

OREST SUBTELNY

UKRAINE

A HISTORY

FOURTH
EDITION



UKRAINE: A HISTORY

Fourth Edition

In 1988, the first edition of Orest Subtelny's *Ukraine* was published to international acclaim, as the definitive history of what was at that time a republic in the USSR. In the years since, the world has seen the dismantling of the Soviet bloc and the restoration of Ukraine's independence – an event celebrated by Ukrainians around the world but which also heralded a time of tumultuous change for those in the homeland.

While previous updates brought readers up to the year 2000, this new fourth edition includes an overview of Ukraine's most recent history, focusing on the dramatic political, socio-economic, and cultural changes that occurred during the Kuchma and Yushchenko presidencies. It analyses political developments – particularly the so-called Orange Revolution – and the institutional growth of the new state. Subtelny examines Ukraine's entry into the era of globalization, looking at social and economic transformations, regional, ideological, and linguistic tensions, and describes the myriad challenges currently facing Ukrainian state and society.

OREST SUBTELNY is a professor in the departments of History and Political Science at York University.

Other books by the author

Domination of Eastern Europe

The Mazepists: Ukrainian Separatism in the 18th Century

The Letters of Ivan Mazepa

Habsburgs and Zaporozhian Cossacks (with L. Wynar)

Ukrainians in North America: An Illustrated History

Orest Subtelny

UKRAINE

A HISTORY

Fourth Edition

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
Toronto Buffalo London

© University of Toronto Press Incorporated 1988, 1994, 2000, 2009

Toronto Buffalo London

www.utppublishing.com

Printed in Canada

Published 1988; reprinted in paper 1989, 1990, 1992; reprinted in cloth 1989, 1991

Second edition 1994; reprinted in paper 1998

Third edition 2000, reprinted in paper 2005

Fourth edition 2009

ISBN 978-1-4426-4016-0 (cloth)

ISBN 978-1-4426-0991-4 (paper)



Printed on acid-free paper.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication

Subtelny, Orest

Ukraine : a history / Orest Subtelny. – 4th ed.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-4426-4016-0 (bound) ISBN 978-1-4426-0991-4 (pbk.)

1. Ukraine – History. I. Title.

DK508.51.S82 2009 947.1 C2009-904728-4

This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, through the Aid to Scholarly Publications Programme, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

The University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial assistance to its publishing program of the Canada Council for the Arts and the Ontario Arts Council.



Canada Council
for the Arts

Conseil des Arts
du Canada



ONTARIO ARTS COUNCIL
CONSEIL DES ARTS DE L'ONTARIO

University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial support for its publishing activities of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program (BPIDP).

To those who had to leave their homeland
but never forgot it

This page intentionally left blank

Contents

MAPS ix

PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION xi

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION xiii

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION xv

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION xvii

Introduction: The Earliest Times 3

Part One Kievan Rus'

- 1 The Rise and Decline of Kievan Rus' 19
- 2 The Society and Culture of Kievan Rus' 42
- 3 Galicia-Volhynia 55

Part Two The Polish-Lithuanian Period

- 4 Under Polish and Lithuanian Rule 69
- 5 Social Structure and Economic Change 81
- 6 Religion and Culture 92

Part Three The Cossack Era

- 7 The Formative Phase 105
- 8 The Great Revolt 123
- 9 The Ruin 139

- 10 The Hetmanate 158
- 11 Society, Economics, and Culture 178

Part Four Ukraine under Imperial Rule

- 12 Russian and Austrian Imperial Rule in Ukraine 201
- 13 The Growth of National Consciousness 221
- 14 Imperial Reforms 243
- 15 Socioeconomic Change 243
- 16 Intelligentsia Activism 279
- 17 Eastern Galicia: A Bastion of Ukrainianism 307

Part Five Twentieth-Century Ukraine

- 18 War and Revolution 339
- 19 The Ukrainian Revolution 355
- 20 Soviet Ukraine: The Innovative Twenties 380
- 21 Soviet Ukraine: The Traumatic Thirties 403
- 22 Western Ukraine between the Wars 425
- 23 Ukraine during the Second World War 453
- 24 Reconstruction and Retrenchment 481
- 25 The Thaw 496
- 26 Stagnation and Attempts at Reform 510
- 27 The Immigrants 538
- 28 The Ukrainian Diaspora 559
- 29 The New Era 573
- 30 The Troubled Transition 597
- 31 The Age of Globalization 633

NOTES 677

ABBREVIATIONS 695

GLOSSARY 696

SELECTED READINGS IN ENGLISH 699

INDEX 735

Illustrations follow pages 65, 198, 335, 452, 572, 595, 632, and 676.

Maps

Introduction: The Earliest Times

- 1 Geographic zones / 4
- 2 Prehistoric cultures and sites / 7
- 3 Nomadic migrations / 10
- 4 Greek colonization / 14

Part One Kievan Rus'

- 5a Slavic dispersion / 20
- 5b East Slavic tribes / 20
- 6 Varangian (Viking, Norman) expansion / 24
- 7 Kievan Rus' in the 10th century / 30
- 8 Mongol incursions / 40
- 9 Galicia-Volhynia / 58

Part Two The Polish-Lithuanian Period

- 10 Polish and Lithuanian expansion / 71
- 11 The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth / 82

Part Three The Cossack Era

- 12 The Campaigns of Khmelnytsky / 130
- 13 Russian-ruled Ukraine in the early 18th century / 162
- 14 Russian expansion in Ukraine in the late 18th century / 174
- 15 Extent of colonization / 186

Part Four Ukraine under Imperial Rule

- 16 Russian-ruled Ukraine in the 19th century / 208

- 17 West Ukrainian lands in the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the late 19th century / 246
- 18 Industrial regions in the Russian Empire in the late 19th century / 266

Part Five Twentieth-Century Ukraine

- 19 Ukraine in the First World War / 342
- 20 German/Austrian invasion in 1918 / 351
- 21 Ukraine in 1917–20 / 366
- 22 Soviet Ukraine during the interwar period / 382
- 23 Western Ukraine during the interwar period / 426
- 24 The German invasion of 1941 / 462
- 25 Ukraine under German rule 1941–44 / 466
- 26 Territorial gains of Soviet Ukraine 1939–54 / 482
- 27 Administrative division of Soviet Ukraine ca 1960 / 498
- 28 Russian speakers in Soviet Ukraine, 1970 / 522
- 29 Destinations of Ukrainian emigrants / 556
- 30 Results of the referendum on Ukrainian independence, 1991 / 584

Preface to the Fourth Edition

In the first decade of the new millennium, Ukraine was characterized by both change and the lack of it. Radical transformations – one might even call them a creeping revolution – became ever more evident. Most striking was the Orange Revolution, a dramatic and civilized demonstration of people power. Capturing the attention of the world, it propelled Ukraine out of the fog of incomprehension and ignorance that had so long surrounded it. Less dramatically but even more extensively, the global economy expanded into the country, drawing it into the all-encompassing process of globalization. Clearly isolation was quickly becoming a thing of the past.

At the same time, Ukraine remained a country in transition. It was still far from completing the changes required of a modern, democratic, and market-oriented society. Much-needed political, economic, and social reforms were stalled. The country finally acquired its own elite. But it was still immature, self-centred, and devoid of constructive goals. The emergence of a middle class, a *sine qua non* of a European-type society, was slow and limited. Meanwhile, the decline of the pillars of traditional Ukrainian society, the intelligentsia and village, gathered momentum. As in most post-Soviet states, corruption was rampant. And demographic conditions went from bad to worse. Although many now accepted the existence of a Ukrainian state in principle, a disturbingly large portion of its citizens were frustrated and disillusioned by the way it functioned in practice. However, its numerous weaknesses notwithstanding, Ukraine was gradually becoming ever more similar to other European societies. And this meant that as the new millennium began a crucial turning point in Ukraine's long and complex history had been reached.

I am grateful to my wife, Maria, for the support she provided in the preparation of this expanded edition. A technical note: among Ukrainians the preferred spelling of their capital's name is Kyiv. I have adopted this version. However, because this book first appeared in 1988, before the Ukrainian ver-

sion was adopted, the old version, Kiev, will, unfortunately, have to be used in this publication.

Orest Subtelny
Toronto, July 2009

Preface to the Third Edition

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, hopes for a rapid transformation of the former republics into democratic societies with market-based economies were high. But, as time passed, it has become clear that these expectations had been far too optimistic. Reforming post-Soviet societies proved to be an extraordinarily difficult and frustrating process. Soviet structures and values had much deeper roots than many realized and, by the same token, the basis for democratic institutions and market-oriented reforms was much weaker than expected. This was especially the case in Ukraine, where so much of Soviet industry and agriculture had been concentrated.

There were, however, noteworthy achievements during the initial phase of independence. State-building in Ukraine was largely completed and the country gained acceptance as a full-fledged member of the international community. In the complex process of nation-building there was also progress, although national solidarity did not as yet reach the levels found in most countries of eastern and western Europe. But it was in the socio-economic field, where hopes for improvement had been the highest, that disappointment was the greatest. Instead of a transition to a new economy, Ukrainians experienced a prolonged deterioration and collapse of the old economy. Unfortunately, it was this painful and all-encompassing process that set the tone for Ukraine's first decade as an independent state. Nonetheless, as the new millennium began, it was clear that the process of transition from the Soviet system had reached the point of no return and that the benefits of change would come, if not in the next decade, then in the next generation.

The third edition of *Ukraine: A History* contains a new and lengthy chapter on the first ten years of Ukrainian independence. An updated bibliography is also included. I am grateful to Ron Schoeffel of the University of Toronto Press for his continuous support of this book and to Taras Kuzio for his helpful comments and the photographs that he provided for the new edition.

Orest Subtelny
Toronto, July 2000

Preface to the Second Edition

What has occurred in Ukraine since this book first appeared in 1988 still boggles the mind. Suddenly and unexpectedly, the seemingly monolithic Soviet Union disintegrated. With it some of the features that have distinguished Ukrainian history for centuries disappeared, or at least receded: imperial rule, the economic exploitation of the land, and the repression of Ukrainian national culture. On 24 August 1991 Ukraine proclaimed its independence, and in a referendum held on 1 December of that year, its population supported the proclamation in overwhelming numbers. Since statelessness had been a central theme of Ukrainian history for more than 600 years, the acquisition of a genuinely independent state was clearly a dramatic turning point. And it was bound to exert a decisive influence on another key historical theme, that of modernization. In Ukraine this universal, ongoing process had perennially been directed by foreign powers and had primarily served their interests, often to the disadvantage of the land's population. With independence, the responsibility for deciding how they would become modern, and, of more immediate concern, how they would extricate themselves from the economic morass left behind by the Soviet system, finally passed into the hands of the Ukrainians themselves. As Ukraine gained control of its political and economic fate, it started to shed some of the anomalies that had characterized its past. It began to fall into step with the modern world.

Clearly these are changes of the greatest magnitude, and a history of Ukraine would be incomplete if it did not incorporate them. Hence this second edition. It contains a new chapter, which surveys the far-reaching transformations that occurred between 1988 and 1993. The reader should keep in mind, however, that Ukraine today is a society still very much in a state of flux. While the general outline of its transformation is visible, the historical significance of many recent events and developments will become clear only with time.

This new edition also includes an updated bibliography and corrections of a few minor errors that crept into the previous edition. I am grateful to those who brought them to my attention. My thanks also to Roma Hadzewycz of the *Ukrainian Weekly* for providing new photographs.

Orest Subtelny
Toronto, February 1993

Preface to the First Edition

Ukraine is the second-largest land in Europe. Its population is close to that of France and its GNP is comparable to Italy's. Yet the political prerogatives of the Ukrainians as a nation – not only in Europe but even in their own well-endowed and highly developed land – are minimal. Today the source of ultimate decision-making power over all aspects of Ukrainians' lives is located, as it has been for centuries, beyond the borders of their country. At a time when even the most impoverished and underdeveloped states in the third world enjoy full sovereignty, Ukraine has practically none. This great discrepancy is a historical puzzle, one that calls for an examination of the often overlooked and even more frequently misunderstood past of Ukraine and the Ukrainians.

In dealing with Ukrainian history, I stress two themes. One of them is statelessness. In most national histories the acquisition and development of the nation-state is a paramount feature, but in the Ukrainian case the opposite is true. The frustration of the Ukrainians' attempts to attain self-government is one of the key aspects of their historical experience. Therefore, the Ukrainian past is largely the history of a nation that has had to survive and evolve without the framework of a full-fledged national state.

Modernization is the other major theme of this work. The transformation of traditional agrarian societies into modern industrial and postindustrial ones is, of course, a global phenomenon. But in this general process there is a multiplicity of national/regional forms and variations. Modernization in Ukraine is striking in several ways. Once a quintessentially agrarian society, Ukraine became an industrialized country in an unusually rapid and traumatic fashion. Even more noteworthy is that modernization in Ukraine occurred largely under the aegis of non-Ukrainians. Thus, to this day a crucial dichotomy still exists between things Ukrainian and modern.

Clearly there is much more to Ukrainian history than can be subsumed under these two major themes. Indeed, there are times and events that stand

in contradiction to them. For example, in medieval Kievan Rus', Ukraine formed the core of an impressive political, cultural, and economic conglomerate. In the 17th century the Cossacks were singularly successful in expelling foreign domination from the land. And in the late 17th and early 18th centuries the Ukrainians were the representatives of modernity for the Russians, not vice versa, as was the case later. The early 20th century witnessed determined efforts on the part of Ukrainians to gain control of their own political and socioeconomic fate. The two themes of statelessness and modernization also cannot encompass the ancient and eventful past of a land that bears some of the oldest traces of human life in Europe, that was part of the classic Mediterranean civilizations, that attracted countless waves of nomadic invaders from Asia, that served as the cultural border between the East and West, and that witnessed the colonization of a vast frontier. Nonetheless, the condition of statelessness and the non-native predominance in modernization are important focal points and they help to illuminate the unusually broad, colorful, and complex canvas that is the history of Ukraine.

I was most fortunate in studying Ukrainian history, a field in which, until lately, good training has not been readily available. At various stages during these studies my mentors were three outstanding historians of Ukraine – the late Ivan Lysiak Rudnytsky, Oleksander Ohloblyn, and Omeljan Pritsak. To them I owe a great debt of gratitude, a modest expression of which is, I hope, the appearance of this book.

Colleagues in the field have helped me greatly in the preparation of the manuscript. For careful readings of and judicious comments on various chapters I thank Marko Antonovych, Yaroslav Bilinsky, Yuri Boshyk, John-Paul Himka, Wsevolod Isajiw, Miroslav Labunka, George Luckyj, and especially Danylo Husar-Struk. The maps were prepared by Carolyn Gondor, Carol Randall and Janet Allin of the York University Cartographic Office, and Vladimira Luczkiw, Andrew Gregorovich, Iosyp Terelia, Taras and Oksana Zakydalsky, and Daria Darevych furnished some of the illustrations. Various institutions provided financial support for this project. They include the Multiculturalism Directorate of the Secretary of State, York University, the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, and the Shevchenko Scientific Society in the United States. Special thanks are also due to the editorial staff of the University of Toronto Press. Ron Schoeffel greatly expedited the publication of the book and Lydia Burton and Lorraine Ourom, the copy editors, were models of efficiency and expertise with whom it was a pleasure to work. Finally, I owe the sincerest appreciation to my wife, Maria, whose patience, knowledge, and counsel was for me a great support.

Orest Subtelny
Toronto, July 1988

UKRAINE: A HISTORY


This page intentionally left blank

Introduction

The Earliest Times

Ukraine means borderland. It is an appropriate name for a land that lies on the southeastern edge of Europe, on the threshold of Asia, along the fringes of the Mediterranean world, and astride the once important border between sheltering forests and the open steppe. Another crucial geographical feature of the land is its lack of natural borders. Except for the Carpathian Mountains in the west and the small Crimean range in the south, 95% of Ukraine's territory is a plain that gradually slopes from the elevated, wooded plateau of Galicia, Volhynia, and Podilia in the northwest down to the gently rolling forested plains on both sides of the Dnieper River and finally to the huge, flat, open steppe that stretches along the Black Sea coast in the south. Indeed, vast plains dominate the Ukrainian landscape to such an extent that a geographer in the early part of this century wrote that "nine-tenths of Ukrainians have certainly never seen a mountain and do not even know what one looks like."¹ In these rolling plains and steppes Ukraine's famous and remarkably fertile black soil (chernozem) regions are found. They encompass about two-thirds of Ukraine's territory. However, the black soil does not extend to the northern and northwestern parts of the country, where forests (which cover only about one-seventh of the country's territory) and less fertile land predominate. Ukraine is rich in mineral deposits, notably coal and iron ore, which are located in the southeast. On the whole, nature has served the land well. One may even argue that in terms of natural resources it is the richest country in Europe.

Flowing southward into the Black Sea are three major river systems that provide Ukraine with an adequate water supply: the mighty 2285-km-long Dnieper (Dnipro in Ukrainian), which bisects the land, the southern Buh, and the Dnister. The climate, although capable of temperature extremes, is generally moderate. Within its present boundaries, Ukraine encompasses about 600,000 sq. km and extends approximately 1300 km from west to east and 900 km from north to south. After Russia, it is the second-largest country in Eu-



Map 1 Geographic zones

rope in terms of area. And its current population of about 50 million is close to that of France.

Because science and technology have greatly reduced the dependence of modern people on nature, they often forget the tremendous impact that the physical environment exerted on their ancestors. In Ukraine this fading awareness is doubly surprising because the very name of the land emphasizes the importance of geography. And much of Ukraine's history is a function of its location. Lying astride the main routes between Europe and Asia, Ukraine was repeatedly exposed to various frequently competing cultures. By means of the Black Sea, Ukraine gained access to the invigorating civilization of Greece, both ancient and Byzantine. In contrast, its position on the western fringe of the great Eurasian steppe exposed it to repeated invasions by warring nomads and the bitter struggle against them sapped the country's human and material resources. It also gave rise to the Cossacks, the frontier warriors who became archetypical figures in Ukrainian history and culture.

The vast stretches of chernozem, which are among the largest and most fertile in the world, also had a decisive impact on this region's inhabitants. It was in Ukraine that the earliest agrarian civilizations in Europe developed. And, until very recently, agriculture has been the hallmark of Ukrainian life. The effect that Ukraine's fertile soil has had on its inhabitants is especially striking when compared to the impact of poor soil on the peasants of neighboring Russia. In the Russian north, the barren, sandy soil, the harsh climate, and the shorter growing season – by at least a month compared to Ukraine – forced Russian peasants to pool their resources and to work the land communally. In Ukraine, however, individual farming was much more widespread. Such divergences helped to create important distinctions between the mentalities, cultures, and socioeconomic organization of these two related peoples. These differences became even more profound when, in time, poor agricultural yields forced Russian peasants to seek more promising living conditions in the cities where they were exposed to modernizing influences, while Ukrainian peasants remained in their bucolic but traditionalist villages.

If nature has been generous to Ukraine, history has not. Because of its natural riches and accessibility from ancient past to most recent times, Ukraine, perhaps more than any other country in Europe, has experienced devastating foreign invasions and conquests. Consequently, foreign domination and the struggle against it is a paramount theme in its history. Played out on a vast, open, and richly endowed stage, this history is long, colorful, and unusually turbulent.



The Earliest Inhabitants

The earliest traces of human habitation in Ukraine reach back about 150,000


years. Arriving on the shores of the Black Sea by way of the Caucasus and, perhaps, the Balkans, the earliest human inhabitants still possessed the signs of their primitive origins. Their brains were small and they had low foreheads, heavy jaws, and large teeth. But their posture was already upright and their extraordinarily manipulative hands were fully formed. By approximately 40,000 BC, in the midst of the last ice age, the Cro-magnons (or *Homo sapiens*) appeared, the species from which modern man is descended – relatively tall, erect, and with greatly enlarged brain capacity. In response to the cold, unforgiving climate and the difficulties in obtaining food, these hunters and gatherers produced an unprecedented array of technological innovations: flint weapons and tools, fish-hooks, harpoons, and shelters made of animal hides and bones.

After the last of the ice glaciers had retreated by about 10,000 BC and had left behind the landscape that exists in Ukraine today, the tempo of man-made changes began to quicken. Indeed, during the Neolithic period, which lasted in Ukraine from about 6000 to 2000 BC, mankind experienced more profound changes than in the previous two to three million years. Despite its name, the Neolithic, or New Stone Age, had little to do with stone. It is in the radically new ways that humans developed for feeding themselves that the “revolutionary” significance of this age lies. Instead of merely gathering and hunting food, human beings had finally learned to produce it.

In Ukraine, agriculture is thought to have first made its appearance in the southwest, between the Buh and Dnister rivers where the earliest agricultural communities in Eastern Europe evolved about 5000 to 4000 BC. Instead of wandering about in search of game, people settled down in order to be near their fields. Villages came into existence. Because agriculture, unlike hunting and gathering, demanded a relatively large labor force, the population increased rapidly. As it did, primitive forms of political and social organization slowly developed.

The best known of the early agrarian peoples on the territory of present-day Ukraine were associated with the so-called Trypillian culture, which originated along the Dnister, Buh, and Prut rivers and later expanded to the Dnieper.² At their high point between 3500 and 2700 BC, they lived in large villages with as many as 600–700 inhabitants. Organized in clans along patriarchal lines, they often lived in long, narrow dwellings in which each nuclear family had its own clay oven and partitioned space. The decorations on their pottery, characterized by flowing designs of ocher, black, and white, reflected a culture rich in magical rituals and supernatural beliefs.

But this culture also had its practical side. The first mechanical device in Ukraine – a drill for boring holes in wood and stone – appeared among the people of the Trypillian culture. Even more important was the introduction of the wooden plow, which definitely made agriculture a more dependable



Map 2 Prehistoric cultures and sites

means of obtaining food than hunting. Another innovation, probably imported from Asia, was the use of the first metal – copper.

Little is known about the decline of Trypillian culture. Archaeologists speculate that overpopulation forced many of its people to resettle in new, inhospitable lands. Some of them moved deeper into the steppe, while those who lived along the Dnieper moved northward into heavily forested Polissia and beyond. By 2000 BC, the people of the Trypillian culture had ceased to exist as a distinct cultural entity. Warlike tribes from the steppe probably overwhelmed or assimilated many of them. Others may have taken refuge in the sheltering forests in the north.

The nomads Stretching from Manchuria to Hungary, the vast Eurasian steppe is the largest expanse of flatland on earth. Although the Tien Shan, the Ural, and the Carpathian mountains intersect it at several points, numerous passes allow for relatively easy access from one end of this approximately 6000-km expanse to the other. On the western edge of this plain, in one of its most temperate and fertile regions, lies Ukraine. This geographic fact has been of inestimable importance for its history because it meant that Ukraine would become a part, and even at times a center, of Eurasian nomadic life.

A distinctive pastoral way of life, based on the maintenance of herds of domesticated animals, emerged in the steppes in about 3000 BC. For roughly two millennia, while raising their herds in the Eurasian steppe, the nomads-to-be also engaged in agriculture and were semisedentary. Sometime around 1000 BC the pastoralists became true nomads and began to roam the steppe in a systematic search for pasture. In the course of this transition, the nomads developed several characteristic features. Most noteworthy was their propensity for warfare. In order to protect their herds and obtain new pastures, fighting skills became an essential requirement of their life-style. Frequent conflicts as well as the need to organize the efficient movement of many people over vast distances encouraged the development of tribal aristocracies. This meant that the relatively peaceful, self-sufficient agriculturalists would be increasingly vulnerable to these aggressive, warlike inhabitants of the steppe.

Pastoralists appeared relatively early in the Ukrainian steppes. The people of the so-called Serehost culture moved in from the east, driving herds of horses (but not yet riding them), in about 3000 BC and occupied the left bank of the Dnieper. They were followed by waves of other pastoralists for many centuries to come. These recurrent migrations, a familiar feature of early Ukrainian history, were apparently caused by overpopulation in the steppes north of the Caspian Sea. As the strongest tribes ejected weaker ones from their pastures, the latter were pushed to the periphery of the Eurasian steppes and beyond. Thus, in a domino effect, waves of pastoralists were sent westward.


The Cimmerians It was only in about 1500 to 1000 BC that the seemingly sim-

ple technique of horseback riding was mastered. And the first nomad horsemen to appear in Ukraine – the Cimmerians – were also its first inhabitants whose name we know. It was Homer who, in the *Odyssey*, mentioned “the land of the Cimmerians” in a passage referring to the northern shore of the Black Sea. This was probably the first literary reference to Ukraine. But, besides noting the name of the people who lived on what was at that time regarded as the murky edge of the world, Homer tells us no more about the Cimmerians. Many scholars hold the view that in about 1500 BC the Cimmerians came to Ukraine from their original homeland on the lower Volga by way of the Caucasian lowlands. Others, however, reject this “migration” theory and argue that the Cimmerians were native to Ukraine. In any case, up to about 700 BC, the Cimmerians inhabited the land between the Don and Dniester rivers. Soon afterward, under pressure from other nomads from the east, the Cimmerians withdrew to Asia Minor.

Exhaustive analysis of the few available sources has led historians to the following conclusions about these “drinkers of mare’s milk,” as the Greeks called them: (1) the Cimmerians were the first pastoralists in Ukraine to make the transition to the nomadic way of life; (2) they mastered the skill of horseback riding and employed it in warfare; (3) because of their contacts with the skilled metal workers of the Caucasus, the Cimmerians introduced the Iron Age to Ukraine and; (4) the growing importance of mounted warriors led to social changes such as the breakdown of extended family units and the evolution of a military aristocracy.

The Scythians In the early 7th century BC, when the Scythians appeared in the Ukrainian steppe, the more sophisticated societies around the Mediterranean took notice, as these words from the Old Testament attest: “Behold! A people comes from the north. They carry bows and short spears. They are most cruel and merciless. Their voices roar like the sea, they prance about on their horses, moving in unison like one man. They are an ancient people, coming from afar and no one knows their language. Their people devour your crops and bread; they destroy your sons and daughters; and they consume your sheep and cows, your grapes and vineyards. And the cities on which you base your hopes, they destroy with the sword.”³ After ravaging much of the Near East, the Scythians finally settled in the steppes north of the Black Sea where they established the first major political organization based on the territory of Ukraine.

In the 5th century BC, Herodotus, the Greek “father of history,” visited Scythia and described its inhabitants. Apparently, they were Indo-Europeans, part of the Iranian-speaking nomads that had dominated the Eurasian steppes for millennia. Herodotus described several types of Scythians. On the right bank of the Dnieper lived the Scythian plowers, an agricultural people who were the aboriginal inhabitants of the land but who probably accepted the



Map 3 Nomadic migrations

name of their nomadic overlords. Some scholars believe that these people were the ancestors of the Slavs. Political power rested in the hands of the nomadic Royal Scythians who considered themselves to be the "most numerous and the best," and who forced other Scythian and non-Scythian tribes of Ukraine to pay them tribute. Their demands were backed by a large, well-armed, and well-disciplined army of horsemen. To develop warlike instincts, Scythian warriors were encouraged to drink the blood of the first enemy they killed, to make gold or silver-mounted chalices out of an enemy's skull, and to take scalps. Fierce and ruthless toward their enemies, these nomads were intensely loyal to their comrades, whose friendship they valued above all else.

Scythian society was very much a man's world. Descent was traced according to the male line, property was divided among sons, and polygamy was the norm. Junior wives were sometimes killed and buried along with their deceased husbands. Judging from the sumptuous burial mounds of the Scythian kings that still dot the Ukrainian steppe, the rich graves of the tribal aristocracy, and the meager burial sites of the commoners, socioeconomic distinctions were quite pronounced among the Royal Scythians. In addition to war booty, trade with the Greek colonies on the Black Sea coast provided the Scythians with most of their wealth. To their trading partners the Scythians offered products for which Ukraine would become famous: grain, wax, honey, furs, and slaves. In return, they obtained wines, fine jewelry and other luxurious goods for which they developed a considerable appetite. This growing interest in the finer things of life was reflected in the highly original decorative style of art that they favored. Characterized by animal motifs, it skillfully rendered dynamic, flowing images of deer, lions, and horses of striking grace and beauty.

Under Scythian rule, Ukraine became an important, albeit distant, part of classical Mediterranean civilization, for through the intermediary of the Greek colonies on the Black Sea, the Scythians came into contact with Greek civilization and learned to value it. But contact with the Mediterranean world also embroiled the Scythians in its conflicts. In 513 BC, the Persian king Darius invaded Ukraine at the head of a vast army. By applying a scorched-earth strategy, however, the Scythians forced him into a humiliating retreat. In the late 5th and early 4th centuries BC, the Scythians expanded westward and overran the Thracians on the Danube. It was a victory they could have done without, for it brought them face to face with Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander the Great. In 339 BC, the Macedonians inflicted a crushing defeat on the nomads. This marked the beginning of the end for the Scythians. About a century later, the Sarmatians, another powerful nomadic people from the east, overwhelmed and assimilated most of the Scythians, only a remnant of whom managed to find refuge in the Crimea, where their descendants continued to live until the 3rd century AD.

The Sarmatians For almost 400 hundred years, from the 2nd century BC to the 2nd century AD, the Sarmatians, who emerged from the lower Volga region, dominated the steppes north and east of the Black Sea. Initially, they mingled peacefully with their fellow Iranian speakers, the Scythians, as well as with the Greeks who lived on the northern shore of the Black Sea. However, as enemy tribes began to pressure them from the east, the Sarmatians became more aggressive. Eventually, they overwhelmed the Scythians, absorbing many of the commoners into their own ranks. Like all nomadic rulers of the Ukrainian steppes, the Sarmatians were not a single, homogeneous tribe, but a loose federation of related and frequently feuding tribes, such as the Iazygians, the Roxolanians, and the Alans. Each of these Sarmatian tribes tried to establish its rule over Ukraine. But because their attempts coincided with those prolonged, widespread population shifts commonly called the Great Migration of Peoples and because Ukraine was at the center of these chaotic population movements, Sarmatian control was frequently challenged and disrupted. Finally, in the 2nd century AD, it was completely destroyed by the terrible onslaught of the Huns from the east, the encroachments of the Germanic Goths from the north, and determined Roman resistance in the west.

From the fragmentary information available about the Sarmatians, it is evident that they looked and lived much like the Scythians and other Iranian-speaking nomads. A contemporary wrote about the Alans that "they are tall and handsome, their hair tends to be blond and the ferocity of their glance inspires dread."⁴ Their dress consisted of long, billowy trousers, leather jerkins, and soft leather boots and caps. Meat, milk, and cheese constituted the basis of their diet. They lived in tents that were mounted on two- or four-wheeled platforms. A striking Sarmatian peculiarity was the prominent role played by their women. Repeating a legend according to which the Sarmatians were the offspring of a union between the Amazons and the Scythians, Herodotus stated that Sarmatian women followed "the ancient Amazon mode of living, going out on horseback to hunt, joining their husbands in war and wearing the same dress as the men."⁵ Archaeological evidence indicates that Sarmatian women were often buried with their weapons and that they frequently performed important religious functions.

When war did not provide them with all their material needs and desires, the Sarmatians engaged in trade. Their caravans ranged far and wide, bringing to Tanais, their capital on the Don River, silks from China, crystal from the Caucasus, and semiprecious stones from Iran and India. In the view of Strabo, a Greek geographer and historian, their contacts with the Greeks and Romans did them more harm than good. "Our mode of life has caused a change for the worse among these people, introducing among them luxury and sensual pleasures and, to satisfy these vices, base artifices that lead to innumerable acts of greed."⁶ Other nomadic tribes soon replaced the Sarmatians, but the latter were the last of the Indo-European peoples to come out of the east. Af-

ter them, the Eurasian steppes would become for almost a millennium the domain of the Turkic peoples.

The Greek Colonies in Ukraine

The sea as well as the steppe brought newcomers to Ukraine. By about 1000 BC, the tiny Greek mainland had become overpopulated by its extraordinarily creative, dynamic, and adventuresome people. Lacking adequate opportunities at home, many Greeks spread out along the Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Sea coasts in a far-flung colonizing movement. In the words of Plato, from Gibraltar to the Caucasus, the Greeks ringed the seas like “frogs sitting at the edge of a pond.” In the late 7th and early 6th centuries BC, they founded a string of colonies on the northern shore of the Black Sea. For the next thousand years, these cities would serve as the outposts of urban civilization in Ukraine.

By the 4th century BC, the Greek cities on the Ukrainian coast were booming. Of these, the richest was Olbia. Situated at the mouth of the Buh River, it became the chief center of the grain trade that developed between the Greek homeland and its Black Sea colonies. Other important centers were Chersonesus and Theodosia on the Crimean coast, and Panticapeum (present-day Kerch), the largest of a cluster of cities located on the Cimmerian Bosphorus in eastern Crimea. For several centuries these cities flourished, but by the 2nd century BC they began to encounter serious difficulties. Social strife increased between the urban elites and the lower strata of the population made up largely of liberated slaves. New nomadic invaders upset the stable relationship that had existed with the Scythians. Cheap Egyptian bread undermined the all-important grain trade. And the rise of Rome upset the political balance that had existed in the Hellenistic world.

For about a century, Panticapeum and its neighboring cities, united in the so-called Bosphoran kingdom under the rule of the Spartocid dynasty, managed to hold their own. But in 63 BC, after the last Spartocid, Mithridates VI, was defeated by the Romans, Rome became master of the Black Sea coast. Roman overlordship returned a measure of economic and political stability to the Greek cities on the Ukrainian coast. However, in the early centuries AD, as barbarian invasions increased and Rome’s ability to fend them off declined, it became clear that the cities on the Black Sea were living on borrowed time. In 270 AD, the Gothic invasion dealt them a devastating blow and a century later the Huns destroyed them completely.



If, at the dawn of the 1st century AD, we were to cast a panoramic glance at the evolution of human life in Ukraine, we would discern three distinct



Map 4 Greek colonization

types of societies inhabiting three different geographic zones. In the northern and northwestern wooded plains lived the agriculturalists. Sheltered from invaders by forests and swamps, these oldest inhabitants of the land were politically unorganized, militarily weak, and sluggish from the point of view of cultural development. But, like peasants everywhere, they had tremendous staying power and, while various overlords might have come and gone, they continued to cling tenaciously to the land that fed them.

In the broad middle zone covered by the steppe, the nomads reigned supreme. In their attempts to control ever-greater expanses of territory, these newcomers from the east created the first major political conglomerates in Ukraine. Culturally cosmopolitan, they brought Ukraine into contact with the major centers of civilization. However, the nomads were each other's worst enemies since, in their continual quest for pasture and booty, they repeatedly destroyed the political structures created by other nomads.

Finally, on the thin stretch of the Black Sea coast in the south, the Greeks established their advanced urban civilization. Although these cities, with their commerce, crafts, schools, and far-flung contacts, accelerated the cultural development of the vast Ukrainian hinterland, they remained merely an extension of ancient Greece and not an organic part of the Ukrainian environment.

This page intentionally left blank

Part One

Kievan Rus'



This page intentionally left blank

The Rise and Decline of Kievan Rus'

Overshadowed by the spectacular conquests of the nomads and by the sophisticated civilization of the coastal cities, the obscured population of Ukraine's northern forests, meadows, and river banks seemed for ages to be little more than a human backdrop for the fast-moving developments in the south. By the 6th century AD, however, these agrarian peoples began to make their presence felt more forcefully as the focal point of historically significant activity in Ukraine shifted slowly, yet inexorably, from the sea coast and the steppe to the wooded flatlands. As the agriculturalists made their way to the center of the historical stage, their linguistic, ethnic, and cultural features became more discernible to modern historians, who established that these people were Slavs, the direct ancestors of Ukraine's current population.



The East Slavs

The Slavs evolved from the autochthonous Indo-European population of Eastern Europe. Most modern scholars adhere to the view that the original homeland of the Slavs encompassed the northern slopes of the Carpathians, the Vistula valley, and the Prypiat marshlands. From there, the Slavs spread out in all directions, particularly in the early 7th century. In the northeast, they reached deep into Finno-Ugric lands around the Oka and upper Volga rivers; in the west, their settlements extended to the Elbe River in northern Germany. But the greatest flow of Slavic colonization was to the south into the Balkans where fertile land, a warmer climate, and wealthy cities exerted a powerful attraction. Compared with the nomadic invasions, Slavic expansion was a slow movement that radiated out from the core Slavic lands without ever losing touch with them. As a result, it covered a large, contiguous area. A striking feature of this expansion was its relative peacefulness. Except for



Map 5a Slavic dispersion



Map 5b East Slavic tribes

some fighting along the Byzantine borders, the Slavs generally moved into the new lands as colonists, not as invaders. But as the Slavs spread out, they also became more fragmented. The linguistic analysis of the noted Russian scholar Aleksei Shakhmatov indicates that by the 6th century the common language of the Slavs was evolving into three subgroups: West Slavic, from which such languages as Polish, Czech, and Slovak eventually developed; South Slavic, from which Bulgarian, Macedonian, and Serbo-Croatian arose; and East Slavic, from which Ukrainian, Russian, and Belorussian developed.

In the 7th century, the East Slavs were based on the right bank of the Dnieper River. Soviet scholars, intent on establishing the oldest possible pedigree for the Slavic inhabitants of Ukraine, argue that the East Slavs or their immediate predecessors, the Antes, were native to the region. Western specialists, in contrast, cite the lack of evidence to support this thesis and generally contend that the East Slavs were newcomers to the area. Throughout the 7th and 8th centuries, the East Slavs continued to subdivide and expand. Eventually they consisted of about fourteen large tribal confederations that inhabited parts of Ukraine, Belorussia, and Russia. Of these, the most prominent were the Polianians who lived in central Ukraine, on the banks of the Dnieper. Other East Slav tribes who inhabited Ukraine were the Derevlionians who occupied the northwest, the Severians who lived in the northeast, and the Ulychians and Tivertsians in the southwest. Located in the westernmost part of the land were the Volhynians and the Dulibians.

The settlements of the East Slavs were numerous but small. Villages, consisting of as few as four and as many as seventy log dwellings, were built one or two miles apart. Thirty or forty miles away, another cluster of villages would be established. At the center of these inhabited areas were fortified strongpoints or *grady* that provided defense and served as tribal meeting places and sites of cult worship. Hundreds of these stockades dotted the East Slavic lands. Hence, the Scandinavian term *Gardariki* – “the country of strongholds” – for this territory. Little is known about the political organization of the East Slavs. Apparently, they had no supreme rulers or centralized authority. Tribes and clans, linked by their worship of common gods and led by patriarchs, most probably reached important decisions by means of communal consensus. Although eventually a class of tribal leaders called *kniazi* did emerge, socioeconomic differentiation did not appear to be great among the tribesmen, who considered land and livestock to be the communal property of extended families. In warfare, the East Slavs were known to be tough, stubborn fighters who could endure extremes of cold and heat and survive with a minimum of provisions. Unsure of themselves in the open plain, they preferred to fight in forests and ravines, where they often employed ambushes to overwhelm their enemies. In both war and peace, persistence and endurance appear to have been their strongest assets.

Trade among the early East Slavs was poorly developed. It received a stim-

ulating impetus in the 8th century, however, when Oriental traders, especially Muslim Arabs, began to penetrate into East Slavic lands. In exchange for precious metals, fine textiles, and jewelry, the East Slavs could offer the traditional products of their land: honey, wax, furs, and a commodity that the Arabs prized most – slaves. In the late 8th century, this trade flourished when the Turkic Khazars, founders of a unique commercial empire on the lower Volga and the Caspian Sea who later converted to Judaism, established contacts with the East Slavs. Some of these, notably the Severians, Viaticians and a part of the Polianians, were even forced to pay tribute to the Khazars. As they became less isolated, the East Slavs entered a new and momentous epoch in their history.

The Normanist Controversy

In the middle of the 9th century, the lands along the Dnieper were still an economic, cultural, and political backwater. About 150 years later, they constituted the core of Kievan Rus', a mighty political conglomerate well on the way to creating one of the most sophisticated societies and flourishing economies in Europe at the time. How was this remarkable transformation achieved? Who were the people who led it? Was it external stimuli or internal developments that made it possible? To deal with these questions, we should first note what the oldest East Slavic chronicle, the "Chronicle of Bygone Years" (*Povest vremennykh let*), has to say about the origins of Kievan Rus':

In the year 852 ... the land of Rus' was first named ... 859: The Varangians from beyond the sea imposed tribute upon the Chuds, the Slavs, the Merians, the Ves, and the Krivichians. But the Khazars imposed it upon the Polianians, the Severians and the Viaticians, and collected a squirrel-skin and a beaver-skin from each hearth. 860-862: The tributaries of the Varangians drove them back beyond the sea and, refusing them further tribute, set out to govern themselves. There was no law among them, but tribe rose against tribe. Discord thus ensued among them, and they began to war one against the other. They said to themselves, "Let us seek a prince who may rule over us, and judge us according to the law." They accordingly went overseas to the Varangian Russes: these particular Varangians were known as Russes, just as some are called Swedes, and others Normans, Angles and Goths ... The Chuds, the Slavs and the Krivichians then said to the people of Rus': "Our whole land is great and rich, and there is no order in it. Come to rule and reign over us." They thus selected three brothers, with their kinsfolk, who took with them all the Russes and migrated.¹


In the 18th century, using this passage as evidence, several German scholars in Russian service, such as Gottlieb Bayer, Gerhard Müller, and August-Ludwig Schlözer, developed the so-called Normanist theory. It argued that

the foundations of Kievan Rus' were laid by the Varangians, a Germanic-Scandinavian people known in the West as the Vikings or Normans. Angered by this emphasis on Germanic influence and by the implication that Slavs were incapable of organizing their own state, Mikhail Lomonosov, a famous 18th-century Russian scholar, wrote a fiery response that stressed the primary role of the Slavs in the foundation of Kievan Rus'. Lomonosov's statement of what came to be known as the anti-Normanist position ignited a controversy that has continued to this day. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, it seemed that the Normanist view might triumph because most Western and a number of prominent Russian historians accepted it. Two leading Ukrainian historians, Mykola Kostomarov and Mykhailo Hrushevsky, however, remained staunch anti-Normanists. In the 1930s, Soviet scholars began a counteroffensive, declaring that "the Normanist theory is politically harmful because it denies the ability of the Slavic nations to form an independent state." They stressed that Nestor, the monk who compiled the "Chronicle of Bygone Years" in the 11th century, was tendentious, that his tale had many internal contradictions, and that archaeological evidence did not point to a large-scale Scandinavian presence in Kievan Rus'. They insisted, therefore, that the East Slavs created Kievan Rus'.

Much of the ongoing debate is linguistic in nature and centers on the etymology of the word *Rus'*. The Normanists contend that *Rus'* stems from *Ruotsi*, a Finnish word for Swedes that, in turn, derives from the ancient Swedish word *rodr*, "to row." Because the Finns had close and long-standing contacts with both the Swedes and the Slavs, it is assumed that their designation for the former was passed on to the latter. The anti-Normanist explanation associates *Rus'* with the names of the Rus and Rusna rivers in central Ukraine. Another hypothesis raises the possibility that the term is related to Roxolany, a nomadic tribe whose name is derived from the Iranian word *rhos*, meaning "light." Because each of these hypotheses has serious weaknesses, none has won general acceptance. In any case, as far as the use of the term *Rus'* is concerned, it appears that it was first applied to (1) a people, that is, the Varangians/Scandinavians; then to (2) the territory of the Polianians in central Ukraine; and eventually to (3) the political entity that came to be called Kievan Rus'.*

Just as no definite conclusion has been reached about the origin of the term *Rus'*, no consensus has evolved on the broader issue of external Scandinavian influence as opposed to internal Slavic evolution in the rise of Kievan Rus'. Actually, the long and acrimonious debate has produced little in the way of new information. It would appear that this lack of knowledge has gradually induced scholars (Soviets excepted) to seek a compromise solu-

* The term "Ukraine" first appeared in the chronicles in 1187. Originally, it was used in a geographical sense to refer to the lands on the periphery of Kiev.



Map 6 Varangian (Viking, Norman) expansion

tion. There is general agreement now that the Scandinavian impact on East Slav society and culture was minimal. Appearing as small, enterprising bands of warrior-merchants, the Varangians rapidly assimilated the East Slavic language and culture and were probably too few in number to bring about important changes in native ways. However, the participation, if not leadership, of the Varangians in political life is difficult to deny in view of the fact that all the rulers of Kiev up to Sviatoslav had Scandinavian names as did the members of their retinues or *druzhy*. Either by politically organizing the Slavs over whom they gained control or by posing a threat and forcing the Slavs to organize themselves more effectively, the Varangians acted as catalysts for political development. On certain issues, such as the restriction of Khazar influence, stemming the nomad incursions, or opening and maintaining the Dnieper trade route with Byzantium, East Slav and Varangian interests coincided.

There are, therefore, good reasons to view the rise of Kiev not as the exclusive achievement of one ethnic group or another, but as the result of a complex Slavic/Scandinavian interrelationship. Recently, Omeljan Pritsak has taken this point further and argued that the entire question of the ethnic origins of Rus' is irrelevant.² In his view, the original Rus' were a multiethnic and multilingual trading company that tried to control the trade routes between the Baltic and the Mediterranean and in the process established the political entity called Kievan Rus'.

The Rise of Kiev

As in the case of most of the world's great cities, location played a crucial role in propelling Kiev to prominence. Situated midway down the Dnieper, Kiev served as a key transit point for the vast territory encompassed by its headwaters and tributaries. At the same time, it was an excellent springboard for the journey down the Dnieper and across the Black Sea to the rich cities of the Levant. Moreover, its position on the border of two environmental and cultural zones – that of the forests and wooded plains to the north and the open steppe to the south – meant that the city had great strategic importance. It thus became the focal point where two historical processes met and merged.

To one of these processes we have already alluded – the slow amalgamation of the numerous, fragmented East Slav communal units into large, territorially based tribes led by native chieftains and protected by well-fortified stockades. In the forefront of this development were the Polianians, the tribe living in the area in which Kiev would arise. Scholars estimate that as early as the 6th–7th centuries, the Polianians, led by their semilegendary leader, Kyi, formed a strong tribal confederation that lorded over its neighbors and maintained close contacts with Byzantium. According to legend, it was Kyi, together with his brothers, Shchek and Khoriv, and sister, Lebid, who founded

Kiev and gave it its name. Murky though our knowledge of this period is, it can be assumed that the East Slavs in general and the Polianians in particular were well on the way to laying the foundation for the vast political, commercial, and cultural entity that would be called Kievan Rus'.

The other process, which brought the Scandinavians on the scene, was more rapid, far ranging, and decisive. To understand it one must first look to the rocky, barren shores of 8th–9th-century Scandinavia where, for reasons that are still unclear, an unprecedented population boom occurred. Unable to find a livelihood at home, many young, adventurous Norsemen took to their ships and sought their fortunes abroad. They launched devastating raids on Western Europe, where, in time, they settled in the lands they raided, founding kingdoms and principalities in England, Ireland, France, and Sicily. Other Scandinavians crossed the Atlantic and colonized Iceland, Greenland, and, quite possibly, reached the American mainland. Others still, especially those from Sweden and the Island of Gotland who came to be called Varangians, turned to the southeast. Initially they established themselves near the Baltic coast, in Aldeigjuborg on Lake Ladoga and, somewhat later, in Novgorod on Lake Ilmen. The Varangian settlements were not the modest earth and wood stockades of the East Slavs, but substantial fortress towns that housed the Varangian leaders, their retainers, and their families and around which native artisans and traders built their suburbs.

Either by trade or by extortion (when one activity proved fruitless, the other tactic was usually applied), the Varangians obtained furs, honey, wax, and slaves from the natives. But they were after even greater profits than the East Slavs could provide. Using their settlements as a base, they explored the river routes that led south to the great centers of Byzantine and Islamic civilization and wealth. It was not long before they discovered a network of rivers and portages that linked the Baltic with the Caspian by way of the Volga and opened the way to Baghdad, the cosmopolitan capital of the Islamic world. Later an even more important route emerged. Called in the chronicles "the route from the Varangians to the Greeks," it followed the Dnieper down to the Black Sea and across to Constantinople, the great emporium of Levantine trade and the richest city in Christendom.

It was only a matter of time before the enterprising Varangians would move farther south to be closer to Constantinople. According to the "Chronicle of Bygone Years," in approximately 830, two Varangians, Askold and Dir, left the retinue of their lord, Riurik of Novgorod, and sailed down the Dnieper with their followers. Noting Kiev's excellent location high on the river banks, they established control over the settlement and imposed tribute on the Polianians in the vicinity. Apparently they prospered, for in 860 they were in a position to launch a raid against Constantinople together with their Polianian subjects. News of their success soon got back to Novgorod. Although Riurik was no longer alive and his son Ihor (Ingvar in Scandinavian, Igor in Russian)

was too young to take command, Oleh (Helgi in Scandinavian, Oleg in Russian), the regent during Ihor's minority, gathered a force of Varangians, Slavs, and Finns and, taking Ihor along, sailed for Kiev. By means of a ruse he lured Askold and Dir outside the city walls, accused them of being usurpers, and killed them. In 862 Oleh established himself in Kiev, declaring that it would become "the mother of all the Rus' cities."

Such is the chronicler Nestor's version of how the Varangians came to Kiev. However, close textual analysis by generations of scholars has revealed numerous internal inconsistencies and weak points in this tale. Modern historians have wondered why the supposedly mighty Riurik is never mentioned in any of the contemporary sources and some question whether he existed at all. Is it likely that such experienced leaders as Askold and Dir would have fallen for Oleh's simple ruse? Was Oleh really associated with Riurik or is the chronicler merely trying to invent for him a more illustrious pedigree? And how can one explain the regent Oleh's extended tenure in power long after Ihor came of age? In short, up to the reign of Oleh, when other sources can be brought to bear on the period, it is difficult to separate fact from fiction in Nestor's account of the origins of Rus'.

The Early Rulers of Kiev

It was not the lofty vision of creating a mighty state (it is highly doubtful whether they were familiar with the concept of statehood) or a flourishing civilization but rather a relentless desire to get at the sources of wealth that primarily motivated the early Kievan princes. For example, Oleh's conquest of Kiev was a successful attempt to unite and control both Kiev and Novgorod, the two main depots on the "Greek" trade route. Indeed, much of the activity of the early Kievan princes represented a combination of commerce and tribute-gathering. Every spring, when the rivers were freed of ice, the tribute that had been collected over the winter from the various East Slavic tribes would be floated down the Dnieper to Kiev. There the princes organized a large armada, loaded with furs and slaves and guarded by their retinue, and dispatched it to Constantinople. It was a difficult and dangerous journey. Below Kiev, the swirling Dnieper rapids (*porohy*) had to be traversed. Because the last one, called Nenasytets (the Insatiable), was virtually impassable, the ships had to be unloaded and dragged around it, leaving the entire trading expedition vulnerable to attack by nomadic marauders who always lurked in the area.

The American historian Richard Pipes has drawn the analogy between the Varangian enterprise based in Kiev and the great early modern commercial enterprises like the East India Company or the Hudson's Bay Company, which were organized for profit but which, in order to extract it most efficiently, were obliged to provide a modicum of administration in areas that

had no viable system of government. As Pipes puts it, "the Great Prince was a merchant par excellence, and his realm was essentially a commercial enterprise, composed of loosely affiliated towns whose garrisons collected tribute and maintained, in a rough sort of way, public order."³ Thus, while pursuing their predatory practices and commercial interests, the early rulers of Kiev transformed it into the center of a large and powerful political conglomerate.

Oleh (d. 912?) Little is known about this first historically verifiable ruler of Kiev. It is unclear whether he was a member of the Riurik dynasty or an interloper whom the chronicler Nestor, writing several centuries later, associated with that dynasty. What is evident, however, is that Oleh was a gifted and decisive ruler. After conquering Kiev in 882 and establishing control over the Polianians, he forcefully extended his authority (that is, the right to collect tribute) over the surrounding tribes, the most prominent of which were the Derevlians. This conquest involved him in a war with the Khazars whose ports on the Caspian Sea he plundered. The highlight of his career came in 911 when, at the head of a large army, he attacked and pillaged Constantinople. But the "Chronicle of Bygone Years" probably exaggerated his success when it recounted how he nailed his shield to the main gates of the Greek capital. Nonetheless, the pressure that Oleh exerted on Byzantium must have been considerable because the Greeks were forced to conclude a trade treaty that was quite favorable to the Kievan prince.

Ihor (912–45) The reign of Ihor was much less successful than that of his predecessor, Oleh. In what became a pattern in the reigns of the early Kievan princes, Ihor spent the initial years of his rule asserting his authority over his rebellious subjects. First the Derevlians and then the Ulychians rose up against him. It took several years of hard campaigning before Ihor and his *druzhyna* (retinue) could force the rebels to pay tribute again. Only after he reasserted his authority at home could Ihor undertake the large-scale, far-flung part-trading and part-pillaging expeditions that Oleh had conducted. When the peace that Oleh had arranged with Byzantium crumbled in 941, Ihor launched a sea campaign against Constantinople. It was a disaster. With the help of a flammable concoction called "Greek fire," the Byzantines destroyed the Rus' fleet and forced Ihor to beat a hasty retreat. As a result, in 944, he was compelled to sign a highly unfavorable treaty with the Byzantine emperor. That same year, Ihor tried his luck in the east with much better results. A large Rus' force sailed down the Volga, plundered the rich Muslim cities on the Caspian coast, and then managed to return to Kiev with its booty. Ihor's reign ended as it had begun, with a revolt of the Derevlians. Angered by his repeated tribute-collecting expeditions, the Derevlians ambushed the prince and killed him and his small entourage.

Olha (945–62) The compilers of the “Chronicle of Bygone Years” were clearly sympathetic to Olha (Helga in Scandinavian, Olga in Russian), the wife of Ihor and regent during the minority of their son, Sviatoslav. Repeatedly they depict her as being beautiful, vigorous, crafty, and, above all, wise. A male chronicler paid her the ultimate compliment by informing his readers that she was “manly of mind.” Her private conversion to Christianity in ca 955 probably explains some of the adulation that the monk-chroniclers lavished upon her. But even without these biased accounts, Olha would have stood out as a remarkable ruler. Vengeance being the moral prerogative of the times, she quickly and effectively avenged herself on the Derevlians. However, she realized that the arbitrary and haphazard collection of tribute that had been the cause of Ihor’s death would have to be altered. Therefore, she introduced the first “reforms” in Kievan Rus’, establishing clearly demarcated areas from which specified amounts of tribute were to be collected at regular intervals.

She also saw to it that her subjects were not deprived of all their sustenance to ensure that they would be in a position to pay tribute again. By assigning to the princely treasury exclusive rights to rich fur-bearing areas, she provided it with a steady flow of income. To familiarize herself with her vast domain, Olha made numerous and extensive trips to all its major towns and regions. Her foreign relations were characterized by diplomacy, not war. In 957 she journeyed to Constantinople to negotiate with the Byzantine emperor. Although the chronicles are replete with tales of how she outwitted the emperor, other sources indicate that the talks did not go well. Nonetheless, the very fact that Olha was accepted as a negotiating partner by the mightiest ruler in Christendom was a reflection of Kiev’s growing importance.

Sviatoslav (962–72) Brave, impetuous, simple, and severe, Sviatoslav was a warrior-prince par excellence. Hrushevsky called him “a Cossack on the throne,” and his turbulent reign has aptly been described as “the great adventure.”⁴ Constantly at war, Sviatoslav was enamored of grand and glorious undertakings. His Slavic name, Varangian values, and nomadic life-style reflected a Eurasian synthesis. His reign marked the culmination of the early, heroic period of Kievan Rus’.

In 964, the 22-year-old Sviatoslav launched an ambitious eastern campaign. Its immediate goal was the subjugation of the Viaticians, an East Slavic tribe that lived on the Oka River, the original homeland of modern-day Russians. After this conquest, he sailed down the Volga and crushed the Volga Bulgars. This brought on a climactic confrontation with the mighty Khazars. In a bloody battle, Sviatoslav defeated the Khazar *kagan* and razed his capital at Itil on the Volga. He then swept on to conquer the northern Caucasus. The results of this spectacular campaign were far reaching. With the conquest of the Viaticians, all of the East Slavs now came under Kievan rule and the northeast – the Russia of today – was opened up to Slavic colonization. The defeat



Map 7 Kievan Rus' in the 10th century

of the Khazars removed Kiev's great competitor for hegemony in Eurasia and it placed the great Volga trade route under Rus' control. But the decline of the Khazars also had a drawback: it removed the bulwark that had kept the eastern nomadic hordes, such as the Pechenegs, from penetrating into the Ukrainian steppe.

During the latter part of his reign, Sviatoslav focused his entire attention on the Balkans. In 968 he agreed to help the Byzantines in a war against the powerful and highly developed Bulgarian kingdom. With a huge army he swept into Bulgaria, annihilated his opponents, and captured the rich cities along the Danube, choosing Pereiaslavets as his base. So impressed was he with the wealth of the land that only the threat of a dangerous Pecheneg raid on Kiev could force him to return to his capital. But once the Pecheneg danger passed, Sviatoslav, who now controlled the territory from the Volga to the Danube, declared, "I do not care to remain in Kiev, but should prefer to live in Pereiaslavets on the Danube, since that is the center of my realm; that is where all my riches are concentrated – gold, silks, wine and various fruits from Greece, silver and horses from Hungary and Bohemia, and from Rus', furs, wax, honey and slaves."⁵ Therefore, after appointing Iaropolk (his eldest son) to administer Kiev, Oleh (the next oldest) to control the Derevlians, and Volodymyr (the youngest) to look after Novgorod, Sviatoslav returned once more to Bulgaria.

Worried by this aggressive new neighbor, Byzantium now turned against the Kievan ruler and after a long and brutal campaign, forced him to withdraw. On the way back to Kiev, the decimated Rus' forces were ambushed by the Pechenegs near the Dnieper rapids and Sviatoslav was killed. According to the "Chronicle of Bygone Years," the Pecheneg khan had a chalice made out of his skull. Thus ended Sviatoslav's great adventure.

Kiev at Its Zenith

Amidst these accounts of war and conquest, it is useful to comment on the extent of the power of the Kievan princes. The geographical limits of Kievan Rus' can be established only approximately. They encompassed almost all the territories inhabited by the East Slavic tribes (the lands on the lower Volga, northern Caucasus, and in Bulgaria which had been conquered by Sviatoslav were subsequently lost). But the control that the early Kievan princes exercised over their realm was limited and erratic. Political organization was too primitive, distances too great, and regionalism too strong to allow for the establishment of a unified political entity. Except for their periodic collections of tribute, the early Kievan rulers had very little contact with or impact upon their subjects, especially those who lived beyond the major towns and strongholds. As for the prince's authority to collect tribute, it depended purely on the brute force that the prince's *druzhyna*, originally staffed by Scandinavians, was able to exert. Sharing the risks and profits from their tribute-

collecting expeditions, the princes and their retinues maintained a personal, direct, and mutually binding relationship that lay at the heart of the early Kievan political system. Thus, it was in their quest for tribute and for control of far-flung commercial trade routes that, in less than a century, the princes and their retinues created the vast, powerful conglomerate that was Kievan Rus'.

After the death of Sviatoslav, Kievan Rus' experienced the first outbreak of what was to become a chronic, debilitating political malady: internecine struggle among members of the Riurikid dynasty for supreme power in the realm. In a conflict sparked by an argument over tribute-collecting rights, Iaropolk killed his brother, Oleh. Fearing that a similar fate awaited him, the young Volodymyr fled from Novgorod to Sweden. Several years later, he returned at the head of a powerful Scandinavian force and waged a war against Iaropolk in which the latter met his death.

Volodymyr the Great (980–1015) When Volodymyr (Valdemar in Scandinavian, Vladimir in Russian) mounted the Kievan throne in 980 with complete and unchallenged power in his hands, he initiated a new epoch in the history of Kievan Rus'. No longer would restless Scandinavian princes view Rus' merely as a staging area for their further conquests or as a land that could be exploited with no thought for its welfare. Volodymyr introduced a much more constructive approach to rulership. The focus of his attention rested primarily on the welfare of the realm rather than on the acquisition of territory and tribute, as had been the case with his predecessors. It was during his reign that Rus' began to emerge as an integrated society and polity.

At the outset, however, it did not appear that Volodymyr's reign would be appreciably different from those of his predecessors. He favored his numerous retinue, supported traditional pagan cults, campaigned against the rebellious Viaticians, and extended his control over the Radimichians. Just as his father had done, Volodymyr appointed his sons (he had twelve legitimate ones) to administer the major towns and regions of his realm. In the process, he removed local princes from power and concentrated it exclusively in the hands of his dynasty. When the Varangian retinue demanded an increase in the contributions from Kiev, Volodymyr arranged to have it transferred to Byzantine service.

Instead of launching the traditional long-range expeditions, Volodymyr concentrated on securing his borders. To deal with the threat of the Pechenegs, he built an extensive fortification system, as well as new towns, just south of Kiev. In another break with tradition, he turned his attention to the west, annexing what is Western Ukraine today to his realm and thereby setting the stage for an age-long struggle with the Poles for the region. The Lithuanian Iatvigians were also forced to recognize his overlordship. Volodymyr also established generally friendly relations with the Poles, Hun-

garians, and Czechs. This new, western orientation was guided by his desire to control the main trade routes to the west and to develop alternate routes to Constantinople. As a result of his conquests, Volodymyr's realm became the largest in Europe, encompassing about 800,000 sq. km.

Undoubtedly, Volodymyr's greatest achievement was the Christianization of his vast realm. Sensing that Kievan Rus' had outlived its traditional animistic, pagan religion, he began to consider more sophisticated ways for his society to express its spiritual, social, and political values. By way of analogy with modern times, his position was that of a rising third-world leader who wishes to push forward the modernization of his country and consequently must adopt one of the two leading ideologies of the world's most advanced societies – capitalism or socialism. In Volodymyr's case, the two highly evolved systems of belief that came into consideration were Christianity and Islam, the religions of the lands with which Rus' had and wanted to maintain the closest commercial and political contacts. Despite the entertaining tales in the "Chronicle of Bygone Years" about how the envoys of Rus' rejected Islam because of its prohibition against alcoholic beverages and supposedly chose Byzantine Christianity because of the awe-inspiring splendor of its religious services, it was concrete political and historical factors that guided Volodymyr's choice.

As Olha's earlier conversion indicated, Christianity had already set down roots in Kiev. The proximity of Rus' to the thoroughly Christianized Bulgarians as well as to the recently converted Poles and Hungarians only hastened this process. However, the immediate reason for accepting Christianity, specifically in its Byzantine variant, was a political one. In 987, as a price for helping the Byzantine co-emperors put down a rebellion, Volodymyr demanded the hand of their sister Anne. Although they were unhappy about diluting the jealously guarded prestige of their imperial dynasty by consenting to a marriage with a "barbarian," the Byzantines tried to make the best of a bad situation by demanding that Volodymyr accept Christianity. But even after Volodymyr converted in 988, they tried to put the marriage off. Pressure in the form of the Rus' conquest of the Byzantine-held Crimean city of Chersonesus (Korsun), however, finally led to the marriage.

Determined to Christianize his subjects as quickly as possible, in 988 Volodymyr ordered a large part of Kiev's population to be herded into the Pochaino River, a tributary of the Dnieper, and baptized it en masse. Despite popular resistance, pagan idols were destroyed and Christian churches built in their place. Not only did the church, whose personnel and organizational structure were imported entirely from Constantinople, receive wide-ranging privileges and autonomy, but 10% of the princely revenues were assigned for its support. As a result of his great innovation, the political prestige of Volodymyr's dynasty, now linked to the highly respected Byzantine ruling house, was greatly enhanced.

As a member of the Christian "family of rulers," Volodymyr's contacts with other European monarchs became much closer. Internally, the conversion also produced positive results. Because the doctrines of the Byzantine church supported a monarch's right to rule, the Kievan princes found in the church's teachings an ideological support they did not have before. Moreover, being a relatively sophisticated organization, the church introduced the rulers of Kiev to organizational patterns from which they had much to learn. And Kievan society was enriched by a dynamic institution that not only provided it with unprecedented spiritual and cultural unity, but that exerted a tremendous influence on its social and economic life as well. In the broader sense, Volodymyr's epochal choice aligned Rus' with the Christian West rather than with the Islamic East, and exposed it to the enormous historical, political, and cultural ramifications that this association entailed. The importance of Christianity coming to Kiev from Byzantium and not from Rome cannot be overestimated. Later, when the religious split between these two centers occurred, Kiev would side with Constantinople and reject Roman Catholicism, thereby laying the groundwork for the bitter conflicts that Ukrainians would have with their closest Catholic neighbors, the Poles.

Iaroslav the Wise (1036–54) The death of Volodymyr in 1015 led to another fratricidal war among the Riurikids. Aided by the Poles, Volodymyr's eldest son, Sviatopolk (often referred to in the chronicles as "the Damned"), turned on his younger brothers, Sviatoslav, Borys, and Hlib, and had them murdered. Young and popular, the latter two were later canonized as saints of the Orthodox church. Following in the footsteps of his father, another brother, Iaroslav of Novgorod, called a large number of Varangians to his aid and defeated Sviatopolk in 1019. This victory did not give him complete control, however. Yet another brother, Mstyslav the Brave, challenged Iaroslav and, in order to avoid further bloodshed, the two agreed to split the realm between them. Remaining in Novgorod, Iaroslav received all the land west of the Dnieper, while Mstyslav, who moved to Chernihiv from Tmutorokan, acquired all the lands east of the river. Because it was too important to grant to one side or the other, Kiev remained unoccupied. Only at Mstyslav's death in 1036 did Iaroslav mount the Kievan throne to become the sole ruler of Rus'.

Iaroslav's long reign is usually considered the high point of the history of Kievan Rus'. Much of what Volodymyr had initiated was expanded and perfected by Iaroslav. Like his father, he continued to extend the boundaries of an already huge realm, winning back the western territories that had been lost to the Poles during the internecine fighting, conquering more Baltic and Finnish tribes, and finally destroying the Pechenegs. As a result of these victories, Iaroslav's authority extended from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and from the Oka River basin to the Carpathians. His military endeavors were marred, however, by an unsuccessful campaign against Constantinople, noteworthy

because it was the last attack that Rus' launched against the Byzantines with whom it had had generally friendly relations.

In medieval Europe, a mark of a dynasty's prestige and power was the willingness with which other leading dynasties entered into matrimonial relations with it. Measured by this standard, Iaroslav's prestige must have been great indeed. His wife was a Swedish princess; one of his sisters married a Polish king and another a Byzantine prince; three of his sons acquired European princesses as wives, while three of his daughters were married to the kings of France, Norway, and Hungary respectively. Little wonder that Iaroslav is often dubbed by historians as "the father-in-law of Europe."

It was his achievements at home, however, that assured Iaroslav lasting fame. With his support, the church grew rapidly. Monasteries were established and became centers of learning for an increasingly urban and cultivated population. The construction of churches was of special interest to Iaroslav. During his reign, "golden domed" Kiev was studded with over 400 churches. Its crowning jewel was the Church of St Sophia, modeled on the splendid Hagia Sophia of Constantinople. The prince's concern with ecclesiastical affairs is evident in his nomination in 1051 of the first native metropolitan of Rus' – Ilarion. Some scholars have interpreted this action as Kiev's rejection of the ecclesiastical overlordship of Constantinople. However, most specialists, while acknowledging the impressive growth of the Kievan church, contend that the patriarch of Constantinople still retained his superiority over the Kievan metropolitan.

The achievement with which Iaroslav's name is perhaps most closely linked, and from which he gained his sobriquet "the Wise," was his codification of customary laws that became the basic legal code of the land, the *Ruska pravda* (Rus' Justice). Not only were existing laws systematized, but some were modified, thus reflecting the increasing involvement of the ruler in the lives of his subjects. For example, blood revenge was replaced by monetary payments that were established by the prince or his representatives. It is evident from these and other examples that the wealthy and increasingly urban and sophisticated society of Kievan Rus' had come a long way from the days when the isolated, forest-bound tribes first came into contact with the rough Scandinavian warrior-merchants.

Shortly before his death, Iaroslav attempted to resolve a problem that had bedeviled him and his father, Volodymyr – namely, how to prevent the internecine fighting for control of Kiev that usually broke out among a ruler's sons at his death. His approach was to apply the principle of seniority within the family to the distribution of land and political power. To his eldest son, Iziaslav, Iaroslav assigned Kiev and Novgorod along with their surrounding territories; to the second eldest, Sviatoslav, he gave Chernihiv; to the third, Vsevolod, Pereiaslav; to the fourth, Viacheslav, Smolensk; and to the youngest, Ihor, he gave Volodymyr-in-Volhynia. Whenever a vacancy oc-

curred in any one of these principalities, each brother would, according to Iaroslav's plan, move up a step until each in his turn reached Kiev, which represented the pinnacle of the system. Thus, by providing all his sons with lands and with a chance to rule in Kiev, Iaroslav hoped to avoid the bitter family feuds in which he himself had been embroiled.

Although this system of rotation worked for a time, thanks largely to the cooperation of the three senior sons, Iziaslav, Sviatoslav, and Vsevolod, it soon encountered several obstacles. The most serious of these was the fact that the rotation idea ran counter to another deeply entrenched principle, that of hereditary succession from father to son. It was not long before the sons of some princes demanded to move into their deceased fathers' places rather than stand aside in favor of their uncles. As a result, bitter conflicts between nephews and their uncles became a characteristic feature of the post-Iaroslav era. Moreover, as the number of princes increased, so too did their feuds.

To add to the spreading civil strife, the citizens of Kiev, dissatisfied with the rule of Iziaslav, drove him out and installed his nephew Vseslav in his place in 1068. Although Iziaslav returned and, with Polish aid, put down the rebels, the events of 1068 were noteworthy because they marked the first recorded "revolution" on Ukrainian soil. In addition, an ancient menace from the steppe reappeared on Ukraine's frontiers at this time to afflict Rus'. The nomadic Polovtsians (Cumans), more powerful than the earlier Pechenegs, launched a series of attacks that came perilously close to Kiev and made it difficult to keep the Dnieper trade route open. For some of these incursions, the princes themselves were to blame. Unable to assemble a viable force on their own, many of the younger princes, who had been deprived of their patrimony in the system of rotation (these displaced princes were called *izhoi*) invited the Polovtsians into Rus' as allies in their struggles against their rivals.

Volodymyr Monomakh (1113–25) Despite these troubles, Rus' could still muster the resources to cope. Another outstanding leader, Volodymyr Monomakh, the son of the Grand Prince Vsevolod (Kievan rulers had assumed the title of Grand Prince in the 11th century), emerged and even before he ascended the grand princely throne, he played a prominent role in restoring order in the land. In 1097, he was one of the organizers of a conference of leading princes held in Liubech, near Kiev, that sought to resolve, albeit unsuccessfully, the fratricidal conflicts by proposing a system of hereditary succession in most principalities. However, with regard to Kiev itself, no agreement could be reached and it remained a bone of contention. Volodymyr Monomakh's great fame and popularity stemmed from his inspiring leadership against the Polovtsians. Uniting the princes and mobilizing the populace, Monomakh was said to have conducted eighty-three campaigns against

them and to have killed 200 of their chieftains. Especially successful were the campaigns of 1103, 1107, and 1111. They marked Kiev's most glorious hour in its long struggle against the steppe nomads.

An indication of Volodymyr Monomakh's popularity was that when his father died in 1113 and there were other princes in line before him for the Kievan throne, the citizens of the city, erupting in another bout of social unrest, calmed down only after the 60-year-old Monomakh had agreed to become grand prince. By force of his enormous prestige, the new ruler succeeded in uniting most of fragmented Rus'. Never again would the land enjoy the unity and harmony that he was able to impose on it. Monomakh was also concerned with the growing social tensions among his subjects. By restoring order to riot-torn Kiev, he gained the support of the boyars and wealthy merchants. He addressed the grievances of the lower classes – his *ustav* or law code systematized the rights and obligations of freemen and indentured servitors – and his popularity with the masses reached even greater heights. The words of counsel that he left his sons just before his death reflect how seriously Monomakh treated social problems: "Above all, do not forget the poor ... and do not let the mighty oppress the people ... I did not allow the mighty to oppress the most lowly peasant or one poor widow."⁶ Volodymyr Monomakh's son Mstyslav still managed to hold the regions of Rus' together and to maintain his authority over the increasingly more numerous princes. But he was the last Kievan ruler to do so. His death in 1132 marked the end of Kiev's role as the dominant center of Rus' and inaugurated the period of political fragmentation.

The Decline of Kiev

Political fragmentation It is not surprising that the territorial conglomerate that the early Kievan rulers had put together began to disintegrate after a relatively short period of time. This same fate befell other medieval empires in Europe, such as that of Charlemagne. These vast but rudimentary political structures simply lacked the technical and institutional means to hold far-flung territories together for extended periods of time. In Rus', the Riurikid dynasty, through its many branches, did provide the land with a semblance of unity, but only so long as the princes agreed among themselves who was the senior and had the right to supreme authority. In the absence of such a consensus, the dynastic, personal bonds among the various principalities loosened dramatically.

But there was yet another dimension to the problem of political fragmentation. As the hereditary (*votchyna*) principle of succession triumphed over Iaroslav's system of seniority or rotation, the princely clans struck still deeper roots in their patrimonial lands and it became increasingly apparent to them that their future was tied to their hereditary holdings and not to Kiev, which

was continually being contested. Throughout the 12th century, ten to fifteen such hereditary principalities evolved, the most noteworthy being Halych-Volhynia, Vladimir-Suzdal, Novgorod, Chernihiv, and Smolensk. Each led its own independent political, economic, and even cultural existence. As a result, Kievan Rus' was gradually being transformed into an entity that had multiple centers related by language, common religiocultural bonds, and dynastic ties, but these centers were largely independent and often in competition with each other.

As more and more principalities went their own way, Kiev's wealth, population, and territory shrank until it ranked little higher than other principalities. It was at this stage that the city of Kiev and its surrounding lands became referred to as *Ruskaia zemlia*, the land of Rus', in the narrow sense of the word. Nonetheless, Kiev was still an alluring prize. Whoever acquired it not only enjoyed the prestige of ruling "the mother of Rus' cities," but could also lay claim to being the senior member of the Riurikid dynasty. Because it was the home of the metropolitan and the site of the major churches and monasteries, the city remained the undisputed cultural and religious, if not political, center of all Rus'. Even with the decline in its population and territory, Kiev and its lands were still among the most developed and populous in all of Ukraine.

Kiev's assets were also its liabilities, however. Princely competition for the city continued unabated. The Ukrainian historian Stefan Tomashivsky calculated that between 1146 and 1246, twenty-four princes ruled in Kiev on forty-seven separate occasions. Of these, one ruled seven separate times, five ruled three times each, and eight occupied the throne twice each. Significantly, thirty-five princely tenures lasted for less than a year each.⁷ One prince took a rather drastic approach in dealing with the problem of Kiev. In 1169, unsure of his ability to retain control of the city once he had won it and unwilling to have it overshadow his growing domains in the northeast, Andrei Bogoliubsky, the prince of Vladimir-Suzdal and a forerunner of the princes of Moscow, attacked Kiev and savagely sacked it. It never completely recovered from this destructive raid.


Economic stagnation Kiev's political problems were matched by its economic difficulties. As we have seen, the city's location on the great trade route "from the Varangians to the Greeks" had played an important role in its rise to prominence. Beginning with the late 11th century, the importance of this route began to decline. The effect on Kiev's economy was calamitous. Enterprising Italian merchants established direct links between Byzantium, Asia Minor, and the Middle East on the one hand, and Western Europe on the other, thus bypassing Kiev in the process. Moreover, with the Rus' princes absorbed in their feuds, it was difficult to secure the Dnieper route from nomadic attacks.

Another blow to Kievan commerce came in 1204 when the Crusaders pillaged Constantinople. Meanwhile, the once-flourishing Abbasid Caliphate, with its capital at Baghdad, entered a period of steep decline. As a result, Kiev lost two of its biggest trading partners. These economic disasters exacerbated the already tense relations between the rich and poor in the city and led to frequent social upheavals. The once proud center of Rus' was clearly coming apart at its political, economic, and social seams.

The Mongols Kiev's nemesis was its ancient enemy – the nomads. It was not the Polovtsians, however, who dealt Kiev its death blow, for, after generations of bitter struggle leading to mutual exhaustion, the Rus' principalities had established a stable relationship with these tribes and some of the Rus' princes had even forged matrimonial links with the Polovtsian elite. Rather, it was the Mongols, or Tatars as they are called in the East European sources, who delivered the coup de grâce to Kiev.

Although the origins of the Mongols have not yet been completely clarified, it is known that in the 12th century they were nomads along the northwestern borders of China. Most of their energy and attention was focused on clan or tribal conflicts over scarce pasturage. In the final decades of the 12th century, an unusually gifted leader by the name of Temujin (who in 1206 adopted the august title of Jenghiz Khan or Khan of Khans) emerged among them and achieved the unprecedented: by means of force and political skill he united the warring tribes and compelled them to recognize his absolute authority. Next, he harnessed their tremendous military capacity and aggressiveness against the neighboring sedentary civilizations.

Never very numerous (numbering at most between 120,000 and 140,000 fighting men), but extremely mobile, well organized, and superbly led, the Mongol forces initially conquered China, Central Asia, and Iran. In 1222, a Mongol detachment crossed the Caucasus and attacked the Polovtsians. Khoran, the Polovtsian khan, turned to some of the Rus' princes for aid and the latter complied with his request. In 1223, near the Kalka River, a combined Rus'/Polovtsian force met the Mongols and, after a fierce battle, suffered a disastrous defeat. But the Mongols, who had overextended themselves, chose not to follow up this victory and returned to their homeland. The princes of Rus' quickly forgot this catastrophic experience and again plunged into their dynastic feuds. In 1237, however, a powerful Mongol army led by Batu, a grandson of Jenghiz Khan, appeared on the frontiers of Rus'. With fire and sword it overran the towns of the northeast, such as Riazan, Suzdal, and Vladimir. In 1240 it reached Kiev. Although its prince (Mykhailo) fled, the citizens of the city, led by a military commander by the name of Dmytro who had been dispatched by Danylo of Galicia, decided to resist the invaders. A long and bitter siege ensued and even after the Mongols broke through the



Map 8 Mongol incursions

city walls, fighting ranged from street to street and from house to house. Finally, early in December 1240, the city fell to the Mongols.



