian involvement in the 1914 war against Germany and Austria, he was quite unprepared for the conflagration of March 1917, which overthrew Nikolai II and the tsarist regime. Neither he nor any of the leading Bolsheviks were in the country at that time. Once on the scene, however, he recognized all too quickly the sort of policies to adopt. And these were not Bolshevik policies accepted by the customary meeting of the Central Committee of the party. They were policies applicable to that particular moment in history. In April, for example, after Lenin returned to Petrograd, the cradle of the March revolution, he called for an end to Russian participation in the First World War and demanded land for the peasants, policies that had long been the rallying call of both the mass of the peasantry and the growing urban workforce.

Can one say therefore that Lenin had no ideas of his own, or that his marxism was adopted as a sort of ideological convenience? On the contrary, his beliefs seem to have been sincere. His commitment to the tenets of Marx and Engels, especially the Communist Manifesto, was wholehearted, but Lenin was quick to realize that even in their wildest dreams, Marx and Engels would not have prophesied that Russia would be the location for a full-scale proletarian revolution. Russia was felt to be economically too backward. Its industry lagged behind that of Western Europe, the countries of which had invested heavily in Russian natural resources and industrial concerns, especially France and Germany. More orthodox thinkers, and even brilliant ones such as Leon Trotsky, subscribed to the view that a revolution in Russia must depend for its success on similar revolutions in Western Europe. Lenin expected revolutions to occur in the latter region. When this did not happen—or did not attain lasting success in the cases of Hungary and Germany—he devised a purely Russian, or by now, Soviet solution to this apparent historical anachronism.

Let us digress briefly to look at Russia's situation in 1917. The

problems had begun with the peasantry, 15.5 million of whom were in the Russian army at the start of the war. Illiterate, badly clothed, these peasants were badly defeated by the German army and began to desert en masse. Food supplies were minimal and taxes were raised to finance the war effort. The peasant was anxious to return home. He had lost his traditional respect for a tsar dominated by a German princess under the sway of the spiritualist wanderer, Grigorii Rasputin. In Petrograd, strikes were becoming more frequent at factories. Some of these enterprises, such as the Putilov works, employed more than 40,000 workers and were potential hotbeds of rebellion. The monarchy eventually collapsed, though Western historians have maintained that its decline predated the war and would have occurred sooner or later. In its place, into a power vacuum, stepped a Provisional Government that was subject, in turn, to an unpredictable and parallel ruling Soviet, or Council, made up largely of workers, soldiers and sailors, a relic from the earlier revolution of 1905.

It is difficult to imagine just how the Provisional Government, which came to be dominated by Aleksandr Kerensky in the summer of 1917, could function with a more revolutionary Soviet Executive Council, which met in the very same building, the Tauride Palace in Petrograd. No major decision could be taken without consultation with the Soviet. Within the Cabinet, members of the Soviet began to hold sway. Indeed, Kerensky himself was a Social Revolutionary, a compromise candidate who had played roles in both ruling bodies. Kerensky was the sort of quasi-democrat for whom Lenin had nothing but contempt. Loquacious, bombastic, he was an orator whom, according to one account, could hold one rapt for a three-hour speech, but whom one forgot about completely by the following day. And Kerensky fell into the folly of launching one last, fatal attack on the German-Austrian forces in the belief that a military victory would help to secure his position.

Lenin and the Bolshevik leaders, it has often been stated, arrived on the scene a little late: Lenin in April; Trotsky, who was to prove to be the key figure, only in May. While Bolshevik propaganda was effective, the Bolsheviks were a deliberately small and urbanized party, and were outnumbered by the massed ranks of the Social Revolutionary Party. The latter was able to outvote the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks combined in the elections to the Constituent Assembly, but never pursued a consistent policy, or even enjoyed

coordination between its leaders, based in the capital, and their supporters in the countryside. The Mensheviks, under Martov, were pursuing a cautious line which seemingly had its roots in marxist theory: the bourgeois revolution had occurred in March 1917. There would now be a lengthy time lapse. Eventually economic development would ensure that the bourgeoisie was challenged by the proletariat. As this scenario lay well into the future, it was essential for the present to safeguard the revolutionary gains, and this meant preserving Kerensky and his Provisional Government.

After the July Days, it was quite clear that Lenin was seeking power by any means. He had recognized the ineffectiveness and increasing unpopularity of the Provisional Government. Bolshevik support, it is sometimes forgotten, was growing faster than that of any other party in Petrograd. By September or October, the Bolshevik Party had secured a majority in the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets. They had the support to dictate or play the key role in formulating policy. Given that Lenin had already coined the powerful slogan of "All power to the Soviets!," the question arises why the Bolsheviks did not simply await the collapse of the Provisional Government. In other words, some kind of Second Revolution would have occurred without any action on the part of the Bolshevik leaders. It was less a question of administering a telling blow to a struggling boxer, than stepping outside the ring and waiting for him to collapse of his own accord.

Part of the answer to this question lies in the personality of Lenin. He was averse to sharing power, and particularly with fellow socialist parties. Lenin's goal was therefore to promote anarchy in Petrograd, propagate slogans that would attract the soldiers, sailors and workers in the streets, such as "Land, bread, and an end to the war," but to prepare to take power as a single, ruthless, minority party, on behalf of the proletariat. Herein lay the dilemma of Soviet historians in 1987-90: one had to somehow account for Lenin's anti-democratic policies in the light of an avowed present day official policy of democratization, declared in the very name of Lenin. In turn, and paradoxically as far as subsequent historical events are concerned, this situation ensured that those Bolshevik leaders who recognized the need simply to take power must gain sway over those who were prepared in some way or other to make conciliatory gestures to the other socialist parties. In the former, intolerant

group, one finds Lenin and Trotsky; in the latter was Stalin. The chief advocates of the more moderate policy and the main Bolshevik opponents of the October Revolution were Lev Kamenev and Grigorii Zinoviev, two of Stalin's future victims.

Lenin's chosen instrument to achieve the takeover of power was the Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC), which made use of the Red Guards. The latter had once taken up arms for the regime, when it was feared that there would be a military reaction against the Provisional Government, led by the Commander in Chief of the Soviet armed forces, General Lavr Kornilov. Though these guards retained some of the weapons from that time, there were also plans to take over the armory, located in Petrograd's St. Peter and Paul fortress. Having established the MRC, Lenin made no secret of his future plans. *Pravda*, the party newspaper, published a succession of articles on the need to take power. No discerning government leader—and Kerensky always watched the Bolsheviks closely—could have failed to perceive such an overt threat. Kerensky, however, may have wanted to provoke an uprising to provide an excuse to crush the Bolsheviks. He had, however, fatally overestimated both his own popular support and the control held by army officers over their soldiers.

On November 7, 1917, the Bolshevik Revolution was led principally by Trotsky, as president of the Petrograd Soviet, and undertaken by Red Guards. It was not, however, a pitched battle in the streets, or even a major skirmish. Far more people died in the March Revolution than in the alleged "class struggle" in November. In Petrograd, on the day of the revolution, stores were open, trams were running, and citizens even went to the movies. It is doubtful if many believed that an event of major significance had occurred. The Mensheviks and mainstream Social Revolutionaries accused the Bolsheviks of betraying marxism and the principles of the revolution. The event was hardly a second revolution at all, and certainly not, as some historians allege, a coup d'état, which by definition implies the use of violence to attain a change of government.⁹ Lenin had stepped into a vacuum of power vacated by a government that never had much authority and in conditions that were close to anarchic. Indeed, the difficulty, as Lenin realized, was not the seizure of power, but its maintenance.

Few Soviet and Western historians have to date placed adequate stress on one of the most important acts taken by Lenin in the first

months of power. It was not the forced dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in January 1918, because it is doubtful that the revolutionary sailors and soldiers would have tolerated its debates for much longer, but rather the creation of a small group called the Commission to Combat Sabotage and Counterrevolution or, in short, the Cheka. Founded by Lenin, it marked the creation of a secret police force headed by a fanatical Pole, Feliks Dzerzhinsky, who had a statue that adorned the exterior of the KGB headquarters in Moscow, carefully ignored by Intourist guides when the Icarus coaches passed by with Western visitors. The statue, however, deserved a second look, for herein lay the foundation of Lenin's success: the establishment of an internal police force that far surpassed in its scope in the years to come, that of the Tsarist secret police, the Okhrana.

Both Lenin and Trotsky advocated the use of terror. Whereas Lenin used Red Terror to overcome internal opposition, real or potential, Trotsky employed similar methods to newly recruited conscripts in a revamped Red Army and to those who undertook the insurrection at the Kronstadt naval base in early 1921. In both cases, the Cheka administered the appropriate punishment. Tens of thousands fell victim to the Red Terror, though one must acknowledge the equally ruthless White Terror of the Civil War period. Most important, the use of terror became a feature of the new state that was called Soviet Russia. While Lenin could maintain, with justice, that the use of terror was required to preserve the revolution, would not this same argument have implied that once the danger had passed, then the Cheka or its successors, which went by various acronyms—MGB, MVD, NKVD, KGB—could have been dissolved?

Lenin's supporters have argued that after 1922, he became so physically incapacitated that he was reduced largely to the role of a spectator in the state that he had created. After his third stroke in 1923, he also lost the power of speech. In the meantime, Stalin was gradually consolidating his position in the Politburo, Orgburo and Secretariat. We will deal with the emergence of Stalin presently. It is, of course, not known what Lenin would have done had he lived, whether a truly different kind of Soviet Union would have emerged that manifested a greater tolerance for human rights. But it is unlikely that Lenin would have ventured much beyond the so-called democratic centralism, whereby policy and economic planning

were dictated from Moscow. Soviet historians have argued that when Lenin announced the New Economic Policy in March 1921, this decision signalled the beginning of a policy unfettered by foreign intervention or an international war, i.e., the true path sought by the Soviet leader. How accurate is this view?

It can be argued to the contrary that the New Economic Policy represented a temporary retreat after the hardships of civil war and its concomitant severe requisitions of grain from the peasantry. It was time to call a truce. The country needed a breathing space of tranquillity and economic recovery. Most important, the peasantry had to be encouraged to produce surpluses of grain which could be used for export, or to feed the urban workforce. Once again, therefore, it can be plausibly maintained that Lenin chose expediency over ideology, but in the short term only. For most Bolsheviks, the New Economic Policy, which replaced grain requisitions with a much more lenient tax in kind and saw a return to private trading in the village—with the major, heavy industries remaining under state control—was a temporary step backward and much disliked.

In other areas, Lenin showed this same flexibility under duress. It was a characteristic feature and part of his genius as a leader. It was most evident in the humiliating Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, by which three centuries of Russian expansion were undone in one treaty that saw the country lose dominions such as Poland, Finland, Ukraine and the Baltic republics to the Germans and their Austrian allies. The alternative to such a treaty may well have been a swift military end to the Bolshevik state. In early 1918, the Germans had the military power to invade Petrograd itself, if necessary. There was far more danger to the fledgling Soviet state from the Germans of Max Hoffmann than subsequently from the French, British or White armies during the Civil War period. Surprisingly, most of the Bolshevik leaders either did not recognize this reality or, perhaps more likely, were reluctant to acknowledge it in a time of revolutionary euphoria.

For example, Lenin's protege Nikolai Bukharin, much revered in Russia today following his rehabilitation as a victim of the Stalinist repression, advocated a return to Kerensky's policy of a revolutionary war against the German invaders. Trotsky, incensed by a separate Ukrainian presence during peace negotiations between the Germans and Bolsheviks at Brest-Litovsk, came forward with his policy of "neither peace nor war." This policy lost some of its at-

tractiveness when the German response to it was simply to continue the military advance into Soviet territory. Only Lenin in the Bolshevik Central Committee held hard and fast to a policy of adherence to the original peace terms, unendurable as they appeared to be. Moreover, he threatened to resign from the committee and as president of the Council of Ministers—which was perennially Lenin's ultimate weapon when he could not get his way with fellow Bolsheviks—if his opinion was not heeded. Brest-Litovsk was another temporary expedient for Lenin. He would break the provisions at the first opportunity, but it had to be signed to preserve the revolution. Such difficulties were a means to a single end: preserving power at all costs.

Is one to suggest, then, that the development of Stalinism occurred naturally from the Lenin era? History is full of analogies, and the anxiety of Soviet and some Western historians to separate a benign Lenin from a malevolent Stalin is akin to that of the "egg" of Erasmus prior to the Reformation, from which, it was said, Martin Luther hatched a bird "of a very different feather." But in each case, are not the similarities between two ideologies more apparent than the differences? True, Stalin built up a party bureaucracy, but it was nevertheless on the foundation that Lenin had created: a party hierarchy over and beyond the fiction of a Soviet, i.e., government rule. Is it not ironic that in early 1990, the clarion call of the Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow was for "All power to the Soviets," the same slogan of Lenin in 1917, but thus far still not a reality?

One can qualify these remarks. Lenin was not the antithesis of Stalin, but he was hardly the pathological killer either. It is very unlikely that, had he lived, Lenin would have conducted the sort of purges and mass killings which, according to Roy Medvedev, resulted in twenty million nonwar related deaths in the 1930s alone. He would, however, have continued to employ terror as a means of consolidating power or enforcing policy. He believed passionately in a worldwide workers' revolution; he was messianic, fanatical and always ruthless. He laid the foundations for a state that could, without difficulty, become totalitarian in nature. And one should be wary of the traditional interpretation that the Russians have a long history of autocratic rule, from the period of Mongol rule, to Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great and beyond. To accept such a statement is to condone its simplification of the change that Lenin

created. There was little in the Bolshevik-Soviet state that could be equated with its tsarist predecessor: witness the simple contrast between Lenin, in exile in Siberia, completing his treatise on the development of capitalism in Russia; and Lev Kamenev, an "Old Bolshevik," being tortured in a Stalinist jail cell, sleepless, and forced to make abject confessions that betrayed his own life.

In November 1917 and afterward, Lenin engineered a singular takeover of power that lacked, in the literal sense of the word, legitimacy. Subsequently, the regime has either harkened back to October/November 1917 as the start of a new age of enlightenment or, more recently, has desperately sought to discover in this period, and in the personality of Lenin, some guiding rules for the present, floundering state. If there was a revolution in 1917, it occurred in March and had its foundation in the mass desertions from the peasant-based army, the refusal of soldiers to obey officers, workers' strikes in factories that often sought legitimate—or seemingly legitimate—economic demands, and the expropriation of the landed estates by the peasants. Lenin used this situation, he did not create it, let alone predict its outcome. He recognized what few personalities have perceived either before or since: that it was possible to bend a "sacred" revolutionary doctrine—Marxism—using whatever means came to hand, and no matter how unlikely or unpalatable such measures appeared to contemporaries.

NEW SOVIET ANALYSES

April 10, 1990 marked the 120th anniversary of Lenin's birth. Consequently several Soviet historians saw fit to commit to paper their latest assessments of the founder of the Soviet state. We will confine ourselves here to looking at two of these analyses which are most pertinent to our topic, by Georgii Smirnov, Director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism with the Central Committee of the CPSU, and by Sergii Grabovsky and Kostyantín Maleev. Both represent examples of research that has had to take into consideration some of the new thinking about Lenin and his role in the foundation of a totalitarian and Stalinist state.

Smirnov observed that the opponents of Lenin and Marx had already begun to publish sharply critical articles against Lenin and his vision of socialism, and about the ideological affinity between Lenin and Stalin. It has been alleged, he noted, that Lenin himself was

the founder of the "administrative-command" system and the repressive tactics in politics. Smirnov himself adheres to the view that it was Lenin's successors who distorted his true policies, that Lenin was blessed with the foresight to anticipate a possible victory of socialism in a few countries or even one country, rather than throughout Europe or the world. In contrast to social democrats in Europe, Lenin was prepared to try to build a socialist society, he added, in Russia. In short, Lenin concentrated first on the immediate political tasks and then turned to the creation of a "civilized" socialism. In this way, while the revolution in October 1917 may have appeared premature, it was not a mistake and marked a complete break with the past.

Smirnov maintains that Lenin never possessed a finalized program for revolutionary change, but developed his ideas "en route"—a comment that lends credence to our own theory. However, he states that Lenin believed in the authority of the Soviets as the organ not only of the armed uprising, but also of administration and self-government. In a clearcut attempt to equate Lenin with what he perceives as the laudable Soviet policies of 1990, the author then attempts to demonstrate Lenin's preoccupation with the democratic nature of the Soviets, their annual election of new personnel and regular leadership changes. Where, then, does this judgment leave the Communist Party, Lenin's personal creation and the consequent holder of unlimited authority for some seven decades?

According to Smirnov, Lenin prepared the party for revolution, regarded it as a military-political organization, and the "vanguard" of the working class which must struggle with the forces of counter-revolution. At the same time, nonetheless, he allegedly expressed concern about its democracy and openness, being constantly concerned that the party take part in legal forms of political activity after the first revolution of February 1917. Lenin, it is held, fiercely attacked the "Leftist" European Communist Parties that ignored work in parliaments and the tactics of compromise. Once the party had come to power, therefore, Lenin relied on general party discussions to resolve complex questions; he paid considerable attention to the forms and methods of party work among the masses.¹⁰

This interpretation of Lenin's intentions is perplexing. It appears to confuse compromise and flexibility. It is not apparent from the discussion whether the Bolsheviks were being persuaded to take part in the democratic process, perhaps as quasi reformers or—as is

well known—to simply “curse the bourgeoisie” on the direct advice of Lenin. Smirnov is at pains to disassociate Lenin’s party from that developed by Stalin. If Lenin had a fault, then this, he concedes, was his failure to create reliable institutions of democracy that would present a serious barrier to the “ambitious pretensions of certain party leaders,” and the party was thus unable to protect itself against the Stalinist dictatorship and its crimes. But one would surely face problems were one to embark on a quest to establish that Lenin was ever unduly concerned with developing institutions of democracy or indeed that he ever had anything but contempt for the democratic processes of his era.

Smirnov is a little more convincing in his analyses of two other facets of the Lenin question: Lenin and the current conception of socialism; and Lenin and the New Political Thinking.¹¹ He acknowledges that in the past the Communist Party leadership has sanctified the Leninist conception of socialism, and sharply differentiated between Lenin’s approach and that of other European and Russian socialists. However, he comments, neither Marx nor Lenin could have foreseen the resilience and future development of capitalism. Socialism today—and he singles out Mikhail Gorbachev as the prime mover in this direction—must be linked to the processes of the development of world civilization. This approach might perhaps be summarized as an implicit desire to extract the more desirable facets of capitalism for application to the socialist system.

The greatest assets of popular civilization, says the author, are “democracy and freedom.” These assets must now be fulfilled by socialist content, and particularly by popular self-government. Observing the 1990 Soviet scene, Smirnov cautions that noting the development of international problems that were nurtured in the Brezhnev period (1964–82), the party was seeking to ensure that national movements toward economic sovereignty and national culture must not take place to the detriment of other peoples, to the Soviet Union, or to perestroika. Is this concept related to Leninist thought? In his second section on new political thinking, Smirnov maintains that Lenin was a supporter of peaceful coexistence between the Soviet Union and the encircling capitalist states.

Thus although Lenin and his followers “dreamed” of a world revolution, when this latter did not come to pass, Lenin advanced the concept of a peaceful coexistence with “workers and peasants of all nations.” (Smirnov does not elaborate on the thorny issue

that the workers and peasants were not in authority in "all nations"). In consequence, with the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, thanks to Lenin's vision, it was possible for the Soviet Union and the Western democracies to form an anti-Hitler coalition: nations with different social and political systems could thus unite against a perceived threat to civilization. In today's world, he appended, events such as the 1986 Chernobyl disaster had revealed to societies the dangers of nuclear war and thus similar "constructive decisions"—similar alliances of opposing systems—were once again conceivable. This seemingly naive view of historical development conveniently omits the German-Soviet Pact and indeed the traditional hostility of British politicians in particular to an Anglo-Soviet alliance in the months preceding the German invasion of the Soviet Union.¹²

Grabovsky and Maleev begin their article with the rather surprising premise that "we do not know Lenin," that despite the plethora of publications of Lenin's works (a new seventy-volume collection is planned to supersede the current fifty-five-volume edition) and biographical accounts, there have been serious gaps in information.¹³ Events have been recalled "superficially" and dogmatic and apologetic accounts have precluded an objective assessment of the founder of the USSR. Lenin has suffered from a "pseudo-religious divinization," they point out, and thus it is high time to provide some new assessments of Lenin based on his actions, comments and his will. First of all, they emphasize, Lenin was a politician, a man who dwelled on politics for twenty-four hours a day. Unfortunately, however, Lenin's takeover resulted in several immoral acts and it is not possible to disassociate him from these misdeeds.

In a brief summary which effectively refutes much of Smirnov's argument (though there is no reference to his articles), the authors cite the Red Terror and the Kronstadt Rising as examples of a revolution gone astray. Workers who supported the revolution in October 1917 in Petrograd were striking en masse three years later. Above all, the policy of War Communism—which as we have noted is regarded as a temporary expedient by Lenin's supporters—in the view of the authors must be regarded as a fundamental mistake, a direct repudiation of the "democratic principles" established by the party program. When the New Economic Policy was finally estab-

lished, the authors state, it was to have been merely a temporary expedient rather than a permanent policy. In other words, we have here the more radical approach: the policies of Lenin, his thinking and actions, already in his own time had led to serious breaches with official policy. But why had this development occurred?

Grabovsky and Maleev delve into Lenin's philosophy and find much there that was derived from Hegel rather than Marx, such as the convincing Hegelian belief in absolute truth, the explanation of the "shining mystery of historical progress." But Lenin was to reject the future possibility of a Stalin dictatorship, and he exhibited the ability to recognize the mistakes of the past. Thus those who speak in the Gorbachev period of a "return to Lenin," they point out, must be very sure as to which Lenin they are referring: the Lenin in the time of War Communism or the Lenin at the time of the New Economic Policy, when he had changed policy and moved in a more definite direction.

Early in 1991, *Pravda* published the results of a survey on Lenin, based on the responses of 2,000 people. Though it was not made clear when the survey took place, its results revealed that while the opposition to Lenin may be somewhat less than many in the West have surmised, it is nonetheless significant in certain circles. Among scholars, for example, 19 percent gave Lenin's work a negative rating, as did 12 percent of engineers, and a remarkable 36 percent of Muscovites. Mikhail Gorshkov, the Deputy Director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, was quoted as saying that anti-Leninism was very much a Moscow phenomenon and not widespread in other parts of the country. But this is surprising. One would have expected that the relatively sophisticated urban population in the Soviet capital would be more familiar with Lenin's works and deeds than most. One might make the claim that those who know Lenin the best approve of him the least, according to this survey. But 59 percent of those polled gave a positive assessment of Lenin's personality, and a rather large 31 percent declined to offer an opinion, so it is difficult to reach any firm conclusions from the survey.¹⁴

Both new and past analyses of this complex topic suffer from some very fundamental problems, not least the attempt to equate the past time of Lenin with the present era of glasnost and perestroika. Soviet historiography, in the light of Lenin's 120th anniversary, has clearly advanced from a general, slavish following of

Lenin to a more discerning characterization of the Soviet leader as advocating both wise and foolish policies. They may be said to concur that Lenin's policies underwent a very basic change in the spring of 1921 (and there is no general consensus on earlier events such as the disbanding of the Constituent Assembly). Soviet historians and journalists now argued that even if the NEP was a stopgap policy, it was to become the accepted policy.

And yet there are surely grounds for advocating that Lenin's basic policy never changed, that he was prepared to acknowledge the wisdom of any policy that would enable the Bolsheviks to maintain power. The NEP and War Communism might be seen as policies that furthered this goal at a particular time. There is little in Lenin's published works to indicate a dramatic change of heart. In fact, one of the difficulties of the cited approaches is that neither takes into account the impact of physical illness on Lenin's activities. If he was incapacitated from early 1922 onward, then how much impact did Lenin really have on the direction of the NEP, for example? To try, in any case, to extract the Soviet founder from his own time to justify or rationalize present day processes is to negate objectivity. It simply cannot be done. The fact that it is being attempted reflects the crisis of legitimacy that is facing the Soviet state, engendered partly by the demise of the Communist Party itself in the present era.

Furthermore, can it be said with accuracy that Lenin "rejected" the notion of a Stalin dictatorship? It is unclear whether Lenin (unlike Trotsky) ever conceived of the nature of the future dictatorship or the growing role of the General Secretary in party and Soviet life. It could be argued that the mere fact that Stalin insulted Lenin's wife Krupskaya played a larger part in the dispute between Lenin and Stalin than did the latter's systematic accumulation of power. Lenin's Testament, in addition, summarized the strong points and failings of the party's leaders and most trusted men, not the party's enemies—which would have required a much longer treatise. Lenin's final call for Stalin's removal, then, may have represented a fit of pique, such as that directed at Kamenev and Zinoviev after their failure to support the Bolshevik takeover of the reins of state. The anger soon passed and Lenin was known to forgive, if not forget. To maintain therefore that there was an explicit repudiation of an anticipated future Stalinist state appears far-fetched.

THE UKRAINIAN PERSPECTIVE

The history of Ukraine in the post-revolutionary period is well known, and requires no reiteration here. Moreover, it can be argued that in the 1920s, Ukraine enjoyed a period of cultural revival that remained unmatched until the present day. The first decade of "bolshevism" therefore brought many benefits to an area that had remained culturally, politically and economically repressed under the tsarist regime.¹⁵ Stalinism in the form of purges and repression came to Ukraine only in the 1930s. Ironically that same Stalinist system contributed significantly to Ukrainian nationalist sentiment with one single act: the uniting of Ukrainian territories after the Soviet annexation of Poland in September 1939. Further annexations followed in the latter stages of the Second World War and beyond, such as the permanent occupation of northern Bukovyna and Bessarabia (small sections of which were given to the Ukrainian SSR), and the transfer of Transcarpathian Ukraine from Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1945.

A further point—and one that might be questioned in some circles—needs to be made here, namely that the impact of Stalin on Ukraine in the 1930s has not always received impartial treatment in the present period. The question of Stalinism generally was perhaps overworked by Soviet historians in the late 1980s, to the extent that today there is reportedly a decreased interest in the subject. But it was hardly treated historically. That Stalin was one of history's tyrants is clear. What is less clear and has not yet been made apparent was the degree to which Stalin was personally responsible for the various evils within the system, and how far they affected the various regions.¹⁶ In Soviet history, there have been recent scholarly attempts by Western historians to show that Stalin's culpability for events such as the purges and the Ukrainian Famine may have been exaggerated.¹⁷ Such studies indicate not merely that there is disagreement on such controversial issues, but also that despite numerous works, definitive studies lie in the future.

The Ukrainian Famine, for example, was a pivotal event in Ukrainian history. For some fifty years, the USSR authorities denied that such a famine had ever taken place. By the end of 1987, it was grudgingly admitted that there had been such a famine. Within three years, Soviet historians, led by Stanislav Kulchytsky of the In-

stitute of History, Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, were adhering to the previously unimaginable concept that the famine was an act of genocide against Ukrainians as a national group. The change of views has been generally welcomed in the West as heralding a greater openness on the part of Soviet historians. Indeed it has. But it had not necessarily resulted in better history or improved historical methodology. It has always been problematic when historians of a nationality group portray themselves as the victims of genocide. It is easier to produce evidence to bolster such a supposition than it is to ask questions based on historical sources after protracted study. All too often in the Soviet Union, history has been used to support political stands. As has been pointed out by three Soviet historians, accurate research into the events in the Ukrainian countryside in the first half of 1933 is only just beginning.¹⁸

Even in the West, the lack of information about the famine in Ukraine from the Soviet Union has not always contributed to rational study of the topic. Although the works of Robert Conquest and James E. Mace have contributed much to our knowledge of the subject,¹⁹ dissension has centered on the number of famine victims and the motives behind the famine. Thus there has arisen the question whether the famine was deliberately implemented by Stalin as an instrument of state policy or whether it was a result of Soviet economic failure, or grain requisitions that were used mainly for export.²⁰ The point here is that there are as yet no accepted or acceptable viewpoints on the subject; Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1930s has been shown by Conquest and others to have been a ruthless process imposed from above. Repression in Ukraine was equal to or greater than in any other Soviet region. But the motives behind this repression have not yet been determined.

How far was Stalinism in Ukraine perpetrated against a potentially recalcitrant nation of the Soviet empire, and how far did it take place because Ukraine was an economically vital region that could not be permitted to go astray? Why were Soviet leaders like Lazar Kaganovich prepared to tolerate and even promote Ukrainization in the 1920s, and then to eradicate it so viciously in the 1930s?²¹ Where does Ukraine fit into the Kremlin power struggle that preceded the assassination of Kirov? There have been some notable works in this area of study,²² but the question can be reiterated as more evidence from Soviet archives finds its way into Soviet studies.

Several conclusions can be drawn tentatively. First, Ukraine was regarded primarily as a source of grain for the Soviet state, both for the industrial proletariat and for export. The haste with which Ukraine was collectivized can be seen from documents of the period. Further, Stalin's view in the 1930s was that the acquisition of such grain must take priority over all other issues. Even the relatively benign Provisional Government of March 1917 had soon imposed a monopoly on grain acquisitions, and the new Soviet government had imposed War Communism, whereby grain was extracted from the richer stratum of the peasantry with the aid of Committees of Poor Peasants. Collectivization and the eventual famine can possibly be perceived as part of this same strategy. Guaranteed agricultural supplies were important to the Stalin regime as a means by which industrialization could be secured. Ukraine, then, as a major grain center was subjected to the various agrarian processes more quickly and more rigorously than other regions.

Second, the 1920s had shown that Ukraine was a developing national state, but Stalin's attitude toward Ukrainians as a nation, even after his 1945 toast to the Russian people, was inconsistent. At times, it appeared that Ukrainians as a whole were being subjected to repression; at others, this policy was reversed (witness the "gift" of the Crimean peninsula to Ukraine after the Second World War, or Ukraine's membership in the United Nations, a symbolic but not unimportant act). There is nothing in Stalin's writing to indicate that he objected to Ukrainians *per se*, and indeed some evidence to suggest that he had once held a moderate view on the nationalities question (in developing the Bolshevik's nationality platform in 1912, for example). Regarding the years of the famine once again, there is every reason to suggest that Stalin was prepared to extract grain from the villages at a high cost in lives. It is much more difficult, however, to demonstrate that he did so in order to destroy Ukraine—or a Ukrainian intelligentsia—as a nation. If this were the case, then why did the famine end in 1934, and why did it only penetrate certain villages and not others?²³ Stalin, if nothing else, was usually thorough in carrying out repressions.

Clearly, nationalist deviations in the Communist movement or any movement that did not conform totally to the Soviet line within the Comintern, were dealt with with the utmost harshness. Thus the Communist Party of Western Ukraine was dissolved over a year

before the Soviet annexation of this region. But as historians have shown, the Poles were treated even more cruelly than the Ukrainians when they fell within Stalin's grasp. Even further afield, it transpires that many of the most horrific atrocities of the Spanish Civil War were carried out by Stalin's NKVD against those of the republican side who did not conform totally to the Soviet political line.²⁴ This implies less a genocidal attitude toward Ukrainians on the part of the Soviet regime, than a distrust of outside forces that increased, the further afield those forces might be. Hence, Stalin was quite content to see the German Socialists and Communists fight battles in the streets of Berlin rather than unite against Hitler.²⁵ If the Soviet Union could not control a movement, he was happy to see its demise.

All the same, unlike the Spanish Republic or Poland, Ukraine lay within the Soviet Union and thus had to be integrated as an important economic and political unit. As with other republics, the Ukrainian leadership became increasingly compliant as the 1930s progressed. By its end, Nikita Khrushchev was at the helm, a man trusted totally by Stalin and one of the few close associates not to arouse his suspicion. Khrushchev's position had become more difficult by the 1940s, and thus, Lazar Kaganovich replaced him for a brief period. Stalinizing an independent-minded Western Ukraine was to prove more difficult than an already heavily russified and largely Russophone Eastern Ukraine. But in both cases, local Communist parties were mistrusted and eventually purged thoroughly, so that a "homegrown movement" no longer existed. The hierarchy was carefully selected from the center, and for the most part owed little territorial allegiance to the areas within its governance.

In conclusion, one can argue that Stalinism was imposed in Ukraine gradually and with increasing ruthlessness and force. Although we have suggested that Leninism led directly to Stalinism, and that the rule of Stalin was not a separate era in Soviet history, one can still posit that as long as Lenin's influence remained (or, perhaps, as long as Stalin's power and that of his close associates was restricted), Ukraine enjoyed some freedom to go its own way. But by the early 1930s, Stalin and Stalinism had become more firmly established in the Soviet Union, and Ukraine was brought to heel. In terms of the cruelty of the regime established, then one's conclusions become relative: one can compare the 1931 famine in Kazakhstan with the Ukrainian famine of 1932–33.²⁶ Both revealed

an inhuman attitude toward the peasantry. By and large, Stalinism was a uniform system to which all society was subjected, though it occurred with different levels of severity in different regions. Much depended on the local elite. Stalinism may be perceived as the actions of an established group of leaders, using terror first to intimidate the potential opponents of the system; second, as a means of economic advancement; and third, as an instrument of cultural and political repression.

In Ukraine's case, there may be a case to be made that Stalin's intentions in the 1930s were genocidal, but it has not yet been proven. The historian is on firmer ground, however, in asserting that the regime's attitude to Ukraine was particularly severe, and indeed was even acknowledged as such in 1953 with the removal of L.G. Melnikov as First Party Secretary, reportedly (among other reasons) for russifying Western Ukraine. Western Ukraine was more nationally conscious, unfettered by the two decades of Soviet rule as in Eastern Ukraine, and with a nontsarist past. Throughout this study, one can trace a merciless policy toward this region, which resisted the imposition of Stalinism with armed force. Moreover, the events of the German-Soviet war had left Stalin a jaundiced and embittered man. In theory, he ended the war as triumphant victor; in reality it had revealed the unpopularity of his regime, prompting his troops to surrender in huge numbers to the Germans at the onset of the war. The late 1940s, therefore, were not to be a period of moderation, heralded by military success, but years of further warfare, deportations, famine and bloodshed. All these processes were clearly evident in the establishment of Stalinism in Western Ukraine.

--- 2 Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia Under Soviet Occupation in 1939-1941

THE MECHANICS OF ANNEXATION

ON SEPTEMBER 17, 1939, in partial fulfillment of the conditions of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Red Army, under the command of General Tymoshenko, invaded Eastern Poland, following the German invasion of Western Poland some two weeks earlier. The occupied territory, which contained large Ukrainian and Belorussian populations,¹ subsequently became known as Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia. In the short period of twenty-one months up to the German invasion of June 1941, the Soviet authorities succeeded in bringing about a major transformation in rural landholding. Several articles have been devoted to the annexation of Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia,² but they have concentrated mainly on political and military issues. Very little has been written in the West about the changes that occurred in rural life and thus it is worthwhile to investigate the takeover of these territories largely from the rural dimension.³

Soviet claims that their soldiers were welcomed by the local population in 1939 may be exaggerated, but it does seem that the general attitude of both Western Ukrainians and Western Belorussians was one of passive acceptance. Polish rule had not been popular, particularly in Western Ukraine where the future of the Galician area had long been a bone of contention between Poles and Ukrainians. Less plausible is the Soviet assertion that the invasion was intended to rescue Ukrainian and Belorussian kin from the "yoke of

Polish oppression.”⁴ In the interwar period, the Soviet leaders had frequently denounced Polish rule in these areas and demanded their “reunion” with Russia.⁵ The usual line was that the Polish government was planning to use its eastern borderlands as a springboard for the invasion of the USSR (one should remember that the Polish-Soviet war had ended in a stalemate only in 1920, so that such suspicions had some foundation). Annexation of the area would thus prevent this and at the same time provide a buffer zone between the USSR and expansionist Nazi Germany.

After the invasion of Western Ukraine, the Poles were treated cruelly. Officials of the former government, landowners, and anyone with the least authority were placed under arrest. According to a recent Soviet account, Poles were deported in three separate waves. First, a decree issued under the name of USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, Lavrentii Beria, of December 29, 1940, declared that Polish military settlers should be removed from Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia. They were herded into fifty-five railroad wagons and deported to Siberia, the Komi ASSR, and Kazakhstan. A second and broader decree of March 2, 1940 included families of Polish officials, landowners, and gendarmes who had been arrested and put into camps shortly after the Soviet invasion. A third decree of April 10, 1940 completed the process. Altogether, it is estimated that almost 1.2 million Poles were subjected to deportation, though some were subsequently released when the German-Soviet war broke out.⁶

For a brief period the area experienced a spell of Ukrainization similar to that carried out in the Soviet Ukraine during the 1920s. Ukrainian newspapers began to appear in the major towns, Ukrainian schools were opened, and a Ukrainian university was established at Lviv. At first, Soviet authorities relied on Temporary Administrations to govern the towns and on Peasant Committees for the villages. Many of the latter had reportedly been set up before the arrival of the Red Army.⁷ In October the new rulers held elections in Lviv which were carefully stage-managed by the Red Army (soldiers of which were allowed to vote) and a committee, run by two prominent Soviet citizens, General F. M. Eremenko and S. M. Horbatenko. Moreover, two special representatives of the Soviet government, O. E. Korniiuchuk and M. S. Hrechukha, the president of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, arrived in Lviv to act in a supervisory capacity.⁸ Delegates were nominated from a “bloc of

party and nonparty" people, and all attempts to put forward rival candidates were defeated. Practically all the delegates were Ukrainians (many may even have been members of the Red Army), further confirming the dispossession of the Polish population. Thus in the Stanyslaviv district, where Poles made up about 22 per cent of the population before the invasion,⁹ only four of the 313 candidates were Polish.

Once elected, the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine acted quickly. On October 27, 1939 it "carried out the unanimous will of the liberated people" and proclaimed the establishment of Soviet power on all territories of Western Ukraine. On October 29 it issued another proclamation asking the All-Union Supreme Soviet to receive Western Ukraine into the Ukrainian SSR, thereby "completing the reunification of Western Ukrainians in a single state." The Supreme Soviet duly ratified the proclamation on November 1, 1939. On December 4, a Soviet *ukaz* abolished the former Polish voivodships and created the Soviet oblasts of Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Drohobych, Stanyslaviv and Ternopil within the Ukrainian SSR.¹⁰

Soviet rule in Western Ukraine began with a land reform, the nationalization of industry and trade (banks were nationalized several months later), and the implementation of an eight-hour day. Unemployment, which had been a major problem in Polish towns, was alleviated not only by the deportation of Poles, but also by moving 20,000 Western Ukrainians to the eastern oblasts of Ukraine, mainly to enterprises and the oil industry of the Donbass.¹¹ The zloty, which had been equivalent to about twelve rubles before the Soviet invasion, was devalued to one ruble, which gave the Red Army soldiers considerable purchasing power. By the end of December, however, the zloty was taken out of circulation and all bank deposits in the currency were requisitioned. The Ukrainian share of the urban population increased gradually, and between 1939 and 1941 rose from 18.6 to 29.2 per cent.¹²

In Western Belorussia, the process of integration was similar. Soldiers of the Red Army and members of the Communist Party of Belorussia played the dominant role in the Temporary Administrations and organized elections for the People's Assembly, which duly proclaimed the reunion of Western Belorussia with the Belorussian SSR. A law of the Supreme Soviet dated November 2, 1939 created five new oblasts within the Belorussian Republic, namely Brest,

Bialystok, Baranovichi, Pinsk, and Vilnius (excluding Vilnius city, which was eventually ceded to Lithuania).¹³ Evidence suggests that in the Belorussian area the Poles were treated somewhat more leniently. Many of those arrested in the early days were subsequently released by the Soviet police.¹⁴

THE LAND REFORM: WESTERN UKRAINE

During the period of Polish rule in Western Ukraine, the land question had been a subject of much contention. The rural regions were overpopulated, and landholding was dominated by the great landowners, who owned over 47 per cent of the land,¹⁵ while over 80 per cent of them were Polish.¹⁶ By contrast, some 16 per cent of the peasant households were landless, and 76 per cent of households had under two hectares of land.¹⁷ The Polish government exacerbated the situation with three laws; in 1920 it declared that the less densely populated regions to the east were to be distributed among demobilized soldiers; the Land Reform act of 1925 saw a further allotment of Ukrainian lands among the Polish settlers and military colonists; and finally in 1936 it was declared that a strip of land thirty kilometers from the Soviet border was directly subject to state authority and could, if necessary, be confiscated by the state.¹⁸ In addition, the prices of land in the Ukrainian regions of Poland were artificially kept much higher than in Western Poland and were probably quite uneconomic. The reason was that the Polish government considered Eastern Galicia an integral part of Poland, and was thus unwilling to allow large-scale Ukrainian landholding in the area. Although some Ukrainians may have found paid jobs, rural overpopulation ensured that the majority did not. Many Ukrainians emigrated to the West in the 1930s to alleviate their plight.¹⁹

The Western Ukrainian farmer in the interwar period was thus treated as a second-class citizen by the state. He was short of land and so had little need of draught animals: 70.7 per cent of households were either horseless or owned a single horse.²⁰ Those who had small farms used a variety of primitive tools to cultivate the land, most notably the plough, scythe, sickle, and wooden harrow. The Lviv region had one harvester for every 2,200 hectares sown.²¹ It is only fair to note that, despite such drawbacks to agricultural production, the harvests on Western Ukrainian farms were still considerably higher (in terms of the grain yields per hectare) than

those on the collectivized East Ukrainian farms and, no matter how harsh the Polish regime may have been, there were no famines in Western Ukraine such as that of 1932–33 in the eastern regions.²² This comparison, however, is a reflection more on the nature of the Soviet regime and agricultural policy in Eastern Ukraine than on any efficiency or relative prosperity in Western Ukraine.

Immediately after the election, the Western Ukrainian People's Assembly formally announced the confiscation of the lands of the great landowners, the monasteries, and the state officials. This land was expropriated and transferred to the control of the Peasant Committees,²³ which had the sole right to distribute it, until the area was officially incorporated into the Soviet Union. By the end of 1939, a total of 2,753,000 hectares of land in the former Polish Ukraine had reportedly been confiscated from the landlords, "kulaks"²⁴ and monasteries; this represented 29.9 per cent of the total land of these oblasts. The majority of kulaks, however, were apparently left alone in the first few months of Soviet rule. By the end of the year land tenure had changed substantially. In eight districts of Lviv Oblast 59.5 per cent of all farms now possessed between two and seven hectares of land.²⁵ By April 1940 little had changed; 62.7 per cent of all farms possessed between two and ten hectares of land, whereas 3 per cent of all farms had more than ten hectares of land.²⁶

The Soviet government also donated to the *bidnyak* (poor) stratum of peasants about 90,000 horses, 2,000 head of oxen, 86,000 head of cattle, 19,000 pigs and 32,000 sheep, which had been expropriated from landowner estates.²⁷ If one bears in mind that the number of needy households was over 470,000, then one can deduce that the amount of livestock actually distributed would not have changed the farmers' situation significantly. It is probable that much of the livestock that the state obtained through expropriation was retained for future state and collective farms. In addition, the question arises as to whether the needy farmers had sufficient land and resources to maintain livestock in the first place.

The distribution of land went according to the following pattern: first, lands were transferred to the landless and "land-hungry" farms, and second, to those peasant households that had less than the maximum norm established by the Soviet state, i.e., five hectares in those raions close to industrial centers (or, in the case of Western Ukraine, where there was little industry in 1939, potential

industrial centers, such as Lviv), and seven hectares in other regions.²⁸ Altogether, 474,000 peasant households received more than 1,136,000 hectares of landlord lands, over 84,000 horses, 1,600 oxen, 76,000 head of cattle, 14,000 pigs, and 27,000 head of sheep.²⁹ The figures sound impressive, but more than half the land remained undistributed and was used mainly to create 180 state farms (sovkhozy) and a variety of auxiliary agricultural enterprises, in which many "formerly unemployed" agricultural workers were employed.³⁰ Thus the problem of land shortage endured for some time after the Soviet takeover (in Drohobych Oblast, for example, 99,050 households received a total of 90,000 hectares of land),³¹ even though one of the justifications given for it at the time was to alleviate landlessness among Western Ukrainian peasants.³²

It is possible, however, that the Soviet state deliberately kept the peasants short of land for two reasons. First, this would render them "natural allies" of the Soviet authorities in the forthcoming "struggle" against the kulaks, in the class war in the villages. Second, it would make them more amenable to the idea of joining the collective farms, once the latter were established, on the grounds that their economic situation could hardly become any worse than it already was.

Although the Polish landowners had been removed or had fled, the churches, military settlers, and the majority of kulaks were essentially left alone until the end of the year.³³ Ivasyuta maintains that the peasant households were freed from various taxes and debts, but another Soviet source indicates that only 35 per cent of the poorer stratum was freed from taxation,³⁴ which would suggest that the authorities were already beginning to differentiate between the peasants.

After the initial redistribution of land in late 1939 West Ukrainian agricultural administration was organized along Soviet lines. On January 15, 1940, the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars divided the oblast land administrations into different departments: an agricultural institute, which included a mechanization sector and an organization department; a planning and finance department; an institute of land regulation and improvement; a sector for selecting and preparing cadres; a veterinary institute; and a department of accounting and business institute.³⁵

The Soviets assigned only 1.2 million rubles from the state budget for the development of the economy of Western Ukraine in

1940, which suggests that no radical economic transformation was anticipated. However, thirty million rubles were set aside for agricultural needs in the local areas and forty million rubles for the organization of Machine-Tractor Stations (MTS) and the mechanization of agriculture. The agricultural potential of the region was obvious, so investment was put into the creation of essentially political mechanisms like the MTS to bring the area more fully under Soviet control.

The official land reform decree in Western Ukraine, however, was not issued until March 24, 1941. This stipulated that in the Galician oblasts the norm for peasant households was to be seven hectares of land, and ten hectares in certain areas (usually the mountain regions). In Volyn and Rivne, the norm was ten hectares, and fifteen hectares in certain raions that possessed a smaller percentage of arable land.³⁶ The most notable point about the reform, however, apart from its relative tardiness, was that the bulk of the peasants clearly possessed less land than the norm permitted. Again, this suggests that Soviet policy was to keep landholding to the minimum, so that the poorer stratum would be attracted to collective farming. Nevertheless, the issue of the land reform suggests that a more concentrated attack on kulak farms was in the offing. A register of peasant property had been compiled in 1940, the purpose of which seems to have been to evaluate kulak landholding.³⁷

After six months of Soviet rule, then, the Western Ukrainian areas were dominated by small subsistence farms. They did not have an urban population to support and, now that the non-Ukrainian landowners had been removed, were enjoying a brief period of relative prosperity.

THE LAND REFORM: WESTERN BELORUSSIA

In Western Belorussia before the Soviet invasion of 1939 there were reportedly 37,000 farms belonging to Polish civil colonists, and more than 35,000 in the possession of Polish military colonists. For the most part Belorussian peasants subsisted on small plots and were obliged to work for Polish landlords or to offer their services as seasonal workers in neighboring countries in order to provide for their families.³⁸ According to a Soviet source, more than 43 per cent of all households possessed an arable land area of under five hectares.³⁹ It is ironic, therefore, in view of Soviet complaints about the

numerous minute peasant holdings as evidence of the Polish "yoke," that one of the results of Soviet land policy in Western Belorussia was to increase the bidnyak statum. Why was this?

The reasons are to be found in Soviet agrarian policy and peasant reaction to it. In Western Ukraine, Soviet land reform brought about an increase in the size of the middle peasant (*serednyak*) stratum. We can surmise that the authorities pursued similar aims in the Belorussian territories. Thus land was given out (on a limited scale) to households already in existence—the Soviets did not create new landholdings—in order to strengthen the lower and middle classes of peasants. These classes would then provide a "natural ally" for the state in its future struggle with the kulak class, a concomitant feature of every Soviet collectivization campaign. Many *serednyak* peasants, however, saw the situation differently, it is safe to suggest. Rather than perceive themselves as "allies" of the state, they saw themselves as potential kulaks, since once the designated kulaks had been removed, they themselves would become the "rich" peasants. Thus they may well have divided up their lands among their families in order to avoid being so categorized in the future. After all, the recent experiences of collectivization in the eastern oblasts would have been known to them both through Communist Party links and through East-West migration during the famine period.