Historians often divide the political history of Kievan Rus' into three phases. Encompassing almost a century, from Oleh's accession to power in Kiev in 882 to the death of Sviatoslav in 972, the initial period was one of rapid expansion. Basing themselves in strategically located Kiev, the Varangian princes gained control of the all-important Dnieper trade artery, "the route from the Varangians to the Greeks," established their control over the East Slavic tribes, and eliminated their major rivals in the region. In the process, they created a vast economic and political conglomerate that was ready and able to challenge the mighty Byzantine Empire.

The reigns of Volodymyr the Great (980–1015) and Iaroslav the Wise (1036–54) encompassed much of the second phase, a time when Kievan Rus' consolidated its gains and reached the height of its political power and stability, economic prosperity, and cultural achievement. In contrast to the expansionism of the preceding period, internal growth and development predominated in this phase. The socioeconomic structure of society became more differentiated. Law and order were better defined. Most important, the introduction of Christianity brought with it a new culture that changed dramatically how the populace of Kievan Rus' viewed its world and expressed itself.

Incessant and destructive princely feuds, increasingly threatening nomadic incursions, and economic stagnation characterize the final phase. Some historians argue that these troubles set in soon after the death of Iaroslav in 1054. Others are inclined to see the onset of decline after the reigns of the last effective rulers of Kiev, Volodymyr Monomakh (1113–25) and his son Mstyslav (1125–32). In any case, when Andrei Bogoliubsky of Suzdal captured and sacked the city in 1169 and then chose to return to the northeast rather than occupy it, it was evident that the political and economic significance of Kiev had already diminished badly. And the total destruction inflicted on the city by the Mongols in 1240 marked the tragic conclusion to the Kievan period in Ukrainian history.

The Society and Culture of Kievan Rus'

In terms of its political organization, it is simpler to establish what Kievan Rus' was not rather than what it was. Kievan Rus' was not a state in the modern sense of the word. To view it as such would be to ascribe to it a much higher degree of political organization than it actually possessed. There was no centralized government, no encompassing specialized bureaucracy. The only contact that existed between rulers and ruled, especially as far as the nonurban population was concerned, was the revenue-collecting process. Personal or dynastic interests motivated princely politics, while institutional or societal concerns were often ignored. Political relationships were loose, fluid, and ill defined. And political problems were often dealt with by means of force. Nonetheless, there was a growing degree of political, social, and economic order and cultural achievement in the society of Kievan Rus' and the goal of this chapter is to survey its major features.



The Political Order

Before the arrival of the Varangians, tribal units constituted the major political entities among the East Slavs. What little is known about this tribal system indicates that extensive authority rested in the hands of clan and tribal leaders who exercised it according to custom and tradition. Meeting in tribal councils to achieve a consensus, these patriarchal figures dominated political activity from the lowest level – that of the commune (*mir, zadruga*) – to the highest – that of the tribal confederation, demonstrated by the Polianians, Severians, and Derevlianians. The centers of political power were located in the numerous tribal stockades situated in forest clearings or on elevated places around which the tribesmen lived.

Upon this East Slavic tribal system, the Varangians imposed their commer-

cially and militarily oriented forms of organization that established a degree of order and unity among the native tribes, thus allowing them to carry out their exploitative operations more efficiently. The major "shareholders" of their commercial enterprises were the members of the Riurikid dynasty and to them went most of the profits and power. But because these princes greatly depended on their retainers or *druzhyna*, they also had to share a significant portion of their gains with them. Indeed, keeping the retinue satisfied so that it would not go off to a rival prince was one of the major concerns of the early Kievan rulers. With the expansion of Varangian control, political power was centered in the cities that sprang up along the major trade routes. The foremost of these was Kiev.

The extent to which the Kievan princes were able to monopolize power varied greatly. Up to the reign of Iaroslav the Wise in the mid 11th century, the most ambitious, talented, and ruthless members of the dynasty managed repeatedly to establish themselves in Kiev and to assert their exclusive authority over their brothers and other rivals. During this period of strongman rule, centrifugal tendencies were contained and cohesion was maintained. In the wake of Iaroslav's reform of the succession system by which each member of the rapidly expanding Riurikid dynasty actually or theoretically gained a share in the realm, decentralization of power set in, with the result that the Grand Prince of Kiev eventually became little more than the titular head of an incessantly feuding, dynastically linked conglomeration of principalities.

Having sketched in broad outline the political development of Kievan Rus', we need next to examine the institutions through which power was exercised. Of these, the most important were the office of prince, the boyar council (*duma*), and the town assembly (*viche*). These institutions were associated with the monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic tendencies that were a part of the Kievan political order. In return for the power and prestige that the prince enjoyed, he was expected to provide justice, order, and protection for his subjects. In performing his military functions, the prince depended first and foremost on his *druzhyna*. When larger military forces were required, town militias or, more rarely, general levies were summoned. The size of these forces was relatively small, averaging about 2000–3000 men or even fewer. As in the case of other pre-state societies, officials such as chamberlains, stewards, and the like, who supervised a prince's personal household, were also used to administer the principality as a whole because distinctions were blurred between the public and private domains. To govern more distant towns and provinces, the princes appointed governors (*posadnyky*), usually chosen from among members of their own families.

On the local level, a prince's will was enforced by the *tysiatsky* (commander) of the local militia and his subordinates. Justice was administered by the prince and his officials according to Iaroslav the Wise's codification of *Ruska*

pravda. Clearly, the office of prince was of central importance in Kievan government, but the fact that this single institution had to fulfill military, judicial, and administrative functions is also an indication of how relatively unspecialized and rudimentary the entire system was.

To finance their activities, the princes depended at first on tribute. Later, a more elaborate system of taxation evolved that encompassed each extended household (called a "hearth" or "plow"). Other sources of princely revenue were tariffs on trade, judicial fees, and fines. Fines were an important source of income because Kievan laws called primarily for such payments rather than capital punishment for criminal acts.

For advice and support, the prince depended on the boyar council or *duma*, an institution that had evolved from the senior members of the *druzhyna*, many of whom were descendants of the Varangian warlords or Slavic tribal leaders. Later, the higher clergy also won a place on this council. The functions of the *duma* were never clearly defined nor was the prince obligated to consult it. However, if he failed to do so he risked the possibility that this influential body and its constituency, the boyar elite, would refuse to support his undertakings. Therefore, the princes usually took the views of their boyar council into account.

Representing the democratic aspect of the Kievan political order was the *viche*, or town assembly, which predated the institution of prince and the roots of which probably lay in the tribal councils of the East Slavs. It was called by the prince or the townsmen to consult or express public opinion, as the need arose. Among the issues the assembly discussed were war, the negotiation of treaties, princely succession, appointments to offices, and military organization. While the assembly could criticize or applaud princely policies, it could not formulate its own policies or legislate laws. However, when a new prince ascended the throne, the *viche* did have the right to enter into a formal agreement, or *riad*, with him whereby, in return for its acceptance of his rule, the prince agreed not to overstep the traditional limits of his authority with regard to it. Although heads of households had the right to participate, the urban merchant elite tended to dominate these assemblies, often using them as a forum for factional disputes.

Social Organization

Inhabited by a numerous population – estimates vary greatly and range from 3 to 12 million – and encompassing a vast territory of about 800,000 sq. km (about half of which fell within the boundaries of modern Ukraine), Kievan Rus' was the largest political entity in medieval Europe.¹ It was also a rapidly changing one. Although experiencing a gradual growth of distinctions between commoners and the emerging tribal elite, East Slavic agrarian society in the 9th century was still ethnically and socially relatively homoge-

neous. But Kiev's rapid expansion brought Varangian trader-warriors, Finnic hunters, Turkic mercenaries, Greek artisans, and Armenian and Jewish merchants into the Slavic midst. Moreover, with the rise of cities, merchants and craftsmen proliferated. Finally, a completely new class – the clergy – appeared with the introduction of Christianity. In short, the inhabitants of Kievan Rus' became culturally more cosmopolitan, ethnically more diverse, and socially more differentiated and stratified.

In the social hierarchy that evolved, the highest place was held by the growing number of members of the various branches of the Riurikid dynasty. The retainers of the princes, senior and junior members of the *družhyna*, and the local elites formed the boyar, or noble class, also referred to as the *muzhi*. In time, the mostly Scandinavian elite was Slavicized, a process reflected in the transformation of such originally Scandinavian names as Helgi, Helga, Ingvarr, and Valdemar into their respective Slavic equivalents – Oleh, Olha, Ihor, and Volodymyr. As a result of the diminishing opportunities in trade caused by repeated nomadic attacks on the trade routes and by Constantinople's commercial decline, by the 12th century, the early trader-warriors gradually changed into large landowners. Land was not difficult to come by because princes had a surfeit of open, uncultivated territory to give away to their retainers. Unlike in Western Europe where noble landholding was conditional upon service to an overlord, in Rus' the boyars had a hereditary right to their estates (*votchyny*) and retained them even if they left the prince they served for another. Many boyars lived in the cities, renting their lands to peasants in return for a portion of their produce, which they sold on the open market. It was their city orientation, commercial interests, and mobility that differentiated the boyars of Kievan Rus' from the nobility of Western Europe.

Below the boyars were the urban patricians, or *liudy* as they were called, often described as the Kievan middle class. Its foremost members were the great merchants who engaged in foreign trade, intermarried with the boyars, and dominated city politics. Compared with the burghers of Western Europe at the time, the urban elite of Kievan Rus' was much more powerful and numerous, even after the slackening trade brought about a relative decline in its position during the 12th century. Included among the less influential and wealthy urban inhabitants – the *molodshi liudy* or younger men – were the petty merchants, shopkeepers, and skilled craftsmen, such as armorers, masons, glaziers, and goldsmiths, who were organized into trade associations. Lowest on the urban social scale was the *chern* or proletariat, people who owned no property and who hired themselves out as manual laborers.

The vast majority of the population consisted of peasants, or *smerdy*. Because the historical sources focused their attention on the upper classes, little is known about the peasantry. It is generally accepted that throughout the Kievan period, most of the peasants were relatively free. However, as times became more difficult in the 12th–13th centuries, there are indications that

peasants became increasingly subject to various forms of bondage. A free peasant had access to a court of law, could move about at will, and his sons could inherit his land (if he had only female heirs, however, the prince had the right to claim his land). The major obligations of the *smerdy* were the payment of taxes (*dan'*) and the performance of military duties in wartime, usually of a supportive nature. An indication of the peasant's low status in society was the penalty imposed by the formulators of the *Ruska pravda* on those responsible for the death of a *smerd*: the blood money was in such cases set at 5 *hryvnia*. By way of comparison, the blood money for killing a merchant or a member of the junior *druzhyna* was 40 *hryvnia*, while that for killing a senior member of the prince's retinue was 80.

If a peasant or member of another social group fell into debt (a frequent occurrence because interest rates ranged from 25 to 50%), or if he simply wanted a cash advance, he could enter into an agreement with his creditor whereby he obligated himself to perform labor for a specified period of time in lieu of monetary payments. These indentured, or half-free, laborers were called *zakupy*. At the very bottom of the social pyramid were the slaves, or *kholopy*. Because slaves were a major commodity of trade between Kiev and Constantinople, it is safe to assume that slavery was commonplace in Rus', especially before the acceptance of Christianity. The ranks of the slaves, many of whom worked on princely estates, were enlarged by prisoners of war, children of slaves, *zakupy* who attempted to flee from their obligations, and other unfortunates. It was possible, however, for slaves to buy their own freedom or to receive it in reward for faithful service to their masters.

The many people who were associated with the church also constituted a separate social group. Parish priests, deacons and their families, monks, and nuns were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the church. In addition, the *izhoi*, a term originally used to designate princes who had lost their patrimony (sometimes referred to as *izhoi*-princes), but later extended to include all individuals who did not fit into a specific social category, were also under the protection of the church. Counted among these were recently freed slaves (the church encouraged the freeing of slaves as a good deed), bankrupt merchants, and priests' sons who were illiterate and therefore excluded from the priesthood.

Historians have long struggled with the question of similarities between the society of Kievan Rus' and that of the medieval West. Specifically, they have been engrossed by the question of whether European feudalism existed everywhere before the age of industrialization. Soviet historians accept it as a matter of fact that Kievan Rus' was a feudal society. This was also the view of such respected non-Marxist scholars as Nikolai Pavlov-Sylvansky, who was impressed by the disintegration of Kievan Rus' in the 12th century into small principalities with an increasingly agrarian-based economy. However, most modern non-Marxist historians disagree with this analysis. They point out

that because of the minimal control exercised by princes over their boyars, the institution of vassalage, which was central to feudalism, did not exist in the Riurikid realm. Moreover, the important role played by commerce and the cities in Kievan Rus' and the existence of a largely free peasantry are factors indicating that the situation in the East was quite different from that in the West. Therefore, rather than subsuming Kievan Rus' under the general category of feudal societies, Western historians prefer to consider it a unique and independent social system.

Economic Activity

It is as adventurous, freebooting merchants that the Varangians first appear in the primary sources for the history of Kievan Rus'. From their bases near the Baltic shores, they pushed eastward along the Volga route in the 8th–9th centuries until they reached the Caspian Sea, where they established contacts with the merchants of the Muslim world. By the 9th century, when the focus of trade had shifted to Constantinople in the south, the famous "route from the Varangians to the Greeks" became Kiev's primary commercial thoroughfare. Foreign trade thus came to constitute the basis of the economic system of Kievan Rus'.

It was no accident that the first formal treaty concluded by a Kievan ruler was Oleh's commercial pact with Byzantium (911) that secured exceedingly favorable terms in Constantinople for the merchants of Rus'. When Byzantine trade faltered in the 12th–13th centuries as a result of the Crusaders' attack on Constantinople and the frequent disruptions of the Dnieper trade by the nomads, commercial contacts with the West, extending primarily over the Cracow–Prague–Regensburg route, assumed greater importance for Kiev.

In contrast to the medieval West where the landowning aristocracy eschewed commercial activity, in Kievan Rus' not only was the boyar nobility deeply involved in trade, but so too was the prince. Most of the early Kievan ruler's time was spent in gathering tribute from his scattered subjects, in bringing it down to Kiev, and then in organizing a large flotilla every year for shipment of the slaves, furs, flax, honey, wax, and other raw products down the Dnieper to Constantinople where they were exchanged for luxury goods. Even when the princes and boyars became more settled and acquired large tracts of land, much of the produce from their estates was intended for foreign markets. Opportunities for commerce must have been numerous, for the cities of Rus' supported a substantial merchant class whose most powerful and wealthy members were also active in foreign trade and enjoyed the same legal and political rights as the boyars. But the vast majority of merchants were simply small shopkeepers and petty traders who were involved in the domestic market and who were often exploited by their wealthier colleagues to whom they were frequently in debt.

Modern scholars estimate that 13–15% of the population of Rus' lived in urban centers. The chronicles indicate that there were about 240 towns and cities in the land. However, it is probable that as many as 150 of these were nothing more than fortified settlements inhabited by a semiagrarian population. Of the approximately ninety large towns and cities, Kiev was by far the largest. Before the Mongol invasion, it had a population of approximately 35,000–40,000 (London was only to reach this size a century later). By comparison, such important centers as Chernihiv and Pereiaslav near the Dnieper, Volodymyr-in-Volhynia, and Halych and Lviv in Galicia probably had no more than 4000–5000 inhabitants. Petty merchants and artisans made up most of the population of these towns because handicrafts were highly developed. In Kiev, for example, between forty and sixty different handicrafts were represented, the most important practitioners of which were carpenters, smiths, potters, and leather workers.

Countering those historians who stress the commercial character of the Kievan economy are those who contend that agriculture constituted its basis. Noted Ukrainian scholars such as Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Dmytro Bahalii, and Iaroslav Pasternak, as well as the leading Soviet specialists in the field, are adherents of the latter view. They argue that because the Slavs had traditionally been an agrarian people, it is unlikely that they would have suddenly changed their way of living during the Kievan period. Additional support for this view comes from the frequent references in the chronicles to agricultural activity in Kievan Rus', the agrarian orientation of the ancient Slavic calendar and mythology, and (most convincingly) archaeological evidence.

Recent archaeological excavations have demonstrated that iron plowshares were in use in Ukraine by the 10th century and that the relatively advanced two- or three-field crop rotation system (leaving one-half to one-third of the land fallow) was also used, as it was in western Europe. Wheat, oats, rye, and barley were the favored crops. Livestock breeding was also widespread among the peasants of Rus', providing them not only with meat and milk, but also with leather for clothing and shoes. So too was the raising of horses, swine, sheep, geese, chickens, and pigeons. Oxen made cultivation possible on a larger scale. Although peasants often owned the implements necessary for farming the land on their own, they usually banded together in communes, or *obshchyny* (which consisted of blood relatives from several generations led by a patriarch), to help each other. Communes could also be territorially based and include unrelated neighbors.

If the economy of Rus' was primarily agricultural, how do proponents of this position explain the rise of large urban and commercial centers? The noted Soviet scholar Mikhail Tikhomirov, whose views are shared by many of his Soviet colleagues, has argued that the development and growing sophistication of agriculture encouraged the appearance of numerous handicrafts and where these became concentrated, towns arose.² He acknowledges that

once towns appeared, commerce played an important role in their expansion, but this trade was primarily between the towns and their agrarian hinterlands rather than large-scale foreign-transit trade.

Confronted by compelling argument on the part of supporters of both the “commercial” and “agricultural” interpretations of the economic history of Kievan Rus’, modern historians are inclined to compromise on this question as well. While agreeing that the prince, his retinue, and the richest merchants were primarily interested and involved in a lively and lucrative foreign trade, especially up to the 12th century, they also accept the argument that the overwhelming majority of the people of Kievan Rus’ made its living from agriculture.

Kievan Culture

Any discussion of the culture of a medieval society concentrates first and foremost on its religious beliefs and institutions. In the case of Kievan Rus’ we have two distinct religious, and therefore cultural, epochs to consider. Prior to 988, animism, based on the deification of the forces of nature and on ancestor worship, was the means by which the early East Slavs sought to satisfy their spiritual needs. The most revered deity in their pagan pantheon was Perun, the god of thunder and lightning, a figure analogous to the Scandinavian Thor, but lacking the elaborate mythology associated with him. Other important deities were Dazhboh and Svaroh, gods of the air and sun, providers of all earthly benefits. As might be expected of an agricultural people, the worship of the gods of fertility, Roh and Rozhdenytsia, was also widespread. In addition, myriad spirits of rivers, woods, and ancestors were also the objects of devotion, which was often expressed by means of animal and occasionally even human sacrifice. The East Slavs did not raise imposing temples to their gods, nor did they have a hierarchically organized priesthood – a fact that helps to explain the relatively weak resistance of their religion to Christianity. Nevertheless, native beliefs did not vanish completely with the coming of the new faith. *Dvoviria* or religious dualism, the practice of originally pagan customs and rites (such as those marking the coming of spring) persisted among the East Slavs for centuries under the guise of Christianity.

With the acceptance of Christianity, Kievan Rus’ was introduced to a new, sophisticated, and highly structured religion. In 1037, upon the arrival from Constantinople of the first in a long line of Greek metropolitans (only two non-Greeks would hold the office throughout the entire Kievan period), a metropolitan diocese was established. Initially, the diocese of Rus’ contained eight eparchies or bishoprics, but their number was eventually increased to sixteen. Of these, ten were located in what is Ukraine today. Many of the bishops also came from Byzantium, bringing along with them their entourages of clerks, assistants, and artisans and thereby making their bish-

oprics centers for the dissemination of Byzantine culture. The clergy was divided into two categories: the "white" clergy, or parish priests who took no vows of celibacy and were usually heads of families chosen from within their communities, and the "black" clergy, who were monks from whose midst high church officials were chosen. Intent on escaping the evils and temptations of this world by living in seclusion, the monks were viewed as the elite of the faithful and their monasteries were centers of Christian devotion and learning. By the 13th century, there were about fifty monasteries in Kievan Rus', seventeen in Kiev alone.

The cultural impact of the institutions of the church on Kievan Rus' was overwhelming. The construction of just one cathedral, the famous St Sophia in Kiev, illustrates graphically how widespread the church's influence was on the arts. Built in 1037 during the reign of Iaroslav the Wise, this splendid stone edifice, which was constructed by Greek artisans and modeled on the Hagia Sophia in Constantinople, had five apses, five naves, and thirteen cupolas. Marble and alabaster columns supported a sumptuously decorated interior. For Kievans who were accustomed to modest wooden structures, this house of the Christian God must have been dazzling. And this was exactly the effect that the cathedral was meant to achieve, for the Greek church realized that the impact of great art on the senses often kindled religious reverence more effectively than did the influence of theology on the mind. To this end, the church supported the introduction of various arts and crafts. For example, the interior of St Sophia was embellished with numerous colorful mosaics and frescoes which recreated the human form with awe-inspiring realism. Another means of inspiring reverence was through the use of icons – religious images painted on specially prepared wooden planks. Icons soon spread from the churches to private homes, where they became the most prized of family heirlooms. All of these new art forms were initially heavily influenced by Greek models. But, in time, the artists of Kievan Rus' learned to incorporate native elements into these artistic genres, creating in the process their own characteristic style. The influence of the Eastern church on some art forms was not always encouraging, however. For instance, because the Byzantines frowned on the use of statues in their churches, sculpture never developed.

Christianity's impact on how the populace of Rus' expressed itself intellectually was equally decisive. A written language, based on an alphabet originally devised by Sts Cyril and Methodius, Greek missionaries to the Slavs, came into use soon after 988. Unlike Rome with its insistence on the use of Latin in liturgical matters, Constantinople acquiesced in the use of native languages among its converts. Thus, Church Slavonic, a literary language based on a south-Slavic dialect and easily understood by all East Slavs, was utilized in church services and other religious observances. Gradually, it became the vehicle for both religious and secular literary expression of an increasing richness and variety.

As might be expected, most of the earliest examples of this written literature were associated with the Christian religion. Thus, excerpts from the Old and New Testaments, hymns, sermons, and lives of saints abounded. Some of the more notable of these were the *Paterikon*, a compendium of the lives of saints prepared by the monks of the Kievan Cave Monastery (Kievo Pecherska Lavra); the sermons and hymns of St Cyril of Turiv; and the writings of Ilarion, the metropolitan of Kiev in the mid 11th century, probably the most outstanding intellectual of Kievan Rus'. In his famous work, "On Law and Grace," a panegyric on Volodymyr the Great that was read in the presence of Iaroslav the Wise in 1050, Ilarion skillfully counterpoised Christianity against paganism and described the Christianization of Rus'. His work revealed a sophisticated grasp of Byzantine rhetorics, and also a great familiarity with the Bible. Yet, despite his indebtedness to Greek culture, Ilarion was not slavishly Greekophile. In "On Law and Grace" he emphasized the importance and splendor of Rus', downplayed Byzantium's role in its conversion, and assigned all the credit for this historical event to Volodymyr.

While Greek influence predominated in religious writing, it was less evident in the chronicles. Written for the most part by monks and imbued with a Christian worldview, the early Kievan chronicles were characterized by realism and richness of detail. They noted both the major issues of the time – princely conflicts and the struggle against the nomads – as well as details of specific events. The most important of these works was the "Chronicle of Bygone Years" as it has come to be known in scholarship. Associated with the names of two Kievan monks, Nestor and Sylvester, it was composed in 1111. Literary works were also produced by members of the secular elite. Despite his constant involvement in political affairs, Prince Volodymyr Monomakh wrote his moving and philosophical "Testament." And there is reason to believe that the anonymous author of the most magnificent poetical work of the Kievan period, "The Tale of the Host of Ihor" (1185–87), belonged to courtly circles. While recounting the story of a disastrous campaign by a minor prince against the nomads, the author infused it with a passionate appeal to all feuding princes of Rus' to unite for the common good. Using rhythmic verse, vivid imagery, rich language, and a strikingly intimate treatment of nature, the author created a moving literary masterpiece.

But written works, no matter how evocative, were inaccessible to Kiev's illiterate masses. For them, oral literature – songs, proverbs, riddles, fairy tales, and especially oral epics or *biliny* – served as the repository of folk wisdom and creativity. Passed on orally from generation to generation, the *biliny* recounted the exploits of such popular heroes as the jovial peasant's son Ilia Muromets, a kind of Slavic Paul Bunyan; the shrewd priest's son Alosha Popovych; and the loyal nobleman's son Dobrynia Mykytych – all members of Prince Volodymyr's mythical retinue. Much like the Knights of King Arthur's Round Table, these East Slavic paladins sallied forth from

Volodymyr's court to combat the forces of evil. Among their frequent enemies were Tugor Khan of the Polovtsians, who could change himself into the dragon Tugurin, a character that symbolized in the popular mind the constant danger from the steppe. Or it could be Zhydovyn, the Jew, whose appearance in the epics might reflect the survival in popular memory of the long struggle in the past with the Judaic Khazars. Magic and mystery abounded in all of these tales and Christian values were closely interwoven with survivals of the pagan past.

There are divided opinions among scholars as to the extent and level of formal education in Kievan Rus'. Undoubtedly members of the elite were exposed to learning. The chronicles inform us that in 988 Volodymyr ordered boyar children to be given an education; and his son Iaroslav established a school in Novgorod for 300 wellborn boys. Again, in Kiev the hub of this activity was St Sophia. By 1037, the cathedral housed on its premises a school and a library. The nearby Kievan Cave Monastery also had a library and some of its monks were renowned for their learning, which at that time meant primarily acquiring mastery of religious texts. Respect for learning was also evident among the princes. Iaroslav the Wise was noted for his love of books; his son Vsevolod is believed to have mastered five languages; and his daughter Anna was literate, an unusual attainment for a woman at the time and one that set her apart from most French women of the court when she became queen of France. But the question of how widespread education was among the masses is more difficult to resolve. The discovery in Novgorod of alphabets written on birch bark for use by schoolboys or of graffiti written on the walls of St Sophia is viewed by some scholars as an indication that the lower classes also had access to education. However, many other specialists believe that, by and large, education in general and familiarity with Byzantine-Christian culture in particular was the domain of the secular and ecclesiastical elites and thus remained out of reach for the masses.



Both Ukrainian and Russian historians treat Kievan Rus' as an integral part of their respective national histories. As might be expected, the question of who has the greater right to claim its heritage often arises. Traditional Russian historians, especially those influenced by the 19th-century Juridical School, argued that because Russians were the only East Slavs to create a state in modern times (the evolution of statehood was viewed by them as the pinnacle of the historical process), the Muscovite-Russian state's link with the earliest East Slavic state was the most consistent and significant. By implication, because Ukrainians and Belorussians had no modern state of their own, their histories had no institutional bonds with the Kievan period. The influential 19th-century Russian historian Mikhail Pogodin went even further

and claimed that Russian ties with Kiev were not only institutional, but also ethnic.³ According to his theory, after the Mongol destruction of Kiev in 1240, much of the surviving populace migrated from the south to the northeast, the heartland of modern Russia. Although this theory has long since been discredited, it still enjoys support among many Russian and non-Russian historians.

As the national consciousness of Ukrainians grew in the 19th century, so too did their resentment of Russian monopolization of the "glory that was Kiev." The most forceful argument against the "traditional scheme of Russian history" was advanced in 1906 by Hrushevsky, Ukraine's most eminent historian.⁴ Thoroughgoing populist that he was, Hrushevsky questioned the study of history primarily in terms of the state-building process. For him, the accumulated experience of an ethnically related people living on its ancestral lands was the focal point of history. He assumed, and several recent Soviet anthropological studies support his contention, that essentially the same ethnic stock occupied much of Ukraine from the time of the Antes of the 6th century to the 20th century. If people did leave central Ukraine as a result of Mongol attacks – and Hrushevsky downplayed the extent of the devastation and migrations – they returned when relative calm was restored. According to Hrushevsky, who was obviously not a Normanist, Ukrainians are the most direct descendants of the Polianians who played the major role in the development of Kiev and, therefore, this experience looms largest in Ukrainian history.

In Hrushevsky's view, to assign the Kievan period a central place in the Russian past thus not only dilutes the uniqueness of the Poliano-Ukrainian achievement, but also burdens Russian history with an artificial or exaggerated appendage that obstructs the exploration of its true origins. If one does choose to use the state as a vehicle by which the Kievan heritage was passed on to future generations, Hrushevsky argued that it was the principalities of Galicia and Volhynia and, later, the Duchy of Lithuania (with its strong Ukrainian and Belorussian elements) that preserved more of this heritage than did the distant northeastern principalities of Rostov, Suzdal, Vladimir, Tver, and Moscow. What then is the relationship of Russian history to the Kievan period in Hrushevsky's opinion? Just as Gaul, once a Roman province and now modern-day France, borrowed much of its sociopolitical organization, laws, and culture from Rome, so too did Moscow with regard to Kiev. But Moscow was not a continuation, or a second stage in the historical process begun in Kiev. Despite its numerous Kievan borrowings, Moscow's roots, according to Hrushevsky, were embedded in the geographical, political, and ethnic conditions peculiar to the northeast.

Soviet historians take what appears to be a compromise position on the issue of the Kievan legacy. They argue that Kiev was the creation of all three East Slavic peoples – the Ukrainians, Russians, and Belorussians. More pre-

cisely, the common ancestors of all three nations – the so-called ancient Rus' people (*drevnerusskii narod*) – constituted the population of Kievan Rus'.⁵ Soviet scholars continually emphasize how uniform and homogeneous the culture, language, customs, economies, and politics of the "ancient Russians" were. By stressing this point, they hope to make it difficult for "bourgeois nationalist historians" not only to claim a greater share of the Kievan heritage for one or another nation, but even to argue that any regional variations existed in the huge territory of Rus'. This emphasis on the ethnic and cultural uniformity of Kievan Rus' leaves one with the impression that the "ancient Rus'" are a projection onto the past of the homogeneous Soviet nation that is planned for the future.

The view of Soviet historians, which is gradually supplanting the views of traditional Russian historiography on the question, is that because the three East Slavic nations evolved only after the decline of Kiev, there is no point in discussing which of them has the primary claim to its heritage. In explaining why the East Slavs broke up into three separate nations, the major reasons given are the impact of the Mongol invasion and the absorption of the Ukrainians and Belorussians into the Polish-Lithuanian state. This is a rather striking departure from the usual Marxist stress on internal socio-economic factors to explain the development of nations. Moreover, it implies that were it not for these external factors, no differentiation would have occurred among the "ancient Russians." If anything, the debate over the Kievan heritage only proves once more how closely political, ideological, and scholarly issues are interwoven in the historiography of the Kievan period.

Galicia-Volhynia

The disintegration of vast, hurriedly established political conglomerates, such as Kievan Rus', was a common phenomenon in the medieval period. In the West, prior to the rise of Kiev, Charlemagne's Carolingian empire enjoyed only a brief life span; and in the East, after the fall of Kiev, the huge realm of the Mongols, stretching from the shores of the Pacific to the Carpathians, broke up within a few generations. Given the poor communications, great expanses, and strong particularistic tendencies, political fragmentation was a common phenomenon. Nevertheless, for historians of Kievan Rus' it has been a depressing spectacle to observe. Gone were the grand designs, the broad sweep, and the wide horizons of the early Kievan empire builders. In their place came petty intrigues, local squabbles, limited objectives, and the narrow perspectives of feuding princelings. The imposing cultural achievements that resulted from the concentration of talent in one capital became a thing of the past, unmatched by the frequently admirable but usually isolated efforts of artists and intellectuals dispersed among the many regional centers. In most of the principalities, the boyar elites gradually abandoned their adventurous commercial ventures and turned to the mundane maintenance of their estates. As its political, cultural, and economic life broke down, Kievan Rus' ceased to function as a whole.



Regionalism

One of the reasons why the various principalities pulled away from Kiev was the triumph of the *votchyna* (private property, appanage) concept, formally recognized at a conference of princes held in Liubech in 1097. In order to put an end to the internecine feuding, the princes at this meeting recognized each other's hereditary rights to the lands they currently held. The issue of Kiev, a prize deemed too great for any one princely line to lay claim to, was left

unresolved. While some of the senior princes continued to fight for it, others, especially those of junior rank, lost interest in the struggle and in the city itself because they realized that their chances of acquiring the old capital were minimal at best. Instead, they concentrated on expanding and enriching their own hereditary lands, encouraging thereby the growth of a regionalism and particularism that would become the hallmark of the late Kievan period.

These tendencies were reinforced by the boyars' growing involvement in landownership: as a result of their interest in local affairs, their willingness to participate in the princely struggles for distant Kiev or, for that matter, in any all-Rus' cause, diminished. It even became difficult for the Rus' principalities to agree on a common enemy. Novgorod considered the Teutonic Knights to be its greatest threat; for Polotsk it was the Lithuanians; for Rostov and Suzdal, the Volga Bulgars; for Galicia-Volhynia, the Poles and Hungarians; and for Kiev, it was the nomadic Polovtsians. When they were not fighting their enemies, the Rus' princes interacted with them. In fact, some of the princes established closer links with their non-Rus' neighbors than they did with other, more distant regions of Rus.'

For example, in the north, the ancient city of Novgorod was drawn into the commercial network that a league of north-German cities, later called the Hansa, organized along the Baltic shores. While Kiev's trade declined, Novgorod's boomed and its orientation became increasingly north European. Like many other trading cities, Novgorod developed a republican-like form of government in which the merchant elite, not the prince or boyars, predominated. Another case of regional differentiation evolved in the northeast. In that vast, sparsely populated "land beyond the forest," the heartland of the Great Russians, principalities such as Rostov, Suzdal, Vladimir, and Moscow were founded by junior members of the Rurikid dynasty. Perhaps because these northeastern princes established themselves in these originally Finnish areas before many of the East Slavic colonists arrived, they were in an advantageous position to dictate exacting terms of overlordship to the newcomers. The epitome of the growing absolutist tendency of the northeastern princes was Andrei Bogoliubsky of Suzdal. Dissatisfied with the growing opposition from the local elite in Suzdal, he moved to Vladimir because it had no well-entrenched aristocracy that could thwart him. And, in 1169, he destroyed Kiev so that it would not rival his new capital. This single-minded pursuit of absolute power was inherited by Bogoliubsky's descendants, the rulers of Moscow (originally a minor outpost, Moscow was first mentioned in the chronicles only in 1147), and it helps to explain their future political success.

The Ukrainian Southwest: Galicia-Volhynia


Another extremely important regional development occurred in the Ukrainian southwest, in the principalities of Galicia and Volhynia. If any compo-

ment of the old Kievan realm could challenge the growing power of the Russian northeast, that is, of Suzdal, Vladimir, and fledgling Moscow, it was the principalities of Galicia and Volhynia in the southwest. Hrushevsky considered these two principalities to be the most direct inheritors of Kiev's political and cultural traditions.¹ Tomashivsky, another eminent Ukrainian historian, called Galicia-Volhynia the first undeniably Ukrainian state because at the height of their power in the 13th century the united principalities encompassed about 90% of the population living within what are today the borders of Ukraine.² The principalities were important in other ways as well. Lying on the western periphery of Kievan Rus', they were from the outset the focus of a fierce struggle between Ukrainians and Poles, a conflict that continued unabated until the mid 20th century. The principalities were also a crucial cultural frontier. Depending on one's perspective, they were either the easternmost inroad of the Catholic West or the westernmost outpost of the Orthodox East.

Located along the eastern foothills of the Carpathians at the headwaters of the important Dnister and Prut rivers that flow into the Black Sea, Galicia was originally inhabited by the Dulibian, Tivertsian, and White Croatian tribes. In the east it shared a long border with the rolling, wooded plains of Volhynia, also inhabited by the Dulibians and White Croats. To the east of Volhynia lay the principality of Kiev. While Galicia had the aggressive Hungarians and Poles to contend with on its western and northern borders, Volhynia's only foreign neighbors were the Lithuanian tribes to the north. Both principalities were fortunate in that they lay beyond the normal range of nomad raiders from the steppe. Volhynia and especially Galicia were well populated and their numerous cities were strategically located on important western trade routes. Moreover, Galicia had great deposits of salt, a commodity upon which all of Rus' depended.

In 980–90, Volodymyr the Great wrested Galicia and Volhynia from Polish control and integrated them into his realm. In Volhynia, he founded the city of Volodymyr, which eventually became the imposing capital of the land. In Galicia, the city of Halych, near the Carpathian salt fields, replaced Premyshl as the political center of the principality. The Kievan princes were able to assign Galicia and Volhynia to their offspring because these lands were their personal domain. Thus, the Rostyslavychi, the house of a grandson of Iaroslav the Wise, initially ruled in Galicia. Meanwhile, in Volhynia, the house of Mstyslav, a son of Volodymyr Monomakh, came to power.

Although often grouped together in historical studies for the sake of convenience, Galicia and Volhynia were quite different principalities in the 12th and 13th centuries. Perhaps the most striking difference between them was the nature of their respective elites. Undoubtedly, Galicia had the most willful, wealthy, and powerful boyars in all the Rus' lands. So pervasive was the influence of this aristocracy that Galicia is often considered the prime exam-



Map 9 Galicia-Volhynia

ple of oligarchic rule in Rus', representing, next to republican Novgorod and absolutist Vladimir-Moscow, the third major variant of the Kievan political system. According to Soviet scholars, the origins of the Galician boyars explain to a large extent their uniquely dominant position.³ Unlike the boyars of other principalities who usually descended from the princely retinue, the Galician aristocracy apparently emerged primarily from the local tribal elite. And it obtained its estates not from the prince, as was usual, but by usurping open communal lands. When the first Riurikid princes arrived here, they were probably confronted by a well-entrenched aristocracy that was ready to defend its own interests.

Other historians also point out that because the Rostyslavychi provided four generations of relatively stable rule, the boyars had ample time and opportunity to establish themselves. Moreover, many of them participated in the salt trade, which provided them with handsome profits and strengthened their already impressive economic standing. As a result, the wealthiest boyars could afford to maintain their own militias and retinues of lesser landholders. Finally, Galicia's distance from Kiev meant that the Grand Prince could not easily interfere in its affairs, while proximity to Poland and Hungary not only provided models of aristocratic dominance, but also opportunities to summon foreign aid against undesirable princes.

The boyars of Volhynia, in contrast, were cast in a more traditional mold than those of Galicia. Most of them had arrived in the principality in the retinues of their princes, who were frequently appointed and replaced at the will of Kiev, which, because of its proximity, exerted a stronger political influence on the principality than it did on Galicia. The lands these boyars acquired were given in return for services they had rendered their princes. Because the Volhynian elite was dependent on the largesse of its princes, it was relatively loyal and supportive of them. This explains why it was the princes of Volhynia, and not Galicia, who were in the best position to unite the two principalities.

The Rostyslavychi of Galicia Of all the principalities on the territory of modern Ukraine, Galicia was the first to break away from Kiev. Employing means both fair and foul, the wily Volodymyrko (1123–53) managed to bring the entire land under his control and then successfully withstood the efforts of the Kievan grand princes to dictate the course of events in Galicia. Building on this achievement, his gifted son, Iaroslav Osmomysl (1153–87) – the epithet means one possessed of eight senses – extended the boundaries of his principality south to the mouth of the Dnister River in present-day Moldavia. While maintaining peace and prosperity at home, Iaroslav nurtured cordial relations with the Hungarians and Frederick I Barbarossa of Germany. The fame and prestige that he and his land enjoyed in Rus' was reflected in this laudatory excerpt from "The Tale of the Host of Ihor": "O Iaroslav Osmomysl

of Halych! You sit tall on your golden throne, propping up the Hungarian [Carpathian] mountains with your iron regiments, blocking the way to its king, closing the gates of the Danube ... your wrath rolls over the earth."⁴ But as Galicia prospered, so did its boyars. In fact, so powerful did they become during Iaroslav's reign that even when he was at the height of his power, they forced him to abandon his second, common-law wife, Anastasia, and later had her burned at the stake.

After Iaroslav's death, chaos ensued. His son Volodymyr (1187–98), the last of the Rostyslavychi, "did not like to take council with his *muzhi* (boyars)," as the chronicle puts it. Before long, the boyars rose up against him and forced him to seek refuge in Hungary. Andrew, the Hungarian king, promised to reinstate him, but when he arrived in Galicia, he claimed the land for himself. As popular uprisings against the foreigners flared up, Volodymyr and the boyars came to an understanding and drove the Hungarians back. What did these years of conflict and destruction lead to? Although Volodymyr finally did regain his throne, he became more dependent on the boyars than ever before. This sorry episode established a pattern that would often be repeated in the next half-century – that of a strong ruler uniting the land, of boyars (fearful of losing their prerogatives) turning on his weaker successors and thereby providing foreign powers with a pretext for intervention, and of chaos ensuing until another strong prince appeared on the scene to master the situation.

The Romanovychi of Volhynia and Galicia Although the rise of Galicia was a clear indication of the growing importance of the borderlands, its union with Volhynia bore the promise of greater, even epochal consequences for all of Eastern Europe. The man who brought about this union was Roman Mstyslavych (1173–1205) of Volhynia. Immersed in political struggles from early youth, Roman was chosen as prince by the Novgorodians in 1168 to defend their city against Suzdal's aggressive designs in the north, while his father, Mstyslav of Volhynia, competed with Andrei Bogoliubsky of Suzdal for control of Kiev in the south. After his father's death in 1173, Roman took over and reconstituted the fragmented, neglected family holdings in Volhynia. In 1188, the Galician boyars invited him to rule their land, but princely rivals and unfriendly boyar factions prevented him from doing so. Only in 1199 was he able to return to Galicia and unite it with Volhynia, thus creating a new, imposing conglomerate on the political map of Eastern Europe with an energetic, forceful prince of great ability at its head.

In his domestic policies Roman concentrated on expanding his princely power: that is, on undermining the boyars, many of whom he either exiled or executed. "You can't enjoy the honey without killing the bees" was one of his favorite sayings. As was often the case elsewhere in Europe, the prince's allies in the struggle with the oligarchy were the townsmen and minor boyars. However, it was his foreign exploits that added most to Roman's widespread

fame. After uniting Galicia and Volhynia, he defeated his Suzdalian rivals and gained control of Kiev in 1203. Thus, all the Ukrainian principalities – Kiev, Pereiaslav, Galicia, and Volhynia (with the exception of Chernihiv) – came under the rule of one prince. It appeared that a renewal of those parts of the old Kievan realm that were on the territory of what is now Ukraine was about to take place. Because Roman came so close to achieving this goal, modern Ukrainian historians have accorded him an exalted place in their histories.

In his efforts to protect the Ukrainian principalities, Roman launched a series of highly successful campaigns against the Polovtsians, while, in the north, he pushed deep into Polish and Lithuanian territory. This desire to extend the boundaries of an already extensive realm proved to be the cause of his undoing. In 1205, while crossing into Polish territory, Roman was killed in an ambush. The territorial conglomerate he had assembled lasted only six years, too short a time for it to crystallize into a stable, permanent political entity. Still, by referring to him as “the Great” and “Autocrat of all Rus’,” Roman’s contemporaries showed their appreciation for his remarkable achievements.

Soon after Roman’s death, the recurrent triumvirate of troubles – boyar intrigues, princely rivalries, and foreign intervention – dismembered the realm he had so assiduously forged. Because his sons, Danylo and Vasylo, were only 4 and 2 years old respectively, the Galician boyars had little difficulty in forcing them and their strong-willed mother, Anna, from the land. In their place, the boyars invited the three Ihorevychi, sons of the hero of “The Tale of the Host of Ihor.” For many of the boyars this was a fatal mistake. Unwilling to share power with the oligarchy, the Ihorevychi massacred about 500 of them before eventually being expelled themselves. (Later, the Galician elite returned the favor by capturing and hanging all three of the Ihorevychi.) Next, the boyars attempted the unprecedented: in 1213, they elected their own leader, Vladyslav Kormylchych, as prince. Taking advantage of the general condemnation of this audacious move, the rulers of Hungary and Poland, under the guise of protecting the rights of Danylo and Vasylo, invaded Galicia and divided it between themselves. It was under these conditions that the young Danylo and Vasylo began the process of “gathering together” the lands their father had once ruled.

As might be expected, Danylo first reestablished himself in Volhynia (1221), where both the elite and the general populace remained loyal to his dynasty. But it was not until 1238 that he was able to retake Halych and a part of Galicia. In the following year, Danylo acquired Kiev and sent his military commander, Dmytro, to defend the city against the Mongols. Only in 1245, when Danylo won the decisive battle at Iaroslav, was his hold on all of Galicia secured. It thus took Danylo forty years to reconstitute the realm that his father had created.

Reserving Galicia for himself, Danylo left Volhynia for Vasylo. Despite

this division, under the leadership of the older, more forceful Danylo, the two principalities continued to function as a single unit. Like his father, Danylo concentrated in his domestic policies on securing the support of the townsmen and peasants in order to create a counterweight to the boyars. He founded numerous towns – among them Lviv, named after his son Lev, in 1256 – and fortified many others. To populate these new urban centers, Danylo invited artisans and merchants from Germany and Poland, and from other Rus' cities. Large communities of Armenians and Jews, spreading westward as Kiev declined, added to the multiethnic character that was to typify Galician towns into the 20th century. In the countryside, special officials were appointed to protect peasants from boyar exploitation and peasant units were formed in the army.

Danylo's major foreign problem was the Mongols. In 1241, they had passed through Galicia and Volhynia without devastating them as badly as other Rus' principalities. However, the successes of the Romanovychi attracted the Mongols' attention. Soon after his victory at Iaroslav, Danylo received the dreaded summons to appear at the Mongol court. Fearful of antagonizing these dreaded conquerors, he had no choice but to comply. In a certain sense, Danylo's visit 1246 to Batu's capital at Sarai on the Volga was a success. He was well received and, more important, allowed to return alive. But this came at the price of accepting Mongol overlordship. This humiliating fact was underscored by Batu himself who, as he handed Danylo a cup of fermented mare's milk, the favorite Mongol beverage, urged him to get used to it "for you are one of ours now." However, unlike the northeastern principalities that were closer to the Mongols and more exposed to their direct control, Galicia and Volhynia were spared such close supervision. Their major obligation to their new overlords was occasionally to provide auxiliary troops during the Mongol forays into Poland and Lithuania. Mongol influence in Galicia and Volhynia was initially so weak that Danylo was able to conduct a very independent foreign policy, one openly aimed at ridding himself of Mongol overlordship.

After establishing cordial relations with Poland and Hungary, Danylo turned to Pope Innocent IV with a request for aid to organize a Slavic crusade against the Mongols. In return, Danylo expressed to the pope his willingness to place his lands under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of Rome. Thus, he sounded what would become a major and recurrent theme in Galician history – the relationship of the West Ukrainians to the church of Rome. To encourage the Galician prince, the pope sent him a royal crown and, in 1253, in Dorohochyn on the Buh River, Danylo was crowned king by a papal representative.

Danylo's chief interest, however, was the crusade and other reinforcements from the west. These, despite the pope's assurances, were not forthcoming. Nonetheless, in 1254, Danylo launched a campaign to retrieve Kiev from the

Mongols, whose main forces were far in the east. Despite initial successes, he failed to achieve his objective and he paid dearly for it. In 1259, a strong Mongol force, led by Burundai, moved unexpectedly into Galicia and Volhynia. The Romanovychi were given two options by the Mongols: either raze the walls of all their fortified towns, leaving them vulnerable and dependent on Mongol goodwill, or face immediate annihilation. Dejectedly, Danylo had to oversee the destruction of the walls he had so diligently constructed.

The failure of his Mongol policy did not mean that Danylo's great influence with his western neighbors had declined. In Poland, especially in the principality of Mazowia, Galician authority reached a high point. Therefore, Mendvog, the ruler of Lithuania (which was just beginning its rise to power), was obliged to make territorial concessions there to Danylo. Moreover, as a sign of goodwill, Mendvog was forced to marry two of his offspring to Danylo's son and daughter. More than any other Galician ruler, Danylo became involved in the affairs of central Europe. Using matrimonial links as an instrument of foreign policy, he married his son Roman to Gertrude, the Babenberg heiress, and attempted unsuccessfully to place him on the Austrian ducal throne.

In 1264, after almost sixty years of political activity, Danylo died. In Ukrainian historiography he is considered to be the most outstanding ruler that the two western principalities ever produced. In view of the difficult circumstances under which he had to function, his achievements were remarkable. While rebuilding and expanding his father's domains, Danylo checked Polish and Hungarian expansion. Breaking the power of the boyars, he raised the social, cultural, and economic level of his land until it was among the highest in Eastern Europe. However, not all his plans succeeded. Danylo failed to hold on to Kiev and he did not attain his major objective – to rid himself of the Mongol yoke. Still, he managed to keep Mongol influence to a minimum. In his attempt to stave off the East, Danylo turned to the West, thereby providing West Ukrainians with an example that they would follow for centuries.

For almost a century after Danylo's death, Galicia and Volhynia experienced few apparent changes. The pattern set by Danylo and Vasylo – that of a dynamic, forceful prince in Galicia and a more retiring ruler in Volhynia – was followed to a certain extent by their respective sons, Lev (1264–1301) and Volodymyr (1270–89). The ambitious and restless Lev was constantly involved in political conflicts. After the Arpad dynasty was extinguished in Hungary, he obtained Transcarpathian Rus', thus laying the foundation for future Ukrainian claims to the western slopes of the Carpathians. Lev was most active in Poland, which was embroiled in internecine warfare; and he even aspired to the Polish throne in Cracow. Despite Lev's aggressiveness, both Galicia and Volhynia enjoyed a period of stability during the late 13th and early 14th centuries because their western neighbors were temporarily weakened.

Volodymyr of Volhynia was the antithesis of his Galician cousin and his

relations with him were often strained. Unwilling to participate in wars and inactive in diplomacy, he concentrated on such peaceful pursuits as the building of towns, castles, and churches. Described as a "great bibliophile and philosopher" by the Galician-Volhynian chronicle, it seems that his favorite pastime was the reading and copying of books and manuscripts. Volodymyr's death in 1289 saddened not only his subjects, but modern historians as well, for, in what was probably a related development, the Galician-Volhynian chronicle suddenly broke off in that year. As a result, a great gap in the history of the western principalities, stretching from 1289 to 1340, now confronts historians. A few haphazard bits of information are all that are available about what occurred in Galicia and Volhynia in the final phases of their independent existence.

After the death of Lev, his son Iurii, ruled both Galicia and Volhynia. He must have been an effective ruler, for neighboring chroniclers noted that during his peaceful reign his lands "blossomed with riches and fame." Iurii's position was imposing enough for him to title himself "King of Rus'." An even more telling indication of the extent of his authority was an event that occurred in 1303. Dissatisfied with the decision of the metropolitan of Kiev to move his residence to Vladimir in the northeast, Iurii obtained Constantine's assent to create a separate metropolitanate in Halych. The two last members of the Romanovych dynasty were Iurii's sons, Andrii and Lev, who ruled Galicia-Volhynia together. Worried by the growing power of Lithuania, they forged an alliance with the German knights of the Teutonic Order. In regard to the Mongols they followed an independent, even antagonistic policy and there are some indications that they may have died fighting them.

With the extinction of the native ruling dynasty in 1323, the elite of the two principalities chose Boleslaw of Mazowia, a Polish cousin of the Romanovychi, as their prince. After changing his name to Iurii and adopting Orthodoxy, the new ruler set about to follow the policies of his predecessors. Despite his Polish background, he fought to regain lands that had in the meantime been lost to the Poles, and he renewed the alliance with the Germans against the Lithuanians. At home, Iurii-Boleslaw continued to support the towns and attempted to expand his prerogatives. It was probably this policy that led to a conflict with the boyars who, in 1340, poisoned him under the pretext that he sought to introduce Roman Catholicism and favored foreigners. Thus, by the hand of its own elite, Galicia and Volhynia were deprived of their last prince. Henceforth, the West Ukrainians would have to live under foreign-based sovereigns.




For 100 years after the fall of Kiev, Galicia-Volhynia served as the political base of the Ukrainians. In this capacity, the two principalities absorbed much

of the Kievan heritage and at the same time prevented the absorption of West Ukrainian lands by Poland. By so doing, they preserved for Ukrainians, or Rusyns as they were then called, a sense of cultural and political distinctiveness at a crucial point in their history. This distinctiveness would be of critical importance to their survival as a separate national entity in the difficult times yet to come.

This page intentionally left blank



Female statuette made from mammoth tusk, late Paleolithic period




Trypillian ceramic statuette, ca. 3000–2500 BC



Gravestones on Polovtsian tombs

Scythians in combat




Scythian binding his comrade's wound



East Slavic pagan idol, ca AD 10th century



A reconstruction of Kiev in 10–13th centuries



OPPOSITE

Christianization of Kievan Rus' from "Chronicle of Bygone Years" (15th-century Radziwill version)



A reconstruction of St Sophia cathedral in 11th century



Mosaic from interior of St Sophia



Mosaic from interior of St Sophia

Dancing couple from 12th-century Chernihiv cup



This page intentionally left blank

Part Two

The Polish-Lithuanian Period



This page intentionally left blank

Under Polish and Lithuanian Rule

For millennia Ukraine had been the crucible of mighty political conglomerates such as the Scythian, Sarmatian, and Kievan realms. Its inhabitants controlled their own destinies and influenced, sometimes decisively, those of their neighbors. The civilizations that were based in Ukraine stood in the forefront of the cultural and socioeconomic developments in all of Eastern Europe. But after the decline of Galicia-Volhynia, an epochal transformation occurred. Henceforth, Ukrainian lands would no longer form the core of important political entities and, except for a few brief moments of self-assertion, the fate of Ukraine's inhabitants would be decided in far-off capitals such as Warsaw, Moscow, or Vienna.*

In cultural and economic terms as well, the status of Ukraine would decline to that of an important but peripheral province whose elites identified with foreign cultures and political systems. No longer dominant but dominated, the natives of Ukraine would have to struggle not only for their political self-determination but also for their existence as a separate ethnic and national entity. This effort became – and remains to this day – one of the major themes of Ukrainian history.



Lithuanian Expansion into Ukraine

The flow and timing of events worked to Ukraine's disadvantage in the 14th century. Precisely at the time when it was sinking to a political, economic, and cultural low point, Ukraine's neighbors – Lithuania, Poland, and Mus-

* During the Polish-Lithuanian period, Ukrainians called themselves Ruthenians (*Rusyny*), a name derived from Rus'. Belorussians were also called by this name. At this time, Russians were generally called Muscovites.


covy – were on the rise. Naturally these expanding societies were drawn to the power vacuum that existed in the south. There, ancient Kiev was but a shadow of its former self. Abandoned in 1300 by the Orthodox metropolitan, who moved to the thriving cities of the Russian northeast and eventually settled in Moscow, Kiev also lost many of its boyars and leading merchants. For extended periods of time it did not even have a resident prince. And with the extinction of the native dynasty in Galicia and Volhynia, the West Ukrainian lands were also left leaderless and vulnerable. For about eighty years the titular overlords of the Ukrainian lands were the Mongols. But endemic internal conflicts within the Golden Horde prevented it, even during its relatively brief period of overlordship, from exerting extensive control in Ukraine. Consequently, the land lay ripe for the taking.

Among the first to take advantage of the opportunities that beckoned were the Lithuanians. In the mid 13th century, their relatively primitive, pagan and warlike tribes were united by Prince Mindaugas (Mendvog) in order to withstand the pressure of the Teutonic Order of the German crusader-colonizers that established itself on the Baltic shores. From this struggle the Lithuanians emerged stronger and more united than ever. In the early decades of the 14th century, under the leadership of Grand Prince Gediminas (Gedymin) they moved into Belorussia. And in the 1340s, during the reign of his son Algirdas (Olgerd), who flatly proclaimed, “All Rus’ simply must belong to the Lithuanians,” they pushed into Ukraine.¹

By the 1350s, Algirdas extended his sovereignty over the petty principalities on the left bank of the Dnieper and in 1362 his troops occupied Kiev. After inflicting a crushing defeat on the Golden Horde in 1363, the Lithuanians moved into Podilia. At this point, with much of Belorussia and Ukraine under its control (roughly half of old Kievan Rus’), the Grand Principality of Lithuania constituted the largest political entity in Europe. Its creation was a remarkable organizational feat, especially in view of the fact that it was accomplished in less than 150 years.

One ought not imagine the Lithuanian takeover of Ukrainian lands in terms of a violent invasion by hordes of fierce foreigners. Actually penetration, cooption, and annexation are more appropriate descriptions of the manner in which the goal-oriented Lithuanian dynasty extended its hold over the Slavic principalities. Frequently, Algirdas’s forces, which consisted largely of his Ukrainian subjects or allies, were welcomed as they advanced into Ukraine. When fighting did occur, it was usually directed against the Golden Horde. Unfortunately, because of the dearth of sources from this period, historians have been unable to establish the details of the Lithuanian expansion. Nonetheless, there is general agreement on the major reasons for the rapid and easy successes.

First and foremost, for the Ukrainians, especially those in the Dnieper region, the overlordship of the Lithuanians was preferable to the pitiless, ex-



Map 10 Polish and Lithuanian expansion

ploitive rule of the Golden Horde. Secondly, because they were too few to control their vast acquisitions – most of the Grand Principality of Lithuania consisted of Ukrainian lands – the Lithuanians co-opted local Ukrainian nobles and allowed them to rise to the highest levels of government. This policy greatly encouraged the Ukrainian elite to join the Lithuanian “bandwagon.” Finally, unlike the Tatars of the Golden Horde, the Lithuanians were not perceived as being completely alien. Still pagan and culturally underdeveloped when they expanded into Belorussia and Ukraine, their elite quickly fell under the cultural influence of their Slavic subjects. Numerous princes of Gediminas’s dynasty adopted Orthodoxy. Ruthenian (Ukrainian/Belorussian), the language of the great majority of the principality’s population, became the official language of government. Always careful to respect local customs, the Lithuanians often proclaimed: “We do not change the old, nor do we bring in the new.”²

So thoroughly did the Lithuanian rulers adapt to the local conditions in Belorussia and Ukraine that within a generation or two they looked, spoke, and acted much like their Riurikid predecessors. Indeed, they came to view their expansion as a mission “to gather the lands of Rus” and used this rationale long before Moscow, their emerging competitor for the Kievan heritage, also adopted it. It was for this reason that the Ukrainian historian Hrushevsky argued that the Kievan traditions were more completely preserved in the Grand Principality of Lithuania than in Muscovy.³ Other Ukrainian historians even claimed that the Grand Principality of Lithuania was actually a reconstituted Rus’ state rather than a foreign entity that engulfed Ukraine.⁴

Polish Expansion into Ukraine

Despite the Lithuanians’ impressive gains in Ukraine, it was Polish expansion that would exert the more lasting and extensive impact on the Ukrainians. The man who initiated it was Casimir the Great (1310–70), the restorer of the medieval Polish monarchy. In expanding eastward, the king had support from three sources: the magnates of southeastern Poland, who expected to extend their landholdings into the neighboring Belorussian and Ukrainian lands; the Catholic church, which was eager to acquire new converts; and the rich burghers of Cracow who hoped to gain control of the important Galician trade routes. Only nine days after the death of Boleslaw (the principality’s last independent ruler) in April 1340, the Polish king moved into Galicia. He did so under the pretext of protecting the Catholics of the land, who were mostly German burghers. But it was obvious that Casimir had been planning the move for some time, for in 1339 he signed a treaty with Louis of Hungary which stipulated that the two kings would cooperate in the conquest of Ukraine.

The aggrandizement of Ukrainian lands did not proceed as smoothly for

the Poles as it did for the Lithuanians, however. No sooner had Casimir returned to Poland than the willful Galician boyars, led by Dmytro Detko, asserted their rule over the land. Unable at the time to launch another incursion, Casimir was forced to recognize Detko as the effective ruler of Galicia. In return, the latter recognized, in a perfunctory and limited fashion, the Polish king as his overlord. An even greater threat to Polish aspirations in Galicia and Volhynia were the Lithuanians. Because Lubart, the son of Gediminas, was the son-in-law of the deceased Galician ruler, Boleslaw, the Volhynian boyars recognized the young Lithuanian prince as their sovereign in 1340. Thus, when Detko died in 1344, the stage was set for a confrontation between the Poles and Lithuanians for control over Volhynia and Galicia.

For more than two decades, the Poles, aided by the Hungarians, fought the Lithuanians, with whom most of the Ukrainians sided, for control over Galicia and Volhynia. Unlike the interprincipely conflicts that were familiar to the inhabitants of the old Rus' lands, this one had a new and disturbing dimension. Proclaiming themselves to be "the buffer of Christianity," the Poles, partly from conviction and partly in order to gain papal support, represented their push to the east as a crusade against the heathen Lithuanians and the schismatic Orthodox Ukrainians. This view of their non-Catholic enemies as being morally and culturally inferior boded ill for future relations between the Poles and Ukrainians.

In 1349, after a particularly successful campaign, Casimir gained control of Galicia and part of Volhynia. Finally, in 1366, the war ended with the Poles occupying all of Galicia and a small part of Volhynia. The rest of Volhynia remained in Lithuanian hands. But even at this point the Polish grip on their huge Ukrainian acquisitions – consisting of about 200,000 people and approximately 52,000 sq. km, an increase of close to 50% in the holdings of the Polish crown – was not secure. In the above mentioned pact with Louis of Hungary, Casimir had agreed that if he should die without a male heir, the crown of Poland and the Ukrainian lands would revert to Louis. In 1370, Casimir died, leaving four daughters but no son. Now the Hungarians moved into Galicia. Louis appointed Władysław Opalinski, a trusted vassal, as his viceroy and installed Hungarian officials throughout Galicia. However, what the Poles lost through dynastic arrangements, they regained in the same way. In 1387, two years after she became the queen of Poland, Jadwiga, the daughter of Louis of Hungary, finally and definitely annexed Galicia to the holdings of the Polish crown.

Initially, the Poles were careful about introducing changes among their new subjects. Casimir referred to Galicia as "the kingdom of Rus'," just as its last native rulers had done. Ruthenian was used alongside Latin and the land preserved its own currency. But there were indications that the days of the old ways were numbered. As early as 1341 Casimir had requested Pope Benedict XII to free him of his commitment to the "Orthodox schismatics," to preserve

their ancient rights, privileges, and traditions. The pope was happy to oblige. Indeed, the Catholic church (which because of royal generosity soon became the largest landowner in Galicia) stood in the forefront of attempts to undermine the old Orthodox order.

In 1375, a Catholic archdiocese was founded in Lviv. Meanwhile, monasteries, especially those of the Franciscan and Dominican orders, proliferated throughout the land. They served a rapidly growing Catholic population that consisted of Polish, German, Czech, and Hungarian noblemen who received land grants in Galicia and of German townsmen that the Polish monarchs had invited to help to develop the cities. Many of the Galician boyars adopted the faith of their Polish peers, especially after 1431, when they received equal status with the Polish nobles. By the mid 15th century, when Galicia was reorganized into the Ruthenian (Rus') *województwo* or province of the Polish kingdom and Latin became the official language of the land, there were few remainders left of the once proud Rus' principality of Galicia.

The Polish acquisition of Ukrainian lands and subjects was a crucial turning point in the history of both peoples. For the Poles, it meant a commitment to an eastern rather than the previously dominant western orientation, a shift that carried with it far-reaching political, cultural, and socioeconomic ramifications. For Ukrainians, the impact went far beyond the replacement of native rulers by foreigners: it led to the subordination of Ukrainians to another people of a different religion and culture. Despite certain positive effects produced by this symbiosis, eventually it evolved into a bitter religious, social, and ethnic conflict that lasted for about 600 years and permeated all aspects of life in Ukraine.

The Union of Poland and Lithuania

Once the issue of Galicia was settled, the political leaders of Poland and Lithuania realized that they shared important common interests. Both countries were threatened by the aggressive designs of the Teutonic Order, which controlled the Baltic coast. Especially Lithuania, strained to the limit by its expansion to the east, was in no position to confront the Germans in the north. To make matters worse, Moscow, growing rapidly in power and prestige, posed a threat in the east. Meanwhile, the Poles, dissatisfied with their dynastic connections with Hungary and eager to gain access to the other Ukrainian lands, were looking for new options. At this point the magnates of southeastern Poland proposed a striking idea: a union of Poland and Lithuania to be concluded by means of a marriage between their Queen Jadwiga and Jagiełło (Jogailo in Lithuanian), the new Grand Prince of Lithuania.

In 1385, in a small Belorussian town, the two sides concluded the Union of Krevo. In return for the hand of Jadwiga and, perhaps more appealing, the title of king of Poland, Jagiełło agreed, among other conditions, to the

acceptance of Catholicism for himself and the Lithuanians and to attach "for all eternity" his Lithuanian and Ukrainian lands to the crown of Poland.

It seemed, from the formal point of view at least, that in return for the Polish crown, Jagiełło had agreed to liquidate the Grand Principality. But no matter what the Polish magnates and Jagiełło agreed upon, the Grand Principality was too big and vibrant, its elite too self-confident to allow itself to be absorbed by Poland. Lithuanian and Ukrainian opposition to Polish influence galvanized around Jagiełło's talented and ambitious cousin, Vytautas (Vitovt), who, in 1392, forced the king to recognize his de facto control of the Grand Principality. Although Poland and Lithuania remained linked by the person of Jagiełło, under Vytautas the Grand Principality retained its separate and independent identity. In fact, on several occasions, Vytautas attempted to sever all links with Poland and to obtain a royal title for himself. Although these attempts failed, they demonstrated very forcefully that the Ukrainian and Lithuanian elite of the Grand Principality was still very much its own master.

For the Ukrainian nobles – the masses hardly mattered politically – the preservation of the autonomy of the Grand Principality was a matter of great importance because unlike the Poles, the Lithuanians treated them as equals. Moreover, Vytautas followed two policies that warmed the hearts of his Ukrainian subjects. By renewing Algirdas's drive to the east, he continued the "gathering of Rus'" lands. And he pushed southward with the avowed purpose of subjugating the fragmented remnants of the Golden Horde, building in the process a system of fortifications to protect his subjects from the nomads. But the strong-willed Vytautas also instituted measures that were much less pleasing to the Ukrainians. To appreciate their significance, a few general remarks about the political structure of the Grand Principality are in order.

The political policies of the Lithuanian grand princes In a certain sense, the Grand Principality was similar to Kievan Rus'. It was a hodgepodge of semi-independent principalities, ruled by members of Gediminas's dynasty and clustered around a core area of which Vilnius was the capital and the seat of the grand prince. There was, however, a crucial difference, especially evident during the reign of Vytautas, that allowed Lithuania to avoid the fragmentation that Kievan Rus' experienced: the Lithuanian grand princes were clearly supreme rulers, not merely first among the equal members of the dynasty. By introducing a series of reforms in the 1390s, Vytautas saw to it that this did not change. The problem, as he perceived it, was that many Ukrainized princes of the Gediminas dynasty had sprung such deep roots in their principalities that they were more committed to local interests than to those of the Grand Principality as a whole. Some were even suspected of separatist tendencies.

To remedy the situation, Vytautas systematically reshuffled the princely

holdings so as to remove the princes from their local bases of support. For example, Fedir Liubartovych was deprived, piece by piece, of his rich Volhynian lands. In exchange he was offered (but did not even bother to accept) the much less attractive Novhorod-Siversk principality, which was taken from Volodymyr Algirdovych, who, in turn, received a lesser holding. If a prince resisted, as did Fedir Koriatovych of Podilia, he was accused of disobedience, attacked by Vytautas's army, and driven into exile. In place of the semi-independent princes, Vytautas appointed his own servitors, who were often untitled boyars and who held their lands "at the Grand Prince's pleasure." Even petty boyars were exposed to change. In order to retain their lands, they were obligated to perform military service for the Grand Prince. Thus, the Ukrainian elite experienced strong, centralized rule of the type it had never known before.

While these policies caused widespread dissatisfaction among the Ukrainians, even more unsettling developments followed. In 1413, at Horodlo, Jagiello and Vytautas agreed to grant the Catholic boyars of Lithuania the same far-ranging rights the Polish nobles had recently won. To speed up the implementation of this decision, forty-seven Polish noble families invited the same number of Lithuanian boyar clans to share their coats of arms. But as the Polish and Lithuanian nobles drew closer, the gap between the Lithuanian and Ukrainian elites grew deeper. The Catholic/Orthodox split that appeared in the Grand Principality as a result of the Union of Krevo in 1385 was now exacerbated by the social and political distinctions that favored the Catholics. The resentment that this circumstance engendered among the Orthodox came to the fore when Vytautas died in 1430.

That year the Ukrainians, backed by some Lithuanian magnates that disapproved of close ties with Poland, elected as grand prince Jagiello's youngest brother, Svidrigaillo, who was prince of Siversk in eastern Ukraine. Although a Catholic, this adventurous, politically rather inept prince had always cultivated close ties with the Ukrainian Orthodox and soon after his election he made it clear that he intended to limit or even break off ties with Poland. Fearful of losing their access to the vast eastern lands, the Poles resorted to force and invaded Podilia and Volhynia. They also sought to undermine Svidrigaillo internally by organizing a pro-Polish party among the Lithuanians. This faction declared the election of Svidrigaillo as grand prince to be illegal and proceeded to elect Sigismund of Starodub, the younger brother of Vytautas, to the office. Consequently, in 1432, the Grand Principality split into two enemy camps: the ethnic Lithuanian areas sided with Sigismund while the Ukrainians backed Svidrigaillo.

The issues that separated these two camps were of crucial importance. Would the union of Poland and Lithuania continue to exist? Would the Ukrainians, by retaining Svidrigaillo on the throne, attain dominance in the Grand Principality? Or would the Poles gain access to the Grand Princi-

pality's vast, open Ukrainian lands? After some desultory fighting, negotiations ensued in which Sigismund and the pro-Polish side gained the advantage. By granting the Orthodox nobles the same rights that the Catholics enjoyed, Sigismund won over many of Svidrigaillo's Ukrainian followers. When Svidrigaillo employed terror tactics, such as the burning alive of Herasym, the metropolitan of Smolensk, he only encouraged more defections, which eventually led to his defeat. As a result of this conflict, another Ukrainian land, Podilia, came under Polish control. However, Volhynia, whose populace fiercely resisted the Polish invaders, remained a part of the Grand Principality. In any case, it was obvious that Polish influence and pressure had severely disturbed the previously placid relations between the Lithuanians and Ukrainians of the principality.

In the mid 15th century, relations between the Lithuanian and Ukrainian elites took a turn for the worse, especially after the new Grand Prince, Casimir Jagiello, instituted another series of centralizing reforms. In 1452 Volhynia, occupied by a Lithuanian army, was transformed, in accordance with Polish models, into a common province, which was governed by an official of the Grand Prince. In 1471, Kiev and its surrounding territories experienced a similar fate. Despite the fruitless protests of Ukrainians to the effect that prestigious Kiev should rule itself or, at least, be governed by a prince rather than an untitled official, it was evident that the last institutional remainders of Kievan Rus' and of Ukrainian self-rule were quickly disappearing.

The rise of Moscow While the Lithuanian grand princes cared little about retaining the goodwill of their Ukrainian subjects, the grand princes of Moscow cultivated it. And they were now a power to be reckoned with. By ingratiating themselves for generations with their overlords, the khans of the Golden Horde, the princes of Moscow rose to a position of prominence among the Russian principalities of the northeast. In time they transformed their predominance into control: in 1463, the principality of Iaroslav; in 1474, Rostov; in 1478, rich and vast Novgorod; and in 1485, the last serious Russian rival, the principality of Tver, succumbed to Moscow. With almost all the northeast under its aegis, Moscow cast off, rather anticlimactically, the centuries-old Mongol yoke in 1480. Along with Moscow's expanding power came the need to rationalize it. Therefore, the so-called Third Rome doctrine was formulated. It proclaimed that Moscow, after the fall of Rome and Constantinople, was destined to be the third – and permanent – holy and universal empire. Meanwhile, Ivan III of Moscow began to title himself "sovereign (*gosudar*) of all Rus'" and to claim that all the lands that were once a part of Kievan Rus' should now belong to Moscow.

For Lithuania, Moscow's actions as well as its words were deeply disturbing. In the 1490s, when Muscovite forces approached a number of Lithuanian principalities in the Chernihiv region of eastern Ukraine, their Orthodox

princes voluntarily accepted Muscovite sovereignty. There were other signs of the attraction that Moscow was beginning to exercise on the Ukrainian elite of Lithuania. Earlier, in 1481, Prince Fedir Belsky, a Ukrainized great-grandson of Algirdas, together with several other Orthodox princes, had planned to assassinate Casimir IV, the current Grand Prince of Lithuania and King of Poland, and then place the Ukrainian lands under Muscovite overlordship. However, the plot was discovered and while Belsky managed to escape to Moscow, his colleagues were captured and beheaded.

An even more dangerous outburst of the Ukrainian elite's discontent occurred in 1508 when Mykhailo Hlynsky, an influential and talented magnate of Tatar origin and West European education, organized an uprising of Ukrainian princes and nobles against Grand Prince Sigismund. In his exhortations to his followers, he spoke of the need to defend the "Greek" faith and of the renewal of the Kievan principedom. However, before the rebellion could spread, a powerful Polish-Lithuanian army forced Hlynsky and his supporters to flee to Moscow. The uprising of 1508 was noteworthy not only because it reflected the dissatisfaction of Ukrainians in the Grand Principality but also because it was the last time that their elite would be able to muster the self-confidence to defend its rights by force.

The Crimean Khanate Lithuania's already acute problems were compounded by the appearance in the south of yet another threat. During the Golden Horde's slow decline, its nomadic Tatar vassals who lived along the Black Sea coast broke away and formed the Crimean Khanate under the leadership of the Girei dynasty. Although the Crimean khans and their Nogai tribesmen lorded over the vast steppes that stretched from the Kuban to the Dnister rivers, they were unable to subjugate the rich Genoese and Greek trading cities situated on the Crimean coast. Therefore, they sought aid from their fellow Muslims and recent conquerors of Constantinople, the Ottomans. In 1475, an Ottoman invasion force captured Kaffa and most of the other coastal cities. The mighty and rapidly growing Ottoman Empire now had a foothold in Ukraine that it expanded in 1478 by forcing Khan Mengli Girei to accept the overlordship of the Ottoman sultan. However, the Crimean khans preserved a large measure of autonomy, often following those policies that best suited their interests. One of their primary undertakings was the organization of large and frequent raids into the neighboring Ukrainian lands for the purpose of capturing slaves (*iasyr*), which were then sold in the markets of Kaffa and Constantinople. Once again the steppe became a menace to the sedentary peoples who lived on its fringes.

The Union of Lublin (1569)

By the early 16th century, it was evident that the Grand Principality of Lithuania was in a state of decline. In 1522, it lost Chernihiv and Starodub in north-

eastern Ukraine to Moscow. And in 1549 and 1552 it was unable to fend off two major Tatar incursions. The mounting crisis reached a high point during 1562–70 when Lithuania became involved in another protracted war with Moscow. Burdened by the tremendous costs of the conflict and confronted by the threat of a Muscovite invasion, the Lithuanians turned to Poland for aid. The Poles were ready to provide it – for a price. Their main condition was that Poland and Lithuania, whose links at this point consisted basically of possessing a common monarch, now unite into a single political entity.

Fearful of losing their dominant positions to Polish rivals and worried by increased Catholic influence, the Lithuanian and Ukrainian magnates balked at the idea of complete union with Poland. But the middle and petty nobility of the Grand Principality, resentful of the magnates' prominence and hoping to gain the broad prerogatives their Polish colleagues enjoyed, supported the Polish position.

Drama and bitterness marked the common deliberations that King Sigismund Augustus called in Lublin in 1569. Unhappy with the course of the negotiations, the magnates of the Grand Principality, led by the Lithuanian Protestant Krzysztof Radziwiłł and the Ukrainian Orthodox Konstantyn Ostrozky, walked out. In response, the Poles, backed by the petty nobles from the provinces of Volhynia, Podlasia, and Kiev, proclaimed the annexation of these lands to Poland. This forced the recalcitrant magnates back to the bargaining table and on 1 July 1569 the Union of Lublin was concluded.

As a result of the union, a commonwealth (*Rzeczpospolita*) was formed that was to have a common, elected king, a common parliament (*sejm*), and common currency, tolls, and foreign policy. But the Grand Principality retained a measure of autonomy and preserved its own local administration, army, treasury, and legal system. However, all the Ukrainian lands that it possessed now became a part of the lands attached to the Polish crown.

For the Ukrainians, the Union of Lublin of 1569 was an event of tremendous import. Despite its shortcomings, for two centuries the Grand Principality of Lithuania had provided them with a hospitable environment in which to live. Although they were not independent, the Ukrainian princes did possess extensive control over their social, economic, religious, and cultural affairs. However, as the fate of Galicia (which had come under Polish rule earlier) indicated, once the Ukrainian lands and populace were transferred from Lithuania to Poland, their continued existence as distinctive societies would be put in question.



Between the 14th and 16th centuries the powers that would decide the fate of Ukraine for subsequent centuries came to the fore. Lithuania scored the most impressive initial gains in Ukraine and its rule was the most acceptable to its

inhabitants. But the more numerous and aggressive nobility of Poland gradually pushed the Lithuanians from Ukraine by means of military pressure and negotiated settlements, and staked out the land as its primary area of expansion. In the background loomed the other important powers that would affect Ukraine: the rapidly expanding tsardom of Moscow and the Crimean Khanate, which was linked to the all-powerful Ottoman Empire. Under the circumstances, the prospects for Ukrainian self-rule were clearly not promising.

There were, however, a few notable attempts by Ukraine's regional elites to stand up for local interests. Most noteworthy was Dmytro Detko's aggrandizement of power in the 1340s in Galicia after the native dynasty died out, the Ukrainian support for Svidrigaillo in the 1430s, and Hlinsky's anti-Lithuanian uprising of 1508. But foreign, especially Polish, dominance introduced a new phenomenon – assimilation of the Ukrainian elites into the culture of the ruling powers. As they gradually identified with the culture of the dominant Poles, the Ukrainian nobles lost their readiness to defend local interests.

Social Structure and Economic Change

The ramifications of the Union of Lublin and the absorption of Ukrainian lands into Poland were not only political in nature; they also had a great impact on the way of life of the Ukrainians. Even before the union, a whole new socioeconomic order, very different from that of Kievan Rus', was evolving in Ukraine. The Ukrainians' exposure to the Poles, and through them, to Western Europe, had a crucial influence on the form and direction this socioeconomic development took. Because of it, society was organized along Western lines. Ukraine's economic links with the West became stronger than ever before. Indeed, rarely in Ukrainian history would the impact of the West on Ukraine as a whole be as great – and as evident in the everyday functioning of society – as it was under the overlordship of the Lithuanians and Poles.



Ukrainians in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

In terms of both territory and population, the Ukrainian lands in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth formed a major part of what was the largest state in Europe. It is estimated – and one should bear in mind that statistics from this period are only rough estimations – that about 28% or about 2 million people of the Commonwealth's population of 7.5 million were Ukrainians. Poles, who inhabited only 180,000 sq. km of the 815,000 sq. km encompassed by the Commonwealth, made up about 50% of its population. Other ethnic groups in the state were, of course, Lithuanians, Belorussians, Jews, Germans, and Armenians.

After 1569, when the last administrative traces of the old Rus' principalities disappeared, the Ukrainian lands in the Commonwealth were divided into six provinces (*województwa*). Based on the incomplete data collected by the Polish historian Aleksander Jabłonowski, the size and population of these Ukrainian provinces is shown in table 1.¹



Map 11 The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

TABLE 1
Size and population of the Ukrainian provinces in the 16th century

Province	Square kilometers	Population (est.)	Population density per sq. km
Galicia	45,000	446,000	10
Volhynia	42,000	294,000	7
Podilia	19,000	98,000	5
Bratslav	35,000	311,000	9
Kiev	117,000	234,000	2
Belz (two regions)			
Kholm	19,000	133,000	7
Pidliassia	10,000	233,000	24

Foreigners who traveled through Ukraine often remarked on its low density of population. While Polish lands, on the average, contained about twenty-two inhabitants per square kilometer, Ukrainian territories (with the exception of Pidliassia which lay closest to Poland) averaged about seven persons per square kilometer. Kiev, the largest Ukrainian province, was practically empty. This had not been the case at the outset of the Lithuanian period. In the early 1400s, when Grand Prince Vytautas's expansionary drive reached the Black Sea, long lines of fortifications were built in the steppe to protect settlements that extended further south than in the times of Kievan Rus'. But as the Crimean Khanate grew stronger and Tatar raids increased, the sedentary population retreated northward until, in the late 1400s, the lower third of Ukraine was empty of sedentary settlements.

The Estate System in Ukraine

As the medieval period drew to a close, the estate system of organizing society, unknown in Kievan Rus', penetrated into Ukraine from the West by way of Poland. Unlike classes that reflect a social group's economic status, estates were based on the legally established rights, privileges, and obligations that each social group possessed. Initially, legal distinctions between the nobles, clergy, burghers, and peasants were fluid and it was possible for individuals to move from one estate to another. However, in time, boundaries between the estates, especially between the nobility and the other estates, became hereditary and well-nigh impenetrable. Indeed, in the early modern period, the estate to which one belonged was at least as important a category of self-definition as was one's religion or nationality.

The nobility Foremost of the estates that emerged in the 14th–15th centuries was the nobility, whose high position stemmed, at least in theory, from the "blood spilled" in the military service of the king or grand prince. Various

socioeconomic groups went into the making of this estate. In Ukraine, while it was still a part of the Grand Principality, the most important component of the nobility were the twenty to thirty princely or magnate families that traced their descent from the once-sovereign princes of the Riurikid or Gediminas dynasties. Most of these princely clans were concentrated in Volhynia, the bastion of Ukraine's aristocracy. The wealthiest among them, the Ostrozky family, had vast holdings that included about 30% of all the land in Volhynia (14,000 sq. km) on which there were 100 towns and over 1300 villages. Other rich and illustrious families were the Sanhusko, Chartorysky, Zbarazky, Vyshnevetsky, Zaslavsky, and Chetvertynsky. These families dominated most of the high offices in the Grand Principality and traces of their former sovereign rights survived in their right to lead their own troops under their personal banners or to be judged only by the grand prince, not by local officials.

The vast majority of the nobility, later called by the Polish term *szlachta*, consisted of those whose privileges derived primarily from military service.² The upper stratum of the *szlachta*, numbering several hundred families in Ukraine, some of whom descended from the boyars of Kievan times, owned estates of ten to fifteen villages and monopolized the local administration. Most numerous were the lowest levels of the nobility. Thousands of families, some recently emerged from peasant or burgher backgrounds, obtained noble status by serving as cavalymen in campaigns, castle or frontier guards, or armed servitors of the magnates. Often they had just enough land to support themselves, and their life-style differed little from that of peasants. Especially in Galicia, whole villages were inhabited by poor noblemen with names like Kulchytsky, Iavorsky, Chaikovsky, and Vytvytsky.

Despite the great socioeconomic differences and tensions that existed within the nobility, the fact that these men of the sword received grants of privileges in common in 1387, 1413, 1430, and 1434 helped to develop among them a consciousness of belonging to a common estate. In Poland, where the nobility was best organized and most powerful, it constituted about 8–10% of the population (the European average was about 1–2%). In the Ukrainian lands of the Grand Principality, the nobles gained special status more slowly and probably did not make up more than 5% of the general population.

The burghers The inhabitants of the cities in Ukraine, about 10–15% of the population, also evolved into a separate corporate entity. As they grew in size and self-confidence, major towns acquired the highly prized Magdeburg Law from Polish kings and Lithuanian grand princes. Modelled on the administration of the German city of Magdeburg and brought to Ukraine by way of Poland, the law was designed to provide a town with self-government. In 1356 Lviv, in 1374 Kamianets in Podilia, in 1432 Lutsk in Volhynia, and in 1494 Kiev obtained Magdeburg Law, thereby freeing themselves from the interference of royal or princely officials.

Despite the theoretical equality of all citizens subject to Magdeburg Law,

sharp socioeconomic distinctions existed among a town's inhabitants. Rich, patrician families, such as the forty or fifty who formed the elite in Lviv, totally dominated town government. Small merchants and tradesmen formed the middle stratum. The urban laborers, who were usually deprived of rights because they owned no property in the town and often lived beyond its walls, made up most of its population. As always, the town dwellers were the most ethnically variegated social group: among them one could find Ukrainians who were descended from the original inhabitants of the towns and, in ever-increasing numbers, newly arrived Polish noblemen and officials, German craftsmen, and Jewish and Armenian merchants.

The peasants While special rights defined the above-mentioned estates, obligations characterized the approximately 80% of Ukraine's population who were peasants. For the right to use land, a peasant owed the landowning nobleman duties, which usually took the form of providing free labor or paying rents in kind. As long as a peasant fulfilled these obligations, and in the 14th century they were relatively light, rarely totaling more than fourteen days of free labor a year, he could not be removed from his plot of land. In fact, a peasant could sell or bequeath the use of his plot to others.

At a time when land was plentiful but people were not, peasants managed to win relatively extensive rights. They were free men – under the pressure of the church and economic constraints, the limited slavery that had existed in Kievan times had died out – who could challenge nobles in law courts and, under certain circumstances, leave their lord's estate to seek better conditions elsewhere. In certain areas of Ukraine there were peasants who were completely independent of nobles. For example, in the Carpathian highlands, where animal husbandry was prevalent, many villages possessed the "Moldavian Law," which provided them with complete autonomy in return for regular payments (usually in the form of sheep) to noble landlords. A similar arrangement existed under the "German Law," whereby an enterprising peasant (*soltys*), in return for a contractually established payment to a noble, obtained the right to establish and administer a village on the noble's land. Along the steppe frontier in central and eastern Ukraine, many peasants were freed from their obligations to their landlords in return for service as frontier guards.

The Lithuanian Statute The numerous grants of rights and privileges to various social groups in the Grand Principality created a need for a codified set of laws. Especially the middle and lower *szlachta*, anxious to convert its privileged status into an article of law, pressed for a legal code. As a result, in 1529, the first edition of the Lithuanian Statute appeared. In addition to confirming noble rights, it incorporated elements of customary law that reached as far back as Kievan times. Simultaneously, it introduced new legal concepts that originated in Germany. In 1568 and 1588 two more editions of the Lithua-

nian Statute appeared, inspired by the need to adjust to the changes brought on by the Union of Lublin.

It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the Lithuanian Statute in Ukrainian legal history. Besides institutionalizing the important socio-economic changes that occurred in 15th–16th century Ukraine, it also formed the basis of the legal system that developed later in Cossack Ukraine. In fact, as late as the 19th century, laws in parts of eastern Ukraine were still based on the statute. There is yet another aspect of the role in Ukraine of the Lithuanian Statute in particular and of the estate system in general that needs to be emphasized. Both of these elements were exceedingly influential in developing a familiarity with and appreciation of such concepts as legally defined and guaranteed rights among Ukrainians. And this consciousness served to link Ukrainians with Western legal and political thought. In contrast, Muscovy, the other outgrowth of Kievan Rus', as a result of centuries of Mongol rule, had little opportunity to familiarize itself with the principles of Western legality.

The Traditional Economy

Prior to the mid 16th century, a landowner produced food mainly to satisfy his household needs, to feed his livestock, and to provide seed for the next harvest. Time-consuming military duties, as well as lack of markets and cash, discouraged noblemen from engaging in commercial activities. Except for the portion of their estates that they reserved for their households, noblemen usually parceled out the rest of their lands to peasants. For the peasants this was a golden age. Noblemen did not interfere in their affairs, colonization increased the amount of available land, and improved agricultural implements raised productivity. While peasants' obligations and rents to their lords remained steady, their income increased.

It was not uncommon for a well-off peasant, of which there were many, to work a twenty-to-thirty-acre plot, own one or two horses or oxen, two or three cows, some pigs, and dozens of chickens and geese. An average Ukrainian's daily diet consisted of about 0.6 kilogram of bread and 2.5 liters of beer. Other common foods were kasha, cheese, eggs, and, when in season, fruits. Meat was eaten only rarely, usually during major holidays. The diet of the average nobleman was much the same except that his family consumed more meat, and sometimes such delicacies as imported spices, raisins, and figs appeared on his table. Sweets were rare and even wealthy noblemen could afford wine only on festive occasions. Even in the best of times, many of the poorer peasants and urban laborers went hungry. Because of poor hygienic conditions, the infant mortality rate was high and the median age was still only about 25–30 years.

For the towns, the 14th–15th centuries were also a time of well-being. Because they were a good source of income and potential allies against the nobil-

ity, Polish and Lithuanian rulers founded new towns and expanded existing ones. In order to generate income, rulers often imposed stringent regulations on the towns, such as high tolls, strictly regulated trade routes, and the granting of permission only to certain towns to sell imported goods. However, as noted earlier, they also granted them a great degree of autonomy and this encouraged urban growth.

In the early 15th century, Lviv, with approximately 10,000 inhabitants, was the largest city in Ukraine (Kiev, exposed to Tatar attacks and bypassed by shifting trade routes, had only 3000 inhabitants). Lviv's large population supported thirty-six different professions, grouped in fourteen guilds. Introduced in Ukraine by German immigrants, the guilds were craftsmens' organizations that protected the interests of their members and controlled the quality and quantity of the wares they produced. In Lviv alone, there were over 500 master craftsmen enrolled in their own or related guilds. Because the towns needed food for their growing populations and the countryside desired finished products, local trade – the mainstay of commerce – was conducted at regularly scheduled trade fairs. Foreign trade also prospered, especially in Western Ukraine, because such towns as Lviv and Kamianets lay astride Europe's main trade routes to Crimea and the East.

Yet, despite their growth, urban centers were still relatively scarce in Ukraine. In relatively populous Volhynia, for example, there was only one town per 300 sq. km. Not only their scarcity but also their ethnic composition limited the role of the towns in the lives of Ukrainians. The numerous foreign immigrants – Germans, Jews, Poles, Armenians, and Greeks – who were brought in by rulers to develop the towns in Ukraine soon formed a majority of the urban population, especially in the larger cities like Lviv. Most numerous were the Germans and Poles, whose religion, Catholicism, soon predominated in the towns. After Poland annexed Galicia and, later, the rest of Ukraine, linguistic and cultural Polonization spread rapidly among the urban populace.

For Ukrainian townsmen this led to severe restrictions. Arguing that the town laws applied only to Catholics, the Polonized urban elite excluded Orthodox Ukrainians from offices and courts. It also limited the number of Ukrainians that could reside in the city. For instance, in Lviv, only thirty Ukrainian households, confined to the small, cramped Ruthenian street (*Ruska ulica*), were allowed within city walls. Even Orthodox religious processions were banned in city streets and Orthodox burghers were forced to pay for the support of Catholic priests. In short, the towns became – and remained for centuries – foreign territory for most Ukrainians.

The great grain boom During the 16th century, much of Europe was bustling with economic activity. Its population grew by leaps and bounds. And so did the price of food. Between 1500 and 1600, the so-called price revolution, exac-

erbed by the influx of silver and gold from the New World, led to unprecedented increases of 400–500% and, in some areas, even 800–1000% in the price of food products. As the crowded cities of the West clamored for wheat, the landowners of Eastern Europe, especially those of the vast Commonwealth, responded. Ever-increasing shipments of grain flowed from the northern and central areas of the Commonwealth via the Vistula River to Gdansk on the Baltic Sea and then to Holland for distribution throughout Western Europe. Meanwhile, in the southern regions of the Commonwealth, such as Podilia, out of reach of the Vistula River route, great herds of cattle were raised and driven to southern Germany and Italy. The great East European food rush, in which Ukraine was to play a very prominent role, was on.

To produce food more efficiently and in greater quantities, nobles began to transform their land holdings into commercially oriented food plantations or estates called *folwarki* (*filvarky* in Ukrainian). It no longer made economic sense for them to collect slowly increasing rents from small, inefficient, peasant holdings. Instead they tried to gain direct control of the peasants' lands so as to amalgamate them into their estates and, in place of rents, they demanded ever more free labor from their peasants. Unlike in Poland, where the estate economy spread quickly and extensively, in Ukraine its expansion was slower. In order to make the estates feasible, access to markets and plentiful labor was essential. Although such conditions existed in parts of Galicia, Volhynia, and Podilia and therefore estates soon appeared there, they were absent in central and eastern Ukraine. There the land had to be colonized before it could be economically exploited.

To encourage colonization, Polish or Polonized magnates whose connections in court helped them obtain grants of vast, empty Ukrainian lands, invited peasants to occupy these lands. To make their offers more attractive, the magnates offered the lands as *slobody* (that is, areas that were freed from all obligations and rents for periods of fifteen to thirty years). Thus, in the sparsely populated Dnieper River basin the appearance of the *folwark* (estate) system was postponed. When it did appear, it was greatly modified so as to fit local conditions.

Noble Ascendancy

Its new-found economic strength helped the nobility of the Commonwealth expand its already extensive privileges and political influence. At first the *szlachta* sought to limit its obligations to its rulers. It cajoled the kings practically to eliminate the taxation of the nobility. Loath to go off on arduous campaigns when there were fat profits to be made from their estates, the erstwhile warriors-turned-entrepreneurs also tried to limit their kings' right to make war. In the late 15th and early 16th centuries, the *szlachta* gained control of the local assemblies (*sejmiki*) and, somewhat later, of the *sejm*, the general assembly of the Commonwealth, which possessed the highest legislative and

executive authority in the land. The *szlachta* was now in a position to limit the prerogatives of its kings more successfully than any other nobility in Europe. In 1505, the noble-controlled *sejm* passed the Nihil Novi Law which forbade the king to pass any new edict without the consent of the nobles' representatives. And in 1573, after the Jagiellonian dynasty died out, the *szlachta* gained the right to elect its monarchs and to define their prerogatives by means of a contractual arrangement called the *pacta conventa*.

Limiting royal power was only one of the nobility's goals. It also wished to deprive every other group in society of the possibility of threatening its favored position. Although the magnates, who numbered less than 100 families, belonged to the noble estate, their virtual monopoly on high offices, their vast landholdings, and their willingness to exploit their fellow nobles raised the ire of the middle nobility especially. Therefore, in the early 16th century, the *szlachta* managed, if only temporarily, to limit the magnates' access to offices and lands.

The towns were another target of the nobles' aggrandizing tendencies. Viewing them as their commercial rivals, the nobles did their best to undermine them. In 1505, they deprived most of the towns of voting rights in the *sejm*. Hoping to eliminate their role as middlemen in trade, in 1565 the noble-dominated *sejm* forbade native merchants from traveling abroad for goods. This action resulted in foreign merchants dealing directly with the nobles and catering to their wishes. Meanwhile, the *sejm* freed the nobles from import and export duties. Unable to withstand the pressure from the noble-dominated countryside, many townsmen decided to join it. Rich burghers invested their capital in estates and tried to marry their daughters into noble families. Craftsmen, unable to find work in the stagnating towns, moved their shops to the estates of the nobles. In Ukraine and elsewhere in the Commonwealth, the pace of urbanization slowed perceptibly.

This expansion of the nobility's privileges was the work of the Polish *szlachta*. In the Grand Principality prior to 1569, the Ukrainian nobility, especially its lower strata, did not enjoy such great rights as its Polish counterpart. The grand prince could still deprive nobles of their lands with relative ease, and the obligations that they owed their monarch were much greater than in Poland. A major reason why the lower nobility of the Grand Principality supported the union with Poland was that it wished to obtain rights similar to those of the Polish *szlachta*. But this meant that Ukrainian nobles would have to adapt to Polish ways. It involved accepting the *szlachta* system of government, adopting its laws and customs, and eventually using its language. Even a change of religion was encouraged because Polish law stipulated that a nobleman who adopted Catholicism would automatically receive the rights of a Polish nobleman. In short, for Ukrainian noblemen to enjoy equal rights with their Polish colleagues it was necessary that they become more like the Poles.

The Enserfment of the Peasantry

As the nobility's fortunes rose, those of the peasantry declined. From the point of view of the nobility, the role of the peasant was to provide cheap labor. Because nobles controlled the political system, they were in a position to raise their demands on the peasants almost at will. In early 15th-century Galicia, for example, labor duties consisted only of two or three peasants from a peasant commune (*dvoryshche*) working for their landlord about fourteen days a year. However, a century later, every adult member of the commune was obligated to work about two days a week on his landlord's estate. This became an article of law when the Voloky Ustav of 1557 – initially designed to introduce a uniform system of land measurement but gradually used to enforce peasant labor obligations – was introduced in the Grand Principality. Later still, peasants were forced to work three or four days a week and sometimes even more. With so little time to work their own plots, the peasants were not only unable to benefit from the higher food prices but they even failed to maintain their previous standard of living.

To facilitate the exploitation of the peasantry, the nobles systematically deprived them of their traditional forms of self-administration, removing or buying out the village elders with their old "Moldavian" or "German" laws and administering the villages directly, in accordance with Polish laws. This process of noble interference and dominance in village affairs began as early as 1457 when the nobles obtained the right to judge their peasants. Eventually, this circumstance allowed a nobleman to control various aspects of his peasants' private lives. Some noblemen went so far as to charge their peasants a fee for allowing them to marry. They also forced peasants to use the mills and taverns that they owned and frequently leased to Jews. By the time the Voloky Ustav of 1557 was passed, the peasants' right to own land was no longer legally recognized. They could work the land, but only a nobleman could own it.

Faced with steadily worsening conditions, many peasants tried to exercise their traditional right to leave their lord's land and seek better conditions elsewhere. But even this option was gradually eliminated. Initially, peasants were allowed to leave only at certain times in the year, most commonly at Christmas, and only if they paid an exit fee and found a replacement. In 1496, this right was restricted to only one peasant household in a village per year. Finally, in 1505, the *sejm* completely forbade peasants to leave their villages without their lord's permission. Unable to move, deprived of personal rights, exploited at will, the peasant became a serf, little better than a slave of his nobleman landlord. Thus, at a time when the institution of serfdom was dying out in Western Europe, the second edition of serfdom, as Engels called it, reemerged in a particularly oppressive form in Eastern Europe and Ukraine.

But the extent of serfdom in Ukraine varied greatly. In the more populated,

western regions like Galicia and Volhynia, where Polish influence was strong, it was quite prevalent and severe. However, in the sparsely populated regions like the Carpathian highlands and, especially, the Dnieper River basin, where labor was scarce and concessions had to be made to peasants, serfdom was practically unknown. Moreover, the Ukrainian peasantry did not give in to serfdom without a struggle. In 1490–92, a series of peasant uprisings, led by a certain Mukha, enveloped Moldavia, Bukovyna, and Galicia. Although the rebels numbered about 10,000 men, they were handicapped by the classical weaknesses of all peasant uprisings: inexperienced leadership, lack of organization, poor military skills, and strictly local concerns. As a result, they were quickly defeated, demonstrating thereby that without the help of a militarily and politically more experienced class, the peasantry alone was incapable of challenging the nobles' monopoly on power and privilege.



While the inclusion of the Ukrainians in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth exposed them to the invigorating influence of the West, it also laid the foundations for deep-seated problems that would bedevil Ukrainians (and Poles) for centuries. As a result of the grain boom, Ukraine's economy, like that of Poland proper, became extremely imbalanced and one-dimensional because almost all economic activity focused on agriculture. Meanwhile, towns and industry stagnated. This economic disequilibrium was accompanied by a great and growing social imbalance: the nobility of the Commonwealth gained extraordinary privileges, while the peasantry experienced a drastic decline in its condition. Because power, wealth, and privilege in the Commonwealth were increasingly associated with Polishness, resentment grew among those who would not or could not identify with Polish culture.

Religion and Culture

The struggle to preserve their cultural identity has long been a central theme in the history of the Ukrainians. Constantly ruled by foreign powers they were repeatedly exposed to attempts to assimilate them into the dominant culture. In the 16th century, as the Orthodox Ukrainians came into ever closer proximity with the Catholic Poles, an intense confrontation developed that flared up into religious/cultural warfare. Formulated primarily in terms of Orthodoxy and Catholicism – religion was the preeminent ideological issue for all Europeans at this time – this confrontation sparked the first major ideological debate in Ukrainian history. Although it focused on purely religious issues such as whether the Orthodox or the Catholic church could best assure the salvation of one’s soul, it also posed questions that have become perennial in Ukrainian history – namely, whether the Ukrainian cultural heritage was doomed to extinction or capable of survival.



Ecclesiastical and Cultural Affairs

Just as it was in Kievan times, Orthodoxy remained synonymous with culture in the 15th–16th centuries. Indeed, its role in Ukrainian society grew: with no state of their own, their church served for Ukrainians as the only institutional means of expressing their collective identity. Unfortunately for its adherents the church was mired in a state of deep decline – just at the time when a strong, inspiring Orthodox church was needed. More so than Catholicism and Protestantism, Orthodoxy flourished best when it had the protection and patronage of the political leadership. Such was the case in the days of Kievan Rus’ and the Galician-Volhynian principality. But a close relationship between the Orthodox church and the Catholic rulers of Poland-Lithuania was difficult, if not impossible, to maintain. While pampering the Catholic

church, the rulers treated the Orthodox institution like a neglected stepchild.

When the Ukrainians first came under Lithuanian rule, there was reason for some optimism as far as their church was concerned. Unwilling to leave their numerous Orthodox subjects under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan of Moscow, the grand princes of Lithuania reestablished a metropolitanate in Kiev in 1458. Consisting of 10 dioceses in Ukraine and Belorussia, the new metropolitan's see broke its ecclesiastical ties with Moscow and returned to the jurisdiction of the patriarch in Constantinople. Following the practice of the times, the grand princes and, later, the kings of Poland acquired the right of patronage; that is, they could appoint Orthodox bishops and even the metropolitan himself. Thus, the crucial issue of the leadership of the Orthodox faithful was left in the hands of secular rulers of another, increasingly antagonistic, church.

The results were disastrous. With lay authorities capable of appointing bishops, the metropolitan's authority was undermined. And with every bishop acting as a law unto himself, the organizational discipline of the Orthodox church deteriorated rapidly. Even more deleterious was the corruption that lay patronage engendered. Recently ordained fortune hunters frequently bribed their way into the bishop's office so that they could plunder the diocese by selling off its icons, jewels, and lands. Eventually, even common noblemen took to auctioning off parishes or monasteries situated on their lands to the highest bidder or assigning them to unqualified relatives. Even the highest clergy behaved in the most unseemly manner. Metropolitan Onysifor Divochka, for example, was accused of bigamy; Bishop Kyrilo Terletsky was taken to court, and acquitted, of manslaughter, rape, and assault; Bishop Ion Borzobohaty charged the faithful a fee to use the church. Following the lead of their superiors, parish priests behaved so badly that contemporaries complained that only "human refuse" was to be found among them and that they were more likely to visit a tavern than a church.

Under the circumstances, Orthodoxy's cultural contributions were limited. Schools, once one of the church's most attractive features, were neglected. Unqualified teachers barely succeeded in familiarizing their pupils with the rudiments of reading, writing, and Holy Scriptures. The curriculum of the schools had changed little since medieval times. The fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453 added to the intellectual and cultural stagnation by depriving the Orthodox of their most advanced and inspiring model. Lacking both external and internal stimuli, Orthodox culture slipped into ritualism, parochialism, and decay.

The Poles, meanwhile, were enjoying a period of cultural growth and vitality. Benefiting from the West's prodigious outbursts of creative energy, they experienced the Renaissance with its stimulating reorientation of thought. Abandoning the medieval preoccupation with the afterlife, individuals like the astronomer Copernicus, the political theorist Andrzej Frycz-Modrzewski,

and the author Jan Kochanowski reflected Humanism's new-found interest in man – his experience in this life, and his social and physical environment. The graduates of the university in Cracow and hundreds of Polish students who had studied in the vibrant universities of Italy and Germany helped to spread the new ideas. By the early 16th century, about twenty printing presses and over 3000 parish schools were functioning in Poland.

The Reformation, whose impact in the Commonwealth became noticeable in the mid 16th century, brought new currents of creative ferment. Calvinism, with its emphasis on the role of the laity in religious affairs, found favor among 25–30% of the nobility. Arianism, a radical offshoot of Calvinism that rejected the notion of the Trinity and preached pacifism, established small but influential congregations throughout Poland, Lithuania, and even Volhynia. To spread their ideas more effectively, the Protestants founded schools of higher learning, established printing presses, and further developed the use of Polish as a literary language. Despite the intense religious rivalries that evolved in the 16th century, the Commonwealth, unlike most of Europe, remained an oasis of religious tolerance. To a large extent, this factor was a function of the nobility's tremendous influence, for, since a noble's rights were inviolable, his religious views, no matter how different, also had to be respected.

When the Catholic reaction to Protestantism gained momentum in the late 16th to early 17th centuries, it achieved some of its greatest successes in Poland. Much of the credit for this achievement belongs to the Jesuits, the shock troops of the Counter-Reformation, who arrived in Poland in 1564. With intensely committed, well-educated, and sophisticated members in its ranks, this highly disciplined religious order was able to entice many of its church's wayward sheep back into the fold. Establishing a network of excellent colleges throughout the Commonwealth, the Jesuits not only educated Poles in a militantly Catholic spirit but also attracted talented Protestant and Orthodox youths into their sphere of influence. Slowly, under the impact of the Counter-Reformation, the former religious tolerance of the Commonwealth began to give way to Catholic fanaticism.

The Polonization of the Ukrainian Nobility

The attractive Polish model of the privileged nobleman exerted a powerful assimilatory influence on the Ukrainian nobility. And the obvious superiority of its culture intensified the appeal of all things Polish. The Jesuits, sure of their victory over Protestantism, now focused their attention on the "schismatics," as they called the Orthodox. Soon after 1569, they moved into Ukraine, establishing collegiums in Jaroslav, Lviv, Kamianets, Bar, Lutsk, Vinnytsia, and Kiev. Their best polemicists, most notably the brilliant Piotr Skarga, castigated the alleged doctrinal fallacies and the cultural backwardness of the Ortho-

dox in sermons and open debates. In his famous work "The Unity of God's Church," Skarga argued that the state of Orthodoxy was so hopeless that its adherents' only alternative was union with Rome. "The Greeks fooled you, O Ruthenian people," Skarga wrote, "for in giving you the Holy Faith, they did not give you the Greek language, forcing you to use the Slavonic tongue so that you could never attain true understanding and learning ... for one can never attain learning by means of the Slavonic language."¹

For status conscious Ukrainian noblemen – and nobles are by definition status conscious – their association with a religion and culture that was considered to be inferior was extremely galling. As a result, they abandoned the faith of their forefathers in droves and embraced Catholicism along with the Polish language and culture. In 1612, in a mournful work entitled "Trenos or the Lament of the Holy Eastern Church," a leading Orthodox churchman, Meletii Smotrytsky, bemoaned the loss to Rus' and Orthodoxy of its leading families: "Where are the priceless jewels of [Orthodoxy's] crown, such famous families of Ruthenian princes as the Slutsky, Zaslavsky, Zbarazky, Vyshnevetsky, Sangushsky, Chartorysky, Pronsky, Ruzhynsky, Solomyretsky, Holovchynsky, Koropynsky, Masalsky, Horsky, Sokolynsky, Lukomsky, Ruzyna, and others without number? Where are those who surrounded them ... the well-born, glorious, brave, strong, and ancient houses of the Ruthenian nation who were renowned throughout the world for their high repute, power, and bravery?"² The question was obviously rhetorical, for it was common knowledge that all of these illustrious magnate families had joined the Catholic-Polish camp.

An insight into one of the ways in which the process of assimilation worked was provided by the Polish archbishop of Lviv, Prucznicki, himself a descendant of a Ukrainian family: "When it happened that a wealthy young lady or a rich widow became available then the Polish kings would dispatch their Polish noblemen to Rus' and helped them [to arrange a good marriage] by means of their influence; as these nobles married, they inundated Rus' and introduced the proper, Roman Catholic faith. Conscientious priests saw to the rest, for soon even the magnates in Rus' abandoned the Greek Schism and joined the Roman church."³ Of the remaining Ukrainian Orthodox magnates, only a few, notably those who began their careers before 1569, when the Ukrainians were still a potent political and cultural force in the Grand Principality, remained true to the old faith. Traditional ways still survived among pockets of poor gentry, which lived in isolated areas, far from the centers of Polish culture. However, they were politically, socially, and economically too weak to stem the process of Polonization.

One cannot exaggerate the profound implications that the loss of their elite had for the Ukrainians. In the hierarchically structured societies of early modern Europe, for a people to be without a nobility was tantamount to being a body without a head. It meant that Ukrainians were left without the class

that normally provided political leadership and purpose, patronized culture and education, supported the church, and endowed a society with a sense of ethnopolitical identity. With the spread of Polonization among much of the Ukrainian nobility, Orthodoxy, as well as the Ukrainian language and customs, became associated primarily with the lower classes. As such they became the objects of scorn in the eyes of the Polish establishment in the Commonwealth. Henceforth, ambitious, talented Ukrainian youths would constantly be forced to choose between loyalty to their own people and traditions and assimilation into the dominant culture and society. Usually they opted for the latter. Consequently, the problem of a Ukrainian elite, or rather, the lack of one, now emerged as yet another of the central and recurrent themes in Ukrainian history.

The Orthodox Revival

Despite its weaknesses, Orthodoxy was able to mount a response to the Polish Catholic challenge. Fighting fire with fire, the few Ukrainian magnates who remained committed to their traditional faith established Orthodox schools and printing presses on their estates. In 1568, Hryhorii Khodkevych provided Ivan Fedorov, a printer who had been hounded out of Moscow because of his attempts to employ the "blasphemous" new printing techniques, with a refuge in his residence in Zabludniv in Belorussia and encouraged him in his work. There are indications that in the 1570s Prince Iurii Slutsky founded a school and printing press on his estate. Support was also forthcoming from the energetic Prince Andrei Kurbsky, a Muscovite defector who settled in Volhynia in the 1570s and devoted himself to the defense of Orthodoxy. But the most widely recognized and important patron of the Orthodox church was the "uncrowned king of Ukraine," Prince Konstantyn Ostrozky, one of the richest and most powerful magnates in the Commonwealth.

Konstantyn Ostrozky and the Ostrih Academy Sparing no cost, in 1578 Ostrozky established a printing press, run by the peripatetic Ivan Fedorov, on his estate at Ostrih in Volhynia. Its most famous publication, the scrupulously edited Ostrih Bible, appeared in 1581. It was the first printed Bible to appear in a Slavic language. Ostrozky also founded schools in Turiv and Volodymyr, and, in 1580, he opened the so-called Ostrih Academy. Initially, it was staffed by learned Greeks whom the prince had invited. Later, their most talented Ukrainian pupils, such as Meletii Smotrytsky, also joined the faculty. The curriculum matched that of the best Jesuit schools. It consisted of Greek, Latin, and Church Slavonic and the seven "liberal arts," which were divided into the *trivium* consisting of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectics and the *quadrivium* composed of arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy.

Soon the Ostrih center of learning attracted such intellectuals as the no-

bleman Herasym Smotrytsky (who served as its rector), the priest Damian Nalyvaiko, the monk Vasył Surazsky (who was a graduate of Italian universities), and the anonymous Ostrih Cleric. Among the foreigners who were associated with the academy were the noted author Krzysztof Bronski, the professor of astronomy from Cracow Jan Latos, and the learned Kyril Lukaris, who later became the patriarch of Constantinople. Inspired by the impact of this cultural center, an Orthodox contemporary wrote: "Our Orthodox faith has begun to shine like the sun again; learned men have returned to God's church and printed books have multiplied." Yet, despite the fact that the Ostrih Academy demonstrated that Ukrainians were capable of impressive intellectual endeavors, its base of support was weak. All depended on Prince Konstantyn Ostrozky. And when he died in 1608, his fanatically Catholic granddaughter, Anna, wasted no time in turning the academy over to the Jesuits.

The brotherhoods (bratstva) Luckily for the Orthodox, individual magnates of the old school were not the only patrons of Orthodox high culture. Even without its elite, Ukrainian society was too large and too deeply imbued with tradition not to generate other defenders of its religiocultural identity. It was in the towns where Ukrainians were frequently a hard-pressed but tightly knit minority that the new champions of Orthodoxy appeared. In contrast to the lone, aristocratic Ostrozky, they were groups of townsmen who banded together in organizations called brotherhoods (*bratstva*).

Historians speculate that these brotherhoods originated in medieval times for the purpose of maintaining churches, supplying them with candles, icons, and books. Probably influenced by guilds, they adopted an organizational pattern that included annual elections of officers, mandatory monthly meetings, payment of dues, and communal courts. They gained popularity and respect by engaging in such activities as caring for the widows and orphans of deceased members, supporting hospitals, and providing members with interest-free loans. By the 16th century, the most important and influential brotherhood was the one associated with the Dormition (Uspensky) Cathedral in Lviv. It provided the model for other brotherhoods, which appeared in Halych, Rohatyn, Stryi, Komarno, Iaroslav, Kholm, Lutsk, and Kiev.

In terms of social composition, the brotherhoods generally consisted of common merchants and craftsmen. As their influence grew, rich merchants – in Lviv they usually made their fortune in the cattle trade – also enrolled. However, in some brotherhoods other social groups predominated. For example, in Lutsk the nobles seemed to be in the majority, while in Kiev it was the clergy. In a highly stratified society such as that of the Commonwealth, it is noteworthy that the brotherhoods accepted Orthodox members from all social strata. But their membership was never large. In Lviv there were no more than thirty members because that was the number of Ukrainian-owned houses that were allowed in the city. Meanwhile, in Lutsk the mem-

bership of the brotherhood was probably no more than fifteen. Nonetheless, these small, cohesive organizations proved to be remarkably effective in their endeavors.

One of their major concerns was education. In the late 16th century, the Lviv brotherhood founded its own school and, except for the learned Greek Arsenii, all of the teachers who taught there – and these included Zyzzanii Tustanovsky, Kyrylo Stavrohretsky, and the future metropolitan, Ivan Boretsky – were locally recruited. The exacting, if somewhat unrealistic, standards that these idealistic youths – members of the older generation did not participate in this work – applied to their efforts is evident from the text of the school regulation (*shkilnyi poriadok*): a teacher was to be “pious, wise, modest, mild and not a drunkard, reveler, bribe-taker, and money-lover. Nor should he be easily angered, jealous, a clown, a gossip, a magician, a story-teller, or an adherent of heresies.”⁴ Emphasizing the great responsibilities that teachers bore, the regulations admonished them “to teach well and to punish the disobedient not tyrannically but so as to teach them a lesson.” So successful was the school in Lviv that other brotherhoods approached it with requests for advice and teachers; by the early 17th century, numerous brotherhood schools existed throughout Ukraine.

Another important aspect of the Lviv brotherhood’s activity, initiated even before the expansion of its school, was printing. When Ivan Fedorov arrived in Lviv, the brotherhood helped him establish a printing press. In 1574, his first book, “The Apostol,” appeared. It was a momentous occasion for it marked the beginning of printing in Ukraine. Fedorov returned to Lviv again in 1582, where he died the following year in great poverty. When foreign creditors threatened to take possession of his press, the Lviv brotherhood bought it and used it to make their city a center of Orthodox book publishing.

The proliferating schools and publications roused the previously passive and conservative Ukrainians. As hundreds of graduates, steeped in native traditions and also acquainted with Western learning, moved into towns and villages in search of a living as itinerant teachers, they carried with them, in addition to the modern knowledge, a new sense of self-confidence and militancy. Rather than succumb to the attractions of Polish Catholicism, Ukrainians became increasingly willing to defend the religious traditions that set them apart from the Poles. An example of these new attitudes was the strong and successful resistance that the Orthodox, led by the Lviv brotherhood, mounted in the late 1580s against Polish Catholic attempts to impose the Gregorian calendar upon them.

Clearly much of the credit for these changes belonged to the brotherhoods. Yet they also had their defects. Lack of funds was always a problem. Despite their proliferation, the brotherhoods never formed an umbrella organization and their links with each other were sporadic. Their levels of activity were erratic because even the work of the leading Lviv brotherhood depended on a few committed individuals. When the latter grew disillusioned, tired, or (as in

the case of teachers) moved away to a materially more secure and rewarding position, the activity of the brotherhood often ceased for extended periods of time. Even more serious were the problems arising over the question of the brotherhoods' right to interfere in church affairs. As might be expected, constant conflicts raged between them and the bishops over such issues as control over the resources of a rich monastery (an example was a fierce, protracted struggle between Bishop Balaban of Lviv and the local brotherhood) or a disagreement between the bishop and the townsmen over the interpretation of the Bible. The upshot of the matter was that the brotherhoods, instead of helping to rehabilitate the Orthodox church, often added to the anarchy within it.

The Union of Brest (1596)

Ever since they split in 1054, the Catholic and Orthodox churches had considered the idea of reunion. In Ukraine, attempts to unite the churches dated as far back as the 13th century and, after the Council of Florence in 1439, the idea almost came to fruition. However, in opposition to the inherently attractive concept of Christian unity lay centuries of ill will and mutual suspicion. Especially the Orthodox were fearful that the more powerful Catholic church might try to dominate them if they entered into a union. Their fears were not misplaced, for during the 16th century the Polish Catholics, confident of their superiority, pressed for a union in the belief that this would inevitably lead to the assimilation of the Ukrainian Orthodox and the expansion of Polish Catholic influence. In 1577, Piotr Skarga's persuasively argued work "The Unity of God's Church" had a widespread impact. Meanwhile, Jesuits worked systematically to persuade leading Ukrainian magnates to support the idea of a union. Even Prince Ostrozky declared his support for the concept in principle. And King Sigismund III, a devout Catholic, used all his influence to help the matter along. In addition to religious fervor, the king had political reasons for backing a union because it would bind Ukraine and Belorussia closer to the Commonwealth and remove them from the dangerous influence of neighboring Orthodox Muscovy.

Surprisingly, it was from the Orthodox side that the immediate impetus for arranging a union emerged. In 1590, Gedeon Balaban, the Orthodox bishop of Lviv, infuriated by his endless disputes with the brotherhood and even more by the tactless interference of the patriarch of Constantinople, broached the idea of a union with Rome at a secret meeting of Orthodox bishops in Belz. In addition to Balaban, three bishops – Kyrylo Terletsky of Lutsk, Dionisii Zbyriusky of Kholm, and Leontii Pelchytsky of Turiv – agreed to investigate the matter further. Later, the conspirators were joined by Ipatii Potii of Volodymyr. This energetic, recently ordained nobleman and former Calvinist, together with Terletsky, became the leader of the pro-union coterie of bishops.

A mixture of self-interest and sincere concern for their church motivated the bishops. They believed that the prestigious, well-organized Catholic church would impose much-needed order and discipline among the Orthodox. That this result would raise the bishops' authority over the clergy and laity was also a consideration. By becoming a part of the Catholic church, the bishops hoped to achieve full equality for the Orthodox in the Commonwealth. No longer, they claimed, would Ukrainian burghers be mistreated in the towns or Orthodox noblemen passed over in appointments to office because of their religion. Moreover, the bishops would also benefit because if they received equal status with the Catholic hierarchy, they would gain membership in the prestigious and influential Senate. Egged on by these alluring prospects and following a series of surreptitious meetings with royal officials, Catholic bishops, and the papal nuncio, in June 1595, the four Orthodox bishops agreed to bring their church into a union with Rome. In return for the guarantee that the traditional Orthodox liturgy and rites, as well as such practices as the right of priests to marry, would be respected, they accepted the supreme authority of the pope in all matters of faith and dogma. At the end of 1595, Terletsy and Potii traveled to Rome, where Pope Clement VIII formally recognized the union.

When news about what had occurred spread, the Orthodox community broke into an uproar. Its leader, Prince Ostrozky, was infuriated not by the idea of the union itself but by the manner in which it had been handled. In a widely distributed open letter, he denounced the bishops as "wolves in sheeps' clothing" who betrayed their flock. And he called on the faithful to protest. In addition to lodging a formal complaint with the king – which was ignored – Ostrozky entered into an anti-Catholic compact with the Protestants and threatened to lead an armed uprising. Meanwhile, in all the Ukrainian and Belorussian lands, Orthodox noblemen vociferously denounced the union in their local assemblies. Frightened by the outcry, the initiators of the affair, Bishops Balaban and Kopystensky, deserted their colleagues and formally declared their opposition to the union.

To resolve the matter, a church council (*sobor*) was called in Brest in 1596. Never had Ukraine and Belorussia seen such a multitudinous church gathering. The antiunion forces included the two above-mentioned bishops, Orthodox dignitaries from abroad, dozens of elected noble representatives, over 200 clergy, and numerous lay supporters. To ensure their safety, Ostrozky brought along part of his private army. In contrast, the pro-union camp mustered but a handful of Catholic hierarchs, royal officials, and four Orthodox bishops. It was immediately apparent that the two sides could not find common ground. Realizing that negotiations were pointless, the pro-union or Uniate side publicly reiterated its intention to enter into the union.

Despite protests and threats, the Orthodox could not force them to retreat

from their position or to have the king remove them from office. Thus, Ukrainian society split in two: on the one hand were the Orthodox magnates, the majority of the clergy, and the masses, while on the other, backed by the king, was the former hierarchy and a handful of followers. Consequently, a situation existed in which there was a hierarchy without faithful, and faithful without a hierarchy. What had begun as an attempt to unite the Christian churches ended in their further fragmentation, for now instead of two there were three churches: the Catholic, Orthodox, and Uniate (or Greek Catholic as it was later called).

Religious polemics The controversy surrounding the Union of Brest evoked an unprecedented outburst of polemical writing. Not unexpectedly, the indefatigable Jesuit Skarga fired the first shot in this bitter war of words with his "Union of Brest and Its Defense" (1597). From the centers of Orthodox learning came a quick response. In Ostrih, a nobleman, Martyn Bronevsky, writing under the pseudonym of Khristofor Filalet, published that same year in Polish (and in 1598, in Ukrainian) his *Apokrysis*. It contained a compilation of documents revealing the Greek Catholic bishops' machinations, as well as arguments defending the legitimacy of the Orthodox council held at Brest. With a typical nobleman's distrust of authority and an admixture of Protestant ideas, Bronevsky rejected the bishops' claim to exclusive decision-making rights in the church.

Another member of the Ostrih circle, the unidentified Ostrih Cleric, applied biting satire in the pamphlets he wrote against the Greek Catholics. Somewhat later, in 1605, Lviv's contribution to the Orthodox polemical barrage appeared. Entitled "Warning," this unsigned work focused on the selfish motives that allegedly guided the Greek Catholic bishops. On the Greek Catholic side there was only one noteworthy writer – Ipatii Potii. Using well-developed Jesuit models, he published in 1599, in Ukrainian, his *Anti-Apokrysis*, a temperamental response to Bronevsky's polemic.

Perhaps the most powerful Orthodox writer of the period was Ivan Vyshensky. A Galician who spent most of his life – he lived sometime between 1550 and 1620 – as a reclusive monk on Mount Athos in Greece, Vyshensky was a fanatical defender of Orthodox traditions. Writing in simple but powerful prose, he mercilessly castigated the Greek Catholics in such works as "A Letter to the Bishops Who Abandoned Orthodoxy" and "A Short Response to Piotr Skarga." But he also criticized the Orthodox, emphasizing the egoism, self-indulgence, and corruption of their nobility, wealthy burghers, and clergy as being responsible for the sorry state of their church. Very much a man of the people, Vyshensky was unique in bemoaning the enslavement of the peasants and fearless in denouncing their exploiters. For all the defects of Ukrainian society, he saw only one solution: a complete rejection of all in-

novations, including such "pagan tricks as grammar, rhetoric, dialectics, and other infamous temptations," and a return to the simple Orthodox beliefs of old.

The literary output of the polemical writers was not voluminous. All the feuding parties together probably did not produce more than twenty to thirty works during several decades of debate. But as these works circulated around the country, they were carefully read and heatedly discussed at the courts of the few remaining Orthodox magnates, on the isolated estates of noblemen, and in the cramped quarters of the brotherhoods. By involving Ukrainian society in its first full-fledged ideological controversy, they helped it reach a higher state of consciousness about itself and the world around it.



The religious controversies of the late 16th and early 17th century highlighted several pregnant issues in Ukrainian society. They placed the growing tensions with the Catholic Poles on an ideological and highly emotional level. Indeed, Catholic Poland now emerged as the antithesis of Ukrainian society. But the cultural confrontation between the Ukrainians and the Poles cost the former dearly: it forced Ukrainian nobles to choose between their own stagnant, impoverished cultural heritage and the vibrant, attractive Catholic/Polish culture. Not surprisingly, the vast majority opted for Catholicism and the Polonization that invariably followed. Consequently, the Ukrainians lost their noble elite. And this development was of epochal importance for their subsequent history.

Another far-reaching by-product of the Orthodox/Catholic confrontation, specifically of the Union of Brest, was that it divided Ukrainians into Orthodox and Greek Catholics, thereby laying the foundation for the many sharp distinctions that eventually developed between East and West Ukrainians. But the period was not merely one of setbacks for Ukrainian society: the religious controversies sparked a cultural upsurge within it and the confrontation with the Poles led to a sharper definition of a Ukrainian identity.

Part Three

The Cossack Era



This page intentionally left blank

The Formative Phase

Since the fall of Kiev in 1240, the western lands of Galicia and Volhynia had served as the stage for major developments in Ukrainian history. However, by the end of the 16th century, the focus of events shifted back to the east, to the lands of the Dnieper basin that had long been partially depopulated. In that vast frontier, which at that time was specifically referred to as *Ukraina* – the land on the periphery of the civilized world – the age-old struggle of the sedentary population against the nomads flared up with renewed intensity, fueled by the bitter confrontation between Christianity and Islam. The oppressive conditions that obtained in the settled western areas provided numerous recruits who preferred the dangers of frontier life to serfdom. As a result, a new class of Cossack-frontiersmen emerged. Initially, the Cossacks concentrated on pushing back the Tatars, thereby opening up the frontier to colonization.

But as they honed their military and organizational skills and won ever more impressive victories against the Tatars and their Ottoman Turkish overlords, Ukrainian society came to perceive the Cossacks not only as champions against the Muslim threat, but also as defenders against the religious and socioeconomic oppression of the Polish *szlachta*. Gradually, moving to the forefront of Ukrainian society, the Cossacks became heavily involved in the resolution of these central issues in Ukrainian life and, for the next several centuries, provided Ukrainian society with the leadership it had lost as a result of the Polonization of the Ukrainian nobility.



Frontier Society

For ages, the sedentary population of Ukraine had attempted to colonize the fertile steppe regions. During the Kievan period, a network of fortifications

was built below Kiev to keep out the nomads and encourage settlement. The Mongol invasion, however, swept these strong points away. Later, under the Lithuanian grand princes, a more successful colonizing drive culminated in the establishment of several fortresses on the Black Sea near the mouth of the Dnister. But, with the rise of the Crimean Khanate in the late 15th century, these settlements were destroyed and the forts on the Black Sea fell to the Ottoman Turks. By the mid 16th century, the limits of Ukrainian habitation were pushed back to a line of strongholds that stretched along the northern fringe of the steppe and included Kamianets, Bar, Vinnytsia, Bila Tserkva, Cherkasy, Kaniv, and Kiev. Below this line lay the so-called wild field (*dyke pole*).

The Tatars What made the “wild field” so forbidding were the Tatars. Year after year, their swift raiding parties swept down on the towns and villages to pillage, kill the old and frail, and drive away thousands of captives to be sold as slaves in the Crimean port of Kaffa, a city often referred to by Ukrainians as “the vampire that drinks the blood of Rus’.” For the Tatars these raids were an economic necessity because their relatively primitive pastoral economy could not satisfy all their needs. Only in exchange for slaves could the Tatars obtain from the Ottoman Empire the finished products and luxury goods that they desired. This was hardly a consolation for the Ukrainians whose folk songs frequently reflected the numbing impact of these raids:

This night at midnight, before the cocks had crowed
 The Tatars flew like the wind into our village
 This night at midnight, an evil came to pass
 When the wild Turkic band plundered all our land.¹

The Tatar raids, usually directed against the provinces of Kiev and Bratslav (although Galicia, Volhynia, and Podilia were also not spared), were particularly devastating in the late 16th and early 17th centuries. For example, from 1450 to 1586, eighty-six raids were recorded, and from 1600 to 1647, seventy. Although estimates of the number of captives taken in a single raid reached as high as 30,000, the average figure was closer to 3000. In any case, the losses to Ukrainians were serious. In Podilia alone, about one-third of all the villages were devastated or abandoned between 1578 and 1583.

Colonization Tatars notwithstanding, the lure of rich, open lands was too powerful to resist. As the grain trade expanded, Polish and Polonized magnates, taking advantage of their contacts at court, obtained vast tracts of territory in the east. To colonize these lands, they coaxed peasants away from their previous owners by offering them the use of land, free from obligations, for

periods of ten, twenty, and even thirty years (*slobody*). Many peasants also simply ran away from their oppressive masters in Galicia and Volhynia to seek their fortunes in the east. After a generation or two, these peasants in the newly colonized regions developed into a different breed from those in the more settled western provinces they had left behind. Simply by making the risky move to the frontier, they demonstrated that they were bolder and more self-reliant. Because they often had to plow their lands with their muskets at their sides in case of Tatar attack, they possessed military skills that their western compatriots did not. Their children, who had never known serfdom, grew up believing that they were free men who owed no obligations to anyone. This impression survived even when the terms of a *sloboda* ran out, for it was customary for peasants in the frontier regions to pay dues to magnates in cash or in kind, rather than in the form of demanding and demeaning labor. With more land available, the colonists tended to be better off, many owning as much as a *lan* (ca forty acres) of land, which was more than many noblemen owned in the West.

Another characteristic of the newly colonized (actually recolonized) provinces of Kiev and Bratslav in particular was the rapid growth of towns. In the early 1600s, over 200 new towns appeared in the province of Kiev alone, giving it a total of 348, roughly one-third of all urban centers in Ukraine. By the middle of the century, once semideserted Bratslav province had one town per 218 sq. km. Although about 60% of the frontier population lived in towns by the mid 17th century, these were not urban centres in the real sense of the word. They were actually little more than frontier forts with rarely more than 100 households living within their wooden stockades. Many inhabitants were peasants who worked the land nearby but lived in the fortified town for protection. The vast majority of these towns did not have self-rule, but were owned by the magnates who built them and provided troops for their defense.

With most of the frontier lands in the hands of magnates, there was little left for the middle and poorer nobles. Those Polish noblemen who did arrive in the Dnieper basin did not, at least at the outset, come as landowners, but rather as administrators, officers, or servitors on the estates of magnates. Only gradually did they acquire relatively modest holdings. Another reason for the middle and lower nobility's low profile on the frontier was their small numbers. In Kiev province in the mid 17th century, there were only 2000–2500 nobles for a population of 350,000–400,000, that is, less than 1%, whereas in the rest of the Commonwealth, nobles constituted, on the average, 8–10% of the population. But while the magnates' rapid accumulation of the frontier lands impeded the influx of the lower nobility, it encouraged the immigration of Jews to central and eastern Ukraine. Because many magnates preferred to spend their time in Cracow, Warsaw, or Lviv, they frequently employed Jews as administrators of their lands in their absence. Most of the Jews who

settled in the burgeoning towns, however, were craftsmen, merchants, and moneylenders whose skills were much in demand. There were already about 120,000 Jews in all of Ukraine in the early 17th century.²

At the highest level of frontier society, far above all other elements, was a small coterie of fabulously wealthy magnates. Foremost among them were such Polonized Ukrainian families as the Vyshnevetsky (later Wiśniowiecki), Ostrozky, Zbarazky, and Koretsky families, and Polish newcomers such as the Zamoyski, Koniecpolski, Kalinowski, Ossolinski, and Potocki. By the early 17th century, their huge latifundia dominated the frontier. In the province of Bratslav, 60,000 of a total of 65,000 households belonged to eighteen magnate families. The richest of the magnates, the recently Polonized Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, owned 7500 estates in Kiev province alone and, in addition, controlled almost the entire Poltava region. It has been estimated that over 230,000 peasants lived on his estates. The size of these landholdings was unmatched anywhere in the Commonwealth or, indeed, anywhere else in Europe. Because these magnates controlled more territory and population than many West European princes at the time, they were often referred to as "kinglets."

The epithet was appropriate: many of these arrogant lords behaved like sovereign rulers, building magnificent mansions decorated with Dutch paintings and Oriental carpets, maintaining lavish courts and large private armies. They scoffed at their king's wishes and frequently broke the law of the land. One magnate by the name of Laszcz, notorious for his cruelty to peasants, also mistreated lesser nobles to such an extent that he was sentenced to exile 236 times. The backing of other powerful magnates prevented these sentences from ever being carried out and the brazen Laszcz even dared to have a suit of clothes fashioned out of the writs and to wear it to the royal court. Although representing an extreme example, the case of Laszcz is indicative of the growing strength and arrogance of the magnates on the one hand and the weakness of the royal government on the other.

The Cossacks

Epitomizing the new society that had evolved on the plains of the Dnieper basin was the emergence of a new class that could have evolved only on the frontier – that of the Cossacks. Of Turkic origin, the word Cossack originally referred to the free, masterless men who lacked a well-defined place in society and who lived on its unsettled periphery. Slavic Cossacks first appeared in the 1480s, but it was not until the development of serfdom in the mid 16th century that their numbers increased significantly. Originally the bulk of Cossacks were runaway peasants, although they also included burghers, defrocked priests, and impecunious or adventure-seeking noblemen. Although Poles, Belorussians, Russians, Moldavians, and even Tatars joined the ranks

of the Cossacks, the overwhelming majority of those who lived in the Dnieper basin were Ukrainians. A Russian variant of Cossackdom evolved farther to the east, along the Don River.

Early organization To avoid the authorities, the Ukrainian Cossacks pushed farther south along the Dnieper and its lower tributaries and beyond the small frontier outposts of Kaniv and Cherkasy. In this bounteous but dangerous terrain they engaged in *ukhody*, that is, hunting and fishing expeditions, and in the grazing of cattle and horses. It was during these extended seasonal forays into the steppe that the first signs of organization appeared among them. As they ventured into the "wild field," they chose the most experienced, brave, and resourceful men from among themselves as their leaders or *otamany*, and formed tightly knit groups (*vatahy*) to better fend off marauding Tatars as well as to cooperate in hunting and fishing ventures. Eventually, permanent fortified camps (*sich*) with small, year-round garrisons were established in the steppe and, for many, Cossackdom became a full-time, year-round occupation.

For royal officials (*starosty*) on the frontier, the sight of increasing numbers of armed, independent Cossacks who often flaunted their disrespect for established authority was worrisome. Yet, as members of magnate families, these *starosty* also benefited from the situation, profiting handsomely through the imposition of heavy (often unsanctioned) duties on the fish, animal pelts, etc. that the Cossacks tried to sell in the towns. More important, they found that the Cossacks were ideally suited for defending the frontier from Tatar raids, an onerous and important responsibility of the *starosty*. Thus, in 1520, Senko Polozovych, *starosta* of Cherkasy, recruited a unit of Cossacks as border guards. In the following decades, other *starosty*, such as Ostafii Dashkevych, Predslav Lantskoronsky, and Bernard Pretvych, became active in mobilizing Cossacks not only for defensive service, but also for offensive campaigns against the Tatars.

The magnates who initially began to organize the Cossacks were still Orthodox, not yet Polonized Ukrainians. Most famous among them was Dmytro "Baida" Vyshnevetsky, *starosta* of Kaniv. The kaleidoscopic nature of his career and his legendary fame often make it difficult to separate fact from fiction. However, it is incontestable that in 1553–54, Vyshnevetsky gathered together scattered groups of Cossacks and on the remote, strategically located island of Mala Khortytsia below the Dnieper rapids (*za porohamy*) built a fort designed to obstruct Tatar raids into Ukraine. In so doing, he laid the foundations for the Zaporozhian Sich, generally regarded as the cradle of Ukrainian Cossackdom. Soon afterwards, he launched a series of attacks with his Cossacks against the Crimea and even had the temerity to attack the Ottoman Turks themselves. When the Commonwealth refused to support him in his anti-Muslim crusade, Vyshnevetsky moved to Muscovy, from where he con-

tinued his attacks on Crimea. Before long, he grew dissatisfied there and, after returning to Ukraine, became involved in Moldavian affairs. This proved to be his undoing, for the Moldavians treacherously handed him over to the Ottomans, who executed him in Constantinople in 1563. Numerous Ukrainian folk songs, some of them surviving to this day, have preserved the memory of "Baida's" exploits.

The Zaporozhian Sich Located far beyond the reach of government authorities, the Zaporozhian Sich continued to flourish even after the death of its founder. Any Christian male, irrespective of his social background, was free to come to this island fortress, with its rough wood-and-thatch barracks, and to join the Cossack brotherhood. He was also free to leave at will. Women and children, regarded as a hindrance in the steppe, were barred from entry. Refusing to recognize the authority of any ruler, the Zaporozhians governed themselves according to traditions and customs that evolved over the generations. All had equal rights and could participate in the frequent, boisterous councils (*radny*) in which the side that shouted loudest usually carried the day.

These volatile gatherings elected and, with equal ease, deposed the Cossack leadership, which consisted of a *hetman* or *otaman* who had overall command, adjutants (*osavuly*), a chancellor (*pysar*), a quartermaster (*obozny*), and a judge (*suddia*). Each *kurin*, a term that referred to the Sich barracks and, by extension, to the military unit that lived in them, elected a similar subordinate group of officers, or *starshyna*. During campaigns, the authority of these officers was absolute, including the right to impose the death penalty. But in peacetime their power was limited. Generally, the Zaporozhians numbered about 5000–6000 men of whom about 10% served on a rotating basis as the garrison of the Sich, while the rest were engaged in campaigns or in peacetime occupations. The economy of the Sich consisted mainly of hunting, fishing, beekeeping, and salt making at the mouth of the Dnieper. Because the Sich lay on the trade route between the Commonwealth and the Black Sea, trade also played an important role. Despite the ethos of brotherhood and equality that the Zaporozhians espoused, socioeconomic distinctions and tensions gradually developed between the wealthier Cossack officers (*starshyna*) and the rank and file (*chern*) and caused recurrent upheavals at the Sich.

The town and registered Cossacks Many Cossacks also lived in the frontier towns. In 1600, for example, the population of Kaniv consisted of 960 people classed as burghers and over 1300 Cossacks and their families. Like their compatriots at the Sich, the town Cossacks ignored the government authorities and recognized only their own elected officers. But although the Polish government realized that it was futile to attempt to control the remote, rebellious Sich, it did have hopes of harnessing the town Cossacks, or at least a selected portion of them, into its service. In 1572, King Sigismund August authorized

the formation of a salaried 300-man Cossack unit, led by a Polish nobleman by the name of Badowski, which was formally removed from the jurisdiction of local government officials. Although the unit was soon dissolved, important precedents were set: it was the first time that the Polish government recognized the Cossacks, or at least 300 of them, as a distinct social class that, like the other estates in the land, had the right of self-administration.

Another, more successful attempt to form a government-sanctioned Cossack unit occurred in 1578 during the reign of King Stefan Batory. In return for pay and assignment of the town of Terekhtymyryv, which was to serve as an arsenal and place of convalescence for their wounded, 500 Cossacks agreed to accept nobles as their officers and to refrain from the "self-willed" attacks against the Tatars that often complicated the Commonwealth's foreign relations. Duly inscribed into a register, the functions of these "registered" Cossacks were to serve as a border militia and, equally important, to control the nonregistered Cossacks. By 1589, there were 3000 registered Cossacks. In general, they came from the ranks of the town dwellers – established Cossacks who had families and who often owned considerable property. For example, according to his will, the property of a registered Cossack by the name of Tyshko Volovych included a house in Chyhyryn, two estates with fish ponds, woodlands and pastures, 120 beehives, and 3000 pieces of gold (1000 of which he lent out at high interest).

The relative wealth of these registered Cossacks contrasted sharply with the poverty of their nonregistered counterparts, who owned little more than did peasants. Consequently, tensions between the 3000 registered and the approximately 40,000–50,000 nonregistered Cossacks often ran high. This distinction did not prevent the sons of wealthier Cossacks from going down to the Sich to seek their fortunes, or other Cossacks who had managed to accumulate wealth from entering the ranks of the registered. Thus, by the early 17th century, there were essentially three overlapping categories of Cossacks: the well-established registered Cossacks who had been co-opted into government service; the Zaporozhians who lived beyond the pale of the Commonwealth; and the vast majority of Cossacks who lived in the frontier towns and led a Cossack way of life, but who had no officially recognized status.

The struggle against the Turks and Tatars In the early phase of their development, the nonregistered Cossacks, and particularly the Zaporozhians, were regarded not only by the magnates and royal officials but also by much of Ukrainian society as little more than brigands and social outcasts. By the late 16th century, this negative image of the Cossack had changed, at least in the eyes of the lower strata of Ukrainian society, largely as a result of the increased frequency, scope, and audacity of Cossack attacks on the Tatars and their powerful overlords, the Ottoman Turks. Ukrainians were not the only

ones who suffered at the hands of the Muslim Turks. All of 16th-century Europe shuddered at the very thought of invasion by the Ottomans who, in 1529, had devastated Hungary and had almost captured Vienna; a large part of Eastern Europe remained directly exposed to Tatar raids. Therefore, anyone who dared challenge the *bisurmany*, as the Muslims were referred to in Ukraine, was sure to win sympathy at home and renown abroad.

Although they certainly reveled in the fame that their raids against the Turks brought them, the Zaporozhians also had pragmatic reasons for launching raids: they pushed the Tatars away from their settlements and the rich booty they captured from the Ottoman towns was a handsome supplement to their incomes. Most raids were carried out by sea. For this purpose, the Cossacks constructed flotillas of forty to eighty long, narrow, and shallow galleys called *chaiky*, each of which could hold about sixty men. Slipping past the Ottoman forts at the mouth of the Dnieper, they attacked the Crimean and Turkish strong points along the Black Sea coast. The earliest record of such raids dates back to 1538, before the founding of the Sich, when a Cossack flotilla partially destroyed the Ottoman fortress of Ochakiv. In subsequent years, the Cossacks launched increasing numbers of these raids, gaining great renown thereby, for the Ottoman Empire was at the time the most powerful state in the world. By 1595, the Habsburgs of Austria, enemies of the Ottomans, dispatched an envoy to the Sich, by the name of Erich von Lasotta, to conclude a pact for a coordinated attack against Ottoman forces in Moldavia. The pope also established contact with the Zaporozhians. Indeed, the Sich behaved as though it were a sovereign power, engaging in campaigns and conducting its own foreign relations.

Cossack raids against the Ottomans reached a high point between 1600 and 1620. In 1606, the Cossacks gutted Varna, the strongest Ottoman fortress on the Black Sea; in 1608, Perekop fell to them; in 1609, they sacked Kilia, Ismail, and Akkerman; in 1614, previously untouched Trabizond in Asia Minor was attacked; and in 1615 they dealt a most audacious blow when, within view of the sultan and a garrison of 30,000, about eighty Cossack *chaiky* managed to slip into Constantinople harbor, burn it, and make their escape. In 1620, they repeated the same feat. Meanwhile, in 1616, Kaffa, the emporium of the slave trade in the Crimea, was taken and thousands of slaves freed. In describing these Cossack forays, Naima, a 17th-century Ottoman historian, noted: "One can state with certainty that there are no people on earth who care less about life and have less fear of death than they ... Military experts claim that this rabble, because of its bravery and skill, is unmatched in sea-warfare by anyone in the world."³

Equally impressive were the Cossack exploits on land. Infuriated by the Poles' inability to control the Cossacks, Sultan Osman II assembled a huge army of 160,000, together with thousands of Crimean auxiliaries, and moved against the Commonwealth. In 1620, the Poles suffered a disastrous defeat

at Cecora. But a year later at Khotyn a Polish force of 35,000 that had tried to hold off the Ottomans was saved from certain annihilation by the timely arrival of 40,000 Cossacks led by Hetman Sahaidachny.

As a result of these successes, Cossack self-confidence grew. In their often acrimonious negotiations with the Poles, the Cossacks began to refer to themselves as defenders of the faith, as a brotherhood of knights, and as paladins fighting for the public good. This rhetoric was partly meant to serve the Cossacks' narrow class interests by convincing the government that they were entitled to the rights and privileges normally accorded fighting men. Yet, to a large extent, the Cossacks took this exalted image of themselves as the defenders of Christendom and of their countrymen seriously. This new sense of mission in turn induced them to confront the burning internal issues of their society.

The Early Insurrections

The Polish government and nobility reacted with confusion and ambivalence to the rapid expansion of Cossackdom. It was difficult for the *szlachta* to understand that the Cossacks – still regarded by many merely as fugitive serfs – had become a distinct, organized social entity. Despite their inherent antagonism to the Cossacks, the nobles of the Commonwealth were not averse to utilizing them when it suited their purposes. The same officials who in peacetime called for the merciless extirpation of the “self-willed rabble” eagerly expanded the register to include more Cossacks and offered them rights, privileges, and pay when they required their services in the wars against Muscovy or the Ottomans. But when peace was restored, these officials often reneged on their promises and again denounced the Cossacks. These inconsistencies were exacerbated by the differences in approach between the local magnates and border officials on the one hand, who were daily at odds with the Cossacks, and the kings on the other, who saw in them a source of experienced, relatively cheap fighting power and a potential counterbalance to the growing power of the eastern magnates. It was only a matter of time before these tensions would come to a head.

The first Cossack uprising occurred in 1591. That year, Krystof Kosynsky, a Ukrainian nobleman and leader of the registered Cossacks, received a land grant from the king for his services to the crown. Before he was able to take possession of it, Janusz Ostrozky, *starosta* of Bila Tserkva and the Polonized scion of the illustrious Ostrozky family, arrogated the land for himself. Realizing that to invoke legal sanctions against a powerful grandee would be useless, Kosynsky took vengeance by leading his Cossacks in a series of raids on the Ostrozky estates. Soon peasants, Cossacks, and even disgruntled military servitors in Volhynia, Bratslav, and Kiev were fighting their own vendettas against their lords. When the shocked nobles finally mobilized their forces, it

was the old patriarch of the Ostrozky family, Konstantyn Konstantynovych, who led them to a victory over Kosynsky's force of about 2000 near Piatka River. The punishment of the rebels was unusually light. While the registered Cossacks who joined the uprising were required to swear loyalty to the king, Kosynsky was forced to bow down three times before the assembled Ostrozky clan, and to beg their pardon. Soon afterwards, he was killed in a minor incident under unclear circumstances.

No sooner had the reverberations from one rebellion faded than another insurrection flared up, this time more widespread. Its leader, Severyn Nalyvaiko, was, according to a Polish report, "a man of pleasant countenance, exceptional ability and an excellent cannoneer to boot."⁴ The son of a Galician tailor who died after being beaten by a magnate, Severyn, in his youth, found refuge together with his brother, Damian, at the Ostrozky estate in Ostrih. While his brother went on to become a priest and noted author, Severyn chose "to earn his bread the Cossack way." In 1595, after leading about 2500 men on a successful raid against the Ottomans in Moldavia, Nalyvaiko returned to Bratslav province and soon came into conflict with the local nobility. Again the Cossacks proclaimed a rebellion against the hated *szlachta* and again the peasants rushed to join them. More important, the Zaporozhians also came to Nalyvaiko's aid. Among the rebels' vaguely articulated goals was the call to establish a region in Ukraine governed solely by Cossacks.

While the Zaporozhians, led by Hryhorii Loboda and Matvii Shaulo, operated in the Kiev and Bratslav regions, Nalyvaiko marched through Galicia, Volhynia, and Belorussia, urging peasants to revolt and spreading havoc among the *szlachta*. Realizing, however, that the Poles were stronger, the rebels united their forces in the spring of 1596 and began to retreat eastward in hopes of finding refuge in Muscovy. By May they had fought off the Poles, but as hunger and disease spread and casualties mounted, internal dissension broke out. Loboda, who favored negotiation, was accused of having secret contacts with the enemy and was murdered. Thereupon, his supporters, who were mostly officers and well-to-do Cossacks, surreptitiously surrendered Nalyvaiko to the Poles and persuaded the rebels to lay down their arms. In the confusion, the Poles entered the camp and massacred most of the unarmed rebels. Nalyvaiko himself was taken to Warsaw and executed.

The search for accommodation It seemed to the Poles that after their victory, the Cossack problem had been solved, especially because internal conflicts were becoming increasingly more pronounced among the Cossacks. The well-established, town-based registered Cossacks generally favored negotiation and cooperation with the Commonwealth, hoping that this harmony would secure their status and provide them with the peace they needed to develop their properties, which were often sizable. However, for the majority of Cossacks, consisting of propertyless Zaporozhians and nonregistered Cossacks

who were in constant danger of being pushed back into the ranks of the serfs, it seemed that only radical actions could gain for them a better place in society. With tensions between the two factions often expressed by open conflict, it was frequently possible for the Poles to play the two sides off against each other.

Events took a favorable turn for the Cossacks at this critical juncture. Because the Commonwealth became involved in an almost continuous series of wars in the early 17th century, it again turned to the Cossacks as a source of experienced fighters. In 1501, a unit of 2000 Ukrainians participated in the difficult Polish campaign in Livonia, and in 1604 and 1609 the Zaporozhians took part in the Polish intervention in Muscovy's Time of Troubles. Hardly a meeting of the Polish parliament took place in the early 17th century without a Polish statesman producing a resolution or project that sought to utilize the military usefulness of the Cossacks, while not giving in to their demands for an enlarged register and self-determination. During this time of complex political maneuvering, the Cossacks were fortunate to have a leader who could rise to the occasion.

Hetman Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny Historians generally agree that, prior to Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny was the most outstanding Cossack leader. An impoverished nobleman from Sambir in Galicia, he studied in the Ostrih Academy and then made his way to the Zaporozhian Sich where, after making a name for himself as a commander of the famous sea raid against Kaffa in 1616, he was elected hetman. Convinced that the Cossacks were not yet a match for the forces of the Commonwealth, he made conciliation with the Poles the keystone of his policy. He mobilized and led the large Cossack armies that fought for the Poles in the continuous wars against Moscow and the Ottomans. A strict disciplinarian who "generously spilled the blood of those who disobeyed him," Sahaidachny liquidated roving bands of undisciplined Cossacks and forced them to recognize his authority. To avoid conflict with the Poles, he agreed in 1619 to lower the register to 3000, forbade unauthorized sea raids, and accepted the king's right to confirm Cossack officers.

Yet Sahaidachny's most outstanding achievement was that he perceived the Cossacks in terms not only of their specific class interests, but also as a potential leading force in Ukrainian society as a whole. It was he who allied the rough, militarily potent Cossacks with the politically weak Ukrainian religious-cultural elite. The link was forged in dramatic fashion: in 1620, Sahaidachny enrolled himself and the entire Zaporozhian Host in the Kievan brotherhood. This step was meant to demonstrate that henceforth the Zaporozhians intended to uphold Ukrainian religious and cultural demands.

In that same year, Sahaidachny, together with the Orthodox clergy, invited the patriarch of Jerusalem, Teofan, to visit Kiev in order to consecrate a new

Orthodox hierarchy. Since the Poles had threatened to arrest Teofan as a spy, the hetman guaranteed his safety. After the new metropolitan and bishops were installed, Sahaidachny escorted the patriarch to the Ottoman border at the head of a force of 3000 Cossacks. So great was the prestige of this Cossack hetman that when he died in 1622, the populace of Kiev turned out for his funeral en masse. Kassian Sakovych, the rector of the Kievan brotherhood school, delivered an eloquent eulogy to this wise leader and dedicated patron of Orthodoxy in which he associated Sahaidachny with the traditions of the Kievan princes. It was evident that Cossackdom had now entered the mainstream of Ukrainian society.

More rebellions After Sahaidachny's death, conflict again dominated Cossack/Polish relations. It had appeared initially that it might be avoided because the deceased hetman's immediate successors, Olifer Holub and Mykhailo Doroshenko, were his close associates and shared his conciliatory views. But Cossack dissatisfaction, especially among the nonregistered, became intense after the Khotyn campaign of 1621, when over 40,000 battle-hardened Cossacks returned to Ukraine with no intention of accepting the serf status the government demanded and yet with no hope of being entered in the register. Some congregated at the Zaporozhian Sich while most returned to their towns and villages. Disgruntled and restless, they were only waiting for an opportunity to vent their frustration. Doroshenko attempted to redirect their animosity and, in the mid 1620s, organized a series of sea raids against the Ottomans, informing the startled Muslims that "the [Polish] king may have made peace with you, but we did not."⁵ And for the first time the Cossacks became involved in the factional strife of the Crimea by supporting an anti-Ottoman candidate for the position of khan.

For the Poles, the Cossack notion of themselves as a state within a state was most irritating. The king complained in parliament that "domestic anarchy is again coming to the fore [in Ukraine], creating difficulties for us and involving us in conflicts with our powerful neighbors. Ignoring the obligations of servitude and the precepts of loyalty, they [the Cossacks] have established their own order, threatening the life and property of innocent people. And, what is more, all Ukraine obeys them."⁶ After deciding to adopt a hard line toward the Cossacks, the government chose Stanisław Koniecpolski, a tough and experienced commander with vast estates in Ukraine, to enforce it.

In 1625, Koniecpolski moved in Ukraine with about 8000 men. A force of about 6000 Cossacks, led by Marko Zhmailo, set out from the Zaporozhian Sich to meet him. After a series of unsuccessful encounters with the Poles, the Zaporozhian officers again reinstated the moderate Doroshenko as hetman and negotiations ensued, ending in a compromise. The register was raised to 6000, something which pleased the wealthier ("more deserving") Cossacks

who were included in it, but the majority of the rank and file was expected to return to bondage.

When the register was completed, Doroshenko proceeded to rationalize the organization of the 6000 "legal" Cossacks. They were divided into six regiments (*polky*) based in Kiev, Kaniv, Korsun, Bila Tserkva, Pereiaslav, and Cherkasy. Each regiment was then divided into companies (*сотні*), which were based in the smaller towns on regimental territory. Cossack officers had both civil and military authority over all the Cossacks in their area, while the hetman and his staff, elected by the Cossacks but confirmed by the king, had overall command. Thus, despite close Polish supervision, the registered Cossacks perfected their self-administration. The Zaporozhian Sich, in contrast, the bastion of the most militant and "illegal" Cossacks, although formally subject to the hetman, maintained *de facto* autonomy.

In agreeing to the expanded register, the Poles hoped that "their" registered Cossacks would control the others. When the ostensibly pro-Polish Hrytsko Chorny was elected hetman in 1629, it seemed that the Commonwealth had found the perfect man for the job. But, in his efforts to please the government authorities, Chorny infuriated many Cossacks, and, early in 1630, a group of Zaporozhians abducted him to the Sich where he was tried and executed. The Zaporozhians and nonregistered Cossacks now elected the daring Taras Fedorovych (nicknamed Triasylo) as their new hetman, and he led a strong force of rebels back into the settled areas. Again Koniecpolski, leading an army of royal troops and registered Cossacks, had a difficult campaign to fight. This time he was less successful than he had been before, and, in a treaty concluded at Pereiaslav in August 1630, the rebellious Cossacks won surprisingly liberal terms: the register was enlarged to 8000; Triasylo went unpunished; and the rebels were granted amnesty. The nagging problem of the thousands of non-registered Cossacks that lay at the root of the rebellion remained unresolved, however.

In 1635, the Commonwealth applied a new method for dealing with unruly Cossacks. On the Dnieper just above the Sich, the Poles constructed the impressive fortress of Kodak in the hope of checking the Zaporozhians. But, within months of its completion, Ivan Sulyma and a detachment of Cossacks destroyed the fortress and wiped out its garrison. Unfortunately for Sulyma, a group of registered Cossacks, anxious to curry favor with the Poles, handed him over to the royal authorities to be executed. Soon afterwards, in August 1637, yet another rebellious Cossack army, led by Pavlo Pavliuk, took the field against the Poles. As Pavliuk's forces moved northward from the Sich, peasants from the Right Bank and, for the first time, from the newly colonized Left Bank joined the rebellion in large numbers. But once again the rebels were outmaneuvered on the open field and, in December 1637, were decisively beaten by the Polish army at Kumeiki near Chyhyryn. This loss, however, did not signal the end of the rebellion, for it continued on the Left Bank un-

der the leadership of Iakiv Ostrianyn and Dmytro Hunia until it was finally quashed in the summer of 1638.