The land reform in Western Belorussia, like that in Western Ukraine, was carried out in two stages, but was less drastic in its expropriations. Land was socialized, but initially only those large landowners (presumably mainly Polish) and "large" kulak households possessing more than fifty hectares of land were subject to confiscation.⁴⁰ So, the authorities did not merely divide the peasants into three main categories of kulak, *serednyak*, and *bidnyak*, but made distinctions within the kulak category. Thus in addition to bolstering a middle class of farms noted above, the authorities also permitted a relatively strong class of kulaks to survive. This may have been a ploy to foster discontent—the obvious motive—or it may have been "forced" on the authorities by circumstances, i.e., since collectivization had only just been completed in Eastern Belorussia, it would have been premature to engage in a large-scale transfer of personnel and resources to the western oblasts at this stage.

During the first stage of the land reform, which lasted approxi-

mately from October to December 1939, it is said that the poorest stratum of peasants (approximately 100,000 households) received altogether between 424,000 and 600,000 hectares of land.⁴¹ If one defines a "poor peasant household" as one possessing under five hectares of arable land (i.e., the figure used by the Soviet source), however, then about 275,000 households would have been eligible to receive confiscated land.⁴² This supports the theory of creating class divisions in the village, although some of this land was being held in readiness for the creation of state and collective farms.⁴³

The second stage of the reform took place in the first months of 1940. It was signalled by an assault on the farms of kulaks and military settlers.⁴⁴ This policy change was not immediately successful, however. As late as January 1941, according to a Soviet source, over 15 per cent of households still possessed more than ten hectares of land, hence a very sizable kulak stratum remained in the Western Belorussian village. By June 1941 a further 400,000 hectares of land had been distributed among 40,000 peasant households.⁴⁵ One assumes this was kulak land.

One reason for the continued prevalence of kulaks in Western Belorussia may have been the peasants' adherence to, or Soviet reluctance to disturb, the *khutor* farms. At the time of the Soviet invasion about 50 per cent of Western Belorussian peasants lived in *khutors*.⁴⁶ The *khutors*, a product of the Stolypin reform, were farms that were fully enclosed, as opposed to the open lands of the communes, or the *otrubs*, in which only the arable land was enclosed. The *khutor* farms developed complex patterns of crop rotation and were apparently quite successful in livestock raising. In the USSR during the first collectivization campaign of 1929–33, perhaps because of their relative value to Soviet agricultural production, the *khutor* farms were left out of the land confiscations. The order for their liquidation was given only on May 27, 1939, with the date for completion being September 1, 1940.⁴⁷

Since the elimination of *khutors* within the pre-1939 borders of the USSR was still under way at the time of the annexation of Western Belorussia, and since it was a complicated affair involving the integration of land subjected to careful crop rotation with general arable land, one can posit that the authorities were not anxious to become embroiled in a similar campaign at this stage in another area. Soviet writers acknowledge that it was because of the *khutors* that it took so long to begin the collectivization campaign in the

Baltic republics.⁴⁸ The passive resistance of Belorussians to the liquidation of the *khutors* probably added to Soviet problems.

ATTEMPTS TO STRENGTHEN RURAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

In July 1938, some fourteen months before the Soviet invasion of Eastern Poland, the Comintern on Stalin's orders had dissolved the Communist Party of Poland and its subordinate bodies, the Communist Parties of Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia.⁴⁹ The consequence of this action was that party life in the annexed areas had been devastated. It was necessary for the Soviet authorities to rebuild the party from scratch, by bringing in party workers from the eastern oblasts of Ukraine and Belorussia, and other areas of the USSR, in addition to trying to attract local support.

Thus before the start of the 1940–41 collectivization campaign, there were few Communists in Western Ukraine and the vast majority of these were located in the towns rather than in the countryside. Of 1,434 Communists operating in Lviv Oblast in October and November 1939, 631 were operating in industry and transport, and 272 in management work.⁵⁰ Thus there was need for a dual campaign: first, to raise the total numbers; second, to raise the proportion of members working in the countryside. Communist representation increased significantly. In Ternopil Oblast there were fewer than thirty Communists at the time of the annexation, but this number had increased to about 1,000 by mid-December.⁵¹ By April 1940 there were more than 16,000 Communists working in Western Ukraine, and this figure had increased to almost 37,000 by June 1941.⁵² But the vast majority of them were still working in the cities, and most were also outsiders with no native ties to the villages and towns in which they worked.

In the villages of Western Ukraine at the end of 1940, there were 1,176 primary party organizations and 189 raion organizations in operation. Most of the former were very small. Of the 319 primary party organizations operating in Drohobych Oblast on January 1, 1941, seventy had fewer than five Communists, 109 had between six and ten Communists, and sixty had ten to fifteen Communists.⁵³ A similar situation existed in the other western oblasts. Although certain events, such as the election campaigns for the Ukrainian and All-Union Supreme Soviets in the spring of 1940, saw an influx of agitators into the villages, collectivization in the prewar period was

retarded by the lack of party workers, particularly from the local population.

In spring 1940 the Ukrainian and Belorussian Councils of People's Commissars began to set up their own Machine-Tractor Stations (MTS). The first MTS in the USSR had been established in the mid-1920s at the Shevchenko state farm in Odessa to help plow lands belonging to individual peasant farms.⁵⁴ They came under state control in 1932,⁵⁵ and thereafter became an important instrument of control over the kolkhozy because the latter were not permitted to own tractors and agricultural machines and so were dependent on the MTS, particularly at sowing and harvesting periods. Unlike the collective farms (in practice if not in theory), the MTS received orders not from the raion, but directly from the republican or oblast authorities, and this gave them an independent position in the villages.⁵⁶ In Western Ukraine in 1940, the task of the MTS was twofold. First, those established in areas where there were no kolkhozy (and none planned for the immediate future) were to help the poorer stratum of peasants, particularly those short of draught animals. Those created in areas which had kolkhozy, however, were to see to the latter's needs first and only afterward to those of individual peasants.

On March 25, 1940, 100 MTS were established in Western Ukraine, of which eighteen were in Volyn, ten in Drohobych, sixteen in Rivne, twenty in Lviv, fourteen in Stanyslaviv, and twenty-two in Ternopil oblasts.⁵⁷ A second decree of June 4, 1940 led to the organization of a further seventy-four MTS, with twelve in Volyn, seven in Drohobych, fourteen in Rivne, fourteen in Lviv, eleven in Stanyslaviv, and sixteen in Ternopil.⁵⁸ By the end of the year, each station possessed an average of fourteen tractors.⁵⁹ In Western Belorussia, 101 MTS were organized early in 1940 with an average at first of about ten tractors per station.⁶⁰ In both the Ukrainian and Belorussian cases, the number of MTS corresponded approximately to the total number of raions.

Soviet scholars of the pre-Gorbachev era have stressed the work carried out by these organizations. It is clear, however, that in their first months of operation the MTS in Western Ukraine were beset with problems. Thus in December 1940 the head of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars, L. P. Korniyets, pointed out that the plan for tractor work had been fulfilled by only 77 per cent overall, in Rivne by 66.4 per cent, and in Stanyslaviv by only 63.6

per cent.⁶¹ Korniyets also noted that the proposed six workshops for major repairs had not been set up in time and that only ninety-eight of the 174 MTS had constructed workshops for minor repairs. The plan for training tractor drivers in 1940 was underfulfilled, as was recruitment for the instruction schools. One can conclude therefore that the MTS were giving some aid to the peasantry economically, but that their chief function was as centers of political control.

SOCIALIST FARMS

The Soviet authorities were eager to demonstrate the "superiority" of large-scale farming and began to set up state farms in the spring of 1940 on the former landlord estates. These farms were considerably larger than the kolkhozy and were operated directly by the state. Nonetheless, in the western regions, they were readily supplied with machinery and seed. It is clear, however, that they were established at a much slower rate than the authorities desired. For example, on April 9, 1940, *Pravda* announced that forty-nine state farms were being created in Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia, but a report by Korniyets in the autumn noted that only six state farms had as yet been established in Western Ukraine.⁶² They appear to have been established with more success in Western Belorussia, however, since there were reportedly twenty-eight state farms in existence by the summer of 1940.⁶³

The first collective farms in Western Ukraine were formed in January 1940, in the villages of Ukhovetsk (in Kovel raion, Volyn Oblast) and Smordva (in Mlynivtsi Raion, Rivne Oblast),⁶⁴ and by the spring there were about 100 kolkhozy in existence. During the summer that figure was raised slowly; thus in Drohobych Oblast forty kolkhozy had been set up by May 15,⁶⁵ but by August 23, the figure had risen only to forty-five.⁶⁶ This should not be surprising, however, since few kolkhozy were constructed as a rule between sowing and harvesting. By the end of 1940 there were reportedly 556 collective farms in Western Ukraine, including 186 in Volyn, eighty-five in Ternopil, and eighty-four in Rivne.⁶⁷

By June 1, 1941 there were altogether 2,866 collective farms in Western Ukraine, embracing 205,137 peasant households, or 12.8 per cent of the total number. These households had in their possession 796,827 hectares of land, or 14.9 per cent of the total land area. The highest figures for collectivization were attained in the

oblasts of Volyn, with 21.5 per cent, and Ternopil, with 14.8 per cent, while the most "backward" regions were Lviv, with 8.1 per cent, and Drohobych, with 7.8 per cent.⁶⁸ In terms of size, the kolkhozy were small affairs. Whereas the collective farms of Eastern Ukraine, in 1939, averaged about 145 households and a sown area of 779 hectares,⁶⁹ in Western Ukraine the average size, in 1941, was fewer than seventy-six households and under 300 hectares of land.⁷⁰ Even these low figures are actually inflated since they include the distant Izmail Oblast, artificially linked to the Ukrainian SSR, though quite distinct, where each kolkhoz averaged 130 households and 888 hectares of land.

Part of the Bessarabian territory, which was reclaimed from Romania in June 1940, Izmail Oblast, originally known as Akkerman Oblast, was neither historically nor ethnically linked with Western Ukraine. The population there at the time of incorporation consisted of Moldavians (28.3 per cent), Ukrainians (25.4 per cent), Russians (27.4 per cent), and other nationalities (18.9 per cent).⁷¹ Isolated from the other newly-annexed Ukrainian territories and located in a geographical enclave, Izmail Oblast evidently presented few political problems for the Soviet authorities. In 1954 it was incorporated into Odessa Oblast.

In Galicia, the kolkhozy in Drohobych possessed on average a mere forty-six households and in Lviv fifty-five, with 113 and 165 hectares of land respectively. In Volhynia the farms were slightly larger, but still very small by Soviet standards.⁷² Plainly these kolkhozy had not been properly "consolidated" (to use the Soviet term) by the time the war with Germany broke out. Within a relatively short time, however, the Soviet authorities had made considerable progress in collectivizing Western Ukraine, particularly in the northern oblast of Volyn.⁷³

In Western Belorussia, progress was slower. We have already noted the problem of the *khutor* farms. Another reason was that, at the time of annexation, collectivization of the eastern oblasts of Belorussia had still not been completed. Whereas the Eastern Ukrainian oblasts had made substantial progress in moving peasant households into the kolkhozy in the early 1930s, and had completed the process by 1937,⁷⁴ the collectivization of Eastern Belorussia was completed only in early 1941.⁷⁵ Because the Ukrainian republic had completed the process earlier, experienced specialists, agricultural and party workers could be moved from the eastern to

the western oblasts. One should add that in support of their claim to be aiding their "blood brothers," the Soviet authorities wanted as far as possible to use Eastern Ukrainians in the Western Ukrainian campaign and Eastern Belorussians in the Western Belorussian campaign. Thus the Belorussians began at a clear disadvantage.⁷⁶

Nevertheless, the authorities began to collectivize Western Belorussia shortly after the establishment of the MTS there. By May 1940, 430 collective farms had been created, made up of 23,200 households, or 3.7 per cent of all households in Western Belorussia.⁷⁷ Therefore these kolkhozy were minute affairs, averaging about fifty-four households. By June 1941 the percentage of households collectivized had reportedly reached 6.7 per cent, but the 1,115 collective farms established comprised only 49,000 households, under forty-four per farm.⁷⁸ It seems that the authorities were more anxious to establish kolkhozy than to ensure that they were large and stable concerns. It is well known that Stalin's preference was for large farms, which were considered economically and politically more viable. Hence the progress made was largely ritualistic and the tiny kolkhozy would in any case have been short of technical equipment given that the MTS were not well provided with machinery at this time.

How strong were the kolkhozy in former Eastern Poland? Let us look at the better documented Western Ukrainian regions.

In Volyn Oblast, it is clear that the movement to the collectives, though it went further than in other areas, met with some opposition. One report speaks of the acute class struggle and alleges that "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" were spreading anti-Soviet rumours and intimidating the peasants.⁷⁹ The nationalists, however, by their own account, did not offer serious resistance to collectivization until after the war, and thus one must doubt these charges. It is conceivable that the resistance was instigated by the kulaks, and indeed the Polish census of 1931 suggests that there may have been a larger kulak stratum in Volyn than in the Galician oblasts. But we gain a different insight when we read in the same Soviet report that certain party organizations had been violating the "Leninist doctrine of voluntariness" and forcing reluctant peasants to join the kolkhozy.⁸⁰ Thus it appears that the authorities themselves, through their coercive methods against the *non-kulaks*, may have caused an upheaval in the villages. The resulting backlash would then have been labelled "kulak" and "nationalist" in an attempted

cover-up, as such opposition to collectivization had been in the past.⁸¹ In reality there was probably no peasant-inspired class war in the villages. The decree of the CC CPU of September 28, 1940, "Concerning mistakes permitted by the local party organizations of Rivne and Volyn oblasts," said as much when it noted the inadequate supervision over collectivization by the two oblast committees and the violations of the Model Charter.⁸²

On June 28, 1940 the bureau of the Lviv Oblast party committee noted that on the kolkhozy "1 Travnya" and "S. M. Kirov" of the Zhovtneve Raion, and "T. H. Shevchenko" of Sokaly Raion, no production and financial plans had been drawn up, no account of the work of collective farmers had been compiled, and the kolkhoz leaders had failed to strengthen "toiling discipline."⁸³ In neighboring Drohobych, the first oblast party conference, held in April 1940, lauded the successes in collectivization, but then referred to sabotage and counter-revolutionary agitation undertaken by the "enemy" against the new farms; for example, in Kalnykiv, a village in Mostyska Raion, twenty-six households that had applied to join the kolkhoz had later withdrawn, and similar developments had occurred in Zhuravnyky and Medynychi raions.⁸⁴ The likelihood is that these were "paper kolkhozy" that had been declared established by the raion authorities but did not yet exist in fact. The reluctant peasants may have added their names to the kolkhoz register under compulsion, but remained on their private farms. The presence of such kolkhozy casts doubt on the collectivization figures as cited in Soviet sources, since there may have been a large number of paper kolkhozy in the western oblasts. This had been a feature of Soviet collectivization in the 1920s and early 1930s.⁸⁵

Despite this instability, Soviet authorities have claimed that in 1940 the kolkhozy of Western Ukraine attained an average grain yield of eleven centners per hectare (including a wheat yield of 11.8),⁸⁶ and so demonstrate the superiority of collective farms. But even if we accept these figures they do not necessarily indicate superiority. In the first place, they were only slightly better than the average of 10.4 centners per hectare for individual farms over the ten years 1928-1937, while in the Volhynian area (Volyn and Rivne oblasts) it had been even higher.⁸⁷ In the autumn of 1940, less than 2 per cent of peasants were involved in Western Ukrainian kolkhozy and a disproportionately large amount of resources (which could not have been sustained if all peasant households had been collec-

tivized) were directed toward them. The benefits for those few kolkhozy in 1940 were numerous: taxation of households within them was 25 per cent less than on individual farms, their obligatory deliveries of grain, meat, and potatoes to the state were lower than those assigned for individual farms, they were able to acquire "with state aid" more draught animals than the individual farms.⁸⁸ Furthermore, since many of the kolkhozy were established on the estates confiscated from Polish landowners, it is likely that the quality of kolkhoz soil was better than that on individual farms, where the farmers had only the most primitive of resources during the period of Polish rule. In addition, a host of factors, such as labor intensity, the amount of fertilizer used, the quality of the seed, and the use of machinery in cultivating, harvesting, and threshing crops, preclude any significant comparisons between them.

Among the kolkhozy of Western Ukraine, the best results were achieved in Ternopil Oblast, where twenty-eight out of thirty-seven kolkhozy received a total harvest return for all crops of twelve centners per hectare.⁸⁹ In contrast, in Drohobych oblast, fourteen out of twenty-eight kolkhozy cultivated a harvest of under ten centners per hectare.⁹⁰ This was a reflection less of the way the kolkhozy were working than of the comparative agricultural conditions in these two oblasts. In the period of Polish rule, too, results in Ternopil had generally been better than in the Drohobych and Lviv regions.⁹¹

In terms of labor-day (*trudoden*) payments, the collective farms of Lviv Oblast, which had fulfilled their obligations to the state in good time, received 3.8 kilograms of grain, 2.7 kilograms of potatoes, and about two rubles cash per peasant labor day.⁹² Payments in Rivne were substantially higher, at five kilograms of grain, 5.2 kilograms of potatoes, and 6.51 rubles.⁹³ These handouts were not particularly high, although the fact that the authorities could keep input at a relatively high level while collectivization was low meant that they were substantially higher than those of the postwar years (when material resources had also been depleted as a result of the war and the German occupation).

That collectivization was accompanied by large-scale repression of the local population has been acknowledged by Soviet historians. The so-called "administrative-command system" was established in Western Ukraine, which reportedly violated the voluntary nature of the collectivization process. As in the 1930s in Eastern Ukraine, collectivization was accompanied by mass deportations of the recalci-

trant or reluctant population. It is estimated that between 10 and 20 percent of the population of Western Ukraine (estimated at eight million, of which seven million were Ukrainians) was deported in the period 1939–1941. The source comments that as a result of such unwarranted repressions, an opportunity was provided to the German invaders who were welcomed by the subject population.⁹⁴

On the eve of the German-Soviet war in June 1941, the Soviet rulers had made a slow start toward collectivization. The kolkhozy were short of livestock, unstable, and apparently encountering some passive (or even active) resistance. This early experiment in collective farming bears some resemblance to the relentless attack on the villages of Eastern Ukraine in the early 1930s, at least in terms of harsh repressions against the local population, including the elimination of alleged kulaks and deportations. However, the process of collectivization was only in its initial stages.

In Western Ukraine in 1939–1941, the Soviet regime was preoccupied with the defense of its western borderlands. In these circumstances, the transformation of the region cannot be compared with that of other regions in peacetime. The collectivization movement in Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia may have reached the level it did as a result of local officials demonstrating their zeal to follow this route. But as far as Stalin was concerned, the collectivization movement in the annexed areas of Eastern Poland was to be at this stage a limited affair. It was more useful to the authorities of course to develop a system that ensured a greater degree of control over potentially recalcitrant villages. But there was no centrally-inspired movement to raise agricultural production in “liberated” areas through the imposition of collective farming.

From the Soviet perspective, the eighteen months before the German invasion confirmed that Western Ukrainians (and, it seems, Western Belorussians) were opposed to collective farming. It had proved easier and more convenient—and this pattern was to be followed in the postwar period—to collectivize lands in Ukraine before those in Belorussia. But the benefit of this early period of collectivization to the Soviet authorities was that it provided a convenient precedent for the postwar years. It could be claimed that the process of collectivization had been interrupted by the German invasion and occupation of 1941–44. Thus the postwar years could be represented as a return to “normality,” and in Western Ukraine, at least, the first collective farms in the postwar years were restora-

tions of those that had existed in 1940–1941. The protracted political leadership of Ukrainian party chief Nikita Khrushchev also helped to foster the notion of continuity between the prewar and postwar eras.

As for the local inhabitants, the first six months of Soviet rule had seen some changes for the better. The Polish settlers, who had not been popular, had been removed and the landless and land-hungry households had received some land. Many rural residents, however, could not have been optimistic about the future once the Soviet system was established in earnest after spring 1940. The authoritarian power of Poland had been replaced by the totalitarian power of the USSR, and the latter had begun to act as ruthlessly as in the eastern oblasts several years earlier. In short, they were generally pleased to see the removal of the Poles, but Soviet rule soon became equally unpopular. Most residents probably contented themselves with the thought that Soviet rule was likely to be short-lived. Their attitude to more permanent Soviet rule was clearly manifested after the war, in the shape of guerrilla resistance (Western Ukraine) and passive resistance that delayed the campaign for full collectivization (Western Belorussia).

3 World War II and Ukraine

WESTWARD EXPANSION

THE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II was celebrated in the USSR from May 3 to May 9, 1985. The anniversary of what has come to be called the Great Patriotic War by the USSR was variously described in the West as an "institutionalized cult"¹ and as an occasion that would genuinely foster popular emotion among Soviet citizens.² For Western Ukrainians and Western Belorussians, however, the period of the war was some eighteen months longer than the duration of the German-Soviet war, for it began with the division of Poland in September, 1939. From the perspective of these two western borderland Soviet republics, the war began not with the attack of June 22, 1941, but with a Soviet expansion westward that was to continue in the postwar period.

In the period between World Wars I and II, ethnic Ukrainian territories were divided among four states. Eastern Ukraine remained part of the USSR as it had formerly been part of the Russian Empire; Western Ukraine, which had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until 1918, was eventually divided among Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. By far the largest territories in the western part of the Ukraine were those that became part of Poland: Galicia and Volhynia. The latter territory had been part of the Russian Empire and was clearly coveted by the Soviet leaders.

The Soviet invasion was a direct result of the Nazi-Soviet pact in

1939 and cannot be viewed in isolation from Germany's attack on Poland on September 1, 1939. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov's speech on radio on September 17 stressed the danger that Poland's collapse posed to the Soviet state and declared that it was necessary to protect "cosanguinous Ukrainians and Belorussians who reside in Poland."³ Presumably, this alleged protection was to shield Ukrainians and Belorussians from the threat of German incursions, although a lack of Soviet preparedness for such incursions became only too apparent only a year and a half later.

At the same time, Semen Tymoshenko, the commander of the Ukrainian Front, the section of the Red Army that invaded Western Ukraine, dropped leaflets to the local population of this area on September 17 stating that the Red Army was invading to rid them of oppressive Polish rulers.⁴ Similarly, the soldiers of the Red Army, in this case predominantly Eastern Ukrainians, were informed by political commissars, that they were entering Eastern Poland as "liberators" rather than "conquerers."⁵

Neither explanation could conceal the Machiavellian nature of the invasion, but the ethnic unity between Tymoshenko's troops and the native population was emphasized from the first so that the authorities could claim the "legitimate" goal of reuniting Ukrainian territories. Ukrainian Party First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev arrived in the major city of Lviv (Lwow) in the wake of the Red Army, and East Ukrainian newspapers were dispatched into Western Ukraine almost immediately.⁶ Members of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Soviet Ukrainian government who were to administer the occupied territories also arrived with the Red Army.⁷ Thus, the Soviet authorities carried out the invasion after considerable premeditation rather than in response to a sudden crisis. In the interwar period, the Soviet leaders had frequently denounced Polish rule in these eastern territories of Poland and demanded their "reunion" with the USSR.⁸ Annexation of this area served to resolve this dispute as far as the USSR was concerned; while it simultaneously provided a buffer zone between the USSR and an expanding Nazi Germany, though, the invasion should be seen rather from the perspective of Soviet expansionism.

Soviet accounts of "liberation" and warm welcomes from the local population are exaggerated. Casualties of the Red Army on the Ukrainian Front totaled about 1,850, including 491 dead.⁹ A member of the invading army commented that after encountering no

resistance on the first day (September 17) there was stubborn resistance that came from Polish troops at the approach to a large town (possibly Ternopil) that took two days to repulse.¹⁰ In other words, despite the collapse of the Polish state, many Poles nevertheless resisted the Soviet invasion. Given the demoralization of the Polish army, Polish casualties may have been higher than the 1,850 mentioned for the Red Army, which suggests a conflict of significant dimensions.

Having prepared the mechanism for invasion, the Soviet authorities now acted quickly and ruthlessly against the former Polish rulers. Officials of the former government, landowners, and anyone who had possessed the least authority were placed under arrest. Many were subsequently deported to Siberia. Ukrainian and Polish political parties were disbanded, and the Ukrainian cultural and sports associations, which had been active especially in Galicia, were forced to cease activities.¹¹ Despite these measures, Western Ukrainians, the vast majority of whom were rural inhabitants, apparently took a sympathetic attitude towards the troops, whom, according to one eyewitness, they found to be badly clothed and often close to starvation.¹²

At the outset of their rule over the newly annexed territory, the Soviet authorities relied on Temporary Administrations to govern the towns and on Peasant Committees to govern the villages. It appears that many of these organizations had been established before the invasion by Soviet officials smuggled over the border for this purpose.¹³ One Soviet version, which turns up frequently in general histories, holds that these organizations were formed spontaneously by the local population because orderly government had collapsed with Germany's invasion of Poland, but this is highly dubious. Pro-Soviet Communist influence in West Ukrainian areas had declined sharply after the dissolution of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine by the Comintern, on Stalin's orders, in July 1938.¹⁴

Besides, the duties of these temporary administrations were so clearly defined that the defy spontaneity. For example, in the Volhynia region in the northwest of what became Western Ukraine, a Red Guard is reported to have been created before the Red Army arrived in the towns of Lutsk, Lyuboml, Volodymyr-Volynsk, and Kovel and to have disarmed the Polish police forces on September 17.¹⁵ By September 18, revolutionary committees and armed units

had been set up in the Stanyslaviv, Kolomiya, Snyatin, and Kosiv Raions of the Stanyslaviv Voivodship; in Lyuboml, Kolko, and Olitsa of Volhynia; and in Brody, Zolochiv, and Kamyianets-Buzkii of Lviv and Ternopil voivodships.¹⁶ The task of these *revkoms* was to organize a workers' guard and peasant militia, to take public property under their protection, to drive out the landlords, and to prepare a welcome for their Soviet "liberators."¹⁷

Once Lviv was firmly under control, the Soviet occupying forces began to "elect" temporary organs, having established this town as the administrative capital of Western Ukraine. These organs, whose members were appointed at meetings in towns and villages, comprised on the average eight to ten persons and seem to have been made up largely of Red Army personnel, members of the Communist Party of Ukraine (i.e., from Eastern Ukraine) and Soviet workers.¹⁸ From the first, the predominance of urban over rural organs was clear. The Peasant Committees were in fact approved by the urban Temporary Administrations.¹⁹ The principal organs of authority in the first weeks of occupation were the Temporary Administrations in the four major West Ukrainian towns: Lviv, Lutsk, Stanyslaviv, and Ternopil. In turn, however, the entire new order was under the direct supervision of the First Ukrainian Front and Commander Tymoshenko. The latter approved the creation of the Peasant Committees on September 29, and on October 3 the Military Council of the Front sanctioned the Temporary Administrations of the Volhynia, Lviv, Stanyslaviv, and Ternopil regions.²⁰

To make themselves known to the local population, which had been virtually excluded from the entire administrative upheaval, the chief authorities in Lviv used the newspaper *Vilna Ukraina*, which prior to October 1 had been distributed free among the population.²¹ In each of the four major regions newspapers were in fact issued immediately upon occupation. For example, the first issue of *Radyanska Ukraina* appeared in the city of Stanyslaviv on September 23.²² *Vilne zhyttia* circulated in the Ternopil area beginning on October 3, and the Volhynia newspaper *Vilna pratsya* was published in Lutsk for the first time on September 25.²³ In October the new authorities convoked a plebiscite in Lviv that was carefully stage-managed by the Red Army.²⁴

The question must be raised why the Soviet authorities concerned themselves with the facade of a plebiscite. After the annexation of northern Bukovyna from Romania in June, 1940, for

example, no election was held. One possibility is that at this stage of World War II, the Soviet authorities were anxious not to antagonize Britain and France more than was necessary. These countries had, after all, given guarantees to Poland before Hitler's invasion. It is also probable that Stalin already had his eye on the Baltic states and wished to proceed in such a way that Balts might take a benevolent view of what was the annexation of territory by the USSR.

Whether Western Ukraine was a buffer zone or intended as an integral part of the Ukrainian SSR from the first, there is little doubt that the Soviet authorities pursued a course designed for long-term rule over the area. Further, laws enacted in 1939–40 were reenacted in 1944–45, such was their suitability for long-term Soviet rule. Moreover, this first period of Soviet rule, though it may have begun mildly, began to become more extreme in form. In short, while both the new rulers and the local Ukrainians might agree on the need to remove Polish officials, between the spring of 1940 and the German invasion, the situation was characterized by harsher administration, the deportation of troublesome Ukrainian leaders or potential leaders, and also alleged kulaks at the start of the collectivization campaign.

Finally, during this same period, the Soviet authorities attempted to build up a party organization in the region virtually from scratch. Before 1940, the majority of party members in Western Ukraine were concentrated in the towns. It is conceivable that the authorities relied largely on imported members, especially for the key positions. Certainly the oblast first secretaries had almost all held prominent positions in the East Ukrainian Party apparatus.²⁵

THE COLLAPSE OF SOVIET RULE

The official Soviet version of the Nazi-German invasion of the USSR makes three statements concerning the collapse of the Red Army, particularly in Ukraine. First, it is said that the invasion was an act of treachery. This makes sense only from the perspective of the nonexistence of a formal declaration of war by the Germans, since, despite the Nazi-Soviet pact that divided up Poland between the two totalitarian powers, there is little doubt that eventual war with Germany was regarded as an inevitability in Soviet ruling circles. The second and third statements are closely linked. They are

the assertion that in the Ukraine, as elsewhere, the people "rose as one man to defend their Socialist homeland" and the contention that "miscalculations regarding the possible time of Nazi Germany's attack brought about errors of omission in the preparations to beat back the enemy from the very start."²⁶

The Soviet line, as has been repeated frequently, is that the natural inclination of most Ukrainians to resist the invader was thwarted because of "miscalculations" in Moscow. This, however, reveals only part of the problem. Much has been made in Western writings of the demoralization of the Red Army following the purges by Stalin of its ranks during 1938–1939. Yet the Soviet authorities had been preparing assiduously for war. From 1939 to 1941, the size of the Red Army had been tripled, and the proportion of Party representatives in the army had increased considerably. Defense spending had been increased from a reported twenty-three billion rubles in 1938 to fifty-six billion rubles by 1940, or to almost one-third of the state budget. Furthermore, production of the T-34 tanks that were to play a decisive role in the latter stages of the German-Soviet war was begun in late 1939 and early 1940.²⁷ The purges therefore had not halted Soviet preparation for an eventual conflict with Nazi Germany (though they certainly affected the quality of Soviet military leaders).

It is clear, however, that in the case of Ukraine, the eighteen months of Soviet rule in the western areas had served to alienate large segments of the population. What is more, some Ukrainian activists, members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), entered Ukraine illegally in the wake of the *Wehrmacht*, in order to try to organize Ukrainian political life in the area "freed" from the Soviet forces. Two Ukrainian military units also arrived—the *Nachtigall* and *Roland*—having been organized by the OUN under the jurisdiction of German military intelligence in the spring of 1941.²⁸

Members of the *Wehrmacht* believed, erroneously, that the Hitler regime intended to make Ukraine an independent state within a Greater Germany, and this belief had been communicated, directly or indirectly, to Ukrainian emigres living in Berlin, some of whom entered their homeland in the summer of 1941. In Western Ukraine, in other words, there were sectors of the population that felt the German attack heralded a new era of independence for

Ukraine. Members of the Bandera faction of the OUN proclaimed an independent Ukrainian state in Lviv on June 30, 1941, but this proved to be short-lived. Yaroslav Stetsko, who had made the proclamation, and other Ukrainian leaders were rounded up by the Gestapo, who arrived in the city shortly thereafter.²⁹

The enthusiasm for an end to Soviet rule in Western Ukraine does not, however, explain the demise of the Red Army in Central and Eastern Ukraine, particularly the surrender of some 650,000 troops in Kiev in early September.³⁰ These predominantly Ukrainian soldiers apparently lacked central directions. They had been all but ignored by the Ukrainian party and government, which had not appealed publicly to Ukrainians to resist the invader until a full three weeks after the German invasion, at which time all Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovyna and Bessarabia was held by the Germans and their Romanian allies.³¹

By August 19, 1941, the whole of Right-Bank Ukraine—i.e., the area west of the Dniro—was in German hands. Before the end of the month, three major cities—Kherson, Cherkasy, and Dnipropetrovsk—had also fallen. Odessa was taken in mid-October, and all of Ukraine but for a small area of the Donbass was under German control by early November. In just over 120 days, the large Ukrainian republic had been occupied by the invader. In the western oblasts of Ukraine, the Soviet authorities had little time to organize the evacuation of large industrial enterprises, although leading Party officials, for the most part, were taken eastward. The NKVD carried out a massacre of political prisoners in the major towns before retreating. In Lviv, it is reported that some 10,000 prisoners died.³² These atrocities, like that at Katyn the year before, went unquestioned by the Western allies in subsequent years in the interests of wartime unity. Their influence on local Ukrainians can hardly be underestimated since they eroded any remaining support the Soviet regime might have maintained. The Germans—as any army of outside invaders would have been—were initially hailed as liberators.

The Central Committee of the CPSU and the hastily assembled State Defense Committee of the USSR decided to evacuate the most important industrial enterprises, heavy machinery, livestock, and a large proportion of the population to the east, but the speed of the German advance into the heart of Ukraine hindered matters. Nevertheless, the evacuation of enterprises and materials from Central

and Eastern Ukraine appears to have been partly successful. Approximately 1,300 industries located in the Dnipro area were removed, in addition to 140 large enterprises from the Kharkiv region, and about 500 from Zaporizhzhya Oblast. According to a Western source, the transportation of livestock to the east began as early as June 1941, and resulted in the removal of 60 per cent of all cattle, 92 per cent of sheep, and 14 per cent of horses from Left-Bank Ukraine.³³

Priority in evacuation was given to members of the Ukrainian party and government, which was transferred to Ufa, the capital of the Bashkir Autonomous Republic. Some 3.8 million persons were evacuated from the Ukrainian SSR in the summer of 1941. Because of feared reprisals by the invaders against Soviet cultural institutions, scholars, writers, and cultural figures also joined the trek eastward. The Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, for example, was moved to Ufa, while Kiev, Kharkiv, and other universities were transferred to Kazakhstan.³⁴

German policy for Ukraine appears to have been a mixture of belatedly laid plans that may have allowed for a less than totalitarian structure and of downright colonialism, which manifested itself quickly as the Germans advanced eastward and units of the Gestapo began to arrive in the conquered territories. A major problem among the Germans was the proliferation of governing groups. For example, on July 27, 1941, Hitler appointed Alfred Rosenberg as head of a new Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Areas, but the latter's authority was being constantly eroded throughout the period of occupation of Ukraine by Hitler's personal secretary Martin Bormann, who had managed to get his protege Erich Koch, the former Gauleiter of East Prussia, appointed as head of the so-called *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*.

In general, it is fair to say that the *Wehrmacht* and the ministry headed by Rosenberg pursued a relatively lenient policy, advocating some devolution of authority to local Ukrainians in order to utilize anti-Soviet feeling among them. In contrast, the Gestapo and those in Hitler's immediate entourage advocated the severest repression of people they held to be of an inferior race and it is they who succeeded in enforcing their policies in Ukraine, as elsewhere in occupied USSR.

Administratively, the ethnic Ukrainian territories were split into

four units. Galicia became part of the Gouvernement-General of Poland; the Ukrainian areas of Bessarabia, Bukovyna and Transnistria (including the city of Odessa) were governed by Romania; Volhynia, Polissya, and the rest of Right-Bank Ukraine, and later Zaporizhzhya Oblast were included in the *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*; and the remainder of Left-Bank Ukraine was left under German military administration.

In the Gouvernement-General, Ukrainians were permitted to play a minor role in the German administration. A Ukrainian National Council was established under the noted demographer Volodymyr Kubijovyc, and Ukrainian cooperative societies, which had flourished for a time under Polish rule, enjoyed a rebirth. Some Ukrainians played a role in the lower ranks of the administration, although none were allocated positions of any significance.³⁵ By contrast, in the *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*, Koch, who arrived at the end of the year and set up his headquarters at Rivne, rather than in the capital city of Kiev, began a reign of terror.³⁶

In both areas, however, the first action of the new rulers was to round up the Jewish population in the fall of 1941, after which Jews were either executed or "deported," which signified part of the Final Solution. According to Kubijovyc, Galicia lost some 22 per cent of its population between 1941 and 1944, but if the Jewish population is deducted from the total, that percentage declines to 13.³⁷ For the same reason, losses were much higher in the cities, where the majority of the Jewish population lived, than in the countryside. A study of German rule in Western Ukraine suggests that Poles and Ukrainians were encouraged to carry out pogroms against the Jews—i.e., the traditional Nazi policy of divide and rule—but that for the most part this enticement was not successful.³⁸ Less clear, however, is how far these two groups were able or prepared to go in defense of Jews. There is little doubt that severe retribution threatened those Poles and Ukrainians who attempted to protect Jews from persecution.

Following the elimination of Ukraine's Jewish population, the occupiers turned on the Ukrainians. The brutality of Koch is evident from the following quotation of a statement made by him in August, 1942, as recorded by a Soviet scholar:

There is no such thing as a free Ukraine. The aim of our work is to ensure that Ukrainians work for Germany. . . . The Fuehrer

has demanded that 3 million tons of grain be delivered from the Ukraine to Germany and this will be carried out to the letter.³⁹

According to Koch, Ukrainians were “colonial people,” “niggers” who could be handled with a whip and some vodka. Both Koch and his aide Fritz Sauckel took literally Hitler’s statements about the subject peoples of the East. Koch ignored the directions of his (theoretical) superior Rosenberg, appealing instead to Hitler directly through Bormann. Consequently, he became a “freebooter” who initiated a reign of terror in the *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*, treating the local population with merciless cruelty.

German policies toward the conquered territories soon disillusioned those who had hoped for an end to totalitarian rule and the beginnings of an independent Ukrainian state. As far as the Third Reich was concerned, Ukraine was a major source of food supply for the German army. Whereas many Ukrainians had hoped that the occupiers would disband the collective farm system, the invaders found that the long-established centralized agricultural setup in Western Ukraine, which could ensure a constant supply of food and provisions for their soldiers, was both useful and essential. Initially, they made few concessions. Contract deliveries to the state from peasant households were resumed in September, 1941, and the peasants were obliged to contribute per head of cattle over the course of a year not less than 800 kilograms of milk or not less than twenty-five kilograms of meat. As for grain deliveries, although the peasants were given a longer time for delivery than under Soviet rule—until the end of November—penalties for nondelivery were severe, including compulsory requisitioning; removal of the “guilty” party to a concentration camp or, in some cases, execution.⁴⁰

On February 15, 1942, the Germans announced an agricultural reform called the *Agrarerlass*. The first result of this law was to change the name *kolkhoz*, with its unpleasant associations, to communal farm. A second reform was to double the size of the private plot of collective farm households.⁴¹ At the same time, these household plots were declared to be private property and free from taxation. The Germans also permitted the peasants to keep an “unlimited” number of livestock. As Alexander Dallin points out, however, this was a meaningless privilege unless the peasants had livestock in the first place,⁴² which in most instances they did not. In

several areas Ukrainian land was confiscated from peasant households and given to German colonists. In Stanyslaviv Oblast, for example, 53,200 hectares of land are reported to have been confiscated for this purpose by the spring of 1942.⁴³

In the Ukrainian territories under the administration of the Gouvernement-General, in which German rule was administered less harshly than under Koch's *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*, the German Central Farm Administration based in Cracow, could evidently not, according to a Western source, keep its promise to restore pre-Soviet property conditions in Galicia since former fields, livestock, and buildings had been redistributed and, with regard to buildings, in some cases leveled to the ground.⁴⁴ But it seems unlikely, given German policy elsewhere, that there was any serious intention of keeping such a promise.

Hitler's attitude appears to have been that the conquered peoples should be made to pay for the war effort. Consequently, harsh grain quotas and other demands were placed on areas from which much essential equipment had been evacuated in the wake of the Soviet retreat. At the same time, as far as the Germans were concerned, a Ukrainian industrial base was unimportant. Industries destroyed by the Red Army in retreat⁴⁵ or during Soviet-German engagements were, for the most part, not restored during the period of German occupation.

Koch's administration was at the forefront of a labor recruiting drive for *Ostarbeiter* that took place throughout occupied Soviet territories in an effort to curb the labor shortage, which became an increasingly critical problem for the Third Reich as the war progressed. According to Edward Homze, Koch ignored all the established procedures for the recruitment of *Ostarbeiter* and herded civilians en masse for transportation to the Reich "in part out of sheer spite for Rosenberg. The more Rosenberg complained about the inhuman treatment in the Ukraine, the more Koch enjoyed it."⁴⁶ The transportation of young people (predominantly women between the ages of fifteen and thirty-five) began in the late summer of 1941 and drew on most areas of Ukraine. The "voluntary" recruitment had turned into a compulsory affair by the following summer. In the western areas of Ukraine, where recruitment was less arbitrary than under Koch, over 400,000 citizens are reported to have been sent to Germany as laborers between 1941 and 1944.⁴⁷ Altogether, about three million persons were deported to work for

Germany's wartime economy during this same period.⁴⁸ As is well known, the *Ostarbeiter* were generally treated with contempt and were allocated the most degrading of duties under appalling conditions.

These two German policies—the refusal to introduce a radical reform of the existing agricultural system and the deportation of young Ukrainians as *Ostarbeiter* to the Reich—when taken together with the widespread repression of the population carried out in the *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*, engendered, within a relatively short space of time, several local resistance movements. Simultaneously, as the German advance eastward was halted, Ukraine also became an area for Soviet partisan activities. During the first two years of occupation, the effects upon the Ukrainian population had been devastating. By 1943, according to Kubijovyc, the population within the territories of the Ukrainian SSR in June 1941, had declined from 40.5 million in 1939 to 30 million—that is, by 10.5 million, or approximately 25 per cent. He estimates that of the 10.5 million, four million were killed, including two million Jews. The remainder included wounded soldiers, *Ostarbeiter*, and a large number of Ukrainians who were either evacuated or serving in the Soviet army.⁴⁹

Within a matter of months, the Germans had revealed the nature of their policies toward the East. Those Ukrainians, who, like the members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, had initially welcomed the invaders as a means of restoring an independent Ukrainian state, now became their avid opponents. Some individual Ukrainians were members of the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police, which assisted the Germans in their repressive actions against Jews and others in the occupied territories of Ukraine. The majority of Ukrainians, however, fought resolutely against the invader, either in the ranks of the Red Army, or in the Ukrainian resistance movement that became embodied in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.⁵⁰

RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS AND SOVIET REANNEXATION

Soviet partisan activity in the Ukraine, and its influence on the outcome of the clash between the USSR and Nazi Germany has assumed almost mythical proportions in Soviet accounts. Moreover, an analysis of partisan activity in Ukraine, as opposed to most other Soviet regions, is complicated by the official organizational struc-

ture behind these operations. Simply stated, there was no native base for the Soviet-sponsored partisan movement. In the early stages of the German-Soviet war, pro-Soviet resistance among the Ukrainian population did not exist, and the partisan movement was a creation of the authorities and the NKVD in particular. In the initial stages, every operation mounted in Ukraine was devised by the Politburo under the direction of Stalin himself.

There were, however, good reasons why the Soviet authorities should place so much emphasis on the Ukrainian sphere. The territory of the Ukrainian SSR constituted about half the area of the Soviet Union under German occupation, and in economic terms its importance considerably exceeded even this size. Also, the specter of Ukrainian nationalism deeply concerned the Soviet authorities. It had a limited impact in Eastern Ukraine, but the western oblasts, annexed in 1939, were believed with justification to be having a considerable impact on the East in terms of the dissemination of nationalist ideas. While this situation persisted, the extent of pro-Soviet feeling in Eastern Ukraine was likely to be limited. Consequently, from the outset, Soviet propagandists began to create the myth of extensive partisan activities in Ukraine.

This myth has been perpetuated. A collection of documents about Ukraine in the "Great Patriotic War," for example, notes the commencement of partisan activities from the time of the decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU dated July 18, 1941, and entitled "On the Organization of the Struggle in the Rear of the German Army." This decree noted, revealingly, Lenin's dictum that partisan operations should be carried out under the close supervision of the party.⁵¹ Another account dates the formation of the first partisan units in Ukraine from September, 1941, when small units were allegedly established in Sumy, Voroshilovhrad, and other oblasts.⁵² If such units were established, they were short-lived. Either they were destroyed by the German Army as it advanced eastward, or they were evacuated to Central Asia with Soviet Party and government personnel.

The difficulties of the movement in 1941 and early 1942 are revealed in a more candid account. It notes that at first, the partisans suffered from a shortage of weapons, medical and other supplies, and that direction was complicated by the diversity of leadership—different orders were given by the party, the army, and others. In turn, German repression was severe, and before the summer of

1942, many underground workers in cities such as Kiev and Vynnytsya were arrested. This source makes it plain that the German occupants rounded up and arrested partisans often as soon as they were formed into groups.⁵³ The true history of the Ukrainian partisan movement therefore dates only from 1943.

What is true, however, is that a structure for partisan activity existed from the late summer of 1941—namely the Ukrainian Partisan Staff within the Southwest Direction of the Soviet Military Command. Obligated to retreat to Stalingrad with the Soviet Army, this staff was subsequently moved to Moscow. Its chief was Timofei Strokach, a former NKVD agent, who had held the position of Deputy People's Commissar for the interior of Ukraine.⁵⁴ Within a few months, the Southwest Direction had been disbanded, and the Ukrainian Partisan Staff, now "independent" (but closely controlled from Moscow), assumed increasing importance within Soviet military planning. Its main task was to *create* partisan units in the rear of the German occupation forces.

Although a number of partisan commanders achieved lasting fame as a result of their activities in Ukraine during the war, the name that usually appears first on any list in Soviet accounts is that of Sydir Kovpak. In fact, as a Western source points out, Kovpak was made into a legend before a Ukrainian partisan movement ever existed, in order that the Ukrainian population might respond to the deeds that were allegedly being carried out in its name.⁵⁵ Kovpak was a veteran of the Civil War, a seasoned campaigner who evidently commanded the respect of his troops and engineered bold raids into Northwest Ukraine in 1943–45. Of initial importance for his mission into Ukraine, in Soviet eyes, was his Ukrainian background. It was essential for the appointed leader of the partisans to be a native Ukrainian if the Soviet partisan movement was to obtain support among the native population.

Before Kovpak was ordered to begin his incursions into Ukrainian territory, there were several more minor efforts to impede the Germans by setting up partisan formations in the rear of the German Army. Some former CPU officials—including Rivne Oblast First Secretary Behma—were parachuted into Western Ukraine, aided by Spanish veterans of the Spanish Civil War. These attempts were, by and large, unsuccessful. The small teams were compelled to establish their headquarters not in Ukraine, but on Belorussian territory.⁵⁶ Only when Kovpak and others were instructed to begin

extensive marches southward in the spring and summer of 1943 did the partisans make an impact. And by this date, it was clear to the local population that the tide of war had turned against the Germans. Despite appeals made to Ukrainian patriotism and the convoking of huge meetings of Ukrainian leaders by the Soviet authorities at Ufa, Saratov, and Moscow,⁵⁷ the effect of pro-Soviet propaganda upon local Ukrainians was limited.

The small-scale nature of operations in Central and Eastern Ukraine is evident from the decree issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine on July 15, 1943, "On the Condition and the Further Development of the Partisan Movement in Ukraine." The decree approved the deployment of partisan troops around Kiev as follows:

Comrade Ushakiv, 510 men; Comrade Khitrichenko, 800 men; Comrade Borodii, 500 men; Pokrovsky-Chepurny, 120 men.⁵⁸

Even these figures may be inflated. At least a Western source claims that such units were usually comprised of no more than 100 men.⁵⁹ They show, nevertheless, that even in the summer of 1943, a matter of months before Kiev was recaptured by the Red Army, partisan movements in Central Ukraine were minor compared to the rival insurgent movements in the western oblasts of Ukraine.