Victorious and eager to avenge themselves, the Poles were not in a mood to bargain. Instead, they dictated their terms. According to the *ordynacija* or regulations formulated by the parliament, the register was lowered to 6000 and even the registered Cossacks lost their right of self-administration. The office of hetman was abolished and replaced by that of a Polish commissioner appointed by the king. Cossack colonels and adjutants were to be selected from among the *szlachta*. Strict limits were established on areas where Cossacks were allowed to settle and anyone trying to make his way to the Sich without permission was to receive the death sentence. The many thousands of Cossacks who were not included in the register were classified as serfs. In addition to these draconian measures, the magnates, especially Jeremi Wiśniowiecki (Vyshnevetsky), the Polonized grandnephew of the famous Baida Vyshnevetsky and the largest landowner in Ukraine, instituted a reign of terror in the land, indiscriminately torturing and killing anyone even vaguely suspected of disobedience. Cynical Polish noblemen rationalized this brutal approach in the following way, at the same time offering a revealing insight into the *szlachta* perception of the Cossack problem: "The Cossacks are the fingernails of our body politic. They tend to grow too long, and need frequent clipping." And, indeed, during the ensuing decade – a period of unprecedented calm and stability often referred to by Polish historians as the Golden Peace – it seemed that in dealing with the Cossacks, the repressive approach was the most effective.

It is useful to examine the reasons why the five major Cossack/peasant revolts that occurred in Ukraine during the forty-five-year period under consideration were all unsuccessful. To a great extent, failures resulted from the fact that, despite the leading role played by the Cossacks in the revolts, many of the rebels were peasants and, therefore, the uprisings possessed some of the weaknesses inherent in all peasant revolts. Usually spontaneous, these revolts lacked detailed planning and long-term goals. Besides redressing their immediate grievances, both Cossacks and peasants had little idea of what they wanted to achieve. Although endowed with a surfeit of bravery, the rebels were often limited and erratic in their military undertakings because peasants were reluctant to fight beyond the bounds of their own localities or during the planting and harvesting seasons. Socioeconomic differences among the Cossacks added to the problem of inconsistency of action: the rank and file, with little to lose, usually rushed into rebellion, while the well-established *starshyna* generally opted for negotiations, compromise, or capitulation. Yet, despite the setbacks, each successive uprising reflected the growing strength and military sophistication of the rebels. Their numbers grew, their tactics improved, and Cossack identification with the plight of the peasantry and the defense of Orthodoxy deepened. The decade-

long Golden Peace merely masked a problem that was waiting to explode again.

Ecclesiastical and Cultural Developments

As in the case of politics and socioeconomic development, the focus of ecclesiastical and cultural activity in Ukraine also shifted eastward in the early 17th century. In Galicia and Volhynia, the proximity to Poland, where the Catholic Counter-Reformation reached a high point, exposed the Ukrainian Orthodox centers there to constant and debilitating pressure. Thus, in 1608, when that stalwart of Orthodoxy Prince Konstantyn Konstantynovych Ostrozky died, his granddaughter, Anna Khodkevych, a recent and fanatical convert to Catholicism, turned the Ostrih Academy over to the Jesuits. The brotherhood school in Lviv also began to falter because the Ukrainian burghers, increasingly discriminated against by the Catholic church and the Polish government, could no longer support it. Meanwhile, the booming eastern provinces were far removed from Catholic Polish pressure. And Kiev, which was steadily growing more populous and more wealthy, again emerged as the center of Ukrainian Orthodoxy.

Initially, the ancient Kievan Cave Monastery served as the catalyst for the Orthodox revival in the newly colonized lands. During the 1620s, its archimandrite, Elisei Pletenetsky, a Galician nobleman by background, assembled a group of learned churchmen, mostly Galicians, such as Iob Boretsky, Kassian Sakovych, Zakhariah Kopystensky, Pamba Berynda, and Lavrentii Zyzanii. After purchasing a printing press, Pletenetsky launched an ambitious publishing program that, within the span of fifteen years, produced about thirty books, mostly of a religious nature. This output was more than the combined total of all the other printing presses in Ukraine. In 1615, inspired by this example and financed from a bequest from Ielyzaveta Hulevych, a wealthy Orthodox noblewoman, the noblemen, burghers, and clerics of Kiev organized a brotherhood associated with the Bohoivlensky Church.

A unique feature of this brotherhood was its close links with the Zaporozhians. Apparently, these contacts were first established through the intermediary of Iosyf Kurtsevych, the abbot of the monastery in Terekhtemyriv, the site of the Cossacks' hospital, arsenal, and treasury. By 1610, these ties had become so strong that the Cossacks publicly announced: "We stand behind Orthodoxy and the clergy that has not betrayed our ancient faith." Under Sahaidachny's leadership, the Zaporozhians joined the Kiev brotherhood in 1620 and, more important, provided the support needed to consecrate a new Orthodox hierarchy. The latter event was of the utmost importance. Since the Union of Brest in 1596, at which time most of their bishops had joined the Union, the Orthodox had been leaderless. When Teofan, the patri-

arch of Jerusalem, ordained several bishops and consecrated Iob Boretsky as metropolitan of Kiev, the Orthodox of Ukraine once again had an ecclesiastical leadership. As expected, Catholics and Greek Catholics were infuriated by what they considered to be an illegal act. But, because the Polish government needed Cossack support for the wars, it did not intervene and the legitimacy of the new Orthodox hierarchy was eventually recognized.

The events of 1620 greatly exacerbated the Orthodox/Greek Catholic feud. In addition to differences over dogma and ecclesiastical procedures, the two competitors became embroiled in a bitter conflict over church properties. So violent were the quarrels over who owned the churches, monasteries, and lands attached to them that hundreds of clerics on both sides died in confrontations that often took the form of pitched battles. The most famous of these incidents was the assassination in 1623 of Iosafat Kuntsevych, the Greek Catholic archbishop of Polotsk, by an Orthodox mob that had become enraged by the archbishop's attempt to confiscate two Orthodox churches. Distressed by the fratricidal struggle, several Orthodox churchmen – most notably the archbishop of Polotsk, Meletii Smotrytsky, and the rector of the Kiev brotherhood school, Kassian Sakovych – attempted to arrange a compromise that would “bring together one Rus’ with the other.” Although several common councils were held in Kiev and Lviv in 1628, these attempts at reconciliation failed.

Frustrated and disillusioned with their recalcitrant Orthodox compatriots, both Smotrytsky and Sakovych eventually went over to the Greek Catholics. Meanwhile, other Orthodox churchmen turned to the tsar of Muscovy for aid. This was not an unprecedented step. Already in the 1570s, the Lviv brotherhood had been in touch with the Orthodox Muscovites, and early in the 17th century numerous Ukrainian Orthodox monks had moved to Muscovy to escape Catholic persecution. In 1625, Metropolitan Boretsky, convinced that the future of the Orthodox under Polish rule was hopeless, petitioned the tsar to accept Ukraine under his overlordship. Moscow, however, was cautious. Fearful of irritating the Poles, it sent funds and words of encouragement to the Ukrainians, but remained noncommittal about standing up for their rights.

So unsettling and destructive was the struggle between the Orthodox and Greek Catholics that finally, in 1632, the Polish government stepped in and imposed a compromise. The Orthodox hierarchy was officially recognized and the disputed properties were divided between the two churches. One of the main architects of this compromise was the newly elected metropolitan of Kiev, Petro Mohyla, often regarded as the leading Orthodox churchman of 17th-century Ukraine. A scion of a leading Moldavian family, Mohyla, like many of his countrymen, received his early education in the Lviv brotherhood school. After completing his university studies in Paris, he returned to Ukraine to pursue an ecclesiastical career. In 1627, at the age of 31, he became

the archimandrite of the Kievan Cave Monastery and five years later was appointed metropolitan of Kiev.

Taking advantage of the relative calm that ensued after 1632, Mohyla introduced badly needed reforms in the Orthodox church and its cultural and educational institutions. With the aid of a group of learned theologians and writers, sometimes called the Mohyla Atheneum, he systematized Orthodox dogma and ritual and prepared the first Orthodox catechism for publication. By uniting a school he founded in the Kievan Cave Monastery with the Kiev brotherhood school, Mohyla laid the foundation for the so-called Mohyla Collegium, which was destined to become one of the most important Orthodox educational institutions among the Slavs. Using Jesuit schools as a model, the college emphasized the study of the classics and especially of Latin and Polish. Greek, once favored by the brotherhood schools, was deemphasized. The curriculum of Mohyla's school reflected his general tendency to combine Orthodox-Slavic traditions with those of the Latin-Catholic West. However, in their enthusiasm for the cultural products of the West, Mohyla and his circle sometimes failed to realize that although Latin philosophical tracts, histories of the world, or poetic works were appealing to a small, sophisticated group of scholastics, they did not have a broader appeal for Ukrainian society as a whole. Therefore, a cultural gap gradually developed between the elitist Kiev scholastics and the rest of Ukrainian society.

Ukrainian high culture, that is, the culture of the small, educated elite, continued to be dominated by religious themes. Most books, such as Zahkariah Kopestensky's *Palinodiia* or Kyril Stavrovetsky's "Mirror of Theology," sought to demonstrate the correctness of Orthodox views and to prove that Orthodoxy represented the one and only way for man to attain salvation. Even the "best-sellers" of the times, which were destined for popular consumption, dealt with such topics as the lives of saints or catalogued miracles that occurred in the Kievan Cave Monastery. For the most part, these works were written in the difficult Church Slavonic that still served as the literary language of Ukraine. However, there were signs that the simpler Ukrainian vernacular was also gaining ground among the literati. Pamba Berynda, for example, spent thirty years compiling his *Lexikon*, which provided Ukrainian equivalents for Church Slavonic words. Another innovation in Ukrainian literature during this period was the growing popularity of poetry, especially panegyrics. Among the best-known example of this genre was Sakovych's presentation on the occasion of Sahaidachny's funeral and the poems dedicated to Mohyla by the students of his college. Dramas, often composed and staged in schools, were also popular and frequently incorporated elements of folklore. As the schools produced hundreds of students and over twenty printing presses appeared in Ukraine, literacy became relatively widespread in the land.

While religious issues and Western models stimulated the Kievan cultural elite, the culture of the masses continued to reflect the impact of the agricultural life-style and conditions of the frontier. Folk songs, many of ancient origin, expressed the peasants' concern with nature, their work in the fields and their personal relationships. They praised such simple virtues as hard work and honesty, while deriding immoral or selfish behavior. The epitome of folk creativity during the 16th and 17th centuries was the *duma* or folk epic. *Dumy* were recited to the accompaniment of the *bandura* (a lutelike instrument) by wandering minstrels during market days or religious holidays, in Cossack encampments or village squares. By and large, these lengthy versified tales concentrated on the two major conflicts confronting Ukrainian frontier society: the struggle with the Turks and Tatars and the resistance against the oppression of the *szlachta*.



Frontiersmen were not uncommon in early modern Eastern Europe. Cossackdom developed along the Don River in Russia as well as along the Dnieper in Ukraine. Roughly analogous social groups evolved in Hungary, Croatia, and other Christian land on the unsettled frontier with the Ottoman Empire. But nowhere did these "peripheral" classes come to play such a central role in their respective societies as did the Cossacks in Ukraine. Of course, one could expect frontiersmen to be all-important in a frontier society like Ukraine. And the Polonization of the Ukrainian elite drew the Ukrainian Cossacks into a role that was fulfilled elsewhere by the nobles. Consequently, the Cossack became a key figure not only in the history of Ukraine but also in Ukrainian national consciousness. Today the image of the Cossack is to Ukrainians what the cowboy is to Americans or the Viking to the Scandinavians.

The growing importance of the Cossacks was accompanied by renewed vigor in Ukrainian religious and cultural life. Once more Kiev became a major center of Orthodoxy. For the city's religious/cultural elite, much of which was associated with the Mohyla Academy, it was, as Ihor Ševčenko put it, "a time when spirits were uplifted and minds were expanding." On the one hand, the Orthodox revival helped to stem the tide of Polonization. On the other hand, it infused Ukrainian culture with the Western elements that slowed Russification in a later period. Thus, after coming perilously close to assimilation into the dominant Polish culture and society, in the early modern period Ukrainians produced more of the distinctive features that distinguished them from their neighbors.

The Great Revolt

The great uprising of 1648 was one of the most cataclysmic events in Ukrainian history. Indeed, it is difficult to find a similar revolt of such magnitude, intensity, and impact in the early modern history of all of Europe. But why Ukraine? What features did it possess that predisposed it to such a tremendous outburst? The recently colonized eastern provinces of Kiev, Bratslav, and Chernihiv that provided the stage for the revolt were unique not only in the Commonwealth, but in all of Europe. They were the domain, on the one hand, of some of Europe's most powerful and wealthy magnates and, on the other, of a population that was willing and able to fight effectively for its interests. In other words, in newly colonized Ukraine, some of Europe's most exploitive feudal lords confronted some of its most defiant masses.

This situation was largely an outgrowth of Ukraine's role as a frontier. It was the presence of the "wild field" that had made the emergence of Cossackdom possible and had allowed the magnates to amass their huge landholdings. The weak, decentralized nature of the Polish government added to the explosiveness of the situation. Unable to protect the frontier itself, it granted vast stretches of territory to the magnates on the condition that they protect them. For the same reason, it acquiesced, albeit in a limited way, in the growth of Cossackdom. However, as both these phenomena mushroomed, the royal government lost control and did nothing to resolve the threatening contradictions that were evolving on the Ukrainian frontier.



On the Eve of the Great Revolt

Although the magnates did much to encourage the colonization or, as 19th-century Polish historians liked to put it, the "civilization" of Ukraine, they were also responsible for the instability and tension that had become endemic

in that society. Acting on the principle that might makes right, they regularly resorted to violence in conflicts with their underlings and with each other. These self-centered, anarchistic tendencies and the weakness of royal authority on the frontier led Poles to observe ruefully that "Ukraine is ruled by the lack of rule." The magnates' penchant for coercion was most evident in their treatment of the peasantry. After attracting the peasants to their vast latifundia by means of the obligation-free *slobody*, they clamped down on them as soon as the time limits on them expired. Their demands grew increasingly greater, especially after what seemed to be the final defeat of the Cossack and peasant rebels in 1638.

Formerly unburdened peasants were suddenly forced to provide their lords with three or four days of labor a week. In addition, they had to furnish noblemen landowners with assorted personal services, while at the same time continuing to pay a tax on their homes and farm animals to the royal treasury. To make matters worse, the magnates in Ukraine frequently resorted to the hated practice of *arenda*, or leasing, in which the leaseholder (*arendar*) agreed that anything he could squeeze out of the peasants above a set figure was his profit. Forbidden to own land, but allowed to lease it, Jews often became leaseholders. Thus, on the vast lands of the Ostrorog family, for example, there were about 4000 Jewish leaseholders, and in 1616, over half the crown lands in Ukraine were leased out to Jewish entrepreneurs. Because they had to make good their investment in a relatively short period of two or three years, they exploited the properties and peasants mercilessly, without regard for future consequences. It was not uncommon for a leaseholder to demand six or seven days of labor from the peasants and, with the help of the magnates' minions, to drive them into the fields.

Another form of leaseholding was the leasing out of an estate's monopoly on the production and sale of alcohol and tobacco to a leaseholder, who then charged the peasants whatever price he wished for these prized commodities. Needless to say, such practices did not make Jews popular with the Ukrainian population. As the English historian Norman Davies puts it, Jewish participation in the oppressive practices of the noble/Jewish alliance "provided the most important single cause of the terrible retribution which would descend on them on several occasions in the future."¹

Among other segments of Ukrainian frontier society, discontent also ran high. The specific nature of the frontier made many of the small, recently established towns vulnerable to magnate pressure. In Kiev and Bratslav provinces, about 50% of the population lived in towns, proportionately three times more than anywhere else in the Commonwealth. Although they possessed town status and, in some cases, even Magdeburg Law, most of the new towns were little more than forts built to protect their inhabitants (many of whom were engaged in agriculture) from the Tatars. This semi-agrarian nature of the towns, plus the fact that many were on magnate-owned ter-

ritory, provided the oligarchs with a pretext to question the status of the burghers and to demand from them onerous obligations and dues. Even the petty nobility, most of whom were still Orthodox, were liable to mistreatment and expropriation by the magnates. But as frustration and resentment mounted, the usual outlets that had helped alleviate them were being shut off. With the progress of colonization, it became more and more difficult for peasants to find empty lands to run away to, while, after 1638, Cossackdom, which had traditionally attracted the most discontented elements, was severely repressed.

Unlike peasants in other parts of the Commonwealth and even in Western Ukraine, the inhabitants of the Dnieper basin were not only unaccustomed to the burdens of serfdom, but also unwilling to accept them. Regardless of what the magnates contended, many considered themselves to be freemen. Among the Cossacks, for example, it was an article of faith, if not of fact, that in 1582 King Batory had granted Cossacks privileges that made them almost equal to noblemen. For their part, the numerous townsmen argued that, by definition, they were self-governing and free. And after decades on a *sloboda*, it was difficult to convince a frontier peasant that he was not his own master. It was irrelevant how legally justifiable these perceptions were. The point was that most of the inhabitants of the frontier believed that freeman status was rightfully theirs and this belief greatly increased their willingness to resist the *Liakhy*, as they called the Poles. The Polish Catholic persecution of Orthodoxy only heightened Ukrainian recalcitrance.

Combined with the frontier-Ukrainians' inclination to revolt was their general aptitude for fighting. Mass uprisings in early modern Europe were usually characterized by a lack of organization and military expertise. In this regard, the Ukrainian case was different. Foreign travelers frequently noted that life on the dangerous frontier forced even common peasants and townsmen to become proficient in the use of firearms. Moreover, the Cossacks provided the discontented with a core of well-organized, highly skilled fighting men. Even their recent defeats provided Ukrainian Cossacks with experience in fighting regular armies and pitched battles. Thus, as the magnates intensified their exploitation, Ukrainian frontier society increased its willingness and ability to withstand it. Only a spark was needed to set off a vast conflagration.

Bohdan Khmelnytsky

Rarely do individuals dominate epochal developments as completely as did Bohdan Khmelnytsky the great Ukrainian uprising of 1648. Because of his great personal impact on events that changed the course of Ukrainian and East European history, scholars consider him to be Ukraine's greatest military and political leader. Yet, his debut as a major actor on the historical stage occurred late in life and was almost accidental. Born in about 1595, Khmel-

nytsky was the son of a minor Ukrainian nobleman named Mykhailo, who was the servitor of a Polish magnate. For his services, Mykhailo obtained an estate in Subotiv; he sent Bohdan to a Jesuit school in Iaroslav where he received a good education by the standards of the time, mastering Polish and Latin. In 1620, tragedy struck. In the great Turkish victory over the Poles at Cecora, the elder Khmelnytsky was killed and Bohdan was taken captive. After two years in captivity, Khmelnytsky returned to Subotiv, entered the ranks of the registered Cossacks, married, and concentrated on expanding his estate. Cautious and well established, he avoided involvement in the uprisings of 1625 and 1638. His good standing with the government led to a brief tenure in 1638 as chancellor of the Zaporozhian Host and to his participation in a Cossack delegation to the Polish king, Władysław IV, in 1646. By the time Khmelnytsky, now a captain in the Chyhyryn Cossack regiment, had reached the age of 50, it appeared that the bulk of a moderately successful career was already behind him.

But a typical case of magnate acquisitiveness and arrogance completely altered Khmelnytsky's life and with it the course of his country's history. In 1646, during his absence from Subotiv, Daniel Czaplinski, a Polish nobleman backed by the local magnates, laid claim to Khmelnytsky's estate, raided it, killed his youngest son, and abducted the woman that the recently widowed Cossack captain intended to marry. When numerous appeals to the court brought no satisfaction, the infuriated Khmelnytsky resolved to lead a revolt against the Poles. This rapid transformation from a respected member of the establishment to a raging rebel was not completely out of character. In later years, observers often remarked about the Cossack leader's split personality. Swarthy and stocky, "Khmel," as he was popularly called, was usually reserved, unpretentious, courteous, and even somewhat phlegmatic. But he could unexpectedly explode in a torrent of passion, energy, and charismatic appeal. In such moments, his speech became mesmerizing, his ideas at once fascinating and frightening, and his will to have his way unshakable.

The mesmerizing influence Khmelnytsky could exert on the masses became evident when, hounded by the Poles who had caught wind of his plans, he fled to the Zaporozhian Sich with a handful of followers in January 1648. In short order he persuaded the Zaporozhians to support him, expelled the Polish garrison from the Sich, and managed to have himself elected hetman. At first, the gathering rebellion had all the features of the previous, unsuccessful uprisings: a vengeful Cossack officer, wronged by magnates, making his way to the Sich and persuading the Zaporozhians to stand up for their (and his) rights. But, in Khmelnytsky's case, his exceptional talents as an organizer, military leader, and politician made the crucial difference.

For more than a year before arriving at the Sich, he had plotted an uprising

and established a network of supporters. Realizing that the Cossacks' great weakness in fighting the Poles was a lack of cavalry, Khmelnytsky found an audacious solution to the problem: he approached the Crimean Tatars, the Cossacks' traditional enemies, with a proposal for an alliance against the Poles. His timing was perfect. At precisely the time that his envoys arrived in Crimea, the khan's relations with the Poles had become extremely strained and he sent Tuhai-Bey, a noted commander, with 4000 Tatars to the Cossacks' aid. In the spring of 1648, forewarned of Khmelnytsky's actions, the Poles moved their army to the south to nip the rebellion in the bud.

The early victories In mid April 1648, at Zhovti Vody, not far from the Sich, a confident Polish advance guard of 6000 men confronted the combined Cossack/Tatar force of about 9000. On 6 May, after prolonged fighting, which resulted in the desertion to the rebels of several thousand registered Cossacks who had been sent to aid the Poles, the Polish advance guard was annihilated. Astounded by the news and convinced by a Cossack prisoner (planted expressly for the purpose) that the rebels greatly outnumbered them, Marcin Kalinowski and Mikołaj Potocki, the two commanders of the 20,000-man main army, abandoned their strong positions near Korsun and retreated through difficult terrain, led by a guide who was a secret agent of the hetman. Not far from Korsun, on 26 May, the Poles were ambushed by the Cossacks (whose forces had grown to 15,000 not including Tatar cavalry) and, once again, were completely crushed. Both Polish commanders, 80 important noblemen, 127 officers, 8520 soldiers, and forty-one cannons fell into Khmelnytsky's hands. To add to the Poles' misfortunes, only six days before the Battle of Korsun, King Władysław IV died. Just as hordes of rebels were gathering in the south, the Commonwealth had suddenly lost its king, its commanders, and its army.

While Khmelnytsky's victories stunned the Poles, they electrified the Ukrainians. First on the Right Bank and then on the Left Bank, Cossacks, peasants, and burghers rushed to form regiments and either joined the hetman or, led by numerous local leaders, staged mini-rebellions of their own. Many peasants and Cossacks used the opportunity to vent pent-up hatred against their oppressors. The so-called "Eye Witness Chronicle" paints a frightful picture of these events: "Wherever they found the *szlachta*, royal officials or Jews, they killed them all, sparing neither women nor children. They pillaged the estates of the Jews and nobles, burned [Catholic] churches and killed their priests, leaving nothing whole. It was a rare individual in those days who had not soaked his hands in blood and participated in the pillage."² Within a few months, almost all Polish nobles, officials, and priests had been wiped out or driven from Ukraine. Jewish losses were especially heavy because they were the most numerous and accessible representatives of the *szlachta* regime. Between 1648 and 1656, tens of thousands of Jews – given the lack of reliable

data, it is impossible to establish more accurate figures – were killed by the rebels, and to this day the Khmelnytsky uprising is considered by Jews to be one of the most traumatic events in their history.³

Whenever they had the opportunity, the Polish magnates and nobles responded to the massacres in kind. The most notorious practitioner of *szlachta* terror tactics was Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, the wealthiest magnate in the land. When the rebellion caught him on his estates on the Left Bank, Wiśniowiecki mustered his well-trained private army of 6000, gathered together as many of the terrified nobles, priests, and Jews as he could, and set off on an epic, roundabout retreat to the west. Everywhere his forces moved, they tortured and killed Cossacks, peasants, women, and children, leaving behind them a grisly trail of corpses. Although Wiśniowiecki's feats won him adulation in Poland, they so infuriated the Ukrainian masses that they would brook no talk of compromise and vowed to fight him to the death.

During the summer, Khmelnytsky, who was based near Bila Tserkva, concentrated on molding his numerous followers into a disciplined, well-organized army. Its core was made up of sixteen regiments of battle-tested Cossacks led by such proven and respected colonels as Filon Dzhalali, Maksym Nestorenko, and Ivan Hyria. However, experienced and gifted Ukrainian noblemen like Danylo Nechai, Ivan Bohun, and Mykhailo Krychevsky, and townsmen like Martyn Nebaba and Vasyl Zolotarenko, were also awarded colonels' maces. A large auxiliary force of light cavalry was led by Wiśniowiecki's bitter rival, Maksym Kryvonis, one of the most popular rebel leaders. As volunteers continued to pour in, new units were created; by the end of the summer, the Ukrainian forces numbered between 80,000 and 100,000. Of these, only about 40,000 were regular Cossack troops.

The Poles also made good use of their time. In order to hold off the rebels, they engaged Khmelnytsky in desultory negotiations and, at the same time, mobilized 32,000 noblemen and 8000 German mercenaries. As their forces, outfitted in the glittering finery that the *szlachta* so loved, gathered near Lviv, an observer remarked that the Poles were going to war not with iron but with gold and silver. The new Polish army was led by three magnates: the indolent, luxury-loving Dominik Zasławski, the erudite Latinist Mikołaj Ostroróg, and the 19-year-old Aleksander Koniecpolski. Khmelnytsky sarcastically referred to them as *peryna* (the feather-down bed), *latyna* (the Latinist), and *dytyna* (the child). On 23 September, the opposing armies met at Pyliavtsi. During the battle, the Polish commanders lost their nerve and fled and, as the news spread, the rest of the army followed suit. Within hours, this once splendid force was completely decimated by the Cossacks and their Tatar allies.

After Pyliavtsi, there was nothing to stand in Khmelnytsky's way. As he advanced into the West Ukrainian lands of Volhynia and Galicia, the peasants welcomed him and joined the uprising. Even in southern Poland, downtrodden peasants were heard to utter, "If God were only so kind as to give us a

Khmelnysky also then we would teach those nobles what they get for oppressing peasants.”⁴ In early October, the Cossack/peasant armies besieged Lviv and were about to take it when a huge ransom and Khmelnysky’s reluctance to destroy the beautiful city saved it. A month later, while preparing to besiege the Polish fortress at Zamość, news arrived that the man Khmelnysky preferred to see on the throne, Jan Casimir, had been elected king and had offered the hetman an armistice.

It has always been a puzzle to historians why Khmelnysky, who at this point was in a position to destroy the Commonwealth, chose to accept the offer and to return to the Dnieper. Apparently, he still hoped to modify the political system of the Commonwealth so that it would accommodate the Cossacks. Moreover, famine and plague were taking their toll of his troops and of the Ukrainian populace as a whole. And the hetman’s Tatar allies were eager to return home. Under these conditions, it seems that he did not wish to conduct a winter campaign. Early in January 1649, at the head of a triumphant army, Khmelnysky returned to Kiev, where he received a tumultuous welcome and was hailed by the assembled Orthodox hierarchy as “the second Moses” who had “liberated his people from Polish slavery.”

Rising complications Even after Khmelnysky’s dramatic victories, the relationship between Poles and Ukrainians remained unclarified. While the hetman had not yet decided to break off all ties with the Commonwealth, he knew that his followers were determined not to return to the pre-1648 conditions. For their part, the Poles were willing to make minor concessions to the Cossacks, but they still insisted that Ukraine return to *szlachta* rule. The impasse produced a recurrent pattern: year after year, the two sides would go to war, but because they were unable to defeat each other decisively, they would conclude their exhausting campaigns with negotiated, unsatisfying settlements, after which they would return home to prepare militarily and diplomatically for yet another war.

In the spring of 1649, it was the Poles who went on the offensive. As their main force of 25,000, led by King Jan Casimir himself, advanced from Volhynia, another force of 15,000, commanded by the notorious Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, moved through Galicia. Responding with his usual deceptiveness and speed, Khmelnysky and his Tatar ally, Khan Islam Girei, blockaded Wiśniowiecki in the Zbarazh fortress with a force of 80,000. When the Polish king hastened to Wiśniowiecki’s aid, Khmelnysky, in a surprise maneuver, attacked and surrounded Jan Casimir’s army near Zboriv. But, just at the point when the Poles were about to go down in defeat at both Zbarazh and Zboriv, the Tatar khan betrayed the hetman. Bribed by the Poles and worried by the growing strength of the Ukrainians, Islam Girei withdrew his forces and demanded that Khmelnysky reach a negotiated settlement with the Polish king. Under the circumstances, the hetman had no choice but to comply.



Map 12 The campaigns of Khmelnytsky

On 18 August 1649, the Zboriv treaty was concluded. It set the register at 40,000, banned the Polish army and Jews from the provinces of Kiev, Bratslav, and Chernihiv where only the Cossack *starshyna* and Orthodox noblemen were allowed to hold public office, and promised the Orthodox metropolitan a seat in the Polish senate. Although amnesty was granted to all who had participated in the uprising, most peasants were required to return to servitude. Polish noblemen, in contrast, were allowed to reclaim their estates. Only Tatar pressure had forced Khmelnytsky to sign this unfavorable agreement, which caused great discontent throughout Ukraine. But as the Poles believed that they had given up too much and the Cossacks were convinced that they had received too little, the treaty was never fully implemented.

The Zboriv agreement highlighted an internal and an external problem that Khmelnytsky would have to face. The fact that peasant interests had practically been ignored at Zboriv was no oversight. Although Khmelnytsky, most of his commanders, and many of the registered Cossacks wished to improve the lot of the peasants, they had no intention of liquidating serfdom altogether. For the Cossack elite, Khmelnytsky included, such an act would have meant undermining the socioeconomic system in which it had a considerable stake. Thus, already at Zboriv, a conflict of interests arose between the Cossack *starshyna* elite and the *chern*, or rank and file. In time, it would prove to be the fatal weakness of the Cossack order that was emerging in Ukraine.

The relationship with the Tatars was the other major problem. Realizing their importance in his recent victories and in the continuing conflict with the Poles, Khmelnytsky wished to maintain his alliance with them at all costs. Among the Ukrainian masses, however, the alliance was most unpopular because, as a price for Tatar aid, the hetman had to allow his allies to take *iasyr*, or captives. While Khmelnytsky hoped to satisfy the Tatars with Polish prisoners, the Crimeans often took what was at hand and this meant that many thousands of Ukrainian peasants were driven off into slavery. Moreover, Tatar policy was not to let any Christian power grow too strong. Therefore, although they backed Khmelnytsky against the Poles, the Tatars would not allow him to defeat them completely. Having used Khmelnytsky to weaken Poland, the Crimean khan also planned to utilize the Ukrainian Cossacks in similar fashion against Moscow. But because Khmelnytsky had great hopes of obtaining aid from the Muscovites, he diverted the Crimean plans to launch a joint Tatar/Cossack attack against Moscow by proposing instead a joint campaign in 1650 against Moldavia, which was rich, more vulnerable, and more accessible. For the next few years, Khmelnytsky became intensely involved in Moldavian affairs and even hoped to make his son, Tymish, ruler of the land, thereby drawing it into close alliance with Ukraine. However, in 1653, Tymish's death during the defense of Suceava brought the costly Moldavian venture to an unsuccessful end.

Meanwhile, in 1651, another round in the Polish-Ukrainian War had begun.

Again it was the Poles, led by Jan Casimir, who went on the offensive and again it was in Volhynia, near the town of Berestechko, that the two armies clashed. By the standards of the time, the size of the opposing forces was huge: the Polish army numbered around 150,000 men, including 20,000 experienced German mercenaries, while the Ukrainians mustered over 100,000 men plus about 50,000 Tatar cavalry. On 18 June, an almost two week-long battle began that ended in a crushing defeat for Khmelnytsky's forces. A deciding factor in the defeat was the actions of the Tatars who, at a crucial juncture, withdrew from the battle. To make matters worse, when Khmelnytsky entreated them to return to the fighting, they abducted him. He was released only after the battle. Under difficult circumstances, the Cossacks, ably led by Filon Dzhali, managed to extricate some of the Ukrainian forces from Polish encirclement, but at a decisive moment panic broke out and a part of the Cossack army, numbering an estimated 30,000 men, perished under the Polish onslaught. The massive battle was also costly to the victorious Poles and near Bila Tserkva they initiated negotiations.

As might be expected, the Bila Tserkva agreement, signed on 28 September 1651, was much less generous to the Cossacks than the Zboriv treaty had been. The Cossack register was reduced to 20,000; the hetman's authority was limited only to Kiev province; and he was forbidden to maintain foreign contacts, especially with the Tatars. This time, with the Cossacks in disarray and Khmelnytsky unprepared to offer resistance, it appeared that the conditions of the treaty would be implemented. Backed by Polish troops, the Polish nobility began to return to Ukraine. Except for the relative few who were included in the register, most of the peasants and Cossacks again faced serfdom. In order to avoid their inevitable fate, thousands fled across the border into Muscovite territory, where they were well received and allowed to establish the Cossack system, thus laying the foundation for what came to be called Sloboda Ukraine, with its locus in the present-day Kharkiv region.

Despite appearances to the contrary, Khmelnytsky had no intention of accepting these humiliating conditions and, in April 1652, a secret meeting of the major Cossack leaders was held at his residence in Chyhyryn where it was decided to assemble new forces and to renew hostilities against the Poles. Within weeks, Khmelnytsky's forces attacked a 30,000-man Polish army stationed at Batih on the border of Podilia and Moldavia, and on 1 May completely demolished it. As revenge for the defeat at Berestechko, the Cossacks killed all their Polish prisoners.

As news of the victory spread, uprisings against the Polish nobility again flared up and Cossack troops occupied much of the territory they had held before Berestechko. However, by now it was evident that the years of tremendous bloodletting and destruction were taking their toll. Both Poles and Ukrainians were less eager to fight and campaigns dragged on inconclusively

as the two sides circled each other like exhausted boxers, unable to administer the decisive blow.

Foreign relations Khmelnytsky realized that if his uprising was to succeed, it needed foreign support. Therefore, he turned his attention more and more to foreign relations. He scored his first diplomatic victory by drawing the Crimean Tatars into an alliance with the Cossacks. But the Tatar alliance proved to be unreliable and transitory. Moreover, it did not resolve Khmelnytsky's key problem of defining Ukraine's relationship to the Commonwealth. At first, the hetman was not ready for a complete break. His goal in dealing with the Commonwealth, ably represented by the leading Orthodox magnate Adam Kysil, had been to obtain autonomy for the Cossacks in Ukraine by making it a separate and equal component of the Commonwealth. But the stubborn refusal of the *szlachta* to accept their former subordinates as political equals precluded the possibility of his ever achieving that goal.

To the modern mind, which views national sovereignty as a natural condition (although the concept did not gain wide currency until after the French Revolution of 1789), the question arises of why Khmelnytsky did not declare independence for Ukraine. During the uprising there were, in fact, rumors to the effect that he wished to reestablish the "old Rus' principality," and even that he planned to form a separate "Cossack principality." Although such ideas may have been considered, it would have been impossible under the circumstances to realize them. As the interminable wars demonstrated, the Cossacks, although able to administer severe defeats to the Poles, were incapable of permanently preventing the *szlachta* from launching repeated efforts to regain Ukraine. To assure themselves of a lasting victory over the Poles, Khmelnytsky needed the continuing and reliable support of a major foreign power. The usual price of such aid was acceptance of the overlordship of the ruler who provided it. In the view of the masses, the main thrust of the uprising was to redress socioeconomic ills, and to many in Ukraine the question of whether these problems were to be resolved under their own or under foreign rule was of secondary importance. Finally, in 17th-century Eastern Europe, sovereignty rested not in the people, but in the person of a legitimate (that is, generally recognized) monarch. Because Khmelnytsky, despite his popularity and power, did not possess such legitimacy, he had to find for Ukraine an overlord who did. At issue was not self-rule for Ukraine, for Ukrainians already had gained it. Their goal was to find a monarch who could provide their newly formed autonomous society with legitimacy and protection.

In Khmelnytsky's opinion, a good candidate for the role of Ukraine's patron and protector in the international arena was the Ottoman sultan. He was powerful enough to discourage Poles from attacking Ukraine and distant enough not to interfere overly much in its internal affairs. Thus, in 1651, after an exchange of embassies, the Ottoman Porte formally accepted the het-

man and the Zaporozhian Host as its vassals on the similar loose conditions of overlordship that obtained with regard to Crimea, Moldavia, and Wallachia. However, widespread animosity in Ukraine toward an “infidel” overlord, and internal changes in the Ottoman Porte, prevented this arrangement from ever taking effect.

A much more popular candidate for the role of Ukraine’s protector was the Orthodox tsar of Moscow. From the start of the uprising, Khmelnytsky had entreated the tsar, in the name of their shared Orthodox faith, to come to his aid. But Moscow’s response had been extremely cautious. Badly mauled in a recent war with Poland, the Muscovites preferred to wait for the Cossacks and Poles to exhaust each other and then to take appropriate action. However, by 1653, with the Ukrainians threatening to choose the Ottoman option, the Muscovites could not put off a decision any longer. Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich called a general assembly, which decided that, “for the sake of the Orthodox Faith and God’s Holy Church, the *Gosudar* [monarch] should accept them under His High Hand.” In reaching their decision, the Muscovites also expected to regain some of the lands they had lost to Poland, to utilize Ukraine as a buffer zone against the Ottomans, and, in general, to expand their influence.

The Pereiaslav Agreement

In the final days of 1653, a Muscovite embassy, led by the boyar Vasili Buturlin, met with the hetman, colonels, and general staff of the Zaporozhian Host in the town of Pereiaslav, near Kiev. On 18 January 1654, Khmelnytsky called a meeting of the Cossack elite and the final decision was taken to accept the tsar’s overlordship of Ukraine. On that day, drummers summoned the populace to the town square where the hetman spoke about Ukraine’s need for an overlord, presented the four potential candidates for such a position – the Polish king, the Tatar khan, the Ottoman sultan, and the Muscovite tsar – and declared that the Orthodox tsar was best suited for the role. Pleased that the choice had fallen on an Orthodox ruler, the crowd responded favorably to the hetman’s speech. Buturlin, Khmelnytsky, and the assembled Cossack dignitaries then proceeded to the town church to seal the decision with a mutual oath.

At this point, an unexpected development created a tense impasse. Under the influence of Polish practice, Khmelnytsky expected the oath to be bilateral, with the Ukrainians swearing loyalty to the tsar and the latter promising to protect them from the Poles and to respect their rights and privileges. But Buturlin refused to swear in the name of his monarch, arguing that the tsar, unlike the Polish king, was an absolute ruler and that it was below his dignity to take an oath to his subjects. Upset by Buturlin’s refusal, Khmelnytsky stalked out of the church and threatened to cancel the entire agreement. Nonetheless, Buturlin steadfastly held his ground. Finally, Khmelnytsky and

his colleagues, fearful of losing the tsar's aid because of what appeared to be a mere formality, glumly agreed to take a unilateral oath of loyalty to the tsar.

Shortly thereafter, Muscovite officials were sent to 117 Ukrainian towns, and 127,000 people took a similar oath of loyalty to Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich and his successors. The significance of the dramatic incident at the Pereiaslav church was that it highlighted the different political values and assumptions with which both parties had entered into the agreement. Yet, these differences notwithstanding, the Pereiaslav Agreement was concluded and it marked a turning point in the history of Ukraine, Russia, and all of Eastern Europe. Previously isolated and backward, Muscovy now took a giant step toward becoming a great power. And, for better or for worse, the fate of Ukraine became inextricably linked with that of Russia.

Because of the conflicts that later developed between Russians and Ukrainians, the interpretation of the treaty that brought their two countries together has been the subject of frequent debate among scholars. The issue is complicated by the fact that the original documents were lost and only inaccurate copies and translations have survived. Moreover, the Russian archivist Petr Shafranov has argued that even these copies were falsified by the tsar's scribes. In general, five major interpretations of the Pereiaslav Agreement have been proposed. (1) According to the Russian legal historian Vasiliï Sergeevich (d. 1910), the 1654 agreement was a *personal union* between Muscovy and Ukraine, whereby the two parties shared the same sovereign but retained separate governments. (2) Another specialist in Russian law, Nikolai Diakonov (d. 1919), argued that by accepting "personal subjugation" to the tsar, the Ukrainians unconditionally agreed to the incorporation of their land into the Muscovite state and the agreement was therefore a *real union*. (3) Historians, such as the Russian Venedikt Miakotin and the Ukrainian Mykhailo Hrushevsky, believed that the Pereiaslav Agreement was a form of *vassalage* in which the more powerful party (the tsar) agreed to protect the weaker party (the Ukrainians) on condition that he not interfere in their internal affairs and that the Ukrainians provide him with tribute, military assistance, as well as other considerations. (4) Another Ukrainian historian, Viacheslav Lypynsky, proposed that the 1654 agreement was nothing more than a temporary *military alliance* between Moscow and the Ukrainians.⁵

The fifth interpretation of the Pereiaslav Agreement belongs in a class by itself. In 1954, during the elaborate celebrations of the 300th anniversary of the Ukrainian-Russian union in the USSR, it was announced – not by scholars but by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union – that the Pereiaslav Agreement was the natural culmination of the age-old desire of Ukrainians and Russians to be united and that the union of the two peoples had been the prime goal of the 1648 uprising. In the official Soviet interpretation, Khmelnytsky's greatness lay in the fact that he understood that "The salvation of the Ukrainian people lay only in unity with the great Russian people."⁶ Although at least

one Soviet scholar – Mykhailo Braichevsky – challenged this view in the mid 1960s (with catastrophic consequences for his career), adherence to the Party's interpretation of the agreement remains mandatory for all Soviet scholars.⁷

The Final Phase of the Great Revolt

One of the immediate results of the Pereiaslav Agreement was a radical restructuring of the political alliances in the region. In response to Khmelnytsky's treaty with the tsar, the Poles and Tatars combined forces and a new, expanded phase of the conflict ensued. In the spring of 1654, a Muscovite army, led by the tsar and aided by a Cossack force of 20,000 men, commanded by Vasyl Zolotareno, pushed into Belorussia and wrested much of it from the Poles. Later, in the fall, the fighting shifted to southwestern Ukraine. The Tatars, now unrestrained by any commitments to the Ukrainians, devastated the region mercilessly. A report by the Polish commander graphically describes the scene: "I estimate that the number of infants alone who were found dead along the roads and in the castles reached 10,000. I ordered them to be buried in the fields and one grave alone contained over 270 bodies ... All the infants were less than a year old since the older ones were driven off into captivity. The surviving peasants wander about in groups, bewailing their misfortune."⁸

During the campaign, an incident occurred that typified the intensity of the conflict. In October 1654, an overwhelming Polish force besieged the Cossack fortress at Busha, killed most of its garrison, and was about to overrun the castle. At this point, the wife of the slain Cossack commander, Zavisny, refused to surrender and instead, ignited the munitions dump, blowing up herself, the surviving garrison, and many of the attacking Poles. As a result of the savage campaigns that were fought on the Right Bank, the most highly developed of the recently colonized lands were left despoiled and practically depopulated.

Misfortune and devastation enveloped Poland as well. In the summer of 1655, the Swedes, taking advantage of the Poles' involvement in the south and east, attacked from the north and occupied much of Poland. Overrun by the Swedes, Russians, and Ukrainians, the Commonwealth seemed to be on the verge of collapse. Polish historians often refer to this period as "the Deluge." For Khmelnytsky, however, the Swedish involvement in the conflict was a godsend, for it provided him with new diplomatic and military options.

Swedish and Ukrainian diplomats were soon discussing combined operations against the Poles, with the Swedes promising Khmelnytsky help in the creation of a Kievan principality. Sensing the imminent demise of the Commonwealth, another neighbor, Gyorgy II Rakoczi of Transylvania, also approached the hetman in 1656. Together they launched a combined operation into Poland with the goal of partitioning the land. With such powerful new backing, Khmelnytsky took a more uncompromising stand toward the

Poles and insisted that all Ukrainian lands, including Galicia and Volhynia, come under his rule.

The Swedes, however, created complications for the hetman as well as opportunities. Eager to settle old scores, they also initiated a war with the Muscovites. With his overlord fighting his new ally, Khmelnytsky found himself in an awkward position. Tensions between Ukrainians and Muscovites began to surface. The stationing of a Muscovite garrison in Kiev and other Ukrainian towns and the interference of tsarist officials in Ukrainian financial affairs alarmed the Cossacks. Bitterness between the allies also grew in recently conquered Belorussia, where the population frequently preferred the Cossack system of government to the Muscovite and swore allegiance to the hetman instead of to the tsar. The competition of "one Rus' [Ukrainians] with another [Muscovites] for control of a third [Belorussians]" nearly led to open warfare and it was some time before the Muscovites could force the Cossacks from the land.

But what infuriated the Ukrainian leadership most was the tsar's conclusion of a peace with Poland in Vilnius in 1656 without consulting it, indeed, without even allowing a specially dispatched Ukrainian delegation to get near the negotiations. Fearful that the Muscovites might sacrifice Ukrainian interests, the hetman and Cossack colonels openly accused the tsar of treason for breaking the terms of the Pereiaslav Agreement. In an irate letter to the tsar, Khmelnytsky compared Muscovite behavior to that of the Swedes: "The Swedes are an honest people; when they pledge friendship and alliance, they honor their word. However, the Tsar, in establishing an armistice with the Poles and in wishing to return us into their hands, has behaved most heartlessly with us."⁹ On the heels of this disillusionment came others. The combined Ukrainian-Transylvanian expedition into Poland failed disastrously and disgruntled Cossacks, blaming the hetman for the setback, revolted. Crushed by the news and already ailing, Khmelnytsky died in Chyhyryn on 4 September 1657.



It is difficult to overestimate Khmelnytsky's impact on the course of Ukrainian history. Ukrainian, Polish, and Russian historians have compared his achievements to those of such giants of 17th-century history as Cromwell of England or Wallenstein of Bohemia. Studies of the hetman and his age frequently stress his ability to create so much from so little. Where a Ukrainian political entity had long since ceased to exist, he established a new one; out of hordes of unruly peasants and Cossacks he molded powerful, well-organized armies; from among a people abandoned by their traditional elite he found and united around him new, dynamic leaders. Most important, in a society bereft of self-confidence and a clear sense of identity, he instilled

pride in itself and a will to defend its interests. An example of the momentous change in Ukrainian attitudes brought about by Khmelnytsky is provided by the words of a simple Cossack captain addressed to a high Polish official: "In regard to Your Grace's recent letter stating that we, the common people, should not dare to address such high officials as a [Polish] *wojewoda*, it should be known that we are now, thanks be to God, no longer common people but knights of the Zaporozhian Host ... and, may God grant Lord Bohdan Khmelnytsky health, we are now ruled by our colonels and not by your *wojewody*, by our captains and not by your *starosty*, and by our *otamany* and not by your judges."¹⁰

Clearly, Khmelnytsky had his share of setbacks, mistakes, and miscalculations. There was Berestechko, the disastrous Moldavian venture, the failure of the combined Cossack/Transylvanian campaign into Poland, and, finally, the inability to ensure that both Ukraine's enemies and allies would recognize its integrity. For these failings historians and writers have been quick to take Khmelnytsky to task. In the mid 19th century, Mykola Kostomarov, the father of modern Ukrainian historiography, praised Khmelnytsky for establishing the link with Russia and chided him for his "underhanded" dealings with the Ottomans.

In contrast, Ukraine's greatest poet, Taras Shevchenko, was critical of the hetman for bringing Ukraine into the Russian sphere. Even more extreme in his criticism was Panteleimon Kulish, another leading 19th-century Ukrainian intellectual, who blamed Khmelnytsky for initiating an era of death, destruction, anarchy, and cultural regression in Ukraine. In the 20th century, Hrushevsky raised doubts about Khmelnytsky's consciousness of well-defined goals and argued that it was events that controlled the hetman rather than vice versa. Yet the majority of prominent Ukrainian historians, led by Viacheslav Lypynsky, concluded that the hetman consciously and systematically attempted to build the basis for Ukrainian statehood and that without his efforts, the modern rebirth of a Ukrainian state would have been impossible. Soviet historians are unanimous in their praise of Khmelnytsky, but for different reasons. They emphasize his role in leading an uprising of the oppressed masses and especially his unification (or rather "reunification," as they put it) of Ukraine with Muscovy.

But the fine points of scholarly evaluation have had little effect on the Ukrainian people's instinctive, unbounded admiration for "Batko (father) Bohdan." For the vast majority of Ukrainians, both in his day and up to the present, Khmelnytsky has towered as the great liberator, as the heroic figure who by the force of his personality and intellect roused Ukrainians from a centuries-long miasma of passivity and hopelessness and propelled them toward national and socioeconomic emancipation.

The Ruin

The great Ukrainian uprising of 1648 succeeded where most mass uprisings in early modern Europe had failed: it expelled a magnate-elite from most of the land and replaced it with a regime based on a native model. But while this epochal event brought about a great many changes, much remained unresolved. Sharp differences arose among the Cossack leaders as to whether Ukraine should remain under Moscow or seek the overlordship of another neighboring power. Pressing socioeconomic issues also came to the fore. Was Ukraine to become a unique society of free Cossack farmers, as envisaged by the peasants and Cossack rank and file, or would the Cossack *starshyna* simply take the place of the expelled nobles and thereby cause the destabilized social order to revert to the elite-dominated models typical for the period?

In the decades following Khmelnytsky's death, bitter conflicts over these issues pitted Ukrainians against each other. Civil strife, foreign intervention, and further devastation of an already despoiled land ensued. In Ukrainian historiography, the tragic spectacle of Ukrainians dissipating the tremendous energy and resolve that had been generated by the 1648 uprising in seemingly endless, self-destructive conflicts is often called the Ruin (*Ruina*). Twenty years after Khmelnytsky's death, the successes that had been scored against a common foe were cancelled out by the woeful inability of Ukrainians to unite towards a common goal. Their failure resulted in the loss of the promising opportunity created by the Khmelnytsky uprising to attain political self-determination.



The New Order

At the time of Khmelnytsky's death, the Cossacks controlled most of the Right and Left banks of the Dnieper (the former provinces of Kiev, Bratslav, and

Chernihiv), while the West Ukrainian lands of Galicia and Volhynia remained in Polish hands. About 1.2 to 1.5 million people lived in the roughly 250,000 sq. km that were held by the Cossacks. In the first decades after the uprising, about 50% of the land – formerly owned by the Polish crown – became the property of the Zaporozhian Host, which, in return for taxes, allocated most of this land to self-governing peasant villages. The income from a part of these lands, the so-called rank lands, was used to remunerate high-ranking Cossack officers while they were in office. About 33% of the land was owned by Cossacks and Ukrainian nobles. And 17% was confirmed as the property of the Orthodox church.

The Cossacks quickly established their own form of government. The territory they controlled was divided into sixteen military districts (*polky*), corresponding to the regiments in the Cossack army. Colonels who commanded the 3000–5000-man regiments in wartime served as their district's chief administrative and judicial officials in times of peace. Each regimental district was further divided into company subdistricts (*sotni*) in which captains performed military and administrative functions. Both regiments and companies had their headquarters in the major towns in their area and carried their names. At the bottom of this administrative structure were the individual small towns and villages in which Cossack *otamany* held sway. Initially, Cossack officers were elected by the Cossacks in their units. However, in time, these posts became hereditary.

At the pinnacle of this military/administrative system stood the hetman. Theoretically, he was subject to the will of the general Cossack council (*rada*) that had elected him. But the rapid growth in the number of Cossacks during the 1648–56 period made these general councils impractical and, consequently, hetmans called them infrequently. Khmelnytsky and his successors preferred to consult the increasingly influential council of officers instead. In practice, however, hetmans were free to exercise their wide prerogatives and they were considered to be the *de facto* rulers of Ukraine. In addition to commanding the Cossack army, they conducted foreign affairs, supervised the administrative and judicial systems, and controlled the Cossack treasury and land fund. The fund consisted of the estates that had been confiscated from the Poles and the hetman's right to distribute them as he saw fit contributed greatly to his political leverage. In addition to the confiscated lands, which were used mainly to support Cossack officeholders, the treasury had an annual income of about 1,000,000 gold pieces from taxation, duties, and tariffs.

Assisting the hetman in the fulfillment of his functions was the *heneralna starshyna*, a combination of general staff and council of ministers. Its most important member was the secretary-general (*heneralny pysar*) or chancellor, who established the agenda of the council meetings, formulated key government documents, and supervised the day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs.

Another key member of the staff was the quartermaster-general (*heneralny obozny*), a position analogous to minister of war, who was responsible for the military preparedness of 40,000–60,000 Cossack regulars, including artillery. The judge-general (*heneralny suddia*) looked after judicial affairs and the two adjutants-general (*heneralny osavul*) as well as the standardbearer-general (*heneralny khorunzhy*) were used for special assignments by the hetman. Although Khmelnytsky and his successors always considered Kiev to be Ukraine's major city, the headquarters of the administration was based in the small Cossack town of Chyhyryn and, in the 18th century, in Baturyn and Hlukhiv. The formal designation for the Cossack order and the lands it controlled was the Zaporozhian Host. The Muscovites, however, usually referred to it as Malorossiiia (Little Russia), although the Poles continued to call it Ukraine.

Changes in the Social System

From the very beginning of the great revolt, two different conceptions of organizing society vied with each other in Ukraine – the egalitarian and the elitist. Initially, the former predominated. Cossacks replaced the Polish nobility as the dominant class and access to Cossack status was, by tradition, open to all. During the tumultuous period of 1648–56, thousands of burghers, peasants, and Orthodox nobles joined Cossack ranks. According to an incomplete Muscovite census taken in 1654, roughly half the adult male population were Cossacks. If a peasant or burgher could render military service at his own cost, it was not difficult to register in a Cossack regiment and claim such privileges as the right to own land, to be excused from taxes, and to vote for or be elected as a Cossack officer. By the same token, a Cossack who could no longer afford to outfit himself for war or who lost his desire for fighting usually reverted back to peasant or burgher status. In any case, in the immediate aftermath of 1648, social boundaries were extremely fluid and a spirit of egalitarianism, unmatched in Eastern Europe, held sway.

For the peasantry who survived the brutal warfare, the uprising brought considerable improvements. With the expulsion of the *szlachta*, peasants regained their personal freedom, the right to dispose of their property and to move when and where they wished. The more ambitious or wealthier among them now had the possibility of raising their status by enrolling as Cossacks. But the peasants were not freed of all their obligations. Because they occupied lands that the Cossacks had confiscated from the Poles, they were required to render to the Zaporozhian Host certain services and payments. Foremost among them was the obligation to provide Cossack armies with transportation, quarters, and provisions. Although the peasants continued to pay taxes in cash and in kind, the hated labor obligations they had owed to their Polish lords were liquidated.

Yet, in time, these gains were threatened by the elitist tendencies of the *starshyna*. Many members of the Cossack leadership, notably the sizable contingent of Ukrainian nobles and registered Cossack officers who had joined Khmelnytsky, had been a part (albeit a minor one) of the pre-1648 establishment. In their view, the uprising was not meant to create an egalitarian society – something unheard of in Eastern Europe – but rather to expel the hated Polish *szlachta* and magnates, replacing them with a native Ukrainian elite. For them a society without an elite was unthinkable and unworkable. Because of their relatively high status, extensive military and political experience, and wealth, many Ukrainian nobles and well-established Cossacks attained positions of leadership in the Zaporozhian Host. And they used these positions to retain and expand their status and wealth. Moreover, they frequently transformed the public lands attached to their offices into their own private property.

Since hetmans frequently emerged from the officer class and greatly relied on its support, they not only failed to prevent its aggrandizement of power and wealth but actively encouraged it with generous land grants and appointments. As this new elite evolved, it pushed for sharper delineation of the classes in Ukrainian society and it increased its demands upon the peasants and common Cossacks. The latter responded to these attempts to deprive them of the gains of 1648 with growing animosity and even open resistance. As a result, a bitter and eventually fatal cleavage developed in the newly formed society of Cossack Ukraine.

The towns had played a relatively minor role in the uprising and their status remained essentially unchanged. About a dozen large towns, such as Kiev, Starodub, Chernihiv, and Poltava, continued to govern themselves through elected magistrates according to Magdeburg Law. Their contacts with the Cossack-dominated countryside were relatively limited. But the vast majority of small, semiagrarian towns came to be dominated by the local *starshyna* who, like the Polish nobles before it, placed its interests above those of the townsmen. An indication of the stranglehold that the *starshyna* and common Cossacks exerted on the towns was the fact that townsmen had to pay tariffs on the items they traded, while Cossacks, often their commercial rivals, did not. Dissatisfied with Cossack rule, many towns looked to the tsar for support and backed him in his conflicts with the *starshyna*.

In contrast to the townsmen, the Orthodox clergy enjoyed friendly relations with the Cossack leadership because the clergy embodied the Orthodoxy that the Cossacks had fought to preserve. Khmelnytsky and his successors were quick to confirm the rights of monasteries to their lands and to the labor obligations of the peasants living on them. In fact, the hetman's generous support of the church was a major factor in undermining the gains of the peasantry. Pleased with the status quo, the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox church was opposed to closer ties with Moscow, especially in ecclesiastical affairs, for

they considered it to be inferior to them in religious and cultural matters. It would take many years of cajolement and gift-giving before the tsars would be able to bring about a change in the attitudes of Ukrainian churchmen.

The Onset of the Ruin

Khmelnysky's death came at an inopportune time for Ukrainians. Their half-formed society, surrounded by predatory neighbors and rent by internal problems, had willingly accepted his leadership. But Khmelnysky's successors, lacking his popularity and prestige, found it much more difficult to mobilize widespread support. Even the immediate issue of succession was not resolved without complications. Hoping to establish a dynasty of Ukrainian Cossack rulers, Khmelnysky had arranged to have his young son, Iurii, succeed him. Yet, it soon became evident to the 16-year-old boy himself (as well as to the *starshyna*) that he was not prepared to rule at such a crucial juncture. Therefore, in 1657, Ivan Vyhovsky, one of Khmelnysky's most experienced associates and the secretary-general of the Zaporozhian Host, was chosen hetman.

Vyhovsky and the Polish orientation Vyhovsky was one of the most sophisticated and best educated of the Cossack leaders. An Orthodox nobleman from the Kiev region, he had studied at the renowned Mohyla Academy. In 1648, while serving with the Poles, he was captured at Zhovti Vody. Because he valued his education and experience, Khmelnysky freed him and Vyhovsky joined the Cossacks, quickly rising to the post of secretary-general. The new hetman soon made it clear that he favored the rising *starshyna*. In international relations, his preference was for the establishment of an independent Ukrainian principality. However, Ukraine was too weak for such a step, so Vyhovsky concentrated on finding a counterbalance to Muscovite influence in Ukraine. For this reason, he established closer ties with Poland.

While the Cossack and ecclesiastical elite supported the rapprochement with Poland, the masses, suspicious of any understanding between the Cossack officers and the Polish nobles, vehemently opposed it. Vociferous in their opposition were the Zaporozhians, led by Iakiv Barabash, and the Cossacks of the Poltava regiment whose colonel, Martyn Pushkar, had ambitions to become hetman. Just as Vyhovsky hoped to play the Poles off against the tsar, the Muscovites, quick to observe the social tensions in Ukrainian society, began to agitate the masses against the hetman. By the end of 1657, a large part of the Cossack rank and file rebelled against the hetman and in June 1658, two opposing Cossack armies clashed in a bloody battle near Poltava. Vyhovsky emerged victorious, Pushkar was killed on the battlefield along with 15,000 rebels, while Barabash was later captured and executed. For the hetman, it

was a Pyrrhic victory, for the total cost of the fratricidal struggle was about 50,000 Ukrainian lives.

Realizing that a break with Moscow was imminent, Vyhovsky intensified his efforts to come to an understanding with the Poles. He was greatly aided by Iurii Nemyrych, a Ukrainian aristocrat who had studied extensively in Europe and who espoused the idea of a sovereign Ukrainian principality whose independence would be internationally guaranteed like that of Holland or Switzerland. But Vyhovsky, who was preparing for war with Moscow, was in no position to insist that the Poles recognize Ukrainian independence. In 1658, after lengthy debate, the Ukrainian and Polish envoys reached a compromise solution known as the Treaty of Hadiach.

According to the treaty, the provinces of Kiev, Bratslav, and Chernihiv were to form a Ukrainian principality that, together with Poland and Lithuania, would become the third and equal partner in the Commonwealth. The Ukrainian principality was to have far-ranging autonomy. Its hetman was to be responsible only to the king and it was to have its own army, courts, treasury, and mint. Unless invited by the hetman, Polish troops were to be banned from the territory of the principality. Traditional Cossack rights were to be guaranteed and every year, upon the recommendation of the hetman, 100 Cossacks were to be accepted into the nobility. The Poles made important concessions on the religious issue: the Union of Brest was to be abolished in the principality and the Orthodox were to enjoy equality with the Catholics of the Commonwealth. Finally, two universities were projected for Ukraine and as many schools and printing presses "as were necessary" were to be established.

Although the Treaty of Hadiach has fascinated historians because of its potential impact on Ukrainian, Polish, and Russian history, its actual influence was minimal because it was never implemented. Even before it was signed, a huge Muscovite army of about 150,000, led by the able Prince Aleksei Trubetskoi, invaded Ukraine. Hastily gathering his forces and uniting with his Polish and Tatar allies, Vyhovsky moved to the northeast to confront the invaders. On 29 June 1658, near Konotop, the tsar's troops suffered one of their worst defeats ever. The Russian historian Sergei Soloviev described its effect: "The flower of Muscovite cavalry perished in one day and never again would a Muscovite tsar be able to field such a splendid army. Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich came out to the people dressed in mourning and panic seized Moscow ... There were rumors that the Tsar intended to leave for Iaroslav beyond the Volga and that Vyhovsky was expected to advance directly on Moscow."¹ The hetman, however, could not take advantage of his brilliant victory. The Muscovite garrisons in Ukraine continued to hold out; a Zaporozhian attack on the Crimea forced Vyhovsky's Tatar allies to return home; and unrest broke out again in the Poltava region. The final blow came when several pro-Moscow colonels accused the hetman of "selling Ukraine out to

the Poles" and rebelled. Unable to continue the war against Moscow, Vy-hovsky resigned in October 1659 and retired to Poland.

Moscow now had the advantage. Hoping that the appeal of his father's name might help to heal internal rifts, the *starshyna* elected the 18-year-old Iurii Khmelnytsky as hetman. Trubetskoi, who returned to Ukraine with another army, insisted that the young hetman come to his camp to renegotiate his father's treaty with the tsar. By acquiescing, Iurii committed the first in a long series of political blunders. Terrorized by the powerful Russian army, bullied by Trubetskoi, and confused by a falsified copy of the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654, Iurii concluded another, extremely disadvantageous version of it in 1659. The Pereiaslav pact of 1659 stipulated that Russian garrisons were to be stationed not only in Kiev, but in all major towns. Furthermore, the Cossacks were forbidden to conduct wars or to maintain foreign relations without the tsar's permission. Nor were hetmans, *heneralna starshyna*, or colonels to be elected without Moscow's approval. Thus, young Iurii agreed to concessions that five years earlier would not even have been considered by his father. For Moscow, the pact was a major step forward in its systematic attempts to tighten its hold on Ukraine.

In 1660, war broke out again between Moscow and Poland for control of Ukraine. When the tsar's troops found themselves surrounded by the Poles near Chudniv in Volhynia, Iurii and the *starshyna* did not hurry to their aid. Instead, the young hetman began negotiations with the Poles and when the Russians suffered yet another disastrous defeat at Chudniv, Iurii agreed to return Ukraine to the Commonwealth. At this point, the already chaotic political situation became even more confused. On the Right Bank, where Khmelnytsky's army and the Poles were ensconced, the hetman's authority remained intact; on the Left Bank, however, where the tsar was still in control, the Cossacks deposed Khmelnytsky and elected Iakiv Somko as acting hetman. Rent by social strife and political factionalism, occupied by Polish and Russian armies, Cossack Ukraine was divided into two parts, each with its own hetman. The period of Ruin was now in full swing.

Depressed by what was in effect a partition of Ukraine and frustrated by his inability to deal with a rapidly deteriorating situation, in January 1663 a morose Iurii Khmelnytsky surrendered his hetman's mace and entered a monastery. The authority of his successor, Pavlo Teteria, was limited to Right-Bank Ukraine. A strong adherent of a pro-Polish policy, the noble-born and well-educated Teteria had served in a number of important positions under the elder Khmelnytsky, but unlike his predecessors, he was unwilling to forge an independent Cossack policy and generally followed the Polish line. Together with the Poles, he invaded the Left Bank and urged King Jan Casimir to push the offensive as far as Moscow. When the attack failed, Teteria and the Poles returned to the Right Bank to crush the numerous insurrections that had broken out against the *szlachta*.

Eager to take vengeance on the region that had fostered the 1648 uprising, the Poles burned, pillaged, and murdered at every turn. Stefan Czarnecki, the Polish commander, even had Bohdan Khmelnytsky's grave opened and its contents scattered to the winds. Because he was perceived as a possible rival, Vyhovsky was arrested at Teteria's behest and executed by the Poles. As for Iurii Khmelnytsky, he was dragged from his monk's cell and interned in a Polish prison. As a result of his generally detested behavior and his Polish allies, the Right-Bank hetman lost the little support that he had had among the Cossacks, resigned his office, and fled to Poland. It had now become abundantly clear that no matter what rationale was used to justify it, cooperation between Ukrainians (especially of the lower classes) and Poles had, practically speaking, become impossible.

The Ottoman alternative: Doroshenko and Iurii Khmelnytsky With Ukraine divided into Polish and Russian spheres of influence and with rival hetmans who were little more than puppets of their foreign overlords, responsible Cossack leaders lamented the condition of "our poor mother, Ukraine," and called for a return to past glories. Among the most forceful proponents of Cossack regeneration was Petro Doroshenko, the 38-year-old colonel of Cherkasy and the next hetman of Right-Bank Ukraine.

Doroshenko's qualifications for leadership were impressive. The son of a Cossack colonel and grandson of a hetman, he had worked closely with Khmelnytsky and had held high office under Vyhovsky and Teteria. After removing two dangerous rivals, Vasyl Drozdenko and Stefan Opara, Doroshenko became hetman in 1666. He stressed that his goal was to unite Right- and Left-Bank Ukraine under his aegis. To solidify his position, the new hetman instituted several well-considered reforms on the advice of his friend, Metropolitan Iosyp Tukalsky. In the hope of winning over the masses, Doroshenko frequently called general councils where he listened to the opinions of the rank and file. To free himself from overdependence on the *starshyna*, the hetman organized a corps of 20,000 mercenaries (*serdiuky*) who took orders only from him. However, Doroshenko's most far-reaching innovations were in the realm of foreign relations.

At the outset of his hetmancy, Doroshenko, like all Right-Bank hetmans, followed a pro-Polish line. But this policy changed radically when, in January 1667, the Poles and Russians signed the Treaty of Andrusovo. Although most of the treaty dealt with Ukraine, neither power bothered to consult the Ukrainians. In essence, the treaty partitioned Cossack Ukraine: the Poles recognized the tsar's sovereignty over the Left Bank, and the Muscovites agreed to a Polish return to the Right Bank. On the sensitive issue of Kiev, it was decided that the city would remain under Muscovite rule for two more years, after which it would revert to the Poles. Moscow never honored this point, however, retaining Kiev permanently. The vast, virtually empty lands of the

Zaporozhians were placed under dual Polish/Muscovite overlordship and were to act as a buffer against Tatar attacks.

While both parties were pleased with the arrangement, for the Ukrainians it was an unmitigated political disaster. If it had been difficult enough for Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky, who ruled all of Dnieper Ukraine, to exercise freedom of action; for their successors, who controlled only half the land and were much more constrained by their foreign overlords, an independent policy was impossible. As the *szlachta* returned to the Right Bank and the realization spread that Moscow had grossly violated its 1654 commitment to keep the Poles out, disillusionment and anger enveloped both sides of the Dnieper.

Doroshenko, who reportedly suffered a seizure upon receiving news of the treaty, abandoned his pro-Polish stance and decided to revive one of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's old projects by approaching the Ottoman Porte for aid. His timing was fortunate, for the Porte had been planning a number of ambitious, expansionary wars and it willingly provided the hetman with support. In fall 1667, a combined Ottoman/Cossack army attacked the Polish forces in Galicia and compelled King Jan Casimir to grant Doroshenko wide-ranging autonomy on the Right Bank. But this success was not enough for the hetman. To rid himself completely of the Poles, he placed Ukraine under relatively loose Ottoman overlordship. With the Right Bank seemingly secured, Doroshenko led his army over to the Left Bank and deposed his rival hetman, Ivan Briukhovetsky. In 1668, Doroshenko reached the height of his power when, backed by the Ottomans and with both Right- and Left-Bank Ukraine under his control, he proclaimed himself hetman of all Ukraine.

His success was fleeting, however. Alarmed by his growing power, the hetman's numerous enemies set about to undermine it. To this end, they utilized the old tactic of supporting rivals for the hetmancy. The Tatars attempted to replace Doroshenko with a certain Sukhovienko. No sooner had Doroshenko disposed of this rival than the Poles produced a more dangerous one in the person of Mykhailo Khanenko with whom they invaded the Right Bank. Turning to meet the invaders, Doroshenko appointed Damian Mnohohrishny acting hetman of the Left Bank. Now Moscow, seeing its chance, moved into the Left Bank and forced Mnohohrishny to renounce his ties with Doroshenko and recognize the overlordship of the tsar.

As his base of power crumbled, Doroshenko even found it difficult to maintain his hold on the Right Bank. In 1672, with a force of 12,000, he was forced to aid an Ottoman army of 100,000, which pushed the Poles out of Podilia and turned it into an Ottoman province. With his unpopularity growing because of his contacts with the hated infidels, the hetman's support was dwindling fast. The final blow came in 1675-76 when the Muscovites, aided by Left-Bank Cossacks, engaged the Ottomans in a bloody contest for Chyhyryn fortress

and Doroshenko found himself supporting the “infidel” Ottomans against his Orthodox countrymen. Realizing that his position was untenable, he surrendered the regalia of his office to Ivan Samoilovych, the new hetman of the Left Bank. Treating him with relative leniency, the tsar ordered this “last of the true Cossacks” into exile near Moscow.

The Ottomans’ replacement for Doroshenko was a surprise. In 1677, hoping to take advantage of his famous name, they appointed Iurii Khmelnytsky hetman of the Right Bank. This enigmatic and probably unbalanced individual already had a chequered career behind him. After entering the monastery, he served as an abbot and was subsequently imprisoned for three years by the Poles. Upon his release, he participated in a campaign against the Tatars, was captured by them, and sent to Constantinople where he spent six more years in prison. Unexpectedly, the Ottomans dragged this tragic figure from his cell, thrust the hetman’s mace in his hands, and, to add a measure of dignity to their uninspiring puppet, grandiloquently styled him “Prince of Sarmatia and Ukraine, Lord of the Zaporozhian Host.” But this title did him little good, for Iurii proved to be as inept in his second tenure as hetman as he had been in his first.

In 1677–78, he joined the Ottomans in several unsuccessful campaigns against his father’s old capital of Chyhyryn. Both Russians and Ottomans deployed huge armies in these battles: the sultan’s forces numbered about 200,000, while Moscow committed 70,000 Russians and about 50,000 Left-Bank Cossacks. After the inconclusive completion of the Chyhyryn campaigns, Iurii Khmelnytsky launched an incursion into the Left Bank, failing miserably. Unable to mobilize significant support, he controlled only a small stretch of territory in Podilia that the Ottomans had set aside for him. Even here his rule was so unstable and despotic that his Muslim patrons finally lost patience with him and, in 1681, executed him. That same year, Moscow concluded the Peace of Bakhchesarai with the Ottomans and Crimean Tatars, whereby they recognized each other’s possessions in Ukraine. Five years later, Russia signed a similar agreement with Poland. By 1686, all of Ukraine was divided up among the powers that surrounded it.

The Left Bank under Russian Overlordship

Because of its proximity to Russia, the Left Bank remained in Moscow’s orbit. During the chaotic 1660s and 1670s, the area experienced fewer of the recurrent Ottoman, Tatar, Polish, and Russians invasions that had plagued the once-flourishing Right Bank. Nonetheless, the Left Bank had its share of destructive upheavals, but these were brought on for the most part not by foreign invaders, but by conflicts between the *starshyna*-elite and the masses.

These internal struggles flared up soon after Iurii Khmelnytsky’s first hetmancy. Iakiv Somko, a member of a wealthy burgher family and an out-

spoken champion of *starshyna* elitism, united with his erstwhile rival, Vasyly Zolotarenko, the colonel of Nizhyn, to secure the latter's election as hetman and thereby assure the *starshyna* a predominant position. Opposing the Somko/Zolotarenko faction was Ivan Briukhovetsky, a man of lower-class origins whose demagogic skill assured him election as *otaman* of the Zaporozhians. As usual, Moscow played one faction off against the other. In this case, it favored Briukhovetsky, since it suspected the *starshyna* of pro-Polish tendencies. In June 1663, Muscovite officials approvingly looked on at the famous "Black Council" (*chorna rada*), a riotous elective assembly at which the Cossack masses (*chern*), reinforced by peasants and poor burghers, overwhelmed Somko's supporters by force and chose Briukhovetsky as hetman. Later, the new hetman had both Somko and Zolotarenko executed.

Ivan Briukhovetsky (1663–68) Completely dependent on Moscow's support, Briukhovetsky made one concession after another to the tsarist government. He willingly endorsed the disadvantageous 1659 Pereiaslav Treaty and, in addition, offered to pay for the maintenance of Russian garrisons in Ukraine. In 1665, expressing a desire to "gaze upon the shining eyes of the monarch," he became the first hetman to journey to Moscow, accompanied by an entourage of 500. Flattered by the honors showered upon him by the Muscovites (he was awarded the rank of Muscovite boyar and a high-born Russian wife was found for him), he responded by signing an agreement that limited Ukrainian rights even more. It placed almost all major Ukrainian towns under Russian control; allowed the tsar's officials to collect taxes from Ukrainian peasants and burghers; agreed to have a Russian appointed head of the Ukrainian Orthodox church; and stipulated that the tsar's representatives were henceforth to be present at the elections of hetmans, who were now required to appear in Moscow to obtain confirmation in office.

But before long, Briukhovetsky paid dearly for his neglect of Ukrainian interests. As Muscovite garrisons moved into Ukrainian towns, as the tsar's census-takers pried into the people's personal affairs, and as arrogant tax officials imposed exorbitant duties, dissatisfaction grew with the Muscovites and particularly with the hetman who had invited them into Ukraine. Even members of the ecclesiastical elite, some of whom had previously supported a pro-Moscow line, openly protested against more Muscovite influence. The event that most outraged Ukrainians and decisively turned them against Briukhovetsky and Moscow was the Treaty of Andrusovo of 1667.

Like their compatriots on the Right Bank, Left-Bank Ukrainians were shocked and outraged that the tsar, who had promised to defend all of Ukraine against the Poles, had surrendered half of it to the hated *szlachta*. In 1667–68, a series of uprisings spread throughout the Left Bank against the tsar's garrisons and their Ukrainian supporters. Realizing that he had pushed his pro-Moscow policies too far, Briukhovetsky issued manifestos in which

he decried “the ruin of our beloved motherland, Ukraine” and secretly established contacts with Doroshenko for the purpose of forming an anti-Russian alliance. But it was too late. As Doroshenko’s regiments crossed over to the Left Bank in spring 1668, an angry crowd of Briukhovetsky’s former Left-Bank supporters captured him and beat him to death.

Damian Mnohohrishny (1668–72) Polish pressure had forced Doroshenko to return to the Right Bank and to appoint Damian Mnohohrishny, the colonel of Chernihiv, as acting hetman on the Left Bank. A “simple and unlettered man,” Mnohohrishny had a reputation for eliciting obedience, if not loyalty, from his subordinates. As the fortunes of his nominal superior, Doroshenko, sank, Mnohohrishny abandoned all thoughts of breaking away from Moscow and instead renewed the pledge of loyalty to the tsar, for which he was rewarded by Moscow by being recognized as hetman of the Left Bank.

However, his rapprochement with Moscow did not mean that, like Briukhovetsky, he intended to be a puppet of the tsar. In characteristically blunt, forceful fashion, Mnohohrishny informed the Russians of Ukrainian grievances and insisted that Moscow’s garrisons be withdrawn from the Left Bank. In a compromise solution, the tsar agreed to limit the garrisons to five of the major towns. On the issue of Kiev, the hetman pointedly reminded Moscow that the tsar had not conquered Kiev or the other Ukrainian towns, but that the Zaporozhian Host had submitted them voluntarily under his rule, and that, therefore, the Russians had no right to surrender Kiev to the Poles. In general, Moscow’s responses were conciliatory. Apparently, its statesmen had concluded that they had been too hasty and aggressive during Briukhovetsky’s tenure in office. Moscow’s astute downplaying of its presence on the Left Bank compared favorably with the political ineptitude of the Poles, whose consistently repressive and vengeful measures on the Right Bank only served to increase the population’s hatred of them.

In addition to recouping some of the autonomy that had been lost by his predecessor, Mnohohrishny also made headway in restoring law and order to the Left Bank with the aid of his mercenaries (*kompaniitsi*). Yet the hetman’s fatal flaw was his lack of tact and inability to cooperate with the *starshyna*. This led the resentful Cossack elite to conspire against him by sending the tsar a series of denunciations implying that Mnohohrishny was secretly corresponding with Doroshenko and planning to accept Ottoman overlordship. Finally, in 1673, the *starshyna* attained its goal. Seeing that the obstreperous hetman was losing support, the tsar ordered Mnohohrishny to be arrested, tortured, and exiled to Siberia.

Ivan Samoilovych (1672–87) While the election of Briukhovetsky reflected the conflict between the *starshyna* and the masses, the deposition of Mnohohrishny highlighted the inherent tensions between the hetmans and the

starshyna. Fearful, in principle, of powerful hetmans, the *starshyna* delayed electing a successor to Mnohohrishny for about three months. Meanwhile, it turned to the tsar with proposals to limit the hetmans' prerogatives. For its part, Moscow was only too happy to comply. Thus, when Samoilovych was elected in 1672, it was on condition that he not discipline and judge members of the *starshyna* or carry on foreign relations without consulting the *starshyna* council. Moreover, the new hetman was forced to disband the hired troops that had traditionally been under his direct control. By imposing these conditions, the *starshyna* expanded its already considerable influence, but it did so at the cost of undermining the prerogatives of the hetmans and, with them, Ukrainian autonomy.

The son of a priest, Samoilovych had studied with notable success at the Kiev Academy before enrolling in the Zaporozhian Host. For most of his tenure as hetman, he was careful to maintain good relations with the *starshyna*. He awarded it generous land grants and created the so-called companions of the standard, a corps of junior officers – mostly sons of the *starshyna* – who became part of the hetman's entourage and were given special assignments in preparation for assuming the positions that would be vacated by their fathers. By creating this corps, Samoilovych encouraged the development of a hereditary elite on the Left Bank.

In external affairs, Samoilovych, like all hetmans, attempted to extend his authority over all of Ukraine. He tightened his control over the unruly Zaporozhians and in 1676 valiantly led his regiments, together with the Russian armies, in the fierce struggle to evict the Ottomans and Doroshenko from the Right Bank. Probably the most satisfying moment of Samoilovych's career occurred in 1676 when Doroshenko ceremoniously surrendered his mace to him, whereupon Samoilovych began to title himself "Hetman of both sides of the Dnieper." Within two years, however, the Ottomans forced Samoilovych and his Russian allies to abandon the Right Bank. As he evacuated the region, the hetman organized the exodus of the population of the Right Bank to the Left Bank. As a result, the original homeland of the Cossacks was left practically uninhabited.

Another setback to Samoilovych's hopes of reuniting Ukraine came in 1686 when the Poles and Russians signed the so-called Eternal Peace. It placed Kiev and the Zaporozhian lands permanently under the sovereignty of the tsar. Yet, despite the hetman's remonstrations to Moscow that the Right Bank and Eastern Galicia (the Rus' palatinate) belonged to the Ukrainians and should not be given up, these lands were left under Polish control. Disgruntled by Moscow's policies, Samoilovych was not very cooperative when the Russians launched a huge campaign against the Tatars in 1687. Although over 100,000 Russians and about 50,000 Cossacks participated in the offensive, poor preparedness and natural calamities turned the campaign into a costly fiasco. Accused by dissident members of the *starshyna* of illegally en-

riching himself and his family and blamed by Russian commanders for the failure of the campaign, Samoilyvych was removed from office in 1687 and exiled to Siberia.

Territorial Fragmentation

For the Ukrainians, a positive aspect of the pre-1648 Commonwealth was that it brought almost all of them together within a single political system. After Russia and Poland partitioned Ukraine during the Ruin, this would not occur again for almost 300 years. Not only would important differences evolve between the Ukrainians in the Russian and the Polish spheres, but distinctions among Ukrainians living within each of these spheres were already becoming marked. The lands inhabited by the roughly 4 million Ukrainians at the end of the 17th century had distinguishable political, administrative, and regional features.

RUSSIAN-CONTROLLED LANDS

The Left Bank (The Hetmanate) Prior to the 1648 uprising, the territory on the left bank of the Dnieper had only recently been colonized and was therefore sparsely populated. Yet, because an autonomous, well-ordered Cossack system of government survived there and because of the massive influx of Right-Bank refugees, the Left Bank (which had an approximate population of 1.2 million in 1700) became the center of Ukrainian political and cultural life. In Ukrainian historiography, this region is often referred to as the Hetmanate (*Hetmanshchyna*). Because of its importance, it will be discussed in greater detail in a separate section.

The Zaporozhian lands As the Cossack system of government spread over much of Ukraine and the hetmans established their authority in the main population centers, the Zaporozhian Sich, once the center of Cossack life, lost its prominence. In the late 17th century, it no longer stood in the forefront of all-Ukrainian political, religious, and social causes. Instead, the Zaporozhians tended to concentrate on their own affairs, that is, those of a relatively small (they rarely numbered more than 10,000), isolated Cossack fraternity based in the vast, empty steppes between the Hetmanate in the north and the Crimean Khanate in the south. The Zaporozhian lands were placed under dual Russian/Polish control in 1667, but from 1686, they came under exclusive Russian overlordship.

While the Left-Bank hetmans always considered the Sich to be subject to their authority, this issue had never been clearly resolved and the Zaporozhians were often at odds not only with hetmans but also with any other power that sought to control them. For much of the late 17th century, they continued to conduct raids against the Tatars and Ottomans, although such actions did not prevent them from sometimes reversing their notoriously erratic politi-

cal affiliations and joining the Muslims against a hetman, a Polish king, or a Russian tsar. An archetypical leader of the Zaporozhians during this period was Ivan Sirko, who gained a resounding reputation as an intrepid leader of numerous successful raids against the Turks and Tatars. Yet, quite typically, Sirko often ignored or even exacerbated some of the political problems that confronted Ukrainian society during the Ruin.

In socioeconomic terms, the Zaporozhian Sich also underwent major changes. No longer were booty or payments for military service the major source of income among the Zaporozhians. Many of them engaged in fishing, hunting, and beekeeping. They practiced trades such as metalworking and boatmaking, or partook in the extensive north/south trade. Some of the Zaporozhian officers obtained landed estates on the Left Bank or in the vicinity of the Sich, giving rise to the socioeconomic differences and tensions that were to plague the Zaporozhians. Nonetheless, it was at the Sich that the old Cossack customs and the ethos of the "Cossack brotherhood" still survived. And the isolated Sich continued to be a magnet and a refuge for the discontented elements in the north. Because of this role played by the Sich, the Zaporozhians retained widespread popularity among the Ukrainian lower classes.

Sloboda Ukraine This vast territory, located east of Poltava and centered around present-day Kharkiv, was technically within the borders of Russia. Because it was largely unpopulated and vulnerable to Tatar attacks, the tsarist government allowed several waves of Ukrainian refugees (who were fleeing the constant strife in their homeland) to settle in this region in the mid 17th century and to establish autonomous, Cossack-style self-government. By the end of the century, the region had a population of about 86,000 Ukrainian males, of whom 22,000 were liable for military service in their Cossack regiments. Like the neighboring Left Bank, Sloboda Ukraine was divided into regimental districts, named after the five major settlements of Kharkiv, Sumy, Okhtyrka, Ostrohsk, and Izum. In contrast to the Left-Bank colonels, those in the *slobody* were elected for life. However, Moscow was careful not to allow the Ukrainian Cossacks on its borderlands to elect a common leader or hetman and thereby to create a strong, united presence, as they had done in the Commonwealth. Instead, the tsar appointed a governor (*voevoda*), stationed in Bilhorod, who carefully monitored Cossack activities and with whom each of the five colonels dealt separately. Thus, while the Sloboda regions contained a significant and growing Ukrainian population, they were not able to play an autonomous political role.

POLISH-CONTROLLED LANDS

The Right Bank The provinces of Kiev, Bratslav, Volhynia, and Podilia on the right bank of the Dnieper suffered most during the great uprising and the repeated Polish, Ottoman, Muscovite, and Tatar incursions that took place dur-

ing the period of the Ruin. The depopulation of the region after the ruinous Chyhyryn campaigns of the late 1670s and Samoilo vych's mass evacuation was almost total. Yet, as soon as the fighting died down in 1681, the Poles wasted little time in encouraging the area's recolonization. Realizing that the most effective means of achieving this goal was to allow the Cossacks to return to their devastated lands, the Commonwealth formally reinstated Cossackdom (with its traditional forms of self-government) on the Right Bank in 1685. Actually, Cossack settlers had already appeared in the region several years earlier.

The Ukrainian Cossacks and peasants, many returning from the Left Bank, resettled the land with astonishing speed. Cossack colonels, such as Semen Palii, Samuilo Samus, and Zakhar Iskra, organized and led this colonizing movement. Some regimental districts sprang up around such settlements as Fastiv, Bohuslav, Korsun, and Bratslav. As had been the case earlier, the Poles also utilized the Cossacks in their wars. For example, in 1683, King Sobieski engaged about 5000 of them in his famous and victorious battle with the Ottomans at the walls of Vienna. By 1684, a year before a renewed Cossack organization was formally sanctioned by the Polish parliament, there were already about 10,000 Cossacks on the Right Bank. As the land became more settled, the Polish *szlachta* also returned. Thus, the tensions that had led to the 1648 uprising began to simmer again.

The West Ukrainian lands Galicia and Polissia, formally called the provinces of Rus' and Belz, had long been densely settled and possessed a well-entrenched nobility. Therefore, Cossackdom, a frontier phenomenon, never developed in these regions. With no Cossacks to stand up to the *szlachta*, the peasants in these western lands were especially hard pressed. The cultural influence of nearby Poland was most widespread here and, unlike elsewhere in Ukraine, the Greek Catholic church was well entrenched. A thoroughly Polonized nobility showed no interest in establishing a native Ukrainian political entity. Although the 1648 uprising reached well into Galicia – and Khmelnytsky, as well as other hetmans, claimed lands as far west “as the Ukrainian language is spoken” – the Poles had little trouble in controlling the West Ukrainian lands and often used them as a base of operations for their attacks upon the Cossacks.

The remainder of West Ukrainian lands were ruled by other neighboring powers. From 1672, the Ottomans occupied most of Podilia, relinquishing the region to the Poles only in 1699. Northern Bukovyna, however, remained in Ottoman hands. The Ukrainian population on the western slopes of the Carpathians continued to be ruled, as it had been for centuries, by the Hungarians.

Cultural Activity

Despite the upheaval and devastation brought on by the 1648 revolt and the Ruin, cultural activity in Ukraine continued to develop and to reach broader segments of the population. As the Christian Arab Paul of Aleppo, who traveled through Ukraine on his way to Moscow, wrote in 1655, "Even villagers in Ukraine can read and write ... and village priests consider it their duty to instruct orphans and not let them run in the streets like vagabonds."² Teachers, trained in the brotherhood schools and hired by village communes, were numerous, and the wandering graduates of the Kiev Academy (*bakalary*) frequently served as tutors for the well-to-do. Higher education, even in the worst of times, was available in the Kiev Academy or its affiliates in Vinnytsia and, later, Hoshcha in Volhynia. In the forty years since Mohyla's reforms, the academy developed a rigorous twelve-year course of study that emphasized, at various stages, the mastery of Latin, Greek, and Church Slavonic, rhetorical and oratorical skills, and (for the most advanced) philosophy and theology. Astronomy, geography, and mathematics were also taught, reflecting a growing interest in the natural sciences.

Most of the academy's students were the sons of the Cossack *starshyna* or rich burghers, although not infrequently the sons of simple Cossacks and even peasants also gained access. The old practice of sending youths to West European universities also continued, and even under Russian overlordship, Left-Bank Ukrainians maintained close contact with European and particularly with Polish culture. This openness of Ukrainians to foreigners and their ways was also noted by Paul of Aleppo, who stated that the Ukrainians "were all friendly and did not treat us as strangers," while in Russia he felt "as if my heart was padlocked and all my thoughts repressed, for no one is able to feel free and joyous in Muscovy."³

The faculty of the Kiev Academy, which included such luminaries as the famous ecclesiastical leader and writer Lazar Baranovych, the German-born polymath Inokentii Gizel, and the fiery polemicist Ianokii Galiatovsky, constituted an impressive cultural elite that was famous throughout the Orthodox world. Many of their works were widely read, notably Gizel's *Synopsis*, which dealt with early Ukrainian and Russian history and was permeated with a protsarist spirit. In the 150 years following its appearance in 1674, the work was published in twenty editions. By and large, the Kievan scholastics, who were all churchmen, still perceived the central issues of life in religious terms. Anti-Catholic and anti-Greek Catholic themes predominated in their works and a favorite political *idée-fixe* of theirs, reflected in Galiatovsky's "The Swan," was the formation of a union of all Orthodox Slavs, led by the tsar, to combat the hated Muslims.

They wrote in a florid, baroque style and used the artificial Church Slavonic

language, which was far removed from the spoken Ukrainian of the day. Among these intellectuals, it was considered bad form to write in the language of the "commoners." In contrast, the works of secular authors tended to use the vernacular and dealt with more concrete topics. For example, the "Eye-Witness Chronicle," which was probably written by the Cossack official Roman Rakushka-Romanovsky, concentrated on the events of the period 1648–57. Books were not lacking in late 17th-century Ukraine. Despite the ravages of war, the land had 13 printing presses, of which 9 were Ukrainian, 3 Polish, and 1 Jewish. The most active Ukrainian presses were in Kiev, Novhorod-Siversky, and Chernihiv. Of the 20 books that the Novhorod-Siversky press put out, 15 were by Ukrainian authors; and in 1679 alone, the press published over 3000 copies of various textbooks for elementary schools.

Ecclesiastical Changes

Initially, the Orthodox church in Ukraine benefited from the 1648 uprising. Khmelnytsky repeatedly stressed that the defense of Orthodoxy was a major goal of the revolt and both he and his successors were quite generous in providing the church with land and privileges. In fact, the grants they bestowed upon it were so great that the church acquired 17% of all the arable land in Ukraine, thereby becoming a major economic force. Its political position, however, suffered a setback.

Under the rule of the early hetmans, the metropolitans of Kiev (such as Sylvester Kosiv and Dionysii Balaban) had almost complete freedom of action. The Cossack leadership did not interfere in ecclesiastical affairs and the clergy and church peasants constituted an almost autonomous segment of Ukrainian society. Even in relations with the tsars and the kings of Poland, where there were still many Orthodox, the Kievan metropolitans pursued their own policies. But eventually the question arose of who should exercise ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the Ukrainian church. It was occasioned by Metropolitan Balaban's decision in 1658 to follow Hetman Vyhovsky over to the Polish side. In the view of Moscow, for the spiritual head of the Ukrainian Orthodox to be based on the territory of its Polish archenemies was unacceptable. Therefore, the tsar appointed Lazar Baranovych, archbishop of Chernihiv, as the "temporary" metropolitan of the Left Bank, thereby splitting the Orthodox hierarchy in two. Furthermore, the Russians applied pressure to have the Ukrainian church removed from the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Constantinople and placed under the patriarch of Moscow.

At first, the Ukrainian clergy on the Left Bank was vehemently opposed to being subordinated to the Muscovite church, which it regarded as being culturally inferior. But by 1686, after decades of careful and tactful persuasion, the Left-Bank clergy capitulated and the newly elected metropolitan, Prince Gedeon Sviatopolk-Chetvertynsky, agreed to place his church under the pa-

triarch of Moscow. Hetman Samoilovych, the Cossack *starshyna*, the lower clergy, and the brotherhoods accepted this decision without protest. Meanwhile, the Orthodox church on the Right Bank was exposed to extreme Polish pressure and – as such important dioceses as Lviv, Peremyshl, and Lutsk went over to the Greek Catholics – it entered into a state of decline.



During the period of the Ruin, the newly established Cossack polity in Ukraine experienced a catastrophic reversal of fortune. A powerful, aggressive force in the days of Khmelnytsky, it became in the twenty years following his death the helpless object of civil strife, foreign incursions, and partitions. Among the underlying causes for the setbacks suffered by Ukrainians during the Ruin were the following: (1) the internal contradictions between the elitist and egalitarian tendencies in Cossack society; (2) the intense external pressure applied on the incompletely formed Cossack society by Muscovy, Poland, and the Ottomans – Eastern Europe's three greatest powers; and (3) the Cossacks' lack of well-defined political goals and of adequate institutions to govern effectively all segments of Ukrainian society. As a result, Cossack Ukraine was able to preserve only a part of the gains it had achieved in 1648.

The Hetmanate

After the chaos of the period of Ruin subsided, the Hetmanate on the left bank of the Dnieper emerged as the center of Ukrainian political, cultural, and economic life. The focus of historically significant development in Ukraine now shifted completely from the westernmost lands to the easternmost. The Hetmanate was an autonomous political entity, not an independent one. Nonetheless, it provided Ukrainians with a greater measure of self-government than they had enjoyed since the days of the Galician-Volhynian principalities. As part of the Russian Empire, it existed in what was for many Ukrainians still a relatively new political environment. It was no longer the fractious and failing Commonwealth of the Polish nobles that Ukrainians had to deal with; rather, since the collapse of the Polish and Ottoman options during the Ruin, they now had to contend with the exacting rulers of expanding Russia.

Intent on monopolizing power, the tsars were inherently opposed to the idea of Ukrainian, or any other, self-rule. This attitude was reinforced by the spread of absolutist principles and practices throughout Europe in the 18th century. Such committed proponents of absolutism as Peter I and Catherine II, two of Russia's foremost rulers, believed that centralized government was the most efficient and enlightened. This view, however, ran counter to the form of self-government – based on uniquely Ukrainian institutions and traditions – that existed in the Hetmanate. Thus, the central political issue of Ukrainian life in the 18th century became the struggle, long and drawn out, between imperial Russian centralism and the Ukrainian desire for autonomy.



Cossack Government

By the late 17th century, after the Poles regained the Right Bank and the Zaporozhians asserted their autonomy, only about one-third of the territory

once controlled by Khmelnytsky (roughly one-sixth of present-day Ukraine) remained under the direct authority of the hetmans. Situated on the Left Bank, this land was called the Hetmanate by Ukrainians, while Russians referred to it as Malorossiiia. It included ten regimental districts: Starodub, Chernihiv, Nizhyn, Pryluky, Kiev, Hadiach, Lubny, Pereiaslav, Myrhorod, and Poltava. Early in the 18th century, the town of Baturyn served as the hetman's official residence and the administrative capital of the land. The Hetmanate was a relatively densely settled and well-developed territory. It included 11 major cities, 126 towns, and about 1800 villages. In 1700, it was inhabited by about 1.2 million people, approximately one-quarter of the total Ukrainian population at the time.

The Hetmanate's Cossack system of government had changed little since 1648. The chancellery, however, had grown markedly and its personnel, often recruited from the Kiev Academy, formed a kind of proto-bureaucracy. Because the hetmans did not distinguish between their private funds and those of the Hetmanate, finances were often in disorder. To deal with the problem, two treasurers-general (*heneralni pidskarbii*) were added to the administration. But these adjustments contributed little to solving the key fiscal problem of the Hetmanate, namely, the steady erosion of income resulting from privatization of public lands by Cossack officers. Apparently the hetmans were unwilling or unable to prevent the *starshyna* from expanding their private holdings at the expense of the Hetmanate's rapidly shrinking fund of "rank" or office-related lands.

Although the structure of Cossack government underwent only minor changes, major shifts occurred in the socioeconomic system of the Hetmanate. By the late 17th century, the *starshyna* had virtually excluded the common Cossacks from higher offices and the decision-making process. The decline in the fortunes of the common Cossacks was closely tied to their mounting economic problems. The almost endless wars of the 17th and early 18th centuries financially ruined many Cossacks who had to go to war at their own cost. As might be expected, the decline in the number of battle-ready Cossacks also had a great effect on the armed forces of the Hetmanate: in 1730, these forces numbered only 20,000 men. Moreover, the equipment, military principles, and techniques employed by the Cossacks had increasingly become outdated. Thus, by the 18th century, the Cossack army had become a mere shadow of the potent fighting force it had once been.

Leadership style also changed. While some Cossack leaders of Khmelnytsky's generation had been characterized by political vision and bold and assertive actions, the leaders of the Hetmanate, born in the post-heroic era, adhered to limited and pragmatic goals. They concentrated on adapting to existing political situations rather than attempting to alter them. In general, their aim was twofold: to maintain a satisfactory relationship with the tsar

and, as members of a rising Cossack elite, to consolidate their socioeconomic gains vis-à-vis the common Cossacks and peasants.

The Turning Point

From the time Moscow established its sovereignty over Cossack Ukraine, it strove to transform its nominal overlordship into direct control. For their part, the Cossack leaders, who had been disillusioned during the Ruin with the Polish and Ottoman options, no longer questioned the need to maintain links with Moscow. Nevertheless, Cossack hetmans were still committed to preserving what was left of the rights that had been guaranteed them by the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654. They hoped that, by adopting a loyalist policy, they would convince the tsars of their reliability and thus be allowed to maintain their autonomy.

Ivan Mazepa (1687–1709) A decisive phase in the relationship of the Hetmanate to Moscow occurred during the hetmancy of Ivan Mazepa, one of the most outstanding and controversial of all Ukrainian political leaders. Born on the Right Bank in 1639 into a Ukrainian noble family that was “highly esteemed in the [Zaporozhian] Host,” Mazepa received an exceptionally broad education. After studying in the Kiev Academy, he transferred to a Jesuit college in Warsaw and later entered the service of the Polish king as a gentleman-in-waiting. This provided him with opportunities to travel extensively in Western Europe and to serve as a royal emissary to Cossack Ukraine. After returning to the Right Bank in 1669, Mazepa entered the service of Doroshenko, hetman of Right-Bank Ukraine. On his first diplomatic mission, however, he was captured by the Zaporozhians, who handed him over to the Left-Bank hetman, Ivan Samoilovych. The polished Mazepa managed to turn a potentially disastrous situation into a personal triumph. His international experience and impeccable manners convinced Samoilovych to make him his confidant. These same qualities helped Mazepa establish close contacts with highly placed tsarist officials. In 1687, when Samoilovych was deposed, it was Mazepa who, backed by Russian officials, was elected as his successor.


For most of his twenty-one years in office, Mazepa pursued the traditional policies of the Left-Bank hetmans. With unparalleled consistency he issued over 1000 land grants to the *starshyna*, thereby greatly strengthening its position. Nor did he neglect his own interests. Thanks to generous grants from the tsar and his own acquisitive instinct, the hetman managed to accumulate nearly 20,000 estates, thus becoming one of the wealthiest men in Europe. A man of intellect and refinement, Mazepa contributed a significant part of his personal wealth toward the support of religious and cultural institutions. An avid patron of Orthodoxy, he built a series of beautiful churches throughout the Hetmanate in the ornate style that some call the Mazepist or Cossack

Baroque. His support of the Kiev Academy made possible the construction of new buildings and increased enrollment to 2000 during his term in office. In addition, he endowed many other schools and printing presses in order that "Ukrainian youths might be able to indulge in any aptitude they had for learning."¹

But while Kievan students and churchmen composed effusive panegyrics in his honor, the peasants and common Cossacks had little good to say about Mazepa. His open, systematic support of the *starshyna* led to widespread discontent among the masses and the antielitist Zaporozhians. A potentially explosive situation developed in 1692 when Petro Ivanenko Petryk, a well-connected chancellor, fled to the Sich where he began organizing an uprising against the hetman. Proclaiming that the time had come to rise up against the "blood-sucking" *starshyna* and to "tear away our fatherland Ukraine from Muscovite rule," Petryk gained Tatar support for the formation of an independent Ukrainian principality.² However, when his Tatar allies turned against him and attacked the populace instead, Petryk's popular support dwindled and the revolt petered out.

Relations with Moscow Mazepa's remarkable rise from prisoner to hetman and his success in controlling the grasping, backbiting *starshyna* while at the same time ushering in an era of great cultural and economic growth were achievements of the first order. Yet, perhaps Mazepa's most impressive political skill was his ability to protect his own and Ukrainian interests while at the same time maintaining good relations with Moscow. When the young and dynamic Peter I came to the throne in 1689, the hetman once more utilized his uncanny ability to charm those in power. He vigorously aided the tsar in his ambitious campaigns against the Ottomans and Tatars that culminated in the capture of Azov, the key Ottoman fortress on the Azov Sea, in 1697. The aging hetman also regularly provided his inexperienced young sovereign with astute advice about the Poles and a close personal friendship developed between them as a result. Cossack colonels wryly noted that "the tsar would sooner disbelieve an angel than Mazepa," while Russian officials declared that "there has never been a hetman so helpful and beneficial to the tsar as Ivan Stepanovych Mazepa."³

His close relations with Peter I allowed Mazepa to take advantage of a great Cossack revolt that broke out in 1702 on the Polish-controlled Right Bank. When the region was resettled, the Polish *szlachta* attempted to drive out the Cossacks. Led by a popular colonel by the name of Semen Palii, the Right-Bank Cossacks rose up in revolt and panic-stricken Polish officials reported that Palii intended to "follow in Khmelnytsky's footsteps." The rebel forces already numbered 12,000 when other Cossack leaders, among them Samuilo Samus, Zakhar Iskra, and Andrii Abazyn, joined them. Soon such Polish strongholds as Nemyriv, Berdychiv, and Bila Tserkva fell to the rebels.



Map 13 Russian-ruled Ukraine in the early 18th century

As the Polish *szlachta* fled westward, it appeared that a lesser version of 1648 was in the making. Yet, in 1703, the Poles managed to regain much of the lost territory and besieged Paliy in his "capital" of Fastiv. At this point, Charles XII of Sweden, Peter I's archenemy, invaded Poland. In the confusion, Mazepa convinced the tsar to sanction his occupation of the Right Bank. Once again the two halves of Dnieper Ukraine were united and Mazepa was able to take the credit for it. To ensure that the popular Paliy did not pose a threat, the hetman, with Peter I's approval, had him arrested and exiled to Siberia.

Early in the 18th century, however, the mutually beneficial relationship that Mazepa had so skillfully cultivated with the tsar began to show signs of strain. The Great Northern War began in 1700. In this exhausting twenty-one-year-long struggle for control of the Baltic Sea coast, the main opponents were Peter I of Russia and Charles XII, the militarily gifted but politically inept 18-year-old king of Sweden. After suffering a number of disastrous defeats early in the war, Peter I, who was a great admirer of Western ways, resolved to modernize his army, government, and society. All his subjects were exposed to greater centralization, more government controls in all aspects of life, and the elimination of "old-fashioned particularities." In the process, the traditional autonomy of the Hetmanate, which had been guaranteed in 1654, was placed in jeopardy.

Unprecedented demands were made upon the Ukrainians by the tsar during the war. For the first time, Cossacks were expected to fight solely for the tsar's interests. Instead of warding off their traditional Polish, Tatar, and Ottoman enemies close to home, Ukrainians now had to confront modern Swedish armies in far-off Livonia, Lithuania, and central Poland. It became painfully obvious during these campaigns that the Cossacks were no match for the regular European armies. Year after year, their units would return from the north with casualty rates as high as 50%, 60%, and even 70%. Cossack morale worsened when, in 1705, in an effort to coordinate his forces, Peter I assigned Russian and German officers to the Cossack regiments. Contemptuous of what they regarded as inferior troops, these foreign officers often used Cossacks simply as cannon fodder. As rumors spread that Peter I intended to reorganize the Cossack army, the *starshyna*, whose positions were linked to their military rank, began to feel uneasy.

Peasants and townsmen in Ukraine also became disgruntled on account of the war. They protested that Russian troops, quartered in their towns and villages, badly mistreated the local populace. "From everywhere," Mazepa wrote to the tsar, "I received complaints against the willfulness of the Russian troops."⁴ Even the hetman himself began to feel insecure as rumors spread that the tsar intended to replace him with a foreign general or a Russian favorite.

The grievance that finally forced Mazepa to seek an alternative to Russian overlordship involved the issue of protection. When Charles XII's Polish

ally, Stanisław Leszczyński, threatened to invade Ukraine, Mazepa turned to Peter I for aid. The tsar, facing a Swedish invasion, replied: "I cannot even spare ten men; defend yourself as best you can."⁵ For the hetman, this was the last straw. When Peter I broke his commitment to defend Ukraine from the hated Poles – a guarantee that constituted the basis of the 1654 treaty – the Ukrainian hetman no longer felt bound to remain loyal to him. On 28 October 1708, when Charles XII diverted his drive on Moscow and moved into Ukraine, Mazepa went over to the Swedes in the hope that his land would be spared from devastation. About 3000 Cossacks and many leading members of the *starshyna* followed him. The terms under which the Ukrainians joined Charles were established in a pact concluded the following spring. In return for military aid and provisions, Charles promised to protect Ukraine and to refrain from making peace with the tsar until it was completely free from Moscow and its former rights restored.

It was with "great wonderment" that Peter I learned of "the deed of the new Judas, Mazepa." Within days of the hetman's defection, Prince Aleksander Menshikov, the Russian commander in Ukraine, attacked the hetman's capital at Baturyn and massacred its entire population of 6000 men, women, and children. As news of the Baturyn massacre spread and as Russian troops in Ukraine began a reign of terror, arresting and executing anyone even vaguely suspected of siding with Mazepa, many would-be supporters of the hetman reconsidered their plans. Meanwhile, Peter I ordered the *starshyna* that had not followed Mazepa to elect a new hetman and, on 11 November 1708, it chose Ivan Skoropadsky.

Frightened by the terrible example set in Baturyn, cowed by the Russian troops in their midst, and put off by the Protestant Swedes, much of the Ukrainian populace refused to join Mazepa. It preferred to wait and see how matters developed. Surprisingly, the one numerically significant segment of the Ukrainian population that did side with the hetman was the Zaporozhians. Although they had often been at odds with him because of his elitism, they regarded Mazepa as a lesser evil than the tsar. But the Zaporozhians were to pay dearly for their decision. In May 1709, a Russian force destroyed their Sich and the tsar issued a standing order for the immediate execution of any Zaporozhian who was captured.

Throughout the fall, winter, and spring of 1708–09, the rival forces maneuvered for strategic positions and competed for popular support in Ukraine. Finally, on 28 June 1709, the Battle of Poltava – one of the most decisive battles in European history – took place and Peter I emerged the victor. As a result, Sweden's attempt to dominate northern Europe ended in failure and Russia, now assured control of the Baltic coast, rose to become one of the great powers of Europe. For the Ukrainians, the battle marked the end of their attempts to break away from Russia. It was now only a matter of time before the Hetmanate would be completely absorbed in the expanding Russian Em-

pire. Indeed, Peter I considered the English subjugation of Ireland to be a fitting model for his plans regarding Ukraine.

Closely pursued by Russian cavalry, Mazepa and Charles XII sought refuge in Ottoman-ruled Moldavia after their defeat. It was here near the town of Bender that a dejected 70-year-old Mazepa died on 21 September 1709.

Pylyp Orlyk (1710–42) About fifty leading members of the *starshyna*, almost 500 Cossacks from the Hetmanate, and over 4000 Zaporozhians had followed Mazepa to Bender. These “Mazepists,” as the refugees are sometimes called by historians, constituted the first Ukrainian political emigration. In spring 1710, they elected Pylyp Orlyk, Mazepa’s chancellor, as their hetman-in-exile. Anxious to attract potential support, Orlyk drafted the *Pacta et constitutiones*, often referred to as the Bender Constitution, which obligated him to limit the prerogatives of the hetman, to eliminate socioeconomic exploitation, to preserve the Zaporozhians’ special status, and to work for the political and ecclesiastical separation of Ukraine from Russia if he were to regain power in Ukraine. With the backing of Charles XII, Orlyk concluded alliances with the Crimean Tatars and the Ottoman Porte and early in 1711 launched a combined Zaporozhian/Tatar attack against the Russians in Ukraine. After some impressive initial successes, the campaign failed. For the next several years, Orlyk and a small group of followers wandered from one European capital to another in search of aid for their cause. Eventually, the hetman-in-exile was interned in the Ottoman Empire. But, he never ceased to bombard French, Polish, Swedish, and Ottoman statesmen with manifestos about Ukraine’s plight or to plan with his son, Hryhor, ways of freeing his homeland from the “Muscovite yoke.”

The Decline of Ukrainian Autonomy

After the failure of Mazepa’s plans, the Ukrainians were put on the defensive. Nonetheless, the absorption of the Hetmanate into the Russian Empire was a long drawn-out process. Not all Russian rulers in the 18th century were such dedicated centralizers as Peter I. Because the tsarist government needed Ukrainian support during its many wars against the Ottomans, it was careful not to antagonize the “Little Russians” (*Malorosy*), as they called the Ukrainians. In general, however, the Russians pushed on with their attempts to limit Ukrainian self-government. In doing so, they applied all the usual techniques of empire builders. A favorite was the divide-and-conquer strategy in which conflicts between the hetman and the *starshyna* were encouraged. Another was to cow the *starshyna* into submission by threatening to support the peasantry. Any failing in the Ukrainian administration or any complaint by commoners against the *starshyna* was used by the central government as an excuse to introduce Russian administrative “improve-

ments." Such changes were invariably accompanied by pious declarations that they were necessitated by the sovereign's concern for the public welfare.

Basically, Russian centralizing policies in Ukraine had three goals: (1) to coerce the Ukrainian elite and general populace into complete obedience; (2) to coordinate Ukrainian government, economy, and culture with those of Russia; and (3) to extract the maximum from Ukraine's human and economic resources. It should be noted that Ukraine was not unique in this respect, for the tsarist government applied the same policies in the other lands bordering the empire and in the Russian heartland as well.

Ivan Skoropadsky (1708–22) Although Skoropadsky was implicated in Mazepa's plans and committed to Ukrainian autonomy, Peter I agreed to his election because Skoropadsky was old and unaggressive. In fact, Skoropadsky offered little resistance to Peter I's reforms. But, at the same time, there was little he could do. Immediately after his election in 1708, the tsar assigned a resident, A. Izmailov, and two Russian regiments to Skoropadsky's court with secret instructions to arrest him and his officers if they acted suspiciously. At about this time, Peter I confirmed the agreement of 1654, but only in very general terms. When Skoropadsky requested confirmation of specific points, the tsar rebuffed the request with the comment that "Ukrainians already enjoy more freedoms than any other people under the sun."⁶ Soon coordinative policies commenced. The hetman's residence was moved from Baturyn to Hlukhiv, closer to the Russian border. The Cossack army received a Russian as its commander-in-chief. Russians and other foreigners were appointed to head the regimental districts. For the first time Russians (most notably the tsar's favorite, Prince Aleksander Menshikov) acquired large landholdings in Ukraine. Even publishing was supervised lest Ukrainian books "disagree with Great Russian publications."⁷

The extraction of Ukrainian resources took various forms. Between 1709 and 1722, Ukrainians had to support ten Russian regiments that were stationed in the land. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Cossacks were sent to the north to work on the construction of the Ladoga canal and the tsar's new capital of St Petersburg under exceptionally harsh conditions, in which many of them perished. In 1719, Ukrainians were forbidden to export their grain directly to the west. Instead, they had to ship it to the Russian-controlled ports of Riga and Arkhangelsk, where it was sold at a price set by the government. Finally, Russian merchants were given preferential treatment to export their goods to the Hetmanate, while Ukrainians had to pay huge duties on the items they shipped to the north.

But the greatest shock for Ukrainians came in 1722 when the Little Russian Collegium, a Russian governmental body made up of six Russian officers based in Ukraine, was empowered to share power with the hetman. This

was too much even for the patient Skoropadsky. He traveled to St Petersburg to request that the tsar relent. Peter I refused and the old hetman died soon after his return to Hlukhiv.

Pavlo Polubotok (1722–24) After Skoropadsky's death, the *starshyna* requested permission from the tsar to elect a new hetman. In the meantime, it chose the respected and self-assertive colonel of Chernihiv, Pavlo Polubotok, as acting hetman. Polubotok took immediate and vigorous steps to thwart the Little Russian Collegium, repeating the requests for the election of a new hetman. Irritated by his persistence, the tsar replied that all hetmans had been traitors and that there would be no election until a trustworthy candidate could be found. Undaunted, Polubotok pushed on. When Peter I was involved in a war in Iran, the acting hetman obtained an order from the imperial senate that forced the collegium to inform him of its plans and to coordinate its activity with the Ukrainian government. Because the collegium was ostensibly created to deal with the complaints of Ukrainians against their government and especially against the corrupt judicial system, Polubotok resolved to address these problems himself rather than have the Russians do it. He reorganized the courts along collegial lines, forbade bribetaking and appointed inspectors to see that his orders were carried out. To reduce peasant complaints, he pressured the *starshyna* to act less blatantly in its exploitation of its subjects.

These changes, initiated by the Ukrainians, greatly irritated the tsar. In the summer of 1723, he summoned the acting hetman and his associates to the capital to explain their obstruction of the collegium's work. Seeing a chance to undermine Polubotok, Veliaminov, who was the chairman of the collegium, persuaded several Ukrainians to lodge complaints against him and to request the introduction of Russian institutions in the Hetmanate. The acting hetman responded by sending an emissary to Ukraine to organize a petition campaign that overwhelmingly supported Ukrainian self-government. Infuriated further by his recalcitrance, Peter I imprisoned Polubotok and all those who had signed the petition. Only the death of the tsar early in 1725 saved them all from exile to Siberia. Most of the *starshyna* returned home, except for Polubotok: a few months before Peter I's death, he had died in his cell in St Petersburg.

Danylo Apostol (1727–34) With Polubotok gone, the collegium had free rein in the Hetmanate. In 1722, to the great dismay of Ukrainians, it introduced direct taxation. By 1724, Veliaminov proudly reported a 600% increase in taxes over what the tsarist government had previously extracted from the Hetmanate. However, Veliaminov's success proved to be his undoing. He demanded that the Russians who owned land on the Left Bank also pay the new tax. Suddenly, Prince Menshikov, the most influential statesman in the empire, who was the owner of vast estates in the Hetmanate and a bitter op-

ponent of Ukrainian autonomy, began to speak up in defense of Ukrainian self-government and strongly criticized the collegium. Other Russian officials also started to take a more benign view of Ukrainian autonomy because in 1726 it appeared that war with the Ottomans was imminent and, under the circumstances, they did not want to alienate the Ukrainians. Therefore, in 1727, Menshikov's influence and strategic considerations led the imperial council to dismantle the first Little Russian Collegium and to decree that "a person who is worthy and loyal should be chosen as hetman in order to satisfy and appease the local populace."⁸

In October 1727, Danylo Apostol, the 70-year-old colonel of Myrhorod, was elected hetman. The general approval with which this event was met was tempered by the fact that the imperial government not only refused to confirm all the articles of the 1654 Pereiaslav Agreement, but imposed further limitations on the hetman. A Russian resident was to supervise all his foreign contacts, a Russian field marshal was to control military affairs, and the tsar had the right to make land grants in the Hetmanate. As a consolation to the Ukrainians, the Hetmanate was removed from the jurisdiction of the imperial senate and returned to that of the foreign ministry. Realizing that any attempt to restore the Hetmanate's political prerogatives was doomed to fail, Apostol concentrated on improving social and economic conditions in it.

He continued with the reform of the judicial system and established an office of the treasury that provided the Hetmanate with its first annual budget. Because the fund of public or "rank lands" had been seriously depleted, between 1729 and 1731 Apostol conducted a thorough survey and restored many of the lost lands. He was especially effective in supporting Ukrainian commercial interests, successfully protecting Ukrainian merchants from unfair Russian competition and reducing the onerous customs duties that had been imposed by imperial officials. He even scored a few political victories. By regaining the right to appoint the general staff and colonels, Apostol greatly reduced the number of Russians and other foreigners in his administration. He also brought Kiev, which had long been under the sway of the Russian governor, under his own jurisdiction. A dramatic indication of the improved conditions in the Hetmanate was the return to Russian sovereignty in the spring of 1734 of the Zaporozhians who had lived in exile on Crimean territory since 1708. Apostol did not live to see this event, for he died in January of that year.

The Governing Council of the Hetman's Office (1734–50) As tsars changed in St Petersburg, so too did their policies towards Ukraine. Immediately after Apostol's death, the new empress, Anna Ivanovna, again banned the election of a hetman and established yet another a new collegium, called "The Governing Council of the Hetman's Office." It consisted of three Russians and three Ukrainians and was headed by a Russian president, Prince

Shakhovskoi. While creating the impression that his collegium was only a temporary arrangement, Shakhovskoi received secret instructions to spread rumors blaming previous hetmans for the taxes and mismanagement that existed in the Hetmanate. The aim was to persuade Ukrainians that the abolition of the Hetmanate was in their best interests.

The imperial government also ordered Shakhovskoi to discourage the marriage of members of the Ukrainian *starshyna* either with the Polish or Belorussian gentry or with Right-Bank Ukrainians. At the same time, matrimonial ties between Ukrainians and Russians were to be encouraged by all means. Attempts to dilute Ukrainian distinctiveness took other forms as well. In 1734, the new president of the Governing Council, Prince Bariatinsky, arrested the entire city council of Kiev and confiscated their ancient charters of rights so that "in time, these burghers will forget their contents and, lacking documents, will be unable to bring up the issue of their rights."⁹ In that same year, the imperial senate twice refused to confirm a Ukrainian as mayor of Kiev and acquiesced only after proof had been provided that there was no Russian in the city qualified for the post.

During the reign of Anna Ivanovna and her all-powerful German favorite, Ernst Biron, a mood of fatalism enveloped the Left-Bank elite, resulting in its tendency to avoid public affairs and to concentrate instead on personal matters. The mood was occasioned by the application of such Russian political practices as the infamous *slovo i delo* (Word and Deed Statute), according to which the expression of even the slightest criticism of or opposition to the tsarist regime in either word or deed made one liable to be summoned to the dreaded Secret Chancellory for interrogation, torture, and possible death or exile. Moreover, the *slovo i delo* obligated even one's closest friends and family members to inform the authorities of any suspicious talk or behavior. Thus, fear and mutual suspicion became the order of the day on the Left Bank.

Peasants and Cossacks also suffered greatly during the so-called *Bironovshchina*, or the period of supremacy of Anna's favorite, Biron. The greatest burdens imposed upon them were associated with the Russo-Turkish War of 1735–39, a conflict in which the Left Bank served as the main staging area for the imperial forces. During the course of these four years, tens of thousands of Cossacks and peasants were mobilized to aid in the war effort. Ukrainian fatalities during the war reached 35,000, a huge figure for a population of about 1.2 million. As well, in 1737–38, Ukraine had to maintain at its own expense between fifty and seventy-five Russian regiments. This maintenance cost the Hetmanate about 1.5 million rubles, ten times its annual budget. The demands of the Russo-Turkish War were doubly painful to Ukrainians because they were preceded by a long series of destructive conflicts. Most of the nearly century-long Cossack/Polish/Russian/Ottoman wars had been fought in Ukraine. And by 1740, it had been bled white. Even Russian officers

who traversed the land were astounded by the devastation they encountered. For decades to come, the Ukrainian *starshyna* would complain that their land was unable to recover from these losses.

The Governing Council did manage one constructive achievement. Because of the chaotic state of Ukrainian law, most of which was still based on the Lithuanian Statute of the 16th century, a commission was formed in 1728 to codify it. In 1744, after sixteen years of work, the eighteen-man commission finally completed a new codex entitled "The Laws According to which the Little Russians Are Governed."

Kyrylo Rozumovsky (1750–64) While Biron brought Ukrainians little in the way of benefits, the husband of the next empress, Elizabeth, was more helpful. When she came to power in 1741, Elizabeth's consort was Oleksii Rozumovsky, a simple, personable Cossack from the Hetmanate who had caught the fancy of the future empress when he had been a singer in the imperial choir. Although Oleksii avoided politics, he did have a great affection for his homeland. Apparently, some of this attitude rubbed off on his wife, especially after she had been received with great enthusiasm on a visit to Kiev in 1744. On that occasion, the Ukrainian *starshyna* approached Elizabeth with yet another request for a new hetman. The empress responded positively. However, she put the matter off because the candidate she had in mind, Kyrylo, the younger brother of Oleksii, was only sixteen and needed experience before he could take the post. Young Kyrylo was sent off to study in the universities of Western Europe. In the meantime, Russian troops were removed from the Hetmanate and the Governing Council was gradually dismantled. Upon his return from Europe, Kyrylo was appointed president of the Imperial Academy of Sciences. In 1750, in Hlukhiv, amid great pomp, he was inaugurated as the new hetman at the age of twenty-two.

Under Rozumovsky, the Hetmanate experienced the golden autumn of its autonomy. Although he spent much of his time in St Petersburg where he was deeply involved in court politics, Rozumovsky maintained close contacts with the Left Bank. Realizing that the society of the Hetmanate had become too complex for the *starshyna* to perform judicial as well as administrative and military functions, Rozumovsky started organizing a separate judiciary. In 1763, after much preparation, the Hetmanate was divided into twenty judicial districts, each of which had courts specializing in criminal matters, boundary claims, and property conflicts. Judges were elected, usually from among the landowning elite. As had been the case previously, townsmen were judged before their own courts.

Rozumovsky also succeeded in extending once again the hetman's authority over Kiev and the Zaporozhians. Moreover, he initiated a somewhat superficial attempt at modernizing the Cossack army by systematizing its drills, providing it with uniforms, and improving its artillery. Plans were drawn up

to establish a university in Baturyn, Mazepa's old capital, and to extend primary education to the sons of all Cossacks. However, political developments prevented their implementation. The hetman did succeed in bringing a touch of European sophistication to Hlukhiv by adorning it with gracious palaces, English gardens, and a theatre in which visiting Italian opera companies performed. The town had numerous coffee shops and French fashions became the rage among the elite.

With the hetman frequently away at the imperial capital, the *starshyna* governed the land as it saw fit. It was during Rozumovsky's tenure that the Cossack elite finally came into its own, completing the transformation, begun late in the 17th century, from an officer corps to a typical nobility. It now began to refer to itself as *shliakhta*, the Ukrainian equivalent of the Polish term for the nobility (*szlachta*).

Yet, even the lenient Elizabeth did not respond positively to many of the hetman's initiatives. When he asked for permission to establish diplomatic relations with European courts, the petition was refused. The response was also negative when he tried to have Ukrainian troops exempted from wars not directly related to Ukrainian interests. Even during these favorable times for the Hetmanate's autonomy, some aspects of imperial centralization were pushed through. In 1754, for example, the budget of the Hetmanate was put under Russian control and the customs boundary between Ukraine and Russia was eliminated. When Rozumovsky sought a free hand in distributing lands on the Left Bank, he was informed that only the empress enjoyed this prerogative. It was clear that there were established limits to the extent to which Ukrainians were to be allowed to control their own affairs.

After Catherine II came to power in 1762, Rozumovsky returned to the Hetmanate to concentrate on its affairs. In 1763, the hetman and *starshyna* held an important council at Hlukhiv. Its original purpose was to discuss judicial reforms. But the discussion soon expanded to a consideration of the decline of the Hetmanate's political prerogatives. In the end, the delegates sent a strongly worded petition to the new empress that called for the return of their lost rights and the creation of a parliament of nobles on the Left Bank, modeled after the Polish *sejm*. The Hlukhiv petition was based on the premise that the hetman and *starshyna* considered their land to be a distinct political and economic entity linked to Russia only in the person of the monarch. In the view of Zenon Kohut, the petition "contained some of the most autonomist views publicly expressed since the time of Mazepa."¹⁰ Rozumovsky followed it up with the bold proposal that the empress make the hetmancy hereditary in his family. In other words, what the Ukrainians were asking from Catherine was a permanent commitment to their autonomy.

But the Ukrainian elite had miscalculated. At exactly this time, influenced by a scathing attack on Ukrainian autonomy written by Teplov, Rozumovsky's former tutor, Catherine II decided to abolish this autonomy alto-

gether. She ordered Rozumovsky to the capital and demanded his resignation. After procrastinating and making some attempts at bargaining, Rozumovsky relinquished his office on 10 November 1764.

The liquidation of the Hetmanate Catherine II finished the work that Peter I had begun in Ukraine. Although herself a German who married into the Romanov dynasty, Catherine was a dedicated proponent of Russification and centralization. Like so many other rulers during the age of enlightened absolutism, she was convinced that a government based on the absolutist principle and devoid of such "feudal relics" as special status for various regions was the most rational and efficient. Hence, her negative attitude toward Ukrainian as well as Livonian and Finnish autonomy. "These provinces," she argued, "should be Russified ... That task will be easy if wise men are chosen as governors. When the hetmans are gone from Little Russia, every effort should be made to eradicate them and their age from memory."¹¹ And the empress did choose a wise man – Peter Rumiantsev, an outstanding Russian military leader and statesman – to rule the Left Bank as its governor-general.

In carrying out his functions, Rumiantsev was aided by a second Little Russian Collegium, which consisted of four Russian officers and four trusted members of the *starshyna*. In a set of secret instructions, Catherine enjoined Rumiantsev to move carefully "so as not to arouse hatred for the Russians."¹² To prepare the ground for the elimination of Ukrainian autonomy, the governor-general was further advised to stress to the peasants that their worsening plight was primarily a result of the backwardness of "Little Russian ways." Meanwhile, Rumiantsev was to apply a carrot-and-stick approach toward the *starshyna*. While all expressions of autonomist tendencies were to be severely punished, those "who were not infected with the disease of self-willfulness and independence"¹³ were to be offered attractive posts in the imperial government. They were also promised that their status would be equalized with that of the Russian nobility and that they would gain greater control over the peasantry.

Rumiantsev fulfilled his mandate well. Initially, he avoided major changes and concentrated on winning goodwill. Numerous Ukrainians were appointed to his staff, a postal service was introduced, and a thorough survey of the socioeconomic conditions of the land was carried out. But not everything went according to plan. Anxious to demonstrate the enlightened nature of her regime, Catherine II established her famous Legislative Commission in 1767. Delegates from all strata of society (with the exception of the peasantry) and from all regions were assembled in Moscow to present their views and desiderata to the empress. To the great chagrin of Catherine and Rumiantsev, a number of Ukrainian delegates, led by Hryhorii Poletyka, used the occasion to reiterate their desire for the renewal of the hetmancy and the restitu-


tion of traditional Ukrainian rights. Similar disturbing views were expressed by delegates from the other bordering lands. Using the ensuing war with the Ottomans as a pretext, the empress permanently "postponed" the sessions of the commission.

After the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768–75, Rumiantsev made his decisive moves. The first blow was aimed at the Zaporozhian Sich, which was destroyed in 1775 during a surprise attack by Russian troops. The turn of the Hetmanate itself came in 1781 when, in conjunction with an all-imperial administrative reorganization, the traditional ten regimental districts of the Left Bank were abolished. In their place, three provinces (those of Kiev, Chernihiv, and Novhorod-Siversk) were established. These were similar in size and organization to the thirty other provinces of the empire. Simultaneously, the appropriate branches of the imperial bureaucracy replaced Ukrainian administrative, judicial, and fiscal institutions. The abolition of the famous old Cossack regiments came next. In 1783, they were replaced by regular dragoon regiments to which peasants and non-Ukrainians were recruited for six-year periods. A separate Ukrainian Cossack army thus ceased to exist. Contrary to government propaganda, the extension of the Russian imperial system to the Left Bank exacerbated rather than improved the plight of the Ukrainian peasantry. In 1783, they were deprived of the right to leave their landlords just as Russian peasants had been long ago. In other words, the peasantry of the Left Bank now became formally enserfed.

The Ukrainian elite, in contrast, benefited from these changes. The peasants were finally placed under its complete control and, in 1785, it was exempted from all government and military service by Catherine's "Charter to the Nobility," thus attaining equality with the Russian nobility. For these reasons, the leadership of the former Hetmanate accepted the liquidation of its autonomy with scarcely a complaint. There were only rare cases of protest against the changes, such as that of Vasyl Kapnist, who in 1791 secretly tried to win Prussian support for the restitution of the Hetmanate. These actions were insufficient, however, to prevent the absorption of Cossack Ukraine into the Russian Empire.

Russian Expansion

Russian expansionism has been a dominant fact in the history of Eastern Europe and of Ukraine in particular since the 15th century. From 1462, when the nascent Muscovite state encompassed a mere 24,000 sq. km, until 1914, when the Russian Empire occupied 13,800,000 sq. km, or one-sixth of the land surface of the earth, Russia expanded at an average rate of 80 sq. km per day.¹⁴ In the late 18th century, it concentrated its efforts on a great drive southward. Its goal was the vast Black Sea hinterland (which had been the domain of the Tatars) and the Ottoman-dominated seaways that offered ac-



Map 14 Russian expansion in Ukraine in the late 18th century

cess to the Mediterranean and world trade. As long as Ukrainian aid was needed in this southward expansion, the Hetmanate was allowed to exist. But after the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji in 1774 that concluded Russia's successful war with the Ottomans and recognized its presence in the Black Sea and its sovereignty over the Crimean Khanate, Ukrainian autonomy was of necessity doomed. A similar fate awaited the other lands that lay between Russia and the Black Sea.

The destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich Upon their return under Russian sovereignty in 1734, the Zaporozhians regained their former lands and built a new Sich close to its previous site. From the viewpoint of the imperial government, this return was a mixed blessing. In the ensuing wars against the Ottomans, the Zaporozhians performed so well that Catherine II showered them with medals and praise. Yet, they also caused her much concern. Because there was no serfdom and much open land on its territory, the Sich became a haven for runaway peasants. Moreover, whenever antinoble uprisings flared up, Zaporozhians were invariably involved. In 1768, for example, they played a key role in the bloody *haidamaky* rebellion on the Right Bank, and when the Russian Cossack Emelian Pugachev staged his huge uprising in southern Russia in 1772, the Zaporozhians offered his men refuge from the wrath of the empress.

Among the Zaporozhians themselves, violence and social upheaval were common. As the Zaporozhian lands became more settled (by 1770, they contained about 200,000 inhabitants, most of whom were not Cossacks), large-scale farming, trading, and livestock raising developed. These activities were largely dominated by Zaporozhian officers. The last Zaporozhian leader (*koshovy*), Petro Kalnyshesky, for example, owned over 14,000 head of livestock. Most of his fellow officers were as wealthy. As in the Hetmanate, sharp socioeconomic distinctions developed between the Zaporozhian *starshyna* and the propertyless rank and file (*holota*) and conflicts often broke out between the rich and poor at the Sich. In 1768, for instance, an especially violent clash forced the *starshyna* to flee to the nearby Russian garrisons, disguised as monks. Order was restored only after the intervention of imperial troops. The constant unrest at the Sich, coupled with the Zaporozhians' stubborn obstruction of Russian efforts to colonize the Black Sea littoral, convinced Catherine II that the problem called for a radical solution. Therefore, as soon as the 1768–75 war was over and the Tatars no longer posed a threat, she ordered the Sich destroyed a second time.

On 4 June 1775, when most of the Zaporozhians were still at the Turkish front, a returning Russian army commanded by General Tekeli surrounded the Sich and razed it to the ground. Despite the fact that Kalnyshesky and the *starshyna* had followed a pro-Russian line, they were arrested and eventually exiled to Siberia. The largest segment – about 5000 men – sought refuge

on Ottoman-held territory near the mouth of the Danube. About half the Zaporozhian lands were distributed among Russian grandees and the remainder were assigned to German and Serbian colonists. Catherine II even attempted to obliterate the Zaporozhians from popular memory. When she announced their liquidation, she added that "the use of the word 'Zaporozhian Cossack' shall be considered by us as an insult to our imperial majesty."¹⁵

There is a postscript to the Zaporozhian story. The 5000 Zaporozhians who fled to the Ottoman Empire were allowed to settle at the mouth of the Danube River. In 1784, to counterbalance their presence, the Russian government settled the remaining ex-Zaporozhians between the Buh and Dnister rivers. In 1792, these Buh Cossacks were renamed the Black Sea Host and transferred to the Kuban. Under the leadership of Iosyp Hladky, a part of the Danube Cossacks returned to the Russian Empire in 1828 and eventually joined their brethren in the Kuban. From 1864 until 1921, they were known as the Kuban Cossacks.

The absorption of the Crimean Khanate For almost a century after the disastrous campaign of 1687, the Russians had attempted to conquer the Crimea. Between 1734 and 1739, Russian and Ukrainian troops managed to fight their way into the peninsula, but lack of provisions and epidemics forced them back. In 1774, they occupied the entire peninsula and, in the treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (1774), forced the Ottomans to renounce their sovereignty over the khanate. Finally, in 1783, at the same time that the last vestiges of the Hetmanate were being obliterated, Catherine II announced the absorption of the khanate into the Russian Empire. For Ukrainian history as well as for that of Eastern Europe as a whole, this was an epochal event. The Turkic nomads, whose last bastion in Europe had been the Crimean Khanate and whose last major raid into Ukraine, involving tens of thousands of Tatars, had occurred in 1769, were finally trampled. The steppe, which for millennia had been a source of danger for the sedentary populations that ringed it, had at last been made accessible to the peasant's plow.

The partitions of Poland-Lithuania Even the Commonwealth, with a population of 11 million and a territory of 733,000 sq. km, was not safe from Russian expansionism. On account of its vaunted "golden freedoms" that, practically speaking, provided its nobility with immunity before the law, the land became almost impossible to govern. Near anarchy, encouraged by magnates and foreign powers who benefited from a weak central government, reigned for most of the 18th century. Exploiting its role as the patron of the Commonwealth's Orthodox, neighboring Russia was especially effective in foiling the efforts of Poles to reform and revitalize their state. Finally, the Commonwealth's three aggressive neighbors, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, moved in. As a result of three partitions – those of 1772, 1775, and 1795 – Poland-

Lithuania ceased to exist. Russia received the lion's share, 62% of the former territory of the Commonwealth and 45% of its population; Austria acquired 18% of the land and 32% of its inhabitants; and Prussia obtained 20% and 23% respectively. These radical changes in the political map of Eastern Europe affected Ukrainians directly. In 1772, the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovyna came under Austrian rule. By 1795, the entire Right Bank was incorporated into the Russian Empire. Ukrainian history now entered a new phase.



For about a century, the Hetmanate had been the focus of Ukrainian political life. Although Russians controlled its foreign contacts and military campaigns, and constantly interfered in its internal affairs, the administration, courts, finances, army, and socioeconomic policies of the Hetmanate had been created and maintained by Ukrainians. Self-government encouraged the rise of a Ukrainian noble elite that was attached to and proud of its traditions. As late as 1767, the *starshyna* delegates to the Legislative Commission rejected Catherine's reforms and confidently declared: "Our laws are best." It was in the Hetmanate that, prior to the 20th century, the precedent for Ukrainian self-government had been set.

More than a half-century after the Hetmanate was abolished, Taras Shevchenko wrote:

Once there was a Hetmanate
It passed beyond recall.
Once, it was, we ruled ourselves
But we shall rule no more.
Yet we shall never forget
The Cossack fame of yore.¹⁶

Not only was the Hetmanate not forgotten, but its memories helped to create a new era in Ukrainian history, for it was from among the descendants of the *starshyna* that many of the intellectuals who later formulated modern Ukrainian national consciousness hailed. The history of the Hetmanate became a key component of national history and the nation-building myth. The example of self-rule that it set helped to arouse the desire of modern Ukrainians for their own nation-state.

Society, Economics, and Culture

The experiment in Cossack egalitarianism had failed. During the 18th century, the social structure of Left-Bank Ukraine was brought back into line with that of the neighboring East European lands. As an elite of nobles emerged in the Hetmanate, the peasantry again slipped back into serfdom, and the status of Cossacks sank to that of peasants. The Polish *szlachta* reestablished its regime on the Right Bank and the old order returned there. In Russian-ruled Ukraine, social tensions were eased somewhat by the opening up for settlement of the vast fertile Black Sea hinterland, which the imperial government had wrested from the Zaporozhians and the Crimean Tatars. But in the Polish-ruled Right Bank, where socioeconomic oppression was exacerbated by religious discrimination, the Ukrainian peasantry rose up in bloody revolt against the *szlachta* in 1768. The revolt failed, however, and the *szlachta* regained control. It appeared that the socioeconomic order was immutable. In the realm of culture, in contrast, heightened activity marked the early and middle parts of the 18th century in the Hetmanate. Nevertheless, by the end of the century, Ukraine assumed a decidedly provincial character in all regions and on all levels – cultural, social, and economic.



The Economy

Agriculture remained the basic form of livelihood in the Hetmanate, and commerce and manufacturing, although showing some signs of activity, remained underdeveloped, even in comparison with the Russian north. Like the other absolutist states of Europe, the Russian imperial government made attempts to stimulate economic growth in Ukraine, but only if doing so did not interfere with the development of Russia. In any case, the effects of these policies were limited throughout most of the century.

Agriculture and related occupations The most noteworthy development in Ukrainian agriculture was its expansion into southern Ukraine. Yet despite the increased acreage and the excellent quality of the new land, agricultural yields did not increase significantly because of outdated implements and techniques. The wasteful system of three-field rotation continued to be used and in the new lands, colonists often moved on to virgin soil rather than enriching the lands they had already worked. Typical harvests of wheat were only three to four times greater than the amount of grain sown – a pitifully low yield by European standards. Serfdom encouraged this backwardness. As free labor was abundant, landowning nobles were not constrained to innovate.

Moreover, serfdom, particularly as it was practiced in Ukraine, discouraged occupational diversification. In the Russian north, where the soil was poor, landowners often encouraged peasants to buy off their obligations (*obrok*) by earning money in the fledgling commercial and manufacturing enterprises that were based in the towns. In fertile Ukraine, in contrast, nobles generally demanded labor obligations (*barshchina*) from the peasantry. As a result – and this point deserves to be emphasized – the Ukrainian peasant became more firmly bound to the traditional way of life in the village and in the field than did the Russian peasant.

General sluggishness notwithstanding, some diversification did appear in the rural economy. New crops, such as corn and potatoes, were introduced in the late 18th century. More than ever before, landowners invested in agriculture-related, cash-producing enterprises. Mills were especially favored. Not only did landowners use them to grind their own grain, but they also allowed their peasants to do so for a price. By 1782, there were over 3300 water mills and about 12,000 windmills on the Left Bank alone. However, the most profitable sideline for entrepreneurs among the nobility was the distillation of wheat-based spirits (*horilka*), the sale of which earned many nobles as much as 50% of their cash income. Not surprisingly, in 1750, the regimental districts of the Hetmanate averaged 500 distilleries each. Other landowners branched out into breeding the famous Ukrainian oxen and sheep as well as horses. For example, Kyrylo Rozumovsky had a herd of 5000 horses, 800 of which were thoroughbred. Also, such traditional occupations as beekeeping retained their popularity, with some apiaries on the Right Bank numbering as many as 15,000 hives.

Commerce Although trade in Ukraine was still hampered by poor means of communication, lack of cash, and exorbitant borrowing rates (ranging from 20% to 50% per annum), it grew markedly. Expanding agricultural production encouraged commerce and the reverse was also true. Because of the difficulty of travel, people would gather in certain towns and villages at regular intervals to buy and sell their wares. Such large commercial fairs,

which lasted for weeks and offered a vast array of goods for sale, took place in Nizhyn, Romny, Kiev, Pereiaslav, Poltava, Kharkiv, and other towns. By the 1780s, the Left Bank, which was economically more dynamic than the Right Bank, had close to 400 fairs. Small-scale trade was carried on in the region's 700 local bazaars. Another popular form of small-scale trade, particularly among Cossacks and wealthier peasants, was salt and fish trading. Those who could afford a wagon and a team of oxen banded together in large caravans to make the dangerous journey to the Black Sea coast where they obtained the salt and fish that were distributed throughout Ukraine. Some of these traders, called *chumaky*, gradually accumulated enough capital to invest in large-scale enterprises. Thus, a money economy developed in Ukraine in place of the barter system, or simple exchange of goods and services.

Before the opening of the Black Sea ports in the late 18th century, foreign trade was quiescent. As might be expected, the primary exports were agricultural products. But whereas in earlier times Ukrainian merchants had had extensive contacts with the Baltic ports and Western markets, imperial policies caused this trade to shift to the north. In 1714, Peter I forced these merchants to ship their wheat to such Russian or Russian-dominated ports as Arkhangelsk, Riga, and St Petersburg. In 1719, the export of Ukrainian grain to the West was forbidden and the stringent import duties were imposed at the Polish-Ukrainian border were meant to prevent the import of Western finished products that might compete with Russia's fledgling industries. As we have seen, Russian merchants received preferential treatment in the export of their products to the Left Bank, while Ukrainians paid duties of 10–40% on the finished goods they shipped to the north. Taking advantage of this situation, Russian merchants became heavily involved in Ukrainian trade. By 1754, when trade barriers were lifted between Russia and the Left Bank, Russians were in control of large-scale commerce.

Manufacturing In comparison with Russia, manufacturing in Ukraine developed more slowly. On the one hand, abundant opportunities in agriculture absorbed the attention and energies of Ukrainians; on the other, imperial policy encouraged industrial development in Russia while treating Ukraine primarily as a source of raw materials. This situation led a number of Soviet economic historians of the pre-Stalin era to describe the economic relationship between Russia and Ukraine as a colonial one. Manufacturing was not totally neglected in Ukraine, however, and although on a small-scale, it was broadly based. The *starshyna* on the Left Bank and the Polish magnates on the Right Bank established a number of iron foundries and glass works that employed about 15–20 workers each. Monasteries were involved in paper manufacturing. In the towns, craftsmen such as smiths, glassmakers, carpenters, painters, tailors, and tanners could often number 400–600 per town. Some villages, especially those in the less fertile northern areas of the Hetmanate, gained their

livelihood exclusively from textile production and woodworking. In contrast to the urban-based industrial centers of Western Europe, manufacturing enterprises in Ukraine and Russia were often located in the countryside, the residence of the entrepreneur nobles. Another difference from European practice was the leading role played by the government in encouraging industry. For example, huge textile works employing thousands of workers were established in Sloboda Ukraine by the imperial government, which simply assigned serfs to work in the factories in the same way as they would work for landlords.

Social Change in the Hetmanate

The new elite By the 18th century, the newly formed elite was already well ensconced at the top of the Hetmanate's social order. The demise of Cossack egalitarianism was almost inevitable because East European societies knew of no other way of ordering their political and socioeconomic life than by allowing a nobility to control the land and the peasantry on it in return for defending and governing this territory. Consequently, as the Left Bank became more settled and stable, it developed social relations similar to those of its noble-dominated neighbors.

The most evident manifestation of the triumph of elitism in the Hetmanate was the Society of Notable Military Fellows (*Znachne viiskove tovarystvo*). Its rolls contained the names of male adults from *starshyna* families who did not yet hold office, but who were eligible to do so if an opening appeared. By the 1760s, the Military Fellows were ranked according to an elaborate hierarchy that included about 1300 names. In addition, there were roughly 800 individuals who actually held office. Thus, about 2100 adult males, out of a total male population of over one million, constituted the elite in the Hetmanate of the mid 18th century. In 1785, when the imperial government attempted to incorporate the Ukrainian elite into the Russian nobility (*dvorianstvo*), this number increased severalfold. Because St Petersburg was unsure of how to define nobility in the Hetmanate, thousands of Ukrainian petty officers and wealthier Cossacks claimed noble status, many using falsified documents.

With elite status came land. It was granted to the *starshyna* by the hetmans and tsars. In many cases, the officers also illegally privatized their office-related lands. As a result, by 1735, over 35% of the cultivated land in the Hetmanate was the private property of the elite. And their offices gave them control of an additional 11% of the land. Thus, less than 1% of the population controlled close to 50% of the land.

Like everywhere else in Europe, wealth was distributed most unevenly among the elite. A few families, particularly those whose members were hetmans, colonels, or members of the general staff, acquired vast latifundia by virtue of their influence and contacts. Mazepa, for example, owned 19,654 estates; Skoropadsky 19,882; and Apostol 9103. The holdings of the average

starshyna member, however, were modest, usually consisting of a single estate with about 30 peasants – about one-third of the holdings of an average Russian nobleman. These figures indicate that in the Hetmanate, the elite was relatively more numerous and enserfed peasants fewer than in Russia. But rich or poor, the Cossack *starshyna* (or *shliakhta*, as it styled itself) exploited both peasants and Cossacks alike. From the former it demanded increasingly onerous rents, labor duties, and personal services; from the many impoverished Cossacks, it bought or extorted land and attempted to impose upon them the obligations of peasants.

The social antagonism between the *chern* (“rabble”) and the *starshyna* had important political ramifications, for it allowed the tsarist government to play one segment of Ukrainian society off against the other. Thus, in the 17th century, Moscow supported the masses against the Cossack elite when it attempted to throw off the overlordship of the tsars, while in the 18th century, the tsars helped the officers, chastised after the failure of their separatist attempts, to exploit the peasantry, thereby strengthening the dependence of the Ukrainian elite on its Russian sovereigns. Thus, although some members of the *starshyna* were still committed to the Hetmanate and its traditions of self-government, the primary loyalties of many focused, for practical reasons, on the Russian sovereign and the empire.

This imperial orientation came to the fore especially after 1785 when Catherine II, in her Charter to the Nobility, equated the Ukrainian elite with the Russian nobility. Equally enticing, especially to the poorer members of the *starshyna*, were the career opportunities that opened up in the Russian imperial government as a result of its vast new acquisitions. Because of their relatively good education and administrative experience, members of the Ukrainian elite obtained posts not only in the imperial administration of the former Hetmanate, but also in the recently acquired Crimean lands, on the Right Bank, and even in far-off Georgia in the Caucasus.

By the late 18th century, Ukrainians occupied some of the highest positions in the empire. In the 1770s and 1780s, the Bezborodkos, Zavadovskys, Kochubeis, and Troshchynskys provided chancellors and ministers for the empire and helped many fellow Ukrainians obtain influential posts in St Petersburg. The numerous personal opportunities and advantages that imperial service provided explain to a large extent why the resistance of the Ukrainian elite to the abolition of the Hetmanate was so weak. And because advancement in imperial service demanded familiarity with imperial culture, many Ukrainian nobles abandoned their colorful Cossack dress, adopted European fashions, and began to speak Russian and French. Only a few, condescendingly viewed as romantics, bemoaned the passing of the Hetmanate and the glories of the Cossack past.

Cossack decline The Cossacks had emerged from the uprising of 1648 with

extensive privileges. In return for military service, they could own land and were exempted from taxation. They enjoyed self-government, could participate in trade, and had the right (formerly reserved for nobles) to distill alcoholic beverages. Thus, while most Cossack landholdings were scarcely larger than those of the peasantry, their rights were almost as great as those of the expelled Polish nobles. The only privilege denied Cossacks was the right to demand labor obligations from the peasantry, a right reserved for nobles alone. Despite these advantages, a steady deterioration was noticeable in the status of the rank and file Cossacks beginning from the late 17th century.

As a result of the growing influence of the *starshyna*, common Cossacks lost such important political prerogatives as the right to elect their officers and to participate in councils. Even more harmful to their welfare were the Cossacks' economic problems. The crux of these problems lay in the fact that Cossacks were expected to function both as farmers and as soldiers. During the pre-1648 era, this dual role had been feasible because campaigns were brief, booty plentiful, and Polish government subsidies provided extra income. But, under the tsars, military conflicts, such as the twenty-one-year-long Great Northern War, dragged on interminably. And when Cossacks were not fighting, they were often forced by Russian officials to work on construction projects.

Because this protracted, exhausting service had to be borne at the Cossacks' own expense, many fell into debt. As a result, numerous Cossacks sold their lands to their *starshyna*-creditors, often under pressure and invariably at low prices, and continued to live on their former properties as tenants who fulfilled peasant-like obligations. Only a few Cossacks managed to join the rapidly closing ranks of the *starshyna*. Thus, the "downward mobility" of the Cossacks reduced their number from 50,000 in 1650, to 30,000 in 1669, and to 20,000 in 1730.

Worried by the dwindling supply of cheap fighting men, tsarist authorities forbade the sale of Cossack lands in 1723 and again in 1728. But these measures were ineffective because they addressed only the symptoms and not the real cause of the problem. In 1735, the government of the Hetmanate attempted more thoroughgoing reforms. It divided Cossacks into two categories: the wealthier, battle-ready Cossacks, called *vyborni*, and those who were too impoverished to fight, called *pidpomichnyky*. While the former were away at war, the latter were expected to collect and deliver supplies, act as messengers, and even work the land of the fighting men. The *pidpomichnyky* were taxed, but only at half the rate of peasants. In effect, the poorer Cossacks became the servitors of their wealthier colleagues and of the *starshyna*. Despite these changes, the economic condition of all Cossacks continued to deteriorate. In 1764, there were 175,000 *vyborni* Cossacks and 198,000 *pidpomichnyky* on the rolls. But, in reality, only 10,000 of the *vyborni* Cossacks were actually battle-ready. The number of debt-free Cossack farms also continued to

decline. By the end of the century, most of the poorer Cossacks had sunk to the level of state-owned peasants. Beset by economic pressures, encroached upon by the *starshyna*, outdated in their military techniques, and redundant in view of the vanishing frontier, Cossackdom, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist in Ukraine.

The reenservment of the peasantry The condition of the Left Bank peasants (one of Eastern Europe's few free peasantries), like that of the Cossacks, deteriorated steadily from the high point it had reached immediately after 1648. But even the hetmancy of Bohdan Khmelnytsky had presaged the return of the old order, for the hetman had allowed certain Ukrainian monasteries to continue collecting their traditional dues from the peasants who lived on their lands. The major decline in the peasants' status came in the 18th century, when the free, self-governing "military villages" in which the peasants lived were turned over from the land fund of the Hetmanate to individual *starshyna* landlords.

Initially, these landlords collected modest rents and expected additional services from their tenants such as chopping wood or transporting hay. In Mazepa's time, the maximum labor obligation rose to two days a week; although this burden was heavy compared to the period when Left Bank peasants had no obligations at all, it was still only one-half to one-third of what Polish and Russian peasants were forced to provide. Only a generation later, however, the average labor obligation rose to three days a week. In some cases, it reached as many as four or five days per week. In addition, in times of war peasants had to provide food and shelter for the imperial troops and their horses, maintain roads, build bridges, and perform other similar services. When peasants appealed to the Russian monarchs for help, they encountered little sympathy, for the plight of Russian peasants was much worse than theirs. Indeed, the example of the downtrodden Russian serf encouraged greater exploitation of the Ukrainian peasant.

Yet as long as the peasant had the right to depart, he could move to a more lenient landlord, to another village, or to the open steppe. For this reason, the *starshyna*, backed by the Russian government, gradually increased the limitations on peasant mobility. In 1727, a law stipulated that peasants who left their lords forfeited the property they had left behind and, in 1760, peasants were required to obtain written permission from their landlords if they desired to leave them. As they lost their legal right to departure, many peasants in the Hetmanate resorted to illegal flight. A favorite destination for thousands of runaways was the lands of the Zaporozhians, providing one of the reasons for Catherine II's destruction of the Sich. In 1783, Catherine took the final step when she forbade Left Bank peasants from leaving their lords under any circumstances. Thus, 130 years after his liberation in 1648, the Left Bank peasant once again became a serf.


TABLE 2
Social structure of Left-Bank Ukraine (1795)

Social category	Population	Percent
Nobles	36,000	1.6
Clergy	15,000	0.7
Townsmen	92,000	4.0
Cossacks	920,000	40.0
Peasants	1,240,000	53.7
Total	2,300,000	100

The neglected townsmen In the agrarian, village-based society of the Hetmanate, the position of townsmen was decidedly underprivileged. Except for such hetmans as Mazepa and Apostol, the Cossack administration neglected them at best and tried actively to undermine them at worst. Burghers were denied access to any offices outside their own towns. Even within their own towns, their governing and judicial bodies could exercise no authority over the numerous members of the *starshyna*, Cossacks, and peasants who resided there because these were subject to the Cossack administration. Consequently, there were numerous instances in which the majority of a town's population consisted of Cossacks and peasants who were not subject to its laws. In some cases, the *starshyna* simply liquidated the autonomy of small or weak towns and placed their inhabitants under its direct jurisdiction. As a result, the number of towns in the Hetmanate dropped from 200 in 1723 to 122 sixty years later.

Not only were townsmen politically disenfranchised, they were also economically disadvantaged. Because Cossacks were not liable to taxation, they could sell their wares in the towns without paying local duties. Meanwhile, in order to provide their towns' treasuries with funds, burghers were compelled to pay a tax on the products they sold. Townsmen thus often owned fewer shops and stalls in their towns than did Cossacks, soldiers from the Russian garrisons, or even monks. Under the circumstances, the population of most Left Bank towns was modest, averaging between 3000 and 5000 inhabitants. (See also table 2.)

In the midst of this general stagnation, however, there were pockets of prosperity and growth. Because of its role as an administrative, military, commercial, and cultural center, Kiev's population rose from 11,000 in 1723 to approximately 43,000 in the 1780s. Towns like Starodub and Nizhyn, located in the north near the Russian trading centers, also prospered. An insight into the kind of economic activity that took place in these prosperous towns may be gained from the following data on the city of Nizhyn: in 1786, it had 387 outdoor shops, 6 coffee shops, 29 smithies, 73 public houses (*shynky*), 124 taverns, 8 brick-making operations, 2 sugar refineries, and 15 windmills. On the whole, though, economic growth in Ukrainian cities was slow throughout



Map 15 Extent of colonization

the 18th century. This fact made the coming boom in southern Ukraine all the more dramatic.

The Opening of the South

For ages, the primordial drive of the East Slavs to the rich black-earth region in the south and to the Black Sea had been a constant factor in the history of Ukraine. By the end of the 18th century, these goals had finally been attained. It was largely through the efforts of the Russian imperial government that the southern third of Ukraine was opened up to development, an achievement analogous to the opening up of the American west. In the colonization of the south, the interests of Ukrainian society coincided with the aims of Russian imperial expansion.

Even before the destruction of the Sich and the absorption of the Crimean Khanate, the colonization of the Black Sea hinterlands had already been under way. Because of the increasing exploitation of the peasantry in the Hetmanate and the Polish-ruled Right Bank, thousands of runaways raised the population of the Zaporozhian lands from a mere 11,000 males in 1740 to over 100,000 males in 1775. Moreover, the imperial government encouraged colonization by foreigners. In 1752, in spite of the protests of the Zaporozhians, several thousand Orthodox Serbs who were fleeing persecution in the Catholic Habsburg empire were assigned to a western portion of the Cossack lands. The new colony was called New Serbia. A year later, another Serbian colony – Slavo Serbia – was established east of the Sich. During the reign of Catherine II, German settlers also received generous land grants in the area. Meanwhile, the Russian administrative and military presence in the south grew steadily. Zaporozhian resistance to these encroachments only hastened the destruction of the Sich in 1775. With the Zaporozhians gone and the Crimean Khanate dismantled, the great boom in the settlement of the south began in the 1780s.