Taken overall, the partisans were successful mainly in the extreme north and northwestern regions of Ukraine, the area between their headquarters in Mozyr Oblast of Belorussia and the Carpathian Mountains, which favored this sort of activity. Efforts to send small teams of partisans into Eastern Ukraine met with limited success. In the West, the partisans clashed with both Polish and Ukrainian nationalist movements. In terms of numbers, there were perhaps 220,000 partisans operating in the Ukraine in 1943-44, of whom, according to a Western source, only about 7 per cent were party members.⁶⁰ This relatively low party representation reflects the depletion of party forces during the war, but it also indicates that the party's role was somewhat limited.

Further, despite the NKVD's connections with the partisan movement, the secret police did not direct the movement so much as monitor its progress. Armstrong contrasts the Ukrainian partisan-NKVD association with the private empire of the German SS, which controlled troops under its jurisdiction much more

rigidly.⁶¹ Whereas the Central Staff of the Soviet Partisans was dissolved at the start of 1944, the Ukrainian Staff remained in place until after the end of the war. In contrast with other areas of the USSR, it was very much a symbol for the legitimacy of Soviet rule in Ukraine.

Of the various guerrilla units that emerged among the local population largely as a result of German repression, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) was the most significant. UPA originated as a self-defense movement on the part of the population in Polissya and Volhynia some time in 1942 (most sources state late 1942, but a participant in UPA has declared that the guerrillas had begun operations by the beginning of the year⁶²). Soviet attacks on UPA have been persistent and vitriolic. The main theme, which was reiterated as recently as 1984, as the Soviet authorities prepared for the fortieth anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany, is that the members of UPA were "henchmen" or "agents" of the German occupation forces and that they were thus "the worst enemies of the Ukrainian people." Soviet propagandists also attack assertions that UPA was obliged to fight a two-front guerrilla-type war against both Soviet and German troops.⁶³ It should be said at the outset that given the conditions in Ukraine in the years from 1942 to 1945 some undisciplined actions on the part of an armed group were almost inevitable. The Germans, for example, would carry out retribution on entire villages for individual attacks on troops or convoys. This is not to say, however, as the Soviet sources do, that UPA consisted of bandits and cutthroats—first in the pay of the Germans and subsequently of Anglo-American "imperialists."⁶⁴

The concerns of UPA at this time were twofold: German repression of local Ukrainians and cooperation between Soviet and Polish partisans against Ukrainians.⁶⁵ (Polish-Ukrainian animosities in this region dated back to the interwar period, but there were also cases of large-scale joint operations of Polish and Ukrainian guerrillas against Soviet reoccupation of this area after 1944.)⁶⁶ Initially, the Ukrainian insurgents attained some success because of their familiarity with the marshy terrain.

By 1943, the insurgent movement had spread into Galicia. Its numbers were inflated by deserters from the Ukrainian units that had originally accompanied the German *Wehrmacht* into Ukraine and by persons of other nationalities that had deserted from similar units once the nature of the occupation regime had become appar-

ent. The original Ukrainian composition of the membership became diluted, and, according to a Western source, the nationality groups within the ranks included Azerbaijanis, Uzbeks, Tatars, and Jews.⁶⁷

Late in 1943, UPA merged with underground units of the Bandera faction of the OUN. Most of its leaders, with the exception of its commander, Shukhevych, a military man, were villagers. This fact has sometimes embarrassed Soviet writers, one of whom went so far as to suggest that in view of their low social standing in the countryside, the members of UPA should *naturally* have supported Soviet authority—i.e., the poor peasants were regarded as a natural ally by the Soviet regime.⁶⁸ UPA was able to survive the enmity of both German and Soviet forces because members received food, provisions, shelter and sympathy from the local villages.⁶⁹ Once the Soviet troops began to take control over these villages in the summer of 1944, UPA began to resort to terrorist attacks to maintain its food supply.

The size of UPA remains debatable. One emigre source gives an estimate of 80,000 persons in 1944.⁷⁰ Another emigre source states that at the end of 1943 UPA consisted of about 10,000 officers and soldiers.⁷¹ However, more recent evidence suggests that these figures are seriously understated, and that the total was somewhere between 150,000 and 200,000. That the ranks contained more members than early emigre estimates is evident even in more dated Soviet sources, one of which states that seventy-four UPA “bands” were liquidated between April and June, 1944, and that one such band was made up of about 1,400 members. It notes also that about 13,000 “OUNites” surrendered to Soviet authorities at the end of 1944.⁷² The key question is whether those who gave themselves up—they were reportedly responding to one of the many “amnesties” offered by the USSR—were in fact active participants in the guerrilla movement, merely sympathizers, or even innocents. The figures in any case refer to Soviet-held Ukraine, and there were sizable UPA contingents in the areas west of the border that eventually became incorporated into Poland.⁷³

Against this background of partisan activities and guerrilla warfare in Western Ukraine, the Red Army was advancing through Eastern Ukraine in the summer of 1943. Many of the 2.5 million Ukrainians who had been conscripted into the army at the time of the German invasion served on the Ukrainian front,⁷⁴ so it is fair to say that Ukrainians played a major role in removing the foreign oc-

cupier from Ukrainian soil. To these 2.5 million may be added a further 750,000 who were conscripted when the Red Army overran Western Ukraine in the summer of 1944.⁷⁵ These raw conscripts served immediately at the front. No doubt the USSR considered it preferable to conscript such youngsters rather than have them remain in the villages as potential support for the Ukrainian insurgents.

By the end of September, 1943, the entire Donbass region was once again in Soviet hands. The cities of Dnipropetrovsk and Dniprodzerzhinsk were retaken toward the end of October, and the Ukrainian capital of Kiev fell to the Red Army on November 6, 1943.⁷⁶ The armies of the First and Fourth Ukrainian Fronts advanced into Western Ukraine in the following summer. The Second Front was directed toward Romania, while the Third eventually swept through southeastern Romania into Bulgaria. In the western part of Ukraine, what Soviet sources describe as "an acute class struggle" in fact became a bitter civil war or, from a Ukrainian perspective, an anti-Soviet war. The Soviet troops were able to capture the major towns, while in the countryside large areas remained under the control of UPA units.

PARTY MEASURES

At the end of 1943, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine and the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars approved the composition of the Oblast Committees and Oblast Executive Committees throughout Ukraine. A decree was issued "On the Creation of Party Organizations in the Raions of the Ukraine Liberated from the German Occupiers and Improving their Leadership."⁷⁷ Following the recapture of Lviv on July 27, 1944, Ukrainian Party First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev held a meeting with leading workers of the raion and oblast organizations "to restore normality" in Lviv Oblast.⁷⁸ Pressure on party organizations in Western Ukraine was stepped up by two decrees of the CPSU furiously deriding the state of political work in Western Ukraine during September and November, 1944, which could hardly have been expected to be functioning adequately at this time.⁷⁹

The first decree, issued on September 27 was entitled "Concerning deficiencies in political work in the western oblasts of Ukraine." It was issued after the Central Committee of the Communist Party

of Ukraine had heard reports from the director of the propaganda section of the committee, K. Lytvyn, and from the first party secretaries of Lviv and Ternopil oblasts about the state of political work there. The decree coincided with an appeal to the nationalist insurgents to surrender, and it was evidently linked to this maneuver. The authorities had adopted a "carrot and stick" approach, though the veracity of the carrot—a pardon for those who gave themselves up—remains in doubt. The political situation explains the harsh wording of the decree, because it could hardly have been expected that party organizations were in good condition at this stage of the war and after appalling losses at the hands of the Germans.⁸⁰

The decree denounced the party organizations for a variety of alleged offenses. First, they had reportedly underestimated the importance of political work among the masses, particularly in the villages, where the people remained ignorant of military-political and international affairs, and understood little about the nature of Soviet rule. In this criticism, one can read between the lines to discern the hostility of the local population toward a renewal of Soviet authority. The decree also noted that political meetings were seldom held in the cities, and that the public lacked literature, films, and access to radios. It complained that little effort had been made to propagandize the various measures adopted by the Soviet state to restore order in Western Ukraine, i.e., the return of lands confiscated by the Germans to the peasants and measures taken to restore normal living conditions.

Concerning the insurgents, the decree complained that "nationalists" had been left unmolested to distribute leaflets, brochures and anti-Soviet handouts among the population. They had also been spreading "provocative rumors." Clearly there were few party forces in place to combat such moves, so the decree was an attempt to remedy this situation. It was alleged that some party and Soviet workers imagined that the struggle against the nationalist guerrillas was the sole concern of administrative and military organs. Was this perhaps an order for the party organs to reassert their control over the wartime Soviet military regime? Elsewhere, the decree concentrated on the years of bourgeois influence in this region of Ukraine, and the fact that newspapers—especially the Lviv *Vilna Ukraina*—had failed to rise to the occasion.

Several "recommendations" were given to the Ukrainian party authorities by Moscow. They were to develop political work

among the masses, especially in the villages. Party organizations were to keep the people informed of major political and military events, and to acquaint the new Soviet citizens with the 1936 Soviet Constitution. Newspapers had also to print significant items. Cited specifically were the "Ukrainian-German nationalists," as "the worst enemies of the Ukrainian people." The Komsomol organs were instructed to participate in a campaign to demonstrate to Western Ukrainians that the nationalists were hindering a return to normality in the region. In short, the Moscow authorities had recognized the extent of anti-Soviet sentiment in Western Ukraine and were trying to eradicate it at its roots. The time period allotted for such work was two months, because in November 1944, an extraordinary plenum of the Ukrainian party's Central Committee was held in Kiev to discuss the fulfilment of the September decree. It was hardly surprising that the passage of two months had scarcely helped to improve matters, as a decree of November 1944 expressly indicated.⁸¹

By 1945, some 20,000 Party members and candidates had arrived in Western Ukraine from the eastern oblasts in addition to an unspecified number of police units.⁸² The latter began to organize so-called "destruction units" to combat Ukrainian insurgents. The units were comprised mainly of soldiers of the Red Army and MVD units and constituted about 23,000 persons by November, 1944. They are said to have been aided by some 3,000 "self-defense units" made up of local residents—a force reported in all to have been about 27,000 strong. Both groups were allegedly organized and led by the raion secretaries of the Soviet police forces.⁸³ The insurgency nevertheless continued into the early 1950s, albeit on a reduced scale. Whereas in Eastern Ukraine the Soviet authorities were able to begin the reconstruction of the economy and the government almost immediately after reannexation of this territory, in Western Ukraine reconstruction was delayed by anti-Soviet resistance from UPA.

In September, 1944, the Soviet armies penetrated the Carpathian Mountains and began to occupy the major population points of the Transcarpathian Ukraine. This region had been under Czechoslovakia's jurisdiction in the interwar period and Hungary's during the war. Although the Soviet-sponsored "people's committees" that arose in October 1944 were initially opposed by rival committees established by members of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile,⁸⁴

there was never much doubt that Stalin intended to incorporate the region into the USSR eventually.

A conference of the Communist Party of the Transcarpathian Ukraine held on November 19, 1944, was addressed by a local Ruthenian, I. I. Turyanytsya, who had spent considerable time in Moscow both before and after the war.⁸⁵ An assembly was duly "elected" to propose incorporation into the USSR, a move that was ratified by the Soviet side in June, 1945.⁸⁶ Turyanytsya became Party first secretary of the Transcarpathian Oblast of the Ukrainian SSR. In contrast with neighboring Galician Ukraine, Communist influence in Transcarpathia had been considerable in the interwar period, and despite the persistence of a strong pro-Ukrainian current very little armed resistance to Soviet rule was put up there. As a result, the Soviet authorities found it relatively easy to seal off the region from the rest of Ukraine and make preparations for its annexation.

By the end of 1944, the entire territory of Ukraine was held once again by the Soviet Army. The major problems facing the Soviet leaders were the restoration of the economy, the reestablishment of Soviet organs on the reconquered territory, and the consolidation of Soviet power in Western Ukraine. The large-scale armed resistance to Soviet authority constituted an authentic threat to Soviet rule over the countryside for the next few years.

The Ukrainian territories had suffered over five years of warfare. Soviet sources estimate the damage to the Ukrainian economy as a result of the German occupation at 285 billion rubles or 40 per cent of the republic's national wealth.⁸⁷ Allowance must be made for the fact that the battles that took place on Ukrainian territory were responsible for a large proportion of that sum rather than mere wilful destruction on the part of the occupiers. Nevertheless, the devastation was considerable. Over 28,000 villages are reported to have been destroyed.⁸⁸ At the same time, the aftermath of the war saw a number of concessions to Ukrainian national feeling, such as a seat at the United Nations, along with the Belorussian SSR. In the long term, however, World War II led directly to a period of intense russification in Ukraine that continued, with brief periods of respite, into the Brezhnev period, and throughout the tenure as First Party Secretary of the late Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, 1972–89. Stalin felt that the Ukrainians had shown themselves to be untrustworthy. He held them largely responsible for the defeats suffered by the Red

Army in Ukraine at the start of the war, for joining the ranks of the insurgents, and for allowing themselves to be deported as slave labor to the Third Reich.

In taking this attitude toward Ukrainians, Stalin chose to overlook two factors. The first of these is that the majority of Ukrainians chose to resist the Nazi invader and played a significant role in the war effort. Ukraine lost some 15 per cent of its population during the conflict. Its sacrifices compare favorably with other regions of the USSR. The second factor is that the many Ukrainians who opposed a return of Soviet rule had compelling reasons for doing so. Soviet writers have chosen to ignore these reasons. In discussing nonreturners among Soviet peoples who found themselves in the West at the end of the war, Mark Elliott notes that 52.6 per cent were Ukrainians, which he perceives as a consequence of Moscow's "rough handling" of its non-Russian Soviet citizens.⁸⁹ The famine of 1933 in Eastern Ukraine, the Stalinist purges, and the short but repressive period of Soviet rule in former Eastern Poland in 1939–41 had clearly alienated many Ukrainians to Soviet rule.

4 Wartime Collaboration in Ukraine: *Some Preliminary Questions and Responses*

ONE OF THE KEY historical questions under debate in the Soviet Union and in the West today is that of wartime collaboration with the German occupation regime during the period 1941–44. Ukrainians, along with Balts and nationality groups from East Europe, are regularly cited as being among those responsible for such collaboration. Historians have begun to reexamine many of the key events, and there have even been calls from Western Ukraine to rehabilitate members of the anti-Soviet guerrilla forces that made up the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which continued to resist Soviet rule long after the German occupation had ended. Some hold that such persons were heroic fighters against a repressive Stalinist system which in structure and nature was analogous to the Hitler regime.

This chapter will examine some of the interpretations of World War II in its Ukrainian context, discuss the Soviet and some Western analyses of particular events, and then relate these topics to the current campaigns in the United States, Canada, Europe and Australia to bring war criminals to justice.

The term “collaboration” is defined by Webster’s dictionary as follows: “to cooperate with or willingly assist an enemy of one’s country and especially an occupying force.” The definition instantly renders analysis an extremely complicated process. In the Western Ukrainian case, what exactly was “one’s country”? The area had been under the jurisdiction of three different rulers in the present century: the Austro-Hungarian Empire; Poland; and the

Soviet Union. The latter had occupied the area by force for only twenty-one months as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Pact stipulations of August 1939. As has often been noted, the 1939 elections incorporating Western Ukraine into the Soviet Union as part of the Ukrainian SSR were fraudulent. From the outset, therefore, the term "collaboration" is suspect. Other than obvious ethnic ties, what was there to commit Western Ukrainians to the Soviet cause? However, we will proceed with our analysis regardless of this problem. Suffice it to say that it has all too rarely been analyzed in judicial processes or historical writings.

One of the earliest attempts to analyze the meaning of collaboration based on the Ukrainian experience with the Germans was that of the American political scientist, John A. Armstrong. He pointed out that Ukrainian integral nationalism, based on the theories of Dmytro Dontsov (originally a marxist), was developed before Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933. Unlike in Western European countries, he notes, Ukraine was not an independent state, and integral nationalism there was influenced by Italian Fascism rather than German National Socialism. Although both the latter and the Ukrainian variant placed the highest value on the "nation," this in the final analysis acted as a source of dissension between the two political groupings. In short, despite some naive beliefs to the contrary on the part of some Ukrainians, it was always an impossibility to link the interests of the two.¹ Armstrong's discussion covers a wide range of other issues which fall beyond the confines of this essay, and it remains a most useful work in the field.

THE SOVIET VIEW

But let us begin with what might be termed the traditional Soviet analysis, which continued almost uninterrupted from 1945 to 1987.² In September 1939, in response to appeals from Ukrainians (and Belorussians, although there is no time here to discuss this nationality group) living in Eastern Poland, the Red Army invaded the territory, in order to offer protection to consanguinous people who now feared an imminent invasion from Nazi Germany, which had invaded western Poland two weeks earlier. Leaflets were dropped from airplanes at the command of Soviet General Tymoshenko assuring the population that it had been liberated from the yoke of Polish oppression. At the same time, Ukrainian territories had been

united—or reunited depending upon one's interpretation of history. At a stroke, Stalin had fulfilled the age-old ambitions of Ukrainians to form their own national state.

While most Ukrainians welcomed the invasion, the official line continued, there was a small group of fanatics who opposed it. These were primarily members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which had existed on an underground basis during the period of Polish rule, and had undertaken terrorist operations against Polish officials; and second, members of the Greek Catholic Church with whom they were reportedly working closely. The historian I.I. Myhovych, for example, has maintained that the church used its influence in every way possible to impede the measures taken by the Soviet authorities and to protest the confiscation of the estates of the landowners and the church. In 1940, the OUN group divided into two, with an older group following Andrii Melnyk, and a younger, more fanatical group embracing the leadership of Stefan Bandera. Both had formed military units which were now in training in German-held territories. There were also attempts to form some Ukrainian organizations in German-occupied Poland, such as a Ukrainian Central Committee, led by Volodymyr Kubijovyc. In short, a "pro-Nazi element" was in evidence among Western Ukrainians from the first.

In June 1941, when the German Army invaded what had now become Western Ukraine (the capital of this territory being the city of Lviv, Lwow in Polish, Lvov in Russian), two units within this army, called *Roland* and *Nachtigall*, were made up of Ukrainian troops. The Soviet view is that these units were created by the German *Abwehr* on the eve of the war as "diversionary units," and subsequently took part in battles with the Soviet army and in punitive operations against "peaceful civilians."

On June 30, 1941, some youthful members of the OUN under Bandera (OUN-B), led by Yaroslav Stetsko, seized the Lviv radio station and declared that an independent Ukrainian state had been formed. According to Soviet accounts, this declaration offered thanks to the great German Army and the Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler. Further, a pogrom of the Jewish population involving thousands of casualties was said to have ensued. In a recent biographical introduction to the memoirs of Nazi-hunter Simon Wiesenthal, Peter Michael Lingens maintains that after the "Russians" left Lviv, Ukrainians wearing German uniforms arrived, who "celebrated"

their return to their native land with three days and nights of continuous pogroms in which 6,000 Jews were killed. He also describes an execution of Jews in Brygidki prison, also carried out by Ukrainian guards.³ He does not, however, provide any material evidence to support this statement.

In Soviet and other accounts of this period, there is also scarce documentation of such atrocities. There is also little indication whether the guards were a small minority or whether pogroms represented part of traditional Ukrainian-Jewish animosities. While there is justifiably an emotional side to such narratives, historical accuracy is not always guaranteed. In fact, Simon Wiesenthal has been the subject of a vicious Soviet propaganda campaign alleging that as a Zionist, he collaborated with and became an agent of the Nazis. Conversely, articles from the Ukrainian perspective, such as one on Ukrainians who saved Jews from the Nazi persecutors have also tended to fall short of objectivity.⁴ The standard history of Ukrainian nationalism, which was recently published in a new edition, does not venture into this troublesome question in depth, and discussions of the same even in published form have degenerated into invective and polemics.⁵ Soviet accounts have insisted that German-OUN collaboration continued throughout the period of occupation, but until very recently they also were characterized by a one-sided and highly inflammatory approach.

In 1942, Ukrainian nationalist tactics changed, and a military organization superseded the political one, though it was still under the leadership of the OUN-B. This was called the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, or UPA from its Cyrillic initials. It is for UPA that the heaviest criticism has been reserved in Soviet accounts. UPA divided itself into groups according to region, and according to the Soviet viewpoint, it formed a ruthless security service that carried out interrogations and torture. It terrorized the population and helped the Nazis' own security forces to persecute, torture and execute innocent citizens. It was aided and abetted by a Ukrainian police force, which assisted with the execution of Jews. UPA would attack entire villages, killing anyone suspected of supporting the Soviets. Before long, their activities extended from the northern part of western Ukraine to the central Galician region.

As the war continued, the Germans were driven westward across Ukrainian territory, until they were faced with total removal. From a base in western Ukraine, in the summer of spring 1943, with the

assistance of the Ukrainian Central Committee, a Ukrainian division of the Waffen SS was formed, called the SS Division *Halychyna*. It was sent to back up German units and was practically wiped out by the Red Army at the battle of Brody. However, it was eventually reformed and saw further action against Soviet partisans in Slovakia. In brief, according to the Soviet interpretation, its members clearly could not be conceived as anything other than collaborators. They were fighting alongside the Germans against their fellow Soviets, a crime that in Soviet eyes could not be more heinous. It was possibly for this reason that the First Party Secretary of Ukraine, Nikita Khrushchev, coined the term "Ukrainian-German nationalists" to describe such activities.

The final stage of the "collaboration" began in the latter years of the war and early postwar years, as the German army was removed from Soviet territories. It is held that Anglo-American imperialists were unhappy that the Ukrainian nationalists were about to suffer an ignominious defeat and, as a result, supplied them with arms and provisions in order that they could continue to resist Soviet rule after the German retreat. The result was increased warfare in Ukrainian villages in western territories from 1945–47. This became so fierce that in March 1947, the ostensibly mild Khrushchev was replaced by one of Stalin's most loyal associates, Lazar Kaganovich, a man known for his ruthlessness. In 1947, Kaganovich, on behalf of the USSR, signed an agreement with Poland and Czechoslovakia for joint action against UPA insurgents in the borderland areas.

UPA now—according to both Soviet and Western sources—was obliged to go underground. However, it focused its activities on opposing the consolidation of Soviet rule in the villages (the towns in the past had been Polish-Jewish enclaves, now a sizeable Russian population was moved in). When Khrushchev and then Kaganovich tried to establish collective farms there, the UPA would attack by night, burn down the buildings, and kill anyone they believed to have sympathy for the kolkhozy, especially Soviet officials and police forces. As a result, it became impossible to avoid a further period of bloody warfare in which, in the Soviet view, UPA was carrying out fratricide. Anyone who was a member of UPA was in Soviet eyes ipso facto an enemy of the people and a war criminal.

Though the numbers of UPA members and casualties has long been a subject of conjecture, a 1990 press conference of the Ukrai-

nian KGB offered more definite figures from Soviet archives: it was stated that the armed formations of UPA numbered about 90,000; and that they were responsible for the deaths of 30,000 Soviet civilians and 25,000 militia.⁶ Conversely, another recent source maintains that in the period 1944–46, 48,300 UPA members were amnestied; 56,600 were killed; and 108,500 wounded.⁷ Even if one allows for the fact that some of the wounded may have been among those amnestied and that some of the wounded may have returned to active service as guerrillas, this would still render the figure of 90,000 total members as much too small. All one can say is that the UPA forces were substantial and the army had firm roots in its local soil.

THE WAR CRIMINALS QUESTION

Before trying to provide some perspective to this interpretation, which incidentally has been widely accepted in many circles in the West, not least by simple repetition, there is another issue to consider. Much of the wartime emigration to Canada and the United States consisted of members of the OUN and the *Halychyna* Division, who were housed initially in DP camps in Austria and Germany and managed to escape to the West rather than being deported back to the USSR. Virtually all of them were anti-Soviet, and the Soviet view was that they constituted a sort of fifth column in the West, whose aim it was to discredit the Soviet Union. In newspapers intended for Western eyes, Soviet writers and historians repeatedly propagated the line that the West had sheltered war criminals, Nazis, collaborators, many of whom were now creating myths about the Soviet Union, not least the theory that a man-made famine had been created in Ukraine in 1933 that was responsible for millions of deaths.

Western Communists also helped to disseminate this theory. In 1987, Progress Publishers in Toronto issued a book by a Winnipeg schoolteacher Douglas Tottle entitled *Fraud, Famine and Fascism*, which maintained that the 1932–33 famine was a myth created by Ukrainian nationalists.⁸ Much of his book consists of an effort to try to discredit Western historians who were then working on a major study about the famine, and especially Stanford's Robert Conquest and Harvard's James E. Mace. While Tottle made some justifiable comments about the authenticity of some of the illustra-

tions used in Dr. Conquest's book *Harvest of Sorrow*, he was unable to offer any serious criticism of a carefully researched and well documented study.⁹ In addition, Tottle's work was seriously undermined by an admission in December 1987 by the hardline Ukrainian party leader, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, that the famine had in fact occurred. Thereafter, revelations came to light at a furious pace from the Soviet side. At the time of writing, a Kiev 1990 conference on the famine had even declared that the event constituted an act of genocide against the Ukrainians as a nation.¹⁰ The point here is that a propaganda campaign linked to the Ukrainian war criminals issue had been exposed by the original instigators: the Soviet authorities themselves. On a personal note, I also was influenced by this campaign as a graduate student. But it became possible to discern that a dividing point had been crossed between historical analysis and propaganda. This became most evident when reading the Soviet Ukrainian press after the formation of the Deschenes Commission in Canada to investigate the possibility that there were war criminals living in Canada who must be brought to justice. Thus after the Commission was formed, it was believed that it would be sending representatives to the USSR to hear Soviet evidence. Such evidence would emanate less from officials than from the villages in western Ukraine in which the alleged crimes had taken place. Already Soviet sources were naming individuals living in Canada who were guilty of crimes, even down to the person's street address, and then berating the Conservative government for acting in such a dilatory fashion in bringing these men to justice.¹¹

Soon this was carried a step further. By the end of the year, entire village populations were being gathered in the central village hall in Ukrainian settlements. Those who could not fit into the hall were gathered outside the building, where loudspeakers had been installed. Soviet officials arrived and then in emotional speeches would inform or remind villagers of the heinous crimes committed by "x," who was now living in Montreal, often showing a graphic film depicting corpses. The goal was simple: when members of the Deschenes Commission arrived in villages subjected to these "reminders," every resident would know exactly about whom the Commission was inquiring and what crimes he had carried out. The state was providing the evidence to convict people long considered to be enemies of the Soviet people.

None of the above, of course, in any way indicates that all the

suspects in question were in fact innocent. Nor should it be held that there were no Ukrainian war criminals or collaborators, or that some of them today live in the West. This, logically, has to be regarded as inevitable. The question is whether this evidence is being fabricated to some extent by the Soviet side, which seems clear enough, and also whether this is a case of victors in war making judgments on the defeated enemy. The USSR before 1987 made much capital out of the wartime alliance, using it as the basis for co-operation on the war criminals issue. It found a willing ally in the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) in the United States, which has rigorously carried out its functions in conjunction with the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB). But the essence of the OSI campaign has been to prove that the alleged criminals entered the United States illegally at the end of the war. If so, then they can be deported to stand trial either in the countries in which their crimes were committed, or in the state of Israel. One of the most controversial cases at present is that of Ivan Demjanjuk, an autoworker from Cleveland, Ohio, who is accused of being the murderous "Ivan the Terrible" at Treblinka. Condemned to death by a trial in Israel, Demjanjuk continues to maintain his innocence and his situation as a case of mistaken identity.

The biggest single problem for any scholar pursuing research in this field is that of ethnic tensions, in this case between Ukrainians and Jews. Ukrainians regarded the establishment of the Deschenes Commission in Canada in 1985 to investigate allegations that some 3,000 war criminals might be living there as tantamount to a witch-hunt. Suspicions were aroused further by the fear that the Commission would hear Soviet evidence. Conversely the Canadian Jewish community welcomed both developments as a belated effort to deal with a question long ignored. In 1985–87 in particular, relations between the two communities in Canada became quite strained.¹²

The background to this problem is also of importance, and is practically an ancient problem in western Ukraine, and in Galicia in particular. For our purposes, let us put it succinctly. For centuries, Ukrainians and Jews have lived together, very often in an uneasy sort of environment. While one group was predominantly rural and agricultural, the other was urban. Village met city for exchanges of goods. To some Ukrainians, the Jew was the moneylender, often the enemy, and the reverse also applied. Relations have not always been bad, but Ukrainophobia still has a place in some Jewish com-

munities, as does anti-Jewish sentiment in Ukrainian communities (but not necessarily anti-Semitism).

After the Russian revolution of 1917, there was a brief period in which it appeared that Jews and Ukrainians might be able to coexist in harmony. However, after the Treaty of Versailles, Western Ukrainian territories which had formerly been under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire fell under Polish control. In theory, the new Polish government had assured the Allied Powers, France, Britain, and the United States that it would guarantee autonomy for the Ukrainians, who made up a majority of the population in Eastern Galicia to the south and Volhynia to the north (the two areas that today comprise Western Ukraine). In practice, Eastern Galicia, for all intents and purposes, was regarded as inherently Polish. The cities housed the Polish and Jewish population; and the vast majority of Ukrainians lived in the countryside.

REVIEWING THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

It is not my intention here to provide a history of Ukrainian developments in interwar Eastern Poland.¹³ It is important, nonetheless, to recognize not only that Ukrainian cultural, social and religious organizations were suppressed, but also that a state of virtual warfare existed in the 1930s. Polish officials were permitted to occupy large tracts of territory in the Ukrainian ethnic area, land prices were inflated far above those in non-Ukrainian Western Galicia, and poverty and land hunger became endemic. After 1930, following assaults on Polish officials, the Polish government began a so-called "pacification," which entailed military rule in Ukrainian villages. Ukrainians who embraced the Ukrainian Catholic Church were Romanized, and it even became difficult to acquire a job without first converting to the Roman Catholic faith.

On a political level, Ukrainians reacted in a variety of ways to this predicament. In the 1920s, the illegal Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU), a branch of the Communist Party of Poland, enjoyed some support, especially in the Volhynian region, formerly a part of the Russian Empire, where communist traditions were stronger. In the latter part of the decade, however, Stalin became suspicious of what he regarded as "nationalist deviations" within the Communist Party of Ukraine, and these doubts quickly spread to the West Ukrainian party apparatus. By the 1930s, the

KPZU ceased to be a force in political life, and in July 1938, it was officially dissolved by the Comintern on Stalin's orders, and most of its members were "invited" to Moscow, where they were executed.

Today, Soviet historians have begun to reassess the significance of the KPZU, and some of its members have been posthumously rehabilitated since 1956. One historian has argued recently that the 1950s campaign to exonerate its members was largely superficial, however. He points out that the notion of restoring the former status of such people was first broached in 1947, and in September 1950 they were readmitted to the party. But after June 1951, they were treated in the same way as former members of "bourgeois" parties, i.e., repression became once again the order of the day.¹⁴ The most surprising part about this account is that it indicates a brief period of leniency in the late 1940s, a period that has been perceived hitherto as one of almost unrelieved gloom.

There have also been efforts to try to demonstrate that the KPZU remained a strong influence on the population in the 1930s; in short, that a sizeable portion of the population was receptive to a Soviet invasion in September 1939. The key point to be made, nonetheless, is that a genuinely representative Communist force in Western Ukraine was systematically eliminated by Stalin. It has been noted that of all the European Communist parties, that of the Poles (the Communist Party of Poland, or CPP) was treated the most ruthlessly by the Soviet leader, who had all its most influential figures executed. The Western Ukrainian party, as an integral part of this party, was treated in very similar fashion. Rostyslav Bratun, the Lviv-based writer, maintains that persecution of the party sprang from the attack on so-called nationalist deviations in Soviet Ukraine, specifically the onslaught against the popular education minister Oleksandr Shumsky, engineered and conducted by Lazar Kaganovich in 1927.¹⁵

The reality, however, was that Ukrainians sought other political alternatives, one of which was a legal political party called the Ukrainian National Democratic Union, which took part in the Polish elections, and had several deputies in the Sejm. By the late 1930s, though, it was the OUN that had emerged as the chief political organization for Ukrainians.

There is no question that there were Fascist and Nazi influences on the OUN. Its program, modelled on the political views of

Dmytro Dontsov, was anti-democratic in nature; it adopted the *fuehrerprinzip*, and favored private agriculture. Founded in 1929, its members swore to a Decalogue, the commandments of which merit listing in full:

1. You will attain a Ukrainian state or die in battle for it.
2. You will not permit anyone to defame the glory or honor of your nation.
3. Remember the Great Days of our struggles.
4. Be proud that you are the inheritor of the struggle for Volodymyr's Trident.
5. Avenge the deaths of the Great Knights.
6. Do not speak about matters with anyone, but only those with whom it is essential.
7. Do not hesitate to undertake the most dangerous deeds, should this be demanded by the good of the Cause.
8. Treat the enemies of your nation with hatred and ruthlessness.
9. Neither pleading, nor threats, nor torture, nor death shall compel you to betray a secret.
10. Aspire to expand the power, wealth and glory of the Ukrainian state.

Many of the above tenets are steeped in historical folklore. It was widely believed that Ukrainian statehood could only be attained under a dictatorship. Its military bent was evident in its founder, Colonel Evhen Konovalets, but its policies, while clearly contemptuous of parliamentary democracy, reflect the tenets of integral nationalism prevalent in Central Europe in the 1930s. To many Ukrainians, the Fascist and Nazi dictatorships appeared to offer more hope for political change in Europe than the ineffectual and posturing democracies. This view became increasingly self-evident by the mid-1930s as Hitler began to roll back the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.

After September 1939, the OUN adopted a waiting policy. By the following year it was, in any case, plagued with internal problems, eventually dividing into the two branches under Bandera and Melnyk.¹⁶ Soviet rule in Western Ukraine began with an election to a People's Assembly which, duly elected with either Red Army personnel or Eastern Ukrainians known for their loyalty to Stalin, petitioned the USSR Supreme Soviet to incorporate Western Ukraine into the Soviet Union as part of Ukraine. Ukrainians were evidently apprehensive toward Soviet rule, but for the most part were non-

committal as a systematic anti-Polish policy was employed by the new rulers. As noted correctly in the Soviet official line, some Ukrainian nationalists were on the German side of the border preparing for the eventual invasion.

By the spring of 1940, however, the Soviets began to turn on the local Ukrainian population. Collectivization of private farms—never popular anywhere—was started, and non-Soviet political and cultural organizations were dissolved. Anyone whose political integrity was even remotely in doubt was imprisoned. Authoritarian Poland had been replaced by totalitarian USSR, at the very height, one should add, of Stalin's terror. The culmination came with the news of the German invasion, at which time the NKVD systematically butchered thousands upon thousands of prisoners in the cells of Western Ukrainian cities that were to be evacuated. The extent of these massacres is only beginning to be realized today, but it is consistent with the massacres that were carried out in Eastern Ukraine in the 1930s.¹⁷

For Ukrainians, the turning point had passed. Many in the OUN and outside it were willing to lend support to anyone or any regime that would oppose the Soviet regime. Also, testimony from the period indicates that many perceived Germany as a civilized European power, an invasion by whom could only be welcomed. Consequently, the Germany army was greeted with the traditional salt and bread by the Ukrainian community. In June 1941, Germany enjoyed widespread and vocal support among a large majority of the Western Ukrainian population. The OUN-B appears to have been under the impression either that a declaration of Ukrainian independence would be welcomed, or that it would be possible to present the Germans with a *fait accompli*.¹⁸

On the question of collaboration, therefore, the essential question is how long this support for Germany lasted. It could not be entirely based on illusions, since Ukrainian nationalist leaders had some close contacts with the Wehrmacht and officials such as Alfred Rosenberg, the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and had spent time either in Germany or in German-occupied territory. At the same time, like many other areas of the German Third Reich, there were several agencies working parallel to one another in elaborating policies toward conquered territories. The OUN-B appears to have underestimated the power of ideological forces that regarded all Slavs as *untermenschen*, and Ukraine as little more

than a granary for the German army. As Reichskommissar of Ukraine was appointed one Erich Koch, the former Gauleiter of East Prussia, and one of the most vicious and depraved of Hitler's subordinates. Koch ignored his nominal superior, Rosenberg, and took orders only from Martin Bormann, Hitler's personal secretary. To Koch, Ukrainians had to be treated with "vodka and a whip."¹⁹

The OUN-B leaders under Stetsko who had declared Ukrainian independence were soon arrested, while Bandera himself was placed under house arrest in Germany and henceforth ceased to play an active role in the events. As the war developed, however, and all Ukrainian territories fell under the control of the German and Romanian occupants, the more extreme policies of the OUN were moderated by contact with Eastern Ukrainians through scouting missions. The former Ukrainian dissident Danylo Shumuk was captured on one such mission,²⁰ while Armstrong points out that there was a discernible change in OUN ideology as early as the spring of 1942. He notes, however, that the Dontsovian concept of integral nationalism remained, as did the OUN's veneration of "heroism."²¹ Political pamphlets issued by the Ukrainian underground during the war years also suggest a wide range of political thought,²² thus it is unwise to stereotype OUN ideology as remaining static in one time period. Its evolution was gradual but not insignificant.

The German occupation regime stepped up persecution of Ukraine in late 1941, and even retained the essence of the hated collective farm system. As some Soviet historians have begun to acknowledge, it was as a direct result of German persecution that the UPA was founded in 1942: as a self-defense mechanism against German atrocities in the villages of northwestern Ukraine. That its forces were soon turned against Soviet partisans is also true, and it was controlled politically by the OUN. Thus it would appear that the band of Ukrainian nationalists was engaged in a two-front war against both the Germans and the Soviets. But if this is so, then how does one explain the formation of an SS Division *Halychyna* only a year later?

The answer would seem to be that in the first place, the initiative for this organization came not from Ukrainian territories under Erich Koch, but from the so-called Gouvernement-General of Poland, which had been under a much milder rule by Rosenberg, and where

the Ukrainian Central Committee had continued to play a key role in Ukrainian life (though only a minor one in the overall German administration). In addition, some German leaders recognized that the tide of the war had turned and were now willing to solicit local Ukrainian help against the Red Army. And hardly surprisingly, the largest contingents for the SS Division came from those areas that had seen massacres in June 1941. Its members were under oath to fight only against the Soviets, not against the Western allies.²³ Only after the decisive defeat at Brody did some Division members drift into the UPA, thereby providing a pretext for lumping all the Ukrainian oppositionists together as German collaborators.

In the Gorbachev period, the criticisms of Stalinism reached a peak in 1989, and prompted a revision of the role of the Banderivtsi. Ukrainian historiography has been noted for its relative orthodoxy and it is to be expected that any attempt to rehabilitate the OUN-B members would be met with strong opposition.²⁴ Almost all sources now concur, nevertheless, that a majority of UPA members opposed the German occupants. Some are said to have been deceived by unscrupulous pro-German leaders. This statement may be quite close to the truth. While those Ukrainians who carried out atrocities against Jews were for the most part individual policemen, not members of the UPA or SS Division, there was also a small minority of leaders known to hold anti-Jewish views.

The war crimes issue has been complicated by the actions of the Western Powers, particularly the United States. By the summer of 1945, the switch of military alliances that eventually resulted in the Cold War rendered some anti-Soviet forces suddenly of strategic value. Not only were some nationalist leaders of various ethnic bases permitted entry into the United States, but the CIA began to offer belated support to the UPA—not to bring about a future Ukrainian state, it would appear, but rather to prolong internal dissensions within the Soviet empire. Such efforts reportedly continued at least until 1953, i.e., three years after the death of the UPA leader, Roman Shukhevysh, in a skirmish with MVD troops near Lviv.²⁵ The Soviet response was shrill and frenetic and clouded the truth. Publication after publication attempted to portray all Ukrainian nationalists as war criminals, without regard for archival records—which were kept secret and were inaccessible to both Soviet and non-Soviet scholars.

One final event in the 1950s period in Ukraine is worthy of at least a footnote. In 1953, L.G. Melnikov, who had become First Party Secretary in December 1949, was removed from office, and given a largely ceremonial position as Soviet ambassador to Romania. The episode was treated by the authorities with the utmost secrecy, and the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, at which Melnikov was removed, was among the least publicized in Ukrainian history. It noted that Melnikov's leadership was "unsatisfactory" and that Melnikov had deviated from the Leninist-Stalinist nationality policy by promoting persons of non-Ukrainian background to prominent posts in Western Ukraine.²⁶ Simultaneous plenums were also held in Latvia and Lithuania that also pointed out such developments in these republics. In short, a campaign had begun in Moscow to redirect Soviet nationality policy.

For our purposes, the significance of the Plenum lies not in the reasons for Melnikov's dismissal—it has been plausibly argued by a Soviet historian that these Plenums were part of a grab for power by Lavrentii Beria, who was anxious to conciliate the national republics, i.e., such concessions were not sincere²⁷—but in the evidence that has been provided subsequently that Western Ukraine was being effectively colonized by a massive intrusion of outsiders into the leading positions. If this was the case, then it can be argued that the UPA's role was less that of an anti-Soviet guerrilla movement than a national independence struggle to preserve the entity of this region as part of Ukraine. Lest this contention sound extreme, it is useful to cite figures provided by the Ukrainian historian, O.V. Haran.²⁸

Haran maintains that at the September 1946 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, it was stated that of the 16,129 members of the nomenklatura of the oblast party committees in Western Ukraine, only 2,097 were workers from the local population, i.e., 13 percent. In Stanyslaviv (Ivano-Frankivsk) Oblast (in which UPA resistance was at its most fierce), the figure was 7.6 percent, and in Chernivtsi, 3 percent. In rural organizations, locals constituted 12.1 percent, and in Soviet, planning and trade organizations, 30 percent. Turning to chairmen of local governments, the native population occupied 31 percent of these posts. Haran asks whether such a situation—in effect a foreign takeover—did not lead directly to the "tragic events" that occurred during the

course of the agricultural transformation, including the struggle with UPA.

The evidence cited against Melnikov reveals further that this was less an Eastern Ukrainian takeover than a Russian one. Haran notes that the Russian language became the only official language in Western Ukraine, a region that ethnically was more Ukrainian in makeup during these years than the territories that had made up Soviet Ukraine before September 1939. At the very least, this new information would suggest that a new analysis is required of the UPA-Soviet struggle of the postwar years. But was this incursion of outsiders an economic or a political move? In the past, Soviet scholars have argued that the lack of skilled cadres in Western Ukraine and its lack of an industrial base made it inevitable that an outside workforce had to be moved there. In developing Western Ukrainian industry, the Soviet authorities started from a negligible base as the region had been underdeveloped during the period of Polish rule.²⁹

One can accept this argument partially. But it does not explain why almost 78 percent of rural organs were run by non-natives. MVD detachments set up headquarters in almost every village of Western Ukraine. Moreover, had the problem been merely one of training, then within 5–10 years, one would have expected to see a change in the situation, with the employment and promotion of more Western Ukrainians to prominent positions. In 1953, when Melnikov was dismissed, the Soviets had controlled the region for almost nine years, but it is evident that not until the 1960s and 1970s did the situation improve for the local Ukrainian population in this particular regard.

And, to reiterate the connection between these events and the question of war criminals: the OUN-UPA resistance continued long after the war, and attained its most extreme form in the postwar years. Soviet accounts of the past have made no distinction between activities before and after the war: all were deemed treacherous acts against their own kind. More current research would indicate that this was not the case, and that one reason why the resistance was so protracted was because the enemy was the Soviet secret police, or Russian officials, or the imposition of the Soviet political and economic system on an undeveloped farming region. One awaits more research from Ukrainian historians as we are only at the beginning of new work on the 1940s period in Western Ukraine.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, anyone researching this complex topic must place the main issues in perspective. Several points emerge that have to be taken into consideration and may be offered as preliminary conclusions:

- a) There are some Ukrainian war criminals.
- b) The majority of Ukrainians did not participate in atrocities against Jews, but a minority did so on an individual basis.
- c) Ukrainians initially supported the invasion of the Soviet Union by the Germans, but the vast majority rejected such collaboration when the German occupation regime revealed its inhumane policies.
- d) German policy itself varied from area to area and from institution to institution.
- e) A majority of Ukrainians in the western regions opposed Soviet rule on any grounds after the eighteen-month period of Soviet rule in 1939–41. If Ukrainian actions are considered in the light of such sentiments, they are more easily explained than otherwise.
- f) From 1945 to 1987 there was a deliberate and intensive Soviet campaign to portray all Ukrainian nationalists as war criminals and to persuade Western nations that this is the case. Because of this policy, many Ukrainians have claimed that the OSI and the Deschenes Commission should not use Soviet evidence. The OSI has ignored such protests, whereas the Deschenes Commission has acknowledged their justice. However, more recent research has shown that it was Stalinist policies in Western Ukraine, and especially the Russification of the region that forced local Ukrainians to take up opposition to the Soviet regime.

In the final analysis, the historian must regard the current process of bringing war criminals to justice with skepticism. As Stalin might have said, "it is no accident" that whereas the OSI resembles a hound after the fox and will stop at nothing to rip apart its prey, the Deschenes Commission has remained tentative. The different attitudes are a result not of divergencies in the political and legal processes in the United States and Canada, but in the relative power and influence of their ethnic communities. In the United States, the Jewish lobby has been a major force behind OSI, urging—with justice, one should add—that war criminals should never be left in

peace. In Canada, the powerful Ukrainian lobby has precluded such an all-out approach, especially when it entails Soviet evidence about Ukrainian suspects.

In Western Ukraine, three oblasts of which have been under non-communist governments since the spring of 1990, the rehabilitation of Bandera and Melnyk has continued apace. Statues of Bandera have replaced those of Vladimir Lenin in many towns and villages (in Drohobych, for example), while unofficial literature has begun to deal with the subject of wartime nationalism and the UPA in some depth. The Communist Party of Ukraine under leader Stanislav Hurenko has reacted with fury to these developments. Hurenko maintained that the "resurrection" of Bandera was part of a campaign of civil disobedience launched by the "political enemies" of Ukraine who have the ultimate intention of seizing power. It is maintained also that the Popular Movement for Perestroika (Rukh) has been taken over by separatist extremists who are followers of the Bandera movement.³⁰

The main source of optimism for the scholar is that the Soviet archives are beginning to open, and that Soviet historians are beginning to acknowledge that there is a whole new dimension to this question. Those suspected of being war criminals were essentially trapped between the two great totalitarian forces of the twentieth century. Ultimately, then, the question becomes one of choice. Nevertheless, the topic awaits further and detailed research, and particularly a dispassionate approach.

5 Khrushchev, Kaganovich and the 1947 Crisis

IN MARCH 1947, Nikita Khrushchev, who had been appointed First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) in 1938 and maintained that position after a distinguished war service, was suddenly dismissed from his post on Stalin's orders. A favorite of Stalin, Khrushchev had been since February 1944 the only prominent Soviet leader to hold simultaneously the positions of CPU First Secretary and Chairman of the Council of Ministers. He was now obliged to give up the former position to Lazar Kaganovich, and the retention of his government post meant little in terms of his continuing authority. In fact, it was a tradition for Stalin to remove those in disfavor by stages, reducing their power a little at a time. That Khrushchev's promising political career was in eclipse seems evident from his almost simultaneous relinquishment (March 22–24, 1947) of two other offices—that of secretary of both the Kiev oblast and the Kiev city party committees—in addition to his hitherto undisputed control over the newspaper *Pravda Ukrainy*.

From March to December 1947, Kaganovich imposed his ruthless style of government on Ukraine. Khrushchev's name and photograph simply disappeared from the pages of *Pravda Ukrainy* and *Radyanska Ukraina*, the two Ukrainian newspapers, and apart from a solitary appearance (and apology) at a meeting of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet about a week after his dismissal, he kept an exceptionally low profile. Certainly his friends would have concluded that his career was over. But even prior to December it became evi-

dent that Khrushchev had been restored to favor. By the fall of 1947 his name began once again to appear on CPU decrees, ostensibly, according to Khrushchev's reminiscences, because Stalin had demanded that all decrees issued in the republic should carry the signatures of both Kaganovich and Khrushchev.¹ This may be interpreted as an attempt to curb Kaganovich's excesses, but it is also proof that Khrushchev had become "acceptable" again. In December, Khrushchev regained his position as First Secretary of the CPU, apparently none the worse for his temporary demotion.

What were the reasons for Khrushchev's removal? How serious was it in terms of a setback to his political ambitions? What impact did the event have on the course of Ukrainian history? Although there have been to date few clear answers to these questions, historians concur that the demotion of Khrushchev was an event of major significance. There have been three principal interpretations, which can be categorized roughly as follows: agricultural crisis; nationalism in Western Ukraine; and political maneuvering within the Soviet leadership.

The "agricultural" interpretation has been adopted by Medvedev and Medvedev.² They argue that in March 1947 the Soviet authorities were afraid that there would be public unrest in Ukraine as a result of the famine of 1946, which had evolved from one of the worst droughts in many years throughout the European part of the USSR. Consequently, they dispatched a "strong arm" in the shape of Kaganovich to ensure that there were no disturbances. This explanation seems plausible, because the 1946 famine occurred in Eastern Ukraine rather than the western oblasts, and many Ukrainians in the former region could still recall vividly the effects of the man-made famine of 1933, which resulted in the loss of several million lives.³ The 1946 agricultural year in Ukraine was a disaster; it had a particularly devastating effect on the heads of livestock. The number of horses in the republic declined by some 360,000 during the year, while that of hogs fell by more than a million.⁴ In addition, the grain harvests were catastrophically low throughout the eastern oblasts, especially in the southern steppe regions and in the Kiev and Kharkiv areas.⁵

During this famine period, Khrushchev's position was ambivalent. He was Stalin's trusted lieutenant, who had been instructed to ensure that the compulsory grain requisitions were delivered to the state on time. But, there is evidence that he made some attempts to

have the Ukrainian impositions lowered, possibly for humanitarian reasons, possibly because he realized the implications that a famine might hold for his political future. In his memoirs Khrushchev recounts that:

[Stalin] would be very unhappy to hear that Ukraine not only couldn't fulfill its assigned quota for delivery to the State, but in fact needed food from the State to feed its own people. . . . However, I had no choice but to confront Stalin with the facts: famine was imminent, and something had to be done.⁶

Stalin's pathological suspicion of his subordinates whenever difficulties arose rendered this communication of Khrushchev's a dangerous one. Ukrainian agriculture, already devastated by the effects of the German-Soviet conflict (many battles had taken place on Ukrainian territory), suffered yet another serious crisis.

Another indication that Khrushchev's difficulties in agriculture may have led to his temporary downfall was the attack upon him in 1946-47 by Andrei Andreev, the Politburo member with overall responsibility for Soviet agriculture (since 1943). For some time Andreev had been a proponent of the theories of the agriculturist Vasili Villyams, who advocated the cultivation of spring wheat throughout the grain-growing areas of the USSR. Khrushchev had nothing but contempt for this theory and maintained that winter wheat always attained the higher yields. The dispute, one of many over Soviet agricultural policy, acquired importance once the famine had spread throughout Ukraine. Stalin needed a scapegoat for the crisis, and Khrushchev, with his willingness and determination to adhere to his own methods, was a convenient target.

As a result of the 1946 agricultural crisis and following the Khrushchev-Andreev dispute, a plenum of the CPSU was held from 21 to 26 February 1947 to discuss ways of alleviating the agricultural problems. The proximity of the dates of this plenum and the dismissal of Khrushchev can hardly have been coincidental. By this time, Khrushchev was on trial. Moreover, as Edward Crankshaw reports, the main speech at the plenum was delivered by Andreev and focused on the need to grow more spring wheat, which could hardly have been more humiliating or ominous for Khrushchev.⁷ It is evident that the situation in agriculture was perceived as a major crisis. Stalin had rarely convoked CPSU plenums in the postwar pe-

riod and had been generally reluctant to allow his subordinates a say in Soviet policy since the war had ended. Further, the plenum was held in conditions of utmost secrecy. No reports were given to the press (other than of the event being held), and not until 1971 were its resolutions made public. Even then it seems that many of them were not revealed.⁸ No reference was made specifically to Ukraine in the publicized resolutions, which focus largely on the general weakness of the collective farms (already indicated in a major decree of the previous year) and the need for less formalistic party control over agriculture. We can assume, however, that the CPU plenum that followed in March 1947 discussed all aspects of the crisis and admonished the person with ultimate responsibility for it, Khrushchev.

At the least, we can assert that the plenum played some role in Khrushchev's dismissal. But it may have been the instrument rather than the cause of his removal. According to Khrushchev's memoirs, both he and Andreev were subsequently appointed to a commission to deal with the plenum resolutions, and only then did Khrushchev incur Stalin's displeasure by making the suggestion that collective farmers should retain a given percentage of grain for their own seed stores.⁹ The aftermath of the plenum, then, may have been more significant than the plenum itself in bringing about Khrushchev's ouster. Another factor suggesting that the agricultural question may have been crucial was that Khrushchev's successor, Kaganovich, was also known to be a strong advocate of spring wheat cultivation.¹⁰

Still, we must beware of overestimating the agricultural aspect, at least in terms of the East Ukrainian famine of 1946. The famine, after all, affected the villages more than the cities. The experience of 1933 suggests that the plight of Ukrainian peasants was not one of Stalin's greatest concerns. In the earlier year, it is alleged, Stalin had deliberately created the famine to curb the recalcitrant Ukrainian nationalists.¹¹ If this statement is true, then how much greater would have been Stalin's truculence in 1946, after Ukrainians had displayed their "treachery" by surrendering in large numbers to the German forces at the commencement of the German-Soviet war? Would Khrushchev have been called to task for failing to avert a famine in the nation that Stalin allegedly would have liked to deport en masse after the war? It is more likely that if the agricultural crisis played a part in Khrushchev's dismissal, it was because it rep-

resented a setback to the agricultural goals outlined in the Fourth Five-Year Plan rather than through any human suffering that might have resulted. As such, it was not likely to have been the sole cause of Khrushchev's removal in March 1947.

Turning to nationalism in western Ukraine, there are two aspects that merit discussion: the collectivization of agriculture; and nationalist resistance as exhibited by forces of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in the early postwar years. According to Crankshaw, one of the main reasons for Khrushchev's fall was his failure to "resovietize" western Ukraine quickly and thoroughly after its re-annexation from the Germans in 1944.¹² He notes the dramatic increase in the number of collective farms established there during Kaganovich's spell as CPU first secretary, thus relating the change of leadership to Khrushchev's problems in the collectivization campaign. Further evidence that Khrushchev himself took this matter seriously were his claims, first, that the number of collective farms established at the end of 1945 was considerably higher than was actually the case,¹³ and second, that his plan was to restore all the collective farms established in the prewar period of Soviet rule by the end of 1947.¹⁴ The plan, if it existed, was an abject failure, but it indicates that Khrushchev was anxious to show Stalin and his critics that he was making progress in collectivizing western Ukraine.

There are two main problems with Crankshaw's analysis. First, it is simplistic in that it treats the question of collectivization in western Ukraine separately from its imposition elsewhere. The campaign was coordinated in the western borderlands as a whole. Since the Soviets lacked material resources as a result of losses incurred during the German-Soviet war, they concentrated on each area in turn. Thus the collectivization campaign was initiated in western Ukraine and right-bank Moldavia, the two most important grain-growing regions among the newly-annexed territories. Once the campaign there was under way, resources were shifted temporarily to the other regions, western Belorussia and the Baltic republics. In Estonia, for example, collectivization of peasant households began only in 1949, but it overtook all other regions by July of that year.¹⁵ This indicates that the Soviet leaders were relying on short periods of concentrated effort to achieve their purpose. Thus, in the case of western Ukraine under Khrushchev's leadership between 1945 and March 1947, a start had been made, but it was essentially

a limited campaign, with the ostensible aim of restoring those collective farms that had been established in the prewar period.

Second, Crankshaw's comments are based on the total number of collective farms rather than the percentage of households within them. It is true that under Kaganovich's leadership the number of collective farms increased from an estimated 274 at the end of 1946 (in western Ukraine, including Transcarpathia) to over 1,400 by 1 January 1948, an increase of about 600 per cent. In terms of peasant households, however, the figure of 1,400 represented only about 7.5 per cent of the total, which hardly constitutes a transformation of land ownership. Thus, under Kaganovich some progress had been made, but collectivization had made only a tentative start, well within the limited ambitions of the Soviet leaders. Mass collectivization began only when the system was initiated in the East European satellite states in the spring of 1948. And it was undertaken in western Ukraine under the guidance of Khrushchev himself (although he left his position and moved to Moscow before the process was brought to completion).

Although Khrushchev would not have been reprimanded merely for the slow pace of collectivization, it is possible that his methods drew some criticism. It was the latter that accounted for the failure to restore the prewar collective farms. Part of the problem was that in the 1939-41 period (also under Khrushchev's leadership), collective farms had been created haphazardly, often miles apart from one another. As a result, they became virtual islands amid a sea of hostile individual peasants, and because of their isolation they were unable to exert any influence over the west Ukrainian farmers. In this period, the Soviet leaders had placed considerable hopes upon the Machine-Tractor Stations (MTS), at least one of which was established in every raion before the collectivization campaign was begun.¹⁶ In the postwar period, however, most MTS were in a state of almost total disrepair. Whereas tractors on east Ukrainian MTS had largely been evacuated before the Germans arrived, in the western oblasts the speed of the invasion prevented this. Thus the MTS did not play a role in early postwar collectivization, and many were not fully reconstructed until after 1948.¹⁷

Khrushchev's method of imposing collectivization was to have groups of enforcers go systematically from village to village when setting up collective farms. An example of this is found in Ternopil

Oblast. There, whereas the central and northern regions remained noncollectivized at the end of 1945, a cluster of collective farms had been created in the south of the oblast.¹⁸ In this way the new farms had close contacts with one another and a greater chance of surviving both external opposition and disintegration from within. Yet although the method made sense, it was undoubtedly responsible, to some extent, from the continuing operations of nationalist forces, which had only to keep away from the small area being collectivized in order to survive. The concentration of Soviet and party forces in the collectivized area also enhanced the survival of recalcitrants elsewhere, and it is possible that Khrushchev was blamed for using such methods, even though he had few options open to him at the time. (Under Kaganovich collective-farm establishment was again widespread, but the farms were less stable, frequently dissolving themselves.)¹⁹

Soviet policy stipulated that mass collectivization in western Ukraine and elsewhere could not be undertaken until warranted by a sufficient build-up of party forces. This necessitated recruitment from among the local population. Khrushchev's dilemma, which was highlighted frequently in *Radyanska Ukraina*, was that western Ukrainians were "not being attracted" to the party cause. There were two principal reasons for this. First, Stalin's almost pathological distrust of Ukrainians was well known, and western Ukrainians were known to be the most nationalistic. In fact, the party organizations in the western oblasts were staffed predominantly by eastern Ukrainians and an indeterminate number of Russians.²⁰ A second factor was the reluctance of the western Ukrainians themselves to play a role in the Soviet government. Many feared nationalist reprisals for manifestations of pro-Soviet feeling, while others opposed Soviet rule for one reason or another.

Khrushchev's difficulties were intensified by the all-out assault on Ukrainian cultural and national figures initiated by Stalin and Andrei Zhdanov in mid-1946. The assault was directed against alleged "nationalist deviations" in Ukrainian life, particularly in the intellectual sphere, such as history and literature. But it was closely linked with current party problems in western Ukraine and the general failures of the CPU in postwar reconstruction.²¹ The Soviet authorities had resolved that radical changes in personnel were required throughout the CPU. How far Ukrainians were trusted with positions of responsibility is shown by Kaganovich's first

moves upon becoming first secretary, which included a purge of party cadres that evidently embraced all levels of the ranks.²²

Khrushchev, then, faced almost insuperable problems with the collectivization campaign in western Ukraine and the construction of adequate party forces. Obligated to rely on eastern Ukrainians for the most part, he discovered that even they were no longer considered trustworthy. But would these difficulties have been sufficient to ensure his dismissal as first secretary? It is doubtful. Certainly matters improved little under Kaganovich. The "cultural policies" initiated by Zhdanov were still continuing in the early 1950s. Further, even as late as the end of 1949, party forces in western Ukraine were still considered woefully inadequate. When mass collectivization was implemented, for example, it was not left to party forces at all, but rather to the recreated MTS political sections, who arrived in the villages and who had jurisdictional powers over the party.²³ If Stalin's chief concern had been the weakness of the party in the western Ukrainian countryside, then Kaganovich would have left his post in disgrace in December 1947, when, in fact, the evidence shows that he returned to Moscow in high favor. The questions of collectivization and party build-up were important and may have added to the list of Khrushchev's alleged indiscretions. But we should emphasize that they would not have brought about his downfall single-handedly.

The second aspect of the nationalism was the opposition of the UPA. Oleh Gerus maintains that Khrushchev's dismissal was a result of his failure to overcome the Ukrainian insurgents.²⁴ The two questions—collectivization and nationalist opposition—are closely connected, but we will treat them separately. Essentially the activist nationalists delayed but did not halt the collectivization campaign. Their threat was first and foremost to Soviet authority rather than to specific aspects of Soviet policy. Collectivization of peasant households had the effect of cutting off UPA's ready-made food supply in the Ukrainian villages, but it would have been imposed regardless of a nationalist presence, as it was, for example, in western Belorussia.

In assessing Gerus's remark, one can say the following. There is no doubt that Kaganovich began a major campaign against the UPA and that UPA forces had been greatly reduced by the end of 1947. Two months after Kaganovich's appointment, the USSR concluded a tripartite agreement with Czechoslovakia and Poland to

eliminate UPA forces from their respective countries, and the countryside was soon combed by forces of these nations.²⁵ Instead of engaging in open warfare in the countryside, the UPA divided itself up into smaller units and relied on "underground cells" to continue its activities.²⁶ It was also during Kaganovich's incumbency that UPA units made the desperate move of crossing Czechoslovakia in an attempt to make contact with Western forces.²⁷ But before accepting the view that Kaganovich was responsible for the demise of the UPA—thus implying that failure to achieve this was behind Khrushchev's removal—one must make two qualifications.

First, the view assumes that a relatively tolerant figure, Khrushchev, had been replaced by a ruthless fanatic. We should recall that upon being appointed CPU First Secretary in April 1925, Kaganovich had been at the forefront of the campaign to curb the "nationalist tendencies" of Oleksander Shumsky and Mykola Khvylovy. He was well known to Ukrainians as a man who had few scruples about the methods used to remove opposition. Further, the view of Kaganovich as a tyrant is one that has been promoted by Khrushchev himself in his memoirs. In his account of the Kaganovich period, Khrushchev is at pains to point out that he tried constantly to restrain Kaganovich's excesses. Attributing the latter's free rein in Ukraine after the spring of 1947 to his [Khrushchev's] illness at this time, Khrushchev remarks that

While I was sick, Kaganovich had a chance to do whatever he pleased without me around, looking over his shoulder. He bullied Patolichev so much that . . . [he] was released from his post in Kiev and transferred to Rostov. . . . After my recovery and resumption of my duties, my own relations with Kaganovich went from bad to worse. He became simply unbearable. He developed his intensive activities in two directions: against the so-called Ukrainian nationalists and against the Jews.²⁸

This image of a mild Khrushchev trying to prevent Kaganovich's repressive policies is essentially a myth. Ukrainians knew only too well that there was more to "our Mykyta" than suggested by his jovial peasant image and genuine concern for Ukrainian matters. According to a Western source, Stalin's purges of the 1930s were exceeded, at least in terms of the "destruction of party functionaries," only by those of Khrushchev in Ukraine.²⁹ His task, in short,

had been to remove any vestiges of Ukrainian nationalism. His mentor, in 1938 and very probably in 1947 also, was none other than Kaganovich. Possibly one reason why Kaganovich felt free to purge Ukraine in 1947 was that he and Khrushchev had co-operated closely in imposing similar purges in the past.

Consequently, there were very few policies carried out by Kaganovich against the Ukrainian nationalists and alleged sympathizers that could not have been undertaken by Khrushchev himself. Possibly Stalin's intention in appointing Kaganovich was for the harshest measures to be imposed by the outsider, so that Khrushchev would be perceived as relatively tolerant by contrast when he reassumed office. This, however, is unproven. We recall that the assault on the nationalists was instigated by Khrushchev. Indeed, it was Khrushchev, not Stalin, who first coined the term "Ukrainian-German nationalists," thereby categorizing all UPA members as bona fide collaborators of the Germans, "the worst enemies of the Ukrainian people."³⁰

The second counter to Gerus's viewpoint is the undue emphasis laid on the March–December 1947 period in the Soviet-UPA conflict. The main impetus for the intensification of operations in 1947 was not the appointment of Kaganovich as first secretary, but the assassination by UPA troops of the Polish vice-minister, General W. Swierczewski, in May of that year.³¹ Essentially, Kaganovich's mission in this field was to continue the policies already implemented by Khrushchev. It was under the latter's hegemony that garrisons of MVD and MGB troops were set up in every western Ukrainian village; that recruits from the villages were forcibly conscripted for "self-defense" operations against UPA units; and that all of western Ukraine took on the appearance of a military zone in the early post-war years. Kaganovich introduced very few new measures. The groundwork had been carefully laid out for him, and Swierczewski's assassination accelerated the process of "mopping up" nationalist opposition. The warfare, albeit on a reduced scale, also continued long after the departure of Kaganovich, with the Soviet forces under Khrushchev's capable supervision. The view of a benevolent Khrushchev watching over the interests of Ukraine could hardly be more erroneous, even though on a personal level Khrushchev seems to have been more approachable, more likeable, than his colleague.

The difficulties in analyzing the relative importance of agricul-

ture and nationalism as factors in the 1947 crisis have been illustrated by the Soviet historian, Yurii Shapoval. He notes that evidence indicates that Kaganovich was occupied with agricultural questions that had resulted from the drought of 1946 (now acknowledged to have been a serious famine).³² However, "most" of Kaganovich's energy was devoted, he states, to eliminating Ukrainian nationalism. He maintains that, essentially, Kaganovich continued the policies that he had introduced as First Party Secretary of Ukraine in the 1920s to eliminate "nationalist deviations." At the time of his departure from Ukraine, dissatisfied with the purge against Ukrainian national culture, Kaganovich was preparing for the convocation of a Plenum entitled: The struggle against nationalism as the chief threat within the Communist Party of Ukraine. The Plenum, mercifully if this account is to be believed, never took place because Khrushchev returned to his old post.³³

What were the relations between Khrushchev and Kaganovich? Despite Khrushchev's attempt to denounce his colleague in his memoirs and his summary removal of Kaganovich in 1957 upon consolidating his authority as Soviet leader, the evidence suggests that Khrushchev owed his remarkable rise in the party hierarchy largely to the aid of Kaganovich. Kaganovich was a Ukrainian Jew who was known for his administrative talent and his ruthlessness in carrying out Stalin's orders, most notably in the collectivization campaign of the early 1930s. Unlike Khrushchev, he had worked closely with Stalin as early as the October Revolution, having been a prominent member of the Bolshevik party since 1911. Whereas Kaganovich's position in the party structure was assured once his administrative talents became known to Stalin (he was head of the CPSU Central Committee's Personnel Department as early as 1922),³⁴ Khrushchev's career possessed no such certainty. And it was Kaganovich who put forward Khrushchev's name as a member of the new Industrial Academy that opened in Moscow in 1929 and who began Khrushchev's meteoric advancement.³⁵ Within three years, upon Kaganovich's recommendation, Khrushchev had been appointed second secretary of the Moscow oblast party committee, which made him Kaganovich's deputy. According to the Soviet press,

Comrade Khrushchev—a working man who has attended the school of struggle and of party work, having started at the very

bottom—is an outstanding representative of the post-October generation of party workers educated by Stalin. Under the guidance of that notable master of the Stalin method of working, Comrade Kaganovich, N.S. Khrushchev has grown step by step with our party in recent years and is a worthy leader of our glorious Moscow party organization.³⁶

Thus, Khrushchev was widely perceived as Kaganovich's protégé, and he used his friend's generous patronage to lever his way into power. His adverse comments about Kaganovich in his memoirs, however, should not be seen merely as ingratitude. As is evident from the quotation, Kaganovich was known as a Stalin man, and Khrushchev in his later years was at pains to dissociate himself from Stalin's policies. Kaganovich's patronage was a painful reminder to Khrushchev that he had been an integral part of the Soviet leadership during the thirties. One scholar maintains that Khrushchev's hostility toward Kaganovich stemmed directly from the events of March 1947.³⁷ This seems unlikely. The reappearance of Kaganovich in Ukraine meant only two things for certain: first, that Khrushchev was in trouble; but second, that he had not been cast aside permanently. Had Stalin appointed anyone else from the Politburo to the position of CPU First Secretary, then Khrushchev would have known that his career was over. Kaganovich, however, was his ally and mentor. This fact has been obscured by the events of 1957 and the bitter rivalry between the two men in the struggle for Stalin's succession.

Khrushchev's worst enemies in 1947 were in Moscow, in the persons of Zhdanov, Andreev, and, especially, Georgii Malenkov. One cannot discuss the events of March 1947 without reference to the intense political rivalry among Stalin's subordinates. As a favorite of Stalin and the first regional leader to hold simultaneously the leadership of both party and government, Khrushchev aroused feelings of great jealousy among his rivals. He was, in short, perceived as "too big for his boots." We noted earlier Andreev's attempts to discredit Khrushchev's agricultural policies. Zhdanov's role in the events affecting Khrushchev are more difficult to assess, since Khrushchev omits him totally from his memoirs; but there is no doubt that relations between the two were far from cordial. The principal figure behind the events of 1947, however, apart from Stalin himself, was Malenkov. Following Zhdanov's death in 1948,

Malenkov was almost assured of the number-two position in the Soviet hierarchy. Thus he was a formidable enemy.

Upon Kaganovich's appointment as CPU First Secretary, it was Malenkov's protegee Nikolai Patolichev who was appointed to assist him as the secretary with control over agriculture (formerly second secretary).³⁸ The implication of this was that it would be Patolichev, rather than Khrushchev, who would succeed Kaganovich when the latter returned to Moscow, which it was known he was desirous of doing. In effect, it looked as though Khrushchev had been levered out of the power structure. This scheme apparently failed, but when Khrushchev got back his old position in December 1947, his second-in-command was Leonid Melnikov, who was also reputed to be a close associate of Malenkov.³⁹ Moreover, Khrushchev's post as chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers went to Demyan Korotchenko. Although the latter was Khrushchev's staunch supporter, this meant that the two Ukrainian leadership posts had been separated once again. It is thus possible that Malenkov had both secured a foothold in Khrushchev's empire and reduced his authority, and that this had been his plan from the outset.

As head of a "committee for the rehabilitation of liberated lands" in the first postwar years, Malenkov had a powerful position. Both he and Andreev had avoided the regional responsibility that Khrushchev had taken on and remained close to the source of authority in Moscow. According to Khrushchev, Malenkov continually exploited his proximity to Stalin to discredit his rivals.⁴⁰ Evidently though, living and working so closely with the leader had its disadvantages. Khrushchev was not eliminated, and a decade later he was to take full revenge. Personality conflicts played a large role in Stalin's USSR and often dictated Soviet policies. In the case of Khrushchev's dismissal, although one cannot state categorically that it was a result of a coup hatched in Moscow by his rivals, we can say, at least, that because of the enormous difficulties he faced in Ukraine, in addition to the power he had accumulated, Khrushchev was vulnerable to such an attack.

There is one other point that should be dealt with briefly: the question of Khrushchev's alleged illness. None of the authorities on Khrushchev in the West have given much credence to this, mainly because Khrushchev was well known for his robust health and general indefatigability. Moreover, shortly after the decision to replace

him had been made, Khrushchev appeared at a session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet to acknowledge the criticisms levelled at him.⁴¹ Had he been really ill, he would not have attended (we have a more contemporary example of this in Yurii Andropov). When Khrushchev had a heart attack in 1971 at the age of seventy-six, this was his first known illness, and certainly his last. Like many aspects of his memoirs, the illness was a product of his imagination.

Why was Khrushchev returned to power? First, it seems that Kaganovich paid respect to their long-time association. Certainly he did not take over all of Khrushchev's functions, leaving agricultural matters largely to his comrade and concentrating on industry. In itself, this helps to discount the theory that agricultural failures were behind Khrushchev's removal. The disappearance of Patolichev suggests that Kaganovich and Khrushchev combined to get rid of Malenkov's favorite. It is possible, then, that Kaganovich saved Khrushchev from oblivion for what can be perceived as only the most selfless of reasons: friendship. Given Khrushchev's fall from grace, Kaganovich was living dangerously, but he may have known that Stalin was unwilling to bend too far to Malenkov's desires. Second, in the final analysis Khrushchev owed his return to power directly to Stalin. Despite the addition of the colorless Melnikov to the Ukrainian hierarchy, Khrushchev's powers had not been reduced during his nine-month absence. He returned to Moscow late in the following year and thenceforth was a serious rival to the ambitions of Malenkov and Beria.⁴² Khrushchev survived because of his personal friendship with Stalin, who, despite his preoccupation with plots, was evidently wise enough to recognize Khrushchev's administrative talents.

In conclusion, perhaps Khrushchev's demotion and reappointment should be viewed within the context of the extreme difficulties of the postwar years in Ukraine. The republic faced the enormous task of recovering from the effects of the war years and foreign occupation; it lacked manpower, resources, materials, livestock, and machinery. Before recovery could be initiated, the eastern oblasts were beset by a severe famine, which destroyed the agricultural goals of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. The reannexation of the western oblasts posed immense difficulties also—a passively hostile population and an actively hostile guerrilla force. Added to these problems, which would have overtaxed any leader, Stalin and Zhdanov initiated their policy of Russification, which saw a purge

of Ukrainian intellectuals, party members, and cultural figures. Khrushchev's rivals exploited these problems as far as possible, but it should be emphasized both that Khrushchev may have fallen from favor without their machinations and that every Soviet leader with regional responsibility was on shaky ground in the first post-war years. The surprising factor is not that Khrushchev was demoted, but that he survived. Even with a powerful ally like Kaganovich, his survival denoted his remarkable political skills and resilience.

This episode occupies only a small niche in twentieth-century Ukrainian history. Despite its harshness, Kaganovich's nine-month rule did not appreciably affect the course of events in Soviet Ukraine. If he was hated, as Mykola Pidhorny has stated,⁴³ it was for his somewhat unpleasant personality. Certainly he lacked Khrushchev's affability. But the event has loomed larger because of the subsequent rise to supreme power of its subject, Khrushchev. In March 1947 many observers would have predicted his eclipse. Thus the months March to December 1947 should be perceived as one of the most rigorous tests in the career of Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet leader.

6 The Kulak in Postwar Ukraine

IN A PIONEERING ARTICLE in 1966, Moshe Lewin¹ made an attempt to define the kulak in Soviet agriculture. Lewin noted that the problem had not been confronted by the Soviet authorities, and that no clear definition had emerged despite the fact that collectivization of agriculture was only achieved after the "elimination of the kulaks as a class." Although the topic has not generated discussion lately, in part because there are few clear answers to the problems raised by Lewin, it is fair to say that Lewin's article leaves room for further study. By and large, it was confined to the period 1929-33. After 1939, however, the westward expansion of the USSR saw the incorporation of a wide area encompassing the Baltic republics, Right-Bank Moldavia, Western Belorussia and Western Ukraine. Collectivization in most of these areas did not begin on a mass scale until 1948-49, but according to Soviet sources, it took place once again after an "acute class struggle" with the kulak. It is pertinent then to ask whether the post-war kulak, the kulak in the Soviet borderlands during the last years of Stalinism, was the same kulak as his predecessor in the great social upheaval in the countryside during the 1930s.

I should stress that my conclusions can only be tentative. This essay is based largely on Soviet statistics, which cannot be considered reliable. Moreover, this chapter does not purport to discuss all aspects of the kulak question in the western oblasts of Ukraine. The relationship between the so-called kulaks and the Ukrainian nationalists in the Western Ukrainian village is too complex a question to

be compressed into the boundaries of this study, but clearly merits future analysis.

This chapter will concentrate largely on the Western Ukrainian regions, and especially those annexed from Poland after September 1939, in the areas of Galicia and Volhynia. The area constituted about 88,000 square kilometers,² with a Ukrainian population of between 4.4 and 5.6 million.³ The Polish population of the area need not concern us here since it was largely removed in 1939–40 and during a population exchange between the Ukrainian SSR and Poland in 1944–46.

The most basic difference between most areas of the USSR in 1929–33 and the Western Ukraine in September 1939 was that in the latter case the major landholders were not from the “native” population. The large landowners, in particular, were predominantly non-Ukrainians. In 1921, for example, 81.5 per cent of *pomishchyky* were Polish, 7 per cent were Ukrainian, 5 per cent Jewish and 3.8 per cent Russian, according to a Soviet source. Only in Volyn was there a sizeable stratum (17.6 per cent) of Ukrainian landowners.⁴ The Ukrainian farms were predominantly small affairs. In Ternopil, for example, it has been estimated that about 86 per cent of all farms were under five hectares in size, and over 96 per cent were under ten hectares.⁵ In fact, one of the main reasons cited for the invasion of Western Ukraine, by the Soviet authorities, was precisely to “free” the poor Western Ukrainian peasant from the “yoke of landlord [dominated] Poland.”⁶ How then was the Western Ukrainian peasantry divided up into the various social strata of kulaks, *serednyaks* and *bidnyaks*?

The “Indices of Kulak Farms,” quoted in Lewin, notes five criteria for “kulak farms,” only one of which had necessarily to apply to cause the process of “dekulakization” to be implemented. These criteria consisted of hiring labor, owning an enterprise such as a flour mill, hiring out agricultural machinery, hiring out premises for business, and the presence of family members with sources of incomes not derived from labor.⁷ In defining the number of kulak farms at the start of the 1939–41 period of Soviet rule in Western Ukraine, the Soviet scholar Varetsky adheres to the use of hired labor, declaring that about 60,000 farms in Western Ukraine used hired labor during the Polish period.⁸ In addition, he refers to kulak farms in terms of sown area, a convenient simplification used by Soviet scholars when they refer to Western Ukraine. Varetsky states

that the Western Ukrainian peasantry was divided as follows at the beginning of Soviet rule: *bidnyak* farms (under five hectares), made up 76.0 per cent of total farms; *serednyak* farms (5–10 hectares), 18.4 per cent; and *kulaks* (10–50 hectares), 5.6 per cent.⁹ We thus have two categories of *kulak*: a farm with a sown area of more than ten hectares, and a farmer who used hired labor. Are we to assume, then, that the 60,000 farms cited by Varetsky fall into the 10–50 hectares category?

This clearly was not the case. The Polish countryside in the interwar period was the scene of chronic rural overpopulation. According to the Polish census of 1931, almost 300,000 holdings employed hired labor. Of this number, 58.7 per cent were *under* ten hectares in size (there are no figures on individual voivodships, so it is not possible to calculate the percentage in the Western Ukrainian areas).¹⁰ In other words, the majority of farms employing hired labor could not be categorized as *kulaks* according to sown area. The hiring of labor was practised by all sectors of peasant society.

If we estimate the number of *kulaks* in Western Ukraine according to sown area alone, the percentages of farms over ten hectares were very low: Volyn, 8.4; Lviv, 1.5; Stanyslaviv, 1.5; and Ternopil 2.2, making up a total of about 35,900 farms.¹¹ Thus on both counts—hired labor and sown area—Varetsky's total of 60,000 *kulak* farms mentioned above seems erroneous. Moreover, the above percentages would have included landholdings of Polish landlords and military settlers, who had been moved into the area according to laws of 1920 and 1925 and were removed by or fled from the Soviet authorities in the autumn of 1939.¹²

An additional factor to be taken into consideration in estimating the number of *kulaks* in the period of prewar Soviet rule in Western Ukraine is that the Soviet authorities may have tried to raise the number of farms that fell into the *kulak* category during the 1939–40 land reform in Western Ukraine. During the socialization of land in 1939, according to Soviet figures, the authorities confiscated from the Polish landowners and others about 2.7 million hectares of land but only 1.3 million hectares had been redistributed by the end of the year.¹³ The bulk of the land had been retained by the state, ostensibly for the creation of state farms. But the net result was that while some households increased the size of their landholdings by an insignificant amount, the majority remained land hungry. It is possible that the authorities were deliberately

withholding the land in order that social differentiation might develop in the Western Ukrainian countryside.

By April 1940 the percentage of kulak farms in Lviv Oblast, for example, had reportedly increased from 1.6 per cent at the end of the Polish period of rule to 2.2 per cent measured in terms of sown area.¹⁴ The Soviet regime had thus removed the (predominantly Polish) landlords, but had retained and evidently added to the landholdings of the kulak stratum. In the 1930s collectivization in the USSR generally had been accomplished by a "class war" between the kulaks and the poor peasants. It is probable therefore that in the Western Ukraine the lessons of the past were being applied and a similar "conflict" was being fostered prior to collectivization. The latter had already begun on a small scale in the spring of 1940, so preparations were already being made for another mass campaign. In this way we can speak of an attempt to *create* kulak farms. The Soviet view was that the greater the social differentiation in the countryside, the more likely it was that the poorer peasants would become resentful toward those with more land, and the more likely they would be to see the "advantages" of joining a collective farm.

Two other factors indicate a Soviet attempt to create social divisions in the villages: first, although it is known that the vast majority of Western Ukrainian peasants were living close to the poverty level, only 35 per cent of peasant households were exempted from taxation;¹⁵ second, restrictions on land tenure were not implemented until 1941, some nineteen months after the commencement of Soviet rule. (The latter law restricted land tenure per peasant household to seven hectares in Galicia and ten hectares in Volhynia, with slight increases for certain areas).¹⁶ This delay in implementation gave some time for differences in peasant landholding to emerge. That this was related to the collectivization campaign seems clear. In the Chernivtsi Oblast (made up of the Khotyn *uezd* of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovyna), which had been annexed from Romania in June 1940, restrictive norms on land tenure were introduced as early as September 26, 1940, yet collectivization had not got under way prior to the outbreak of war in June 1941.¹⁷ The collectivization campaign required the presence of the class enemy in the village, the exploiter, the rich peasant. In Chernivtsi, mass collectivization was left until after the Galician and Volhynian areas of Western Ukraine had been propagandized. This is not the place to enter into a detailed explanation of the reasons for this: in

brief, the largest areas of arable land were in the former Polish regions so it made sense to begin collectivization there; and second, Chernivtsi had been under Soviet rule for only a year when war broke out.

Whether a full-scale class war would have developed in the Western Ukrainian countryside is not known. The German and Romanian invasion not only delayed the process of collectivization—evidently Western Ukrainian peasants tried to disband most of the *kolkhozy* during the war—but also complicated the crucial kulak question. Before discussing the early postwar years in Western Ukraine, it should be stated that the war had a profound psychological impact on the peasants of the Soviet western borderlands. Whereas Lewin's kulaks faced seemingly insuperable odds as the Soviet authorities and police forces entered their villages, in the western borderlands many of the peasants had had a chance to fight against Soviet rule, and perhaps more important, had seen the Soviet regime on the verge of total collapse. In the western regions the Soviet forces faced guerrilla movements when they reannexed the territories in 1944–45, and these insurgents were especially strong in Estonia, Right-Bank Moldavia and Western Ukraine.¹⁸

As a result of this opposition, the category of kulak was expanded by the authorities to include the following:

1. those households that fitted the old prewar formula of more than ten hectares of arable land.
2. those who were opposed to the creation of the *kolkhozy*.
3. those who were opposed to Soviet rule.

Whereas the recalcitrant peasants of the 1930s had resisted Soviet anti-kulak measures passively, by trying to conceal grain and similar actions, the postwar opposition faced the authorities with active resistance for the first time.

In Soviet ideology the kulak has always been the principal opponent of "socialization" in the village (at least, until very recently). In the 1930s anti-kulak campaign, which preceded the onset of mass collectivization, the kulak was isolated from his fellow peasants by discriminatory measures, while the Soviet authorities encouraged poor peasants to carry out grain and livestock requisitions from the "kulak" farms. But the postwar situation presented new problems, because opposition to Soviet rule pervaded all sectors of rural society.¹⁹ In order to maintain the line that the kulak again was principally responsible for resisting Soviet policy, the authorities either

included the "nationalists" within the category of kulak, or used the terms "nationalist" and "kulak" as synonymous in party and government reports. Like the small landowners, the churches and the monasteries, the nationalist insurgents in Western Ukraine and other western borderlands were included in the list of those to be expropriated in the postwar land reform imposed throughout these newly-annexed territories in 1944-45.²⁰

At this time in Western Ukraine a new phenomenon emerged in the Soviet reports, namely the "Ukrainian-German nationalist." The name, which was apparently first coined by Khrushchev or his secretary for propaganda, K. Lytvyn, in March 1944,²¹ indicates the Soviet attempt to forge a direct link between the Ukrainian insurgents and the Nazi-German occupation regime. Both kulaks and insurgents were thus portrayed as "lackeys" and "active abettors" of the Germans. A further premise was that the Germans and their supporters were responsible for all the damage to industry and agriculture during the German-Soviet war. In Western Ukraine, the attacks of UPA insurgents were portrayed as a part and continuation of this purely destructive tendency. As a Soviet source declared, with reference to the spring of 1945: "Kulaks and nationalist bands tried in every way to hinder [reconstruction] work, destroyed documents, burnt down the residences of the village Soviet."²²

While the "class enemies," adhering faithfully to German policy, were carrying out the destruction, the line went, the Soviet regime was concerned solely with the reconstruction of the economy and cultural life in Western Ukraine. The prevalence of UPA insurgents in the postwar years suggests that this propaganda campaign enjoyed only limited success, but it nonetheless formed an integral part of early postwar Soviet policy.

Once the Soviet western borderlands had been reannexed (or, in the case of Transcarpathian Ukraine, annexed for the first time), the authorities implemented a major land reform, which saw the redistribution of some 3.2 million hectares of land, confiscated from landowners, kulaks, churches and monasteries, among one million peasant households.²³ In Western Ukraine, it is reported that approximately 354,000 households received some 513,000 hectares of land,²⁴ or an average of 1.6 hectares per eligible household. Soviet reports claim that this land reform constituted a major attack on kulak landholding.²⁵ In Lviv Oblast, for example, it is reported that in 1944 there were 2,600 households with more than ten hectares

of land. By the end of the year, the authorities had reportedly confiscated 6,300 hectares of this kulak land and divided it among *bidnyak* households, and the process is said to have continued throughout the following year.²⁶

Despite the apparent scale of the reform, it only affected only about 32 per cent of West Ukrainian peasant households, and there was marked reluctance on the part of the peasants to accept the land.²⁷ There were probably two main reasons for this attitude. First, there was in all likelihood a natural reluctance on the part of the individual farmer to take land that was not his own—Soviet sources refer to this as the “private farming mentality.” Second, there was a fear on the peasants’ part that if they took the land, they might at some point be reclassified as “kulaks.” The implication is that a campaign which one Soviet source has termed “*serednyakization*” (i.e., the creation of a large stratum of middle-sized peasant holdings of about 3–10 hectares), was but the forerunner of a major campaign against both *serednyak* and kulak households, under the guise of *dekulakization*. Because of the hostility toward the Soviet regime in Western Ukraine, the term “kulak” was extended to include members of the *serednyak* stratum. As this did not comply with Leninist land policy, the authorities declared blandly that the kulaks were “concealing land and livestock.”²⁸ In other words, *serednyak* farms were perceived often as kulak farms, the owners of which were trying to hoodwink the authorities.

In 1947, a year after the land reform was allegedly completed in Western Ukraine, the Soviet authorities tried to create a “class war” in the countryside by adopting several measures against alleged kulak farms. First, they raised the obligatory deliveries of agricultural goods to the state. A decree of June 3, 1947 stated that, beginning immediately, kulak farms were to be subject to increased norms for the delivery of agricultural products to the state: for grain, sunflower, soya, potatoes, vegetables, straw, meat and milk, by 50 per cent more than the norms established for other peasant households; and for wool, an increase of 100 per cent over the established norm. The time limits for the delivery of these products to the state were reduced on kulak farms: by one month for grain, potatoes, vegetables, sunflower, soya and straw; by two months for meat and wool; and by three months for milk. The oblast executive committees were instructed to take steps to ensure that the confiscation of land,

livestock and other property from kulak farms did not occur "fictitiously."²⁹

Significantly, however, the published decree gave no indication of what was meant by a kulak farm. It also did not state what happened to those "kulak farms" which failed to make the required delivery quotas on time. A non-Soviet source, however, states that the failure to make the deliveries of milk, for example, for which the time limit had been most drastically reduced, could result in the confiscation of the cow. For the nondelivery of meat, it was possible that the authorities would confiscate a farmer's horse.³⁰ In this way, not only were "kulak farms" punished and ostracized, but the authorities obtained livestock and draught animals that could be transferred to the newly established collective farms. For the most part, the latter appear to have been made up of landless and land hungry peasants,³¹ i.e., those households which had absolutely nothing to lose by joining, but which, since they were landless, lacked draught animals. These early collective farms lacked the basic prerequisites for farming.

The confiscation of draught animals was undoubtedly one of the main reasons why peasants began to dislike the kolkhoz so intensely. For one thing, the horse or ox was in most cases the farmer's principal means of farming. But since in Western Ukraine the majority of his compatriots lacked even a draught animal (and about 35 per cent of Western Ukrainian peasant households lacked a horse at the end of 1945),³² he was raised by the authorities to the rank of "kulak" on a comparative basis. The problem was not unique to Western Ukraine, but applied to all areas of the USSR at the time of collectivization to a greater or lesser degree. Perhaps the matter became especially acute in the newly annexed Ukrainian areas as the number of horses (and other animals) actually decreased in the postwar years. We have to allow also for the Ukrainian farmer's viewpoint. One eyewitness (describing the 1939-41 period) declared that he was "heartbroken" to see the horse he himself had reared confiscated for the use of the kolkhoz.³³ Throughout the postwar period prior to the time of full collectivization, the Soviet authorities had problems collectivizing personal livestock (in theory, the peasant was allowed to retain his own cow or horse). The "kulak" resisted this. But we should bear in mind that we are not speaking of the "rural rich," but of those peasant households that were fortunate enough to own a horse. After the destruction of

warfare, such ownership elevated a peasant above his fellows, and thus he became a prime target of Soviet anti-kulak policies.

A second decree, adopted on August 23, 1947, "Concerning the taxation of peasant households of Ukraine," which applied almost exclusively to the western oblasts, implemented an income tax on the "wealthy." It established an increase in taxation of 50 per cent on those earning up to 10,000 rubles per annum, 75 per cent on incomes up to 15,000 rubles per annum, and 100 per cent for those with incomes exceeding 15,000 rubles.³⁴ Since this decree has not been published thus far, it is not known whether it contained other clauses giving a more precise definition of a kulak. But the differentiation had now begun in terms of income.

Although Soviet sources do not give details about the precise amount of taxation paid out by alleged kulak households in Western Ukraine, the identical measures carried out in the other western borderlands (implemented in most cases one week later on August 30, 1947) permit a revealing insight into the predicament of the so-called class enemy. In Right-Bank Moldavia the average taxation paid by a kulak is said to have increased from 553 rubles in 1947 to 1,274 rubles in 1948, or by 230 per cent. At this time, the kulak household was paying forty-four times more in taxes than kolkhoz households and 7.6 times more than individual bidnyak households.³⁵ Thus the kulak's livelihood was being brought quickly to ruin. How did these policies affect Western Ukrainians?

In 1947 a Soviet source indicates that the farms of over ten hectares in Western Ukraine had now completely disappeared.³⁶ If we assume that the stratum disappeared by the end of the year (the source is unclear), when taxes became due, the question arises as to where these "kulak farms" went. There are two possible answers. First, it is probable that many kulaks, anticipating restrictive measures on the part of the authorities, divided their land up among family members (and even possibly among friends). It is known, for example, that the number of peasant households in Ternopil Oblast increased considerably in these early postwar years.³⁷ Second, a large number of so-called kulak households moved to the kolkhozy at this time. This second point requires a brief elaboration.

During the period of mass collectivization, Soviet sources (and this applies to all areas, not just Western Ukraine) declare that the kulak, instead of offering resistance, "changed his tactics," and "wormed his way into the kolkhoz to destroy it from within."³⁸

Whether or not the majority of kulaks entered the kolkhoz with such a precise aim in mind is not known, but it is true that many of those designated kulaks entered the kolkhozy. The reason for this was, as noted, in order to avoid the restrictive policies directed at kulak farms. But the number of those households entering the kolkhozy in Western Ukraine at the end of 1947, when taxes were due, suggests that it was primarily the *serednyak* who was most affected by these laws. Thus for the former Polish regions of Western Ukraine the percentage of households in kolkhozy increased from 5.4 per cent at the start of 1947 to 41.2 per cent by the end of the year.³⁹ By any definition only a tiny minority of these households could have fitted into the kulak category, yet the increase was largely due to taxes and delivery quotas placed on "kulak farms." As the Estonian specialist Rein Taagepera has noted, in Estonia during this same period, "Anyone considered 'anti-kolkhoz' could be secretly reclassified as a kulak and . . . the only way to escape the 'anti-kolkhoz' label was to join a kolkhoz."⁴⁰ It is not likely that the kulak joined the kolkhoz with much enthusiasm, but he was more or less obliged to join in order to survive.

Beermann notes that during the mass collectivization in the 1929–33 period, the kulaks were divided into three groups: criminals and terrorists; wealthy peasants who exploited labor; and others who exploited labor, but were not so wealthy.⁴¹ The second category was scheduled for deportation, while the third was generally resettled outside the arable lands of the kolkhoz (the members of the first group were put on trial, but as straightforward criminals hardly qualified as "kulaks"). In Western Ukraine, it is known that in some regions (possibly in all) collectivization on a mass scale was preceded by deportations. This is also known to have occurred in Estonia.⁴² For Western Ukraine, let us look at the Volyn Oblast.

According to a Western source, a report concerning the latter part of 1947 appeared in *Newsletter from behind the Iron Curtain* of the following year. This stated that on October 20–21, 1947, the Soviet authorities carried out an unprecedented deportation of persons from the oblast, totalling between 500,000 and 800,000 people, or between one-fifth and one-quarter of the oblast's population. These included all the prominent people who were put on the deportation list on charges of either collaborating with the UPA or with the German occupation forces during the war.⁴³

Were these people "kulaks"? The facts from the Soviet side suggest that they might have been considered so. On December 22, 1948 the Ukrainian party newspaper, *Radyanska Ukraina*, declared that an essential measure for the success of collectivization in Volyn had been the "isolation of the kulak," and the "liquidation" of his influence on the bidnyaks and serednyaks. At first, the paper stated, the kulaks were ostracized, but soon the bulk of the peasants turned against them and "demanded their liquidation as a class." The statement is ominous. To the peasants are attributed the actual deeds of the authorities. An example of the authorities' attitude toward the kulaks in 1948 is provided by a raion secretary in Right-Bank Moldavia, who declared:

We must resolve the kulak question. In the report given, I have not heard direction on this problem. How is it that in "the village Maramanovka, which has achieved full collectivization, there remain 22 kulak farms? What are we to do about them? You see, they will not sit quietly, they will do harm, they will wreck the kolkhozy, they will take every possible diversionary act against the kolkhozy. . . . It is absolutely vital to isolate these kulaks. . . . [Leaving them alone] is tantamount to capturing a fortress and leaving its defenders armed. We must disarm [the kulak], isolate him and wage a decisive struggle against him."⁴⁴

One can assume that this attitude prevailed generally throughout the western borderlands during the period of mass collectivization.

Another pointer indicating that the deportations might have seen the removal of the "kulaks" was the tremendous increase in the number of households collectivized in Volyn following the period of deportations: in percentages an increase from 9.9 per cent to 71.2 per cent over the course of the year.⁴⁵ This suggests that the deportations were directly related and a prelude to the mass collectivization campaign. We know from recent research in the Soviet Union, that in the prewar period after the annexation of the Baltic republics, Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia, there were also mass deportations. In the Western Ukrainian case, it is noted that about one-third of the deportees (1.2 million people) were peasants.⁴⁶ It is plausible therefore that such policies were renewed after the war. The class enemy had to be eliminated in order to "encour-

age" peasants to enter the kolkhozy. The likelihood is that the terrified peasants joined the kolkhozy because this seemed to be the only way to be sure of avoiding deportation.