In order to attract nobles to the new lands, the imperial government offered them attractive inducements. The nobles (mostly Russian officers and civil servants) received grants of 4000 acres each on condition that they settle twenty-five peasant households on them. But although land was plentiful, peasants were not. To attract peasants, nobles were obliged to make concessions to them. Instead of the usual four or five days of labor obligations, newcomers only had to work two days to earn the right to use large, 160-acre plots. Many of the peasants recruited were Ukrainians from the Right Bank. However, numerous Russian Old Believers, Germans, and Moldavians also moved into the province, which, despite repeated reorganizations and name changes, was generally known as Novorossiiia (New Russia). By 1796, its population was already an impressive 554,000 males, 80% of whom were Russians and Ukrainians.

Even more rapid than the colonization of the steppe was the growth of cities along the Black Sea coast. Cities named Oleksandrivsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odessa sprang up on the sites of ancient Greek polises or old Turkish fortresses. They were inhabited by a cosmopolitan population consisting of Russians, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews. Grain was the mainstay of the flourishing trade that developed on the Black Sea. For centuries, Ukraine had produced an abundance of wheat, but it had lacked convenient access to world markets. When the new Black Sea ports finally provided it, both grain producers and merchants were quick to take advantage of the new opportunities this afforded. Between 1778 and 1787, harvests in Novorossiiia increased by 500%. Foreign trade in the Black Sea ports, primarily Odessa, leaped by 2200% between 1764 and 1793. Landowners, who once produced primarily for home consumption, now produced for commerce. At long last, Ukraine ceased to be Europe's steppe frontier and now became the granary for the entire continent.

Demographic and Spatial Dimensions

By the end of the 18th century – a period when population growth in Europe increased dramatically – Ukrainians numbered close to 10 million and, following the Russians, inhabited the largest land area in Europe. But lacking a state of their own and governed by foreign states, they were politically imperceptible. For an overview of the regions in the Russian Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that were largely inhabited by Ukrainians, see table 3.

The population density of the Ukrainian lands was uneven. The most heavily populated region was Eastern Galicia with a population density of 35 per sq. km; on the Left Bank it was 25 per sq. km; on the Right Bank 20 per sq. km; and in the recently acquired steppe region of southern Ukraine, it was a mere 5 per sq. km. By comparison, Western Europe at this time had an average population density of about 50 per sq. km. The ethnic composition of the lands inhabited by Ukrainians also varied greatly from region to region. Ukrainians made up about 95% of the population of the Left Bank; about 90% of the Right Bank; close to 75% of Eastern Galicia; and about 65% of southern Ukraine. Migratory movement was considerable and most of it flowed from the Left Bank to the Right and especially to the south.

The Right Bank under Polish Rule

Despite the gradual loss of its autonomy, the Hetmanate on the Left Bank remained a distinctly Ukrainian political, cultural, and socioeconomic entity governed by its own native elite for over a century. This self-rule was not the case for the approximately 50% of Ukrainians who remained under Polish

TABLE 3
Ukrainian-inhabited lands in the late 18th century

Territory	Land area (sq. km)	Population (approx.)
Left-Bank Hetmanate or Malorossia (Russian Empire)	92,000	2,300,000
Sloboda Ukraine (Russian Empire)	70,000	1,000,000
Southern Ukraine (Russian Empire)	185,000	1,000,000
Right-Bank Ukraine (Commonwealth)	170,000	3,400,000
Eastern Galicia (Commonwealth)	55,000	1,800,000
Transcarpathia (Habsburg Empire)	13,000	250,000
Bukovyna (Ottoman Empire until 1772)	5,000	150,000
Total	585,000	10,000,000

rule. With their elite largely Polonized and lacking any political institutions, these Ukrainians (the vast majority of whom were peasants) were helpless in the face of extreme socioeconomic and religious oppression. Little remained of the once dynamic cultural centers of Western Ukraine. Especially calamitous was the fate of the Right Bank. This original homeland of the Cossacks and the primary arena for the 1648 uprising had initially seemed destined to become the center for a new Cossack order. But the devastating wars of the period of the Ruin turned it into a depopulated wasteland. Poland regained it in 1667 although it was not until 1713, that the Right Bank again saw the establishment of the Polish *szlachta* order.

Dividing up the land into the four traditional provinces of Volhynia, Podilia, Bratslav, and Kiev (the city itself remained under Russian control), the Poles proceeded to sell or distribute vast stretches of open land to a few magnate families. The most prominent of these were the Lubomirski, Potocki, Czartoryski, Branicki, Sanguszko, and Rzewuski families. By the middle of the 18th century, about forty magnate families, many of whom were the sons or grandsons of the Polish grandees who had been expelled in 1648, owned almost 80% of the Right Bank. Just as they had a century earlier, the magnates enticed peasants into the area by offering them obligation-free leases on the land for fifteen to twenty years. The peasants responded with enthusiasm, pouring in from Galicia, the Left Bank, and even central Poland. Predictably, as the land became more settled and the time limits on these *slobody* ran out, the landlords' demands on the peasantry increased. By the end of the 18th

century, the peasants in most of the northwestern lands of the region had become enserfed and forced to work the nobles' estates for four to five days a week. In the less settled areas in the south, conditions were somewhat more favorable because rents rather than labor were the primary form of peasant obligation there.

While the countryside rebounded quickly, the revitalization of the urban centers on the Right Bank was a slower process. In addition to the destruction they had suffered, the towns were bedevilled by their old nemesis: the nobles. Enconced in their self-sufficient country estates, the nobles undermined the development of the towns in various ways: the numerous craftsmen who worked on the nobles' estates competed with those in the towns; burghers were banned from participating in such lucrative enterprises as milling, textile manufacturing, potash works, and especially the profitable distilleries of the nobles; many towns were towns in name only because they were the private property of magnates, with upwards of 80% of their population consisting of peasants who worked the surrounding lands. Despite these difficulties, some towns, such as Lutsk and Dubno in Volhynia, Kamianets-Podilskyi and Bar in Podilia, and Berdychiv and Uman in the provinces of Kiev and Bratslav, managed to grow perceptibly, thanks mainly to the active role they played in local and international trade. Much of this trade was carried on by Jews who were highly urbanized. The primary exports of the Right Bank were grain and cattle. Traditionally, these had been shipped overland to the West or to Baltic ports; however, as the 18th century came to a close, Polish magnates gradually shifted their orientation to the ports on the Black Sea coast.

Almost all the wealth generated by the Right Bank went into the pockets of the Polish "kinglets" whose holdings and extravagance became legendary. The Lubomirski family alone owned 31 towns and 738 villages, while one member of the Potocki clan had 130,000 serfs and was attended at his court by 400 noblemen. An example of the conspicuous consumption of the magnates is provided by a description of one of their banquets at which 60 oxen, 300 calves, 50 sheep, 150 pigs, and close to 20,000 fowl were washed down with 270 barrels of Hungarian wine, not to mention huge quantities of other beverages. With the costs of such extravaganzas being borne by the Ukrainian peasantry, it was evident that the Polish *szlachta* chose not to draw any lessons from 1648.

Another example of the resurgence of the old habits of the *szlachta* was renewed persecution of the Orthodox on the Right Bank. With the strong backing of the Polish government and army, the Greek Catholic hierarchy conducted a systematic campaign to undermine the Orthodox clergy and convert its parishioners to Catholicism. It was so effective that, by the 1760s, there were only about twenty Orthodox parishes left in the provinces of Kiev and Podilia. Deprived of their churches, the Orthodox came to view their monasteries as the strongholds of their faith. In 1761, Melkhysedek Znachko-

Iavorsky, the young and energetic abbot of the Montronynsky Trinity Monastery and leader of the Orthodox on the Right Bank, began to organize opposition to Catholic and Greek Catholic pressure. His most important act was to ask Catherine II of Russia to come to the aid of the Orthodox of Poland. With the involvement of Orthodox Russia, the religious issue on the Right Bank took on a new and ominous dimension.

The haidamaky Except for the relatively few Cossacks who were hired to serve in the private armies of the Polish magnates, Cossackdom no longer existed on the Right Bank. As a result, in contrast to the situation that had existed in 1648, the oppressed peasantry lacked the leadership that could help it stand up against the *szlachta*. Nonetheless, a widespread, albeit haphazard, form of popular resistance did emerge. Its participants were called *haidamaky*. Like the word "Cossack," the term *haidamak* was also of Turkic origin and meant "vagrant" or "robber." From the early 18th century onward, it was applied by the Poles to those runaway peasants who hid deep in the forests from whence they emerged periodically to plunder isolated nobles' estates. The phenomenon of social outcasts making a living by robbing the rich, often with the support of the masses, was a common one in early modern Europe. In analyzing it, the English historian Eric Hobsbawm coined the term "social banditry." According to him, "social bandits" were motivated by a combination of simple, predatory instincts and semi-altruistic desires to avenge the oppression of their compatriots by expropriating the property of the rich.¹ But apart from these vaguely idealistic motivations, "social bandits" had no well-defined ideology or plan to establish an alternate socioeconomic system to the one that already existed. To a large extent, Hobsbawm's concept can be applied to the *haidamaky*.

Appearing initially as a minor irritant, the *haidamaky* gradually became a major threat to the Right Bank *szlachta*. One reason for their growing numbers was the expiration of the fifteen-to-twenty-year exemptions from peasant obligations. After so many years of freedom, many peasants refused suddenly to accept enserfment and preferred instead to join the *haidamaky*. Doing so was made all the easier by the weakness of the Polish army. Because of *szlachta* unwillingness to finance a large army, the forces of the Commonwealth had dwindled to only 18,000 men. Of these, 4000 had been assigned to the Right Bank – too few to ensure order. But perhaps the crucial factor contributing to the growth of the *haidamak* movement was *haidamak* proximity to the Zaporozhian Sich from whence supplies, recruits and, most important of all, experienced leaders could be obtained.

The *haidamaky* were especially dangerous to the *szlachta* at times when the Poles were distracted by international conflicts or crises. Thus, in 1734, when the Russians and two Polish factions were fighting over the election of a new Polish king, an officer in the private army of Prince Jerzy Lubomirski by the

name of Verlan deserted and proclaimed a revolt against the *pany* (lords). Falsely declaring that he had the support of the Russian empress, Verlan mobilized about 1000 *haidamaky* and peasants into Cossack-style units and embarked on an extended plundering raid through Bratslav, Volhynia, and Galicia. Polish forces finally forced him to seek refuge in Moldavia. Encouraged by his success, other *haidamak* bands sprang up to emulate Verlan's achievements. The *szlachta*, however, fought fire with fire. It bribed a noted *haidamak* leader, the Zaporozhian Sava Chaly, to hunt down his compatriots. For several years, Chaly performed his task most effectively until he was assassinated by Zaporozhians on Christmas day in 1741. In 1750, *haidamak* outbursts again increased substantially. In the province of Bratslav alone, 27 towns and 111 villages were plundered. Only the arrival of army reinforcements quelled what had become a major conflagration.

"Social banditry" was also widespread in Western Ukraine, especially in the Carpathian highlands. There, bands of outlaws, called *opryshky*, usually numbered thirty to forty men and frequently attacked noblemen, rich merchants, and Jewish leaseholders. The most famous of the *opryshky* was Oleksa Dovbush who, in a manner reminiscent of the mythical Robin Hood, distributed among the poor much of the booty he robbed from the rich, thus gaining great popularity among the Carpathian highlanders. After Dovbush was murdered in 1741 by the husband of his mistress, other outlaw leaders, such as Vasył Buiurak and Ivan Boichuk, emerged to take his place. The second of these, after suffering a setback in Galicia, fled to the Zaporozhian Sich from where he attempted, unsuccessfully, to lead another band back to the west. Despite repeated efforts by Polish authorities to repress them, the *opryshky* continued to operate in the Carpathians until the region became part of the Austrian Empire in 1772.

Koliivshchyna 1768 was a year of general unrest. In the Commonwealth, the *szlachta* was becoming increasingly irritated by the constant intervention of Catherine II of Russia in Polish affairs. First she pushed through the election of her lover, Stanisław Poniatowski, as king of Poland; then she forced the Poles to guarantee religious freedom to the Orthodox. Infuriated by Russian bullying, the Polish nobles formed the so-called Confederation of Bar in February 1768 and attacked the Russian troops based in their homeland. For the Orthodox of the Commonwealth, these were anxious times. Many were convinced that the Bar Confederates would turn on them because of the support they received from the Russians. Others decided to strike at the *szlachta* before it attacked them.

In May 1768, a band of seventy *haidamaky*, led by Maksym Zalizniak, a Zaporozhian from the Left Bank, set out from the Montronynsky Monastery. As they moved northward into the settled parts of the Right Bank, Zalizniak's men urged the peasants to revolt. Their manifestos declared: "The time has

come to liberate ourselves from slavery ... to take vengeance for all the suffering, scorn, and unprecedented oppression that we have suffered at the hands of our masters."² Within days, the band was inundated with recruits from the peasantry and roving *haidamaky*. Town after town fell to the rebels: Fastiv, Cherkasy, Korsun, Bohuslav, and Lysianka. By early June, over 2000 *haidamaky* surrounded Uman, a well-fortified town in which thousands of nobles, Catholic and Greek Catholic priests, and Jewish leaseholders had sought refuge. The fate of Uman was sealed when Ivan Honta (Gonta), an officer in Stefan Potocki's guard, went over to the rebels with his entire unit. When the town surrendered shortly thereafter, a merciless massacre ensued in which thousands of men, women, and children were brutally killed.

Late in June, the entire provinces of Kiev and Bratslav and parts of Podilia and Volhynia were in rebel hands. Only the presence of Polish and Russian troops in the other West Ukrainian lands prevented them from joining the revolt. The downfall of the rebellion was brought about unexpectedly by the Russians. Worried that the uprising might spread to the Left Bank, Catherine II ordered her commander, General Mikhail Kretchetnikov, to aid the Poles. On the night of 6 July 1768, Kretchetnikov invited the unsuspecting Zalizniak, Honta, and other *haidamak* leaders to a banquet at which they and their astounded followers were arrested. After surrendering Honta (who was tortured and executed) and 800 of his men to the Poles, the Russians exiled Zalizniak and the rest of the *haidamaky* to Siberia. For the next several years, the Polish commander, Jozef Stepkowski, continued to exact a terrible revenge on the Ukrainian peasants, thousands of whom he tortured to death at his headquarters at Kodnia. Thus the last great uprising of the Ukrainian peasantry against its Polish lords came to an inglorious end.

Cultural Activity

The 18th century was a paradoxical era in the history of Ukrainian culture. It witnessed a remarkable flowering of Ukrainian arts and literature, expressed in the ornate Baroque style. Almost simultaneously, however, it saw the creation of conditions that deprived Ukrainian culture of its distinctive features and forced it to adapt to Russian imperial models.

The church For centuries, the Orthodox church had been the focal point and generator of cultural activity in Ukraine. As a result of its struggle against Polish Catholicism, it came to embody Ukrainian distinctiveness. But this distinctiveness receded once the Russian Empire stepped forward as the champion of all the Orthodox – Ukrainians included. Deprived of its *raison d'être*, the Ukrainian church lost its driving force. At about the same time, it ceased to exist as a separate entity.

The absorption of the Ukrainian church into the imperial ecclesiastical es-

tablishment was a parallel development to the liquidation of the autonomy of the Hetmanate. For a time after it accepted the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Moscow in 1686, the Ukrainian church flourished: its schools were the best in the empire; its well-educated churchmen were eagerly sought out by Russia; and, thanks to Mazepa's patronage, its economic base was sound. Yet, there were developments that did not bode well. As early as 1686, the diocese of Chernihiv was detached from the metropolitanate of Kiev and placed under the authority of Moscow. Somewhat later, the same was done with the diocese of Pereiaslav.

The authority of the Kievan metropolitan was curtailed even more between 1690 and 1710, when such old bastions of Ukrainian Orthodoxy as the dioceses of Lviv, Peremyshl, and Lutsk finally succumbed to Polish pressure and went over to the Greek Catholics. The most devastating blow came in 1721 when Peter I abolished the Moscow patriarchate and established the Holy Synod, a bureaucratic body consisting of churchmen and government officials, that supervised church affairs. This in effect made the Orthodox church in both Russia and Ukraine a bureaucratic appendage of the state. Ukrainians were deeply involved in these changes: Teofan Prokopovych, the tsar's closest adviser in ecclesiastical affairs, supported them, while Stefan Iavorsky, the leading Orthodox cleric in the empire, was opposed to them.

It was only a matter of time before bureaucratic centralism undermined the autonomy and distinctiveness of the Ukrainian church. In 1722, Varlaam Voniatovych was appointed by the Holy Synod to head the Ukrainian church, rather than elected by his peers, as had been the custom. Because he persistently protested against the reforms, he was exiled to the far north in 1730. Xenophobic Russian churchmen, long suspicious of Ukrainians whom they accused of being "contaminated" with Latin influences, proceeded to mold the Ukrainians in their own image. Under the pretext of rooting out "heretical deviations," the Holy Synod forced Ukrainians to print their books, paint their icons, and build their churches according to Russian models. In 1786, all ecclesiastical lands were secularized and the church became totally dependent on the government for financial support. By the end of the century, most of the hierarchy in Ukraine consisted of Russians or Russified Ukrainians. The Ukrainian Orthodox church, once individualistic and Western-oriented, now became merely a ready medium for the dissemination of imperial Russian culture.

Education In comparison with Russia, the educational level in the Hetmanate was high. In the 1740s, data from seven out of ten regimental districts revealed that there were 866 primary schools that taught the rudiments of reading and writing in a three-year course. This structure contrasted sharply with the Right Bank, where the Jesuits controlled most of the schools and Polish-run primary education was practically unavailable to Ukrainian peas-

ants. This was one of the reasons why the Right Bank played only a minor role in Ukrainian cultural life of the period.

On the secondary level, the Left Bank could boast several colleges, such as those at Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, and Kharkiv. The principal institution of the educational system was the Kiev Mohyla Academy, which was raised to the status of an academy in 1701. Generously subsidized by Mazepa, it became one of the leading schools in the Orthodox world. In the decade before the Battle of Poltava, it enrolled as many as 2000 students a year. Its faculty included such luminaries as Ioasaf Krokovsky, Stefan Iavorsky, and Teofan Prokopovych. So respected was the academy's rigorous twelve-year course of study that hundreds of its teachers and graduates were eagerly recruited by Russian rulers to fill the highest ecclesiastical and government posts in the empire.

The Kiev Academy's relations with Russian rulers were not always amicable, however. After the Mazepa episode, a tsarist crackdown reduced the academy's student body to less than 200. During the 1740s, under the dedicated leadership of Rafail Zaborovsky, enrollment rose again to over 1000 and the academy experienced one last period of growth. Many of the causes for its ultimate decline were of its own making. Closely bound to the church and staffed by clerics, the academy continued to stress traditional subjects such as philosophy, theology, rhetoric, and logic. Its scholastic pedagogical methods were badly dated and attempts to assimilate the rationalistic, scientific currents emanating from Europe were halfhearted and ineffective. Because of its ecclesiastical orientation and traditionalism, the academy failed to attract students interested in acquiring modern knowledge. By 1790, over 90% of its 426 students were the sons of clerics. Eventually, the famous old institution was transformed into a theological seminary. Meanwhile, those Ukrainians who desired a modern education enrolled in great numbers in the new Russian institutions (such as Moscow University or the Medical Academy) that were established in the 1750s. Aware that their institutions of higher learning were outdated, Hetman Rozumovsky and the *starshyna* requested permission from the imperial government to found a university at Baturyn, but it was denied. By the end of the 18th century, a complete reversal had taken place: it was no longer in Ukraine but in Russia that the leading educational institutions of the empire were to be found.

Cultural achievements From about the mid 17th to the late 18th centuries, the Baroque style dominated artistic and intellectual expression in Ukraine. Its advent coincided with and helped to mold an impressive cultural epoch in the history of the land. Catering to the tastes of the elite, the Baroque emphasized grandeur, sumptuousness, and decorativeness. It sought to stimulate the senses and thereby sway the mind. It stressed form over content, complexity over simplicity, and synthesis over originality.

But it was perhaps the penchant for synthesis that made the Baroque especially appealing to Ukrainians. Situated between the Orthodox East and the Latin West, they were naturally attracted to a synthesizing style. The Baroque did not bring new ideas to Ukraine; rather, it provided new techniques, such as paradox, exaggeration, allegory, and contrast, all of which helped the cultural elite to define, elaborate, and expound old truths more effectively. Many members of this elite were not "Ukrainian" in the sense of showing interest in local affairs or national causes. Their primary frame of reference was the whole Orthodox world or the empire. For this reason, some modern Ukrainian cultural historians have criticized them for their lack of national roots, their aridness, and their isolation from the life around them. Nonetheless, the Baroque brought to Ukraine a cultural dynamism, a desire to shine, and a thirst for Western contacts. It would be a long time before Ukrainian cultural life would again be as ebullient.

Literature and the arts Many of these Baroque features were reflected in the works of the so-called migratory birds – Ukrainians who had studied in Polish or West European institutions and had returned to Kiev to teach in the academy. Because of their European sophistication, they were summoned by Peter I to Russia to head its ecclesiastical and educational institutions. Foremost among them were Teofan Prokopovych, Stefan Iavorsky, Dmytro Tuptalo, and Simeon Polotsky. But there were many others. Indeed, between 1700 and 1762, over seventy Ukrainians and Belorussians occupied the highest ecclesiastical posts in the empire. The much more numerous Russians filled only forty seven. Although most of their careers were spent in the north, some of these peripatetic churchmen-scholars made significant cultural contributions when they were still in Kiev. As a professor of poetics at the Kiev Academy, Prokopovych wrote his famous historical drama, *Vladimir*, in 1705 to commemorate the introduction of Orthodoxy to Rus'. Dedicated to Mazepa and Peter I, the play contained strong traces of patriotism, elements of which were also evident in Prokopovych's concept of Kiev as the "second Jerusalem." However, these sentiments did not prevent Prokopovych from becoming the leading ideologist for Peter's secularizing and centralizing reforms. Stefan Iavorsky, a rector of the Kiev Academy, who in 1721 rose to the highest position in the Russian church, was famous for his elegant poems written in Ukrainian, Polish, and Latin. While in Russia, he wrote "The Rock of the Faith," an eloquent attack on Protestantism.

The Kiev Academy also produced another breed of writers. Neither clerics nor professors, they were students who went on to become Cossack officers or chancellorists. In contrast to the theological issues, flowery panegyrics, and learned disputations that absorbed their teachers, these writers were primarily interested in the history of their homeland and composed the so-called Cossack chronicles. The most interesting of these works was written

by Samuil Velychko, a chancellorist who completed his "Tale of the Cossack Wars with the Poles" in 1720. In the introduction to his work, this bookish Cossack asked: "Is there anything so pleasant, kind reader, and so satisfying to the curious disposition of man ... as the study of books and the knowledge of past events and human actions?"³ Velychko then explained how the devastation of Ukraine had kindled his interest in his land's past:

I saw in various places many human bones, dry and bare under the naked sky and I asked myself, "Whose bones are these?" My answer was: "The bones of all those who died in these wastes." My heart and spirits were oppressed, since our beautiful land, Little Russian Ukraine, which before was inundated with the blessings of the world, has now been turned by God's will into a desert, and our own famous forefathers have been forgotten. I have asked many old people why this happened, for what reasons and by whom was this land of ours turned into ruin, but their replies were varied and contradictory. Therefore, I found it impossible to learn from these various explanations the true reason for the downfall and destruction of our country.⁴

Another work of this genre was written by Hryhorii Hrabianka. Entitled "The Most Bitter Wars of Bohdan Khmelnytsky," it proposed to show that "the Ukrainians are the equal of others." In their analyses of the recent past, both Velychko and Hrabianka strongly supported the claims of the *starshyna* to socioeconomic and political dominance in Ukraine. The liquidation of the Hetmanate also sparked a literary response. For example, in 1762, Semen Divovych wrote a long, polemical poem entitled "The Dialogue of Little Russia with Great Russia," in which he defended Ukraine's right to autonomy. The works of Hryhorii Poletyka were written in the same vein. A revealing insight into the mentality of the Cossack elite was provided by the diaries and journals of Mykola Khanenko, Iakiv Markovych, and Pylyp Orlyk.

The arts also reached a high point in the 18th century. Ukrainian artists, most of whom worked in Russia, were especially prominent in music, with composers such as Dmytro Bortniansky, Maksym Berezovsky, and Artem Vedel laying the foundations for the great Ukrainian and Russian choral traditions. Many of their works were influenced by Ukrainian folk melodies. In painting, Dmytro Levytsky, and in architecture, Ivan Hryhorovych Barsky, achieved widespread recognition. Early in the century, Mazepa's financial support led to the construction of a series of churches in the so-called Cossack Baroque style which was more restrained and elegant than its West-European models. Later in the century, such glorious examples of Baroque architecture as the church in the Kievan Cave Monastery and the cathedrals of St Andrew in Kiev and St George in Lviv were erected. In the countryside, meanwhile, folk theatre (*vertep*) proliferated and wandering minstrels or bandurists appeared in great numbers.

Skovoroda (1722–94) Undoubtedly, the most original Ukrainian intellectual of the age was Hryhorii Skovoroda. The son of a poor Left-Bank Cossack, Skovoroda enrolled in the Kiev Mohyla Academy at the age of twelve. His long and varied education included extensive travel in the West and legend has it that he walked through much of central Europe in order to observe the people more closely. He mastered Latin, Greek, Polish, German, and Old Church Slavonic and was thoroughly familiar with the philosophical writings of ancient and modern writers. Between 1751 and 1769, Skovoroda intermittently taught poetics and ethics at the colleges of Pereiaslav and Kharkiv. However, the antagonism of the ecclesiastical hierarchy to his unorthodox views and pedagogical methods led him to abandon formal teaching and to undertake the life of a wandering philosopher.


Often called the “Ukrainian Socrates,” Skovoroda traversed his native Left Bank and Sloboda Ukraine on foot, engaging all types of people in markets, roads, and village gardens in probing philosophical discussions. His major concern was the attainment of true happiness for the individual. According to Skovoroda, the key was to “know thyself” and to do in life that for which one was naturally suited. Personal independence had to be maintained at all cost and unnecessary riches and honors avoided. This conviction led Skovoroda to criticize the *starshyna* and clergy openly for their exploitation of the peasantry. His numerous writings included collections of poetry, textbooks on poetics and ethics, and philosophical treatises. Living as he preached, Skovoroda enjoyed great popularity among the common people and many of his views were incorporated into folk songs and *dumy*. It is said that for his gravestone Skovoroda prepared the following epitaph: “The world tried to entrap me, but it did not succeed.”



This vibrant, multifaceted cultural epoch drew to a close at the end of the century. As a result of Peter I’s conquests, Russia obtained its long-sought-after “window to the West” in the Baltic – and Ukraine’s invigorating role as transmitter of cultural influences became redundant. Imperial borders greatly reduced Ukraine’s contacts with the West. Now it was Russia – benefiting from direct access to Europe as well as from the westernizing efforts of its monarchs and from the “brain drain” from Ukraine – that moved to the cultural vanguard. Meanwhile, Ukraine, isolated and defensively traditionalist, sank into provincialism. Having lost its political autonomy, it was now in danger of losing its cultural distinctiveness as well.



Church-fortress in 15th-century Podolia



A Cossack camp, based on a contemporary engraving

Zaporozhians dancing by T. Kalynsky, late 18th century





Lviv in early 17th century



Battle of Poltava, 1709



Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Contemporary engraving by Hondius



Zaporozhians Writing a Letter to the Turkish Sultan. Painting by E. Repin (1891)



Students of the Kiev Academy from engraving of late 17th–early 18th century



Title page of Kiev Academy thesis. Engraving by H. Levytsky (1739)



Peasant girl

Peasant

Four inhabitants of Left-Bank Ukraine. Engravings by T. Kalynsky (1778–82)



Noble woman



Cossack colonel



Church on Left-Bank Ukraine, late 18th-century engraving

Part Four

Ukraine under Imperial Rule



This page intentionally left blank

Russian and Austrian Imperial Rule in Ukraine

For close to 150 years, from the late 18th to the early 20th centuries, Ukrainians lived in two empires: about 80% of them were subjects of the Russian emperors, and the remainder inhabited the Habsburg empire.* Thus, at the dawn of the modern era, Ukrainians found themselves in political systems that were radically different from those to which they had been accustomed. Like all empires, those of the Russian Romanovs and the Austrian Habsburgs were vast territorial conglomerates containing huge populations of ethnically and culturally diverse peoples. Political power was highly centralized and vested in the person of the emperor, who saw no need to take into account the views or desires of his subjects. Emperors and their officials demanded absolute obedience and loyalty from their subjects, viewing these obligations not only as political duties, but also as moral and religious ones. In return for subservience, empires promised their subjects security, stability, and order. It was an arrangement that many of the empire's subjects found reasonable and even attractive.

In governing their numerous and widely scattered subjects, emperors depended primarily on the army and the bureaucracy. The army defended and, if the opportunity arose, expanded imperial borders. It could also serve to preserve internal order. The bureaucracy extracted taxes (most of which went to support itself and the army) and attempted to arrange society in a manner that best served the interests of the empire. In contrast to the nobles – both Ukrainian *starshyna* and Polish *szlachta* – who dominated Ukrainian society in the 18th century and acted on the principle of the less government, the better, the imperial bureaucrats who governed in the 19th century believed that

* In the 18th and 19th centuries the Ukrainians in the Russian Empire were usually called Little Russians (*Malorossy*). Those in the Austrian Empire continued to refer to themselves as Ruthenians (*Rusyny*).

the more rules and regulations they imposed on society, the better off society would be. Although local elites continued to be important, it was increasingly imperial ministers, based in far-off capitals, who made the crucial decisions that affected the lives of Ukrainians.



The Russian Empire

The Russian Empire was one of the largest in the world. Apart from its imposing size, it possessed political features that differed markedly from those of other European powers. Nowhere on the continent did rulers have the unlimited power of the tsar-emperors. Nowhere was the bureaucracy as domineering, the police as harsh, or the people as bereft of rights as in Russia. In the 18th century, as a result of the modernizing reforms of Peter I and Catherine II, the empire had come a long way from its rude, semioriental beginnings in the principality of Moscow. It boasted a huge, modern army, a growing European-style bureaucracy, and an increasingly Westernized elite. Yet, despite these changes, autocracy – the central principle of old Muscovite politics that stipulated that the tsars had absolute power over all their subjects and over all aspects of their lives – was not abandoned by Russia's rulers.

At the onset of the 19th century, there were a few ambiguous indications that the young and popular Alexander I might push reforms to their logical conclusion and grant his subjects a constitution, thereby replacing autocracy with the rule of law. But it soon became apparent that the “enlightened” emperor did not treat the idea of a constitution seriously. Nevertheless, he did raise hopes in the tiny liberal segment of the imperial elite, and in December 1825, immediately after his death, a group of nobles attempted a coup for the purpose of establishing constitutional government. Although the Decembrist Revolt, as it was called, failed miserably, the new emperor, Nicholas I, was deeply shaken by this challenge to his authority and resolved to impose greater control over his subjects than ever before.

A military man at heart, Nicholas I attempted to impose the discipline and regimentation of his beloved army on the entire society. To attain his goals, he expanded the bureaucracy, and in 1826, introduced the Third Section of the Imperial Chancellery, Russia's first secret police. He also ordered the formation of the Corps of Gendarmes, or regular police, and greatly increased censorship. Because of such measures, the Russian Empire during the lengthy reign of Nicholas I entered a period that the great Russian historian Vasilii Kliuchevsky called “the most bureaucratic era in our history.”¹

The Russian imperial presence in Ukraine Adherents of Russian autocracy often cited another argument in its favor. It related to the multiethnic na-

ture of the empire and was formulated most clearly by Prince Oleksander Bezborodko, one of the most illustrious of the many Ukrainians who joined the imperial service and, it should be noted, a man who was known for his love of his native Ukraine: "Russia is an autocratic state. Its size, the variety of its inhabitants and customs, and the many other considerations make it [autocracy] the only natural form of government for Russia. All arguments to the contrary are futile, and the least weakening of the autocratic power would result in the loss of many provinces, the weakening of the state, and countless misfortunes for the people."² Attitudes such as this encouraged bureaucrats to administer the empire as if it consisted of a single people – the Russians – and to disregard the different ethnic origins and historical traditions of its many other subjects.

Because Ukrainians were linguistically and culturally closely related to the Russians, the government found it easy to view Ukraine essentially as a Russian land. If one were to ask an imperial official (and very few people ever dreamed of doing so) by what right Russia ruled much of Ukraine, the reply would have been similar to the inscription on a medal struck in honor of Catherine II in 1793, which read: "I have recovered what was torn away." The implication was that Ukraine had always been an integral part of Russia and that it was only as a result of historical accident that it had been temporarily separated from it. The differences that existed between Russians and Ukrainians, an imperial bureaucrat would argue, were simply the result of this temporary separation. Now that they were united once again with the Russians, Ukrainians, or "Little Russians," were expected to lose their distinguishing features and become "true Russians." Until the collapse of the empire, it was government policy to speed this "natural" process along.

A concrete and ubiquitous sign of the imperial presence in Ukraine was the army. Its numerous garrisons and forts dotted the countryside and its commanders demanded onerous obligations from the populace. The most dreaded military burden was conscription, introduced in Ukraine in 1797. For those unfortunates who fell into the hands of recruiting agents, the length of service was twenty-five years. Because of the inhumane discipline and frequent wars, such a term of service was widely regarded as tantamount to a death sentence. Little wonder that recruits were often led away in chains and landlords would punish their most troublesome serfs by having them conscripted.

An outgrowth of the tsar's militaristic approach to government was the establishment of the hated military colonies by Alexander I and his fanatically authoritarian minister, Aleksei Arakcheev, between 1816 and 1821. About 500,000 soldiers were ordered to establish settlements, which were run like military camps and in which every aspect of family life, including permission to marry and the timing of children, was regulated by strict and detailed instructions. There were about twenty of these regiment-sized settlements in

Ukraine. However, the stifling regulations proved to be counterproductive and, by 1857, most of these military colonies were disbanded. Nonetheless, they served as a telling, if extreme, example of the tsarist bureaucracy's efforts to impose military discipline on civilian activities.

The process of imposing imperial administrative structures on Ukrainian lands began as early as the 1770s, but it was not until the 1830s that it assumed its final form. At that time, Ukraine was divided into nine provinces (*gubernii*), which could be subdivided informally into three distinct regions: Left-Bank Ukraine, where Cossack and *starshyna* traditions were strongest, consisted of Chernihiv, Poltava, and Kharkiv provinces; the recently acquired Right Bank, where Polish nobles still exercised socioeconomic domination over the Ukrainian peasantry and where the towns were populated mainly by Jews, consisted of Kiev, Podilia, and Volhynia provinces; and the newly colonized south, once the domain of the Zaporozhians and the Crimean Khanate, was divided into the provinces of Katerynoslav, Kherson, and Tavria (Crimea). Each of these provinces was further subdivided into counties (*povit/uezd*), and these were broken down into townships and villages.

The hierarchy of officials who administered these units was similar throughout the empire. Provinces were headed by governors who were appointed by the tsar. Aiding the governors were an administrative board and various bureaus that dealt with matters such as public order, education, and taxes. The upper levels of the administration were usually made up of professional bureaucrats. However, on the county level and lower, many officials, such as police commandant, marshal of the nobility, and judges, were local nobles elected by nobles. The empire simply did not have enough full-time bureaucrats to fulfill all its needs.

In general, the new administrative structure worked to the disadvantage of Ukraine's oldest cities, most of which had enjoyed autonomy under the ancient Magdeburg Law. In 1835, Kiev was the last city to lose the special status associated with this law. Henceforth, most of Ukraine's cities were subordinated to the provincial administration. On the lowest administrative level – that of the village – the maintenance of law and order was the responsibility of local noblemen.

In terms of social background, the people who staffed the administration and were responsible for the day-to-day government of Ukraine in the 19th century tended to be noblemen-turned-bureaucrats. The highest offices, such as governor, usually went to officials who belonged to important aristocratic families, while middle-level offices were generally staffed by average noblemen. Such lowly positions as clerks or scribes were the domain of townsmen or sons of priests. Peasants almost never rose to even the most insignificant posts.

The ethnic composition of the bureaucracy in Ukraine varied according

to region. In Left-Bank Ukraine where scions of the old Cossack *starshyna* were recognized as nobles, well-known Ukrainian names, such as Myloradovych, Myklashevsky, Kochubei, Zavadovsky, Kapnist, and Poletyka, could be found among the highest officials. On the Right Bank, Poles and Russians predominated. And in the south where there had been an influx of various peoples from throughout the empire, the backgrounds of officials were exceedingly varied, although again, Russians predominated. It should be noted, however, that once a non-Russian entered the ranks of the bureaucracy, he tended to become Russified, often becoming more "Russian" than the Russians in the process.

The imperial bureaucracy was organized along military lines and was replete with ranks and uniforms. Many of its members were notorious for their proclivity to fawn before their superiors, while simultaneously bullying underlings. With no constitution to protect the rights of individuals, bureaucrats could, and often did, interfere in people's personal lives. Their irritating presence was mitigated somewhat by their relatively small numbers: because the Russian Empire was a comparatively poor country, it could afford to support only about 12 officials per 10,000 inhabitants. By comparison, the ratio in the West was three to four times higher.

The Russian government's inability to pay its officials adequate wages encouraged widespread corruption that was informally tolerated by the government, especially on the local level. As long as its officials supplied the imperial treasury with the assigned amount, it cared little how much they extorted from the populace on their own. While Russians were more accustomed to this burdensome bureaucratism, it was still a new and strange phenomenon for Ukrainians in the early 19th century. Perhaps this explains why it was a Ukrainian, Nikolai Gogol, who satirized the imperial bureaucracy so brilliantly in his famous play *The Inspector General* (1836).

Until the reign of Nicholas I (1825–55), the Russian Empire had only informal, haphazard police supervision and there was no institution that specialized in political repression. But, in 1826, after the shock of the Decembrist Revolt, the tsar's formation of the Third Section produced the empire's first regular secret police. Although its full-time staff was relatively small at first, the Third Section employed numerous informers who frequented fairs, taverns, universities, lectures, and other public gatherings, carefully noting suspicious views and behavior. Censorship as a means of stifling potential opposition had always been practiced in Russia, but during the reign of Nicholas I it was applied more rigorously than ever before, with special committees closely inspecting everything that appeared in print. The tsar's obsession with controlling unsanctioned ideas led Ukraine's greatest poet, Taras Shevchenko, to remark that all the peoples of the empire, "from the Finns in the north, to the Moldavians in the south are silent in every tongue."³

Yet despite its repressive features, the empire was by no means a police

state. Corrupt, inefficient, and spread over vast territories, its bureaucrats could not or would not fulfill all the instructions that poured forth from the capital. For every martinet there was usually an official who, out of kindness or for the sake of bribes, ignored minor offences or softened prescribed sentences. Moreover, foreign travel was allowed for the few who could afford it, and Western influences spread among the ruling elite, mitigating some of the worst abuses of the regime.

The Little Russian (Maloros) mentality Impressed with the empire's power and grandeur, attracted by its career opportunities, and placated by acceptance into the Russian imperial nobility, many members of the former Ukrainian *starshyna* needed little urging to become loyal, even devoted, subjects of the tsar-emperor. For them Ukraine became little more than a part, albeit an endearing one, of the imperial whole, and Ukrainians were but a "tribe" of the Russian people. They were indifferent and even antagonistic to any political action based on the notion of Ukrainian separateness. Typical of the "Little Russian mentality" were the words of Viktor Kochubei, a Ukrainian who became the chairman of the imperial council in the 1830s: "Although I was born a *khokhol* [a somewhat derogatory term for Ukrainians], I am more Russian than anyone else ... My position puts me above all sorts of petty considerations. I look at the concerns of your provinces [Ukraine] from the point of view of the common interests of our entire society. Microscopic views are not my concern."⁴

Among 20th-century historians of the nationalist school, the Little Russian mentality has been severely criticized. Viacheslav Lypynsky, the leading proponent of Ukrainian elitism and statehood in the 1920s, commented that it was a typical complex of stateless peoples. He argued that in advocating assimilation into the Russian imperial model, the Little Russians often gave up some of the best features of Ukrainians while adopting many of the worst traits of Russians.⁵ Nonetheless, the fact remains that Little Russian attitudes were quite prevalent among the 19th-century Ukrainian elite and Ukrainians themselves were sometimes the greatest opponents of Ukrainian distinctiveness.

Political Developments

It was fortunate for the Russian Empire that it had evolved into a stronger, tighter structure by the early 19th century, for this was the time when the tsarist regime was severely tested.

The Napoleonic invasion The first shock was the most traumatic. It occurred in 1812, when Napoleon's Grande Armée, numbering 640,000, invaded Russia. As is well known, Russia managed not only to repulse the invaders, but

to push them all the way back to Paris – though at great cost and with tremendous effort. The impact of the invasion on Ukraine was relatively minor. A part of Napoleon's forces broke into Volhynia and caused considerable damage there. For the most part, Ukrainians responded willingly to the tsar's call to join the war effort. Several volunteer regiments were quickly organized along Cossack lines on the Left Bank. The widespread support for these units demonstrated not only the readiness of Ukrainians to fight for the empire, but also the popularity of Cossack traditions. However, there were also rumors that several scions of Cossack *starshyna* families were drinking toasts to Napoleon's health and hoping that he would smash the tsarist empire. Recent precedents for such attitudes were not lacking. In 1791, for example, Vasyly Kapnist (a prominent member of the Left Bank nobility) had secretly journeyed to Prussia on a fruitless mission to obtain Prussian aid for a Ukrainian uprising against the tsar. Nonetheless, antitsarist attitudes were the exception and the vast majority of Ukrainians fought loyally and well in defense of the empire.

The Decembrist uprising During the lengthy Napoleonic wars, many of the tsar's officers who for years had fought in Europe were exposed to and impressed by the political institutions and values of the West. After their victorious return, they expected their seemingly liberal tsar, Alexander I, to introduce Western-style reforms in Russia. But the enigmatic ruler empowered reactionaries such as Arakcheev to rule the land instead. Deeply disillusioned, a small but dedicated group of young army officers, mostly members of Russia's most illustrious families, formed secret societies whose goal was the overthrow of autocratic rule and the establishment of constitutional government.

The first of these societies, the Union of Salvation, was founded in St Petersburg in 1816. About five years later, it broke up into two separate groups. The aristocratic Northern Society, still based in St Petersburg, continued to work for the establishment of a republic. Lacking strong leadership, it accomplished little. However, the Southern Society, based in Tulchyn in southern Ukraine where its leader, Colonel Pavel Pestel, was stationed, was much more effective. Iron-willed and talented, Pestel convinced another secret group, the Society of United Slavs, to join his organization. Among the leaders of the United Slavs were two Ukrainians, the Borisov brothers from Poltava. Pestel also managed to convince a Polish revolutionary group based in Ukraine to cooperate. Thus, by 1825, his original group of about thirty officer/conspirators had grown to approximately 160.

Pestel's program, as formulated in his "Russian Truth" (*Russkaia pravda*), was more radical than that of the northern constitutionalists. It advocated the abolition of all social and political inequalities, economic modernization of the land, leadership by a revolutionary elite, and rigid, centralized gov-



Map 16 Russian-ruled Ukraine in the 19th century

ernment. Although based in Ukraine, Pestel evinced little interest in the non-Russian peoples of the empire. He argued that, except for the Poles who had a highly developed culture of their own, all other minorities should be Russified. As for the Ukrainians in particular, he stated blankly that "Little Russia ... never was and never can be independent ... It must, therefore, surrender its right to be a separate nation."⁶ For generations, other Russian revolutionaries would hold similar views on the Ukrainian issue.

Members of the United Slavs did not share Pestel's centralist bias. They favored the reorganization of the empire along federal lines. But, despite the fact that there were Ukrainians in the United Slav leadership, Ukraine was not included among the members of the proposed confederation. There is, however, some evidence that suggests that yet another secret society, not connected with Pestel and consisting of Ukrainian noblemen existed at this time. It was led by Vasyl Lukasevych, the marshal of the nobility of Poltava. Apparently, its platform called for a return of Ukrainian autonomy.

Idealistic but amateurish, the members of both the Northern and Southern societies were caught unprepared by Alexander I's death in December 1825. After much confusion, the leaders of the Northern Society mobilized several thousand troops under their command in St Petersburg and tried to topple the new tsar, Nicholas I. The uprising failed, however, and all the leaders were arrested. In Ukraine, the Southern Society fared only slightly better. Because Pestel was arrested shortly before the uprising in the capital, leadership in Ukraine fell into the irresolute hands of the Bestuzhev-Riumin and Muraviev-Apostol brothers. Although they managed to convince about 1000 of their men to join them in revolt, efforts to gain more support from the soldiers and peasants in Ukraine failed. After a week of aimless wandering in the vicinity of Chernihiv, they were crushed by loyal troops. The Decembrist uprising, the empire's first revolutionary outburst, thus came to a disastrous conclusion.

The Polish uprising of 1830 Ukraine was the scene of yet another uprising. In November 1830, a secret society of young Polish officers, inspired by revolutions that had just occurred in France and Belgium, ignited an uprising against the Russians in Warsaw. After initial successes, however, internal conflicts dissipated Polish energies. In an effort to extend the revolt to Right-Bank Ukraine where the Polish nobility was well entrenched, a Polish force moved into Volhynia in early 1831. Although lack of support and Russian pressure forced it to retreat to Eastern Galicia, about 5000 Polish nobles on the Right Bank nevertheless attempted to continue the struggle.

It was obvious that for the Polish rebels to succeed they would need popular, that is peasant, support. In an effort to gain the backing of anti-tsarist Russians and Ukrainians, the Poles coined their famous slogan, "We fight for our freedom and yours as well." However, more than mere slogans were needed to convince Ukrainian peasants to aid their hated Polish landlords. Some of

the Polish rebels suggested freeing the serfs in return for their cooperation, but this idea was rejected by most nobles. As a result, most Ukrainian peasants on the Right Bank adopted a neutral stance, while some took this opportunity to avenge themselves on their Polish lords. Many Polish peasants also refused to back the rebellious nobles in 1830–31, indicating that even among the Poles, national consciousness and solidarity had not yet penetrated to the masses. By the middle of 1831, the uprising was crushed. But for many years thereafter, secret Polish societies continued to conspire against the tsar.

From the point of view of Ukrainian history, it is noteworthy that these conspiracies and uprisings had little to do with Ukrainians as such, although they occurred for the most part on Ukrainian soil. This fact was in itself a telling indication of how vague and emasculated the political significance of Ukraine and the Ukrainians had become in the Russian Empire in the early 19th century.

Russian Imperial Reforms

After the Polish uprising of 1830, the imperial government resolved to amalgamate the so-called western provinces that had once belonged to the Polish Commonwealth – that is, Right-Bank Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania. Just as the Left Bank had been deprived of its distinctive features in the 1780s, so too was the Right Bank to be subjected to a similar process in the 1830s and 1840s. However, in the 19th century, the process of imperial amalgamation was more systematic and thorough than it had been in the 18th century. Not only was administrative uniformity established, but an attempt was made to transform the Right Bank into a culturally “genuinely Russian land.” The policy of Russification now emerged in full force.

Although their primary goal was to reduce Polish influence on the Right Bank, Russian policies also had a great impact on the Ukrainian peasantry and the Jewish townsmen of the region. In November 1831, Tsar Nicholas I formed a special commission for the western provinces, based in Kiev. Viktor Kochubei, the commission’s chairman, was ordered “to bring these western lands into conformity with the Great Russian provinces in all respects.”⁷ Within months, all the Polish schools (there were almost no Ukrainian ones) were closed and the school system was reorganized along imperial lines, with Russian as the language of instruction. The famous Polish college at Kremianets was also closed. In its place, a Russian university, named after St Vladimir, was founded in Kiev. As far as the goals of the new university were concerned, Sergei Uvarov, the minister of education, did not mince words in his inaugural address: “The university of St Vladimir is my creation. But I will be the first to repress it if it does not fulfill its assignment ... and this is to disseminate Russian education and Russian nationality in the Polonized lands of western Russia.”⁸

The incarnation of the harsh new regime on the Right Bank was General Dmitrii Bibikov, governor-general of Kiev, Podilia, and Volhynia provinces from 1837 to 1852. During the tenure of this martinet, "whose every word was like a blow from a cane," Kiev was transformed into a bastion of Russian culture and a major stronghold of the imperial army.

Backed by powerful military forces, Bibikov carried out his policies unrestrained. On his order, about 60,000 Polish noblemen were deprived of their patents of nobility and demoted to the status of commoners. Many were exiled to the depths of Russia. About 3000 confiscated nobles' estates were transformed into military colonies and Russians were brought in to replace Poles in the bureaucracy. The abolition of the Lithuanian Statute (a law code based on medieval Western models) in 1840, together with the earlier abolition of Kiev's Magdeburg Law, marked the end of what had essentially been Western legal practices in Russian-ruled Ukraine.

Some of Bibikov's measures were aimed at the Ukrainian masses. In 1839, he renewed a campaign (originally launched by Catherine II) to convert – or rather reconvert – the Greek Catholics to Orthodoxy. In the provinces of Volhynia and Podilia, as well as in Belorussia, the Greek Catholic church, which acknowledged the supremacy of Rome, was well established, consisting of over 2 million adherents. By means of mass deportations, bribery, and even executions, Bibikov succeeded in practically eliminating the Greek Catholic church in the empire. Only a small number of Greek Catholics in the region of Kholm managed to retain their adherence to it.

Although it had certainly not been the governor-general's intention, some of his policies had unforeseen advantages for Ukrainians. For example, by supporting St Vladimir University, which had been set up as a counter-balance to Polish cultural influences in Kiev, he helped to develop an institution that would play an extremely important role in the coming Ukrainian cultural resurgence. Similarly, by organizing a commission in 1843 to assemble ancient Ukrainian documents that he hoped would prove that Ukraine had been Russian "from time immemorial," Bibikov inaugurated the first systematic collection of Ukrainian archival materials and gave Ukrainian patriots working on the commission an opportunity to delve into their land's non-Russian past.

His approach to the peasantry also had unexpected results. In 1847, hoping to gain the goodwill of the Ukrainian peasants and to alienate them even more from their Polish landlords, the governor-general introduced the Inventory Regulations. These stipulated exactly the amount of land a peasant had at his disposal and the type of work he owed his landlord. It abolished private taxation by landlords and limited their right to interfere in the peasants' personal affairs. However, in a fashion that was typical of the Russian bureaucracy, Bibikov's successors added so many amendments to the regulations that they became impossible to implement and the nobles carried on as before. Instead

of being grateful to the authorities, the confused and frustrated peasants on the Right Bank staged a series of minor revolts against them. These miscarried measures were merely one of the many indications during this highly regimented age that, despite the seemingly unshakable control the imperial regime exercised over society, it could never be sure of the full impact of its policies or of the course of social developments.

The Austrian Empire

Austria, it has been said, was an imperial organization, not a country. In the 19th century, it consisted of a hodgepodge of eleven major nationalities and a number of minor ethnic groups who inhabited much of Eastern Europe and comprised about one-seventh of Europe's population in 1800. Because no nationality represented an absolute majority in the empire, no one culture molded Habsburg imperial society to the extent that Russian culture did in the tsarist empire. And although German, which was the language of the most influential nationality in the Habsburg Empire, predominated in the army and bureaucracy, the Habsburg Empire's most striking characteristic was its ethnic diversity.

In expanding its sovereignty over its subjects, the Habsburg dynasty did not, at least at the outset, tamper with the traditional forms of government in the various kingdoms, duchies, provinces, and cities that it acquired. It was not merely that the Habsburgs did not wish needlessly to arouse opposition, but they lacked the strong, centralized institutions necessary to standardize administration. Therefore, well into the 18th century, their empire was a ramshackle, uncoordinated conglomerate, which was frequently in a state of crisis because of internal discord or external pressure.

In the 1740s, Empress Maria Theresa concluded that for the empire to survive, reforms were necessary. Despite fierce opposition from local nobilities, she pushed through a series of measures that strengthened central ruling institutions and created offices of local government. In order to staff these positions, she expanded the bureaucracy. She also laid the foundations for a large, permanent military establishment. A prudent politician, she did not, however, attempt to impose complete uniformity. In dealing with the recalcitrant Hungarians, for example, she would often choose a compromise solution rather than demand total compliance with her wishes.

An even more ardent reformer was Maria Theresa's son, Joseph II. Committed to current Western ideas of good government, he resolved to make his reign the epitome of enlightened absolutism. In the words of an English historian, "it was enlightened because Joseph II believed that it was a monarch's duty to promote the welfare of his subjects ... and absolute because it was for him alone to say in what that welfare consisted and how it should be achieved."⁹

The emperor made it his goal to improve the lot of the peasants, invigorate the stagnant economy, raise the efficiency of the bureaucracy, and improve educational facilities throughout the empire. True to his absolutist principles, he also intended to eliminate the particularistic rights and privileges that his various lands enjoyed and that greatly impeded the implementation of his reforms. Inevitably, to Joseph II's bitter disillusionment and frustration, only some of these ambitious goals could be realized. Nonetheless, Joseph II's reign marked a high point in the empire's will and ability to invigorate and renovate itself.

The aforementioned reforms were of tremendous relevance for Ukrainians because they came precisely at the time of Galicia's incorporation into the empire. Thus, from their point of view at least, Ukrainians were introduced to the Habsburg imperial system at its best.

Ukrainians under Habsburg Rule

The vast majority of Ukrainians in the Austrian Empire lived in Galicia, a southeastern part of the old Polish Commonwealth, acquired by the Habsburgs after the first partition of Poland in 1772. Two years later, Bukovyna, a small Ukrainian-inhabited area that Vienna snatched away from the faltering Ottoman Empire, was attached to Galicia. Finally, in 1795, after the third and final partition, ethnically Polish lands (including the city of Cracow) were incorporated into the province as well. Thus, while Eastern Galicia (Ukrainian: Halychyna) was inhabited primarily by Ukrainians, Western Galicia was largely Polish. The inclusion of these two peoples in one administrative province would be a future source of tension for all concerned.

There was yet another Ukrainian-inhabited region under indirect Habsburg rule. Transcarpathia, on the western slopes of the Carpathian Mountains, had since medieval times been a part of the kingdom of Hungary. In the 19th century, it remained in the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Empire and was isolated from the other Ukrainian lands.

The peasants One word summed up conditions in the Ukrainian-inhabited areas of the Habsburg empire: poverty. Hilly terrain and small plots made agriculture difficult, while the exploitive rule of the Polish nobles had left peasants in a permanent state of economic and physical exhaustion. Moreover, the plight of the small, grimy Galician towns worsened when they were cut off from their traditional markets in Russian-dominated Ukraine as a result of the partitions. Little wonder that Galicia had the dubious distinction of being one of the most destitute and backward areas of the empire.

The vast majority of West Ukrainians were enserfed peasants and exploitation was for them a fact of daily life. In return for the use of their meager plots of land, they owed their landlords labor duties that amounted to as many as

five to six days of labor per week. In addition, noblemen frequently pressed peasants into domestic service and demanded payment in agricultural products. It has been calculated that roughly one-half to one-third of a peasant's meager income went to his landlord. To make matters worse, estate owners systematically expropriated their serfs' plots and public lands, thereby decreasing the size of peasant holdings. Thus, while in 1819, the average size of a peasant's plot in Eastern Galicia had been 14 acres and a nobleman's estate 1051 acres, by 1848, their respective holdings were 9.6 acres and 1400 acres. Eastern Galicia provided a graphic example of a society in which the rich were getting richer while the poor were becoming progressively poorer.

Under such circumstances, even survival was no simple matter. Isolated in about 3500 nearly inaccessible villages and utilizing primitive farming methods, the peasants of Eastern Galicia managed to attain only about one-third the output of their Czech or Austrian counterparts. Their food intake, which consisted mainly of cabbage and potatoes, was only about one-half that of a West European farmer. When famine struck, as it often did, the already weakened serfs would perish in great numbers. In fact, there were times, such as the period between 1830 and 1850, when the death rate in Eastern Galicia exceeded the birth rate. As might be expected, the life expectancy of the West Ukrainian peasant was low, averaging only 30–40 years.

To alleviate the misery of their condition, peasants often took to drink. They were encouraged in this by their Polish landlords, who had a legal monopoly on alcohol production, and by the tavern-keepers, most of whom were Jews. Some landowners even set regular consumption quotas for their serfs, hoping thereby to dispose of the alcohol they produced. The thought of easing or improving the lot of the peasant rarely, if ever, came to the mind of the Galician nobleman. In all probability, most would have wondered at the very need or feasibility of such an idea, for to them the peasant represented a lower form of human life that defied any kind of improvement.

The clergy Not all West Ukrainians were peasants, however. The Greek Catholic clergy constituted a distinct social group that was the closest thing West Ukrainian society had to an elite. The clergy had gained a position of leadership among the peasantry by default when the native nobility had alienated itself from Ukrainian society in the 16th–17th centuries by becoming Polonized (and hence Catholicized). Because members of the lower clergy, unlike the hierarchy, were allowed to establish families, priestly dynasties evolved that often came to be associated with specific regions for many generations. In the 19th century, there were about 2000–2500 such priestly families in Eastern Galicia. Frequent assemblies, lengthy visits, and intermarriage had made the Greek Catholic clergy a tightly knit, hereditary caste with a strong sense of group solidarity.

Bound to the masses by a common faith, they enjoyed great influence and

authority among their peasant parishioners. Yet – especially prior to Habsburg rule – the material and cultural levels of the Ukrainian village priest were scarcely higher than those of the peasant. True, the priestly plots provided by the community were generally larger than those of the peasant, and fees from christenings, weddings, and funerals provided additional income. But the widow and children of deceased parish priests often lived from the same plots as new appointees, while the expense of preparing sons for the priesthood and daughters for suitable marriages bankrupted many a priest.

Because theological training was inadequate, many Greek Catholic priests in Eastern Galicia in the late 18th to early 19th centuries could barely read the Church Slavonic liturgical texts. Consequently, their worldview was not much broader than that of the peasantry. Polish nobles showed the Greek Catholic clergy little respect. For example, it was not uncommon, prior to Habsburg rule, for nobles to force priests to work on their estates. Yet these conditions yielded a positive result, for the Ukrainian clergy developed much closer personal and cultural bonds with the peasantry than did its Polish counterpart. This relationship made it easier for the Greek Catholic clergy to provide the peasantry with leadership and guidance, not only in religious, but in other matters as well. Thus, for much of the 19th century, West Ukrainian society consisted of only two social groups – a mass of peasants and a small priestly caste. As the Poles jokingly phrased it, there were among the Ukrainians only the *khlop* (peasant) and the *pop* (priest).

Because Ukrainians in West Ukraine lacked a nobility and were underrepresented among the townsmen to an even greater extent than Ukrainians in the Russian Empire, some modern historians have described their society as being “sociologically incomplete.”¹⁰ As the phrase implies, a “sociologically incomplete” society is severely handicapped; and indeed, in 19th-century Eastern Europe, Ukrainians had little access to political power because of their lack of a nobility. Without townsmen, they were excluded from commerce and industry. That is not to say, of course, that Galicia as a whole lacked a nobility or urban class. In the late 18th century, Polish nobles numbered about 95,000, or 3.4% of the population of the province, and the townsmen, most of whom were poor Jewish artisans and shopkeepers with a sprinkling of wealthy merchants, numbered about 300,000, or 10% of the population. In addition, with the coming of Habsburg rule, a new social group appeared – the bureaucrats. Mostly Germans, or German-speaking Czechs, they were never very numerous. However, tens of thousands of other Germans were also brought into the province by the Habsburg authorities as colonists in the hope that they would provide models of good farming and invigorate the rural economy. Thus, Galician society as a whole was both multiethnic and rigidly stratified, with each of its individual ethnic groups occupying its own distinct and insular social, economic, and cultural sphere.

The Impact of Habsburg Reforms on West Ukrainians

While the Habsburg reforms of the late 18th century applied to the entire empire, their impact was especially great on Galicia, which was in greatest need of improvement. Joseph II developed an especial interest in the province, which he viewed as a kind of laboratory in which he could experiment with various means of restructuring society and, specifically, of improving its productive capacity. At the outset, Vienna's goals in Galicia were twofold: first, to dismantle the old noble-dominated governmental system and to replace it with a disciplined, centralized bureaucracy, and second, to improve the socio-economic conditions of the non-noble population.

The administrative reorganization of Galicia was accomplished quickly and effectively. By 1786, Austrian laws replaced Polish ones and the nobles' assemblies were abolished. To soften the blow to the old elite and to give it a voice in government, Vienna instituted an Assembly of Estates composed of nobles and clergy. But the assembly had no real decision-making power of its own, for it could only address petitions to the emperor. Real power lay in the hands of the imperial bureaucrats. The entire province was divided into eighteen regions (their number rose to nineteen with the addition of Bukovyna), each of which was headed by an official appointed by Vienna and his German-speaking staff. At the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy was the governor, personally appointed by the emperor. The entire bureaucratic apparatus was based in Lviv, or Lemberg as the Austrians called it, which became the administrative and judicial center of the province.

The reforming emperor Of Joseph II's many reforms, the most important dealt with the peasantry. In 1781, realizing that he could not improve socio-economic conditions in Galicia if he did not alleviate the plight of the peasants, the emperor decided on a bold policy that called for the dismantling of serfdom. Among the steps taken towards this goal were the following: a limit of three days per week or 156 days per year was set on the labor that a landlord could demand from his peasants (the poorest peasants owed even less labor); additional services to landlords were strictly limited; the peasant's right to work his plot was legally recognized and the peasants received such individual rights as being able to marry without first obtaining their lord's permission, to move to other plots, and to lodge complaints against their lord in a court of law.

These were momentous changes. No longer was the Galician peasant someone who was ignored and unprotected by the law. He now became an individual with certain legal rights. This is not to say that these reforms made peasants equal to the other classes. In many ways the peasant remained subordinated and dependent upon his landlord. However, his condition im-

proved from being mere chattel to being something like a hereditary tenant whose relationship with the landlord was regulated by law. The bold and progressive nature of these reforms is all the more evident when we realize that at exactly the time they were being implemented, Joseph II's fellow monarch, Catherine II of Russia, was imposing serfdom on the peasantry of Left-Bank Ukraine.

The Greek Catholic church also benefited greatly from the new policies. From the start, Maria Theresa and Joseph II applied the principle of parity in dealing with the Greek and Roman Catholic churches. For the Greek Catholic clergy, which had long been discriminated against under the Polish regime, this principle represented a marked improvement. No longer could Polish landlords interfere in the appointment of parish priests, who now enjoyed equal legal rights with their Roman Catholic counterparts. Moreover, the economic status of the Greek Catholic clergy was elevated by the payment of modest government salaries. The crowning measure was the renewal of the office of metropolitan of Halych in 1808 after a hiatus of about 400 years. Thus, the Greek Catholic church, the one and only institution with which the Ukrainian peasantry could identify, entered the 19th century rejuvenated.

A major reason for the growing confidence of the Greek Catholic clergy was the educational reforms initiated by Maria Theresa. In 1774, the empress founded the Barbareum, a Greek Catholic seminary in Vienna that provided West Ukrainian students not only with systematic theological training, but also with an invigorating exposure to Western culture. In 1783, a larger seminary was founded in Lviv. As usual, Joseph II carried his mother's measures a step further: anxious to obtain more well-trained bureaucrats and priests, he founded a university in Lviv in 1784. It was the first such institution of higher learning on Ukrainian soil. About 250 students, mostly Poles, but also a sizable minority of Ukrainians, enrolled in its four faculties. Because the professors, most of whom were Germans, lectured in German and Latin, which the Ukrainians could not understand, a separate faculty, called the *Studium Ruthenum*, was organized for the Ukrainian students. Its language of instruction was an artificial and stilted language that combined Church Slavonic and Ukrainian vernacular.

Elementary education was practically nonexistent in Eastern Galicia. The few one-class schools that could be found in the villages were usually the domain of half-literate deacons who did little more than teach their pupils the rudiments of the alphabet and the Holy Scriptures. As early as 1774, to improve this situation, the Austrians introduced a system of three types of schools: parochial, one-class schools, using the native language of the region; three-class schools, using German and Polish; and four-year schools, preparing pupils for further training in the high schools (*gymnazia*) and universities.

The old secondary schools that a number of Catholic monastic orders had maintained for the sons of the nobility were abolished.

Impressive though they appeared, Joseph II's reforms were in reality more an indication of what he attempted rather than what he actually achieved. In Galicia, as elsewhere in the empire, many of the measures encountered insurmountable obstacles. For example, the emperor believed that by improving the lot of the peasants, he could make them and the province more productive. But it soon became apparent that Galicia's economic problems went beyond the peasantry. Unlike Russian-ruled Ukraine, Eastern Galicia had no vast, open lands to colonize or a seacoast to encourage trade. In contrast to Western Europe, where peasants were beginning to move into bustling cities to work in proliferating factories, Eastern Galicia's approximately sixty largest towns were economically stagnant. In short, economic options in the region were extremely limited. Furthermore, Vienna's economic policies only exacerbated the situation. Their goal was to keep the eastern half of the empire agricultural and to encourage industry in western provinces like Austria and Bohemia. Assigned to serve as a source of food and raw products and as a market for finished goods, Galicia in effect functioned as an internal colony of the more developed western provinces of the empire.

The reforms were also hampered by the nobles, who seized every opportunity to subvert them. Angered by the confiscations of its land and the reduction of its role in education, the Roman Catholic church was also slow to cooperate. Finally, opposition to change reached a critical point when the Hungarians, incensed by the centralizing and Germanizing policies of Vienna, threatened to revolt. Frustrated and disillusioned, Joseph II was forced to revoke many of his measures. When he died in 1790, he left behind the bitter epitaph: "Here lies Joseph II who failed in all his endeavors."

In the early 19th century, Habsburg rulers, especially the conservative Francis I, continued to retreat from the position taken by the reforming emperor. Most notably, many of the improvements in the position of the peasantry were revoked and serfdom was reinstated in effect. However, some of the changes dealing with the church, education, and law remained in force. Without them and the other enlightened precedents set by Joseph II, the liberalization of the empire that was to come in the late 19th century would have been difficult to achieve.

Ruthenianism (Rutenstvo) Although limited and incomplete, the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II nonetheless improved the conditions in which the West Ukrainians – one of the most downtrodden peoples in the empire – lived; and they affected not only the conditions of their material existence, but their views and attitudes as well. As might be expected, the reforms evoked a deep sense of gratitude among Ukrainians to the Habsburgs in general, and

Joseph II in particular. This loyalty to the dynasty became so deeply rooted that the Ukrainians were called “the Tyrolians of the East.”

This deep dependence and even subservience to the Habsburgs had its negative effects. It bred the so-called *rutenstvo*, a set of attitudes that came to prevail among the West Ukrainian elite well into the 1830s. Its proponents – mostly priests – were characterized by an extreme provincialism that identified Ukrainians exclusively with Galicia, Greek Catholicism, and the priestly caste.

The new conservatism that held sway in Vienna reinforced the suspicion of innovation and of new ideas that was inherent to the West Ukrainian clergy-elite. Aping the Polish nobility (even to the point of adopting the Polish language), the *rutentsi* practiced a pseudo-aristocratism that included looking down on the peasants and their “swineherd language.” Having had its status elevated by the Habsburgs loosened the clergy’s identification with the peasantry among whom it lived. The clergy began to look only toward Vienna, servilely accepting all that the capital deigned to grant it and posing no demands of its own. For generations, this *rutenstvo* mentality helped to maintain West Ukrainian society in its oppressed and backward state and discouraged Ukrainians from taking any initiative to improve it. Thus, in Austrian-ruled Ukraine, just as in Russian-ruled Ukraine, many members of the native elites helped to keep their own countrymen firmly set in the imperial mold.



Imperial rule exposed Ukrainians to much tighter, more extensive, and intrusive forms of political, social, and economic organization than they had ever known before. Through the intermediary of its bureaucrats, the imperial state became a major presence in Ukrainian communities. With this presence came a new feeling that in the splendid if distant imperial capital an all-powerful, all-knowing emperor was ordering, indeed, molding Ukrainian lives. As the image of awesome majesty projected by the empire – be it Russian or Austrian – captivated the Ukrainian elite, its commitment to its homeland faded. Ukrainian lands were, after all, clearly only a part of a greater whole. By the same token, consciousness of a distinct Ukrainian identity – which had been strong in the 17th- and 18th-century Cossack Ukraine – weakened.

Another feature of the imperial age was that it highlighted the existence of two distinct Ukrainian societies, one in the Russian Empire and the other in the Austrian Empire. True, Ukrainians had lived in two very different political systems since 1654, when Moscow extended its overlordship over the Left Bank while most of the Ukrainian lands remained in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. But the political, cultural, and socioeconomic significance of the West Ukrainians in the latter stages of the Commonwealth’s existence

reached such a low point that it was almost imperceptible. As we shall see, in the 19th century and under Austrian rule, this position changed dramatically, and West Ukrainians again assumed a prominent role in the history of their people. Consequently, the course of modern Ukrainian history has largely been the tale of two parallel paths, one tread by the West Ukrainians in Austrian Empire and the other by the East Ukrainians in the Russian Empire.

The Growth of National Consciousness

Rarely has there been a more exciting, varied, and widespread flowering of new ideas than in the 19th century. By that time, the disengagement from the medieval belief that the world could be comprehended only in terms of God's will, begun in the Renaissance, had long since been completed. Educated Europeans were secure in the conviction that the mind of man was fully capable of analyzing and guiding human life. This intellectual confidence led to an unprecedented growth of ideas and ideologies. Indeed, ideology – that is, a system of ideas that claims to explain the past and present world and to serve as a guide for a better life in the future – emerged as a major historical force at this time.

Closely linked to these developments was the rise of intellectuals or intelligentsia, as the roughly analogous social group was called in Eastern Europe. As specialists in the formulation and propagation of ideas and the mobilization of people in behalf of these ideas, the intelligentsia would be in the forefront of political and cultural change in Eastern Europe. And one of the most gripping concepts developed by the intelligentsia during the 19th century was that of nationhood. It was, as we shall see, a wholly new way not only of viewing society, but also of influencing its behavior. In Ukraine, as elsewhere in the world; the rise of the concept of nationhood was an unmistakable indicator of approaching modernity, for with nationhood came ideas and causes that are still with us today.



The Modern Idea of Nationhood

Today nationhood is such a pervasive reality that it is difficult to imagine that in early 19th-century Eastern Europe, and indeed, in much of the world, it was only a hazy, slowly unfolding notion. This is not to say that premod-

ern peoples were oblivious to ethnic differences. People always felt a close attachment to their homeland, language, customs, and traditions. But until relatively recently, ethnicity was not considered to be a primary basis for defining group identity. Legal and socioeconomic distinctions embodied in the feudal estate system, that is, distinctions *within* a people, were generally thought to be more significant than differences *between* peoples. In other words, a Ukrainian, Russian, or Polish nobleman believed that he had more in common with noblemen in other countries than with peasants or townsmen in his own land. Only in the 19th century did a new concept of community – one based on common language and culture – begin to emerge. In Ukraine, as elsewhere, the evolution and slow dissemination of the idea of ethnically based nationhood would become one of the major themes of modern history.

It was the French Revolution, which reflected the disintegration of feudal society and the advent of a new, mass-based political and socioeconomic system, that helped this idea gain prominence. In its wake, growing numbers of Europeans accepted the ideas of individual rights and of sovereignty being vested in the people, not in their rulers. The common folk began to come into their own – and their speech, customs, and traditions also gained recognition. In fact, these latter elements became the key integrating factors in the creation of national consciousness.

The most persuasive argument for the importance of native languages and folklore was provided by the German philosopher Johann Herder. Reacting against the “lifelessness” of the impersonal imperial systems and the artificiality of the foreign languages and fashions that dominated royal courts and noble salons, Herder focused his attention on the ethnic culture of the peasantry. The noted historian Hans Kohn wrote: “Herder was the first to insist that human civilization lives not in its general and universal, but in its national and peculiar manifestations; each cultural manifestation must be original, but its originality is that of the national community and the national language. By nature and history men are above all members of the national community: only as such can they be really creative.”¹ Among the intelligentsias of Eastern Europe, which was dominated completely by monolithic empires, Herder’s ideas found an especially appreciative response; and it was the intellectuals who would take the lead in developing and spreading the modern concept among East Europeans.

While the ways in which national consciousness developed in every society varied considerably, modern scholars have discerned three general and partly overlapping stages in the development of East European national movements. The initial phase, marked by a somewhat nostalgic mood, generally consisted of a small group of scholarly intellectuals collecting historical documents, folklore, and artifacts in the belief that the individuality of their people would soon disappear with the onslaught of imperial culture. The second or cultural phase usually witnessed the unexpected “rebirth” of vernacular

languages and their increasing use in literary and educational activities. And the third or political stage was marked by the growth of nationally-based organizations and the formulation of nation-oriented demands that implied, to a greater or lesser extent, the desire for self-rule. As we shall see, the evolution of Ukrainian national consciousness fits well into this general pattern.

The Intelligentsia

One cannot fully appreciate the evolution and dissemination of the new ideas that appeared in Ukraine, as in all of Europe, in the 19th century without taking into account the emergence of the new category of people that produced them. In Eastern Europe these “new people” were called the intelligentsia, a term only roughly equivalent to the West European “intellectual.” First introduced in Russia and then throughout Eastern Europe, the term intelligentsia was used in the broad sense to designate the relative few who possessed a higher education. But in the narrower and historically more significant sense, “intelligentsia” referred to those individuals who committed themselves out of ideological conviction to the cultural, social, and political improvement of the masses, that is, the peasantry.

The “newness” of the intelligentsia manifested itself in several ways. The intelligentsia perceived life in terms of ideas and ideologies and not, as was the case previously and with other social groups, in terms of concrete social rights, privileges, and obligations. Instead of viewing society from the narrow perspective of a nobleman, townsman, or peasant, members of the intelligentsia believed that they looked at society as a whole and considered the interests of all. In time, criticism of the status quo became a standard feature of intelligentsia discourse – so much so that in the late 19th century, a part of the intelligentsia even dedicated itself to changing the status quo at any cost and by whatever means necessary.

In the Russian Empire, as in all of Eastern Europe, the appearance of the intelligentsia was a development of great importance. This was especially true for societies, such as that of Ukraine, that had “lost” their noble-elites through assimilation to imperial culture and service. For it would be the intelligentsia that would provide Ukrainians with cultural and, eventually, political leadership throughout the modern period.

As might be expected, the intelligentsia usually appeared in cities, especially those where institutions of higher learning were located. Thus, Kharkiv, where in 1805 the first university in Russian-ruled Ukraine was founded, became an early center of the land’s evolving intelligentsia. The circumstances in which this university appeared were noteworthy: they differed greatly from those of the empire’s other universities, which were founded at the initiative of the government for the purpose of training servants of the state. Fueled by local patriotism and a desire to raise the cultural level of Ukraine,

a group of local gentrymen, led by the indefatigable Vasyl Karazyn, successfully lobbied Emperor Alexander I for permission and raised the funds necessary for the establishment of the university. Only in 1834, when St Vladimir's University was founded in Kiev, did that city displace Kharkiv as the intellectual center of Ukraine.

The social milieu from which the first generation of Ukrainian intelligentsia primarily emerged was that of the old Cossack *starshyna*-nobility. However, this group was not that of the wealthy and influential aristocrats whose contacts allowed them to obtain easily high ranks in the imperial bureaucracy. It was, instead, the impoverished gentrymen whose shrinking estates forced them to seek other means of livelihood that were most drawn to higher education. A small fraction of these early intellectuals consisted of sons of priests, townsmen, and Cossacks. Members of the intelligentsia who were of peasant background were extremely rare before 1861.

In Ukraine, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the numbers of the intelligentsia were quite small. Prior to 1861, Kharkiv University produced a total of 2800 graduates, while the newer and larger university in Kiev had about 1500 alumni. From this tiny pool of well-educated individuals, only a small number evinced an interest in things Ukrainian. Thus, those who were involved in the creation of a new sense of identity in Ukraine were only a minute fraction of its populace.

Members of the intelligentsia generally congregated in "circles" (*kruzhky*)—small discussion groups where ideas, philosophies, and ideologies would be introduced, analyzed, and debated. Another focal point was the journals that provided like-minded intellectuals with a forum for their works. The intelligentsia's contacts with other sectors of society, especially the peasants with whom, in theory, they were primarily concerned, were minimal. For much of the 19th century, the Ukrainian intelligentsia, like the Russian, remained a minute sector of society, frequently fragmented by intellectual debates, increasingly alienated from the government, isolated from the masses, and immersed in activities that were of interest only to itself. Yet when the appropriate conditions emerged, the impact of these seemingly irrelevant, esoteric activities was much greater than the intelligentsia could ever itself have imagined.

The Building Blocks of National Identity

Although the evolving intelligentsia emerged from among educated bureaucrats and nobles, it did not fit in well with the imperial elite, which had little interest in new ideas or independent thinking. Therefore, many among the intelligentsia gradually developed a sense of estrangement from the empire's establishment. This, in turn, inclined them to show a greater interest in the long-neglected peasant masses.

The impact of Western ideas strengthened this inclination. Herder's notions and their ready acceptance in Eastern Europe were a case in point. In the early 19th century, the German philosopher's adulation of peasant culture dovetailed with the spreading influences of Western Romanticism. In many ways, Romanticism was an intellectual revolt against the Enlightenment of the 18th century. The Enlightenment, which molded the thinking of the Habsburg and Russian empire-builders, stressed rationality, uniformity, universality, and order. In contrast, Romanticism, which captured the imagination of the new East European intelligentsia, glorified emotion, spontaneity, diversity, and nature. And in drawing attention to the unique features of the world's various peoples "in their natural state and habitats," the ideas of Herder and the Romantics gave rise to the concept of national characteristics and provided thereby the means for defining nationhood.

In establishing the elements of national identity, the Ukrainian intelligentsia, like others in Eastern Europe, focused on such unique features of their ethnic group as their history, folklore, language, and literature. Of course, when Ukrainian intellectuals first embarked on their studies of these fields, they did not have a grand, predetermined plan of creating a Ukrainian national identity. If asked why they were drawn to such seemingly esoteric pursuits as the collection of old documents and rare folk songs or the emulation of peasant speech, many intellectuals would probably describe their activities as little more than a hobby encouraged by local patriotism or a nostalgic affection for a disappearing world. Nonetheless, as a result of these early, amateurish labors, a consensus arose among a small clique of the educated as to what were the basic elements of a distinctively Ukrainian culture. Eventually, these conclusions would become the basis of Ukrainian national consciousness.