What is one to make of the *number* of those deported? First, the figures as stated are too large to have embraced kulak farms, if by the latter we mean farms that fell into that category in terms of sown area or hiring of labor. They could have included farms that hired labor during the war, however. This suggests that once a peasant landholder had been classified as a kulak, he retained the label no matter what he did in the future, even if he divided up his lands or joined the kolkhoz. In fact, only in this way could the number of kulaks have been high enough to merit the 1947 measures. The numbers deported, however, add weight to Lewin's statement that the kulak was anyone "who is declared to be as such by the authorities."⁴⁷ Because of the terrorist attacks carried out by UPA bands in Western Ukraine, especially on kolkhozy and on Soviet officials, the category of kulak, or class enemy, was expanded to include anyone opposed to the Soviet regime.

Collectivization in the Western Ukraine was reportedly completed by the end of 1950.⁴⁸ During this period the kulak was supposedly "eliminated as a class."⁴⁹ But was this true? The evidence suggests otherwise. In Soviet documents of late-1950 the "kulak" in Western Ukraine is still cited as the chief menace to collectivized society.⁵⁰ Events of the early 1950s also suggest that the "class enemy" was still at work. In 1953 Ukrainian First Secretary L. G. Melnikov was dismissed for, among other reasons, his failure "to consolidate organizationally and economically the kolkhozy in the Western Ukraine."⁵¹ In plain language, this meant that many of the kolkhozy were disbanding themselves and proving unworkable, clear evidence one would have thought in Soviet eyes that the "kulaks" were continuing their activities.

One should be aware here of oversimplification. There were many reasons why the West Ukrainian peasants should have opposed the kolkhoz. First, the prewar experience has to be taken into account. Collectivization in Chernivtsi, for example, and in the recently annexed Transcarpathian Oblast (June 1945) took place much faster than in the former Polish regions of Ukraine.⁵² This suggests that the process was more difficult in those areas which had some firsthand experience of collective farming in 1939-41. Sec-

ond, the important factor of armed nationalist bands has already been noted. Other reasons also spring to mind.⁵³ It is possible, however, that in creating the class enemy, the authorities did their work too well, and managed to engender a real and lasting hatred for the kolkhoz and all that it symbolized. One of the reasons for this was the vagueness that applied to the category of kulak. Instead of creating a small minority of would-be exploiters, the regime had in fact antagonized a broad sector of the village community. Because of this, even in 1953, four years after the completion of collectivization in Western Ukraine, the kolkhozy were still unstable.⁵⁴

CONCLUSION

Even before the first Soviet annexation, the so-called "kulak stratum" in the Western Ukraine was small. Many households, from bidnyaks to landowners, employed hired labor, so this categorization is too vague to be used. The vast majority of Western Ukrainian farms were short of draught animals and implements, and this situation persisted in the postwar years when the agricultural associations were created. The class war in the villages, noted in Soviet works, was fomented by the Soviet authorities. There are no indications of class antagonism between the various strata of peasants. In general, the differences between the peasants were too small to create friction, and also the Western Ukrainians could remain united in the face of a common enemy: the Bolshevik, commonly represented in this region by Eastern Ukrainians and Russians in the MVD.⁵⁵

Between the prewar kulak and the Western Ukrainian example lies a profound difference. In his analysis of the 1929–33 kulak, Lewin did not have to allow for a general opposition movement based on a clearly developed ideology like that in Western Ukraine, which can be loosely termed Ukrainian nationalism. This meant that whereas Lewin's kulak had the utmost difficulty in thinking or organizing as a group, those opposed to Soviet rule in Western Ukraine had no such problems. This is why the problem of the kulak (and collectivization) in Western Ukraine was declared to be so difficult.⁵⁶ In addition, the Western Ukrainian territories had remained under the influence of so-called "bourgeois philosophy" for centuries, as is freely admitted in Soviet accounts. Although Eastern

Ukraine had been permitted a freer period of development in the 1920s, this came to a halt toward the end of the decade and had been seriously reversed by 1932–33.

The Soviet authorities actually failed on two counts: they did not manage to create serious class divisions in the West Ukrainian villages, but they did create an attitude of hostility among the peasantry that persisted in addition to nationalist opposition and continued long after the nationalist bands had reportedly been eliminated. Western Ukraine had no NEP to foster a peasant hierarchy. But the Polish period had, for all its problems, helped to foster a closely knit Ukrainian community. The kulaks in Western Ukraine were those who utilized this community network to oppose the kolkhoz in the early postwar years. Once one dispenses with the superficial Soviet categories—exploiter of peasants, hirer of labor, leaser of land—which clearly do not apply to Western Ukraine, the kulak of 1944–50 emerges as what he was, namely a political opponent of the Soviet regime who had to be taken very seriously. In contrast, Lewin's kulak was a more ethereal figure, who offered limited resistance to the authorities only when forced to do so by the most unmitigating of circumstances.

7 The Collectivization of Western Ukraine, 1948-1949

WESTERN UKRAINE COMPRISES those areas of Ukraine annexed by the Soviet Union after September 1939. They are (1) Galicia, made up of the Soviet oblasts of Lviv, Stanyslaviv (now Ivano-Frankivsk), Drohobych (now part of Lviv Oblast) and Ternopil; (2) Volhynia, made up of Rivne and Volyn oblasts; (3) Bukovyna (Chernivtsi Oblast); and (4) Transcarpathia (Zakarpatska Oblast). In the interwar period, the Galician and Volhynian territories were governed by Poland, Chernivtsi was part of Romania and Transcarpathia was ruled by Czechoslovakia. Whereas the former areas were all annexed by the USSR after the invasion of Eastern Poland in 1939, Transcarpathia became part of the Soviet Union only in June 1945.¹

The annexation of Western Ukraine and the consequent collectivization of agriculture is of interest to the student of the USSR for two main reasons. First, it brought about the merger of a highly westernized region with the sovietized Eastern Ukraine, which led to the reemergence of Ukrainian nationalism on a wide scale. Second, the annexation united, along with Western Belorussia, a zone of collectivized farming with a zone of private farming. It would have been illogical for collectivization to have been delayed indefinitely, since such a delay might have caused difficulties on the Eastern Ukrainian kolkhozy. But, what is of particular interest is how much the experience of collectivizing the eastern oblasts was utilized in the western campaign; and to what extent this campaign

was conducted either by Eastern Ukrainians or by personnel predominant in the Eastern Ukrainian collectivization process.

As far as collectivization was concerned, Soviet authorities introduced few new ideas into the newly annexed territories. Basically, the experience of the 1930s served as the precedent for the following decade. At the same time the postwar process was accelerated by the imposition of collectivization on Eastern Europe.

THE COLLECTIVIZATION CAMPAIGN

To date, the so-called "mass movement" of peasant households to collective farms in the western oblasts of Ukraine in 1948–49 has received little attention in the West, although there have been studies of the postwar collectivization campaign in the Baltic republics and Right-Bank Moldavia.² This essay looks at some of the problems in collectivizing Western Ukraine, makes a comparison with the process in the other western borderlands, and analyzes the nature of the anti-kolkhoz movement.

For the eighteen months before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, about 12.8 percent of peasant households and 14.9 percent of the arable land had been collectivized.³ Thus some progress had been made. However, the political situation—with the German army across the old Polish border—made conditions for a mass campaign less than ideal. During the war, the Western Ukrainian peasants left their kolkhozy en masse, and most were disbanded. As is well known, the Germans attempted to maintain the kolkhoz system, using the name "communal farm." But as far as Ukraine was concerned, they were obliged to rely on those farms in the eastern oblasts that had been stabilized before the invasion. After the war, it is clear that piecemeal collectivization was taking place in Western Ukraine from 1944 to 1947, although no mass movement occurred during those years.⁴

In 1948, however, the Soviet authorities suddenly stepped up the collectivization campaign. Why? It is possible that the party had been waiting for the economy to be restored. Perhaps more important, the Soviet leaders were adhering to the Leninist agrarian policy. Before collectivization could be implemented, the policy held, the peasant had to be won over gradually to the kolkhoz system. The first step was to attract peasant support through land reforms; that is, authorities wanted to create what they saw as the essential

preconditions to the collectivization campaign. In this they were following their interwar policies.

But in early 1948, the effects of the 1946 famine were still being felt,⁵ and these prevented economic recovery. The rural economy of the Ukrainian SSR had suffered a debilitating blow from the famine, which stopped the transfer of resources from the collectivized Eastern Ukraine to the western oblasts. This transfer had been a feature of the first two postwar years, and was often cited by Soviet propaganda as evidence of the benevolence of the Soviet state toward its newly annexed territories. In addition, it is possible that the collectivization process was speeded up in 1948 because of the party's increased strength in the western oblasts. However, although the party's position—at least in terms of numbers—had improved by 1948, it was still far short of the situation desired by the authorities (the majority of party workers were located in the towns rather than the countryside). Moreover, it was clear from decrees⁶ issued in 1944–45 that the party was not going to rely on local cadres alone to carry out its political program (i.e., cadres were to be moved in from the east as much as possible, rather than selecting them from the Western Ukrainian oblasts). There must have been other reasons why mass collectivization was imposed in 1948.

One plausible reason has been suggested by Waedekin and Jacobs.⁷ They link mass collectivization in the western borderlands to its simultaneous imposition in Eastern Europe and suggest that the timing was precipitated by and coincided with Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform. Stalin, they claim, decided to enforce collectivization at home as a means of preventing further recalcitrance on the agrarian issue within the Communist-bloc countries. The inference here is that Soviet collectivization was pushed forward ahead of time to provide an example for Eastern Europe. The East European countries then followed the Soviet example, but it took them considerably longer to complete collectivization than the western areas of the USSR. The difference in time scale is, perhaps, only to be expected, since the Soviet authorities already had some experience in collectivization in the western areas in the prewar period and were aware of the problems involved. In Eastern Europe, in contrast, conditions were not the same as in the USSR (land reform proceeded somewhat differently; there was a great shortage of machinery; political cadres were in shorter supply; and most im-

portant, local political conditions were different), and the Soviet experience was not always applicable.

In short, mass collectivization began in 1948 as a mass campaign in the western areas of the USSR and in Eastern Europe. Events in Western Ukraine were merely a part of this campaign. But they were a very important part because of the difficult political situation there and the fact that the area contained valuable agricultural land.

THE PATTERN OF MASS COLLECTIVIZATION BY INDIVIDUAL OBLAST

Before examining the general characteristics of the collectivization process in individual oblasts of Western Ukraine, it is pertinent to comment on the regional variations in the rate at which collectivization progressed. Only in two oblasts—Chernivtsi and Volyn—was collectivization declared to have been completed by the end of 1949. According to *Radyanska Ukraina*, collectivization was occurring “too slowly” in Stanyslaviv, Drohobych, Ternopil and Lviv oblasts, and the newspaper laid the blame for this squarely on the shoulders of the raion authorities.⁸

There may have been genuine reasons why collectivization was proceeding slowly, particularly in Lviv and Stanyslaviv oblasts. But given that collectivization was being imposed in Eastern Europe at this time, it made sense for the authorities to concentrate first on collectivizing the border regions. The more easterly oblasts, such as Stanyslaviv and Rivne, were adjoined to the collectivized oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR and would subsequently become noncollectivized “islands” amid the collectivized oblasts to the east and west. In the most westerly oblast, Transcarpathia, collectivization proceeded rapidly in the postwar years, especially in the winter of 1948–49. Again, this suggests that the outlying regions were collectivized first.

In the case of Transcarpathia, there may have been additional explanations for why the oblast was collectivized so rapidly. First, the oblast was separated from the rest of Western Ukraine by the natural barrier of the Carpathian Mountains. Both geographically and historically, the region was quite different.⁹ This aided the Soviet authorities in two ways. First, they could mobilize forces for a concentrated effort on a small, remote area, having sealed off the

border. The majority of residents from the mountain regions had been transferred to the lowlands and provided with new lands by the state. As they became totally dependent upon the state for their needs, they were prime candidates for entry into newly formed collective farms. Second, the region had not experienced Soviet rule prior to the war and thus had had no direct experience of collectivization. Moreover, it had not been an area of Ukrainian nationalist penetration. These factors may have accounted for a passive attitude toward Soviet rule¹⁰ and the relatively quick pace of collectivization.

In contrast, other oblasts lagged behind. Lviv, the prime locus of party forces, was one such oblast. How does one account for this? Three reasons spring to mind. First, the years of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1946–50) saw a major campaign to industrialize the city of Lviv, initiated by two decrees the previous year.¹¹ This required that the bulk of party forces remain in the city. Agriculture, by comparison, was a secondary matter. A second reason was the activity of nationalist forces—the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, or UPA—in Lviv Oblast (a factor that also helps to explain the slow rate of collectivization in Stanyslaviv Oblast). In fact, UPA commander Roman Shukhevysh was reportedly killed near the city of Lviv during a skirmish with Soviet troops late in 1950.¹² Thus there was underground activity at least until that year, that is, throughout the period of “mass collectivization.” Third, the oblast party cadres may have been dispersed fairly widely. Lviv, after all, was the capital of Western Ukraine, operating on a “national” rather than an oblast level. As suggested, it seems that party workers were sent to the outlying oblasts first, thus leaving collectivization in Lviv until a later date.

In Rivne Oblast, also “lagging behind,” Soviet reports suggest that the delay was due “almost entirely to deficiencies in organization and political work among the peasants, especially in Rivne, Mizotsk, Tuchynsk, Mezhyrychy and Hoshchany raions.” Speakers at the second oblast party conference, held in January 1949, roundly denounced all those responsible for agriculture: the oblast agricultural section, instructors, executive committee, and others.¹³ The key problem, however, was the weakness of the raion party and government organizations, a feature common to the western oblasts in these early postwar years. The attacks on the oblast organizations were veiled hints that the raion organizations required ur-

gent attention. According to a Soviet source, the reason why about only 59 percent of peasant households were united in kolkhozy in November 1949 was the "unhealthy tendency" of "certain raion leaders" to strengthen first those kolkhozy that already existed rather than to organize new ones.¹⁴ Evidently, the authorities secured numerous appeals from households to join kolkhozy, but little was done to take advantage of them. Again, one suspects that the real reason for the delay was the authorities' failure to provide the peasants with any real incentives to join the kolkhozy, such as seed, livestock or money.

The Soviet authorities claim that, whereas in 1946-47 the majority of peasants joining the kolkhozy had been land-hungry bidnyaks and farm laborers, in 1948 it was the serednyak stratum that was starting to join.¹⁵ In Ustyhuha raion, Volyn Oblast, for example, more than half the households joining the kolkhozy were reportedly serednyaks.¹⁶ *Radyanska Ukraina* (March 24, 1948) explained that the kulaks had by then been isolated as a result of the consolidation of those kolkhozy already in existence, so that the serednyak stratum was being "encouraged" to join. This explanation is implausible: the kolkhozy at this time were poorly equipped, and farming was being conducted at a low technical level, even according to Soviet accounts.¹⁷ There were thus few reasons why the serednyak would voluntarily have joined the kolkhoz. The evidence suggests that it was in fact widespread coercion that was involved. Mass collectivization, by definition, required that serednyaks join the kolkhozy, and all means, including coercion, were employed to ensure that they did so.

There are many examples to show that in 1948 and 1949, collectivization was becoming an increasingly coercive process. In Volyn in 1948 a kolkhoz had been established in the village of Domashiv (Tsumany Raion) by the raion party secretary, who reportedly had entered the village and forced the peasants to go to the building of the village soviet, whereupon he demanded that they present appeals to join the kolkhoz.¹⁸ This example is probably typical, particularly in oblasts like Volyn in which the rate of collectivization increased suddenly in 1948. In other areas, also, there are numerous instances to suggest that coercion was involved in the collectivization process. In Briukhovysk raion (Lviv Oblast), the authorities had reportedly disregarded the principle of voluntariness. Two kolkhozy had been set up, but the oblast party committee "had to in-

tervene and dissolve these kolkhozy, since they had, in the process, violated the voluntary principle.”¹⁹ In Sokaly Raion (Lviv Oblast), forty-eight communists had been sent into the villages, where they organized a local *aktiv* (activist group) and were the first to sign their names to the list of those who wished to join the kolkhozy.²⁰

Such “violations” were common not only in Western Ukraine, but in the western borderlands generally. The Sokaly and Briukhovytsh examples suggest that the party members were having difficulty in creating any support for the kolkhozy among the Western Ukrainian villagers. Possibly, the raion members established paper kolkhozy without consulting the local peasants at all. More likely, however, is that the peasants themselves were resisting efforts to establish kolkhozy. As a result, the raion members came under attack on the grounds that they had violated the voluntary aspect of kolkhoz membership.

The authorities also dealt severely with those in the village who were opposed to collectivization and with recalcitrants on the kolkhozy. In the Lviv region, for example, on October 19, 1949, six collective farmers were sentenced to six months hard labor for their refusal to participate in kolkhoz work.²¹ In Volyn, as a result of deportations that accompanied the mass-collectivization campaign, it is said that all the well-to-do families had completely disappeared from the villages. Extermely high taxes were being imposed on those who refused to join the kolkhozy, and all the young people—those born between 1929 and 1933—had been drafted into the Red Army and taken out of the region.²²

Two consequences of enforced mass collectivization were weak kolkhozy and alleged dissolutions of kolkhozy. The most dramatic increase in collectivization occurred in Drohobych Oblast, where the percentage of households collectivized rose from two at the start of 1948 to seventy-nine at the end of the year. As late as 1949–50, according to a Soviet report, 138 out of the 811 kolkhozy in the oblast were “badly organized,”²³ and, given the tendency of Soviet accounts to smooth over problems, one can assume that the real figure was somewhat higher than this.

Dissolution of kolkhozy was said to be a common occurrence during the campaign. In Rivne, for example, the plenum of the oblast party committee of April 1948 revealed eighteen cases in which kolkhozy had not been “organizationally strengthened” and subsequently “ceased to exist.” The reason cited for this was that

some party organizations had grown used to small individual farms that required less attention than kolkhozy.²⁴ The more likely reason is that these were "paper" kolkhozy, that is, they had never gone beyond the planning stage. There is additional evidence of paper kolkhozy in the oblast later in the year when mass collectivization got under way. *Radyanska Ukraina* declared, in a report about Rivne Oblast (September 9, 1948), that although sixty-seven kolkhozy had been created since April, they had not been consolidated so it was "difficult to call them real collective farms." Either these kolkhozy had been dissolved or, as seems more likely, they existed only in the minds of the raion authorities, who were under pressure to collectivize peasant households rapidly. Perhaps some dissolutions occurred as a result of the coercion of households into the kolkhoz at the behest of urban plenipotentiaries, who would then proceed to the next village. As a result, the peasants left the kolkhozy as soon as they had an opportunity.

In the midst of the campaign to collectivize Western Ukraine, the authorities organized a mass excursion of Western Ukrainian peasants to the kolkhozy of the eastern oblasts of Ukraine. Altogether, about 2,000 peasants are said to have visited collective farms in Kiev, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Kamyanets-Podilsk, Kharkiv, Stalino, Voroshylovhrad and Odessa oblasts.²⁵ The excursion lasted about ten days. The participants, according to Soviet newspaper reports, visited various raions, and in each raion, several collective farms in order to become acquainted with the nature of collective farming, workers who had attained high harvests and other "progressive" collective farmers.²⁶ In Kiev, the delegation from Volyn and Rivne oblasts met with Khrushchev and other Ukrainian leaders, and a ceremony was held during which several members of the delegation were accepted into the party.²⁷

How significant was this excursion? According to Soviet accounts, it played a major part in convincing Western Ukrainians of the "advantages" to be derived from collectivization. They cite the fact that three months after the excursion, another 285,000 peasant households had joined the kolkhozy, and 1,600 new kolkhozy had been established.²⁸ One might assume from these figures that the excursions were predominantly individual peasants, or members of initiative groups. But, evidently, this was not necessarily the case. In Ternopil Oblast, for example, of the 118 excursions, twenty-seven were kolkhoz chairmen and six were chairmen of village soviets.²⁹

Thus about one-quarter of the participants seem to have been people who were already convinced of the “advantages” of collective farming. In fact, the excursions were largely a Soviet propaganda exercise. The ceremonial acceptance of members of the Volyn and Rivne delegations into the party is proof of this. Newspapers such as *Vilna Ukraina* and *Radyanska Ukraina* devoted entire issues to the excursions so that the dramatic increase in collective farms in 1949 could be directly attributed to the influence of the excursion. But, Western Ukrainians were already familiar with the problems facing Eastern Ukrainian kolkhozy because many Eastern Ukrainians had entered the western oblasts after 1946 in search of food.

The excursions, then, were an attempt to portray mass collectivization as a voluntary process; as something that the peasants wanted and had been convinced of as a result of visits to sample kolkhozy in Eastern Ukraine. Following the excursion, it is claimed that “delegates from Eastern Ukrainian collective farms” attended meetings of agricultural experts in Western Ukraine,³⁰ and that “hundreds of people” were returning to Western Ukraine from the eastern oblasts and were standing as “popular agitators for the kolkhoz road.”³¹ However, as a Western source indicates, the dramatic increase in collectivization at this time owed much to the infusion of about 6,000 “specialists” who were sent into Western Ukraine from the eastern oblasts to “supervise” collectivization.³² In other words, the excursions marked the beginning of a move to force the peasants into the kolkhozy; they signalled a major push toward collectivization.

In addition to the excursions, the effective isolation of areas such as Transcarpathia, and the coercion of the serednyaks, there were other reasons for the rapid increase in households collectivized in 1948–49. One was the collectivization of migrant households. In Transcarpathia, these were families who had been moved from the mountain regions to the lowlands. In the other western oblasts, they were frequently families who had been removed from the Polish side of the border in 1944–46. In Pustomytiv Raion (Lviv Oblast), for example, it was possible to chart the distribution of the kolkhozy because they were all located around the village of Navariya, which had been fully collectivized in July 1948,³³ a rare phenomenon in the oblast at this time. But evidently the village had been either empty or emptied shortly after the war and was filled

with migrants, who had been repatriated from Poland. Consequently, almost everyone in the village was new and entirely dependent upon the charity of the Soviet authorities. As a result, it was relatively easy for the latter to establish a kolkhoz and to ensure that the entire village joined it, since the migrants were permitted to bring only a few goods with them during their repatriation.³⁴ The authorities were clearly less successful with the longterm Western Ukrainian residents.

Another period when collectivization appears to have made headway was at the time of election to the local soviets in December 1948. It is likely that the villages were flooded with agitators at this time, and evidently, those people who were "elected" as deputies were frequently the initiators of kolkhozy. Another incentive was that prospective kolkhozniks were offered "labor day advances;" that is, individual peasant households could be more easily persuaded to join the kolkhozy if they were promised an immediate reward in terms of payment with grain.³⁵

Finally, the increase in the number of kolkhozy (as opposed to the increase in the number of peasant households joining) was partly the result of a campaign to restore those kolkhozy that had existed in the prewar period. First Secretary Khrushchev had announced (in 1945) that all prewar Western Ukrainian kolkhozy were to be restored by the end of 1947.³⁶ This campaign failed. But there is evidence that steps toward this goal were again undertaken in 1948-49. In Lviv Oblast, in 1947, only forty-one kolkhozy out of 171 opening were said to have existed in 1940-41; in 1948, 119 out of 198 kolkhozy had existed before the war. In the first three weeks of 1949, another ten prewar collective farms were restored.³⁷ The restoration of these prewar kolkhozy in the western oblasts also played a part in the mass-collectivization campaign.

Thus, in the years 1948-49, collectivization had virtually been completed in Volyn, Chernivtsi and Drohobych. In Drohobych, the most dramatic increase occurred between April and November 1948, when the number of households within the kolkhozy more than doubled. In other oblasts, the biggest increase occurred in the fall and winter of 1948-49. In Transcarpathia, Ternopil and Rivne, collectivization had achieved a decisive breakthrough. Thus, only in Lviv and Stanyslaviv were the majority of peasant households still farming on an individual basis, largely as a result of the activity of

the nationalist underground and the concomitant weakness of the raion and village authorities in these oblasts.

RESISTANCE AND PURGES

The mass collectivization campaign was accompanied by three events: alleged nationalist terrorism, the regime's assault on kulaks and thorough, frequent purges of Soviet and party personnel in the rural areas. According to a Soviet scholar, the low percentages of collectivized households in Ternopil, Lviv, Rivne and Stanyslaviv were a result of "weak organization and inadequate political work," unsatisfactory struggling against kulaks and "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists," and violations of the Model Charter.³⁸ The XVI Congress of the CPU, which took place in January 1949, also emphasized the necessity of "heightened class vigilance" and increased agitation against the kulaks in order to expose their hostile work against kolkhoz construction.³⁹

What form did this kulak resistance take and why did it occur? First, one should differentiate between the so-called kulaks and the Ukrainian nationalists. In the case of the former, resistance was provoked by specific measures of the Soviet authorities, whereas the nationalists were continuing a long and drawn-out campaign of general opposition. Thus the aims and perspectives of the kulaks and nationalists did not necessarily coincide, and there is no evidence that the two groups worked in concert. Moreover, as in the interwar period of collectivization, the term kulak was widely applied to all strata of peasants, not only to the richer ones.⁴⁰

According to an UPA report, in the latter part of 1949, the authorities were desperately trying to raise the number of livestock on kolkhozy and therefore turned to individual peasant households to increase their supply. High taxes were placed on animals in the possession of individual farmers. Although some of the livestock was reportedly purchased by the authorities for a cash or grain payment, calves were taken without payment. As a result, the peasants in Drohobych, Medynychi and Dubliansky raions,⁴¹ and undoubtedly throughout Western Ukraine, began to slaughter their livestock, thus acquiring the kulak tag, whether or not they were rich. In addition, a penalty of five years' imprisonment was imposed by the authorities. In spite of this treatment, the peasants are said to

have "paid no attention."⁴² This slaughter of livestock was not a new phenomenon, having been a typical feature of interwar collectivization.⁴³

Events in Transcarpathia also show the division between the kulak and nationalist opposition in Western Ukraine. It is known that in Transcarpathia nationalist forces were negligible. However, there are reports of "kulak resistance" in Soviet accounts. For example, a note of December 8, 1948 by the oblast secretary declares that the kulaks had remained strong and had "influence over that part of the bidnyak-serednyak population that took a negative view of the increasing tempo of socialist construction in the villages."⁴⁴ The report suggests that there was anti-kolkhoz sentiment in the oblast among *all* sectors of the peasantry. Notably, the Soviet authorities had reacted to this situation in 1948 (the precise date is not given) by trying to separate the bidnyaks-serednyaks from the kulaks by freeing the former from taxation and stepping up taxes on the kulaks.⁴⁵ In other words, the distinctions between the peasant strata were being artificially created by the authorities once again, so that collectivization would occur simultaneously within a regime-inspired "class war."

In addition to the alleged resistance from kulaks, the year 1948 saw a continuation of the terrorism that had dogged the Western Ukrainian villages in the early postwar years.⁴⁶ Although UPA forces had been substantially reduced by this time, their actions became increasingly desperate as collectivization took on a mass perspective. In Lviv, for example, Khrushchev declared that the slow rate of collectivization was a result of weak party forces in villages in which "new settlers were offering determined resistance."⁴⁷ However, it was the new settlers who were the most committed to the kolkhozy, since they lacked the resources to carry out individual farming and were dependent upon the state for their welfare. Khrushchev was evidently attempting to conceal the extent of nationalist opposition at this stage of the collectivization campaign. On Soviet writer admits that in some cases, the peasant households would present appeals to join a kolkhoz, but then the kolkhoz had to be dissolved almost immediately because "kulaks and nationalists" reportedly terrorized those who had added their names to the register.⁴⁸ Again, the source is unclear. But the nature of the attack suggests that it was the nationalists, not the kulaks, who were doing the damage. The UPA stepped up the attacks in an attempt to stave

off the onset of collectivization, thereby hoping to maintain its supply of food from the villages.

One result of these attacks was the apparent unwillingness of people to take on positions of rural authority because of the fear of assassination. For example, in Lviv Oblast, on November 26, 1949, the secretary of the soviet in the village of Briazi was assassinated. His position was left vacant, and in many other villages, the soviets remained leaderless, or the top positions were taken over by lesser officials. Evidently retribution for support of collective farms could be quite severe from the underground. According to one account from Lutsk Raion, Volyn Oblast, a party organizer had commandeered assent to establish a collective farm at a mass meeting. That night, guerrillas entered the village in question and chopped off the arms of those peasants who had raised them earlier in support of the *kolkhoz*.⁴⁹ The raion centers began to look like military occupation zones. UPA sources claim that the centers were being run by Russians, while in a typical raion center there were over 250 members of the Komsomol who were almost all Eastern Ukrainians. Also, an MGB unit made up of 220 soldiers was stationed on a permanent basis in the raion center.⁵⁰

The period of mass collectivization also featured thorough purges of Soviet and party personnel in the Western Ukrainian oblasts. At the oblast level, the purges were revealed at the second oblast party conferences held in the spring of 1948 and the third conferences held in January 1949. For example, at the Chernivtsi conference in March 1948, speakers declared that questions of Soviet and *kolkhoz* construction were not being raised to their crucial primary role by the oblast party committee. Two secretaries, Zelenyuk and Vovk, had reportedly been removed from their posts.⁵¹ In Stanyslaviv Oblast, in January 1949, the conference declined to reelect First Secretary Slon, ostensibly because of his failure to improve the situation of the party in the villages of the oblast.⁵² The purge, however, did not end there, and it is reported that when Melnikov took over the position of Ukrainian First Secretary (Khrushchev went to work in Moscow at the end of 1949), one of his first acts was to make a tour of towns and villages of Western Ukraine, carrying out extensive purges of party organizations along the way.⁵³

The purges were also directed below the oblast level. A report from UPA focuses on the changes in one raion, which might be

taken as typical of a so-called backward raion in Western Ukraine during this period. According to the report, virtually the entire membership of the raion party committee had been changed in the latter part of 1949. Many people were arrested for alleged "anti-state activities," bribery and other charges that suggest a thorough purge of personnel.⁵⁴

Why did these purges occur? In answering this question, one should differentiate between the removal of oblast personnel and the purges at the raion level. In the former case, it is possible that the secretaries were being made scapegoats for their failure to overcome the opposition to collectivization in the Western Ukrainian villages and for what the authorities perceived as inadequate organizational and political work. Not all the secretaries were removed, and those that were dismissed, such as Slon in Stanyslaviv, were evidently reinstated after several months.⁵⁵ Thus the purges at the oblast level were a short-term goal intended to put pressure on the oblast secretaries to improve work toward the completion of collectivization. A Western scholar has noted that the party's problems were magnified at this time because, in place of open opposition, there were the peasants' clear indifference and apathy toward kolkhoz work.⁵⁶ However, open opposition was still continuing. The authorities were thus very concerned about this situation, and the instability at the oblast level in the republic as a whole is evident from the fact that fourteen of the twenty-five Ukrainian oblast leaders were moved between December 1949 and June 1951.⁵⁷

At the raion level, however, the purges seem to have been more widespread. Possibly the removal of many members of raion party committees was a sign that the authorities wanted to clamp down on "careerists" and others who had joined the party only recently and lacked the discipline necessary at such a crucial period. The vague term "anti-state activities" also suggests that this purge may have been part of the general purge against the Jews in the USSR that was occurring at this time.⁵⁸ Again, the term may have indicated mainly the extent of the opposition to Soviet rule in Western Ukrainian villages, and the raion party organizations were not up to the task of attracting the villagers to the kolkhoz movement. These organizations were not entrusted by the authorities with enforcing mass collectivization, and MTS political sections were brought in for this purpose.⁵⁹ We may assume that their performances were deemed unsatisfactory in late 1948 and early 1949.

The measures adopted by the authorities suggest that the campaign took on many of the features of the collectivization campaign of the 1930s: the rapid enforcement of collectivization, accompanied by deportations and coercive methods; heavy punishments imposed on those who refused to work once the kolkhozy had been established; and extensive purges and changes within the village, raion and oblast leaderships. This was also a characteristic of the campaign in the western borderlands, generally.

COLLECTIVIZATION IN OTHER SOVIET BORDERLANDS, 1948–49

The collectivization campaign in Western Ukraine formed part of a general pattern that encompassed the other western borderlands and the Soviet-bloc countries of Eastern Europe at this time. In Western Ukraine, the takeoff point for mass collectivization took place after September 1948. Thus, whereas in mid-September there were still reportedly only about 20 percent of peasant households collectivized,⁶⁰ this figure had risen to 41.2 percent by the end of the year.⁶¹ In contrast, the figure in Right-Bank Moldavia remained under 20 percent, and the process had barely begun in Estonia. But the Western Ukrainian figure is complicated by several factors. The question arises, why the authorities would have delayed the onset of mass collectivization until well after the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute in the Cominform had come to a head (March-June 1948) and some two months after the Polish authorities had announced that the countryside was to be collectivized in July 1948.⁶² It would have been more logical to commence mass collectivization at once in order to show the other Soviet borderlands, Yugoslavia and the rest of Eastern Europe that the “correct” agrarian policy was to give priority to the rapid elimination of small-scale peasant farming through collectivization. There are, in fact, indications that a major push was attempted as early as February 1948.⁶³ It seems likely that the authorities were prevented from pushing mass collectivization as early as they had desired because of the fierce opposition from nationalist forces. This statement is borne out by the great variations in the extent of collectivization among individual oblasts. In those oblasts where UPA forces were known to be strong (principally Stanyslaviv, Lviv and Ternopil), collectivization had failed to take root.

Collectivization in Western Ukraine, then, was probably insti-

tuted in the spring of 1948, well before the Polish decision was announced, but it did not take on mass movement until September of that year. Between September 1948 and July 1949, it increased quickly, enveloping almost 60 percent of peasant households by July 1, 1949. Thereafter it appears to have slowed down dramatically. Over the next six months, it increased only to 66.4 percent. The cause of the delay was probably due to the fact that in the Autumn of 1949, resources were being shifted to several small republics (Moldavia and Estonia), although nationalist opposition may again have caused some delay. By the end of 1949 the total households collectivized in Estonia and Right-Bank Moldavia had temporarily surpassed those in Western Ukraine.

In Western Belorussia, however, Soviet authorities, according to a Soviet source, met with extraordinary difficulty. In January 1947 a CC CPSU decree complained that in this region, the local authorities "were not applying practical measures for the movement of peasants toward agricultural cooperation."⁶⁴ A year later, only about 2 percent of all peasant households had been united in collective farms. In 1950 the total was still less than 40 per cent—it had reportedly *declined* during that year—and the fifth plenum of the Communist Party of Belorussia (CPB) issued a decree "concerning deficiencies in the CC CPB's leadership over agriculture." At the same time, forty-five new MTS were created the same year, which suggests that the party organizations were considered too weak to supervise collectivization unassisted.⁶⁵ As guerrilla forces in Western Belorussia were virtually nonexistent, one must assume widespread passive resistance to collectivization and firm peasant adherence to the formerly prevalent *khutir* (homestead) system of agriculture. Only in 1952–53 was collectivization in Western Belorussia brought to completion.⁶⁶ It is also possible, however, that the Soviet authorities deliberately left this area alone until the main grain-producing western borderlands, such as Western Ukraine and Right-Bank Moldavia, had been collectivized.

In the second half of 1949 and early 1950, the nationalist underground clearly had a delaying effect on collectivization in Western Ukraine. Although there were reportedly guerrilla-type activities in the other border areas (although evidently not in Western Belorussia), it appears that the authorities were able to bring them under control more quickly. In Estonia, for example, collectivization was close to completion by the end of April 1949, and the guerrillas

were rounded up and deported, along with other actual and potential recalcitrants.⁶⁷ Yet in Western Ukraine, at the end of this year, the authorities were still issuing appeals promising amnesty to those insurgents who gave themselves up. Although it is known that deportations occurred in Western Ukraine, they evidently did not encompass all the guerrilla forces. But there were perhaps other sources of opposition. First, it seems that the degree of anti-Soviet feeling in Western Ukraine ran wider than the insurgency, embracing a large portion of the Western Ukrainian rural population. The Soviet authorities were quite candid about this, maintaining that the region had been for too long under the influence of “bourgeois states” and “bourgeois influence.”⁶⁸ Second, party forces in the raions and villages had been badly weakened by the purges, and by the authorities’ failure to promote local cadres, as noted repeatedly in *Radyanska Ukraina*.

As a result of these difficulties, in December 1949, the authorities introduced the MTS political sections into Western Ukraine to complete collectivization. They seem to have achieved this objective quite successfully. Thus collectivization in Western Ukraine was completed before that of the other western borderlands. Whereas 98.7 percent of peasant households in Western Ukraine had been collectivized by the end of 1950,⁶⁹ the Baltic states achieved this figure only in July 1953. Collectivization in Right-Bank Moldavia followed quickly after that in Western Ukraine.⁷⁰

Although the Soviet authorities were evidently anxious to bring the process to completion in all regions, the Ukrainian and Moldavian areas appear to have taken priority. There were probably three main reasons for this. In the case of Western Ukraine, the attainment of full collectivization also signified the demise of the nationalist opposition, since it severed the latter’s close connection with the Western Ukrainian villages. As demonstrated, the extent of the opposition was considerably greater than in the other western borderlands. Second, the authorities felt it important to complete collectivization quickly in Western Ukraine in order to set an example to the Polish authorities, who were evidently having great difficulty in implementing collectivization in Poland.⁷¹ Third, as suggested by a Western scholar,⁷² Western Ukraine and Right-Bank Moldavia were major grain-growing regions, and the wheat crop in particular was politically more important to the regime than other crops. Moreover, grain-producing regions were more adaptable to

collectivization than the animal-breeding Baltic republics.

Some valid comparisons can be made between collectivization in Western Ukraine after the war and that in Eastern Ukraine in the 1930s. In both cases, it took some time for the process to get started. Although there was no nationalist resistance in Eastern Ukraine, the coercive measures adopted by the authorities provoked opposition to the kolkhozy. Also in both, the MTS political sections played a key role in completing the process, using harsh, coercive methods to attain this.⁷³ In both cases, mass collectivization was implemented very quickly once it got under way. But in Western Ukraine, it was implemented before sufficient cadres had been trained, and thus the kolkhozy were established without the necessary personnel capable of running them.⁷⁴ This adds weight to the argument that the establishment of the kolkhozy was a political rather than an economic maneuver; that it was more important to ensure that households were moved into the kolkhozy and would thus be under Soviet control than it was to ensure that the kolkhozy in question would be efficient operating units.

Collectivization in Western Ukraine was completed in 1950–51. The entire process was accompanied by repressions and armed warfare in the villages, which contrasted with the passive resistance offered by Soviet peasants in the early 1930s. It was completed by the MTS political sections and party workers brought in from the eastern oblasts of Ukraine and other areas of the USSR. The most notable feature of the Western Ukrainian campaign was the similarity in Soviet methods over two decades. This suggests two things: first, that there was an alarming poverty of new ideas within the Soviet leadership; and second (which may negate the first), that the old methods—those of force—were considered the only reliable means to ensure that reluctant peasants joined the kolkhozy.

8 Khrushchev and Mass Collectivization in Western Ukraine, 1950–1951

FULL COLLECTIVIZATION

COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE IN Western Ukraine was basically completed in 1950–51. Early in 1951, according to a Soviet decree, in the area as a whole, about 7,190 kolkhozy united about 1.6 million peasant households, or 95.1 per cent of the total. These kolkhozy allegedly possessed about 5.5 million hectares of arable land, or 95.6 per cent of the total. Collectivization was declared to have been completed as early as July 1950.¹ These totals are, however, exaggerated. Perhaps the Western Ukrainian oblast and raion authorities, anxious to assure their superiors that they were making good progress in collectivization, inflated the percentages of households collectivized. Nevertheless, by the end of 1950, the collectivization process can be said to have been completed.

In oblasts such as Volyn and Chernivtsi, in 1950 consolidation rather than creation of kolkhozy occurred, whereas in other oblasts, in the first months of the year there was a frantic campaign to complete collectivization. There were also considerable variations in the size of the new kolkhozy. Whereas the kolkhozy were relatively large by Ukrainian standards in Ternopil (with about 224 households per kolkhoz), those of Lviv Oblast were small (averaging only about 166 households).

In 1950 a large number of kolkhozy were constructed in Lviv and Stanyslaviv in particular, and collectivization was completed in

Rivne and Ternopil oblasts, which had been lagging behind in the process. In Lviv, 303 kolkhozy had been organized in 1948, and 129 in 1949, but in the first three months of 1950, 285 new kolkhozy had been organized. The number of households collectivized had increased from 50.1 per cent at the start of 1950 to 98.3 per cent by April 1, while the arable land collectivized increased correspondingly from 58.9 to 98.1 per cent of the total.² This dramatic increase coincided with two events: first, the apparent demise of the oblast's nationalist underground, the members of which were now declared to be trying to infiltrate the kolkhozy from within in order to sabotage them;³ and second, the visit to Lviv of the members of the Politburo of the CC CPU. Given the situation in the oblast and the large number of assassinations of party officials in the postwar years by UPA members, one can surmise that the leading officials were accompanied by a large military force. It is very likely then that the collectivization in Lviv Oblast took on the appearance of a military maneuver; the party organizations were purged and the peasants were moved forcibly into the kolkhozy.

In Stanyslaviv, the increase in the number of collectivized households was so dramatic that a forced campaign is indicated. The collectivization of peasant households reportedly stood at only 37.6 per cent on January 1, 1950, but rose to 84.3 per cent by March 20. This figure would have been much higher but for the inclusion of the mountain raions, which had not yet been collectivized.⁴ At least ninety kolkhozy are said to have been created during the period of elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in February.⁵ Almost 93,000 peasant households had been collectivized in the space of three months, or 50 per cent more than in the preceding five years. In 1951-54 there was a major campaign by the security organs in the noncollectivized mountain regions. The ostensible aim of this campaign was to root out the "remnants of the nationalist bands" and it was also connected to the alleged landing of British and American parachutists in this oblast to help the UPA.⁶ Since the authorities operated in this fashion in 1951-54, it is reasonable to assume that the completion of collectivization in the lower regions early in 1950 took the form of a military campaign, directed against "nationalist elements" and people who were reluctant to join the kolkhozy.

Soviet reports divide the kolkhozy into "weak" and "strong." The weaker kolkhozy were the focus of a CC CPU plenum, held

from April 13 to 15, 1950, at which a decree was issued "Concerning measures for the further political and organizational-economic strengthening of kolkhozy in Lviv and Volyn oblasts." The preamble of the decree made it clear that it referred to all the western oblasts and not just Lviv and Volyn. The decree combined many of the usual criticisms directed at kolkhoz organization such as the necessity of raising the level of party leadership in the villages; the need to strengthen the kolkhozy politically and economically; the need to disseminate reports from "progressive" kolkhozy; and the need for vigilance against and implacability toward the "enemies" of the kolkhozy. The decree maintained that as a result of the self-satisfied attitude on the part of local leaders, kulaks and nationalists had penetrated the kolkhozy and were taking advantage of the "short-sightedness" of local party leaders to hinder the consolidation of the kolkhozy.

The decree also claimed that large sections of kolkhoz land had not been brought into a single land area; that private plots of collective farmers exceeded the established maximum norms; and that often in the kolkhozy there had been no registration of lands and private plots.⁷ Many of the measures of the decree were formalistic and repeated earlier decrees of the CPSU and CPU on this question. Of more significance were the demands to raise the work of the MTS political sections, which were expected to play a decisive role in the campaign to complete collectivization, and to improve the leadership of the MTS.⁸ Perhaps the main function of the decree was to act as a warning to local party organizations that more purges would take place if the situation in the Western Ukrainian villages did not improve. Since the decree was directed ostensibly at two oblast party organizations, it follows that its main thrust was directed at the oblast level. Moreover, although the complaints about the raion party officials were vociferous, the actual measures undertaken suggest that MTS and their political sections were held equally to blame for the difficult situation that had arisen. One of the main aims of Soviet agricultural policy during the period of mass collectivization was to enhance the role of MTS in kolkhoz production, and this was a facet of Soviet policy that has largely been ignored in the western oblasts of Ukraine, not least because of the dearth of agricultural machinery on the MTS.

The March 1950 decree reveals the chaotic and disorganized state of kolkhozy in Western Ukraine. Many of the newly formed

kolkhozy were declared to be weak and some were not yet operational. In Lviv Oblast, for example, of the 678 kolkhozy in existence early in 1950, 142 (21 per cent) were declared to be "backward," 453 (67 per cent) were "average" and only eighty-three (12 per cent) were "strong."⁹ Several sources verify that weakness. For instance, following the March 1950 CPSU decree, *Pravda Ukrainy* condemned what it called the "inefficient management" of Western Ukrainian kolkhozy, citing in particular those of Lviv Oblast, where animals and machines had not been "socialized," work squads had not been formed, and kolkhoz property was reportedly being sold for "private gain." Evidently these problems were occurring not only on the newly created kolkhozy, but also on those that had been founded in the early postwar years.¹⁰ The newspaper's complaints were followed by a decree of the CPSU dated August 25, 1950, "Concerning the work of the Lviv Oblast committee of Ukraine." Its main focus was on the "serious defects" in consolidating the new kolkhozy. These included the delay in collectivizing agricultural implements, draught animals and production buildings; the failure to register kolkhoz land within the set period; violations of the Model Charter; slack discipline; and the great fluctuation in the number of cadres.¹¹

The totals for the number of kolkhozy constructed in the first months of 1950 clearly included a number of paper kolkhozy. In Stanyslaviv Oblast, for example, where collectivization was progressing with the utmost difficulty, the new Ukrainian First Party Secretary, L.G. Melnikov, and a delegation from the CPU Central Committee, paid a personal visit to the oblast early in 1950, at which time there was evidently a purge of the oblast party organization.¹² The sudden increase in kolkhoz totals that occurred immediately after this visit is, therefore, suspect. In April 1950, there were 660 kolkhozy in the oblast, but at the end of the year, when collectivization was said to be 97 per cent complete, most Soviet sources concur that there were 616 kolkhozy (before the merger campaign).¹³ It is possible that some Stanyslaviv kolkhozy were merged before the official merger campaign was initiated, but two other explanations are also possible. Either a number of kolkhozy could have been disbanded between April and December 1950 or, as seems more likely, the April totals may have been inflated by the local authorities in order to avoid further purges or recriminations.

The Soviet authorities implemented two measures to try to con-

solidate the vast number of newly created kolkhozy. In a repeat of the measure undertaken in November 1948, at the start of the mass collectivization process, they organized another mass excursion to the kolkhozy of Eastern Ukraine. This occurred from June 20 to 30, 1950 and is said to have involved almost 1,500 persons from new kolkhozy. For the most part the excursionists appear to have been kolkhoz chairmen, members of kolkhoz boards of directors, brigadiers of field brigades and link leaders. Each western oblast delegation visited a different Eastern Ukrainian oblast. The purpose was evidently to acquaint the inexperienced Western Ukrainians with "progressive" collective farming in the eastern oblasts.¹⁴ The second measure was the imposition on July 12, 1950, of the State Acts for the Usage of Land. The main reason behind the Acts appears to have been to define more strictly the boundaries and areas of kolkhoz land. The Acts stated that local party organs had neglected this sphere, pointing out that in Drohobych Oblast, for example, the borders of kolkhoz lands had been defined for only about 25 per cent of all kolkhozy, so that jurisdiction over inter-village roads had not been determined. Another likely purpose of the measure was to strengthen work discipline; to ensure that the private plots of collective farmers did not exceed maximum size; and to ensure that the kolkhozy were in possession of the land assigned to them.¹⁵

During the period of the completion of collectivization, the Soviet press and the CPU made several harsh statements about the lax attitude of local party organizations toward the process. Two examples show the sort of publicity given to collectivization in the press. One example, taken from *Radyanska Ukraina* (January 26, 1950), concerning Drohobych Oblast and was entitled "Why is Stryia Raion the Most Backward?" The article was typical of the period and the problems outlined were similar to numerous Western Ukrainian raions then. Of the fifty kolkhozy in the raion, the article reported, twelve had not fully collectivized horses and agricultural implements. In these same kolkhozy, the kolkhoz administrations were nonfunctional, and brigades and links had not been created. Only twenty kolkhozy had completely filled their quota for the seed fund. Although a "class struggle" was declared to be in progress in the raion, "mass-political work" had been badly neglected. The raion authorities had apparently claimed that about 1,300 lectures and reports had been delivered, and that there were twenty-four village lecture groups and sixty-two agitcollectives, but

these figures, the report stated, were "greatly exaggerated." Moreover, the subject matter of the lectures omitted crucial questions such as the "struggle with kulaks and Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists." The raion leaders were also chastised for not visiting villages personally with reports on political themes and lectures, and for their apparent failure to utilize effectively the large party organization in the raion.

Four months later, matters had evidently improved very little. On May 28, 1950, *Radyanska Ukraina* published an article entitled "Party Organizations in the Struggle to Strengthen Young Kolkhozy," which focused on Lviv Oblast. After noting the exemplary progress of Novomyliatyn Raion authorities, the article noted that many local party authorities had paid little attention to the matter of consolidating collective farms. They had forgotten, it declared, Stalin's instructions that the party organizations must guide kolkhoz matters "in every detail," and must know every single thing that occurred in the kolkhozy. In Peremyshliany Raion, even though collectivization had been basically completed, there was no attempt to differentiate between individual kolkhozy, with the result that "kulaks and bourgeois-nationalist elements" had been able to infiltrate some of the kolkhozy. Thus, according to the newspaper, concrete leadership had been replaced by stereotyped "office" leadership.

In some respects, these criticisms were formalistic. This is most evident in the comments directed at the raion authorities. The second example shows that they were expected to be involved in every facet of collective farm life, but this was typical of the general tendency during the early postwar years to control closely any local initiative. The raion authorities were accordingly made the scapegoats for the problems of the new collective farms. In effect, it was a vicious circle, for without local initiative, the problems were likely to continue, but any acquiescence by raion authorities to "independent" kolkhoz actions was likely to be frowned upon. As for the criticism that raion party leaders were never seen in the village, one can point to numerous examples in which the raion leader visited villages. In such cases, the press usually castigated the leader because "guest appearances" were replacing "efficient aid." According to *Radyanska Ukraina*, a backward kolkhoz called "Gorky" (Drohobych Oblast) received "almost daily visits" from the raion secretaries, the head of the MTS *politotdel* and other leading work-

ers. Their visits lasted several minutes, "just enough to glance at the situation and deliver a rebuke to the kolkhoz chairman."¹⁶ These rebukes were administered at a time when the raion party organizations were known to be weak, and when many of their functions had already been usurped by the MTS political sections, established in December 1949. Thus the complaints were largely ritualistic, but they do reveal serious defects within the kolkhoz movement.

THE KOLKHOZY IN 1950-51

Kolkhoz Cadres

The leadership cadres question was a key factor in agricultural progress as collectivization was being completed. Most of the leaders in kolkhoz construction and organization were outsiders, often plenipotentiaries from the raion center. Many of these plenipotentiaries would enter the villages only during the period of spring or winter sowing, after which they would return to the raion centers.¹⁷ For example, about 50 per cent of party members in Vynnyky Raion, Lviv Oblast, lived and worked permanently in the raion center, but came to the villages periodically to help strengthen the kolkhozy.¹⁸ The need for local Western Ukrainians to participate in the kolkhozy was stressed repeatedly. Although Western Ukrainians made up the vast majority of the village population, in most raions fewer than half of all leading posts were filled by local Western Ukrainians, even in 1950 as collectivization was being completed.¹⁹ The Soviet authorities were still reluctant to entrust local Western Ukrainians with positions of responsibility, while at the same time, the shortage of those local people also suggests that many were still opposed to collective farming and reluctant to play an active part in collectivization.

In January 1950, of the 5,220 kolkhoz chairmen in Western Ukraine, only one had a higher education, 119 had a secondary education and the remainder had only an incomplete secondary or primary education. Perhaps, however, this affected primarily the centralization of control over the kolkhozy rather than their strengthening, since the lack of education of the kolkhoz peasant would hinder written communication with his superiors, the quality of his reports and the like, rather than the way in which he ran the day-to-day operations of the farm. The situation with kolkhoz cadres had also failed to improve. In Volyn Oblast, for example, in

1950, when there were 866 kolkhozy in operation, only seventy-three had the required agronomists, and only sixty-eight had zoo-technicians or veterinary surgeons. Further, most of these were not fully qualified.²⁰ This situation was evidently typical of all the western oblasts at the time of full collectivization, and was also a general problem in the USSR as a whole.

In the postwar years there was a constant influx of "specialists" from Eastern Ukraine to Western Ukrainian agriculture. Altogether, from 1944 to 1950, there were over 13,500 specialists sent into the western oblasts, of whom 8,300 came directly from universities and technical schools and 5,200 were individually selected.²¹ Training of local Western Ukrainians started in 1946, and by 1949, there were almost 2,000 Western Ukrainian "specialists with a higher and middle education."²² Nonetheless, these totals were, according to Soviet accounts, woefully inadequate. Thus the authorities established thirty-one one-year schools. These schools prepared 533 kolkhoz chairmen, while retraining 790 kolkhoz chairmen and over 8,600 other specialists, including MTS workers, in 1949–50.²³ How successful this "training" was in improving performance is unclear. The effect was probably not great because most of the cadres serving the kolkhozy did not receive instruction. The training of kolkhoz chairmen, for example, encompassed only about 18 per cent of the total number. The Western Ukrainian farms were run therefore by the "imports"—those specialists sent there from Eastern Ukraine.

Livestock and Livestock Farms

In the first postwar years, livestock raising was not a priority of the Soviet authorities in Western Ukraine. As collectivization approached completion, however, the authorities laid increasing stress on livestock raising and on the creation of livestock-raising farms on the kolkhozy. By 1950, as a result largely of the transfer of about half a million head of productive livestock from other regions of the USSR on long-term credit the situation had improved somewhat. From 1949 to 1950, the head of livestock owned by the kolkhozy tripled.²⁴

In May, 1950, there were about 26,700 head of large-horned livestock in Lviv Oblast, or about 28.5 per kolkhoz. These were distributed among 710 farms on the kolkhozy. (The Lviv kolkhozy averaged 2.6 livestock-raising farms at this time, well below the four

farms demanded by the three-year plan for livestock raising, 1949–51.)²⁵ By December, however, the head of cattle and oxen on Lviv kolkhozy had more than doubled and the average per kolkhoz had risen to 63.2. Although a substantial improvement, in 1950 the average kolkhoz in the USSR possessed 224 head of cattle, whereas the average for the Ukrainian republic was around 189 per kolkhoz.²⁶ In terms of households per kolkhoz, however, most Western Ukrainian kolkhozy were smaller than their Eastern Ukrainian counterparts, so the shortage of livestock was in fact less acute than the figures suggest.

By the end of 1950 in Western Ukraine, each kolkhoz averaged seventy-nine head of horned livestock, but only forty-nine pigs and thirty-nine sheep and goats. The number of pigs in the republic had fallen drastically as a result of the 1946 famine and had barely recovered four years later. A feature of livestock-holding during this period in Western Ukraine, as well as in other areas of the USSR, was that the largest portion of the livestock was privately owned. Thus in the western oblasts, whereas the kolkhozy possessed about 480,000 head of large-horned livestock at the end of 1950, the total number of privately-owned, large-horned livestock was about 1.25 million.²⁷ In the eyes of the authorities, this imbalance could only be considered an impediment to kolkhoz livestock raising. However, because of the meager incomes derived from kolkhoz farming in 1950, the state was obliged to let the poor collective farmer keep his cow, sheep or goats. The Soviet authorities were also doubtlessly concerned that the forced sale or confiscation of livestock would lead to more slaughtering and increased opposition to the kolkhozy.

A major problem in 1950 was the wintering of kolkhoz livestock and the raising of fodder crops so that they would be ready in time for the next winter. In Pomoriany, Pidkamin and Brody raions of Lviv Oblast, there was a “rupture” between these two processes which greatly hampered the wintering of livestock.²⁸ Linked to this problem was a general lack of buildings for communal livestock. The kolkhozy of Lviv Oblast in May 1950 possessed a total of 583 cowsheds, with capacity for 18,750 head; and 1,619 stables, with capacity for 49,700 horses. Yet in June 1950, there were in the oblast kolkhozy some 26,700 head of cattle and over 82,000 horses.²⁹ The rural authorities were evidently well behind with the reconstruction of those farm buildings damaged during the war,

and with the construction of new buildings to meet the demands of livestock raising.

However, there is evidence that the construction of farm buildings had begun in earnest by 1950. In Stanyslaviv Oblast in 1950, the plan was to construct 250 stables, 140 cowsheds, eighty pigsties, fifty-seven sheep pens and 200 poultry houses. By the end of November, the plan had almost been fulfilled and a report suggests that it would in fact be overfulfilled by year end.³⁰ In spite of such belated efforts, the problem remained serious. Many of the livestock being transferred to the kolkhozy could not be properly accommodated, and many of the animals may have died as a result during the winter of 1950–51.

Harvesting on the Kolkhozy, 1950

The authorities focused on several problems in kolkhoz harvesting work in 1948–49, most notably on the failure of various kolkhozy to make their deliveries of grain and other produce to the state on time, and the substantial time lapse between the harvesting and the threshing of grain. Such complaints became even more frequent in the Soviet press in 1950. In addition, there were numerous references to “anti-mechanistic elements,” which note that threshing and horse-drawn machines were “standing idle.”³¹ In Stryia Raion, Drohobych Oblast, for example, the authorities made no allowances for the increase of machinery that had occurred at the time of the completion of collectivization. Two combines of Stryia MTS had reportedly gathered a harvest of only about fifty hectares in the course of a month. Further, these combines had allegedly been allocated to the worst fields.³² Another typical report concerned a meeting of kolkhoz chairmen of Rivne Oblast, held early in 1950. The chairman of the oblast executive committee complained that preparation for spring sowing was “inadequate”; that the MTS were not repairing tractors quickly enough; that “toiling discipline” on the kolkhozy was at a low level; and that responsibility for various agricultural duties remained too widely dispersed.³³ These criticisms may have contained some truth, but such reports are too similar in tone and too frequent to be taken literally. In Volyn Oblast, for example, the discovery of defects in harvesting, in additions to violations of the Model Charter, followed directly after the CPSU decree about mistakes in Volyn and Lviv oblasts. The oblast authorities

were providing quick evidence that the CPSU directives were being followed, rather than elaborating on genuine problems.

THE MTS IN WESTERN UKRAINE

In the prewar period of Soviet rule in Western Ukraine, the establishment of MTS had occurred simultaneously with the creation of kolkhozy. Altogether, 174 MTS had been established by 1940.³⁴ After the annexation of the Chernivtsi region in June 1940, a further thirteen MTS were sanctioned, but not set up prior to the outbreak of war in June 1941. The prewar MTS had in their possession 2,376 tractors, or over thirteen tractors per station, but the average land area cultivated by these tractors was extremely low. Whereas the republican average for cultivation per tractor in 1940 was 558 hectares, that in the Western Ukrainian regions in which MTS had been established was only 186.3 hectares. These prewar MTS were evidently intended less as instruments of control over kolkhoz production than as a means of indicating to the peasants the benefits of mechanization and collective work, even before the kolkhozy had been established. Even though the mechanization of Western Ukrainian agriculture was in its infancy, the MTS thus still had some function to play in agriculture at this time. Ultimately, the authorities probably intended to use MTS as political watchdogs over the newly annexed territories, but the German-Soviet war interrupted matters.

When the Germans invaded Ukraine, the authorities were able to evacuate much of the agricultural machinery in the eastern oblasts of Ukraine. Consequently, after the removal of the Germans, this machinery was returned largely intact and Eastern Ukrainian MTS were soon restored. In the republic as a whole, by the end of 1945, all the prewar MTS had reportedly been restored, and an additional fifty MTS had been created. Although the number of tractors had dwindled from 77,300 to 44,400 as a result of destruction, military engagements during the war, the wearing out of machines or allocation to industry, the MTS still serviced over 90 per cent of the sown area of the kolkhozy. (The sown area had also been reduced considerably between 1941 and 1944). By 1948, the number of tractors in the republic exceeded the prewar level.³⁵

In the western oblasts, Soviet sources state that 162 of the 174

MTS had been "restored" during 1944, and a further twenty-eight MTS had been constructed by the following year.³⁶ One must have reservations about these totals. A report from the oblast level suggests that the majority of stations were restored between February 1946 and February 1948,³⁷ that is, well after 1944. That meaningful restoration took longer than a year or two is borne out by the low volume of conventional plowing undertaken by Western Ukrainian MTS in the first postwar years. In the former Polish oblasts of Western Ukraine, for example, the fulfillment of conventional plowing by the MTS dropped from 334,000 hectares in 1940 to a mere 63,000 hectares in 1946.³⁸ The likelihood is that some of the buildings of the MTS were restored, but there was little machinery on the stations for some time. In Volyn Oblast, for example, from 1946–48, less than 4 per cent of agricultural work was mechanized.³⁹ Moreover, provision of tractors in the western oblasts lagged well behind that in Eastern Ukraine. As late as 1949, for every 100 hectares of cultivated land on kolkhozy, there were 5.2 tractors in Eastern Ukraine and 3.2 in Western Ukraine.⁴⁰ Since the tractor parks of the Western Ukrainian kolkhozy had not been evacuated at the outbreak of the war, the losses were much greater. Either the tractors required extensive repairs, or the MTS of Western Ukraine had to await delivery of tractors from other parts of the USSR.

Thus in the early postwar years MTS aid to Western Ukrainian agriculture, in terms of machinery at least, was negligible. Only with the onset of mass collectivization were they provided with sufficient tractors to make an impact. In some ways, this was logical. While the kolkhozy remained few in numbers and small in area, it was inadvisable to stock the Western Ukrainian MTS, when tractors were in short supply in areas already collectivized. However, the problems of MTS work in Western Ukraine, once mass collectivization was under way, were typical of other areas of the USSR at that time. The press contained numerous references to such matters as the failure of MTS to fulfill their plans and the lack of agreement about work between the MTS and the kolkhozy. One of the chief criticisms directed at the MTS leaders was their failure to carry out repairs to tractors. In one case, in Transcarpathia Oblast, it was charged that the MTS leaders were "pulling the wool over their own eyes," in giving "false reports" about the repair of tractors in preparation for the spring sowing campaign.⁴¹ Problems repairing tractors were also highlighted in the CC CPU plenum of March

10-13, 1947 in the decree entitled "Concerning measures for raising agriculture in the postwar period."⁴²

In 1948, the provision of machinery for the Western Ukrainian MTS began to improve, although their agricultural work remained at a low level. By the end of 1948, the number of tractors on Western Ukrainian MTS finally surpassed the prewar total. The authorities realized the urgency of increasing the MTS machinery stock as the number of kolkhozy grew as a result of the mass collectivization campaign. By 1948, each MTS served approximately eight kolkhozy. By 1950 this figure had risen to about thirty kolkhozy. However, the mechanization of agriculture increased sharply in 1950. In Volyn Oblast, for example, it rose from a reported 3.8 per cent in 1948 to 41 per cent in 1950.⁴³ In the former Polish oblasts, the number of tractors in the MTS tractor stock increased from a reported 501 in 1946, to almost 9,000 in 1950. Over the same period, the number of combines rose from seven to 229, and the number of complex threshers from 266 to 2,800.⁴⁴ Thus, on average, each MTS in the six former Polish oblasts in 1950 possessed fifty-two tractors, 1.3 combines and sixteen complex threshers, while the average MTS park in the republic as a whole possessed about ninety tractors, seventeen combines and sixteen threshers.⁴⁵ Thus there was still considerably less machinery than on Eastern Ukrainian MTS, although it was a vast improvement over the situation in 1946 and even over that of 1940.

Despite the quantitative improvement, there are frequent reports about the unsatisfactory condition of the Western Ukrainian MTS in 1950. To take, for example, Lviv Oblast, the tenth plenum of the oblast party committee held at the end of November noted that the MTS had not been strengthened as planned. In fact, the plenum noted, most MTS had not even used the funds assigned for such matters as electrification and the construction of workshops. The preparation of mechanized cadres was declared to be a source for "serious alarm." Although a school for the preparation of mechanized cadres was scheduled to open in the following month, nothing had been done to prepare for that. Each MTS was supposed to hold training courses beginning on November 1, but not a single tractorist was being prepared.⁴⁶

The productivity of tractors in Western Ukraine remained well below the level of their Eastern Ukrainian counterparts. Whereas the average tractor in the eastern oblasts attained 640 hectares of

conventional ploughing in 1950, the average tractor in Western Ukraine managed only about 420 hectares.⁴⁷ Thus in terms of both organization and performance, the Western Ukrainian MTS had severe problems in 1946–50. There were perhaps two main reasons for this. First, there was a shortage of trained personnel with sufficient expertise to organize MTS work, and to see to the repair of the numerous tractors that had remained inoperable as a result of the war years. Second, peasants were apathetic toward the MTS. This reluctance to work on MTS was not confined to the western oblasts of Ukraine. The CC CPSU plenum of February 1947 had addressed the question, and had tried to resolve the matter by guaranteeing workers of MTS tractor brigades a minimum of three kilograms of grain per *trudoden* for fulfilling their work quotas, and by providing other incentives.⁴⁸

Equally as important as the role of the MTS in farming was their political function in the Soviet countryside. During World War II, Soviet agriculture had leaned heavily on the reintroduced MTS political sections, which were responsible for seeing that sowing and harvesting were carried out properly. After the dissolution of the political sections in 1943, the chief political role in agriculture fell once again to the raion party secretary, who was ill-equipped to deal with periods of special tension or emergencies. Therefore in February 1947, the CC CPSU plenum decided to recreate the position of MTS deputy director for political affairs, which had been used in the 1930s. His jurisdiction was broader than that of his predecessor because he was expected to supervise all operations within the MTS zone, that is, he had to look into all aspects of kolkhoz work and examine the primary party organizations on the kolkhozy. This position was usually filled by an experienced party man, and many of those who filled the posts were very well educated.⁴⁹ In Western Ukraine, the creation of this post was not as momentous as the establishment of the MTS political sections there at the end of 1949. Nonetheless it reveals the growing importance of the role of the MTS in collective agriculture.

Generally, over the period 1944–50, the MTS's function in Western Ukraine was more political than economic. The MTS political sections played a key role in enforcing collectivization, but the economic aid given to the newly created kolkhozy by the MTS remained minor. The main difficulties were the shortages of both machinery and the cadres, and the problems were accentuated as

collectivization was completed and the number of collectivized households suddenly increased, but the MTS had to play a major role in the enforcement of collectivization. As many of the stations were located at key communication points, near raion centers and on railroads, they were often better situated than the raion committees to scrutinize the work of the kolkhozy. In Western Ukraine, where the rural party organizations remained weak, the stations, at least in the eyes of the authorities, were the most reliable centres of authority in the countryside.

STATE FARMS

In the prewar period of Soviet rule in Western Ukraine, the establishment of state farms occurred extremely slowly. Although Soviet accounts maintain that fifty-two state farms were founded before the outbreak of war, evidently only about twenty were actually set up.⁵⁰ By 1950, there were fifty-nine state farms in Western Ukraine, which encompassed about 40,100 hectares of land (about 680 hectares of arable land per farm). By Soviet standards, these were extremely small affairs. An average sovkhoz in Kharkiv Oblast, for example, possessed about 2,500 hectares of arable land. Twenty-four of the Western Ukrainian state farms were located in Ternopil and Transcarpathia oblasts, but those in the latter region were tiny, averaging about sixty-six hectares of arable land and possessing about twenty-seven cattle and thirty-four pigs. In terms of machinery, the state farms were even worse off than the kolkhozy in 1950.⁵¹ Thus, in 1950 the establishment of state farms was not a major concern of the Soviet authorities, who gave priority to the creation of kolkhozy and MTS.

Moreover, after the merger of kolkhozy, which began in 1950, the state farms were reduced even further in number and size. By 1954, only thirty-nine state farms remained in Western Ukraine. They possessed fewer than 25,000 hectares of land, or about 640 hectares per state farm.⁵² The evidence suggests that the attempts to establish state farms were abandoned because they were not a reliable means of grain procurement for the state. Instead, the authorities placed their hopes on the kolkhozy, and in particular, the enlarged kolkhozy, which effectively replaced the state farms. Not until the early 1960s did state farms play a major role in the agriculture of Western Ukraine.⁵³

THE AMALGAMATION OF KOLKHOZY

Brigades versus Links

The campaign to amalgamate collective farms in the USSR was preceded by a debate over the use of links, as opposed to brigades, in Soviet agriculture. The link (also known as a *zveno* or squad) was a small work unit composed of about six to eight persons. It had been championed by the Soviet Minister of Agriculture, A. A. Andreev (who was also the Politburo member responsible for the rural regions) as early as 1939, at the Eighteenth CPSU Congress. Then, Andreev had received overt support from the Soviet premier, V. Molotov, and between 1939 and 1949 the link—although in theory only a temporary subdivision of the parent brigade—was regarded as the principal work unit in the kolkhoz fields.⁵⁴

In the postwar period, when there was little agricultural machinery available to cultivate kolkhoz lands and when much of the agricultural work, such as weeding, was done by hand, the primacy of the link appeared to make sense to the Soviet authorities, at least in terms of productivity, but it was never very satisfactory as a means of maintaining political control over the peasantry. Simply put, there were too many of them and too many link leaders to keep track of. Further, small work units had a long tradition in Russian agriculture. (The link was not dissimilar to the village community of the tsarist period.) So the peasants were carrying out old rather than new Soviet methods of work. An alleged danger posed by the continuance of the link system, which came to the fore early in 1950, was that eventually it might replace the kolkhoz itself. By 1950 it had indeed largely taken over one of the main functions of the collective farms, namely the delivery of agricultural produce to the state.

The alternative to the link was the brigade, which sometimes consisted of dozens of members and generally was composed of at least thirty-five members. In the spring of 1950, Nikita Khrushchev initiated an attack on the existing system in collectivized agriculture in the USSR. The first sign that this attack had begun was an anonymous article published in *Pravda* on February 19, 1950, denouncing the use of the link in grain farming. This article maintained that the employment of the link was "inconsistent" with mechanized agriculture, and that the permanent replacement of the brigade by the link would mean a regression from "advanced" collective farming,

based on the extensive use of agricultural machines, to a backward system, based on manual labor in the kolkhoz fields.⁵⁵ The only concession that the writer was prepared to offer the link was that it might be suitable for those crops not yet cultivated by machines, such as some of the technical crops and vegetables.

There has been some speculation among western scholars about the authorship of the article. The likelihood is that it was written either by Stalin or Khrushchev. At the least it would have been approved by the former. Since Khrushchev had the main responsibility for the merger campaign that followed, however, he may well have been the main author. It is also possible that in 1950 Khrushchev capitalized on an opportunity to discredit his main rival, Andreev. On February 25, *Pravda* published an abject apology by Andreev, who admitted that he had been mistaken in advocating the primacy of the link over the brigade. Evidently Khrushchev had won an important victory.

A return to the brigade had other implications for Soviet agriculture. It signified that mechanization of agricultural production was to be increased which, in turn, meant a larger role for MTS. Also, given the brigade's ostensible function as an instrument of political control over the kolkhozy—as originally envisaged the brigade itself was to be a unit for party work—the Communist Party had to play a more significant role in the Soviet countryside. In Ukraine and in the USSR as a whole in the early postwar years, party members often made up only a tiny minority of the rural population and were particularly scarce on the collective farms.

The link/brigade dispute led to a more fundamental change in Soviet agricultural policy. As there were a number of problems with the way collective farms were operating, Khrushchev and his subordinates decided to propose another scheme that would allegedly demonstrate the superiority of large over small agricultural units.

The Merger Campaign Is Initiated

On March 8, 1950, Khrushchev published an article in *Pravda* proposing the consolidation of existing collective farms into larger units. One of the problems faced by the postwar kolkhozy—and often cited in Soviet decrees of the period—was their excessive overhead costs. In September 1946, the Soviet authorities had issued a decree “Concerning measures to liquidate violations of the Model Charter on collective farms.” This dealt in particular with the

"squandering" of labor days on kolkhozy as a result of the large number of people who were occupied with nonproductive work.⁵⁶ Although many of them were engaged in only part-time work, the rates of remuneration they received were set at full-time standards. Consequently the earnings of these administrators cut into those of "productive" kolkhoz members. Evidently little was done about this, since a similar decree followed in September 1948. By early 1950, the problem remained, so the merger was initiated partly to reduce the number of administrative personnel. At the same time it became possible to select proficient managers and agricultural specialists as the number of kolkhozy was reduced.

A second reason for the merger of kolkhozy put forward by Khrushchev was that it would enable increased mechanization and the use of progressive agricultural techniques. Here the connection between the mergers and the link/brigade dispute was clear. It was felt that when the collective farms possessed fields of over 150 hectares, machinery could be used more efficiently. MTS tractors, for example, could be used more economically on larger areas which required less fuel than on smaller farms when the tractors were obliged to make frequent turns. As the collective farms were amalgamated, the number of kolkhozy served by a single MTS fell. For example, in the USSR, in 1948 each MTS served an average of thirty-two kolkhozy; by the end of 1952, however, this figure had decreased to eleven.⁵⁷ Third, Khrushchev and his associates held that larger farms were more productive than their predecessors and could provide higher incomes for the collective farmers and bigger grain surpluses for the state.⁵⁸ The word *peredovyi* (progressive) became virtually synonymous with "large."⁵⁹

Khrushchev made little allowance for the preferences of the collective farmers themselves. Also, his comments omitted what some western scholars have seen as the main reason for the merger campaign, namely a greater degree of political control over the collective farms. The amalgamation of kolkhozy allowed the Soviet authorities to increase both the percentage of collective farms with party organizations and the percentage of party members among collective farm chairmen. Previously, ineffective chairmen had been replaced all too frequently, and Western Ukraine was no exception to this general phenomenon, but in theory, after amalgamation reliable cadres could be selected, and at the same time "unreliable elements" could be weeded out of the system.

The numerical improvement in party representation is evident from the example of the Ukrainian republic. Whereas at the beginning of 1950 there were primary party organizations in 52 per cent of the kolkhozy, by the end of 1950, this total had risen to 80 per cent. Moreover, the number of communists in the party organizations of collective farms showed a similar increase. Before the merger, 46 per cent of kolkhoz party organizations in Ukraine were small, averaging about five communists. After amalgamation, however, 1,000 larger party organizations were created, with up to twenty-five communists each, and about 2,000 party groups had been created in kolkhoz production brigades in 1950-51.⁶⁰

Once the amalgamation campaign had begun, Khrushchev tried to take matters one step further with a scheme to establish agrarian cities, or *agrorod*y.

The Agrorod

One of the problems created by the merger campaign was that whereas the pre-amalgamation kolkhoz was usually based in a single village, the amalgamated farm encompassed two or three villages, often several miles apart. The peasants were often obliged to travel considerable distances to work in the fields. Khrushchev's "solution" was to select one village as the basis for settlement and eliminate the others. In the remaining village, the peasants' residences were to be located close together in order to save costs on water and electricity. This proposal also had another function, namely the removal of the peasants' private plots to locations outside the *agrorod*. These plots were also to be reduced in size and devoted to the cultivation of fruit and vegetables rather than the more important (to both the peasants and the authorities) grain or fodder crops.⁶¹ In short, Khrushchev had decided to reduce the role of the private plot in collective agriculture, most likely because the authorities believed that the kolkhoz peasants spent an excessive amount of time tending to these plots.

Although Khrushchev's proposals first appeared in *Pravda* only on March 4, 1951, they date at least to 1949 when he constructed a specimen *agrorod* in Kherson Oblast in Ukraine, and presented it to Stalin as a seventieth birthday present.⁶² This was clearly a ploy to convince Stalin of the viability of the agrarian city, and it almost worked. Khrushchev elaborated on his ideas at a conference in Moscow Oblast in January 1951, and his proposals were then pub-

lished in *Pravda* two months later. The delay in publication suggests that the concept was discussed in some detail, but evidently Khrushchev was misled into thinking that it had been approved. On March 5, however, *Pravda* noted that in its previous edition, it had failed to state that Khrushchev's proposals were intended for discussion only.

Opposition to these proposals soon came from two quarters. First, the scheme was attacked with particular vehemence in the Transcaucasian region. (Traditionally this area had been a stronghold of the USSR secret police and rival of Khrushchev, L. P. Beria.⁶³ So it is possible that Beria was behind these attacks on Khrushchev.) More open opposition came from the new minister of agriculture, I. A. Benediktov, who apparently supported the amalgamation campaign but had misgivings about the *agrogorody*.⁶⁴ Within days of the two *Pravda* articles, the *agrogorody* had been completely discredited. Their final demise was pronounced by Malenkov at the Nineteenth CPSU Congress in October 1952.

Officially, the *agrogorody* scheme collapsed because the agrarian towns would have had a disruptive effect on production. Perhaps more important, however, was the social upheaval this system would have caused. The peasants would have strongly resented the attempts to separate them from their private plots—they would have been obliged to spend weeks at a time outside their villages, away from their families, in order to tend these plots—and it is doubtful whether the collective farm system could have survived without the products of private agriculture. Khrushchev must surely have believed that he had Stalin's backing over the *agrogorody*, and in some ways these proposed cities seem to have been almost a logical progression after the merger of collective farms. In other respects, however, this was not the case. Amalgamation did not constitute a radical departure from the existing *kolkhoz* system, but instead tried to impose tighter party control over that system. In contrast, the *agrogorody* would have caused a wholesale disruption of rural society and cut off the *kolkhoz* farmer from his main source of sustenance, the private plot.

Despite the attacks on his policy, Khrushchev did not fall into disfavor. Perhaps this was because he was so closely identified with the policy of amalgamation. Had he been vilified or denounced, the merger campaign would have had to be abandoned. Another possibility is that Stalin was unsure which direction to take. He may

have supported Khrushchev's proposals initially and then have been persuaded that they were misguided.

The Effects of the Merger Campaign in Western Ukraine

The amalgamation campaign was officially inaugurated with a decree of May 30, 1950. The mergers took place rapidly. By the end of the year in the USSR, the number of collective farms had fallen from about 252,000 to 123,000.⁶⁵ In the Ukrainian republic, the number of kolkhozy was reduced from 33,653 to 16,186 by the end of 1950.⁶⁶ Although it had been stipulated that amalgamation was to be concentrated in the nonblack-soil regions where the kolkhozy were smaller, evidently Ukraine became the main focus of the entire campaign.⁶⁷ Possibly this was because the existing collective farms there were considered weak. Even weaker, however, were the newly-founded kolkhozy in Western Ukraine, and in July 1950, the amalgamation campaign was extended there.⁶⁸

The confusion caused by the implementation of collective farm mergers in Western Ukraine must have been immense. Small kolkhozy, which had been using the link system for crop cultivation were transformed into large units using brigades. Moreover, the new system was introduced in many cases only months after the reported completion of the collectivization campaign. Given that one of the rationales behind amalgamation was to strengthen weak farms and to raise party representation on them, the authorities concentrated first on those oblasts that had just completed collectivization, namely, Lviv, Stanyslaviv, and Rivne. There the percentages of kolkhozy with under 500 hectares of arable land in the spring of 1950 were 80.5, 71.2 and 70.7 respectively.⁶⁹ Another reason these oblasts were immediately included in the merger campaign was to increase the average arable area of their kolkhozy.

In the western oblasts as a whole, the number of kolkhozy decreased from 7,191 in July 1950, to 4,540 in July 1951.⁷⁰ As a result, the average area of arable land within the possession of an individual kolkhoz increased from 597 to 973 hectares.⁷¹ In Lviv Oblast, before the mergers, the average kolkhoz possessed about 165 households and 780 hectares of arable land, but after the amalgamation the average size was 372 households and 1,783 hectares of land.⁷² In addition to the enlargement in size, the percentage of kolkhoz chairmen in western oblasts who were party members increased from 16.4 to 54.2.⁷³ Not only was the position of kolkhoz

chairman much strengthened, but displaced chairmen were often used to replace less efficient kolkhoz personnel on animal-husbandry farms and brigadiers of tractor brigades. Also, the number of well-educated chairmen rose considerably as a result of the merger. Of the 293 kolkhoz chairmen in Transcarpathia Oblast after the merger, fifty-one had a higher or secondary education, 102 had an incomplete secondary education and only 140 had just a primary education.⁷⁴

It is uncertain, however, whether the mergers actually occurred as quickly as is claimed in Soviet works. On November 30, 1950, *Radyanska Ukraina* focused on a plenum of Lviv Oblast committee, which reported that the oblast and raion committees were paying little attention to the amalgamation of kolkhozy. There also were a great many instances in which the amalgamation was "legal" rather than "actual" (that is, the figures remained largely on paper),⁷⁵ so one can assume that the situation in Lviv Oblast was not unique. Another example, from Chernivtsi Oblast, reveals difficulties involved in the mergers. Not only were the kolkhozy exceptionally small before amalgamation (each averaged fewer than 200 households and about 300–400 hectares of arable land), but in the mountain regions, the old *khutir* system of farmsteading still prevailed. The oblast authorities thus had the dual tasks of persuading the mountain residents to move to lowland areas so that they could be collectivized,⁷⁶ and also of merging the numerous small kolkhozy.

By the end of 1950 in Chernivtsi Oblast, 325 small kolkhozy had been merged into 134 larger collective farms, and 65 per cent of kolkhoz chairmen were party members. More than 75 per cent of kolkhozy had created primary party organizations, but in contrast to the sweeping statements made in Soviet reports about the technical expertise of the new breed of kolkhoz officials, in Chernivtsi at least, the majority of those selected from the local Bukovynian population were in need of further training.⁷⁷ A western scholar points out that this was a feature of the entire Western Ukrainian campaign. He states that the party generally mistrusted "agricultural specialists," so that although it wanted kolkhoz chairmen to be party members, many of those appointed lacked the training necessary to run their farms.⁷⁸

Was the merger of kolkhozy a benefit to the kolkhozy of Western Ukraine? The question is not easy to answer since the merger continued into the 1960s, as the number of kolkhozy constantly de-

creased. Further, as noted, Khrushchev was obliged to back down from his scheme to create agricultural cities. Thus one of the original aims of the merger had been abandoned at the outset. But in the case of Western Ukraine, the campaign caused considerable confusion. Many of the amalgamated kolkhozy, having been newly created, had only begun to attend to matters such as the creation of animal farms, consolidating fields and crop rotation and (especially) the link method of field work, and in these basic tasks they were dependent upon inexperienced cadres to a large extent.

Despite these difficulties, some improvements were allegedly brought about as the result of the mergers. First, the large number of economically unviable kolkhozy was reduced. Second, the increase in the area of arable land on the kolkhozy meant that MTS work on kolkhoz land could be undertaken more effectively once more tractors were available. Third, the party had gained a footing in most villages, and had a meaningful representation in most kolkhozy. Nevertheless, in the light of the neglect of state farms in this area, it may be that the amalgamated kolkhozy were little more than "sovkhozy without a wage bill."⁷⁹ From the viewpoint of the authorities, the situation in the Western Ukrainian village had improved, but there is little to suggest that the kolkhoz peasants derived any immediate benefits from the merger. As the role of the party and the MTS on the kolkhozy increased, that of the collective farmer declined accordingly. The amalgamation campaign, in the final analysis, was introduced into Western Ukraine because it had been centrally decreed for the whole USSR.

PLANNING AND RESULTS, 1950

As the last year of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, the year 1950 has often been taken as a base date from which to measure results in Soviet agriculture. In some ways, this is misleading because the plan itself, in all its aspects, was a failure, and in agriculture it was superseded by a three-year plan to raise livestock, which was to be completed in 1951. In addition, the plan—which has never been published in its entirety—evidently did not take into account the merger of kolkhozy in 1950.⁸⁰ In the case of Ukraine, the magnitude of the collectivization campaign in western oblasts would also have had a major impact on the overall results. Nonetheless, in theory, the Soviet authorities adhered to the old plan until 1950.

The Fourth Five-Year Plan was a failure in Ukrainian agriculture first, because the drought of 1946 immediately rendered the plan obsolete. Evidently the February 1947 CC CPSU plenum was called largely to redefine the plan goals in light of the drought and the disastrous harvest of 1946 that resulted. The drought had the additional effect of focusing attention on the reduction of livestock. On collective farms, for example, the number of all "horned livestock" on July 1, 1947, was 88.9 percent of the previous year's total; for calves, 77.6 percent; and for pigs, 43.6 percent.⁸¹ This was considered such a serious problem that the 1947 decree stated that not only socialized but even privately-owned livestock were to be increased substantially. Second, there is little doubt that like many of the Stalinist plans, the Fourth Plan was overambitious. Thus, it decreed that gross agricultural production had to be increased by 27 per cent in 1950 as compared to 1940, whereas even Soviet sources agree that the actual totals did not approach the 1940 levels.⁸²

There were also other basic reasons for the failure of the plan in agriculture. The authorities placed emphasis on industrial recovery, and the material resources of the state were allocated primarily to the industrial branch of the economy. The kolkhozy and state farms were lacking such basic prerequisites as technical machinery and mineral goods throughout the years of the plan. This was particularly the case in the newly-annexed territories of the western borderlands, which had little technical equipment to begin with and were largely dependent upon state help to achieve any progress on the kolkhozy. Another factor which affected the plan and also life on the kolkhozy was the price paid by the state to the kolkhozy for the procurement of agricultural products. Although these prices had not risen since 1927-28, wholesale prices for consumer and industrial goods had been increased many times.⁸³ Thus the procurement prices, which did not even cover the production costs of the kolkhozy, led to a deterioration in the living standards of the collective farmers, and gave little incentive to collective farmers to pay increased attention to socialized agriculture as opposed to their personal plots.

Soviet agricultural policy in the early postwar years had a direct effect on Western Ukraine, as the centralization of the various facets of agriculture influenced all regions alike. Since Western Ukraine was still in the throes of collectivization in 1949-50, changes in agricultural practice tended to follow the general Soviet

model with a delay of one or two years. In the postwar period, especially after the implementation of the three-year plan for socialized livestock raising, the traditional emphasis on grain growing in Ukraine was tempered with an increasing attention to the cultivation of feed crops for animals, such as annual and perennial grasses and fodder beets. Also, the area of land devoted to technical crops increased. In the republic as a whole, the area devoted to feed crops increased from 4,428,000 hectares in 1940 to 5,238,000 hectares in 1950, or from 14.2 to 17.1 per cent of the total cultivated area.⁸⁴ The area of the republic devoted to technical industrial crops also rose from 8.6 per cent of the total cultivated area in 1940 to 9.4 per cent in 1950.⁸⁵

In Western Ukraine, feed crops had been grown extensively in the 1920s.⁸⁶ Under Soviet rule, however, the area cultivated with feed crops declined substantially between 1940 and 1950. In the former Polish regions, in percentages of total cultivated land, the area of feed crops declined from 13.2 to 8.5 over the course of that decade. In Ternopil, for example, the authorities placed more emphasis on the cultivation of technical crops, such as sugar beets and tobacco. From 1940 to 1950 in this oblast, the total sown area under sugar beets doubled. After 1950, however, Western Ukraine also turned toward more extensive cultivation of feed crops, and by 1955, the percentage of cultivated area devoted to them had increased to 17.3 per cent (for all western oblasts).⁸⁷

Indicative of the changes in cultivation of agricultural crops is Transcarpathia Oblast. Although grain crops remained the principal branch of agriculture, more and more area was cultivated with feed crops. On the kolkhozy, this situation was accentuated, and in the 1950s, almost 30 per cent of the total area was devoted to feed crops. With living standards on the kolkhozy already at a low level, some western scholars have criticized this policy for neglecting the basic consumption needs of the collective farmers. Borys Lewytzkyj, for example, points out that by 1953, in Ukraine as a whole, the area under grain crops was less than in 1913.⁸⁸ In Western Ukraine, the situation was slightly better, but the sown area of grain crops in 1950 still fell short of the 1940 total by over 44,000 hectares. The most serious decline was in Rivne Oblast, where the total sown area of grain crops in 1950 was reported to be only about 67 per cent of the 1940 level.⁸⁹

The gross harvest of crops in the Ukrainian SSR trebled between

1946 and 1950. Yet the total of 20,467 kilograms gathered in 1950 comprised only 77.4 per cent of the 1940 collection of 26,453 kilograms.⁹⁰ Generally, the harvest results in the Western Ukrainian oblasts were superior to those in Eastern Ukraine. For example, whereas the harvest of grain crops for all types of farms in Ukraine was said to be 10.2 centners per hectare, the returns in the western regions were: Volyn, 10.3; Transcarpathia, 14.6; Lviv, 11.6; Rivne, 10.5; Stanyslaviv, 12.7; Ternopil, 11.1 and Chernivtsi, 11.1. This numerical superiority in Western Ukraine was evident for almost every category of crops.⁹¹

Nevertheless, the yields were still below those of 1940. The relative success of the Western Ukrainian oblasts meant very little. In Eastern Ukraine, the harvests had increased only gradually after the disasters of the 1946 year, and moreover, as Western Ukraine was being collectivized, the eastern oblasts were largely neglected as manpower and resources were shifted constantly to the new and unstable kolkhozy in the western regions. Further, one also has to take into account the migration of peasants from Eastern to Western Ukraine in the early postwar years, and the physical losses as a result of the famine. Between January 1, 1947 and January 1, 1948, for example, the rural population of Eastern Ukraine declined by 23,000.⁹² Despite harvest results, Soviet sources maintain that the output of collective work per collective farmer in Western Ukraine in 1950 was still less than half of his Eastern Ukrainian counterpart.⁹³ This may have been a result of the more highly mechanized agricultural tools in the eastern oblasts, but it also probably indicates the apathy of Western Ukrainian peasants towards collective farm work.

In addition to these factors, the Fourth Five-Year Plan, with its emphasis on industry, affected Eastern Ukraine more. As a result, in the eastern region, many rural workers were moved into cities. Rural labor, although reduced as a result of war losses and dislocations of population, was still more readily available in the western areas, which were only just being industrialized. In Western Ukraine in 1959, over 63 per cent of the population were still country dwellers, but in Eastern Ukraine, whereas 63 per cent of the population lived in rural areas in 1939, by 1959 (the date of the next census), this total had been reduced to 50 per cent.⁹⁴ In general, it seems fair to say that the 1950 year in Western Ukrainian agriculture had seen some improvement over the earlier postwar years, but

that here, as in other regions of the USSR and Poland, the overall results fell well below those attained in 1940.

Although the Fourth Five-Year Plan and the harvest returns of 1950 fell well below the levels anticipated, the three-year plan for the development of livestock in Western Ukraine was evidently fulfilled ahead of time in all the oblasts. In Volyn Oblast, for example, the plan for the development of cattle and oxen was fulfilled by 125.9 per cent, for pigs by 100 per cent and for sheep by 114.9 per cent. The number of working and productive livestock had increased from 105,700 at the start of 1949 to 324,000 early in 1951.⁹⁵ These results are again not as significant as they might appear as a result of the negligible basis of livestock-holding in Western Ukraine in the early postwar years. Taking into account all categories of farms, at the end of 1940 there were about 2.9 million cattle and oxen, but in 1950, the figure was 1.9 million. For pigs, correspondingly, the decline was from 1.6 to 1.2 million.⁹⁶ Livestock-raising in Western Ukraine, and especially on the *kolkhozy*, had yet to recover from losses during the war and the collectivization campaign. The three-year plan succeeded because it was relatively cautious whereas the Fourth Five-Year Plan had been brash. It did not mean that the livestock dearth in Western Ukrainian socialized agriculture had been resolved.

INCOME PAYMENTS AND LABOR-DAY FULFILLMENT, 1950

Kolkhoz income is difficult to assess since Soviet authorities have been very reluctant to provide information about the value of labor-day *trudoden* in the postwar period. More information is provided about cash payments than about "payments in kind" of grain, but it was the latter upon which the kolkhoz peasants depended for their livelihood. As a result of the Soviet currency reform of 1947, which destroyed most peasants' savings, thereby cutting the demand for consumer goods, cash payments meant little to the peasants because there was nothing to buy with their money. Karl-Eugen Waedekin has noted that there were two notions behind the system of remuneration for collective farm work: first, to base remuneration on the results of collective production; and second, to base the individual share in such payment on the labor input of that person. He has concluded that the idea failed from the outset as a result of the "psychological effects of coercive collec-

tivisation, the lack of adequate inputs and of competent management for large-scale production and the exaggerated demands for product deliveries at prices extremely low in real terms, which left only token cash rewards for work."⁹⁷ The system in Western Ukraine appears to have been imposed with particular ruthlessness.

Some Soviet scholars have strongly criticized the inadequate levels of kolkhoz production and income in Western Ukraine during the early postwar years. High levels of production and correspondingly high wages for collective farmers were achieved by only a "very few" kolkhozy. In the majority of cases, successes were rare, the harvest of agricultural crops remained low, incomes were minimal and most kolkhozy practiced egalitarianism in pay. The situation was blamed on the kolkhozy's weak "organizational-economic relations" and the fact that most of them lacked leadership cadres.⁹⁸ Accusations of levelling payment were also reporting in Volyn, where *trudoden* fulfillment was said to be exaggerated. In many cases, the kolkhozy evidently allocated the *trudodens* on the basis of an actual day's work rather than according to the scale which awarded labor days according to the level of skill required and the fulfillment of work quotas. Also in this oblast, in 1949 (a time when collectivization had reportedly been completed), 61 per cent of able-bodied collective farmers apparently had not worked the minimum number of *trudodens*, while 8 per cent "did not work at all."⁹⁹ Given such reports from the Soviet side, there can be little doubt that kolkhoz incomes at that time were extremely low.

The number of labor days attained in the first years of collectivization was well below average. In Volyn Oblast in 1948, for example, the average number per kolkhoz household was only about 100.¹⁰⁰ The situation in this oblast appears to have been improved by 1950 when the total had tripled, but whereas the average number of labor days per able-bodied collective farmer in the republic was 307 in 1950, most Western Ukrainian oblasts achieved only about half this total, and it appears that even these totals were inflated by Soviet statistics.¹⁰¹ In Stanyslaviv, the average number of labor days earned per able-bodied collective farmer was 136, well below the minimum norm of 150.¹⁰² One reason for this was undoubtedly the widespread opposition to collective farm work in this oblast. A second reason, however, was that the majority of kolkhozy in the oblast had been created only in 1950, and thus many would have paid out little or no grain per *trudoden*.

Payments in kind were reported as quite high between 1945 and 1947 before mass collectivization got under way. A feature of grain payments in the postwar period was that as the number of collectivized households increased, the grain payments paid out to the collective farmers steadily diminished. In Transcarpathia Oblast, which is a good example because collectivization was carried out quite smoothly there, in 1949, each collective farmer received on average 6–14 kilograms of grain and 3.2 rubles in cash per *trudoden*.¹⁰³ By 1950, however, the payment had decreased to 3.4 kilograms of grain and 2.5–3 rubles in cash.¹⁰⁴ The logical explanation for this development is that a large number of kolkhozy were being established in 1950, and consequently made few or no payments at all in that year, thereby lowering the general average. The decline may have resulted also from a lack of interest in kolkhoz work on the part of the collective farmers. One should also ascribe some importance to the Soviets' insistence that many of the kolkhozy were weak and not yet functioning properly.

The payments handed out in Transcarpathia Oblast were among the highest in Western Ukraine. According to *Radyanska Ukraina* (March 7, 1950), "many kolkhozy" in the western oblasts handed out to the collective farmers per labor day about 3.5 kilograms of grain and 2.5 rubles cash, in addition to fruit and vegetables. The use of the term "many" rather than the "majority" suggests that such payments were the exception rather than the rule, and those figures for individual oblasts that have been made available corroborate this supposition. In Lviv Oblast, for example, the average grain payment was only 2.5 kilograms in the spring of 1950.¹⁰⁵

In terms of the average total cash payments per kolkhoz, the Western Ukrainian oblasts were among the poorest in the republic in 1954 (the only year for which figures have been provided). One can estimate that the average cash payment per *trudoden* in Western Ukraine in 1950 was something less than two rubles. In Ukraine as a whole, 85.5 per cent of kolkhozy were bringing in an average income of more than 300,000 rubles. In the western oblasts, the figure was less than 70 per cent, and this total was inflated by the high incomes attained in Chernivtsi Oblast. There, 72 per cent of kolkhozy received an income of over 500,000 rubles. In Stanyslaviv and Drohobych oblasts in particular, cash incomes on the kolkhozy were extremely low.¹⁰⁶ Money income per Western Ukrainian kolkhoz household in 1950 averaged 546 rubles per annum. Whereas

Chernivtsi and Transcarpathia oblasts almost doubled this total, households in Stanyslaviv received fewer than 350 rubles per annum. Thus there was a clear distinction between the various western oblasts. The outlying areas, which had experienced least difficulty in collectivizing and in which party membership was reported to be at its strongest, achieved the highest cash incomes per household and per kolkhoz in Western Ukraine. The lowest totals, were received in the former Polish oblasts. This may have been because in many cases, kolkhozy in these areas had been established only recently, but this was not always the case. In Volyn Oblast, which had been collectivized relatively quickly, money income was still very low.¹⁰⁷

Collective farmer incomes in Western Ukraine were among the lowest in Ukraine in 1950. Within Western Ukraine, kolkhozy in the outlying areas—and principally in those regions that had been annexed from Romania and Czechoslovakia—performed much better than those in the central regions that had been annexed from Poland. There were probably several reasons for this. Perhaps the key factor was the instability of the kolkhozy in the latter regions. Also, party forces were weaker in these regions, especially in the Galician oblasts of Lviv, Drohobych, Stanyslaviv and Ternopil. Once party representation in these oblasts increased after the merger campaign, the number of labor days achieved per household in Western Ukraine rose by 27 per cent over the 1950 total,¹⁰⁸ largely as a result of improved totals in the former Polish oblasts.