The road to national consciousness was paved with books. They were the storehouses in which information about Ukrainian culture was collected. Simultaneously they served as the means for the dissemination of this information among literate Ukrainians. Furthermore, in the process of writing these books, the intelligentsia developed and refined the Ukrainian language, the one element that was most effective in creating a feeling of fraternity among all Ukrainians. For this reason literary works loom large in the early history of Ukrainian nation-building.

The re-creation of a national history In the growth of national consciousness throughout the world, the study of national history has always played a crucial role. In achieving a new sense of community, it was necessary for a people to believe that it had shared a common fate. Moreover, this shared historical experience should be perceived as a glorious one that instilled in individuals a sense of pride and encouraged them to identify with their nation. As important as a glorious past was an ancient past. An extended history gave

people a sense of continuity, a feeling that the current sad state of their nation was but a passing phase. A glorious and ancient past was also useful in rebutting the arguments of numerous skeptics who claimed that a given nation never existed, that it was a new, artificial creation (hence nationalist writers in Eastern Europe preferred to speak of a national rebirth or renaissance). Because national histories fulfilled these functions, it is not surprising that among Ukrainians, as well as other peoples, it was historians who were in the forefront of the nation-building process.

By the late 18th century, there were signs that interest in history, especially that of the Cossacks, was growing among the gentry-intelligentsia of the Left Bank. This interest was reflected in the work of several scions of old *starshyna* families who, after retiring from imperial service, devoted themselves to compiling and publishing historical materials. For the most part, they were motivated by simple antiquarianism or local patriotism and were completely unaware of the broader ramifications of their work. The most noteworthy of these amateur historians, all of whom wrote in Russian, were Vasyl Ruban ("The Short Chronicle of Little Russia," 1777), Opanas Shafonsky ("Typographical Description," 1786), Oleksander Rigelman ("A Description According to the Chronicles of Little Russia," 1798), and the young, extremely patriotic Iakiv Markovych ("Notes Concerning Little Russia," 1798). Their works were all well received by the Ukrainian gentry.

But the motives of some of these amateurs were not only altruistic. In approximately 1800, the Imperial Heraldic Office began to question the right of the descendants of the *starshyna* to noble status because, in the words of a Russian bureaucrat, "In Little Russia there was never a genuine nobility."² As a wave of indignation and protest swept through the Ukrainian elite, some of its members, such as Roman Markovych, Timofei Kalynsky, Vasyl Chernysh, Adrian Chepa, Vasyl Poletyka, and Fedir Tumansky, took to collecting historical documents. And, between 1801 and 1808, they wrote a series of essays attesting to the glorious deeds and high status of their forefathers. After the controversy was resolved in the 1830s in favor of most Ukrainians, some of the Left Bank nobles retained their interest in the history of their land and encouraged further historical studies.

Because the early historians were untrained dilettantes, the need for a more sophisticated, well-researched history of Ukraine soon became apparent. In 1822, Dmytro Bantysh-Kamensky (a Moscow-born and educated son of an archivist and secretary of Prince Repnin, the governor-general of the Left Bank) completed his thoroughly documented and very popular four-volume history, "A History of Little Russia." The appeal of Bantysh-Kamensky's work to the Ukrainian elite lay not only in its professionalism but also in its interpretation of the Ukrainian past. A loyal tsarist bureaucrat, Bantysh-Kamensky argued that Ukrainians, despite their distinctive and heroic history, were nonetheless a branch of the Russian people and their reunion with

Russia was a high point of their history. For many Ukrainian nobles this interpretation was convenient and convincing, for it allowed them to acknowledge their Ukrainian (*Maloros*) distinctiveness while stressing their loyalty to the tsar and adherence to the powerful Russian state and nation.

A very different work from those mentioned above was the *Istoriia Rusov* ("History of the Rus'"). An air of mystery surrounds this extremely influential historical tract. Neither the place nor the date it was written is known. Historians can only deduce that it probably appeared in the first decade of the 19th century, somewhere in the Novhorod-Siverskyi region of the Hetmanate. For decades the *Istoriia Rusov* remained unpublished, circulating widely but surreptitiously among the Left-Bank gentry. Only in 1846 did it appear in print. Even the most painstaking and detailed historical detective work has failed to identify the author conclusively, although specialists have narrowed the circle of possible authors to such members of the gentry-intelligentsia as Hryhor Poletyka and his son Vasyl, as well as Opanas Lobosevych and Oleksander Bezborodko.

Why the mystery? Apparently it is because of the dangerously inflammatory tone of the *Istoriia Rusov*, which was actually more of a political tract than a scholarly history. The work unabashedly glorified and romanticized the Cossack past, and although the author did not advocate outright independence for Ukraine, he did view Ukrainians as a people separate from the Russians and called for some form of self-government. His heroes were Khmelnytsky and, significantly, the recalcitrant Polubutok who stood up to Peter I. He also argued that it was Ukraine and not Russia that had a primary claim to the heritage of Kievan Rus'. Although the author portrayed the Poles as the Ukrainians' worst enemies, a subtle note of anti-Russianism also permeates the work. For example, in contrast to the Ukrainians' love of freedom, the author of the *Istoriia Rusov* claims that "serfdom and slavery in the highest degree reign among the Muscovite people ... it is as if their people were created only that they might become serfs."³

But while the *Istoriia Rusov* brims with national pride, it is not based on narrow ethnocentrism. The author contends that truth and justice are the cornerstones of any political system and the defense of life, liberty, and property are the inalienable rights of all individuals. Even more radical is the work's argument that no government can rest on tyranny and serfdom. Thus, on the one hand, the work's colorful (if not always accurate) depiction of the Cossacks heightened interest in the Ukrainian past, and on the other hand, it raised questions about Ukraine's place in the present political order. Consequently, with the appearance of the *Istoriia Rusov* the study of Ukrainian history began to have an ideological and political significance.

The glorification of folklore Another absorbing and widespread activity among the early Ukrainian gentry-intelligentsia was the study of folklore. This new

interest in the customs, traditions, and songs of the peasants was in striking contrast to the past, when educated elites had always insisted on maintaining a gap between their own culture and that of the masses. Again, it was Herder's ideas, which slowly seeped into Ukraine, that sparked the Ukrainian intelligentsia's interest in native culture.

In Herder's view, the chief prerequisite for a vibrant, creative culture was naturalness. Unfortunately, in his estimation, the cultural activity of late 18th-century Europe was dominated by cosmopolitan, imitative courts and nobilities that readily adopted foreign languages, manners, and values, thus creating an atmosphere that stifled the expression of a people's unique cultural characteristics. The solution, Herder argued, was to reject the artificial "high culture" and turn for fresh sources of inspiration and modes of expression to the unspoiled, authentic, and organic culture of the common people. It was not long before the East European intelligentsia began to adopt the view that the folk songs of the people were more beautiful than the most elaborate Baroque music, peasant customs more charming than courtly manners, and ancient proverbs more enlightening than weighty tomes written in foreign languages.

In the early decades of the 19th century, many young intellectuals tramped through the countryside in order to discover, collect, and, later, to publish these pearls of folk wisdom and creativity. For example, the noted Ukrainian historian Kostomarov recalled how in his youth he "went off on ethnographic expeditions to the villages around Kharkiv ... listened to the tales and discussions, noted down interesting words and phrases, entered into conversations, questioned people about their lives, and asked them to sing their songs."⁴

Because Ukrainians were largely a peasant people, one of their most appealing features was a rich, vibrant folklore. Herder himself was so smitten by the beauty of this folklore that he declared, "Ukraine will become another Greece: the beautiful sky, the gay spirit of the people, their natural musical gifts, and their fertile land will arise one day!"⁵ Even Poland's greatest poet, Adam Mickiewicz, acknowledged that Ukrainians were the "most poetical and musical people among the Slavs."⁶ It is not surprising, therefore, that ethnographic studies soon became all the rage among the Left-Bank intelligentsia.

Among the early enthusiasts of Ukrainian folklore was Prince Nikolai Tsertelev. Although of Georgian origin and Russian education, Tsertelev grew up in Ukraine and developed a deep attachment to its people. In 1819, he published in St Petersburg his "An Attempt at a Collection of Ancient Little Russian Songs." In the preface, Tsertelev noted that the songs would demonstrate "the genius and spirit of the people, the customs of the times, and, finally, the pure moral quality for which the Little Russians have always been known."⁷ A much more comprehensive and systematic study on Ukrainian ethnography entitled "The Little Russian Folk Songs" was completed in 1827 by

Mykhailo Maksymovych, a Ukrainian of Cossack background who became a professor at Moscow University and, in 1834, the first rector of the new university in Kiev. Another Ukrainian professor at Moscow University, Osyp Bodiansky, had devoted his master's dissertation (completed in 1837) to a comparison between Russian and Ukrainian folk songs. With typically Romantic exaggeration, he contrasted the supposedly despondent, submissive tone of the songs of the Russian north with the dramatic, vivacious melodies of the Ukrainian south. "How different is the north from the south," wrote Bodiansky, "and how different are the peoples who live there."⁸

Besides helping to draw distinctions between Ukrainians and their neighbors, the seemingly harmless study of folklore soon affected the intelligentsia in other ways. Observing everyday life in the village, members of the intelligentsia not only saw colorful customs, but also came face to face with the merciless exploitation of the peasantry. Initially they were too absorbed by their idealistic search for universal truths and uniquely Ukrainian characteristics to draw broader conclusions about the socioeconomic plight of the peasantry. However, eventually some of them concluded that they could no longer simply observe the hapless peasants but that something had to be done to help them.

Language: the common link According to Herder, language is the most important component of nationality: "Has a nationality anything dearer than the speech of its fathers? In its speech resides its whole intellectual domain, its traditions, its history, religion and basis of life, all its heart and soul. To deprive a people of its speech is to deprive it of its one eternal good."⁹ But the function of language in the development of national consciousness is even broader than that sketched by the German philosopher. Language establishes most effectively the "natural" limits of a nationality. It distinguishes between native and alien. It binds together various classes and regions. Modern social scientists have argued that not only does a language facilitate communication among its speakers, but – because it constitutes a unique system of perceiving and expressing a particular people's view of the world – it also allows them to understand each other on a deeper, subconscious level.

Given the central importance of language to the nation-building process, it would only be a matter of time before the Ukrainian intelligentsia attempted to transform the vernacular (that is, the spoken language) of the common people into the primary means of self-expression of all Ukrainians. Only by doing so could a common bond be established between the elite and the masses and the basis laid for a shared identity. At the outset, however, this transformation seemed to be an unattainable goal. Compared to prestigious and cultivated languages such as French, German, and, increasingly, Russian, the spoken language of the untutored Ukrainian peasant appeared crude and of limited application. Ukrainian nobles would use the language only to discuss

simple and mundane domestic matters with their peasants. Among the educated, the view prevailed that as peasants had little to say of importance and as their way of saying it was crude anyway, it was pointless to raise peasant speech to the level of a literary language. Moreover, because Ukrainian was closely related to Russian, many members of the intelligentsia argued that Ukrainian was not a distinct language but merely a dialect of Russian.

Nevertheless, despite these daunting obstacles, some members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia attempted to refine and uplift the vernacular. But even these pioneers initially had doubts about the viability of their undertaking and they approached the task only as a curious literary experiment. An example was Ivan Kotliarevsky's *Eneida*, the first work ever written in the language of the Ukrainian peasants and townsmen. Its appearance in 1798 marked the advent of Ukrainian as a literary language and of modern Ukrainian literature as well.

Significantly enough, the *Eneida* was a travesty, a burlesque poem. Based on the famous *Aeneid* by the Latin poet Virgil, it portrayed the ancient Greek heroes and Olympian gods as rollicking Cossacks and lusty village maidens who spoke in the pithy and colorful Ukrainian vernacular. Kotliarevsky, a tsarist official and himself the son of a minor Cossack officer, liked to mix with the Ukrainian peasants, note down their customs, and listen to their speech and songs. At first, he did not believe that his linguistic experiment was worthy of publication. Only the urging of his friends persuaded him to publish the *Eneida*, which to his surprise enjoyed instant success among the Left Bank gentry. However, even then Kotliarevsky did not realize that his work represented a linguistic and literary turning point. It merely proved to him that Ukrainian, a language that he loved and in which he continued to write, could be used effectively for comic effect. But he retained his doubts about its usefulness in "serious" literature.

Similarly tentative were the efforts of Oleksii Pavlovsky, who wrote a "Grammar of the Little Russian Dialect" in 1818. The author's attitude toward the Ukrainian language was ambivalent, for although he wished to refine it, he still regarded it as a dialect of Russian. But Pavlovsky's achievement, like that of Ivan Voitsekhovych, who in 1823 compiled a small dictionary of Ukrainian, was significant.

Literature: the enrichment of Ukrainian national culture The ultimate test of the viability of the Ukrainian language resided in the quality and range of the literature produced in it. Kotliarevsky earned the epithet "father of modern Ukrainian literature" not just because he was the first to write in the Ukrainian vernacular, but also because his *Eneida* was of high literary merit. His success, however, encouraged a host of feeble imitations of his classic, temporarily impeding the development of other genres. For a time, it appeared

that written Ukrainian would be used exclusively in jocular, folksy, regionalistic burlesques rather than in "serious" literary productions.

Much of the credit for expanding the range of literary expression in Ukrainian belongs to the Kharkiv Romantics, as they were called. Most of these writers were based in Sloboda Ukraine and were associated with the newly founded Kharkiv University. In the 1820s and 1830s, this easternmost of ethnic Ukrainian lands took its turn in playing the leading role in Ukrainian cultural development.

It was allegedly a wager between Petro Hulak Artemovsky (the son of a priest and rector of Kharkiv University) and Hryhorii Kvitka Osnovianenko (the scion of a prominent Cossack family) that hastened the development of Ukrainian prose. Hulak, who had a strong affinity for Ukrainian and experimented with it in literature, was convinced that its future was dim: "The thought that perhaps the time is near when not only traces of Little Russian customs and antiquity will disappear forever, but also the language itself will merge with the huge river of the mighty, dominant Russian language and will not leave any trace of its existence, plunges me into such melancholy that there are moments when I feel like renouncing all my ambitions and going away to the peaceful refuge of the simple villager in order to catch the last sounds of the native tongue which is dying every day."¹⁰

Because the Ukrainian nobles were abandoning Ukrainian for Russian and it was only the villagers who spoke it, Hulak argued that the language could not be used to produce serious literature. Kvitka disagreed with him and resolved to prove his point. In 1834, he wrote his "Little Russian Stories by Hrytsko Osnovianenko." These sad, sentimental tales were well received and the astute Osyp Bodiansky quickly proclaimed that they heralded the beginning of Ukrainian prose writing.

Levko Borovykovsky, another Kharkiv writer, further expanded the range of Ukrainian literary genres by composing ballads in Ukrainian. The favorite, indeed almost exclusive, theme of the Kharkiv writers was Cossack Ukraine, which was portrayed in typical Romantic fashion as a sad echo of the glorious past. These mournful ruminations about the past were epitomized by Ambrozii Metlynsky, a professor of Russian literature at Kharkiv University, whose own collections of Ukrainian poetry and translations he characterized as "the work of the last *bandurist* who passes on the song of the past in a dying language."¹¹

A myriad of other, minor writers in Kharkiv also contributed to the growth of Ukrainian prose and poetry. Surprisingly, the moving spirit behind much of this literary activity was a Russian – Izmail Sreznevsky – who later became one of Russia's leading philologists. However, the contributions of this fervent convert to things Ukrainian were more on the organizational than on the literary level. Sreznevsky's multivolume anthologies of Ukrainian literature, entitled "Zaporozhian Antiquities" and "Ukrainian Anthology," represented

an attempt to address the serious problem of the lack of a suitable forum for Ukrainian writers. The only regularly published journals on the Left Bank, the "Ukrainian Herald" and the "Ukrainian Journal," appeared in Kharkiv in the 1830s, mostly in Russian. Little more than a potpourri of local news, travelogues, ethnographic materials, and some literary works, these journals had a small readership, numbering only several hundred.

To reach a broader and more sophisticated audience, Ukrainian writers often turned to Russian journals published in St Petersburg and Moscow. Many of these, especially the more conservative, were quite willing to publish Ukrainian stories, even those written in Ukrainian. In fact, among Russian Romantic writers of the 1820s and 1830s, there existed something of a vogue for things Ukrainian. To many Russians, the turbulent history and rich folklore of the land evoked fascinating, exotic images, not the least of which was that of Ukraine as a "wild frontier." But although they acknowledged its distinctiveness, they considered Ukraine to be an integral part of Russia and viewed the promotion of Ukrainian "regional" literature merely as an enrichment of general Russian culture. A similar fascination with Ukraine existed among some Polish writers of the time, such as Antoni Malczewski, Bogdan Zaleski, and Seweryn Goszczyński, who formed the so-called Ukrainian School in Polish Romantic literature. They, for their part, viewed Ukraine as part of Poland's historical and cultural heritage.

Thus, despite the progress in Ukrainian literature and scholarship, the intelligentsia of the early 19th century continued to regard Ukraine and Ukrainians in "regionalist" terms. It did not as yet believe that Ukrainian culture could ever develop to the point of displacing Russian cultural dominance in Ukraine. Like their Russian colleagues in St Petersburg and Moscow, Ukrainian literati were convinced that, in cultivating things Ukrainian, they were also enriching the cultural heritage of Russia as a whole. Yet, their work and their efforts would have ramifications that neither Ukrainians nor Russians could foresee. These have been lucidly summarized by George Luckyj: "If one assumes that these early Ukrainian historical and folkloristic researches are the first stirrings of modern Ukrainian consciousness, one must conclude that they provided it with a firm foundation. For what can be more urgent to the needs of an emerging nation than to find its historical origins and its cultural distinctiveness? For the time being, Ukrainians were busy doing just this and discovering thereby their basic identity."¹²

Shevchenko

A peculiar situation evolved among the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the early 19th century. As we have seen, the intellectual currents that permeated much of Eastern Europe and Russia did not bypass Ukraine. The radical, republican ideas of the French Revolution were well represented in Ukraine by the De-

cebrists and the Ukrainian members of the Union of Slavs, while Herder's philosophical concepts regarding national culture clearly inspired the writings of the Kharkiv Romantics. Yet in Ukraine, political activism and nation-centered cultural activity did not mesh: political radicals remained anational, reserving no place for Ukraine in their political schemes, while the propagators of Ukrainian national culture were apolitical conservatives committed to the tsar and the status quo. This dichotomy, which crippled both ideological tendencies and eventually became a chronic weakness of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, did not seem to trouble the generation of the 1820s. However, for the next generation – that of the 1840s – the synthesis of national culture and political ideology would become a major concern.

The generation of the 1840s, which included individuals such as the historian Kostomarov, the author Kulish, and the poet Shevchenko, was based not in Kharkiv, but in Kiev where a new university had been founded in 1834. Its members hailed from both the Right Bank and the Left Bank and their social origins were more varied than those of their gentry predecessors.

Among the young men of the 1840s, one individual – Taras Shevchenko – towered above the rest. Indeed, it may be argued that Shevchenko's impact on his countrymen was greater than that of any other Ukrainian in modern history. That a poet should have attained such preeminence in a developing nation of 19th-century Eastern Europe is not unusual. Cultural activity was the one arena in which the stateless Slavs could express their individuality, so poets, writers, and scholars often played leading roles as "national awakeners." Nevertheless, it is difficult to find another example of an individual whose poetry and personality so completely embodied a national ethos as did Shevchenko for the Ukrainians.

For his countrymen, Shevchenko's biography symbolized his nation's sad fate. Born in 1814 in Moryntsi, a village on the Right Bank, Shevchenko grew up as an orphaned serf. When his master took him along as a servant to St Petersburg, the youth's talents as a painter attracted the attention of several leading artists who, in 1838, helped him to buy his freedom. Shevchenko then entered the Imperial Academy of the Arts where he obtained a first-rate education. Meanwhile, his growing contacts with the numerous Ukrainian and Russian artists and writers in the capital greatly broadened his intellectual horizons. Soon he was consumed by the need to express himself in poetry. In 1840, his first collection of Ukrainian poems, entitled *Kobzar* ("The Bard"), appeared in print. Based largely on Ukrainian historical themes, these powerful, direct, and melodious poems were quickly hailed as the work of a genius by Ukrainian and Russian critics alike.

The appearance of the *Kobzar*, as George Luckyj notes, was the single most important event in the history of Ukrainian literature because "in his work the Ukrainian language achieved for the first time literary excellence."¹³ It transcended the one-dimensional, limited role that Ukrainian literature had ful-

filled up until now and disproved the views of those, such as the famous Russian critic Vissarion Belinsky, who believed that the language of the Ukrainian peasant was incapable of expressing cultivated thoughts and feelings. In reply to Belinsky's belittling view of Ukrainian, Shevchenko wrote:

You've given me a sheepskin coat
 Alas, it does not fit.
 The garment of your own wise speech
 Is lined with falsehood's wit.¹⁴

Shevchenko's success also countered the example set by his contemporary fellow Ukrainian Nikolai Gogol, who believed that if talented Ukrainians wished to attain literary fame and fortune they could do so only within the context of Russian literature.

Shevchenko expanded the flexibility, range, and resources of Ukrainian by synthesizing several Ukrainian dialects, the colloquialisms of peasants and townsmen, and the forms and vocabulary of Church Slavonic. In so doing, he demonstrated to his countrymen that their language could express the fullest range of emotions and ideas with splendid artistry; he thereby proved that Ukrainians did not need to depend on Russian as a vehicle of higher discourse. His poetry became in effect a literary and intellectual declaration of Ukrainian independence.

Shevchenko's concerns and impact radiated far beyond the literary sphere. The former serf never forgot his "unfortunate brothers" and in the thundering tones of a biblical prophet he castigated the exploiters of the enserfed peasantry. Unlike most of his colleagues among the intelligentsia, Shevchenko did not believe in liberal, gradualistic projects of reform. His poems openly advocated radical, revolutionary solutions to injustice in society. In his famous *Zapovit* ("Testament"), Shevchenko called upon his countrymen to bury him on a steep cliff above the Dnieper and then to rise in revolt:

Make my grave there – and arise,
 Sundering your chains,
 Bless your freedom with blood
 of foemen's evil vein!
 Then in that great family,
 A family new and free,
 Do not forget, with good intent
 Speak quietly of me.¹⁵

Inextricably interwoven with Shevchenko's anger about social injustice was his bitterness about national oppression in Ukraine, "this land of ours that is not ours," as he described it. An implacable enemy of tsarist autocracy,

he called for Ukrainian self-determination long before his more cautious colleagues espoused the idea. This stand is clearly evident in his treatment of Ukrainian history, his favorite theme. For Shevchenko, Khmelnytsky was a “genial rebel,” but also the man responsible for Ukraine’s fateful union with Russia that resulted in the loss of Ukrainian self-rule. Cossack leaders who stood up to the tsars, such as Polubotok, earned his sympathy; those who cooperated with Moscow were severely criticized. Shevchenko did not mask his hatred of Peter I whom he called a “tyrant” and “torturer” and Catherine II did not fare better with him. In response to the praise of these monarchs by Aleksander Pushkin, Russia’s greatest poet, Shevchenko wrote:

Now I understand
 It was the First who
 crucified our Ukraine
 And the Second finished
 off the widowed orphan.
 Murderers! Murderers! Cannibals!¹⁶

But Shevchenko’s nationalism was not of the narrow, chauvinistic variety. He viewed Ukraine’s striving for freedom as part of a universal struggle for justice. As the poems “The Heretic,” dedicated to Jan Hus, the famous Czech martyr, and “Caucasus” suggest, he sympathized with downtrodden peoples all over the world.

Shevchenko’s poetry, some of it so rebellious that it was not published until 1905, exposed his contemporaries to new and unsettling ideas and emotions. After reading it, the historian Kostomarov wrote that “Shevchenko’s muse tore away the shrouds that shielded us from the life of the people and it was terrible, sweet, painful and intoxicating to behold.”¹⁷ Shevchenko forced his colleagues to see in the *narod* (the people) not merely colorful customs, but their suffering. In Cossack history he sought not romantic heroes, but lessons that would lead to a better future. For him Ukraine was not just a picturesque region of the Russian Empire, but a land that could and should stand on its own.

The Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius

On 3 March 1847, Aleksei Petrov, a student at Kiev University, informed the tsarist authorities about a secret society that he had accidentally discovered. The police quickly swooped down on the leading members of the group, brought them to St Petersburg, and subjected them to intense interrogation during which the authorities learned of the existence of the Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius, the first Ukrainian ideological organization in modern times.

It soon became apparent that the original fears on the part of the authorities about a large, dangerous underground movement were greatly exaggerated. The brotherhood consisted of only about a dozen core members and perhaps several dozen sympathizers. Led by Mykola Kostomarov (the talented historian and university lecturer), Vasyl Bilozersky (a teacher of gentry background), and Mykola Hulak (a minor but well educated bureaucrat), the group consisted of young members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Although two other intellectuals – the secondary schoolteacher and writer Panteleimon Kulish and the already well-known poet Taras Shevchenko – were only loosely associated with the brotherhood, they too were arrested. Not only was the membership of the brotherhood small, but its activity was limited. During the approximately fourteen months of its existence, the “brothers” met several times for lengthy philosophical and political discussions (one of which had been overheard by the informant, Petrov) and prepared several statements of their program and goals.

The most important of these statements, formulated by Kostomarov, was entitled “The Law of God” or “The Book of Genesis of the Ukrainian People” (*Zakon bozhyi* or *Knyhy bytiia ukrainskoho narodu*). Written in the Romantic, idealistic spirit of the times, the work (which was permeated with Christian values and Pan-Slavic sentiments and was strongly influenced by Polish models) called for the restructuring of society on the principles of justice, equality, freedom, and fraternity. Specifically, it proposed the liquidation of serfdom, the abolition of legal distinctions among estates, and access to education for the masses. The issue of nationality, which was clearly a major concern for the brotherhood, was placed in a broad Pan-Slavic context: all Slavic peoples should be allowed to develop their cultures freely and, more important, they should form a Slavic federation with democratic institutions “akin to those of the United States.” The capital of this federation was to be Kiev.

Ukraine, which Kostomarov and his colleagues considered to be at the same time the most oppressed and the most egalitarian of all Slavic societies because of its alleged lack of an elite, was to lead the way in the creation of the federation. The Christ-like resurrection of the land was described in pseudo-biblical style: “And Ukraine was destroyed. But it only appeared to be so ... because the voice of Ukraine was not stilled. Ukraine will rise from her grave and will call upon her brother Slavs; they will hear her call and all Slavs will arise ... and Ukraine will be a self-governing republic in the Slavic union. Then all the peoples will point to that spot on the map where Ukraine is situated and they will say, ‘Behold, the stone which the builders rejected has become the cornerstone.’”¹⁸ This messianic vision of Ukraine’s future in the federation, although buttressed by a highly idealized picture of its past, precluded the idea of its complete independence. Apparently, most members of the brotherhood, with the exception of Shevchenko and a few others, had doubts about the ability of their “soft,” “poetical” countrymen to stand on their own.

Although they agreed on general principles, the members of the group differed on issues of priority and emphasis. For Kostomarov, Slavic unity and fraternity were most important; Shevchenko was passionate in demanding the social and national emancipation of Ukrainians; and Kulish stressed the development of Ukrainian culture. The majority favored an evolutionary approach, hoping that general education, propaganda, and the setting of "moral examples" to the authorities would be most effective in the attainment of their goals. Shevchenko and Hulak, in contrast, represented the minority view that only revolution could bring about the desired changes. Yet, these differences ought not to be exaggerated. The members of the brotherhood were clearly united by their common values and ideals and, most notably, by their desire to improve the socioeconomic, cultural, and political plight of Ukraine.

Despite the relatively harmless nature of the society, the tsarist authorities resolved to punish its leading members. The punishments varied greatly in severity, however. Kostomarov, Kulish, and the other moderates received comparatively light sentences consisting of banishment to the depths of Russia for periods of a year or less, after which they were allowed to resume their careers. Hulak received a three-year prison sentence. But the severest sentence was reserved for Shevchenko, whom the tsar and his officials regarded as the most dangerous member of the group. He was forcibly conscripted and assigned to a ten-year term in a labor battalion in Siberia. Nicholas I himself added the following note to the sentence: "under the strictest supervision, forbidden to write and sketch."¹⁹ The physical and psychological suffering that resulted from this sentence contributed to Shevchenko's untimely death in 1861.

The Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius and its liquidation were significant for several reasons. It represented the first, albeit unsuccessful, attempt of the intelligentsia to move from the cultural to the political phase of national development; it alerted the tsarist government (which until this time had tried to play Ukrainophilism off against Polish cultural influences in Ukraine) to the potential dangers of growing Ukrainian national consciousness; it signaled the onset of an anti-Ukrainian policy and marked the beginning of the long, unceasing struggle between the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the imperial Russian authorities.

The Growth of National Consciousness in Western Ukraine

Ukrainian cultural activity was distributed very unevenly. For the most part, it was concentrated on the Left Bank, the territory of the former Hetmanate, and in Sloboda Ukraine. In other areas of Russian-ruled Ukraine, there was little evidence of interest in Ukrainian folk culture. On the Right Bank, a few Polish noblemen – such as Tymko Padura, Michał Czajkowski, and Zorian Dołęga-Chodakowski – developed a highly romanticized vision of Ukraine's Cossack past and dreamed of a time when the Ukrainian peasantry, forget-

ting its grievances against the *szlachta*, would help to bring the Right Bank into a reconstituted Polish Commonwealth. This tendency made little headway, however, against the Polish cultural hegemony that predominated on the Right Bank. As for the newly colonized Black Sea regions, there were practically no signs of Ukrainophilism there.

In Western, or Austrian, Ukraine, evidence of Ukrainian cultural activity in the early 19th century was also very spotty. In such isolated, backward regions as Romanian-dominated Bukovyna and Hungarian-dominated Transcarpathia, it was almost nonexistent. Only in Eastern Galicia did Ukrainophilism, even more tentative and narrowly based than on the Left Bank, succeed in establishing a foothold.

The West Ukrainian intelligentsia To speak of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia in the early 19th century is to speak of the clergy. Indeed, because the clergy was the only social group that could avail itself of the opportunities for higher learning provided by the Austrian Empire, higher education in Western Ukraine became practically synonymous with the study of theology. Thus, in the early 1840s, of the approximately 400 Ukrainian students at Lviv University and other institutions, 295 studied theology while almost all the rest were enrolled in philosophy courses, which were a prerequisite for theology. Another example of this clerical preponderance is the fact that of the forty-three Ukrainian-language books that appeared between 1837 and 1850, forty were written by priests.

Only in the latter part of the 19th century would a secular intelligentsia, composed of teachers, lawyers, scholars, writers, and bureaucrats, become a significant factor in Western Ukraine. Conversely, one should not assume that every priest was an intellectual. The vast majority of the clergy were poor and isolated village priests, whose education and intellectual horizons were only marginally broader than those of the peasants to whom they ministered. It was only a small minority based in cities such as Lviv and Peremyshl (which were centers of ecclesiastical administration and had institutions of higher learning, libraries, and printing presses) that had an opportunity to engage in cultural activities.

Even where such opportunities existed, the inbred conservatism of the clergy and its slavish loyalty to the Habsburgs discouraged intellectual growth. Provincial and conservative, the thin, educated stratum of Western Ukraine looked with extreme suspicion on new ideas and preferred to expend its limited intellectual resources on secondary (but furiously debated) issues such as those dealing with alphabets, calendars, and church procedures. For the few who sought to explore more radical Western ideas or to become involved in revolutionary activity, the only avenue open was in the Polish context. As a result, in the 1830s, a small number of young Ukrainian seminarians joined Polish revolutionary groups that were striving to rebuild

the Polish Commonwealth and who viewed Ukrainians as nothing more than a confused and backward branch of the Polish nation.

The attractions of the prestigious Polish culture, even to the most traditional members of the clergy-intelligentsia, were so great that – as the legal, educational, and material standing of the West Ukrainian elite improved – they began to emulate Polish ways. Upward mobility had linguistic ramifications and the more a Ukrainian improved his social status, the more embarrassed he became about using the language of the peasantry.

As a result, the use of Polish gradually became more widespread among the clergy and intelligentsia, and Ukrainian was confined more and more to communication with the peasants. A telling example of the decline in the use of Ukrainian (that is, of the artificial and unwieldy mixture of the vernacular, Church Slavonic, and Latin, Polish, and German words that passed for literary Ukrainian at this time) by the educated, was the dismantling of the Ukrainian-language *Studium Ruthenum* at Lviv University in 1809. Paradoxically, it was brought about not by the Poles or Austrians, but by Ukrainians themselves. Because all other courses at the university were taught in German, the Ukrainian students at the *Studium Ruthenum* considered it discriminatory that they too were not taught in that language and they readily agreed to have it replace Ukrainian.

But if higher education highlighted the inadequacies of the Ukrainian language, it also produced its defenders. While pursuing their studies in Lviv or Vienna, some Ukrainians could not help but hear about the ideas of Herder concerning the importance of one's native language. Often they came into contact with Polish or especially Czech intellectuals who were far ahead of other Slavs in the Habsburg empire in terms of national consciousness and cultural development. Inspired by the successes of their neighbors, a small but growing number of West Ukrainian members of the intelligentsia, despite the discouraging milieu in which they lived, began to develop an appreciation of the new idea of Ukrainian nationhood.

The "national awakeners" in Western Ukraine The first signs of growing interest in the cultural aspects of nationhood appeared in the early 19th century in the ancient city of Peremyshl, the seat of a Greek Catholic eparchy, site of a lyceum and rich libraries, and the home of some of the most sophisticated members of the Ukrainian clergy. For several decades, this westernmost city on Ukrainian-speaking territory would perform for Austria's Ukrainians a role in the development of national consciousness that was analogous to the role played by Kharkiv, on Ukraine's easternmost fringe, for Russia's Ukrainians at approximately the same time. However, it ought to be stressed that it was from the Kharkiv Romantics that the Peremyshl clerics, with their more limited literary and creative talents, took their cue.

Among the members of the Peremyshl circle, Ivan Mohylnytsky, a highly

placed churchman and superintendent of primary education in the eparchy, was the most prominent. In 1816, with the support of his superior, Bishop Mykhailo Levytsky, Mohylnytsky organized a group of clergymen into a Clerical Society, the purpose of which was to prepare and distribute simple religious texts, written in Ukrainian, to the peasantry. Considering the Polonophile attitudes that were predominant at the time, this act was viewed as an unorthodox undertaking. Mohylnytsky and his colleagues were apparently not motivated solely by Herder's ideas or East Ukrainian examples; an important realization was that if Polish-language materials alone became available to the peasants, they might turn to Roman Catholicism.

Although the results of the society's efforts, which consisted of the publication of several prayer books and primers, were modest and the group soon disbanded, its appearance was noteworthy: it was the first attempt of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, both in the west and in the east, to organize itself; and more important, it focused attention on the language issue that would remain for decades a key concern of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia. However, in his attempts to "improve" the vernacular, Mohylnytsky insisted on using it with many Church Slavonic admixtures. The resulting artificial linguistic hybrid did little to dispel questions about the appropriateness of Ukrainian for literary use.

In addition to the Peremyshl circle, in the 1820s a few isolated Western Ukrainian scholars appeared who, in the spirit of collectors and antiquarians, gathered materials about the history of Eastern Galicia and its native folklore. Some of the members of this small group were the historians Mykhailo Harasevych and Denys Zubrytsky, as well as such grammarians and ethnographers as Iosyf Levytsky and Iosyf Lozynsky. But, because their works were written in Latin, German, or Polish, their impact was limited.

The Ruthenian Triad In the 1830s, the center of national consciousness-raising activity shifted to Lviv, where young, idealistic seminarians, captivated by Herder's ideas, came to the fore. Their leader was Markian Shashkevych, a 21-year-old youth endowed with poetical talent and an inspiring personality. Together with his two close associates, the scholarly Ivan Vahylevych and the energetic Iakiv Holovatsky, they formed what is commonly referred to as the Ruthenian Triad. In 1832, they organized a group of students that set for itself the ambitious goal of raising the Ukrainian vernacular, free of Church Slavonic and other foreign "refinements," to the level of a literary language. Only this, they believed, would give the peasants access to the knowledge that might improve their lot and allow Ukrainians to express their long-suppressed cultural individuality.

To the Greek Catholic authorities, the idea of writing in the plain, unmodified language of the peasantry in a simplified Cyrillic script seemed outlandish. In no uncertain terms they let Shashkevych and his associates know

that they could expect no support from the church for their undertaking. But encouragement did come from Russian-ruled Ukraine, where the Ruthenian Triad established contacts with such Ukrainophiles as Izmail Sreznevsky, Mykhailo Maksymovych, and Osyp Bodiansky. And from the west came the inspiring example of the flourishing Czech national movement. With the help of Karel Zap, a Czech intellectual serving in the administration of Galicia, the threesome, especially Holovatsky, developed a lively correspondence with such experienced "national awakeners" and avid Slavophiles as the Slovaks Ján Kollár and Pavel Šafarik, the Slovene Bartholomeus Kopitar, and the Czech Karel Havlíček.

To set their plans in motion, the Ruthenian Triad resolved to publish an almanac, entitled *Rusalka Dnistrovaia* ("The Nymph of the Dniester"), which would contain folk songs, poems, and historical articles written in the vernacular. When news of the almanac reached the Greek Catholic hierarchy, they condemned it as being "undignified, indecent, and possibly subversive."²⁰ Meanwhile, the German police chief of Lviv noted: "We already have enough trouble with one nationality [the Poles], and these madmen want to resurrect the dead-and-buried Ruthenian nation."²¹ The local censor, Venedikt Levytsky, a Greek Catholic clergyman, blocked publication of the almanac in Lviv, so Shashkevych and his colleagues were forced to publish it in far-off Budapest in 1837. Of the 900 copies that were transported to Lviv, almost all were confiscated by the police. Only a handful found their way into the hands of a skeptical public. Disillusioned by this response and hounded by church authorities, Markian Shashkevych died a young man; Vahylevych eventually joined the Polish camp; Holovatsky alone, carefully but stubbornly, continued to work for the attainment of the Ruthenian Triad's original goals.

Although the publication of the *Rusalka Dnistrovaia* initially appeared to be a fiasco, it set an important precedent, demonstrating in Western Ukraine that the language of the Ukrainian peasant could in fact be used as a literary language. Moreover, it focused attention on the common people and their "unspoiled" culture. Under the influence of the *Rusalka Dnistrovaia*, a new generation of Western Ukrainian intelligentsia would begin the slow, yet irreversible, process of shifting its orientation to the Ukrainian masses from among whom it would draw most of its members.



The spread of the idea of nationhood in Ukraine was, as we have seen, a laborious and halting process. At the mid 19th century, it had not progressed far beyond the point of small groups of Ukrainian intelligentsia defining for themselves the essential ingredients of a Ukrainian cultural identity. Hurdles to progress beyond this cultural phase were numerous and daunting. Except for the intelligentsia, there were no social groups in Ukraine – an agrar-

ian, traditionalist, and provincial society – that were receptive to new ideas. Moreover, the view that Ukrainians were a separate nationality and that their language and culture were worth cultivating found numerous skeptics and detractors among Ukrainians themselves. The pull of the prestigious, more highly developed cultures of the Poles and Russians was difficult to withstand. Yet, inspired by Western examples and convinced that they were responding to the needs of the idealized “*narod*,” the “national awakeners” persevered.

From the outset, there were important differences in the spread of national consciousness in Eastern and Western Ukraine. On the Left Bank, where Cossack traditions and the memory of self-government were still strong and the intelligentsia more numerous and sophisticated, national consciousness-raising activity got off to a promising start. However, the harsh treatment of the Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius revealed that once the Ukrainian movement in the Russian Empire transcended certain limits, it faced an implacable and overwhelming enemy in the tsarist government. In Eastern Galicia, progress was more modest and much of the resistance was due to the conservatism of the Greek Catholic establishment. Nonetheless, there were no dramatic setbacks there and the growth of national consciousness, although sluggish, was perceptible. Finally, the parallel, if differing, development had another important consequence: after centuries of limited contact, East and West Ukrainians began to evince a growing interest in each other. The process of national integration had begun.

Imperial Reforms

Conservatism reigned supreme in all of Europe in the middle of the 19th century but nowhere was it more evident than in Austria and Russia, the two empires inhabited by Ukrainians. For them, as for the other subjects, their lives and minds were dominated by the principles of authoritarianism, obedience, social order, and traditionalism. Change, in every form, was looked upon with great suspicion. Nevertheless, the new ideas, social forces, and economic relationships that were permeating Europe also seeped into the Austrian and Russian domains, despite strenuous efforts to restrain them. As internal and external pressures mounted, the Habsburg and Romanov emperors realized that the old order could no longer remain impervious to change. This realization, born of crisis, generated an era of great reforms – first in Austria and then in Russia. These reforms had an especially great impact on the Ukrainians because they were among the most disadvantaged subjects of both empires.



Change in the Austrian Empire

At the beginning of 1848, the Habsburg ruling elite was confident about the future of the empire. One reason for its confidence was the recent Habsburg success in dealing with such trouble-spots as Galicia, where small groups of Polish nobles and intelligentsia had conspired for decades to restore the old Commonwealth. Convinced that they stood for general political freedom, the Poles had always assumed that all inhabitants of the dismembered Commonwealth, regardless of their social or ethnic status, supported their goals. This attitude was reinforced in the 1830s when a group of Ukrainian seminarians joined the Polish conspiratorial cells. However, when their Polish colleagues refused to recognize them as a separate nationality, the Ukrainians withdrew.

In 1846, Polish assumptions about widespread support suffered an even more devastating blow. Upon learning that Polish nobles were planning an uprising, Austrian officials convinced the peasants of Western Galicia that their lords intended to continue their unlimited exploitation of them as of old. Infuriated, Polish peasants turned on their own nobles, massacring great numbers of them and thereby undermining the abortive revolt.

The revolution of 1848 in Galicia The series of revolts that engulfed much of Europe in spring 1848 signaled a dramatic change in Habsburg fortunes. These revolts, brought on not just by demands for political and socioeconomic reform, but also, in central and Eastern Europe in particular, by the awakening desire for national sovereignty, hit hard at the conservative, multinational empire. During this "spring of nations," when nationhood emerged as the paramount political issue, the Habsburgs' German and Italian subjects rose up to demand unification with their brethren outside the empire. Simultaneously, the Hungarians commenced a war of national independence, and the Poles once again agitated for the restoration of their lost statehood. Influenced by these events, other peoples of the empire also proceeded to formulate their national demands. As chaos ensued, the empire appeared to be on the verge of collapse.

When news of the riots in Vienna, of the resignation of the hated Prince Metternich, and of the promises of the badly shaken Emperor Ferdinand to implement political liberalization and social reform reached Lviv on 19 March 1848, the Poles immediately sprang into action. They sent off a petition to the emperor calling for even more liberalization and greater political rights for Poles in Galicia, but they totally ignored any mention of the Ukrainian presence in the province. To mobilize support for these demands, a Polish National Council was organized in Lviv on 13 April. Soon afterwards, a network of local councils and a newspaper were founded. To the great surprise and disappointment of the Poles, the Ukrainians – whom the Poles did not consider a separate nationality – rejected invitations to join in these efforts. Instead, they formed their own representative body, the Supreme Ruthenian Council (Holovna Ruska Rada), along with a system of local branches and a newspaper. Fortunately for the Habsburgs, they had an unusually intelligent and enterprising defender of their interests in Galicia in the person of Count Franz Stadion, the recently appointed governor of the province. In the tense situation that developed in Galicia, he was able to manipulate skillfully the key issues and play the Ukrainians and Poles off against each other in a generally successful attempt to retain Habsburg control over the province.

From the Ukrainian point of view, there were two main and closely intertwined issues that predominated in 1848. One was socioeconomic in nature and dealt with the traditional problem of the peasantry, particularly its crushing feudal obligations to the landlords. The other was concerned with the

new concept of nationality and, specifically, how two peoples – the Poles and Ukrainians – who had until recently always viewed themselves simply as peasants or noblemen, Greek Catholics or Roman Catholics, but who were now beginning to define themselves as separate and distinct ethno-cultural communities or nations (with competing national aspirations) were to coexist in a single province.

The peasant problem Already for many years prior to 1848, it was clear to open-minded bureaucrats, liberal intelligentsia, and even some noblemen that the feudal rights the landlord nobility exercised over the peasants who worked on its estates were badly outdated. As early as the 1780s, during the reign of Joseph II, major changes were introduced in the landlord/peasant relationship. The most important of these was that the peasants obtained the right to defend their interests in court. Another reform distinguished the landlord's lands from those lands set aside for the use of peasants. However, a major feature of the feudal lord/peasant relationship, namely *corvée* (*pan-shchyna* in Ukrainian), remained – especially in the less advanced areas of the empire, such as Galicia. *Corvée* was the obligation of peasants to work on the lands of their lord, usually two or three days per week, in return for the use of their plots. It was this hated obligation that was the cause of most dissatisfaction and bitterness among the Galician peasantry.

The revolution of 1848, and particularly the tense situation it engendered in Galicia, finally created the conditions for the abolition of this last vestige of serfdom. Having learned their lesson in 1846, Polish patriots – mostly nobles – now eagerly sought the goodwill of the peasantry in an effort to strengthen their position in Galicia. To this end, they urged their fellow Polish noblemen to abolish the hated *corvée* voluntarily. The nobility's response was generally negative, however. Nevertheless, Polish tactics were so worrisome to Stadion that he desperately urged Vienna to take the lead in freeing the peasants of their obligations. He argued that this would not only check Polish designs, but it would also win the gratitude of the peasants for the monarchy at a most critical moment. Persuaded by these arguments, Emperor Ferdinand issued the historic manifesto abolishing the *corvée* in Galicia on 23 April 1848. It preceded a similar patent banning the *corvée* in the rest of the empire by about five months.

Stadion's plan succeeded. Ukrainian peasants in particular greeted the announcement with enthusiasm and pledged their loyalty to the Habsburgs (although it was clear that the patent left many questions unanswered). To mollify the nobles, the Viennese government announced that it would pay them for the lost labor. (Later it shifted about two-thirds of the cost of this indemnity onto the peasantry itself.) Furthermore, although the peasants received 70% of the cultivated lands and the landlords 30%, the crucial question of who owned the forests and pastures – lands previously held in common – was not



Map 17 West Ukrainian lands in the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the late 19th century

resolved. In time, landlords would obtain ownership of these common lands and peasants would become dependent on them for the all-important firewood and grazing land. Finally, the size of peasant allotments was pitifully small: over 70% of these were less than fourteen acres, an area that at best barely allowed for the subsistence of an average family.

This is not to say, however, that the impact of the abolition of the *corvée* (*panshchyna*) on the peasant was slight; on the contrary, it cut the last formal bond between him and his lord (*pan*) and made the peasant outright owner of his own land. By making the Galician peasant master of his own fate, it awakened in him an interest in political, educational, and even cultural issues that he had never before evinced. From this time onward, the West Ukrainian peasant would become a political factor that could no longer be ignored.

The nationality issue The revolution of 1848 provided the small, educated segment of West Ukrainian society (which consisted chiefly of members of the clergy and intelligentsia) with the impetus and the opportunity to define themselves formally as a distinct nationality and to establish their own national institutions. The timid West Ukrainian elite was strongly encouraged and supported by the Habsburg governor, Stadion, who openly favored the Ukrainians throughout 1848 in hopes of using them as a counterweight to the more aggressive Poles. Because of Stadion's policies, the Poles would for many years accuse the Habsburgs of "inventing the Ruthenians" (i.e., Ukrainians), implying thereby that the Ukrainians were merely a by-product of Austrian machinations and not a genuine nationality. Nonetheless, flattered by government attention and resentful of Polish attitudes, the Ukrainians resolved for the first time in the modern era to enter the political arena.

On 19 April, at the instigation of Stadion, a group of Greek Catholic clergymen, associated with St George's cathedral in Lviv and led by Bishop Hryhorii Iakhymovych, addressed a petition to the emperor. Unlike the earlier Polish appeal, it was a timid, loyalist document. Its introduction consisted of a historical survey stressing the national distinctiveness of the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia, the past glories of the medieval principality of Halych, its subsequent subjugation and exploitation by the Poles, and the fact that the populace "belonged to the great Ruthenian [Ukrainian] nation, whose 15 million members, of whom 2.5 live in Galicia, all speak the same language."¹

The petition itself requested the introduction of the Ukrainian language in the schools and administration of Eastern Galicia, access to government positions for Ukrainians, and the genuine equalization of the Greek and Roman Catholic clergy. Two weeks later, on 2 May 1848, the Supreme Ruthenian Council, the first modern Ukrainian political organization, was established in Lviv. Led by Bishop Iakhymovych, it consisted of sixty-six members, almost half of whom consisted of clergy and theology students and the other half of the secular intelligentsia. In the weeks that followed, fifty local and thirteen regional branches of the Supreme Ruthenian Council were estab-

lished throughout Eastern Galicia by priests who acted as the chief organizers. Another unprecedented event was the publication of the first Ukrainian weekly, *Zoria Halyska*, on 15 May. Meanwhile, contacts with the Ukrainians of Bukovyna and Transcarpathia were also established.

The rise of Ukrainian political activism in Eastern Galicia necessarily led to the growth of Ukrainian/Polish antagonism. Because the Poles considered Galicia to be the cornerstone of their plan to restore Polish statehood, they regarded the emergence of a Ukrainian movement that was pro-Vienna as a grave threat. Therefore, they attempted to neutralize the Supreme Ruthenian Council by forming a rival "Ukrainian" organization that was pro-Polish. On 23 May, a handful of thoroughly Polonized nobles and intelligentsia of Ukrainian origin of the type who usually referred to themselves as "Ruthenians of the Polish nation" (*gente Rutheni natione Poloni*) met in Lviv to form the Ruthenian Council (Ruskyi Sobor). A Ukrainian newspaper, *Ruskyi Dnevnyk*, published in Latin script, was also established. The Poles scored a coup of sorts when they enticed Ivan Vahylevych, a member of the Ruthenian Triad, to become its editor. But this was their only success. Almost universally shunned by Ukrainians, the Ruthenian Council and its newspaper had a brief, ephemeral existence. Moreover, the entire episode only soured Polish/Ukrainian relations.

The Prague congress Poles and Ukrainians soon clashed head on. Ironically, the confrontation occurred in early June at the Slav Congress organized in Prague by Czechs specifically to celebrate Slavic solidarity and common interests. Delegates were sent to Prague by the Supreme Ruthenian Council, the Polish National Council (Rada Narodowa), and the Ruthenian Council. To the great consternation of the Czechs, the Poles and Ukrainians immediately commenced a heated, protracted debate about who should represent Galicia and what the relationship between its two peoples should be. The most controversial issue, however, emerged somewhat later, when the Ukrainians demanded that Galicia be divided into separate Polish and Ukrainian administrations, an idea the Poles adamantly opposed.

Because the fierce Polish/Ukrainian rivalry was impeding the general progress of the congress, the Czechs intervened and helped effect a compromise between the two delegations. If the Ukrainians would drop their demands for the partition of Galicia, the Poles would agree to recognize them as a separate nationality with equal linguistic rights and equal occupational opportunities, especially in the administration. This agreement was never implemented, however, for only days after it was reached, Austrian troops bombarded Prague, forcing the congress to disband and rendering its decisions meaningless. The modern debut of Ukrainians on the international political stage was thus cut short.

Ukrainians in the imperial parliament While the Prague congress was still in session, elections commenced in Galicia to the Reichstag, or lower house, of the newly founded imperial parliament. For the Ukrainians, and the peasants in particular, these elections were a new and confusing experience. The Poles, in contrast, being politically much more sophisticated, enjoyed a distinct advantage, and they succeeded by means of rumors and threats in keeping many Ukrainian peasants away from the polls. Those who did vote often supported fellow peasants, many of whom were illiterate, rather than the priests and members of the city-bred intelligentsia recommended by the Supreme Ruthenian Council. As a result, the Ukrainians won only 25 of the 100 seats allotted to Galicia. Of these, 15 were held by peasants, 8 by priests, and 2 by members of the intelligentsia.

In the parliamentary debates that took place in the latter part of 1848, first in Vienna and then in Kromeriž, the Ukrainians concentrated on two issues: the question of compensation to landlords for the abolition of corvée and, once again, the proposal for administrative division of Galicia. The Ukrainian peasant delegates vehemently rejected any form of compensation. In the first speech ever made by a Ukrainian in parliament, Ivan Kapushchak, a simple peasant, emotionally denounced the centuries-old exploitation of the peasantry by the nobles, concluding with these words: "Should we pay an indemnity for this mistreatment and abuse? I think not. Let the whips and knouts that lashed our tired bodies be our indemnity payment. Let them satisfy the landlords!"²

Although this memorable speech was greeted with enthusiastic applause, the indemnity proposal nevertheless passed by a narrow margin. Disillusioned, the peasant members lost interest in all further discussions. The non-peasant members of the Ukrainian delegation, for their part, considered the administrative division of Galicia into separate Ukrainian and Polish parts as "a matter of life and death for our people." To back their proposals, they produced a list of about 15,000 signatures, which later swelled to 200,000. But after months of acrimonious debate, they too failed in their attempt to convince the majority of parliament. Meanwhile, the imperial government was slowly regaining control of the situation. In December, soon after the new emperor, the 18-year-old Franz Joseph, ascended the throne, parliament was disbanded.

Ukrainian activity in Eastern Galicia Ukrainian achievements on the local level were more concrete. Taking as their model the Czech cultural institution, Matica, they established the Halytsko-Ruska Matytsia in Lviv in July 1848. The goal of this organization was to publish inexpensive books for the general reader on religion, customs, crafts, agriculture, and pedagogy. It also strove to encourage the use of Ukrainian in the schools. On 19 October, the Supreme Ruthenian Council convened a congress of Ukrainian scholars to

assess general Ukrainian cultural needs and to discuss the standardization of the Ukrainian language. Of the approximately 100 participants, over two-thirds were members of the clergy, while the remainder belonged to the intelligentsia. Not surprisingly, they concluded that Ukrainian culture in Galicia was in a sad state. About two-thirds of educated Ukrainians were Polonized and the majority of peasants were illiterate. The problem was exacerbated by the lack of standardization in the Ukrainian language. After lengthy debates, the congress unanimously recommended the use of the Cyrillic rather than the Latin alphabet. It also reached the consensus that the spoken language should serve as the basis for the literary language, but this motion was accepted only after much opposition and many qualifications.

During this period, Ukrainians began the construction of a National Home in Lviv, which was to include a museum, a library, and printing facilities. They also successfully lobbied for the establishment of a chair of Ukrainian language and literature at the university. Its first holder was Iakiv Holovatsky. Finally, late in 1848, because of their reluctance to join the Polish-controlled Galician National Guard and as a sign of their loyalty to the Habsburgs, they received Vienna's approval to form Ukrainian military units. The 1400-man Ruthenian Riflemen were not trained in time, however, to fight on the Habsburg side against the Hungarian rebels.

Bukovyna and Transcarpathia In the other West Ukrainian lands, 1848 also sparked a flurry of activity, but on a much smaller scale than in Galicia. Only a few events of note occurred in tiny Bukovyna: several peasant uprisings led by the bold Lukiian Kobylitsia took place against Romanian landlords; five Ukrainian delegates were elected to parliament; and in 1849 the area was separated from Galicia and formed into a separate crown land.

In Hungarian-dominated Transcarpathia, there was a minor upsurge of political activism associated mostly with the talented and energetic Adolf Dobriansky. When the Hungarians revolted against the Habsburgs, they hoped, as the Poles had in Galicia, to gain the support of the non-Hungarians whom they had long oppressed. However, Dobriansky, acting like a one-man Supreme Ruthenian Council, persuaded his countrymen to reject Hungarian blandishments and to pledge loyalty to Vienna. Convinced that the Slavic populace of Transcarpathia belonged to the same ethnic stock as the Ukrainians of Galicia, he also urged the Supreme Ruthenian Council in Lviv to make the union of Transcarpathia with Galicia one of its goals. These views did not prevent Dobriansky and his small circle of associates from having pro-Russian sympathies which were strengthened by the sight of Russian armies advancing through Transcarpathia on their way to crush the hated Hungarians. These Russophile tendencies would later contribute to the confusion regarding national identity that characterized this most isolated of Ukrainian lands.

The significance of 1848 In the West Ukrainian lands, the revolutionary events of 1848 were packed into a mere 227 days. During this remarkably eventful period, the Ukrainians were presented with the opportunity to express themselves as a nation for the first time in their modern history. The experience, however, produced mixed results. For the Ukrainians, the greatest achievements of 1848 were undoubtedly the abolition of the *corvée* (*panshchyna*) and the introduction of constitutional government. But these gains were not peculiar to the Ukrainians, for they were scored by other peoples of the empire as well, at the expense of the momentarily faltering Habsburg regime. Of the uniquely Ukrainian achievements during this period, foremost was the activity of the Supreme Ruthenian Council. Considering the total lack of experience on the part of Ukrainians in political affairs, the performance of the Supreme Ruthenian Council, which effectively organized previously passive Ukrainians in the pursuit of well-defined goals, was impressive. By establishing institutions that would systematically promote cultural growth, the Supreme Ruthenian Council took the first crucial steps toward making Eastern Galicia an organizational bastion of Ukrainianism.

But 1848 also highlighted West Ukrainian limitations, the most serious of which was the problem of leadership. Because it monopolized positions of leadership, the clergy put its own indelible stamp on West Ukrainian politics. Seeing the Habsburgs as their greatest benefactors, the churchmen of the Supreme Ruthenian Council committed Ukrainian society wholly and unconditionally to the support of the dynasty. As a result, throughout 1848, Ukrainians found themselves supporting absolutism against Polish and Hungarian insurgents who, by and large, espoused liberal, democratic views (while continuing their association with the landowning nobility). Thus, because of the clergy's political and social conservatism and because the anti-Habsburg forces were identified with the hated landowners, Ukrainians often functioned merely as tools of the Habsburgs. Moreover, instead of trying to wring greater concessions from the government for their services, the priests of the Supreme Ruthenian Council did no more than meekly hope for imperial favors. Such an approach brought disappointing results.

Yet taken as a whole, 1848 clearly marked a turning point in the history of the West Ukrainians. It broke their age-old inertia, passivity, and isolation, and launched them on the long and bitter struggle for national and social emancipation.

Change in the Russian Empire

In the mid 19th century, the imperial system of Russia, like that of the Austrian Empire, experienced an unsettling shock that raised questions about its effectiveness and durability. The event that severely tested the regime that had been zealously maintained by Nicholas I during his thirty-year reign was

the Crimean War of 1854–55. It began as a typical great-power conflict that pitted Russia against the alliance of England, France, Sardinia, and the Ottoman Empire. This alliance was determined to halt the age-old Russian attempt to expand into the Balkans to gain control of the Straits of Bosphorus and the Mediterranean trade routes, a particularly important goal in view of the expanding wheat trade of the Black Sea ports at this time.

Crimea became the main theater of the war after it was invaded by the allied powers and the impact of the conflict on neighboring Ukraine was greater than on any other area of the empire. The Ukrainian provinces functioned as the primary source of supplies for the imperial armies and their inhabitants were recruited in large numbers to serve either as frontline troops or border guards, wagoners, and fortification workers. An example of the kinds of strains that began to be felt in Ukraine itself was the so-called Kievan Cossack movement of 1855. When the tsarist government announced in that year the formation of a volunteer militia, Ukrainian peasants, construing it to mean a renewal of Cossackdom that, to their minds, was synonymous with freedom from serf obligations, rushed by the thousands to form “Cossack” units and refused to serve their landlords. The situation became critical in Kiev province, where over 180,000 peasants from more than 400 villages identified themselves as Cossacks and demanded an end to serfdom. With the arrival of troops, order was restored, but the incident clearly revealed one of the internal weaknesses that plagued the empire.

These weaknesses were even more apparent on the Crimean battlefield where, despite the heroic defense of Sevastopol, the Russian troops suffered ultimate defeat. Aside from badly undermining Russian prestige, the defeat demonstrated dramatically how far Russia had fallen behind the modernized, industrializing Western countries. Russian backwardness was evident at every turn: their rifles had only half the range of English and French weapons; their supplies and communications networks were less effective than those of the West Europeans, despite the fact that the latter were thousands of miles from their home bases; the Russian command structure, notable exceptions notwithstanding, proved to be incompetent; and tsarist soldiers, most of whom were serfs, although not lacking in bravery, were wanting in both technical skill and initiative. Crushed by the defeat, Nicholas I died in 1855. His son Alexander II came to the throne fully cognizant of the empire’s desperate need for reform.

The emancipation of the serfs During a speech to the nobles of Moscow in 1855, the new tsar declared: “It is preferable to abolish serfdom from above than to wait until the serfs abolish it from below.”³ Even Nicholas I, the arch-conservative father of the new tsar, had let it be known that serfdom would have to be dismantled sooner or later. Radical and liberal members of the gentry-intelligentsia had for decades demanded an end to the “hateful in-

stitution." But when Alexander II made his memorable comment, it became clear that he had reached the historic decision to launch a series of reforms aimed primarily at the abolition of serfdom.

As with any historic turning point, the decision to reform sparked a debate among historians about its causes. Some Western scholars are convinced that economic factors were decisive in bringing about the reforms. They argue that the opening of the Black Sea ports and the growing participation of Russia's landowners in world trade made them aware of the drawbacks of serf labor. They point out that the level of productivity of the Russian serf in 1860 was equivalent to that of the English farmer in 1750 and to the central European peasant in 1800. In short, although serf labor was cheap, it was of such low quality as to be uneconomical. Moreover, unprecedented competition and their own mismanagement had forced many landowners into debt. In 1848, over two-thirds of the landowners in Ukraine were indebted to the extent that they could no longer provide seed or food for their peasants, let alone improve their methods of raising cash crops. As a result, serfdom was already in decline well before the reforms were instituted. This is borne out by the fact that although about 58% of the peasants in the Russian Empire were enserved in 1811, by 1860 the percentage had dropped to 44%.

There are also scholars who contend that although economic factors were important, other considerations were equally, if not more, significant. Soviet historians are adamant in insisting that peasant unrest created a "revolutionary situation" that frightened the tsar and nobles into making concessions.⁴ According to their statistics, between 1856 and 1860, there were 276 disturbances involving about 160,000 peasants in Ukraine alone. The American historian Alfred Rieber has argued that the desire to modernize the imperial army was primarily responsible for the reforms.⁵ Meanwhile, the Englishman Bernard Pares claimed that it was Russia's anxiety about falling behind the West.⁶ Other historians prefer to emphasize the role of the liberal intelligentsia, which, by means of moving novels, polemics, and poems (such as Shevchenko's), made serfdom appear morally reprehensible. There is, however, agreement on one point: the crushing blow of Russian defeat in the Crimean War was the precipitating factor that shocked the imperial establishment into recognizing the need for immediate reform.

Aware of how potentially explosive the emancipation of the serfs could be, Alexander II proceeded carefully. In 1857, he appointed a secret committee (later renamed the Main Committee) composed of leading bureaucrats and public figures of both liberal and conservative tendencies to discuss emancipation and to formulate concrete proposals for its implementation. Ukrainians were prominent in the Main Committee, which was based in St Petersburg. One of these was Hryhorii Galagan, a dedicated abolitionist who was a personal friend of Shevchenko. But another, M.P. Pozen, a wealthy, influential, but unscrupulous landowner from Poltava province, did his best to

thwart any progress. To get a sampling of local opinion, the government also established committees of nobles in each of the provinces. In Ukraine, a total of 323 nobles participated in these local committees and represented the differing interests of such regions as Sloboda Ukraine, the Left and Right banks, and southern Ukraine. The peasants were not consulted.

Although many nobles were less than enthusiastic about emancipation, they realized that it was inevitable. Therefore, from the outset, the key questions were the terms of the reform and the manner in which it would be carried out. To calm their anxieties, the tsarist government made it clear that, first and foremost, the interests of the nobility, still considered to be the chief pillar of the regime, would be safeguarded. As for the emancipation of the serfs, the two aspects that had to be considered were the serfs' personal status and their relationship to the land. Although it was assumed that serfs would be declared free men, the question arose whether this freedom would be complete or whether it should be limited in some way. The prospect of millions of peasants suddenly set loose to go where they pleased and do what they wished filled many a noble and bureaucrat with consternation. There was also the complex question of landownership. Was the serf to be freed with or without land? And if he was to be freed with land, on what terms would it be granted to him?

Given the differing landholding patterns that prevailed in various parts of the empire, it is no wonder that nobles were divided on the issue of land allotments to the peasantry. In the less fertile northern lands of Russia, the main source of the serf-owner's income had been *obrok*, or payments in cash. Instead of having the peasants work the unproductive soil, nobles there had encouraged them to find work in towns and cities in order to pay their obligations off in cash. As land was not their only source of income in this region, Russian serf-owners were thus willing to provide serfs with generous allotments of land. However, they demanded compensation in cash for the revenues that would be lost to them as a result of emancipation. In the rich southern black-earth (chernozem) region of Ukraine, however, a very different attitude prevailed. The landlords here had always demanded *corvée* or labor duties from their serfs because landlords' incomes derived mainly from crop production. Predictably, they were unwilling to provide peasants with land under any conditions. Slight regional variations of this "southern" attitude prevailed in other parts of Ukraine as well. On the Left Bank, especially in Poltava province, landowners were willing to provide peasants only with garden plots. In recently colonized southern Ukraine, where labor was scarce, the owners of large latifundia wanted to see serfdom prolonged by about ten years. And on the Right Bank, the Polish magnates did not want to let the peasants have any land at all. Yet despite the difficulties and obstruction that it encountered, the Main Committee pushed on at the urging of the tsar.

On 19 February 1861, Alexander II issued a manifesto abolishing serf-

dom. Although a document of epochal significance, it was in effect a clumsy and confusing statement that gave peasants the impression that their long-awaited emancipation would be neither quick nor fully satisfactory.

The act of emancipation did free serfs from the personal authority of their landowners. But, while it transformed former serfs into citizens, it did not entail full equality. Unlike other segments of society, emancipated serfs were still obliged to pay the head tax. They fell under the jurisdiction of special courts that had the right to impose corporal punishment for minor offenses. Although the reform mandated self-government for peasant communities, government officials, who were usually appointed from among the local nobility, retained a supervisory function. Peasants had to obtain passports from their village leadership if they wanted to leave their village. And if they did not meet their financial obligations to the state, village elders were empowered to reorganize their personal affairs to enable them to do so.

The qualifications and complexities associated with the issue of landownership were even more disheartening to the peasants. Basically, the reform allowed landowners to keep about one-half of their estates for personal use, while the other half was to be redistributed among their former serfs. The crucial stipulation was that peasants would have to pay for their allotments. Because peasants had little or no money, the arrangement was that the government would pay the landlords 80% of the cost of the land they sold in the form of treasury bonds, and the peasants would, in turn, be obligated to repay this amount with interest to the government over a period of forty-nine years. The remaining 20% of the cost of the allotments would be paid directly to the landlord by the peasants, either in cash or, what was more likely, in the form of negotiated labor obligations.

For those who could not shoulder the financial burdens of the settlement, an alternative called a "pauper's allotment" was provided in the form of an outright grant of a tiny plot, about 2.5 acres in size. Less fortunate were the serfs who worked as servants in the homes of landlords – in Ukraine they numbered about 440,000 – for emancipation brought them freedom, but no land.

In the allocation of land, the reform took regional variations into account. Cultivated land was divided into three categories: black earth, non-black earth, and steppe land. In general, peasant allotments in the latter two categories, which represented land of poorer quality, were larger, while those in black earth regions, such as Ukraine, were smaller.

Generally speaking, peasants emerged from the reforms with less land at their disposal than they had had prior to 1861. In the Russian north, peasants lost about 10% of their former plots. In the Left Bank and in southern Ukraine their holdings were reduced by almost 30%. Thus, whereas the average size of peasant holdings in the empire was about 27 acres per family, in the Left Bank and in southern Ukraine it was only 18 acres per family.

Landlords in Ukraine appear to have fared especially well in the bargain. Through the use of various tactics during the period of negotiation and redistribution of land, they appropriated forests, meadows, and ponds that had previously been considered common property. Invariably, they kept the most fertile areas for themselves and sold inferior land at inflated prices. In the course of redistribution, they often forced peasants to move, thereby imposing additional expense upon the poor. To be sure, these practices were common throughout the empire, but, in Ukraine, where competition for land was keenest, they were especially widespread. As a result, the peasants of the Left Bank and southern Ukraine fared much worse than their Russian neighbors.

The Right Bank was an exception to this rule. Because the government had serious doubts about the loyalty of the Polish nobles in the region (the Polish uprising of 1863 confirmed their misgivings), it sought to win over the Ukrainian peasantry of the region to its side by making allotments that were about 18% larger than those that had been held by the peasants prior to 1861. But what the former serfs gained in allotment size, they lost in the highly inflated prices they had to pay for their lands at this time.

Another particularity of the reforms in Ukraine involved the forms of landownership. In Russia, where over 95% of the peasants lived in communes (*obshchiny*), deeds to the newly acquired land were held collectively and payment for the land was a communal responsibility. But in Ukraine, communal ownership was rare. Over 85% of the peasants on the Right Bank and almost 70% on the Left Bank worked individual homesteads. Therefore, most Ukrainian peasant families took individual title to their land and personally shouldered the responsibility for the debt on it. This arrangement served to strengthen the already well-developed attachment to private property that distinguished Ukrainian peasants from their Russian counterparts.

We must remember that not all peasants were serfs. Roughly half were state-peasants, of whom there were at least thirty different categories, including about 1 million former Cossacks in Ukraine. They were usually better off than privately owned serfs, for although they paid a higher head tax to the state, which was in effect their landlord, they could leave their villages without permission, had more land at their disposal and there were no petty, exploitative landlords to contend with (but corrupt bureaucrats were a frequent nuisance). The reform of 1861 and the law of 1866, in particular, emancipated the state-peasants more quickly and on terms that were more favorable than those accorded serfs. Along with their freedom, they received larger plots and paid proportionately less for them than did serfs. On the Right Bank, however, the condition of the state-peasants showed very little improvement.

Generally speaking, the peasants, and especially former serfs, were disappointed by the reform. They expected it to bring them immediate and outright ownership of their plots; instead, they found the size of their plots reduced and crushing financial burdens imposed upon them. A wave of unrest rolled

through the countryside, but its intensity varied from region to region. On the Left Bank and in southern Ukraine, there were relatively few disturbances. However, on the Right Bank, memories of the *haidamak* uprisings were still strong; religioethnic as well as socioeconomic differences fueled animosities between the Ukrainian Orthodox peasantry and the Polish Catholic nobility; and minor clashes were widespread. But order was always quickly restored and the peasants resumed their struggle for their daily bread, albeit under markedly different circumstances.

Other reforms The abolition of serfdom entailed other reforms. One aspect of imperial society urgently needing improvement was the local administration. As society changed, and especially after serfs acquired rights of citizenship, demand for local services increased. However, the imperial government had neither the personnel nor the money to meet these demands. Therefore, in 1864, it allowed communities to elect their own representatives on the county and provincial levels to oversee such matters as education, medical care, postal services, road maintenance, food reserves in case of famine, and collection of statistics. To finance these services, the local committees, or *zemstva* (singular: *zemstvo*), were given the right to impose local taxes.

In a radical departure from the usual tsarist practice of appointing all government officials, members of the *zemstvo* were elected from an electorate divided into three separate categories: large landowners, townsmen, and peasants. The impact of voters was proportional to the amount of land they owned. As might be expected, the great majority of *zemstvo* members were noblemen. In Ukraine, they usually made up over 75% of *zemstvo* membership, with peasants rarely constituting more than 10%. But although they were not truly representative, the *zemstva* performed a very important function. Besides helping to raise the general standard of living in the countryside, they introduced local populations to a limited measure of self-government.

In Ukraine, a network of *zemstva* was established on the Left Bank and in the south. However, because the recent rebellion of Polish nobles, *zemstva* were not instituted on the Right Bank until 1911. Because they represented local interests, the *zemstva* tended to be much more sensitive to Ukrainian cultural aspirations than was the imperial bureaucracy. The Poltava *zemstva* in particular became associated with Ukrainophile tendencies in the latter part of the century, and it served as a training ground for many leaders of the Ukrainian movement.

In even greater need of improvement was the legal system. Much of the problem lay in the Russians' poorly developed sense of legality. Imperial bureaucrats, who were responsible for many legal decisions, considered justice to be a department of the state and, in their view, courts existed to decide what was in the interests of the state. Individual rights were irrelevant or, at best, of secondary importance. Thus, trials were held in secret, judges were often cor-

rupt, and their frequently arbitrary decisions were based on class distinctions – with harsher punishments meted out to the lower classes and lighter sentences going to the nobles. The legal reform of 1864 improved this situation considerably: it made the judiciary an independent branch of government, free from bureaucratic interference. Henceforth, trials were held openly, with contending sides arguing their respective cases. One of the ramifications of this change was that it gave the impetus for the rise of a new occupational group – the lawyers.

Important changes were also introduced in other areas of imperial society. The educational reforms of the 1860s provided the lower classes with greater access to all levels of education, universities included. They also improved the curricula and granted universities greater autonomy. At the same time, censorship regulations were loosened, although it still remained unclear to what extent one could advocate “subversive” ideas. In 1874, the harsh terms of military service were amended to require all classes, not just the lower strata of society, to render military service. The length of service was also reduced from twenty-five years to six and an array of exemptions was made available.

Significance of the reforms Although the “great reforms” did not revolutionize the conditions of life for Ukrainians and other subjects of the Russian Empire, they did introduce basic changes. Western scholars often emphasize the personal freedom that they brought the serfs, the development of the *zemstvo*-led local government, and the new appreciation for legality that they introduced. For their part, Soviet historians believe that the reforms ushered in the epochal transition from feudalism to a bourgeois, capitalist society in Russia. It is clear that the reforms had serious shortcomings, but there is general agreement that the subsequent socioeconomic modernization of the empire would have been impossible without them.

In Ukraine, where the percentage of the population who were serfs was roughly 42%, compared to an imperial average of about 35%, the impact of emancipation was that much greater. As education improved, legal protection became more widespread, and local government more entrenched, national particularities and local interests had a greater opportunity for self-expression. Certainly, various ideologies, including that of Ukrainian nationhood, would now find it easier to reach a broader constituency.



The changes and reforms introduced by the Austrian and Russian Empires in 1848 and in the 1860s, respectively, had important similarities. Although forced upon both empires, particularly on the Austrian, the reforms were nonetheless implemented “from the top” by regimes that still retained po-

litical control. Fundamental, but not revolutionary, they left much of the old regimes intact. Yet they clearly hastened the coming of a new era, one in which the masses and their representatives would exert a growing influence on political, socioeconomic, and cultural activity. Thus, in both the Austrian and Russian empires, the changes of the mid 19th century were a giant step toward modernity.

In terms of understanding the impact of this era on the Ukrainians, the differences between the Austrian and Russian reforms were as significant as were the similarities. The revolutionary year of 1848 brought two main issues to the fore among the Ukrainians of the Austrian Empire: the socioeconomic plight of the peasantry and the national aspirations of the clergy-intelligentsia. Of crucial importance was the fact that in Western Ukraine these issues were interrelated, since the Poles who opposed Ukrainian national goals were often the self-same noblemen who exploited the peasants. Thus, for West Ukrainians, nationality was from the outset associated with such bread-and-butter issues as education, local government, and social legislation. In time, this linkage would endow nationhood with a relevance among the peasants that it had already attained among the intelligentsia. Naturally, Habsburg acquiescence in the establishment of a constitutional government that – despite its limitations and imperfections – allowed West Ukrainians to express and defend their national and socioeconomic interests in parliament, also increased peasant involvement. Thus, the socioeconomically disadvantaged West Ukrainians who inhabited the most backward lands of the Austrian Empire were presented with opportunities for political, organizational, and cultural activity that Ukrainians in Russia did not have.

For the Ukrainians of the Russian Empire, the profound changes of the 1860s had little impact on the development of their national movement. The nationality question in Russia could not share the limelight with socioeconomic problems as it did in Austria for a variety of reasons – including the cultural and demographic preponderance of Russians in the empire; the inherent tsarist distrust of pluralism; the tsar's refusal even to consider a constitution that might create the means for national and regional self-expression; the weakness of communal organizations; and the government's harsh, repressive policies toward the national movements among the non-Russians of the empire. As a result, the crucial linkage between the peasantry's socioeconomic condition and the national aspirations of the intelligentsia was absent. This circumstance severely stunted the growth of national consciousness among the Ukrainians of the Russian Empire.

Socioeconomic Change

New ideas, political upheavals, and social reforms captured the attention of Europeans, Ukrainians included, during much of the 19th century. Yet at this same time, a less noticeable but far more fundamental process of change was under way, namely, the Industrial Revolution. Not since man mastered agriculture in the Stone Age would such profound changes occur in all aspects of human life as those associated with the coming of the machine. In Ukraine, however, industrialization came slowly at first, and the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians remained what they had been for millennia – an agrarian people. But when industrialization finally did develop in the late 19th century in certain limited areas of Ukraine, it did so rapidly and on a large scale. As a result, two radically different systems of production, of social organization, and of values suddenly confronted each other – one associated with the modernizing city, the proletariat, and the machine and the other with the traditionalist village, the peasant, and manual labor. The strains, contradictions, and dilemmas that arose from this confrontation would mold Ukrainian history well into the 20th century.



The Troubled Countryside

Although the Emancipation of 1861 freed the peasants of the Russian Empire from their landlords, it did not improve their economic condition. In fact, any discussion of the condition of the peasant in the postemancipation era reads like an endless and depressing litany of troubles. Some of these problems stemmed directly from errors in judgment by the architects of the reforms. Their most grievous mistake was to place too great a financial burden on the peasantry, while at the same time providing it with too little land. Thus, in addition to onerous redemption payments, peasants had to pay a head tax

and were also indirectly taxed when they bought such goods as sugar, tea, tobacco, cotton, iron implements, and, most important, vodka. Late in the 19th century, when a government commission investigated the matter of financial overload, it reported that – if redemption payments were included – peasants paid ten times more taxes than did the nobles. Even after the government abolished the head tax in 1886 and redemption payments in 1905, indirect taxes soaked up most of the peasants' meager amounts of cash.