The average total income per collective farmer in Western Ukraine in 1950 was 450.6 kilograms of grain and 355.8 rubles in cash. In the republic as a whole, payments per *trudoden* were on a similar level. Again Soviet reports are vague. For example, one of the most reliable sources declares that only 21.2 per cent of the republic's kolkhozy gave out 2–5 kilograms of grain per *trudoden*, while 30.7 per cent handed out 2.3–4 rubles in cash.¹⁰⁹ However, the average labor payment per day in Western Ukraine in 1950 was 2.6 kilograms of grain and two rubles in cash. Labor-day payments in Eastern Ukraine were much higher, with an average in 1950 of four kilograms of grain and seven rubles in cash. Moreover, in the east, the average number of *trudodens* earned was reportedly much higher than in the west. The average East Ukrainian collective farmer was earning annually more than three times the grain and more than seven times the cash of his counterpart in the west. In

Western Ukraine, the data suggest that payments for kolkhoz work would have kept the majority of peasants at or below subsistence level. Certainly the kolkhoz incomes were insufficient for the farmers to make a living. Only by concentrating heavily on their private plots could the collective farmers feed their families.

It is important to place these figures in perspective. If one looks at information about kolkhoz *trudoden* payments in the western borderlands of the USSR generally then, one finds a similar or even worse situation. In Moldavia, for example, the average payment per *trudoden* in 1950 was 1.1 kilograms of grain and 3.32 rubles cash. In Western Belorussia in 1948, the collective farmers were paid 1.9 kilograms of grain, 9.25 kilograms of potatoes and 2.8 rubles cash per *trudoden*.¹¹⁰ If one considers that incomes probably diminished as collectivization in the newly-annexed areas of Belorussia neared completion, then these totals would have been lower in 1950. Thus the Western Ukrainian collective farmers were slightly better off than their fellows in two other borderland republics. However, the statements presented earlier suggest that some of the figures represent little more than wishful thinking on the part of the Western Ukrainian authorities. In Transcarpathia, for example, most of the figures are derived from a report of oblast first secretary Turianytsya, who was making a speech at a session of the All-Union Supreme Soviet, at which he was evidently anxious to make a good impression. (Other sources do indicate that the results here were above average.) In fact, this was the case with most of the information given about *trudoden* payments in Western Ukraine. So Western Ukrainian totals in reality were probably well below the totals cited. The likelihood is that payments were close to the norm for western borderlands in the postwar years.

Much of the responsibility for the poor performances of Western Ukrainian kolkhozy in 1949–50 must fall on the Soviet authorities. Even a Soviet source has admitted, reflecting on the failure of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, that the “excessive centralization of the leadership . . . in these years was a great impediment to the development of agriculture,” since there had been excessive bureaucratization, and “banal explanations of how agricultural leaders should be operating.”¹¹¹ Added to this was the failure to provide any incentives to the new collective farmers. Once they had been persuaded or coerced into joining the kolkhozy then, to all intents and purposes, the state promptly became indifferent to their plight. As the collec-

tive farm system was so centralized, the kolkhozy could not rely on local initiative to help resolve their problems.

Thus the year 1950 in Western Ukraine has been hailed as a momentous one by Soviet scholars, since it saw the completion of collectivization, but the kolkhozy were performing badly. Although the same can be said for the various branches of Western Ukrainian agriculture at the time, in terms of harvest results at least, there are grounds for believing that the kolkhoz sector lagged behind all others. Thus the kolkhoz harvests in yields per hectare for almost all species of crops fell behind those for all categories of farms.¹¹² The kolkhoz peasants in Western Ukraine were achieving only very low totals of *trudodens*, and the payment per *trudoden* was also extremely low. Many of these difficulties can be attributed to the collectivization campaign. More general problems such as the large number of administrative staff using up *trudodens* in nonproductive work had often been cited as a factor in the low payments, but this was a common problem in the USSR at that time. Evidently it affected Eastern Ukraine just as much as the western oblasts, but in the latter area, the main problem was the failure of the authorities to induce the kolkhoz peasants to adapt to kolkhoz work. This lack of incentive, added to the general hostility toward the kolkhoz in Western Ukraine, meant that living standards in the countryside were extremely low in 1950.

9 Conclusion

POSTSCRIPT ON COLLECTIVIZATION

THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAD succeeded in collectivizing Western Ukraine over the course of seven postwar years. Once mass collectivization was introduced, it spread relatively quickly. It was achieved by the same sort of coercive means that had been used in the USSR in the interwar period. Villages were garrisoned, the MVD and MGB troops evidently took an active part in the process and the MTS political sections were reintroduced in 1949 to complete the campaign. The raion, party and Soviet organizations were considered too weak to carry out the task—small numerically, made up partially of “unreliable” Western Ukrainians (by 1950–51) and failing lamentably in their mission to “attract” the Western Ukrainian peasantry to collective farming.

The use of special forces to attain full collectivization, and the arrests and deportations that accompanied it illustrate the bankruptcy of ideas within the Soviet leadership. It was adhering closely not merely to the methods employed in the USSR as a whole, but to those used in Eastern Ukraine in particular. When the MTS political sections were introduced in December 1949, for example, according to Soviet reports their functions were identical to those of the Eastern Ukrainian MTS political sections established in 1933. Despite a sixteen-year time gap, no alterations were made to the original concept. There were no new ideas and no attempts to introduce features applicable to the peculiar conditions of Western

Ukraine. One of the first efforts to introduce collective farm methods in the western oblasts—the agricultural association—also originated in Eastern Ukraine. Essentially, then, the authorities seem to have concluded that the well-tried and predominantly coercive methods were the only sure means of achieving collectivization.

In addition to the continuation of prewar methods, some features of Stalinist agricultural policy in the postwar years were introduced in the Western Ukrainian oblasts as they were being collectivized. The “squandering” of kolkhoz land, for example, as noted in the CC CPSU decree of September 19, 1946 on violations of the Model Charter, was frequently mentioned in reports from the Western Ukrainian oblasts. One suspects that in many cases oblast secretaries were diligently uncovering cases of kolkhoz land theft to back up the decree, rather than finding genuine cases of land concealment, the private farming mentality of the peasants notwithstanding. Other all-Union measures that were simultaneously imposed in the western oblasts included the three-year plan to increase animal husbandry (1949–51), and the amalgamation of kolkhozy in 1950. In the first case, some attention to livestock raising was becoming an urgent necessity in Western Ukraine. Animal husbandry was in a deplorable state in the western oblasts in 1949, as a result of wholesale animal slaughter by the peasants during the mass collectivization campaign. Amalgamation was a questionable maneuver. It was initiated before collectivization had been completed, and certainly before the Western Ukrainian peasant had been accustomed and reconciled to working on a kolkhoz.

The early postwar years saw much political in-fighting in the Politburo. This had repercussions down to the lowest level of the Soviet bureaucracy. Between 1945 and March 1947, Khrushchev was evidently under some pressure to come up with results in the collectivization of Western Ukraine, especially in resurrecting prewar collective farms. Thus he began to exaggerate the totals of households collectivized and the number of collective farms established. This urgency was relayed to the oblast and raion committees which, in turn, tried to placate their superiors by inflating the numbers of kolkhozy actually founded. In this way, a sizable number of paper kolkhozy were created, and throughout the 1944–47 period, there are references to the alleged dissolution of kolkhozy for reasons such as violations of the Model Charter in their establishment and inability

to get beyond the inactive group stage; that is, these farms existed only on paper.

The authorities clearly perceived Western Ukraine within the sphere of a huge collectivization campaign in the Soviet western borderlands and in Eastern Europe that took place after 1948. Among the western borderlands, Western Ukraine was considered one of the priority areas for the completion of collectivization. For one thing, it made sense to collectivize the area quickly before the peasants gained too unfavorable an impression of the effects of collectivization in Eastern Ukraine as a result of the 1946 famine there, and from encounters of Eastern and Western Ukrainian peasants in 1949, when Eastern Ukrainians again crossed the border into Western Ukraine in large numbers. This also worked in reverse: Eastern Ukrainians might have become dissatisfied with their collective farms as long as individual farming prevailed in the western oblasts. To the authorities, however, the latter does not seem to have been so important, since Western Belorussia remained uncollectivized until 1953, in contrast to the collectivized Eastern Belorussia.

Of more significance to the authorities was the rapid collectivization of a major grain-growing area, and, moreover, full collectivization in Western Ukraine was likely considered of paramount importance to the success of the campaign in the East European satellite states, which began in the summer and autumn of 1948. In the Soviet western borderlands, the campaign took place from 1948–1953. Western Ukraine completed collectivization two years before Western Belorussia and the Baltic republics and just ahead of Right-Bank Moldavia, another important grain region.

In Western Ukraine, the Soviet authorities were also faced with a determined and armed nationalist opposition, the UPA. Not only was this a serious impediment to Soviet rule, it also hindered the collectivization process at every opportunity, since that process threatened to sever its supply of food and provisions from the Western Ukrainian villages. With UPA, the authorities also faced an enemy of uncertain dimensions. Although the number of guerrillas hiding in the forests was clearly declining after 1947, the regime had little idea of how widespread support for them was among the village population. Given Stalin's suspicious nature and his general distrust of Ukrainians, as a result of their alleged treachery during the German-Soviet war, the authorities probably exaggerated the

UPA threat. However, the purges carried out within the party organizations in the postwar years and the authorities' reluctance to entrust local Western Ukrainians with positions of responsibility in party and Soviet work meant that the Soviet organs in the Western Ukrainian countryside were seriously weakened throughout the postwar years. As a result, whereas guerrilla forces opposing the Soviet regime were evidently eliminated by the late 1940s in Estonia and Right-Bank Moldavia, in Western Ukraine, they persisted at least until 1950, and perhaps as late as 1956.

The collective farms were established before they possessed the necessary equipment and trained personnel to run them. Soviet sources stress that all the prewar MTS were restored rapidly after the war, that is, before collectivization was implemented. This was a radical departure from interwar agricultural policy. Their restoration appears to have been for political rather than economic reasons because they had very little machinery with which to aid the peasants, either in the agricultural associations formed in 1945–47, or during the period of mass collectivization. On the kolkhozy, there was a general shortage of accountants and very little accounting and registration work seems to have been done between 1946 and 1951. Work organization on the whole was in a deplorable state, as shown by the peasants' almost total failure to use draught animals for collective farm work (partly through their reluctance to use their former private stock for kolkhoz labor), reports about long delays in harvesting work, short working days in the fields during sowing and harvesting and the ineffectiveness of the theoretical leadership of the kolkhozy—the general meeting and the kolkhoz chairman. There were very few general meetings on the Western Ukrainian kolkhozy in 1945–51 and the chairman not only had very little real authority, he was also replaced with alarming frequency. According to UPA reports, he was often arrested, quite often for alleged collaboration with the Ukrainian nationalists or for less tangible reasons such as “anti-state activities.” One should not be surprised, then, that so many Soviet decrees of 1946–51 speak of the “instability” of the kolkhozy and the urgent need for their “organizational and economic strengthening.”

From the peasants' perspective, conditions had deteriorated from the prewar situation. In 1941, about 88 per cent of peasant households were still practising individual farming, and some had

benefited from the redistribution of land, which was confiscated primarily from Polish landowners. The latter, on the whole, had not been well liked in the Ukrainian community, so in some respects, Soviet rule in 1939 brought the prospect of an improvement in fortunes for many peasants. After the war, however, the Western Ukrainian peasant was in an unenviable position. The authorities linked him with the UPA forces, while the latter were capable of employing drastic measures against anyone who seemed sympathetic toward the Soviet regime.

The postwar land reform, less widespread than the prewar version, also saw the beginning of an attack on the "kulaks" that continued for about another four years. (The Soviet press continued to denounce "kulaks" at least until 1953.) Between 1945 and 1947, in particular, the authorities tried to foster a "class war" in the villages. Although in terms of landownership, the kulak stratum was miniscule, Soviet leaders attempted to link kulaks to the terrorist attacks of the Ukrainian nationalist bands. In reality, not only were there no discernible connections between the kulaks and the bands, but the kulaks, like their interwar counterparts in Eastern Ukraine and other regions, were disorganized and quite unprepared for the assault upon them. In brief, they were incapable of acting as a "class." Within a short time, the authorities seemed to have antagonized a broad section of the peasant community, which responded with passive resistance, as manifested in apathy toward collective farm work. The peasants could successfully continue this passive resistance as long as Soviet organs in the Western Ukrainian countryside remained weak. Kolkhoz farming suffered the consequences, and the kolkhoz seems to have been heartily disliked by all strata of peasant society.

This antagonism toward the kolkhozy continued throughout the early postwar years. Part of the problem, in addition to the coercive methods, was the peasant preference for private farming. Even Soviet reports are frank about the time needed by "the individual farmer of yesterday" to adjust to the kolkhoz system. One reason for the peasants' reluctance to adjust, however, was the authorities' failure to offer any tangible incentive for them to join the kolkhozy. The payments in kind and in cash were usually so low that the peasants could not have sustained themselves and their families on them. Only by devoting considerable time to their small private

plots could they hope to survive, and the evidence suggests that most peasants did this to the almost total neglect of kolkhoz work. Perhaps the individual farming mentality also made the peasants reluctant to collectivize the possessions they brought with them onto the collective farms. Once mass collectivization began, the peasants preferred to kill their livestock at once rather than have it confiscated and transferred for the kolkhoz's use.

By 1951, the Western Ukrainian peasants were encompassed within fairly large collective farms. Their harvests, in terms of yields per hectare, were quite high in comparison with the republican average, at least in 1950, but the yields had little effect on overall living standards. The state took "first bite" at the grain for a nominal price, and the peasants' frequent failure to achieve their allotted quota of labor days meant that the payment per *trudoden* was often extremely low. Although Soviet reports constantly refer to the "superior" results of collective over individual farms, it would be misleading to accept such reports at face value. They are not comparing like with like. Moreover, the "superiority" only occurred in the 1945–47 period when there were only a few collective farms and the state could thus devote resources, goods and considerable attention to them. As the number of kolkhozy increased, the peasants' living standards suffered a corresponding decline. Thus the *trudoden* payments to the Western Ukrainian collective farmers were higher in 1945 than they were in 1949.

During the time of full collectivization, once the peasants had paid off the MTS workers with grain, refilled their seed funds and delivered the required amount of grain and other goods to the state procurement office, they found themselves in an unenviable state. They had little left to sell on the open market, were close to poverty and had little control over how their lives were being run. At the same time, they were reliant for the most part upon a raion administration that was itself beleaguered with the demands of a bureaucratic state. The position of the Western Ukrainian peasants was not uncommon in the USSR at the time, but it is unlikely that they viewed their changing surroundings with much pleasure, or that they entertained hopes that the future would bring about an improvement of their situation. They had been effectively coerced, rather than satisfied. The Stalinist system—whether administered in Ukraine by Khrushchev, Kaganovich, or Melnikov—was at its most ruthless.

FINAL COMMENT

We have discussed a variety of topics pertaining to Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s. As each year passes, our knowledge of the period is increasing as Soviet historians debate current issues. Thus it is possible to use sources that go beyond the polemical, though as yet there are still many such works. At present, one's conclusions cannot be definitive. Nonetheless, several statements can be made about the overall picture of Ukraine in this period.

First, Ukraine was part of the long-term Stalinist economic program that tolerated no deviations from the norm established by the center. It signified that the collectivization process was closely modelled on a pattern established in the 1930s, whether or not these same policies were relevant to this newly incorporated region. Officials conducted policy with savagery and violence. Whether the Ukrainian leader was Khrushchev or Kaganovich was, ultimately, immaterial. Both were integral to the overall system that they served. This is not to subscribe to the view that Stalin personally was responsible for all the evil in Soviet society in these years. Indeed a brief word on such a supposition is merited since it continues to permeate Western and Soviet scholarly writing.

Stalinism, it seems, was less the personal authority of a single man than a system that was put into place in the 1930s and 1940s, with Stalin at the helm. In fact, it would not have been possible for any one individual to conduct all the actions associated with his name. Most biographers of Stalin testify to his innate suspicion of colleagues, his deviousness and cunning. At the same time, many associates were closely linked to the system developed under the name of Leninism-Stalinism, so much so that at the regional level (in the case of Ukraine, for example), zealotry to implement repressive policies may even have exceeded Stalin's desires. In short, an elite was in place that not only implemented Moscow's policies, but was also closely and permanently identified with the Stalin regime.

The second point to be made is that the Ukrainian response to Stalinism—especially in the western provinces—was equally extremist and ruthless. One could argue that had the case been otherwise, then the possibility of opposing Soviet rule would not have existed. Nonetheless, the “freedom fighters” against the Stalin regime carried out many vicious acts of retribution against any compatriots thought to be harboring sympathy for the Soviet regime,

and in some cases, merely for wavering. It would be misleading to view the situation as one of a potentially democratic movement seeking independence and fighting a rearguard action against the Red Army while facing insuperable odds. Certainly those odds were heavily weighted against them. But the tradition of integral nationalism of the 1930s persisted, even though it was broadened in scope as a result of the war years. Today, in the somewhat artificial conditions of Galician Ukraine, past history is rarely looked at in rational terms. Unfortunately, there are very few available sources to achieve any sort of objective approach. It is one of the tragedies of the 1940s that so many unreliable works have been written about them by both sides, whereas uncommitted observers have not had access to primary source materials of a trustworthy nature.

So how should one perceive the UPA struggle against the Soviet regime, if not as a liberation struggle? It should be regarded, first of all, as a continuation of the war years; a time of total war in which neither side would give any quarter to the opposition. There was no end or final goal in sight, unless one believes there was any realistic chance that the West and the Soviet Union would eventually declare open war on each other. As for the liberation of the homeland, the resistance was limited to pockets in the western regions. Even had most or all of Ukraine been up in arms in the early postwar years, there is no certainty that the OUN-UPA perspectives would have been acceptable to the majority of the population. Evidence would suggest the contrary. Yet, no other political group in Ukraine had the organization or will to resist the Soviet regime. Here were insurgents of selflessness, great personal courage and total commitment.

One might also ask why these insurgents were prepared to fight under such conditions, heavily outnumbered and doomed to eventual defeat? Was it a political philosophy, anti-Sovietism, Ukrainian nationalism or some other factor that played the major role? The situation seems to have changed in 1947 from one of mass insurgency to one of underground actions. The most fanatical of the brethren carried on the struggle even when Polish, Czech and Soviet police forces were attempting to destroy all their members. But for many of these persons, their entire lives had been devoted to some sort of struggle under difficult circumstances. The original enemy was the Pole, often a military colonist or official, and especially a Polish regime that declined to give its Ukrainian lands a promised

autonomy. Then Soviet rule and the war had shown the horrors of Soviet totalitarianism. It is hard for the historian to glean accurate perspective when both sides commit atrocities, but one can say that in the case of Ukrainian insurgency, patriotism and religion (the Ukrainian Catholic Church, dissolved by Stalin in 1946) played key roles in the unity of the insurgents.

The present decade has seen a revival of nationalism throughout the world, but particularly in Europe. In 1991 civil war broke out in Yugoslavia, once heralded as one of the most successful socialist states that combined several distinct nationality groups. Within the Soviet Union, nationalism has played such a key role that not only all the major republics, but even tiny autonomous regions—sometimes comprising only a few hundred people—declared their sovereignty in 1990–91. The case of Ukraine in the 1940s combines nationalism and a historical tradition of statelessness, apart from brief historical periods. Nationalist aspirations there were genuine. Where else in Europe or Asia does one find a people comprising almost forty million without its own state? The aftermath of the 1917 Russian Revolution represented the best hope for Ukrainians to fulfill nationalist ambitions, but then—from the Ukrainian perspective—resulted in a bitter betrayal under both Lenin and Stalin. The 1930s saw Ukrainians suffer as never before in their history under the conditions of the famine, and the purges of 1936–38.

Similarly, outside the USSR, many Ukrainians in Poland concluded that democracy had failed them. The conciliatory tactics of Ukrainian democrats in the Polish Sejm had not achieved the desired results. England and France were seen as powers that had lost their greatness and were interested only in appeasing an aggressive Germany under Hitler. Further, the main hopes for political change were placed in the Axis powers. Central Europe in the late 1930s provides a number of examples of the progress of integral nationalist thought. It was thus to be expected that the stateless Ukrainians would have subscribers to the same thinking. The extremism to be found in the period under study owes much not simply to such political thought, but also to the specific historical situation of Ukrainians. All the paths to statehood to date had failed. No major democratic power was going to help Ukraine (Poland was another matter) achieve independence. And Ukraine was trapped between the two great forces of the period. A choice had to be made between

supporting one or the other. When German rule turned out to be equally oppressive, the fight still continued, this time against both powers, and with no real hope of success.

NOTES

I THE FOUNDATIONS OF STALINISM IN UKRAINE

1. The official policy of the regime seems to have been defined by the former prime minister. See N.I. Ryzhkov, *Leninizm—osnova teorii i politiki perestroiki: Doklad na torzhestvennom sobranii v Moskve, posvyashchenom 117-i godovshchynе so dnya rozhdeniya V.I. Lenina, 22 aprelya 1987 goda*. Moscow, 1987.

2. Stephen B. Cohen, "Bolshevism and Stalinism," in Robert C. Tucker, ed., *Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977).

3. The bewildering speed with which Lenin's statues have been dismantled can be put into perspective by two studies of their location throughout Ukraine. See L.P. Markitan, "Pamyatnyky V.I. Leninu na Ukraini," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 5 (April 1985): 132–37; and L.P. Markitan, "Z istorii monumentalnoi Leniniany na Ukraini," *ibid.*, no. 4 (April 1987): 128–34. A good journalistic perspective is Edward Greenspon, "Fate of Lenin statues a political barometer," *The Globe and Mail*, January 21, 1991.

4. See, for example, the bitterly cynical but eloquent "friendly letter" to Lenin from Arkadii Averchenko in *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, October 24, 1990.

5. For a recent Soviet view on this question, see L.P. Nahorna, "Borotba V.I. Lenina proty shovinistychnoi polityky kadetiv v ukrainskomu pytanni," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 4 (April 1987): 58–69.

6. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, in *Komsomolskaya pravda*, September 18, 1990. But see also his somewhat more moderate comments in *Literaturna Ukraina*, September 20, 1990.

7. On the various interpretations of this treaty, see John Basarab,

Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1982).

8. There are several useful modern analyses of Lenin in Ukrainian historiography. See especially the following: O.A. Pyrih, "Lenin pro rol torhivli u sotsialistychnomu budivnytstvi," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 2 (February 1985): 39–50; Ya. S. Kalakura, "Leninska kontseptsiya partiinoho zizdu v dii," *ibid.*, no. 11 (November 1985): 5–15; L.M. Hlazon, "Rozrobka V.I. Leninym teorii sotsialistychnoho federalizmu," *ibid.*, no. 4 (April 1986): 34–43; and S.V. Kulchytsky, "Leninska nova ekonomichna polityka ta ii zdiisnennya v URSR," *ibid.*, no. 8 (August 1989): 88–93. A detailed biography of Lenin's life is to be found in N.K. Krupska, *Pro Lenina: zbirnyk statei i vystupiv* (Kiev, 1989), pp. 9–120.

9. Richard Pipes, who does prefer the term "coup d'etat," has provided a fascinating revisionist account of the events of the revolution, demonstrating that many of the legendary events of the revolution have been exaggerated by Soviet historians. He lays particular emphasis on Lenin's alleged cowardice and various disguises to avoid detection, even during the revolution itself. Richard Pipes, *The Russian Revolution* (New York, 1990), pp. 482–501.

10. *Robitnycha hazeta*, April 17, 1990.

11. Both appeared in *ibid.*, April 20, 1990. For a comparative study, see V. Desyterik, "Osvobozhdenie ot dogm," in *Ekonomika i zhizn*, no. 17, (April 1990), p. 5. See also P. Volobuyev, "Lenin i nasha istoricheskaya sudba," *Izvestiya*, April 20, 1990.

12. See Graham Ross, ed., *The Foreign Office and the Kremlin: British Documents on Anglo-Soviet Relations 1941–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

13. *Molod Ukrainy*, April 18, 1990. It should be stressed that this line of argument is not new. One of the first examples of a Soviet attempt to blame Lenin for some of the evils of Stalinism was that of Vasilii Selyunin in *Novyi mir*, no. 5 (May 1988). See also Vera Tolz, "Soviet Journalist Passes Verdict on Russian and Soviet History," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 244/88, June 13, 1988; and Gabriel Superfin, "Censorship of Lenin in the USSR," in *ibid.*, RL 328/88, July 20, 1988. Aleksandr Tsipko of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System went somewhat further by arguing that the roots of Stalinism lay in Marxist theory. In addition, he declared that Lenin and the Bolsheviks were anxious to maintain power at all costs. See *Nauka i zhizn*, no. 11 and 12 (1988) and no. 1 and 2 (1989).

14. *Pravda*, January 3, 1991.

15. See, for example, Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "Soviet Ukraine in Historical Perspective," in Ivan L. Rudnytsky, *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1987).

16. Robert H. McNeal maintained that Stalin could not have known much about the majority of purge victims, and that "Stalin kept his distance from the physical reality of the terror." Robert H. McNeal, *Stalin: Man and Ruler* (New York, 1988), p. 202.

17. Robert W. Thurston, "Fear and Belief in the USSR's "Great Terror": Response to Arrest, 1935-1939," *Slavic Review* 45, no. 2 (Summer 1986): 213-234; and Mark B. Tauger, "The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933," *Slavic Review* 50, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 70-89.

18. V.M. Danylenko, H.V. Kasyanov, S.V. Kulchytsky, *Stalinizm na Ukraini: 20-30-ti roky* (Kiev, 1991), p. 131.

19. Robert Conquest, *Harvest of Sorrow* (New York, 1986); Commission on the Ukraine Famine, *Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine 1932-1933* [Ed. James E. Mace] (Washington, D.C., 1988).

20. See, for example, N.L. Rogalina, *Kollektivizatsiya: uroky proidennogo put* (Moscow, 1989), pp. 161-62.

21. The explanation of a noted Soviet historian is that Kaganovich's behavior can be explained by his total loyalty to Stalin at all times. He notes, for example, that Kaganovich led collectivization campaigns for Stalin not only in Ukraine, but also in Voronezh Oblast and western Siberia. R.A. Medvedev, *Oni okružhali Stalina* (Moscow, 1990), p. 100.

22. For example, James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918-1933* (Cambridge, Mass., 1983).

23. Walter Laqueur, for example, writes that: "... the punishment thesis has not been proved. There seems to have been no plan to destroy Ukrainian agriculture and to cause the death of millions of people. One tends to underrate the extent of the foolishness and incompetence of the leadership and, perhaps even more importantly, the fanaticism and lack of moral scruples of the dictator and his emissaries who believed that all difficulties could be overcome if only sufficient toughness was shown and pressure applied. The year 1933, after all, also witnessed widespread famine in Central Asia and the Kuban region. If so, can it be shown that there was a specific anti-Ukrainian motive in Stalin's policy?" Walter Laqueur, *Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations* (New York, 1990), p. 282. Another historian has maintained that the famine demonstrated Stalin's callous disregard for the peasantry as a whole: Robert H. McNeal, *Stalin: Man and Ruler* (New York, 1988), p. 132.

24. See, for example, Hugh Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War* (New York, 1977), pp. 523-27.

25. David Childs, *Germany since 1918*, 2d edition (London, 1980), p. 42.

26. All the same, it is hard to avoid the tentative conclusion that the situation in Ukraine may have been worse than elsewhere. One notes, for ex-

ample, the closure of borders to starving peasants there, the constant "discovery" of Ukrainian "kulak counterrevolutionary organizations" and arrests of Ukraine's leading agricultural specialists on spurious grounds. See, for example, Yu. I. Shapoval, *U ti trahichni roky: Stalinizm na Ukraini* (Kiev, 1990), pp. 100–101.

2 WESTERN UKRAINE AND WESTERN BELORUSSIA UNDER SOVIET OCCUPATION IN 1919–1941

1. In 1931, Ukrainians constituted about 63 per cent of the total population of Western Ukraine and Poles about 25 per cent. See *IV Ukrainskyi statystychnyi richnyk 1936–1937* (Warsaw and Lviv, 1937), p. 15. In the same year, Belorussians reportedly made up 77.9 per cent of the population of Western Belorussia, Jews 10.2 per cent, and Poles 5.9 per cent. See I. S. Lubachko, *Belorussia Under Soviet Rule 1917–1957* (Lexington, Kentucky, 1972), p. 129.

2. For example, R. Szporluk, "West Ukraine and West Belorussia: Historical Tradition, Social Communication and Linguistic Assimilation," *Soviet Studies*, XXXI, no. 1 (January 1979), 76–98; J. T. Gross, "A Note on the Nature of Soviet Totalitarianism," *Soviet Studies*, XXXIV, no. 3 (July 1982), 367–76; and G. I. Antonov, "The March into Poland, September 1939," in B. H. Liddell Hart, ed., *The Red Army* (New York, 1956), pp. 73–78.

3. Unfortunately this essay cannot deal with Western Belorussia in the same depth as Western Ukraine. The former area has been seriously neglected, at least in terms of materials published, by Soviet scholars. Although there are no clear reasons for this, it seems plausible that the difficulties encountered in collectivizing Western Belorussia in the postwar years made the Soviet authorities reluctant to draw attention to the issue. After the war, while mass collectivization was taking place in Western Ukraine, Right-Bank Moldavia, and the Baltic republics, the number of households encompassed in collective farms increased dramatically, but in Western Belorussia it actually declined. So far there has been no explanation of this surprising event. See *Sovetskaya derevnya v pervye poslevoennye gody* (Moscow, 1978), pp. 394–95; and E. P. Beliazo, "Sotsialisticheskoe pereustroistvo selskogo khozyaistva oblastei BSSR," in *Tritsat let po sotsialisticheskomu puti* (Vilnius, 1979), Vol. 1, pp. 74, 76.

4. Cited in the preamble of the Declaration of the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine. See *Z istorii kolektyvizatsii silskoho hospodarstva zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1976), p. 17.

5. See Y. Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1964), p. 85.

6. M.F. Buhai, "Deportatsii naselennya z Ukrainy [30-50-ti roky]," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 10 (October 1990): 34-35.
7. *Istoriya Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1977), Vol. 6, p. 499.
8. R. Umiasowski, *Russia and the Polish Republic, 1918-1941* (London, 1945), p. 224.
9. *Concise Statistical Year-Book of Poland* (Warsaw, 1938), pp. 22-23.
10. Cited in *Z istorii*, p. 22.
11. *Narys istorii Lviivskoi oblasnoi partiinoi orhanizatsii* (Lviv, 1969), p. 72.
12. *Rozkvit ekonomiky zakhidnykh oblastei URSS (1939-1964rr.)* (Lviv, 1964), p. 28.
13. *Istoriya Belorusskoi SSR* (Minsk, 1961), Vol. 2, pp. 384-88.
14. N. P. Vakar, *Belorussia: The Making of a Nation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), p. 157.
15. M. K. Ivasyuta, *Narys istorii kolhospnoho budivnytstva v zakhidnykh oblastyakh Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1962), p. 14.
16. V. L. Varetskyi, *Sotsialistychni peretvorennia u zakhidnykh oblastyakh URSS* (Kiev, 1960), p. 44.
17. *Sotsialistychna peredbudova i rozvytok silskoho hospodarstva Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1968), Vol. 2, p. 78.
18. *Pravda ne zdolaty* (Lviv, 1974), p. 12; S. Horak, *Poland and her National Minorities, 1919-1939* (New York, 1961), p. 153.
19. Ivasyuta, *Narys istorii kolhospnoho budivnytstva*, p. 21.
20. Varetskyi, *Sotsialistychni peretvorennia*, p. 49.
21. Report note of the Lviv oblast committee CPU at the first oblast party conference, April 23, 1940, "Pro stan silskoho hospodarstva oblasti," cited in *Z istorii*, p. 116.
22. James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine 1918-1933* (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), pp. 280-301.
23. Declaration of the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine, October 28, 1939, "Pro konfiskatsiyu pomishchytskykh zemel," cited in *Z istorii*, pp. 20-21.
24. The question of what constituted a kulak is still open to dispute. See Chapter Six.
25. *Pravda*, January 9, 1940.
26. Report of Lviv conference, April 23, 1940, cited in *Z istorii*, p. 115.
27. *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, Vol. 2, p. 88.
28. Ivasyuta, *Narys istorii kolhospnoho budivnytstva*, p. 46.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*
31. Varetskyi, *Sotsialistychni peretvorennia*, p. 223.

32. See, for example, *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, Vol. 2, p. 76.
33. M. K. Ivasyuta, *Narysy istorii kolektyvizatsii na Ternopilshchyni* (Kiev, 1958), p. 37.
34. Ivasyuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnogo budivnytstva*, p. 46. The other source is *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, Vol. 2, p. 89.
35. Ivasyuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnogo budivnytstva*, p. 47.
36. Decree of the CC CPU and the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, March 24, 1941, "Pro vstanovlennya hranychnykh norm zemle korystuvannya na odyn selyanskyi dvir po Volynskii, Drohobyskii, Lvivskii, Rovenskii, Stanislavskii i Ternopilskii oblastiakh URSR," cited in *Z istorii*, pp. 43-44.
37. M. Rudnytska, ed., *Zakhidnia Ukraina pid bolshevykamy*, IX 39-VI 41 (New York, 1958), p. 317.
38. Lubachko, *Belorussia Under Soviet Rule*, pp. 132-33.
39. *Sotsialno-ekonomicheskoe preobrazovaniya v Belorusskoi SSR za gody Sovetsoi vlasti* (Minsk, 1970), p. 209.
40. V. N. Mykhnyuk, "Istoriografiya pervykh sotsialisticheskikh preobrazovaniy v selskom khozyaistve zapadnykh oblastei Belorussii," in *Tritsats let po sotsialisticheskomu puti*, Vol. 2, p. 188.
41. The smaller figure is calculated from Vakar, *Belorussia*, p. 166; the larger is cited in V. A. Poluyan, *Revolutsionno-demokraticheskoe dvizhenie v Zapadnoi Belorussii* (Minsk, 1978), p. 349.
42. *Sotsialno-ekonomicheskoe preobrazovaniya*, p. 209.
43. Poluyan, *Revolutsionno-demokraticheskoe dvizhenie*, p. 349.
44. *Ibid.*
45. *Sovetskaya derevnya*, p. 353.
46. Beliazo in *Tritsats let po sotsialisticheskomu puti*, Vol. 1, p. 71.
47. N. Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR: Plans and Performance* (Stanford, Calif., 1949), p. 342.
48. I. M. Volkov, M. A. Vyltsan, and V. V. Kabanov, "Problemy kolektyvizatsii selskogo khozyaistva zapadnykh raionov SSSR v sovetskoi istoriografii," in *Tritsats let po sotsialisticheskomu puti*, Vol. 1, p. 9.
49. On the dissolutions, see, for example, V. M. Terletskyi, *Rady deputativ trudyashchykh Ukrainskoi RSR v period zaversheniya budivnytstva sotsializmu (1938-1958rr.)* (Kiev, 1966), p. 83.
50. M. P. Teslenko, "Do istorii partiinoho budivnytstva v zachidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainy," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 10 (October 1969): 44-48.
51. Ivasyuta, *Narysy istorii kolektyvizatsii*, p. 39.
52. Ivasyuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnogo budivnytstva*, p. 64.
53. M. P. Teslenko, "Orhanizatsiino-partiina robota v zachidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainy (1939-1941rr.)," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 9 (September 1975): 68-72.

54. R. F. Miller, *One Hundred Thousand Tractors* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), pp. 32, 37.

55. See *ibid.*, pp. 36–48.

56. L. Volin, *A Century of Russian Agriculture: From Alexander II to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), pp. 446–47.

57. Decree of the Ukrainian Council and the CC CPU, March 25, 1940, "Pro orhanizatsiyu MTS v zakhidnykh oblastyakh URSR," cited in *Z istorii*, pp. 26–27.

58. Decree of the Ukrainian Council and the CC CPU, June 4, 1940, "Pro orhanizatsiyu 74 derzhavnykh mashyno-traktornykh stantsii v zakhidnykh oblastyakh URSR," cited in *Z istorii*, pp. 30–31.

59. *Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1957), p. 318.

60. *Istoriya Belorusskoi SSR* (Minsk, 1977), p. 363.

61. Decree of the Ukrainian Council, December 24, 1940, "Pro vykonannya postanovy Radnarkomu Soyuzu RSR i TsK VKP(b) vid berezhnya 1940r., 'Pro orhanizatsiyu derzhavnykh mashyno-traktornykh stantsii v zakhidnykh oblastiakh URSR i BRSR,'" cited in *Z istorii*, p. 39.

62. *Kolhospnyk Ukrainy*, September 17, 1940.

63. Mykhniuk in *Tridtsat let po sotsialisticheskomu puti*, Vol. 2, p. 190.

64. Ivasyuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnoho budivnytstva*, p. 50.

65. *Pravda*, May 15, 1940.

66. *Kolhospnyk Ukrainy*, August 23, 1940.

67. Varetskyi, *Sotsialistychni peretvorennia*, p. 253.

68. *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, Vol. 2, p. 93.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

71. A. Grekul, *Rastsvet moldavskoi sotsialisticheskoi natsii* (Kishinev, 1974), p. 27.

72. *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, Vol. 2, p. 93.

73. For the purposes of simplification, this chapter does not discuss collectivization in areas annexed by the USSR from Romania in June 1940. Here, the authorities began to organize rapid collectivization in the southern Izmail oblast, in which the percentage of households within the kolhozy surpassed the total in Volyn in June 1941. See *ibid.*

74. See *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, Vol. 1, pp. 485–86.

75. *Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie preobrazovaniya*, p. 209.

76. One should note *en passant* the surprising statement by the noted western scholar on Belorussia, Lubachko, that by the spring of 1941 individual farming in Western Belorussia had been "almost completely eliminated." Lubachko, *Belorussia Under Soviet Rule*, p. 44. This is a clear error as about 93 per cent of households in this area were farming individually at the time of the German invasion in June 1941.

77. *Istoriya Belorusskoi SSR* (1977), p. 363.

78. Ibid., p. 364.
79. *Narys istorii Volynskoi oblasnoi partiinoi orhanizatsii* (Kiev, 1968), p. 61.
80. Ibid.
81. See M. Lewin, "Who Was the Soviet Kulak?" *Soviet Studies*, XVIII, no. 2 (October 1966): 189-212.
82. Cited in *Narys istorii Volynskoi oblasnoi partiinoi orhanizatsii* (Lviv, 1981), p. 54.
83. *Narys istorii Lviivskoi*, p. 106.
84. From the report of the Drohobych oblast committee CPU at the first oblast party conference, April 27, 1940, "Pro stan silskoho hospodarstva oblasti," cited in *Z istorii*, p. 128.
85. See, for example, Davies, *The Socialist Offensive*, p. 269.
86. Ivasyuta, *Narys istorii kolhospnoho budivnytstva*, p. 60.
87. *Concise Statistical Year-Book of Poland* (Warsaw, 1938), p. 73.
88. Ivasyuta, *Narys istorii kolhospnoho budivnytstva*, p. 59.
89. Varetskyi, *Sotsialistychni peretvorennia*, p. 254.
90. Ibid.
91. *Concise Statistical Year-Book of Poland*, p. 73.
92. *Narys istorii Lviivskoi*, p. 109.
93. Decree of the bureau of Rivne Oblast committee CPU, November 18, 1940, "Pro naslidky hospodariuvannya kolhospiv oblasti za pershyi rik ikh isnuvannya," cited in *Z istorii*, p. 139.
94. Yu.O. Kurnosov, "Vozzyednannya zakhidnoukrainskykh zemel z URSR." *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 2 (February 1990): 87. It is also maintained that one reason for such harsh policies was the lack of education among Soviet and party officials. For example, the Moscow historian, V.G. Kolichev, points out that this was a widespread phenomenon in the Soviet Union, and that in 1939, 41 percent of oblast and district secretaries of union republics, 71.4 percent of city and raion secretaries, and 78 percent of those of primary party organizations lacked even a middle education. V.H. Kolychev, "TsK VKP(b) u 1938-1941rr." *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 5 (May 1990): 9.

3 WORLD WAR II AND UKRAINE

1. *The Spectator*, March 9, 1985.
2. *International Herald Tribune*, January 26-27, 1985.
3. B. M. Babyi, *Vozzyednannya zakhidnoi Ukrainy z Ukrainskoyu RSR* (Kiev, 1954), p. 55.
4. H. Vashchenko, "Vyzvolennia Zakhidnoi Ukrainy Bolshevykami," *Ukrainian Review*, no. 1 (1954): 66.

5. G. I. Antonov, "The March Into Poland, September 1939," in B. H. Liddell Hart, *The Red Army* (New York, 1956), p. 73.

6. John A. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite* (New York, 1959), p. 107.

7. Antonov, op. cit., p. 75.

8. See Y. Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II* (New Brunswick, N. J.), 1964, p. 85.

9. *Pravda*, November 1, 1939.

10. Antonov, op. cit., p. 74. That it may have been at Ternopil is apparent from *Izvestiya*, September 25, 1939.

11. See, e.g., R. Szporluk, *Ukraine: A Brief History* (Detroit, 1979), p. 92.

12. The USSR claims otherwise, maintaining that extensive supplies of food and provisions were sent into Western Ukraine from the USSR (see *Pravda*, October 10, 1939).

13. *Istoriya Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1977), Vol. 6, p. 499.

14. See "Za pravilnoe osveshchenie istorii Kommunisticheskoi Partii Zapadnoi Ukrainy," *Kommunist*, no. 10 (1963): 37-48. Some members may have survived the ensuing purge, however. See *Komunist Ukrainy*, no. 9 (1989): 5.

15. *Torzhestvo istorichnoi spravedlyvosti* (Lviv, 1968), p. 570.

16. M. K. Ivasyuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnoho budivnytstva v zakhidnykh oblastyakh Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1962), p. 40.

17. Ibid.

18. *Torzhestvo istorichnoi spravedlyvosti*, p. 575.

19. V. M. Terletsky, *Rady deputativ trudyashchykh Ukrainskoi RSR v period zavershennya budivnytstva sotsializmu (1938-1958 rr.)* (Kiev, 1966), p. 85.

20. Ivasyuta, op. cit., p. 40.

21. *Narysy istorii Lvova* (Lviv, 1956), p. 291.

22. *Istoriya mist i sil Ukrainskoi RSR: Ivano-Frankivska Oblast* (Kiev, 1971), p. 31.

23. *Istoriya mist i sil Ukrainskoi RSR: Ternopilska Oblast* (Kiev, 1973), p. 45; and *Narysy istorii Volynskoi oblasnoi partiinoi orhanizatsii* (Kiev, 1968), p. 42.

24. R. Umiastowski, *Russia and the Polish Republic, 1918-1941* (London, 1945), p. 224.

25. For example, V. A. Behma, former first secretary of Kiev Oblast Party Committee, became first secretary of Rivne Oblast Party committee. See *Who's Who in the USSR 1965-66* (New York, 1966), p. 100. For a treatment of this subject, see Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*, op. cit.

26. M. P. Bazhan, ed., *Soviet Ukraine* (Kiev, 1969), p. 147.
27. I. O. Herasymov, "Fashystska ahresiya proty SRSR; krakh 'blits-krihu,'" *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 6 (June 1981): 20.
28. John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2d ed., (Littleton, Colorado, 1980), pp. 73–74.
29. On the proclamation of an independent Ukrainian state, see Yaroslav Stetsko, 30 *Chervnya 1941: Proholoshennya vidnovlennya derzhavnosti Ukrainy* (Toronto and New York, 1967).
30. Mark R. Elliott, *Paupers of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America's Role in Their Repatriation* (Urbana, Illinois, 1982), p. 7.
31. The USSR Supreme Soviet issued an *ukaz* "On the Military Situation" on the day of the invasion, June 22, 1941 (see *Sovetskaya Ukraina v gody velikoi otechestvennoi voiny 1941–1945*, Vol. 1 (Kiev, 1980), pp. 19–20). But this and subsequent decrees were not published, nor were their contents made available to the public.
32. *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), p. 886.
33. Borys Lewytskyj, *Die Sowjetukraine, 1944–1960* (Cologne, 1964), p. 18.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
35. *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. 1, pp. 887.
36. On Koch's role in the Ukraine, see David Marples, "'Zabutyi voiennyi zlochynets,'" *Diyaloh* (Toronto), no. 10 (1984): 44–50.
37. *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. 1, p. 888.
38. Ihor Kamenetsky, "National Socialist Policy in Slovenia and Western Ukraine During World War II," *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States*, Vol. XIV (1978–1980): 48–49.
39. M. K. Ivasyuta, "Stanovyshche selyanstva zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainskoi RSR pid chas tymchasovoi nimetsko-fashystskoi okupatsii i ioho borotba z zaharbnikamy ta ikh naimytany (cherven 1941–zhovten 1944)," *Z istorii zakhidnoukrainskykh zemel*, no. 5 (1960): 168.
40. *Ibid.*, pp. 176–77.
41. Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia 1941–1945: A Study of Occupation Policies*, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colorado, 1981), p. 322.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 325.
43. Ivasyuta, *op. cit.*, p. 173.
44. Karl Brandt, *Germany's Agricultural and Food Policies in World War II*, Vol. 2 (Stanford, 1953), pp. 19–20.
45. *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. 2 (Toronto, 1971), p. 767.
46. Quoted in Elliot, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
47. *Pravdu ne zdolaty: Trudyashchi zakhidnykh oblastei RSR v borotby proty ukrainskykh burzhuaznykh natsionalistiv u roky sotsialistichnykh peretvoren* (Lviv, 1974,) p. 44.

48. Dmytro Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian History* (Winnipeg, 1975), p. 748.
49. *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. 1, p. 204.
50. See, for example, Serhii Cipko, "Uniforms that didn't match," *Ukrainian Issues*, Vol. 3, no. 2 (Summer 1988/89): 17-19.
51. *Sovetskaya Ukraina v gody velikoi otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945*, Vol. 1 (Kiev, 1980), p. 13.
52. M. I. Metlenkov, "Dopomoha viiskovykh radi politorhaniv frontiv ta armii u rozvytku partizanskoho rukhu na Ukraini v 1941-1944rr.," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 12 (December 1984): 45.
53. *Istoriya Ukrainskoi SSR*, T.8. *Ukrainskaya SSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1941-1945* (Kiev, 1984), pp. 180-83.
54. John A. Armstrong, ed., *Soviet Partisans in World War II* (Madison, Wisconsin, 1964), p. 51.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
57. Robert S. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 1917-57* (New York, 1962), p. 237.
58. *Sovetskaya Ukraina v gody*, Vol. 2, p. 241.
59. Armstrong, *Soviet Partisans*, p. 113.
60. John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, pp. 130-31.
61. Armstrong, *Soviet Partisans*, p. 51.
62. Lew Shankowsky in *The Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the Fight for Freedom* (New York, 1954), p. 25.
63. See, for example, *Pravda Ukrainy*, October 16, 1984.
64. See, for example, Ivasyuta's introduction to *Z istorii kolektyvizatsii silskoho hospodarstva zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1976), p. 10.
65. Bilinsky, *Second Soviet Republic*, p. 121.
66. See, for example, Antoni B. Szczesniak, Wieslaw Z. Szota, *Droga do nikad* (Warsaw, 1973), pp. 348-52.
67. Bilinsky, *Second Soviet Republic*, p. 343.
68. *Pravdu ne zdolaty*, p. 95.
69. Bilinsky, *Second Soviet Republic*, p. 118.
70. Doroshenko, *Survey of Ukrainian History*, p. 751.
71. *Ukrainian Insurgent Army*, p. 25.
72. *Pravdu ne zdolaty*, p. 131.
73. This is covered in detail by Szczesniak and Szota, *Droga do nikad*. See also US Department of State, *Nature and Extent of Disaffection in the Ukraine*, Office of Intelligence Research Report No. 4228-R, March 17, 1948, p. 13.
74. The figure of 2.5 million is cited in *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), p. 148.

75. *Khliborob Ukrainy*, no. 1 (1985): 28.
76. *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. 2, p. 149.
77. M. O. Butsko, *KPRS: orhanizator vsenarodnoi dopomohy trudyashchym zakhidnykh oblastei URSR v vidbudovi i dalshomu rozvytku narodnoho hospodarstva (1944–1950rr.)* (Kiev, 1959), p. 79.
78. *Ibid.*
79. The decree of September, 1944, is cited in Robert H. McNeal, ed., *Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Vol. 3: *The Stalin Years* (Toronto, 1974), pp. 228–32; the decree of November, 1944, is cited in *Komunistychna partiya Ukrainy v rezolyutsiyakh i rishennyakh zizdiu, konferentsii i pleniumiv TsK*, Vol. 2 (Kiev, 1977), pp. 78–88.
80. McNeal, ed., *Resolutions and decisions*, pp. 228–32.
81. *Komunistychna partiya Ukrainy v rezolyutsiyakh*, Vol. 2, pp. 78–88.
82. P. I. Denysenko, "Vidbudova ekonomiky i kultury v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainiskoi RSR (1944–1945rr.)," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 5 (May 1964): 94.
83. *Ibid.*
84. *Narysy istorii Zakarpatskoi oblasnoi partiinoi orhanizatsii* (Uzhhorod, 1980), p. 132.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 136.
86. Borys Lewytzkyj, *Die Sowjetukraine 1944–1960*, p. 25.
87. Vsevolod Holudnychy, *Soviet Regional Economics: Selected Works of Vsevolod Holubnychy* (Edmonton, 1982), p. 112.
88. M. P. Bazhan, ed., *Soviet Ukraine*, p. 155.
89. Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta*, pp. 166–67.

4 WARTIME COLLABORATION IN UKRAINE

1. John A. Armstrong, "Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe," *The Journal of Modern History* 40, no. 3 (September 1968): 396–410.
2. See, for example, V. Cherednychenko, *Natsionalizm proty natsii* (Kiev, 1970); M.K. Ivasyuta, "Sotsialistychna perebudova silskoho hospodarstva v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainiskoi RSR," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 4 (1959): 3–13; *Narysy istorii Lviivskoi oblasnoi partiinoi orhanizatsii* (Lviv, 1969); and especially M.K. Ivasyuta, ed., *Pravdu ne zdolaty: trudyashchi zakhidnykh oblastei URSR v borotby proty ukrainskykh burzhuaiznykh natsionalistiv u roky sotsialistychnykh peretvoren* (Lviv, 1974). In the recent period, a similar line has been maintained. See, for example, I.I. Myhovich, "Z istorii protydii uniatsko-natsionalistychnoho alyansu vstanovlennyyu radyanskoi vlady i budivnyt-

stvu sotsializmu na Ukraini," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 1 (January 1986): 47–59; M. Ye. Horyelov, *Kryza orhanizatsii Ukrainskoho burzhuaaznoho natsionalizmu na suchasnomu etapi* (Kiev, 1985); and Yu.I. Rimarenko, *Burzhuaaznyi natsionalizm i klerikalizm* (Kiev, 1986).

3. Simon Wiesenthal, *Justice not Vengeance* (London, 1990), p. 9.

4. On the campaign against Wiesenthal, see, for example, L.A. Rubinsky, "Zlochyna zmovy sionistiv i fashystiv naperedodni ta v roky druhoi viiny," in *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 9 (September 1985): 99–109. One effort to emphasize Ukrainian aid to Jews is Taras Hunczak, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Soviet and Nazi Occupations," in *Ukraine during World War II: History and its Aftermath* (Edmonton, 1986), pp. 39–57. The merits of this article, incidentally, are considerable and Professor Hunczak has been one of the principal researchers into this field. My criticism is of the focus of such articles, which seems peripheral to the overall question.

5. John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 3d edition (Littleton, Colorado, 1989). See also the articles by Yaroslav Bilinsky and Aharon Weiss and the Round-table discussion in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, ed. Howard Aster and Peter J. Potichnyj (Edmonton, 1988).

6. *Robitnycha hazeta*, February 13, 1990.

7. V.S. Koval, "Shcho take OUN i khto taki Banderivtsi," in Akademii nauk Ukrainskoi RSR, Instytut istorii, *Zakhidna Ukraina: pershe desyatyrichchya pisly viiny*, Preprint no. 3 (Kiev, 1988), pp. 21–22.

8. Douglas Tottle, *Fraud, Famine and Fascism* (Toronto, 1987).

9. Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow* (Edmonton, 1986).

10. The conference was reported in the weekly *Literaturna Ukraina*, September 9, 1990. It was organized inter alia by the Ukrainian branch of the Memorial Society, the Ukrainian Union of Writers, the Popular Movement for Perestroika (Rukh), the Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society and the Institute of Literature, Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Several Western scholars, including James E. Mace and Marco Carynnyk, were present.

11. See, for example, Canada, House of Commons *Debates*, December 13, 1985, exchange between Terry Clifford (MP, London-Middlesex) and the Rt. Hon. Elmer M. MacKay, Minister of National Revenue.

12. See, for example, "An Open Letter to the *Canadian Jewish News*," in *Ukrainian Echo* (Toronto), November 27, 1985; and Keith Spicer, "Jews and Ukrainians: time for entente," *The Ottawa Citizen*, November 20, 1985.

13. In 1988, the Institute of History of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences issued an interesting prepublication brochure on this topic under the editorship of I.M. Khvorostyany: *Zakhidna Ukraina: pershe desyatyrich-*

chya pislya viiny (Kiev, 1988). Modern analyses of the period include I.K. Vasyuta, "Robitnycho-selyanskyi soyuz u narodnomu fronti v Zakhidnii Ukrainy (1935–1939rr.)," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 9 (September 1986): 83–93; S.A. Makarchuk, *Etnosotsialnoe razvitie i natsionalnye otnoshennya na zapadnoukrainskikh zemlyakh v period imperializma* (Lviv, 1983); and Yu.Yu. Slyvka, *Zakhidna Ukraina v reaktsiinii politytsi polskoi ta ukrainskoi burzhuzii (1920–1939)* (Kiev, 1985).

14. O.V. Haran, "Problemy formuvannya natsionalnykh kadrov u zakhidnykh oblastiakh URSR u druii polovyni 40-kh-50-kh rokakh," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 10 (October 1989): 64. On the KPZU, see, for example, I.M. Shumenko and P.M. Yatskiv, *Komunistychna partiya Zakhidnoi Ukrainy u borotbi za narodnyi front* (Lviv, 1985); V.I. Yurchuk, "Perebudova i pereosmyslennya istorychnoho dosvidu Kompartyy Ukrainy," in *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 7 (July 1988): 9–18; and O.Yu. Karpenko, "Do pytannya pro utvorennia KPZU," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 2 (February 1989): 63–70; also Ivan Syvokhip (a former CPWU member), "‘Bili chy ‘chorni’ plyamy," *Molod Ukrainy*, September 20, 1988; Rostyslav Bratun, "Historical memory: impossible without historical truth," *News From Ukraine*, No. 38, 1988; Yurii Slyvka, "KPZU: storinky borotby i zahybeli," *Molod Ukrainy*, November 29, 1988; and O. Milko, "Komu potribno ochorniyuvaty veresen?" *Radyanska Ukraina*, October 17, 1989.

15. *Molod Ukrainy*, November 29, 1988.

16. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, pp. 37–44.

17. See, for example, Yu.O. Kurnosov, "Vozzyednannya zakhidnoukrainskykh zemel z URSR," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 2 (February 1990): 80–87; Orest Subtelny, "The Soviet Occupation of Western Ukraine 1939–41: An Overview," in *Ukraine during World War II*, p. 12. There are numerous new accounts of these atrocities, of which several have been compiled by the Lviv branch of the Memorial Society. See, for example, the eyewitness testimonies compiled by the branch's newspaper: *Poklyk sumlinnya*, no. 4, February 1991, pp. 1–2.

18. For the latter view, see Roman Ilnytskyi, "Yak narodzhuvavsyia Ukrainskyi rezystans proty nimetskoho fashyzmu?" in Mykhailo H. Marunchak, ed., *V borotby za Ukrainsku derzhavu* (Winnipeg, 1990), pp. 31–32.

19. The treatment of Koch after the war remains one of the mysteries of recent history. Originally sentenced to death for his crimes, he remained under house arrest in a Polish prison and by all accounts was treated with exceptional lenience; this during a period when lesser criminals were pursued with rigor in the Soviet Union. Was Koch of service to the KGB? His case was of interest to Poles, and narrated to Dr. Bohdan Krawchenko, di-

rector of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies on a visit to Poland. Erich Koch died in 1989.

20. Danylo Shumuk, *Life Sentence: Memoirs of a Ukrainian Political Prisoner* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1982).

21. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, p. 117.

22. See, for example, *Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground 1943–1951*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj and Yevhen Shtendera (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986). See also the continuing series *Litopys Ukrainskoi povstanskoi armii* (Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1978—continuing series of volumes). An interesting review article on the latter and other sources is John A. Armstrong, "The Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* XIV, Number 1/2 (June 1990): 171–75.

23. The standard work on the Division is Wolf-Dietrich Heike, *The Ukrainian Division 'Galicia', 1943–45. A Memoir* (Toronto: The Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1988).

24. Among the first revisionist or partially revisionist works to appear on the OUN-UPA in the Gorbachev period were the following: R. Yurchenko, "Bumeranh povertayetsya," *Robitnycha hazeta*, September 17, 1989; V.S. Koval, "Shcho take OUN i khto taki Banderivtsi," in Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Institute of History, *Zakhidna Ukraina: pershe desyatkrichchya pislya viiny*, pp. 13–22; M.M. Holushko, "Ne stvoryuvaty vorohiv tam, de ikh nemaye," *Robitnycha hazeta*, December 3, 1988; and V. Zarechnyi and O. Lastovets, "Banderovshchina," *Pravda Ukrainy*, August 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18 and 19, 1989.

25. Reference to the CIA missions (and that of the British) is provided by Phillip Knightley, *Philby: K.G.B. Masterspy* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1988), p. 162. They have also been confirmed by a US source, and are mentioned in the *Arkhiv misii UPA*, located at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario. The fact that Philby was aware of them probably rendered them futile from the first, but evidence suggests, as noted, that they were supported not as a means for ultimate victory by the Ukrainian opposition but rather as a restricting factor on Soviet international activities.

Shukhevych's death is described in Petro Mirchuk, *Roman Shukhevych (Gen. Taras Chuprynka): komandyr armii bezsmertrykh* (New York, 1970), pp. 243–44.

26. *Radyanska Ukraina*, June 13, 1953.

27. Haran, "Problemy formuvannya natsionalnykh kadrov," 62–64. The first attempt at a biography of Melnikov is: I.P. Kozhukalo, "L.G. Melnykov: narys politychnoi diyalnosti," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 9 (September 1989): 95–105.

28. *Ibid.*, 61.

29. See H.I. Kovalchak, "Industrializatsiya zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrain-skoi RSR," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 6 (June 1959): 3-12; and H.I. Kovalchak, *Rozvytok promyslovosti v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainy za 20 rokiv radyanskoï vladu (1939-1958rr.)*. *Istoryko-ekonomichnyi narys* (Kiev, 1965).

30. See, for example, Hurenko's speech in *Pravda Ukrainy*, September 30, 1990.

5 KHRUSHCHEV, KAGANOVICH AND THE 1947 CRISIS

1. *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, introd. E. Crankshaw (Boston, 1970), p. 243.

2. Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores A. Medvedev, *Khrushchev: The Years in Power* (New York, 1976), p. 48.

3. For a brief account of the 1933 famine in Ukraine, see Dana Dalrymple, "The Soviet Famine of 1932-1934," *Soviet Studies* XV, no. 2 (1964): 250-84. More detailed studies have been provided by Robert Conquest, *Harvest of Sorrow* (Edmonton, 1986), and by the US Commission on the Ukraine Famine, *Report to Congress* (Washington, D.C., 1988).

4. *Narodnoe hospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR: Statystychnyi zbirnyk* (Kiev, 1960), p. 216.

5. *Sotsialistychna perebudova i rozvytok silskoho hospodarstva Ukrain-skoi RSR* (Kiev, 1968), Vol. 2, p. 212.

6. *Khrushchev Remembers*, p. 233.

7. Edward Crankshaw, *Khrushchev: A Career* (New York, 1966), p. 157.

8. The resolutions of the February 1947 plenum are quoted in *Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, ed. R. H. McNeal (Toronto, 1974), Vol. 3: *The Stalin Years: 1929-1953*, pp. 243-48.

9. *Khrushchev Remembers*, p. 237.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 241-42.

11. See Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow* (Edmonton, 1986).

12. Crankshaw, p. 157.

13. In *Pravda Ukrainy* (January 30, 1946) Khrushchev announced that there were 177 collective farms in western Ukraine. This was clearly an exaggeration. According to a Soviet scholar, there were only 94, and even this total may have been on the generous side. See M. K. Ivasyuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnoho budivnystva v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1962), p. 88.

14. Ivasyuta, p. 95.

15. See Chapter Seven, here and ff.

16. See the official decree of March 25, 1940, "Pro orhanizatsiyu MTS v zakhidnykh oblastiakh URSR," cited in *Z istorii kolektyvizatsii silskoho hospodarstva zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1976), pp. 26-29. (Referred to hereafter as *Z istorii*.)

17. See, for example, *Radyanska Ukraina* (February 22, 1948) on the reconstruction of MTS in Lviv oblast.

18. See, for example, information of the Ternopil oblast land section to the CPU oblast committee, July 1, 1944, "Pro orhanizatsiyu kolhospiv u Zalishchytskomu raioni," cited in *Z istorii*, pp. 180-82.

19. This is discussed in Ivasyuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnoho*, p. 114.

20. Noted in *Arkhiv misii UPA pry ZP UHVR* (Munich, n.d.).

21. See R. S. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine 1917-1957* (New York, 1962), pp. 254-56.

22. Roy Medvedev, *Khrushchev* (Oxford, 1982), p. 44.

23. On the formation and role of the MTS political sections in western Ukraine, see R. F. Miller, *One Hundred Thousand Tractors* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), pp. 221-22.

24. Dmytro Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian History*, ed. and updated by Oleh W. Gerus (Winnipeg, 1975), p. 773.

25. See the account by V. Holubnychy in *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia* (Toronto, 1963), Vol. 1, p. 901.

26. Lew Shankowsky, "Ten Years of the UPA Struggle (1942-1952)," in *The Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Fight For Freedom* (New York, 1954), p. 43.

27. John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2d. ed. (Littleton, Colo., 1980), p. 299.

28. *Khrushchev Remembers*, pp. 242-43.

29. Crankshaw, pp. 122-23.

30. Evidently Khrushchev first used this term in a speech he gave on March 1, 1944, but he was not necessarily its inventor. Cited in Yaroslav Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: Ukraine After World War II* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1964), p. 127.

31. Holubnychy, op. cit., p. 901.

32. See I.M. Makoviichuk and Yu.H. Pylyavets, "Holod na Ukraini u 1946-1947rr." *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 8 (August 1990): 14-32.

33. Yu. Shapoval, "Stalinskyi poslanets na Ukraini. Storinky politychnoi biohrafii L.M. Kahanovycha," *Pid praporom leninizmu*, no. 20 (October 1989): 82-83.

34. Crankshaw, op. cit., p. 29.

35. Medvedev, op. cit., pp. 14-15. The two men first met in 1916. See Crankshaw, p. 22.

36. *Rabochaya Moskva*, March 9, 1935; cited in Medvedev, p. 16.
37. Crankshaw gives a good account of the Khrushchev-Kaganovich relationship in *Khrushchev Remembers*, pp. 544–55.
38. Crankshaw, op. cit., p. 159.
39. Bilinsky, op. cit., p. 235.
40. *Khrushchev Remembers*, pp. 239–40.
41. Medvedev, op. cit., p. 44.
42. For a detailed account of the political intricacies that led to the fall of Lavrentii Beria, see V. Popyk and D. Tabachnyk, "U chortoryi Beriivskoi zmovy," *Ukraina*, no. 49–50 (December 1990): 38–44.
43. See Medvedev, op. cit., p. 45.

6 THE KULAK IN POSTWAR UKRAINE

1. M. Lewin, "Who Was the Soviet Kulak?" *Soviet Studies* XVIII, no. 2 (October 1966): 189–212.
2. *Pravda*, November 1, 1939.
3. S. Horak, *Poland and Her National Minorities, 1919–1939* (New York, 1961), p. 84.
4. V. L. Varetskyi, *Sotsialistychni peretvorennia u zakhidnykh oblastiakh USSR* (Kiev, 1960), p. 44.
5. M. K. Ivasyuta, *Narys istorii kolektyvizatsii na Ternopilshchyni* (Kiev, 1958), p. 7.
6. See, for example, Declaration of the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine, October 27, 1939, "Pro vkhodzhennia Zakhidnoi Ukrainy do skladu Ukrainskoi Radyanskoi Sotsialistychnoi Respubliky," cited in *Z istorii kolektyvizatsii silskoho hospodarstva zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1976), pp. 18–19. [Referred to hereafter as *Z ist.*]
7. Lewin, op. cit., 196.
8. Varetskyi, op. cit., 48.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Concise Statistical Year-Book of Poland* (Warsaw: 1938), p. 63.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Pravda ne zdolaty: trudyashchi zakhidnykh oblastei USSR v borotbi proty ukrainskykh burzhuanzykh natsionalistiv u roky sotsialistychnykh peretvoren.* (Lviv, 1974), p. 12; Horak, op. cit., p. 153.
13. *Sotsialistychna perebudova i rozvytok silskoho hospodarstva Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1968), Vol. 2, p. 88; M. K. Ivasyuta, *Narys istorii kolhospnogo budivnytstva v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainskoi RSR*, (Kiev, 1962), p. 76.
14. Report of Lviv Oblast committee CPU at the first oblast party conference, April 23, 1940, "Pro stan silskoho hospodarstva oblasti," cited in *Z ist.*, op. cit., p. 115.

15. *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 89.
16. Decision of the CC CPU and the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, March 24, 1941, "Pro vstanovlennya hranychnykh norm zemlekorystuvannya na odyn selyanskyi dvir," cited in *Z ist.*, op. cit., pp. 43-44.
17. According to *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, op. cit. vol. 2, p. 93, there were sixty-two kolkhozy in the Chernivtsi Oblast on June 1, 1941, uniting about 4,600 households. But in the former Polish regions, 2,589 kolkhozy had been created, with a total of 172,518 peasant households.
18. *Sovetskaya derevnya v pervye poslevoennye gody 1946-1950* (Moscow, 1978), pp. 352-54.
19. *Pravdu ne zdolaty*, op. cit., p. 95.
20. *Sovetskaya derevnya*, op. cit., p. 354.
21. The first evidence for this was in a speech by Ukrainian First Secretary Khrushchev on March 1, 1944. Cited in Y. Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: Ukraine After World War II* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1964), p. 127.
22. See, for example, Act of the oblast commission to examine the damage perpetrated by the German-fascist plunderers on the territory of Drohobych Oblast, April 12, 1945, cited in *Z ist.*, op. cit., p. 208.
23. *Istoriya selyanstva URSR* (Kiev, 1967), vol. 2, p. 375.
24. *Sovetskaya derevnya*, op. cit., p. 353.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 354.
26. Ivasyuta, op. cit. (1962), p. 78.
27. I. A. Teterin, *Sotsialistychnyi peretvorennia v silskomu hospodarstvi zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainy* (Kiev, 1954), p. 11.
28. *Sovetskaya derevnya*, op. cit., pp. 352-53.
29. Decision of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, June 3, 1947, "Pro poriadok zahotivel silskohospodarskykh produktiv u kurkul'skykh hospodarstvakh Lvivskoi, Stanislavskoi, Drohobyt'skoi, Ternopil'skoi, Rovenskoi, Volynskoi ta Chernivets'koi oblastei," cited in *Z ist.*, op. cit., pp. 67-68.
30. *Arkhiv misii UPA pry ZP UHVR*, folio 6, no. 1 p. 29 (Bolekhiv Raion).
31. A description of one such kolkhoz is given in *Istoriya mist i sil Ukrainy RSR: Rovenska Oblast* (Kiev, 1973), p. 359.
32. *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 250, notes that this number of horseless farms was served by the agricultural associations. The total figure of horseless farms was probably much higher.
33. Interview, I. Kuzma, Sheffield, April 1977.
34. *Pravdu ne zdolaty*, op. cit., p. 170.
35. *Sovetskaya derevnya*, op. cit., p. 386.
36. *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 251.

37. Report of the Ternopil oblast land section to the oblast executive committee, after December 10, 1948, "Pro stan kolektyvizatsii silskoho hospodarstva oblasti," cited in *Z ist.*, op. cit., p. 372.

38. For Western Ukraine, see, for example, *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 257.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 259.

40. R. Taagepera, "Soviet Collectivization of Estonian Agriculture: The Deportation Phase," *Soviet Studies* XXXII, no. 3 (July 1980): 386.

41. R. Beermann, "Comment on 'Who Was the Soviet Kulak?'," *Soviet Studies* XVIII, no. 3 (January 1967): 374.

42. A detailed account of the Estonian deportations is given in Taagepera, op. cit., pp. 379-97.

43. *Ukrainian Bulletin*, February 1, 1949. Neither this source nor the one cited are altogether trustworthy. However, Soviet sources now confirm these events.

44. *Sovetskaya derevnya*, op. cit., p. 389.

45. *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 259.

46. M.F. Buhai, "Deportatsii naselennya na Ukrainy (30-50-ti roky)," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 10 (October 1990): 35. The second part of this article, which describes the situation in the 1940s and 1950s, appeared too late for citation in this volume.

47. Lewin, op. cit., p. 195.

48. Ivasyuta, op. cit. (1962), p. 123. See Chapter Eight.

49. According to *Istoriya mist i sil Ukrainskoi RSR: Ternopilska Oblast* (Kiev, 1973), p. 55, "in the wake of the successful completion of the collectivization of agriculture, the kulak was totally liquidated."

50. For example, report of the secretary of Yavoriv raion committee CPU, Lviv Oblast, F. K. Zhurba, at the raion party conference, December 9, 1950, "Pro hospodarski uspikhy kolhospiv raionu," cited in *Z ist.*, op. cit., p. 453.

51. See, for example, Y. Bilinsky, "The Incorporation of Western Ukraine and its Impact on Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine," in R. Szporluk, ed., *The Influence of East Europe and the Soviet West on the USSR* (New York, 1975), p. 183.

52. Ivasyuta, op. cit. (1962), p. 123.

53. In 1946 a severe drought occurred in the USSR, which caused widespread famine in Eastern Ukraine. According to a Soviet account, Ukrainian nationalists, in their propaganda, were able to point to the hordes of starving East Ukrainians entering the western oblasts in search of food, as evidence of the bankruptcy of the kolkhoz system. In Western Ukraine there was no famine, despite the drought. See I. K. Sas, "Vysvitlennya sotsialistynoho budivnytstva v zakhidnykh oblastyakh Ukrainskoi RSR," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 4 (April 1960): 105.

54. For the purposes of simplification we have omitted from this essay the campaign to amalgamate kolkhozy that occurred in 1950. If anything, however, this should have served to strengthen the kolkhozy since it radically increased party representation in them. There is a good account of this in V. Yurchuk, *Borotba KP Ukrainy za vidbudovi i rozvytok narodnoho hospodarstva (1945–1952rr.)* (Kiev, 1965), p. 209. It is covered in Chapter Eight.

55. See e.g., *Arkhiv misii UPA*, folio 14, no. 32 (Zalozets Raion, October 1946).

56. See Ivasyuta, in *Z ist.*, op. cit., p. 10.

7 THE COLLECTIVIZATION OF WESTERN UKRAINE, 1948–1949

1. On Western Ukraine in the interwar period, see V. Kubijovyc, *Western Ukraine within Poland, 1920–1939* (Chicago, 1963); S. Horak, *Poland and Her National Minorities* (New York, 1961); and B. M. Babyi, *Vozzyednannya zakhidnoi Ukrainy z Ukrainskoyu RSR* (Kiev, 1954). The best works covering the area for the postwar years up to 1953 are Y. Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1964); J. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 3d. ed. (Littleton, Colo., 1989); and R. S. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 1917–1957* (New York, 1962).

2. J. Biggart, "The Collectivisation of Agriculture in Soviet Lithuania," *East European Quarterly*, 9 (1975): 53–75; E. Jacobs, "The Collectivization of Agriculture in Right-Bank Moldavia," Ph.D. dissertation, London School of Economics, 1979; J. Labsvirs, "A Case Study in the Sovietization of Baltic States: Collectivization of Latvian Agriculture, 1944–1956." Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1959; R. Taagepera, "Soviet Collectivization of Estonian Agriculture: The Deportation Phase," *Soviet Studies* 1 (1980): 379–97. To date nothing has appeared in the West about the process in Western Belorussia.

3. See Chapter Two.

4. At the end of 1947, only about 7.5 percent of Western Ukrainian households were reported as collectivized. See *Sotsialistychna perebudova i rozvytok silskoho hospodarstva Ukrainskoi RSR*, vol. 2 (Kiev, 1968), p. 268. [Referred to hereafter as *Sots. pereb.*]

5. On the effects of the 1946 famine in Ukraine, see I. K. Sas, "Vysvitlennya sotsialistychnoho budivnytstva v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainskoi RSR," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 4 (April 1960): 105; and also especially I.M. Makoviichuk and Yu.H. Pylyavets, "Holod na Ukraini u 1946–1947rr.," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 8 (August 1990): 14–32. This latter article is the first to deal with the 1946 famine in depth from a Soviet perspective.

6. Three decrees, published on September 27, October 19 and November 24, 1944 all focused on the weaknesses and "mistakes" made in the Western Ukrainian party organizations. By February 1945, about 20,000 party members had reportedly been sent into Western Ukraine (mainly from Eastern Ukraine). See I.P. Denysenko, "Vidbudova ekonomiky i kultury v zakhidnykh oblastyakh Ukrainskoi RSR (1944-1945 rr.)," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 5 (May 1964): 94.

7. K.-E. Waedekin, *Agrarian Policies in Communist Europe* (The Hague, 1982), pp. 27-28; Jacobs, op. cit., pp. 422-25.

8. *Radyanska Ukraina*, September 25, 1948.

9. The best work on Transcarpathia and its historical development in English is P. R. Magosci, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978).

10. See Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2d ed. (Littleton, Colorado, 1980), pp. 294-95.

11. *Leninizm torzhestvuie* (Lviv, 1957), p. 193; and O.V. Haran, "Problemy formuvannya natsionalnykh kadrov u zakhidnykh oblastyakh URSR u druhii polovyni 40-kh-50-kh rokakh," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 10 (October 1989): 57.

12. See Armstrong, op. cit., p. 300.

13. *Pravda Ukrainy*, January 15, 1949.

14. I. P. Bohodyst, "Sotsialistychna perebudova zakhidnoukrainskoho sela," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 2 (February 1957): 75.

15. *Radyanska Ukraina*, March 24, 1948.

16. V. P. Stolyarenko, *Sotsialistychne peretvorennia silskoho hospodarstva na Volnyi (1944-1958)* (Kiev, 1958), p. 56.

17. In Volyn Oblast, for example, which may be taken as representative of Western Ukraine, a Soviet source admits that in 691 out of 1,074 kolkhozy established by 1949, "the organization of work was on a low technical level," and the accountants in particular lacked the necessary preparation. See *Z istorii kolektyvizatsii silskoho hospodarstva zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainskoi RSR (1939-1950)* (Kiev, 1976), p. 416 [Referred to hereafter as *Z ist.*]; and Stolyarenko, *Sotsialistychne peretvorennia*, 68.

18. Stolyarenko, *Sotsialistychne peretvorennia*, pp. 57-58.

19. Information of Lviv oblast executive committee to the UkSSR Council of Ministers, December 30, 1948, "Pro provedennia oblasnoi narady holiv kolhospiv, peredoviykiv-kolhospnykiv i selian-odnoosobnykiv," cited in *Z ist.*, p. 377.

20. Bohodyst, op. cit., p. 76.

21. *Arkhiv misii UPA pry UHVR (1945-1950)* (Munich), folio 6, no. 1, pp. 8-10.

22. *Ukrainian Bulletin* (New York), September 15, 1948.

23. *Radyanska Drohobychchyna* (Drohobych, 1957), p. 129.

24. *Radyanska Ukraina*, September 9, 1948.
25. *Ibid.*, November 24, 1948.
26. Information of the newspaper *Vilna Ukraina*, November 26, 1948, "Pro ekskursii kolhospnykiv skhidnykh oblastei URSSR dlya zapozychennya peredovoho dosvidu i oznaiomlennya z zhyttiam kolhospnykiv," cited in *Z ist.*, p. 361.
27. *Radyanska Ukraina*, November 24, 1948.
28. See, for example, *Istoriya selyanstva Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1967), vol. 2, p. 391; and M. K. Ivasyuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnogo budivnytstva v zakhidnykh oblastyakh Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1962), p. 102.
29. Ivasyuta, op. cit., p. 47.
30. M. O. Butsko, *KPSR: orhanizator vsenarodnoi dopomohy trudyashchym zakhidnykh oblastei URSSR v vidbudovi i dalshomu rozvytku narodnogo hospodarstva (1944–1950 rr.)* (Kiev, 1959), p. 93.
31. *Radyanska Ukraina*, November 25, 1948.
32. *Ukrainian Bulletin*, December 15, 1948.
33. *Radyanska Ukraina*, July 27, 1948.
34. *Ibid.*, July 14, 1948.
35. *Ibid.*, December 22, 1948.
36. *Pravda Ukrainy*, January 30, 1946.
37. Report of the agricultural section of Lviv oblast executive committee CPU, December 2, 1949, "Pro khid kolektyvizatsii v oblasti," cited in *Z ist.*, p. 396.
38. V. P. Stolyarenko, "Borotba komunistychnoi partyi za sotsialistychno peretvorennya ta dalshyi rozvytok silskoho hospodarstva zakhidnykh oblastei URSSR." In *Z istorii zakhidnoukrainskykh zemel*, no. 5 (1960): 63.
39. Resolution of the XVI Congress of the CPU on the report of the CC CPU, January 28, 1949, "Pro zavdannya v orhanizatsiino-hospodarskomu zmitsnenni kolhospiv zakhidnykh oblastyakh URSSR," cited in *Z ist.*, p. 73.
40. On the kulak question, see Chapter Six.
41. *Arkhiv misii UPA*, folio 6, no. 5, p. 1.
42. *Ibid.*
43. See, for example, R. W. Davies, *The Soviet Collective Farm [The Industrialization of Soviet Russia 2]* (London, 1980), pp. 101–2.
44. Information of Transcarpathia oblast committee CPU to the CC CPSU, December 8, 1948, "Pro khid kolektyvizatsii v oblasti v 1948 r.," cited in *Z ist.*, p. 370.
45. *Narysy istorii Zakarpatskoi oblasnoi partiinoi orhanizatsii* (Uzhhorod, 1980), pp. 162–63.
46. On the insurgents, see Y. Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic*, pp. 111–40.
47. *Radyanska Ukraina*, September 25, 1948.

48. Bohodyst, op. cit., pp. 77-78.
49. Cited in Department of State (USA), OIR Report No. 4228-R, "Nature and Extent of Disaffection in the Ukraine," March 17, 1948, p. 12.
50. *Arkhiv misii UPA*, folio 6, no. 1, pp. 8-10.
51. *Radyanska Ukraina*, March 6, 1948.
52. *Pravda Ukrainy*, January 15, 1949.
53. V. Holubnychy, "Outline History of the Communist Party of Ukraine." In *Soviet Regional Economics: Selected Works of Vsevolod Holubnychy* (ed. I. S. Koropecyk) (Edmonton, 1982), p. 120.
54. *Arkhiv misii UPA*, folio 6, no. 1, pp. 1-4.
55. Slon had evidently been reinstated by November 29, 1950; witness the report given under his name at the Stanyslaviv committee plenum on this date, cited in *Z ist.*, pp. 450-51.
56. See Sullivant, *Soviet Politics in the Ukraine*, p. 273.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 275.
58. See, for example, M. McCauley, *The Soviet Union Since 1917* (London, 1981), pp. 135-36.
59. On the formation of the MTS in Western Ukraine (the decree has never been published), see Ivasyuta, op. cit., p. 132.
60. Note of the deputy chief of the Western Ukrainian section of the Ukrainian Ministry of Agriculture, P. Cheresnyuk, September 17, 1948, "Pro velyki peretvorennia v zakhidno-ukrainskomu seli," cited in *Z ist.*, p. 347.
61. *Sots. pereb.*, vol. 2, p. 259.
62. A. Korbonski, *Politics of Socialist Agriculture in Poland: 1945-1960* (New York, 1965), p. 135. For a reference to the Cominform, see Jacobs, op. cit., pp. 422-25.
63. A report of an UPA scouting mission in Horodok Raion (Lviv Oblast) points out that in February 1948, the raion authorities demanded that "not less than 50 percent of peasant households had to be collectivized by the spring of 1948," and the rest by the end of the year. It is probable that this was the Soviet policy for the entire Western Ukraine. See *Arkhiv misii UPA*, folio 7, no. 8, p. 6.
64. M. A. Vyltsan, M. P. Danilov, V. V. Kabanov and Iu. A. Moshkov, *Kolektivizatsiia selskogo khoziaistva v SSSR: puti, formy, dostizheniia* (Moscow, 1982), p. 327.
65. E. P. Beliazo, "Sotsialisticheskoe pereustroistvo selskogo khoziaistva zapadnykh oblastei BSSR." In *Tridstat let po sotsialisticheskomu puti: Tezisy dokladov i soobshchenii vsesoyuznoi nauchnoi konferentsii, posvyashchennoi problemam kollektivizatsii selskogo khoziaistva Pribaltiki, zapadnykh oblastei Ukrainy, Belorussii i Moldavii*, vol. 1 (Vilnius, 1979), pp. 77-78.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

67. Taagepera, op. cit., p. 387.
68. See, for example, V. Cherednychenko, *Natsionalizm proty natsii* (Kiev, 1970), pp. 157–67, a virulent anti-UPA tract.
69. *Sots. pereb.*, vol. 2, p. 259.
70. Jacobs, op. cit., p. 509.
71. See, for example, Korbonski, op. cit., pp. 159–91, and especially pp. 189–90.
72. Jacobs, op. cit., p. 509.
73. In Drohobych Oblast, for example, the MTS political sections, upon formation, at once began a purge of “kulak elements” in kolkhozy. See *Radyanska Drohobychchyna*, p. 128.
74. See, for example, Ivasyuta, op. cit., p. 145.

8 KHRUSHCHEV AND MASS COLLECTIVIZATION IN WESTERN UKRAINE, 1950–1951

1. Decree of the UkSSR Council of Ministers and the CC CPSU, July 12, 1950, “Pro vydachu kolhospam zakhidnykh, Izmailskoi, Chernivetskoi i Zakarpatskoi oblastei derzhavnykh aktiv na beztrovoke (vichne) korystuvannya zemleyu,” cited in *Z istorii kolektyvizatsii silskoho hospodarstva zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1976), p. 76. [Referred to hereafter as *Z ist.*]
2. Report of Lviv oblast committee CPU at the Plenum of the CC CPU, April 12, 1950, “Pro orhanizatsiino-hospodarske zmitsnennya kolhospiv oblasti,” cited in *ibid.*, p. 426.
3. *Ukrainian Bulletin*, June 1, 1950.
4. Decree of Stanyslaviv oblast executive committee and the buro of the oblast committee CPU, April 1, 1950, “Pro khid kolektyvizatsii i zakhody orhanizatsiino-hospodarskoho zmitsnennya kolhospiv oblasti,” cited in *Z ist.*, p. 425.
5. *Radyanska Ukraina*, February 17, 1950.
6. *Almanakh Stanyslavivskoi zemli. Zbirnyk materialiv do istorii Stanyslavova i Stanyslavivshchyny* (New York, 1975), p. 189.
7. *Komunistychna partiya Ukrainy v rezolyutsiyakh i rishennyakh zizdiv konferentsii i plenumiv TsK*, vol. 2, 1941–1976 (Kiev, 1977), p. 321.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 328–29.
9. M.K. Ivasyuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnogo budivnytstva v zakhidnykh oblastyakh Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1962), p. 144.
10. Cited in *Ukrainian Bulletin*, June 1, 1950.
11. *Sotsialistychna perebudova i rozvytok silskoho hospodarstva Ukrainskoi RSR*, Vol. 2, 1938–1966 (Kiev, 1968), p. 261.
12. V. Holubnychy, *Soviet Regional Economics: Selected Works of Vsevolod Holubnychy* (Edmonton, 1982), p. 120.

13. Decree of the Stanyslaviv oblast committee, April 1, 1950, cited in *Z ist.*, p. 425; Report of the Stanyslaviv oblast agricultural administration to the oblast executive committee, after January 1, 1951, "Pro kolektyvizatsiyu ta rozvytok tvarynytstva v kolhospakh oblasti za 1950r.," cited in *ibid.*, p. 457.

14. Decree of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers and the CC CPU, June 10, 1950, "Pro provedennya ekskursii kolhospnykiv zakhidnykh, Zakarpatskoi i Izmailskoi oblasti v peredovi kolhospy skhidnykh oblasti URSS," cited in *ibid.*, pp. 75-76.

15. Decree of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers and the CC CPU, July 12, 1950, "Pro vydachu kolhospam zakhidnykh, Izmailskoi, Chernivetskoi i Zakarpatskoi oblasti derzhavnykh aktiv na bezstrokovu (vichne) korystuvannya zemleyu," cited in *ibid.*, pp. 76-79.

16. *Radyanska Ukraina*, August 8, 1950.

17. See, for example, *ibid.*, January 19, 1950.

18. *Ibid.*, March 31, 1950.

19. *Ibid.*, January 28, 1950.

20. Ivasyuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnoho*, p. 145.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 128.

22. P.M. Khorolets, "Pikluvannya komunistychnoi partii pro pidvyshchennya kulturno-tekhnychnoho rivnya trudyashchykh zakhidnykh oblasti Ukrainskoi RSR (1946-1950rr.)," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 5 (May 1960): 13.

23. Ivasyuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnoho*, p. 128; *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, Vol. 2, p. 264.

24. *Radyanska Ukraina*, March 7, 1950.

25. Information of Lviv Oblast statistical administration to the Ukrainian SSR Statistical Administration, before June 8, 1950, "Pro osnovni pokaznyky roboty kolhospiv na 15 travnya 1950r.," cited in *Z ist.*, pp. 431-32.

26. *Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR* (1957), p. 239.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 239, 349.

28. Ivasyuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnoho*, p. 146.

29. Information of Lviv Oblast, June 8, 1950, cited in *Z ist.*, pp. 430-31.

30. Report of the secretary of the Stanyslaviv oblast committee CPU, M.V. Slon, at the oblast committee plenum, November 29, 1950, "Pro hospodarske budivnytstvo i partiino-politychnu robotu v kolhospakh oblasti," cited in *ibid.*, p. 450.

31. *Radyanska Ukraina*, August 8, 1950.

32. *Ibid.*, January 26, 1950.

33. *Ibid.*, January 7, 1950.

34. See Chapter Two.

35. *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, Vol. 2, p. 269.
36. M.O. Butsko, KPRS: *orhanizator usenarodnoi dopomohy trudyashchym zakhidnykh oblastei URSR v vidbudovi i dalshomu rozvytku narodnoho hospodarstva (1944–1950rr.)* (Kiev, 1959), p. 90.
37. *Radyanska Ukraina*, February 22, 1948.
38. Ivasyuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnoho*, p. 131.
39. V.P. Stolyarenko, *Sotsialistychne peretvorennya silskoho hospodarstva na Volyni (1944–1950rr.)* (Kiev, 1958), p. 68.
40. Report of the Ukrainian SSR Statistical Administration to the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, November 17, 1949, "Pro sotsialistychnu perebudovu i rekonstruktsiyu silskoho hospodarstva zakhidnykh oblastei," cited in *Sotsialistychni peretvorennya v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainskoi RSR 1939–1979: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kiev, 1980), p. 199.
41. *Radyanska Ukraina*, March 30, 1948.
42. *KPU v rezolyutsiyakh*, Vol. 2, p. 169.
43. Stolyarenko, *Sotsialistychne peretvorennya*, p. 68.
44. Ivasyuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnoho*, p. 131.
45. *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, Vol. 2, p. 270.
46. *Radyanska Ukraina*, November 31, 1950.
47. *Narodnoe hospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1957), p. 322.
48. *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, Vol. 2, p. 273.
49. Robert F. Miller, *One Hundred Thousand Tractors* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), pp. 279–80.
50. See Chapter Two.
51. *Narodnoe hospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR* (1957), pp. 267, 272.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 272.
53. *Narodnoe hospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1965), pp. 352–53.
54. Lazar Volin, *A Survey of Soviet Russian Agriculture* (Washington, D.C., 1951), p. 29.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
56. *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, Vol. 2, p. 208.
57. Miller, *One Hundred Thousand Tractors*, p. 58.
58. M. Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled* (New York, 1953), p. 539.
59. R.D. Laird, *Collective Farming in Russia: A Political Study of the Soviet Kolkhozy* (Lawrence, Kansas, 1958), p. 131.
60. V. Yurchuk (1965), *Borotba KP Ukrainy za vidbudovi i rozvytok narodnoho hospodarstva (1945–1952rr.)* (Kiev, 1965), p. 209.
61. N. Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR: Plans and Performance* (Stanford, 1949), p. 158; Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled*, p. 540.
62. Naum Jasny also stated that the campaign began in the "second half of 1949." N. Jasny, "Kolkhozy, The Achilles Heel of the Soviet Regime," *Soviet Studies* III, no. 2 (October 1951): 158.

63. On the Khrushchev-Beria rivalry, see V. Popyk and D. Tabachnyk, "U chortoryi Beriivskoi zmovy," *Ukraina*, no. 49–50 (December 1990): 38–44.

64. Benediktov "paid the price" for such lack of support by being eventually removed from office by Khrushchev himself to take up the largely ceremonial position of Soviet ambassador to India. See *Khrushchev Remembers*, introd. E. Crankshaw (Boston, 1970), pp. 289, and 294–95.

65. Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled*, p. 540.

66. Miller, *One Hundred Thousand Tractors*, p. 57.

67. J.A. Armstrong, *The Politics of Totalitarianism: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1934 to the Present* (New York, 1961), p. 207.

68. *Istoriya selyanstva Ukrainskoi RSR*, vol. 2 (Kiev, 1967), p. 404.

69. Ivasyuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnoho*, p. 124.

70. *Istoriya selyanstva*, vol. 2, p. 404.

71. I.A. Teterin, *Sotsialistychni peretvorennia v silskomu hospodarstvi zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainy* (Kiev, 1954), p. 23.

72. Ivasyuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnoho*, p. 124.

73. Teterin, *Sotsialistychni peretvorennia*, p. 23.

74. Information of Transcarpathia oblast committee CPU to the CC CPU, October 11, 1950, "Pro khid ukрупnennia kolhospiv ta zmitsnennia skladu kerivnykh pratsivnykh kolhospiv oblasti," cited in *Z ist.*, p. 442.

75. Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled*, p. 540.

76. In other words, Soviet authorities were willing to leave land fallow in the mountain areas that had long provided a living for the peasants in order that collectivization might be achieved more easily.

77. Report of the Chernivtsi oblast committee CPU to the CC CPU, December 20, 1950, "Pro ukрупnennia kolhospiv ta zmitsnennia ikh kerivnytstva," cited in *Radyanska Bukovyna 1946–1970: Dokumenty i materialy* (Uzhhorod, 1980), pp. 64–65.

78. B. Lewytskyj, *Die Sowjetukraine 1944–1963* (Cologne, 1964), pp. 50–51.

79. Jasny, "Kolkhozy, The Achilles Heel," p. 158.

80. E. Zaleski, *Stalinist Planning for Economic Growth, 1933–1953* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1980), p. 376.

81. I.M. Makoviichuk, Yu.H. Pylyavets, "Holod na Ukraini u 1946–1947rr.," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 8 (August 1990): 27.

82. See, for example, *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, vol. 2, p. 244.

83. V. Kubijovyc in *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia (UCE)*, vol. 2, (Toronto, 1971), p. 880.

84. *Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1957), pp. 120, 163.

85. Kubijovyc in *UCE*, vol. 2, p. 879.

86. Ivasyuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnoho*, p. 138.

87. L.H. Kozlovska, *Rozvytok narodnoho hospodarstva Zakarpatskoi oblasti za roky radyanskoi vlady* (Lviv, 1959), p. 107.

88. Lewytzkyj, *Die Sowjetukraine*, p. 53.

89. V. Zadorozhny and M. Palamarchuk, *Uspikhy ekonomichnoho rozvytku zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1960), p. 126.

90. *Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR v 1964 rotsi. Statystychnyi shchorichnyk* (Kiev, 1965), p. 164.

91. See David R. Marples, "Collective Farm Production in East and West Ukraine during the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1946-1950): A Comparative Study," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* XXII, no. 4 (December 1980): 503-4.

92. Makoviichuk and Pylyavets, "Holod na Ukraini," p. 28; and Teterin, *Sotsialistychni peretvorennia*, p. 22.

93. V.P. Stolyarenko, *Sotsialistychne peretvorennia silskoho hospodarstva na Volyni (1944-1950rr.)* (Kiev, 1958), p. 91.

94. Calculated from Tsentralnoe statisticheskoe upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, *Itogi vsesoyuznoi perepisi naselennia 1950 goda. Ukrain-skaya SSR* (Moscow, 1963), p. 16.

95. *Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR* (1957), p. 238.

96. *Ibid.*, pp. 300-301.

97. Karl-Eugen Waedekin, "The Re-emergence of the Kolkhoz Principle," *Soviet Studies* XLI, no. 1 (January 1989): 21.

98. *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, vol. 2, p. 263.

99. *Radyanska Ukraina*, June 18, 1950.

100. Ivasyuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnoho*, p. 141. The use of the term "household" by Ivasyuta and other Soviet authors is confusing. In all probability, they are calculating the average number of labor days earned by the able-bodied members of a household, since given the large percentages of nonable-bodied persons in the Western Ukrainian kolkhozy in the early postwar years, the average number of labor days earned by all household members would have been much lower than this total.

101. This is evident from a comparison of reports given by Soviet scholars and Soviet statistical handbooks. For example, Ivasyuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnoho*, p. 141, gives the number of labor days attained by the Volyn households in 1950 as 280. *Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR* (1957), p. 296, on the other hand, gives the total as 310. There are numerous similar examples, all of which suggest that the figures cited in the statistical handbooks are inflated.

102. See *Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR* (1957), pp. 300-301.

103. Kozlovska, *Rozvytok narodnoho hospodarstva*, p. 86.

104. *Istoriia selyanstva*, vol. 2, p. 408.

105. Again this is based on the supposition that Soviet totals are based on reports from model rather than average kolkhozy.

106. *Narodne gospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR* (1957), pp. 300–301.
107. Ibid.
108. *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, vol. 2, p. 244.
109. Ibid., p. 296.
110. E.M. Jacobs, "The Collectivization of Agriculture in Right-Bank Moldavia, 1939–1950," Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economic and Political Science, 1979, p. 490.
111. *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, vol. 2, p. 244.
112. See Marples, "Collective Farm Production," p. 503.

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