To meet their financial obligations, some peasants would borrow money either from other peasants who were better off or, on the Right Bank in particular, from Jews who specialized in moneylending. But with interest rates often exceeding 150%, the peasants would usually only sink deeper into debt. Others attempted to sell what little surplus produce they had, but customers were few, markets too distant, and prices too low to make small-scale business profitable. Finally, the poorest peasants would often hire themselves out to former landlords or rich peasants at extremely low wages.

Obviously, the chronic lack of cash among 90% of Ukraine's population had serious economic ramifications. Most peasants could not afford to buy either additional land to enlarge their plots or modern implements (not to speak of machines) to improve their productivity. Indeed, on the Left and Right banks, about 50% of the peasants possessed neither horses nor good steel implements. The sight of a peasant harnessed to a dull, wooden plow was common in the Ukrainian countryside. Lack of cash also spelled weakness in Ukraine's domestic market, impeding the growth of commerce, industry, and cities and making it an economic backwater of the empire.

From the peasant's point of view, however, the main reason for his woes was not lack of money but lack of arable land. It was, after all, possible to live without money, but how, he would argue, could one survive without land. The tiny land allotments of 1861, smaller in Ukraine than anywhere else in the empire, could hardly satisfy their holders' already exceedingly modest needs. And natural causes compounded these problems to calamitous proportions. In the latter part of the 19th century, the Russian Empire, like most of Europe, experienced tremendous population growth. Between 1861 and 1897 the population of the empire grew from 73 million to 125 million. By 1917, it had reached 170 million. In Ukraine, the population jumped by 72% in less than forty years.

Because most of the Ukrainians lived in the countryside, it was here that demographic pressures became most evident. In 1890 there were almost twice as many inhabitants per acre of arable land on the Left and Right banks as there had been in 1860. This made the region one of the most densely inhabited in Europe, with twice as many inhabitants per arable acre as in England. Why this sudden jump in population? Paradoxically, improved medical care, brought to the countryside by the *zemstva*, sharply reduced the infant mortality rate and thereby greatly contributed to population growth. Yet it should

be noted that despite these improvements in medical care, the death rate per thousand in the Russian Empire was still twice as high on the average as that in Western Europe.

The consequences of the twin dilemmas of overpopulation and land shortage soon manifested themselves in the Ukrainian countryside in the form of soaring prices for land. In some regions, most notably the southern steppe, they were three to four times higher in 1900 than they had been in 1861, thus making it even more difficult for peasants to obtain the additional land they so desperately needed. Another consequence of rural overpopulation was unemployment. It has been calculated that in the 1890s Ukraine had an available labor force of almost 10.7 million people. Of these, agriculture required 2.3 million and other sectors of the economy utilized 1.1 million. The remaining 7.3 million, or 68% of the labor force, constituted a surplus that was largely unemployed or underemployed and that virtually led a hand-to-mouth existence. Little wonder that the living standard of Ukrainians fell far behind that of the West. For example, in 1900 an average Dane consumed 2166 pounds of bread annually, a German 1119, and a Hungarian 1264 pounds. In Ukraine, however, where bread was a larger component of the diet than in the West, the average annual consumption was only 867 pounds – and that in a land that was referred to as the breadbasket of Europe.

Emigration to the east Desperate for land, peasants were willing to go to any lengths to get more of it. One way was to work a large strip of land for a landlord for free in return for the use of a smaller strip. Although such arrangements were disturbingly reminiscent of serfdom, many villagers had no choice but to accept them. A more drastic option was to emigrate. But unlike West Ukrainians who had to travel overseas in search of land and employment, East Ukrainians did not have to leave the boundaries of the Russian Empire. They could travel overland (often for distances as great as that between Eastern Europe and America) to the open areas of the Russian east, particularly the Amur basin near the Pacific coast.

Between 1896 and 1906, after the construction of the trans-Siberian railroad, about 1.6 million Ukrainians migrated eastward. Discouraged by difficult conditions, many of these migrants returned to their homes. Even so, by 1914 about 2 million Ukrainians lived permanently in the Far East. Moreover, proportionately almost twice as many Ukrainians as Russians moved eastward in the search for land. Thus, at exactly the same time West Ukrainians from the Habsburg empire were colonizing the prairies of western Canada, their East Ukrainian counterparts were bringing the plow to Russia's Pacific coast. This was a telling indication of the lengths to which the Ukrainian peasant was willing to go in order to obtain land.

Differentiation of the peasantry Despite the generally dismal condition of the

peasantry, some, as usual, did better than others. Consequently, in the post-emancipation era, economic distinctions among the peasantry became more marked. Essentially, the socioeconomic structure of the Ukrainian (as well as Russian) village reflected Aldous Huxley's famous dictum that humans tend to be divided into the high, the middle, and the low. The Ukrainian peasantry came to consist of the relatively rich, called *kulaks* (Ukrainian: *kurkuli*); those of average means, called *seredniaky*; and poor peasants or *bidniaky*.

A combination of hard work, initiative, luck, and, quite often, exploitation of their fellows – hence the negative connotations of *kulak* meaning a grasping, tightfisted person – allowed about 15–20% of peasants to enlarge their plots and accumulate wealth, while others sank deeper into poverty. Inter-marriage among the *kulaks* helped them to further expand and retain their holdings for generations. On the average, this stratum of villagers possessed between sixty-five and seventy-five acres, several horses, and farming machinery. Often they hired labor and engaged in commercial farming. Following the lead of Lenin, Soviet scholars have been particularly harsh in their condemnation of these successful peasants, viewing them as a rural bourgeoisie and an exploitive class. However, many Western scholars argue that the socioeconomic distinctions between *kulaks* and other peasants should not be exaggerated. Although it is true that the *kulaks* often took advantage of poorer peasants and the latter were frequently resentful and envious of the former, the *kulaks* considered themselves and were still perceived by others as peasants, not related in any way to city people or nobles. Indeed, the dream of poor peasants was not to eliminate *kulaks*, but to become one of them.

The middle stratum of the peasantry was relatively large, constituting about 30% of the village population. Usually, *seredniaky* owned eight to twenty-five acres, which was enough to feed a family. In addition, they often possessed several horses and some livestock. Only very rarely could they afford any type of farm machinery. This solid, hardworking village “middle-class” – whose neat, whitewashed cottages bespoke pride of ownership and self-sufficiency – was particularly widespread on the Left Bank.

Most numerous by far were the *bidniaky*. Making up about 50% of the peasantry, they either had no land at all or only a few acres that were insufficient to provide a living. To survive, the *bidniaky* hired themselves out to richer peasants and nobles or they left the village in search of seasonal work. A family could slip into poverty in a variety of ways. Often, misfortunes such as sickness, death, or natural calamity would force peasants to sell some or all of their land, thereby depriving themselves of a secure economic base. At times, they would deplete their resources through imprudent farming techniques. Not infrequently, laziness and heavy drinking would push a family to the brink of disaster. In any case, as the already high percentage of poorest peasants increased, an undercurrent of tension and disaffection began to

permeate the seemingly peaceful countryside. Thus, for many observers, it seemed that if revolution was to come to the Russian Empire, it would have to begin in the village.

Decline of the nobility Despite the generous land settlement, financial support from the government, and a variety of social advantages and privileges, the nobility also experienced a sharp decline in the post-1861 period. It was a result mostly of the fact that nobles were incapable, by and large, of running their estates efficiently as profitable commercial ventures. Rather than investing capital in machinery, they wasted it on ostentatious living; accustomed to the free labor of the serfs, they could not adjust to hiring help; and the discipline, initiative, and hard work required to run a profitable business were foreign to many nobles.

To solve their financial problems, they borrowed. By 1877 about 75% of them were heavily mortgaged. Consequently, many sold their land, usually to the ambitious and industrious kulaks, with the result that between 1862 and 1914 noble ownership of land in Ukraine declined by 53%. But not on the Right Bank, however, for there the extremely wealthy Polish landowners found it easier to weather their difficulties and retain their vast holdings.

The plight of the nobility indicated that the traditional elite in Ukraine and the empire as a whole was gradually moving into oblivion. After they sold their lands, nobles usually moved into cities where they became bureaucrats, officers, or members of the intelligentsia. True, they still enjoyed great social advantages, and as late as 1917 most of the arable land was still in their hands. But as a class, deprived of its dominance over the peasantry and gradually losing its control of the land, the nobility was living on borrowed time.

Commercial agriculture Paradoxically, although the Ukrainian countryside was haunted by stagnation and decline, its role as the “granary of Europe” continued to grow. This circumstance occurred because a small segment of the nobility, along with entrepreneurs from other classes, had succeeded – contrary to the general trend – in transforming their estates into large, bustling agribusinesses that supplied imperial and foreign markets. The anomaly of the situation was caught by Vyshnegradsky, the imperial minister of finance, who remarked that “We may go hungry, but we will export.”¹

The export of food had, however, a limited and regional character. Only certain parts of Ukraine and a relatively small percentage of the population were involved in it. It was the steppe region, with its open land and easy access to the Black Sea ports, that became the center of commercial wheat and bread production early in the 19th century. Even before emancipation, estate owners in the region were busily expanding the acreage under cultivation, investing in machinery, and using hired labor. After 1861, when labor became mobile and plentiful in the south and transportation improved, Ukraine

in general and the steppe region in particular expanded its food production more rapidly than the rest of the empire. Thus, in the early 20th century, as much as 90% of the empire's main export – wheat – came from Ukraine. Even on the global scale Ukraine's food production was impressive: it accounted for 43% of the world's barley crop, 20% of its wheat, and 10% of its corn.

Wheat, however, was not Ukraine's primary cash crop. This distinction belonged to beets, which were the main source of sugar for the empire and much of Europe. In all of Europe there was no area as well suited for large-scale production of sugar beets as the Right Bank. Consequently, by the 1840s sugar-beet production was well established in the region. As might be expected, it was Polish families, such as the Branicki and Potocki, who owned the largest sugar enterprises. But Russians like the Bobrinsky family; Ukrainians like the Tereshchenkos, Symyrenkos, and Iakhnenkos; and Jews like the Brodskys and Halperins also belonged to the "sugar barons" of the Right Bank. Meanwhile, on the Left Bank, the most important cash crop was tobacco, which accounted for over 50% of total imperial production. On both sides of the Dnieper, the distillation of alcohol was a widespread and profitable industry. With the crucial contribution it made to the economy of the empire, it is little wonder that Ukraine was regarded as an indispensable and an inseparable part of it.

Industrialization

With the liquidation of serfdom, the way was finally cleared for the modernization and industrialization of the empire. This process had already been embarked upon by many countries of Western Europe and America, but the experience of the Russian Empire was unique in a number of important respects. First, the state assumed a much greater role in initiating and guiding industrialization in Russia and Ukraine than it did in the West. The Russian Empire's internal market was too weak; the bourgeoisie, which usually provided capitalist entrepreneurs, was practically nonexistent; and private capital was too scarce to spark the rise of large-scale industry without government support. Second, once the empire did start to industrialize with the aid of capital and expertise, the rate of growth was remarkably rapid, particularly in Ukraine in the 1890s, with industries springing up full-blown in a matter of a few years. Finally, the economic modernization of the empire was most uneven. At the turn of the century in Ukraine, it was not uncommon to see some of the biggest, most modern factories, mines, and steel mills in all Europe amidst villages where peasants still harnessed themselves to the plow and eked out a living from the land as they had for centuries.

As everywhere, one of the first harbingers of economic modernization was the railroad. For military reasons (a major cause of the Russian defeat in the Crimean War had been lack of adequate transport), as well as economic ones,



Map 18 Industrial regions in the Russian Empire in the late 19th century

the imperial government rushed to create a network of railroads. In Russian-ruled Ukraine the first railroad tracks were laid in 1866–71 between Odessa and Balta to expedite grain exports. By the 1870s – the high point of railroad construction in Ukraine – railroads connected all the major Ukrainian cities with each other. And, most important, they linked Ukraine with Moscow, the center of imperial markets. As Ukrainian food and raw materials moved northward in exchange for an unprecedented flow of Russian finished products to the south, Ukraine's economy, which had heretofore been relatively distinct and self-sustaining, began to be integrated into the imperial system. Furthermore, the rapid growth of railroad construction created a pressing need for coal and iron. Suddenly, the coal and iron reserves that were known to exist in southeastern Ukraine in large quantities, particularly in the basin of the Donets River, became not only valuable, but also accessible.

Between 1870 and 1900, and especially during the frenetic 1890s, two areas in southeastern Ukraine – the Donets basin and Kryvyi Rih – became the fastest growing industrial regions in the empire and, quite possibly, in the world. The combination of factors making this growth possible were the generous government support for industrial development (so that these undertakings were practically risk-free); the continued rise in domestic demand for coal and iron; and abundant Western capital (confronted with shrinking profits in highly developed Europe) that rushed to take advantage of the alluring opportunities in Ukraine.

Signs of the coming boom first appeared in the coal-mining industry of the Donets basin. Between 1870 and 1900, when coal production jumped by over 1000%, the region produced close to 70% of the empire's coal. As the number of mines in the Donets basin increased, so too did the work force: in 1885, it numbered 32,000; in 1900, 82,000; and in 1913, 168,000. The industry was controlled by about twenty joint stock companies and by 1900 about 94% of their stock belonged to French and Belgian investors, who had poured millions of rubles into the development of the mines. These companies formed syndicates that gained a virtual monopoly on the production and sale of coal. Thus, when capitalism finally came to Ukraine, it came fully developed.

In the 1880s, about a decade after the coal boom, came the large-scale development of iron ore production. Concentrated in the Kryvyi Rih region, the growth of the metallurgical industry was even more spectacular than that of coal mining. The stage was set in 1885 when a railroad was built linking Kryvyi Rih with the coal mines of the Donets basin. The government offered entrepreneurs in the budding metallurgical industry an incentive that few could ignore, guaranteeing to buy many of their products at greatly inflated prices. Western investors, again led by the French, responded enthusiastically. By 1914 they had put up more than 180 million rubles for the construction of some of the largest, most technologically advanced foundries in the world. Some of these enterprises grew so fast that they became bustling cities. Iuzivka, for example, named after the Welshman John Hughes, who estab-

lished a metallurgical plant at the site, became the important industrial city of Donetsk. As late as the 1870s, the Kryvyi Rih region had only 13,000 workers, but by 1917 the number had increased more than ten times to 137,000. Even more striking is the comparison of the growth rate of the metals industry in Ukraine with that of Russia's old metal-producing centers in the Urals: while the antiquated plants of the Urals only managed to raise their production of iron ore fourfold between 1870 and 1900, those of Ukraine had increased by 158 times.

But while the basic, extractive (raw-material-producing) industries of Ukraine burgeoned, other types did not. This underdevelopment was especially evident in the production of finished goods. At the turn of the century, the only industries in Ukraine that showed a marked improvement in the production of finished products were, not surprisingly, factories specializing in farm machinery and, to a lesser degree, locomotive works. For the vast majority of its finished products, Ukraine depended on Russia. In 1913, for example, Ukraine was responsible for 70% of the empire's extractive industry, but had only 15% of its capacity to produce finished goods. Therefore, the economic relationship that developed between the two lands was based on the exchange of Ukrainian raw materials for Russian finished goods. Thus, while the sudden, vast outburst of industrial activity in Ukraine was indeed impressive, it tended to obscure the one-dimensional, imbalanced nature of this growth.

The question of colonial exploitation The question often raised in the evaluation of the remarkable industrialization of southern Ukraine is the degree to which it benefited Ukraine as a whole. Contemporary Soviet scholars argue that, on balance, the impact was positive. As a result of the growth of transportation and the quantum leap in the transfer of goods and materials between north and south, the economies of Russia and Ukraine finally and irrevocably became integrated. This led to the creation of a larger, more productive and more efficient economic unit – a vast all-Russian market, as they call it – from which both lands benefited greatly. In fact, Soviet economic historians like Ivan Hurzhyi imply that, in the new economic context, Ukraine performed even better than Russia: not only did it gain access to a huge market but, because of its faster industrialization, it consistently enlarged its share of this market.² Any suggestion that the Russian heartland derived greater economic advantage from linkage with the Ukrainian periphery is angrily rejected by the Soviets. To buttress their argument, they point out that it was a Russian imperial government that stimulated the faster growth rate in Ukraine.

But Soviet scholars did not always view the issue in this manner. In the 1920s, before the imposition of Stalinist orthodoxy, the leading Soviet historians, such as Mikhail Pokrovsky in Russia and Matvii Iavorsky in Ukraine, unequivocally reiterated that despite industrialization, Ukraine was exploited

by Russia.³ Lenin himself declared in a speech in Switzerland in 1914 (which is not included in the Soviet editions of his works) that "it [Ukraine] has become for Russia what Ireland was for England: exploited in the extreme and receiving nothing in return."⁴

How was the alleged exploitation of Ukraine to be reconciled with its industrial growth? In 1928, Mykhailo Volobuev, a Russian Communist economist in Ukraine, provided an explanation. He stated that Ukraine was not an "Asian" type of colony – poor, nonindustrialized, with its resources simply carried off by an exploitive empire; rather it belonged to the "European" type of colony, that is, an industrially well-developed land that was deprived not so much of its resources as of its capital and potential profits. The main culprit, in his view, was Russia, not Western capitalists.⁵ The mechanism by which this capital was syphoned from Ukraine was relatively simple: imperial price-fixing insured that the costs of Russian finished goods would be exceedingly high, while the price of Ukrainian raw materials remained low. As a result, Russian manufacturers made greater profits than Ukraine's producers of coal and iron ore and capital accumulated in the Russian north, not the Ukrainian south. In this manner, the economy of Ukraine (which, Volobuev stressed, was a distinct autonomous entity) was deprived of potential benefits and made to serve the interests of the Russian core of the empire.

Urban development The 19th century also brought major changes to the cities and towns of Ukraine. However, the tempo and focus of these transformations varied considerably. Prior to 1861, except for the rapidly growing Black Sea ports like Odessa, urban growth was sluggish. In the small- to medium-sized towns of the Left Bank, like Poltava, Romny, Sumy, and Kharkiv, numerous trade fairs (*iarmarky*) – which the region hosted and for which it was famous – slightly increased the population. On the Right Bank, urban growth was somewhat greater because of the influx of Jews to such centers of trade and handicrafts as Bila Tserkva, Berdychiv, and Zhytomyr. The vast majority of Ukraine's urban population (which accounted for 10% of the total) lived in towns with less than 20,000 inhabitants. Only Odessa had a population higher than 100,000.

Radical changes occurred in the latter part of the century, especially between 1870 and 1900, when the rate of urban growth jumped sharply, particularly in the large cities. By 1900, four large urban centers dominated Ukraine: Odessa, a thriving commercial and manufacturing city whose population jumped to over 400,000; Kiev, a focal point of domestic trade, machine building, administration, and cultural activity, which had 250,000 inhabitants; Kharkiv, a city of 175,000, which controlled the trade and industry of the Left Bank; and Katerynoslav, the booming industrial center of the south, which experienced a rise in population from 19,000 to 115,000 in a few decades.

The greater mobility of the peasants after 1861, the expansion of industry and trade, and especially the construction of railroads, which allowed the concentration of economic activity in a few strategically located centers, accounted for much of this growth. As the big cities grew, the towns began to stagnate and by the turn of the century most urban dwellers lived in large cities. Yet these developments did not mean that Ukraine was rapidly urbanizing. Far from it. While the population of the cities multiplied, so did that of the countryside. In 1900 only 13% of Ukraine's total population was urban – less than Russia's 15% and nowhere near West European countries like England, for example, where 72% of the population lived in towns and cities.

The emergence of the proletariat With accelerated economic development came equally rapid social changes. Of these, the most important was the appearance of a new and as yet relatively small class – the proletariat. Unlike peasants, the proletarians (or industrial workers) did not own the means of production. They sold their labor rather than their produce. And they worked with machines. Because they worked in large, complex enterprises, industrial workers tended to be more knowledgeable and sophisticated than peasants. Because they labored in huge factories with thousands of their fellows, they were quicker to develop a sense of group consciousness and solidarity. And, most important, the highly structured and interdependent nature of their work meant that they were more amenable to organization than were peasants.

Unlike Russia, where enserfed peasants had been assigned to work in factories since the 18th century, industrial workers appeared in appreciable numbers in Ukraine only in the mid 19th century. Initially, most of them were engaged in food production, specifically in the huge sugar refineries of the Right Bank. But the vast majority of the sugar workers were not proletarians in the true sense because their work was seasonal and in the off-season they returned to their villages to work their plots. The half-peasant, half-proletarian character of these workers was typical for most of the empire, but it was especially so among Ukraine's sugar workers.

It was the workers in heavy industry – the coal miners of the Donbas and the iron-ore producers of Kryvyi Rih – who were true proletarians. One could find among them the largest percentage of full-time workers whose fathers and grandfathers had also worked in industry. Yet even among them, there were many who still maintained ties to their villages. In 1897 the total number of industrial workers in Ukraine was about 425,000, with close to half concentrated in the heavy industries of Katerynoslav province. Since 1863 their number had increased by 400%. Yet industrial workers still constituted only 7% of the labor force, and the proletariat remained a small minority in the sea of peasants.

Industrial working conditions in Ukraine, as in the rest of the Russian Empire, were deplorable by European standards. Even after the government legislated improvements in the 1890s, shifts of ten, twelve, or fifteen hours were common. Safety precautions and medical care were practically nonexistent. And the pay (almost all of which went for food and squalid quarters) of the average worker in Ukraine was only a fraction of that earned by his European counterpart. Little wonder that strikes and other confrontations between workers and employers became increasingly frequent.

Other social changes Major modifications also occurred in the intelligentsia, the other newly formed class. Industrial development, social change, modernization of legal institutions, and the growth of the *zemstva* created an increased demand for educated people. The government responded by establishing more professional and technical schools. In Ukraine the number of students rose from 1200 in 1865 to over 4000 in the mid 1890s. By 1897 there were about 24,000 individuals with some form of higher education. The social origins of the intelligentsia also changed. At the beginning of the century, the vast majority of its members were of gentry origin. But by 1900 only 20–25% came from the nobility and the very rich; the remainder were mostly sons of burghers, clerics, and professionals. Peasants and workers, however, were still rare in the universities, mainly because of the lack of adequate academic preparation. With the establishment of higher schools for women, these too began to enter the intelligentsia in increasing numbers. New occupational groups such as engineers, physicians, lawyers, and teachers grew rapidly. No longer composed primarily of socially isolated and alienated sons of the nobility, the more broadly based intelligentsia now moved to the forefront of modernization.

Compared to the societies of Western Europe, the Russian Empire in general, and Ukraine in particular, was marked by a sociological anomaly: its bourgeoisie was so small and underdeveloped as to be insignificant. In Ukraine there was simply too little money to give rise to a bourgeoisie. Government policies drained away capital to the north; domestic trade (especially the fairs) was largely in the hands of Russian merchants; and industry, as we have seen, was owned almost totally by foreigners. Naturally, there were extremely wealthy people in Ukraine, over 100,000 by some estimates. But most of them derived their income not from factories and commercial enterprises but from their estates. Ukrainians even lacked a *petite bourgeoisie*, that is, artisans and shopkeepers. Business, both large and small, was in the hands of Russians and Jews.

Modernization and the missing Ukrainians Modernization in Ukraine created several paradoxes. As Ukraine's importance as the granary of Europe grew, poverty increased in its countryside. And although its industrial boom was

one of the largest in Europe, Ukraine still remained basically an agrarian society. Perhaps most striking was the fact that although Ukrainians constituted the vast majority of the population, they hardly participated in these transformations. Statistics best underscore this point. Among the most experienced workers in the heavy industry of the south, only 25% of coal miners and 30% of metallurgical workers were Ukrainians. It was Russians who constituted the majority in these occupations. Even in the sugar refineries of the Right Bank there were almost as many Russian as Ukrainian workers.

Turning to the intelligentsia, one encounters a similar phenomenon. In 1897, Ukrainians made up only 16% of lawyers, 25% of teachers, and less than 10% of writers and artists in Ukraine. Of 127,000 individuals involved in "mental work" only one-third were Ukrainian. And in 1917 only 11% of the students in Kiev University were of Ukrainian origin. The lack of Ukrainians in the cities was striking. At the turn of the century, they made up less than one-third of all urban dwellers; Russians and Jews accounted for the remainder. As a rule, the bigger the city, the smaller was the number of Ukrainians living in it. In 1897, only 5.6% of Odessa's population was Ukrainian and in 1920 the percentage sank to 2.9%. In Kiev in 1874, those who considered Ukrainian to be their native language constituted 60% of the population; by 1897 the percentage had sunk to 22% and in 1917 to 16%. Clearly, modernization was bypassing the Ukrainians.

Why was the number of non-Ukrainians so great in those areas that were modernizing? In explaining the heavy preponderance of Russians in the proletariat, of utmost importance was the fact that, unlike in Ukraine, industry had existed in Russia since the 18th century. When the sudden boom occurred in the Donbas and Kryvyi Rih, creating an urgent demand for experienced workers, Russians were welcomed with open arms. A contributing reason for this massive influx of workers from the north was the fact that Russian industries were stagnating at the time whereas wages in the booming Ukrainian mines and foundries averaged about 50% more than in Russia.

In the cities, the Russian presence had been growing since Ukrainian lands had been incorporated into the empire. Because many of the towns and cities functioned as administrative and military centers, they attracted Russian bureaucrats and soldiers. As trade and industry grew, so too did the number of non-Ukrainians in the urban centers. Thus, as early as 1832, about 50% of the merchants and 45% of the factory owners in Ukraine were Russians. For reasons mentioned earlier, they had more capital to invest than Ukrainians. As well, many Russian peasants were forced by the infertility of their soil to seek alternate ways of making a living in the cities. Peasant newcomers from the north often became successful merchants in Ukraine, especially on the Left Bank and in the south, where they found numerous opportunities and little competition from the native populace.

The other major non-Ukrainian element in the cities and towns of Ukraine

was the Jews. As the focus of economic activity shifted from country estates to cities, and as emancipation loosened the regulations that restricted Jewish mobility, great numbers of Jews moved into urban centers. As a result, the towns of the Right Bank, where most of the Jews in the Russian Empire lived, became preponderantly Jewish. By the late 19th century, the Jewish presence in the large cities also expanded rapidly. In Odessa more than half the population was Jewish, and the city was one of the largest Jewish centers in the world. In 1863 Kiev had 3000 Jewish inhabitants; by 1910 the number had risen to 50,000. Because most of the educated Jews tended to speak Russian, they added to the Russian character of Ukraine's cities.

Cities were also centers of education and culture, and so were home to the majority of the intelligentsia. Non-Ukrainian urban dwellers had easiest access to education and occupational opportunities and, therefore, predominated among the intelligentsia of Ukraine. For the most part, Ukrainian members of the intelligentsia were located in the countryside and small towns where many worked in the *zemstva* as physicians, agronomists, statisticians, and village teachers. Few Ukrainians belonged to the intellectual elite that dominated the universities and press in the large cities.

But why were the Ukrainians so reluctant to enter the urban environment and participate in the modernizing process? Most students of the problem have concentrated on its psychological dimensions. Those with Ukrainophile tendencies argued that the Ukrainian peasant's deeply rooted love for the soil prevented him from giving up agriculture; those less sympathetic to Ukrainians emphasized their alleged sluggishness and conservatism. But historical antecedents lend little support for these arguments. In Kievan times, an inordinately large part of the population of Ukraine lived in cities and engaged in trade. Even as late as the 17th century, as much as 20% of the Ukrainian population lived in an urban environment. And in the early 18th century, it was Ukrainians (not Russians) who predominated among the intellectual elite of the empire.

The political and socioeconomic conditions that obtained in Ukraine in the 18th–19th centuries help explain the relative absence of Ukrainians in the process of urbanization and modernization there. Because the cities and towns were the centers of imperial administration, Russians and their language and culture tended to dominate in them. Meanwhile, the original Ukrainian inhabitants either became assimilated or, in some cases, were forced out. As has been pointed out by Bohdan Krawchenko, the reason for the absence of a Ukrainian peasant migration to the cities was the prevalence of the *pan-shchyna* (corvée) in the preemancipation era.⁶ Unlike Russian peasants, who were encouraged by their masters to seek additional employment and income in the cities, Ukrainian peasants were forced to continue working on the land so as to take advantage of its fertility. This not only made them less mobile but also left them with little opportunity to develop the skills and

crafts that allowed Russians and Jews to make the easy transition to an urban environment. Therefore, when the industrial boom and urbanization began, Ukrainians were not prepared to participate in it. Hence, while Russians moved hundreds of miles to the factories of the south, Ukrainian peasants, even those living within sight of a factory, preferred to migrate thousands of miles to the east in search of land. It would not be long before the weighty social, cultural, and political consequences of this phenomenon would make their impact felt on the course of events in Ukraine.

National Minorities in Ukraine

Another important feature of the socioeconomic modernization of Ukraine was the great changes that it brought about in the ethnic composition of its population. As long as the economy of the land was almost exclusively agrarian, its population remained overwhelmingly Ukrainian. Thus, in 1800, Ukrainians constituted about 90% of the inhabitants of Ukraine, with the percentage on the Left Bank reaching as high as 95%. But in the course of the 19th century, a marked change occurred: the Ukrainian component of the population sank to about 80%, while that of the Russians, Jews, and other minorities rose dramatically. To a great extent, this change was the result of the increased tempo of commercial and industrial growth with which the non-Ukrainian minorities were largely associated.

The Russians Since the union with Moscow in 1654, Russians were a common sight in Ukraine, but they had never been very numerous. Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, the most numerous category of Russians in Ukraine was the soldiers on garrison duty. In fact, the word *moskal* (Muscovite) by which Ukrainians designated Russians was synonymous with "soldier." Smaller subgroups of Russians included nobles who had been granted estates in the south, tsarist bureaucrats, and, on the Left Bank especially, merchants. In the late 18th to early 19th centuries, when land became available in the south, a steady although by no means massive, stream of Russian settlers, mostly religious dissenters such as the Old Believers, moved into the new territories. Only in the late 19th century, in connection with the industrial boom, did Russians come to Ukraine in great numbers, particularly to the industrial and commercial centers of the south. Voluntary Russification, especially widespread among the Ukrainian gentry, also enlarged the number of Russians. As noted earlier, by 1897 they constituted 11.7% of the land's population.

Convinced that Ukraine was essentially a Russian land and that theirs was a superior culture, Russians generally made no effort to master the Ukrainian language and showed little respect for or interest in Ukrainian customs and traditions. They insisted on the Russification of all aspects of Ukrain-

ian life and, in the large cities at least, they attained their goal. By and large, the attitude of the Ukrainian peasantry toward the Russians was not sharply antagonistic. Because Russian newcomers were concentrated in the cities and factories, contacts between them and the Ukrainian countryside were limited. Furthermore, Ukrainian peasants realized that Russian peasants and workers were exploited as mercilessly as they were. Finally, a common Orthodox religion and the similarity of languages made the gap between the two peoples easier to bridge. This is not to say that Ukrainian peasants were not keenly aware of the distinctions between themselves and the northerners. They frequently referred to Russians, many of whom wore beards, by the derogatory *katsap* (like a billygoat), while Russians returned the compliment by referring to Ukrainians with the equally contemptuous *khokhol* (a lock of hair on a Cossack's shaven head). It was, however, among the Ukrainian intelligentsia that the resentment against Russian cultural hegemony was most keenly felt.

The Poles Poles had lived in Ukraine much longer than the Russians. In the 16th and 17th centuries they participated in the colonization of the Ukrainian frontier and although the uprising of 1648 drove them from the Left Bank, they managed to retain control of the Right Bank. They viewed this region as an integral part of Poland – even after the integration of the area into the Russian Empire in 1795. Their great influence on the Right Bank certainly did not depend on their large numbers: in the mid 19th century they totaled only about 500,000 and their share of Ukraine's population dropped from 10% in 1795 to 6.4% in 1909. It was their wealthy and influential elite that accounted for the Polish preeminence on the Right Bank. In 1850, about 5000 Polish landowners held 90% of the land and 1.2 million serfs in the region. With 60% of all of Ukraine's nobles concentrated there, the Right Bank remained a bastion of the old order.

Even the emancipation failed to shake the hold of such fabulously wealthy Polish magnates as the Potocki, Czartoryski, Branicki, and Zaslowski families, each of which owned lands totaling hundreds of thousands of acres. With vast capital at their disposal, they easily switched to hired labor and mechanized farming when the need arose. But the great majority of Polish nobles found the transition to commercial farming difficult. By the late 19th century, many of them had sold their estates and moved into towns and cities where they became bureaucrats, merchants, and members of the liberal professions. Nonetheless, in 1904, over 46% of the private landholdings and 54% of the industrial output on the Right Bank were still in Polish hands.

Tensions between Polish landowners and Ukrainian peasants had always been great. The emancipation ameliorated the situation somewhat. Later, when the Poles rebelled against the Russians in 1863, some of them made an effort to win the Ukrainian peasants over by issuing the so-called golden decrees whereby the rebels claimed that they, not the tsar, were granting the

peasants land and freedom. In general, the results of these efforts were minimal. Few Ukrainian peasants joined their Polish lords, and about 300,000 volunteered for police duty against the rebels.

Some Polish nobles had an interest in Ukrainians that was not politically or economically motivated. They and their ancestors had lived in Ukraine for centuries. Consequently, in the mid 19th century, a few nobles developed a predilection for things Ukrainian. For example, Tymko Padura took to writing folk poetry in Ukrainian, and the "Ukrainian school" of Polish writers from the Right Bank, which included the famous Juliusz Słowacki, often wrote on Ukrainian themes. As we shall see later, a few Polish or Polonized nobles played a prominent role in the Ukrainian national movement. Yet the conflict of interests between Polish estate owners and Ukrainian peasants remained, and there were few basic changes in the traditional relationship between the two peoples.

The Jews Of all the larger minorities in Ukraine, the Jews had lived there the longest. Already present during the Kievan period, they moved into Ukraine in great numbers in the 16th and 17th centuries under the aegis of Polish nobles. But while they were ancient inhabitants of Ukraine, they were relatively new subjects of the tsars. Only in 1795 was the Right Bank, where almost all the Ukrainian Jews lived, incorporated into the Russian Empire. The tsarist government adopted a unique policy towards its large number of new Jewish subjects: in order to prevent them from competing with Russian merchants, it forbade Jews to reside in Russia proper. The Jewish zone of residence, called the Pale of Settlement, was limited to their original homelands in the newly acquired western borderlands of Lithuania, Belorussia, and much of Right-Bank Ukraine. Despite some modifications, the Pale remained in effect until 1917.

Throughout the 19th century, especially in its latter part, the Jews experienced a tremendous rise in population. Between 1820 and 1880, while the general population of the empire rose by 87%, the number of Jews increased by 150%. On the Right Bank, this rise was even more dramatic: between 1844 and 1913 the number of its inhabitants rose by 265% while the Jewish population increased by 844%! Religious sanctions of large families, less exposure to famine, war, and epidemics, and a low mortality rate because of communal self-help and the availability of doctors largely accounted for this extraordinary increase. Of the 5.2 million Jews in the empire at the end of the 19th century, over 2 million lived in Ukraine. The disproportionately large number of Jews living in Ukraine is evident from the fact that although in the empire as a whole they constituted 4% of the population, in Ukraine they were 8% – and on the Right Bank 12.6% – of the population.

Traditionally, the Jews were an urban people. Tsarist restrictions against their movement into the countryside reinforced this condition. Therefore, it

is not surprising that over 33% of the urban inhabitants of Ukraine were Jewish, and in the small towns (*shtetls*) of the Right Bank, the percentage reached as high as 70–80%. Tight-knit, insular, traditionalist Jewish *shtetl* communities were a world unto themselves. There, Jewish Orthodox religion, culture, and language (Yiddish) dominated. Rabbis and communal self-governing bodies (*kahals*) were most influential, and contact with the “outside” world was restricted to economic transactions. The poverty and overcrowding of the *shtetls* was proverbial, for the Jewish communities simply had more people than their economies could support. To survive in the teeming provincial towns, which had limited opportunities for earning a living and intense competition, required industry, marketable skills, and quick wits.

About three-quarters of Ukrainian Jews made their livelihood as petty traders and artisans. Although by no means wealthy, these shopkeepers, tavern owners, tailors, shoemakers, and jewelers constituted the Jewish “middle class.” The unskilled laborers, many of whom barely subsisted on odd jobs and charity, accounted for only about 20% of their labor force. The elite consisted of two subgroups: on the one hand were the rabbis and other greatly respected “men of the book” who exerted great influence in the community and, on the other, the wealthy capitalists. In 1872 these wealthy Jews owned about 90% of Ukraine’s distilleries, 56% of the saw mills, 48% of tobacco production, and 33% of the sugar refineries. As educational opportunities improved, many Jews joined the secular, Russified, intelligentsia, especially in such fields as law and medicine. And as industry developed, great numbers of Jews (38% by some estimates) found work in the factories.

But changes also increased the difficulties that confronted the Jews of the empire. There was a rapid growth of Jewish population and a resultant rise in economic competition with non-Jews. The exploitive actions of some Jewish merchants and moneylenders – and, most important, increasingly anti-Semitic government policies – as well as agitation by reactionary groups all contributed to the rise of antagonism toward Jews in the late 19th century. In 1881 and again in 1903–05 the animosity culminated in a series of pogroms, or mob assaults, on Jewish communities and property, leaving dozens dead and causing millions of rubles in damage. Many of the pogroms were carried out by the ultraright Russian nationalist groups such as the Union of Russian People and the notorious Black Hundreds with the connivance or, at least, non-interference of government officials. Yet perhaps the most far-reaching consequence of the pogroms was that they heightened the already acute sense of insecurity among Jews and encouraged the massive emigration of about 1.2 million Jews from the Russian Empire to the United States by 1914.

In general, the relationship between Ukrainians and Jews was not – nor could it hardly have been – a friendly one. For centuries, the two peoples found themselves in structurally antagonistic (yet mutually dependent) po-

sitions. To the Jew, a Ukrainian represented the backward, ignorant village; to a Ukrainian, a Jew epitomized the foreign, exploitative city that bought his produce cheaply and sold him goods dearly. Ukrainian peasants feared Russian officials and hated Polish landlords; Jews, for want of other means of making a living, often acted as their representatives or middlemen. Culturally, the Jews and Ukrainians had little in common, and their religions only widened the gap between them.

The relationship between their respective intelligentsias was hardly better. In terms of national orientation, the Jewish intelligentsia saw only two options: either to assimilate into the dominant Russian culture or to work to develop a separate Jewish identity. Developing closer ties with the Ukrainians, who had little to offer Jews culturally, economically, or politically, seemed hardly worthwhile. The Ukrainian intelligentsia, for its part, resented the tendency of Jews, who had lived among Ukrainians for centuries, to identify with the stronger Russians. Although there were attempts at mutual understanding and even cooperation – such as those made by Mykhailo Drachomanov and Aron Liberman or Symon Petliura and other Ukrainian socialists on the one hand, and the prominent Zionist Vladimir Zhabotinsky on the other – they had little impact. Thus, the two communities continued to live in close proximity but in almost total isolation from each other. Moreover, many of their members were more inclined to harbor old resentments than to cultivate common interests and mutual understanding.



Three major features characterized the socioeconomic development of Eastern Ukraine in the late 19th century: economic stagnation in much of the countryside, dramatic industrialization in Kryvyi Rih and the Donets basin, and the growing presence in the land of non-Ukrainians. As we have seen, it was the non-Ukrainians, largely Russians and Jews, who were most closely associated with industrial expansion and urban growth. For their part, the Ukrainians remained in the countryside. Consequently a socioeconomic bipolarity emerged: Ukrainians were identified, even more so than before, with the stagnant, backward village, while non-Ukrainians dominated the dynamic, modernizing sectors of the society. To a considerable extent this crucial division still exists today.

Intelligentsia Activism

At the outset of the 19th century it was the imperial government that held the initiative in producing new ideas and providing society with a sense of direction. However, by the end of the century it was clear that the imperial elite was losing its confidence, sense of purpose, and ability to adapt. Meanwhile, society, and especially the intelligentsia – its self-appointed advocate – was emerging as the source of creativity and dynamism, much of it unfettered by the momentous changes of the 1860s–90s. Confronted by the unresponsiveness and even obstructionism of the government, the intelligentsia gradually moved from simply formulating proposals for change to organizing itself and attempting to mobilize society to implement these proposals by revolutionary means if necessary.

In Russian-ruled Ukraine, the intelligentsia championed both national development and social justice. It was a daunting task. Relatively smaller and more isolated than its counterparts elsewhere in the empire, the Ukrainian intelligentsia experienced great difficulties in establishing contacts with the largely uneducated and disinterested masses it sought to help. Its dual goals engendered doubly great problems and repression. The question whether national or social issues deserved most attention brought about confusion and disagreement among Ukrainians. Nonetheless, despite painful setbacks, the Ukrainian movement continued to grow until, in the early years of the 20th century, it appeared to be ready to spread beyond its traditionally narrow social base.



The Ukrainophiles

The nascent Ukrainian movement, which suffered a sharp setback when the Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius was crushed in 1847, showed new

signs of life after the death of the arch-conservative Nicholas I in 1855. Mykola Kostomarov, Vasyl Bilozersky, and finally Taras Shevchenko were released from exile and gathered in St Petersburg where they joined Panteleimon Kulish. These Ukrainophile veterans, some of whom obtained responsible positions (Kostomarov became a well-known professor of history), attracted about a dozen younger Ukrainians and formed a *hromada* (society) in the imperial capital. Similar groups of Ukrainian intelligentsia would serve as the crucible of the national movement for the remainder of the century.

The prime concern of this group was to improve the lot of Ukrainians, especially the peasantry. Except for Shevchenko, all agreed that *hromada* activity should be apolitical and should focus on the enlightenment of the masses. Kostomarov and Kulish were adamant about restricting their activities to the cultural field and avoiding any radicalism that might arouse the ire of the authorities.

To popularize their ideas, the St Petersburg group obtained, with great difficulty, permission from the authorities and in 1861 established *Osnova*, the first Ukrainian periodical in the Russian Empire. It was funded by two wealthy Ukrainians, Vasyl Tarnavsky and Hryhorii Galagan. During its brief twenty-two-month existence, *Osnova* functioned as a means of communication and arouser of national consciousness among the Ukrainian intelligentsia scattered throughout the empire.

The renewed activity of the Ukrainians was well received by the Russian intelligentsia of the capital. Russian journals accepted articles in Ukrainian and supported Ukrainian cultural development. Shevchenko often appeared at public readings with such titans of Russian literature as Ivan Turgenev and Fedor Dostoevsky. According to some accounts, the Russian public received him more warmly than Dostoevsky. Turgenev translated Marko Vovchok's heartrending tales about serfdom in Ukraine into Russian and their impact on the Russian public was similar to that of Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* on Americans. Generally speaking, the feeling of both Ukrainian and Russian intellectuals alike was that they were working together for the benefit of the people (*narod*).

In Kiev, meanwhile, a new generation of Ukrainian enthusiasts composed mostly of students also formed a *hromada*. Numbering several hundred, the Kievans concentrated on developing a network of Sunday schools for the illiterate peasantry. Between 1859 and 1862 they established several schools, with hundreds of pupils, in the region of Kiev. In the long run, however, the most important feature of the Kiev *hromada* was the new type of adherents that it attracted.

Among the Polish and Polonized nobles of the Right Bank there appeared in the early 1860s a small group of students who, conscious-stricken by the age-old exploitation of the peasantry by their own class, resolved to draw closer to the masses among whom they lived. Adopting Ukrainian speech,

dress, and customs, this group, led by Volodymyr Antonovych, was called the *khlopomany* (lovers of the peasantry).

On the eve of the Polish uprising of 1863, the *khlopomany* openly broke with Polish society, declared themselves Ukrainians, joined the Kiev *hromada*, and plunged into the work of enlightening the peasantry. Their sense of obligation to the *narod* was reflected in an open letter they sent to a Moscow newspaper: "As individuals who have benefited from a higher education, we should concentrate all our efforts on providing the people with the opportunity to gain an education, become conscious of their own needs, and obtain the ability to fulfill them. In a word, through their own internal [personal] development, the people should reach a level to which they are legally entitled."¹

In response to a Polish accusation of betrayal, Antonovych, the scion of an old, Polonized Ukrainian noble family, published his famous "Confession" in *Osnova*. In it he argued that the nobles of the Right Bank had two options: they could either "return" to the Ukrainian people and, by means of dedicated labor on their behalf, attempt to compensate them for centuries of exploitation; or they could choose to remain hated parasites who, sooner or later, would be forced to move to Poland. Choosing the first alternative, Antonovych became a famous historian of Ukraine, a life-long populist, and an outstanding leader of the Ukrainian movement. Several of his colleagues, such as Tadei Rylsky, Pavlo Zhytetsky, Borys Poznansky, and Konstantyn Mykhalchuk, also contributed greatly to the Ukrainian cause.

Inspired by the example of the Kievans, the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Poltava, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Odessa also established their *hromady* and expanded the Sunday-school network until there were close to 100 such schools in Ukraine. Members immersed themselves in the traditional study of ethnography, philology, and history. In the style of the *khlopomany*, they adopted the dress of the Ukrainian peasants, observed their customs, ate their food, consorted with them in taverns, sang their songs, and, in the privacy of their homes, spoke Ukrainian. There evolved among them a cult of the Cossack, replete with the wearing of colorful Cossack dress. However, it was not Cossack hetmans and *starshyna* whom they idealized but the freedom-loving Zaporozhians and *haidamaky* who supposedly epitomized the nature and strivings of the Ukrainian masses. In the latter part of the 19th century, this romanticized, apolitical combination of populism, volunteerism, and Ukrainian ethnicity became known as Ukrainophilism.

But even the modest, measured activity of the Ukrainophiles aroused suspicions. In 1863, when the Polish uprising was at its height and suspicion of non-Russians mounted, the government and even the Russian intelligentsia concluded that the Ukrainian movement represented a potentially mortal threat to Russia and they turned against the Ukrainophiles. Tsarist officials argued that the Sunday schools were in reality a sinister plot to disseminate Ukrainian separatist propaganda among the peasantry. The seemingly inno-

cent wearing of embroidered Ukrainian blouses and the singing of folk songs were viewed as subversive activities. The minister of war, Dmitrii Miliutin, went so far as to warn the tsar that the *khlopomany* sought to establish an independent Ukrainian state.

Part of the Russian press, led by such ultrapatriotic newspapers as *Vestnik iugozapadnoi Rossii*, *Kievljanin*, and *Moskovskii vedomosti*, launched a vicious campaign against the Ukrainophiles and their alleged attempts to undermine the Russian state. Soon much of the Russian intelligentsia, which until only recently had viewed Ukrainophiles with benevolence as enthusiasts of a harmless, colorful regionalism, now began to see them as a genuine threat to the empire. While many Russians believed that the Ukrainian movement was a Polish plot to undermine their hold on the Right Bank, the Poles viewed it as a Russian ploy to weaken their position in the region.

The Ukrainians, for their part, hastened to stress their harmlessness. Antonovych and about twenty members of the Kiev *hromada* published an open letter assuring the Russian public that "our goal is only to educate the people," and that "all talk of separatism is a silly joke since we neither need it nor will we benefit from it."² But their remonstrances had little effect. In July 1863, Petr Valuev, the minister of internal affairs, secretly banned the publication in Ukrainian of all scholarly, religious, and especially pedagogical publications. Only belles-lettres were allowed to appear in the "Little Russian dialect." Valuev declared that the Ukrainian language "never existed, does not exist and shall never exist."³ Soon after, the *hromady* disbanded, *Osnova* ceased publication (for want of subscribers more than because of repression), and a number of Ukrainian activists were banished to distant parts of the empire.

For almost a decade the Ukrainophiles were forced to lie low. Early in the 1870s, as the xenophobia of 1863 dissipated and censorship was relaxed, the Kievans slowly resumed their activities. Antonovych (now a professor at Kiev University) and his colleagues, reinforced by such talented adherents as Mykhailo Drahomanov, Oleksander Rusov, Mykola Ziber, and Serhii Podolynsky, surreptitiously formed the Old Hromada, so named to differentiate its older, experienced members (about seventy in number) from the young *hromady* that were also reappearing and that consisted mostly of students. Again, the Ukrainophiles concentrated on nonpolitical activities.

These activities expanded considerably in 1873 when the Kiev branch of the Imperial Geographical Society was founded. The Ukrainophiles enrolled in this semiofficial institution en masse and gained virtual control of it. Under its auspices they commenced the publication of archival materials and founded a museum and a library that collected Ukrainian materials. In 1875, the Old Hromada acquired the Russian newspaper *Kievskii Telegraf* and used it to provide a Ukrainian perspective on current events.⁴

The ban on Ukrainian publications, however, remained a galling impediment to the development of national culture. To circumvent this restriction, individuals such as Kulish, Konysky, Drahomanov, and others established

contacts with Ukrainians in Galicia and used their Ukrainian-language press, especially the newspaper *Pravda*, to express views banned in Russia. In 1873, with the help of the aristocratic Elisaveta Skoropadska-Myloradovych and the wealthy sugar-baron Vasyl Symyrenko, the Ukrainophiles initiated and financed the creation in Lviv of the Shevchenko Literary Society, which, several decades later, developed into an unofficial Ukrainian academy of arts and sciences.

But it would only be a matter of time before the Ukrainophiles again aroused suspicion. As was so often the case, some of the Ukrainians' worst enemies emerged from their own midst. In May 1875 Mikhaïl Iuzefovych, a wealthy, conservative former member of the Kiev branch, sent a stinging denunciation to St Petersburg in which he accused the Ukrainophiles of turning the branch into a subversive organization, of propagandizing the peasantry, and of working for the independence of Ukraine. As a crowning touch, the informer added that the Ukrainophiles spread anti-Russian propaganda in Galicia and that their movement was an Austrian/German plot. The government reacted in predictable fashion.

The Ems Ukaz of 1876 An imperial commission, appointed by an alarmed Tsar Alexander II and including Iuzefovych, recommended a total ban on the import and publication of Ukrainian books, a prohibition against the use of Ukrainian on the stage (even the lyrics of Ukrainian songs that were sung in the theater were translated into other languages), the closing of the *Kievskii Telegraf*, and a subsidy for *Slovo* – a pro-Russian paper in Galicia. The Ministry of Education was instructed to prohibit the teaching of any subject in Ukrainian in the elementary schools, to remove from school libraries books in Ukrainian or by Ukrainophiles, and to replace Ukrainophile teachers with Russians. Finally, the commission proposed the liquidation of the Kiev branch and the exile of several Ukrainian activists, most notably Drahomanov and Pavlo Chubynsky. In short, this was a more systematic and ruthless attempt than Valuev's had been to paralyze the Ukrainian movement. Alexander II, who was vacationing in the German town of Ems, accepted all the recommendations of the commission and on 18 May 1876 the Ems Ukaz went into effect.

Not only did the Ems Ukaz cripple Ukrainophile activity but it brought into question some of the basic assumptions on which the Ukrainian movement rested. Despite the experience of 1863, the Ukrainophiles continued to believe that if they restricted themselves to moderate views and apolitical, cultural work, they would avoid government repression. Kulish even developed a theory to justify strictly cultural Ukrainianism. According to him, the Russians had unusually well-honed, political state-building skills – while the Ukrainians, as demonstrated by their unfortunate history, did not. Therefore, to Kulish it was natural and even beneficial for the Ukrainians to remain in the Russian Empire and to enjoy the security, power, and prestige it afforded

them. But he also believed that the Ukrainians with their splendid folklore were culturally more gifted than the Russians. Thus, it seemed only logical that Ukrainians should leave politics to the Russians and concentrate on culture, their strong point. However, the Ems Ukaz shattered Kulish's hopes for a live-and-let-live relationship between Ukrainian culture and Russian politics, and led him to adopt even more unrealistic views to justify his brand of cultural Ukrainianism.

Kostomarov, another of the "founding fathers" of the Ukrainian movement, became openly defeatist after 1876. Having once written defiantly "Let neither Russians nor Poles believe that they own the land upon which the Ukrainians live," he now advised his colleagues to submit obediently to tsarist policies.⁵ Other leading Ukrainophiles, such as Antonovych and Zhytetsky, opted for compromise. While they remained committed to fostering Ukrainian cultural distinctiveness, they emphasized that it should not lead to the separation of the Ukrainians from the salutary impact of Russian culture and empire. Indeed, they believed that it was possible to be committed simultaneously to their "narrower" Ukrainian homeland and to the "broader" all-Russian society, which consisted of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians. Others still, such as Borys Hrinchenko and Oleksander Konysky, considered themselves to be exclusively and staunchly Ukrainian and wished to minimize Ukraine's links with Russia. But they had no concrete, realistic program for bringing this circumstance about. Thus, under the threat of tsarist repression, considerable differences about the goals, tactics, and even the definition of Ukrainian nationhood emerged among the Ukrainophiles and added to their already daunting difficulties.

Drahomanov and the rise of Ukrainian socialism The need for fresh ideas was most acutely felt by the younger members of the Kiev *hromada*. One of these, Mykhailo Drahomanov, almost single-handedly undertook the task of expanding the intellectual and ideological horizons of his fellow Ukrainians. Despite the fact that his views did not win universal acceptance among the Ukrainian intelligentsia, they inspired many younger members to move beyond the cultural activity of their elders and to address, in a Ukrainian context, the key political, national, and socioeconomic issues of the day.

Born in 1841 in Hadiach, near Poltava, Drahomanov belonged to the petty gentry that traced its roots to the Cossack *starshyna* of the Hetmanate. While native traditions were respected in his family, they were overshadowed by the cosmopolitan liberalism of Drahomanov's father, an unusually enlightened and well-read individual. By the time he entered Kiev University, Drahomanov had become a committed democrat, filled with a strong desire to aid the *narod*. This led him to become a leader in the efforts to establish the first Sunday schools in Russia for illiterate peasants. It was while working with the peasants that Drahomanov, realizing the need for Ukrainian-language educational materials, developed an interest in things Ukrainian and joined

the Kiev *hromada*. It was, therefore, not a romanticized image of Ukraine that brought him to the Ukrainian movement, but a desire to aid the downtrodden in a practical way.

Drahomanov's goal for Ukraine was the achievement of a political, socioeconomic, and cultural status similar to that of advanced European countries. However, he believed that the achievement of this status was possible only if the Ukrainian movement became more broadly based and appealed to the masses by addressing concrete, bread-and-butter issues. In his view, Ukrainians, who were (in his words) a "plebian nation" of oppressed and toiling masses that lacked a national elite, were ideally suited for political programs combining both national and socioeconomic concerns. Hence his declaration that in Ukraine, a true democrat had to be a Ukrainian patriot and a genuine Ukrainian patriot had to be a democrat.

An avowed federalist, Drahomanov did not advocate Ukrainian separatism from Russia. But because he feared the potential of any powerful, centralized state to restrict the rights of the individual, Drahomanov favored the reorganization of the Russian Empire into a loose confederation of autonomous regions – not necessarily ethnically based – in which decision making rested primarily on the local level. Although he often urged Ukrainians, especially those in Galicia, to acquaint themselves with the best of Russian culture, Drahomanov rejected Pushkin's view that "all Slavic rivers should flow into a Russian sea." In a famous article, "The Lost Epoch," he claimed that on balance Ukrainians lost more than they gained under Russian rule. He stated clearly that the loyalty of Ukrainians should not be to "all Russia" but primarily to Ukraine: "Educated Ukrainians usually work for anything in the world except for Ukraine and its people ... They must take an oath to themselves not to desert the Ukrainian cause. They must realize that every educated man that leaves Ukraine, every cent which is not spent for Ukrainian purposes, every word that is not spoken in Ukrainian, is a waste of the capital of the Ukrainian people, and that with things as they are, anything lost is irreplaceable."⁶

Drahomanov's career was that of a man completely committed to his ideals. During the repression of 1875–76, he refused to renounce his views and chose foreign exile instead. Before leaving Kiev, he reached an agreement with the Old Hromada whereby with its financial support, he promised to publish a journal devoted to the Ukrainian cause. This was the genesis of *Hromada*, the first Ukrainian political journal, which appeared irregularly in the late 1870s and early 1880s in Geneva, the home of a small group of Ukrainian political émigrés who joined Drahomanov. But along with national issues, Drahomanov also increasingly espoused radical socialist views in *Hromada*. As a result, a split occurred between him and the much more conservative Kievan Ukrainophiles in 1885 and this rift led to the demise of the journal.

However, as his links with the Ukrainians of Russia weakened, those with

the Galician Ukrainians increased. Drahomanov had already visited Galicia and Transcarpathia in the 1870s, and since that time had worked systematically to familiarize West Ukrainians with their compatriots in the east. In time, Drahomanov's ideas struck root among a small but dedicated segment of Galician youth and would lead eventually to the establishment of the first Ukrainian socialist party.

Drahomanov was not the only Ukrainian activist to be drawn to socialism. His close friends from the Kiev *hromada*, Mykola Ziber (a half-Swiss and half-Ukrainian economist) and Serhii Podolynsky (the son of wealthy landowners), also played an important role in spreading socialist ideas among Ukrainians. Ziber is best known for being one of the very first intellectuals in Russia to disseminate Marx's ideas in 1871. The energetic Podolynsky, who developed contacts with Marx and Engels, worked closely with Drahomanov in Europe and helped to organize socialist circles in Ukraine and Galicia.

The Russian Revolutionary Movement in Ukraine

It became evident during the 1870s that, despite emancipation, the economic plight of the peasant was not improving and that despite other reforms, absolutism showed no signs of retreating. Disillusionment spread through imperial Russian society. Among the intelligentsia it resulted in the rise of radicalism and the willingness to do whatever was necessary to destroy the old order. In short, the stage was set for the appearance of the revolutionary.

By the late 19th century the social composition of the intelligentsia, from which almost all revolutionaries came, had undergone a marked change. The postreform liberalization of education meant that nobles would no longer constitute the overwhelming majority of university students or, by extension, the intelligentsia. Now sons of burghers, priests, petty bureaucrats, Cossacks, and even peasants entered the universities in increasing numbers. In the three universities of Ukraine – Kiev, Kharkiv, and Odessa – they made up about 50% of the student body in 1895. These people of varied backgrounds (*raznochyntsi*) gave the new intelligentsia a *déclassé* flavor that reduced somewhat its estrangement from the masses.

But despite the growth of universities in the late 19th century, the intelligentsia still remained a tiny fraction of society. In 1895 there were only about 5000 university students in Ukraine. And, of course, revolutionaries were only a small part of the intelligentsia. For example, in 1881 (a high point of revolutionary activity in the empire) there were, out of a population of 100 million, fewer than 1000 cases of antistate activity. Finally, the revolutionary movement was essentially anational. Anxious to mold a strong, unified "all-Russian" force against tsarism, its members initially downplayed nationality issues and, with time, viewed them as a major impediment in their revolutionary struggle.

The narodnyky From the 1860s, the radical youth of the empire were usually referred to by the term *narodnyky*. As the term implies, these were people who were identified with the *narod* (the people), which, under the circumstances, meant the peasantry. This identification with and idealization of the peasantry on the part of the radical intelligentsia cannot be understood in purely rational terms. To a large extent, it arose from a sense of guilt that young, idealistic students developed when they compared their privileged and comfortable position to that of the struggling peasantry. A way of subconsciously compensating the peasant for his misery was to idealize him. The intelligentsia made much of the supposed moral purity that resulted from the peasant's hard, honest labor. From its point of view, an especially praiseworthy aspect of peasant society was the commune, which seemed to be proof positive of the peasant's natural unselfishness and inborn tendency toward socialism.

But while the idealization of the peasantry was not peculiar to the *narodnyky* (the Ukrainian *khlopomany* and other segments of the imperial intelligentsia shared it to some extent), they were exceptional in their determined commitment to create a revolution that would introduce a new and just order. The first revolutionary *narodnyk* group was organized by Mikhail Chaikovsky in St Petersburg in 1871; similar groups soon appeared throughout the empire. In Ukraine, Fedir Volhovsky organized one such group of about 100 members in Odessa in 1873. Among its members was Andrii Zheliabov, a Ukrainian student of peasant origin who would become one of the most prominent revolutionaries in the empire. Soon afterward, a small, anarchistically inclined circle called the Kiev Commune cropped up in Kiev; it, too, included individuals who would gain revolutionary renown: Vera Zasulich, Volodymyr Debohory-Mokrievych, and Iakiv Stefanovych.

As the revolutionary groups proliferated, a heated debate developed among them about the most effective methods for the attainment of their goals. One tendency, identified with the famous Russian *narodnyk* Petr Lavrov, favored a gradual approach that would prepare the masses for revolution through education and propaganda. Another, initially less popular view, was associated with the colorful, charismatic Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, who urged the revolutionaries to commit violent, incendiary acts that would ignite a massive, spontaneous revolt of the masses. In 1874 Lavrov's approach seemed to triumph when, following a disastrous famine in the Volga region, about 2500–3000 *narodnyky* throughout the empire abandoned their universities, donned peasant garb, and spread out in the countryside to establish contacts with the *narod* and to prepare it for a great uprising. However, this "going to the people," as it was called, failed miserably. Peasants simply refused to associate with the strange city folk, who unsuccessfully and often comically masqueraded as tillers of the soil. Often peasants themselves helped the police to identify and capture the would-be revolutionaries.

In Ukraine "going to the people" occurred mainly in the Chyhyryn region of Kiev province, an area that was chosen by the *narodnyky* because it had been one of the centers of the bloody *haidamak* uprising a century earlier; they hoped to find the rebellious spirit still smoldering there. Although the movement failed, a noteworthy sequel to the affair took place in the region in 1877, when Stefanovych and his Kiev-based anarchist group attempted to take advantage of the peasants' loyalty to the tsar by fabricating "tsarist manifestos" that ordered peasants to form "secret teams" and rise against local landlords and officials. The plot was uncovered and about 1000 peasants were implicated in the so-called Chyhyryn Conspiracy.

While the great majority of *narodnyky* concentrated on the peasantry, a few began to pay attention to the increasing numbers of workers. In 1875 in Odessa, Evgenii Zaslavsky founded an illegal labor association called the South Russian Workers Union that was one of the first in the empire. A few other workers' circles, modeled on those established in the Russian north, emerged in subsequent years, but their existence was brief and their impact ephemeral.

After the failure of the propaganda approach, some of the most radical *narodnyky* turned to Bakunin's ideas and resolved that only violence and terroristic acts could initiate a revolution. In 1878, Vera Zasulich, an erstwhile member of a Kiev anarchist group, shot and wounded General Trepov, the military commandant of St Petersburg. Soon a splinter group, the notorious Narodnaia Volia (People's Will) emerged and made terrorism its primary means of operation. Tightly organized and strictly conspiratorial, the People's Will (among whose leaders was Zheliabov) launched a campaign of political murder that culminated in the assassination of Alexander II in 1881. But instead of revolution, the death of the tsar engendered a general revulsion against violence, discredited the terrorists, and convinced the government to pursue a reactionary course. It is noteworthy that during the terrorist campaign of 1879–81, the *narodnyky* in Ukraine were especially active. A number of important government officials were killed in Kiev and elsewhere. Some revolutionaries even claimed that political assassinations had been invented by such "southerners" as Zheliabov, Dmytro Lyzohub, and Mykola Kybalchych.

The Russian revolutionaries and the Ukrainian issue Although the focus of the *narodnyky* was social revolution, they could not (in preparation for it) disregard "local conditions," that is, the national particularities of the various peoples of the empire. Lavrov, the leading ideologist of the *narodnyky*, viewed nationalism as a passing phase in world history and expressed great doubts about its ability to aid human progress. Many revolutionaries of Ukrainian origin supported his position, arguing that, painful though it may be, it would perhaps be better for national distinctions to disappear so that a new, global socialist society could emerge. But, for the present, national particularities had to be taken into account.

A graphic example of the type of problem that national particularities caused the *narodnyky* was the issue of the peasant commune. The revolutionaries considered peasant communal landholding in Russia to be a convincing indication of the fact that Russians had a natural inclination toward socialism. From this they concluded that Russia could skip the capitalist stage of development and arrive at socialism more quickly and directly than Europe. However, conditions in Ukraine did not support this theory. In the Ukrainian village private ownership of land was widespread, and some *narodnyky* spoke despairingly of the Ukrainians' "natural aversion" to the commune. Other revolutionaries in Ukraine, such as M. Starodvorsky of the Kamianets-Podilskyi group, simply admitted that "in Little Russia, matters are different. Our people are bourgeois because they are permeated by the instincts of private ownership." Even worse, according to Starodvorsky, this Ukrainian predilection for private property could mean that "Little Russia might serve as a barrier to the spread of the socialist idea in Russia."⁷

These drawbacks notwithstanding, *narodnyky* and Ukrainophiles, particularly the younger generation, had much in common because of their shared interest in the peasantry. Frequently, young Ukrainophiles gathering ethnographic information in the village established friendly relations with *narodnyky* who were spreading revolutionary propaganda there. Indeed, many individuals combined the two activities. Even on the organizational level there were numerous cases of co-operation between revolutionary groups and the "young" *hromady*. However, the "old" *hromady*, whose members were deeply immersed in compiling a dictionary of the Ukrainian language, disapproved of the activities of their younger colleagues and this circumstance became a source of serious tensions between the two generations of Ukrainophiles.

The revolutionary movement not only led to a split among the Ukrainophiles, but it also greatly depleted the number of its adherents. Because of its dynamism, heroic romanticism, and appealing universalism, the revolutionary movement attracted growing numbers of young Ukrainians. Having joined the ranks of the revolutionaries, they adopted an antinational bias and broke with or never developed ties to the Ukrainian movement. At best, these young Ukrainian recruits to the cause of social radicalism sought to create the revolution first and deal with nationality issues later. Thus, the ability of revolutionary populism to attract increasing numbers of Ukraine's most talented and energetic young people resulted in a critical weakening of the Ukrainian movement.

Marxism Perplexed and frustrated by the peasants' blind faith in the tsar and disillusioned by the realization that the average peasant preferred to be a rich kulak rather than struggle for social equality in his village, many radicals began to have their doubts about the revolutionary potential of the peasantry. Consequently, growing numbers of radicals became receptive to ideas that placed hopes for a revolution on a new class – the proletariat.

The source of these ideas was Marxism. Compared to the fuzzy idealism of the *narodnyky*, Marxism's stress on economics seemed to provide a scientific, verifiable way of analyzing social behavior. It provided a framework for the division of all societies into exploiters and exploited and revealed why class struggle was unavoidable and revolution was inevitable. Moreover, it appeared to be capable of explaining social relations throughout history and everywhere on earth.

Another appealing aspect of Marxism was its contemporary relevance. By contending that the last decisive confrontation was already occurring between the capitalist thesis and the proletarian antithesis, Marx predicted that the world's greatest revolution would take place in the foreseeable future. After a titanic struggle, the proletariat would win and usher in the ultimate synthesis – socialism. He thus not only provided radicals with new optimism, but also encouraged them to believe that they themselves could be instrumental in bringing about these epochal events.

Marxist ideas made an early (albeit abortive) appearance in Ukraine when Ziber – whom Marx held in high regard – first introduced them to his Kievan students and colleagues in 1871. According to Soviet scholars, Ziber's failure to generate interest in them was a result of his focus on Marx's economic theories only and not on his revolutionary message. The fact that, at the time, large-scale industrialization had not yet begun and that the proletariat in Ukraine was exceedingly small also helps to explain this initial unreceptiveness to Marxist ideas.

It is Georgii Plekhanov, a disillusioned Russian *narodnyk* who became familiar with Marx's works during his exile in Switzerland, who is usually credited with having introduced Marxism to the intelligentsia of the Russian Empire. In 1883 he founded the first Russian Marxist group, The Liberation of Labor, in Geneva, where it published the works of Marx in Russian translation and disseminated them illegally in the empire.

In Ukraine the first stable Marxist group, called the Russian Group of Social Democrats, appeared in Kiev in 1893. Its formation was largely the work of Iurii Melnikov, a Russian who established a trade school that served as a conduit for the spread of Marxist ideas. Other Marxist groups appeared in Kharkiv, Odessa, and Katerynoslav. Ethnic Ukrainians were rare among these early Marxists, almost all of whom were Russians with a strong admixture of Jews and some Poles. This composition is understandable because the social democrats focused their attention on the largely non-Ukrainian proletariat to which the peasant-oriented Ukrainian intelligentsia found it difficult to relate.

Even in Russia the growth of social democracy was slow. Most of those who had constituted the membership of the Marxist Social Democratic party in 1898 were arrested; by 1903 a new congress had to be called abroad to rebuild the party. Instead of solidifying the party, however, the congress brought

about a split in its ranks that would be of great significance to Russia and Ukraine. The Bolsheviks or “majority,” led by Vladimir Ulianov (later known as Lenin), opted for the formation of a disciplined, tightly knit organization of professional revolutionaries who would serve as the “vanguard” of the proletariat. From historical hindsight, the appearance of Lenin and the Bolsheviks was an event of tremendous importance. At the time, however, it went unnoticed by the people of Russia and even by the tsarist police, who were well informed about the activities of the social democrats and believed that any movement based on such obtuse, complicated theories as those of Marx had little chance of success in the empire.

Other non-Ukrainian parties in Ukraine The growth of the social democrats also forced their ideological rivals, the *narodnyk*-populists, to mobilize. In 1901 they formed the Socialist Revolutionary party, whose ideology was a mixture of old populist principles and new Marxist ideas and whose tactics still included the use of political assassination. Radical activism finally forced the liberals – whose goal was the establishment of a constitutional system like that of England or France and who were concentrated in the *zemstva* – to form their own party. In 1904 they established the Union of Liberation, which later became the Constitutional Democratic party or Kadets for short. Alarmed at the rise of illegal, antisarist parties, the government sought to redress the balance by supporting the organization of ultranationalist, progovernment parties such as the Russian Monarchist party and groups such as the Union of Russian People. These ultrarightist groups, which were strongly supported by the Orthodox clergy, were popularly called the Black Hundreds and they specialized in pogroms of Jewish communities and anti-Ukrainian agitation in Ukraine. The national minorities in Ukraine also established their own political organizations. The Poles were represented by the Polish Socialist party (PPS) and the Jews, who were the most politically active and well-organized people in the empire, were led by the nationalist Zionists and the Marxist Bund.

The Russian parties in Ukraine were by no means composed exclusively of Russians. Large numbers of Russified and even nationally conscious Ukrainians were attracted to the Kadets and the Socialist Revolutionaries, for they saw in them the most effective means of combating tsarism. Even in the ultranationalist, anti-Ukrainian organizations, many “Little Russians” competed with Russians in demonstrating their loyalty to the tsar and their hatred of his enemies.

The attitudes of the Russian and non-Ukrainian parties toward the Ukrainian movement varied. Because they favored decentralization, the Socialist Revolutionaries were understanding, if not supportive, of Ukrainian aspirations. The Polish socialists and especially the Jewish Zionists and the Bund – who shared with the Ukrainians a desire for autonomy and cultural rights –

were often willing to cooperate with certain Ukrainian groups. However, on the few occasions that they addressed the issue, the Marxists, and especially the Bolsheviks, were only partially successful in repressing their antagonism to Ukrainian "separatist" tendencies.

Ukrainian Political Parties

Like the Russians and the other nationalities in the empire, the Ukrainians were also caught up in the political activism that characterized the 1890s and early 1900s. They were motivated, on the one hand, by the general reaction to the repression of the 1880s and, on the other, by the inspiring example of the new dynamism and fresh ideas that appeared among Russian radicals. Another important impetus was the appearance of a new generation of Ukrainian activists who no longer wavered about their national identity but proudly referred to themselves as "nationally conscious Ukrainians" and militantly demanded national rights, political freedom, and social justice for their people.

These "new" Ukrainians were, for the most part, students and it was in the milieu of the *gymnazium* (high school) and the university that these individuals established the personal contacts and developed the ideas that led them actively to oppose tsarism. The career of a Ukrainian activist usually followed a familiar pattern. A youth would first be exposed to "subversive" ideas in a *gymanazium* where a liberal teacher or elder colleagues would introduce him to contraband publications and invite him to secret discussion groups. Once in university, such an individual would then join a Ukrainian student *hromada*, some of which, like those in Kiev and St Petersburg, had hundreds of members. As a member of the *hromada*, the student would be exposed to a variety of ideologies, become acquainted with well-known activists, and often commence illegal activities, such as the publication and distribution of antitsarist literature.

Students were further radicalized by conflicts between them and the government. For example, in 1901 the government forcibly drafted into the army 183 student activists from Kiev University. This called forth a massive sympathy strike throughout Ukraine and led to the expulsion from the universities of numerous students, many of whom concluded that their only option was to become revolutionaries. Of course, many students either never engaged in radical activities or abandoned them upon completing their studies. Nevertheless, few were the Ukrainian political leaders who had not first made a name for themselves as student activists, and many were the student *hromady* that served as the initial building blocks of Ukrainian political organizations.

The first organized appearance of these young "conscious" Ukrainians occurred in 1891 when a group of students, led by Ivan Lypa, Borys Hrinchenko, and Mykola Mikhnovsky, gathered at the grave of Taras Shevchenko to form

the Brotherhood of Taras (Bratstvo Tarasivtsiv). Concerned that the best of Ukrainian youth were being lost to Russian revolutionary organizations, the brotherhood resolved to forge the Ukrainian movement as a serious alternative to Russian radicalism and Russian culture in general. It established contacts with student groups in Kiev, Odessa, Poltava, and Chernihiv and began sponsoring lectures, plays, and celebrations honoring Shevchenko. Some members of the groups also joined a publications society of about eighty members, mainly elementary school teachers, whose goal was to disseminate Ukrainian literature among students and peasants. Lypa and his colleagues also urged Ukrainian authors to utilize European models in their work instead of Russian ones.

But the brotherhood's most noteworthy achievement was the publication in 1893 of its famous credo, "The Declaration of Faith of Young Ukrainians," in *Pravda*, a Lviv-based newspaper. This strongly worded document reflected a militant nationalism and contained a stinging critique of the Ukrainophiles for their intellectual dependence on Russian culture. Its authors confidently declared their intention of becoming something the older generation had never been – a genuinely Ukrainian intelligentsia. As a sign of their "uncompromising Ukrainianism" they bound themselves to speak Ukrainian at all times, to raise their children in the "Ukrainian manner," to demand the teaching of Ukrainian in schools, and to defend the Ukrainian cause on every occasion. Their political goal was full recognition for Ukrainians as a separate nation within a democratic, federated Russia. Yet, despite these bold declarations and a flurry of cultural activity, the brotherhood attained few concrete results and was soon assimilated by other Ukrainian political groups.

Rumblings of discontent, the appearance of splinter groups led by younger members, as well as the numerical growth of the *hromady* finally forced the elder statesmen of the Ukrainian movement to act after the long hiatus of the 1880s. In 1897, on the initiative of Antonovych and Konysky, they resolved to form a clandestine organization that would unite all the Ukrainian activists in the empire. The result was the General Ukrainian Organization (GUO), a federation of about twenty *hromady* plus many student groups and individual members that was directed by an executive committee in Kiev. According to secret police estimates, its active membership was around 450, about 100 of whom were based in Kiev. As usual, one of the first acts of the organization was to attempt to get the "Ukrainian message" into the printed media. This goal was reflected in the establishment of a GUO literary publishing venture and a bookstore in Kiev. The organization also sponsored morale-boosting anniversaries of Shevchenko and other noted Ukrainian writers. Especially noteworthy in this regard were the festivities honoring Ivan Kotliarevsky in 1903 and the composer Mykola Lysenko in 1904 in which several thousand members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia participated, including representatives from Western Ukraine. To aid those individuals who were persecuted

by the police for Ukrainophile activities, the GUO established a special fund. But although the appearance of the GUO indicated that the older generation of Ukrainians had also become aware of the need to organize, the nature of their activities showed that they were still unwilling to renounce cultural activity for politics. Thus, when the 19th century came to an end, the Ukrainians still did not possess what other minorities, such as the Jews and the Poles, already had – a political party.

The Revolutionary Ukrainian party (RUP) Again it was in Kharkiv that a group of students, which included L. Matusevych, Iurii Kollard, O. Kovalenko, and the sons of several old Ukrainophiles such as Dmytro Antonovych, Mykhailo Rusov, and D. Poznansky, took the initiative. In January 1900 they founded the Revolutionary Ukrainian party (RUP), a tightly knit, conspiratorial group. The aim of this first East Ukrainian political party was to unite various generations and classes in the struggle for national rights and social revolution. Students in particular responded favorably to the initiative of the Kharkiv group. By 1902, six branches, coordinated by a central committee, functioned in Kiev, Kharkiv, Poltava, Lubny, Pryluky, and Katerynoslav. Many smaller groups of *gymnazium* and university students were also affiliated with the party. To facilitate the obligatory publication program, a foreign bureau was established in Lviv in Galicia and Chernivtsi in Bukovyna. RUP published two periodicals, *Haslo* and *Selianyn*, which were designed to politicize the peasantry, and smuggled them into Russian-ruled Ukraine.

The party soon encountered difficulties, especially when it attempted to formulate its program more precisely. From the outset the problem was whether national or socioeconomic issues deserved greater emphasis from a revolutionary standpoint. Initially, as the party's publication of the pamphlet *Samostiina Ukraina* (by the fiery nationalist Mykola Mikhnovsky) indicated, the national question was of great concern to its members. In time, however, in order to expand beyond its original constituency of "conscious Ukrainians" and reach the peasantry, RUP increasingly focused its attention on socioeconomic matters. Moreover, many of its members became converts to Marxism, thus gradually transforming the party into a social democratic organization.

In the process, tensions developed among RUP members. The majority, led by Mykola Porsh and his colleagues Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura, argued that the organization should be a national party, composed solely of Ukrainians but combining nationalism with Marxism. Others, whose foremost spokesman was Marian Melenevsky, wanted RUP to shed its national character and become an autonomous branch of the Russian Social Democratic party, which would represent all workers in Ukraine, regardless of nationality.

A note about factionalism is now in order. The radical intelligentsia was

engaged in a bitter struggle with tsarist autocracy that precluded a climate of tolerance in which differing ideas could be discussed openly and calmly. This struggle also prevented the development of the Western art of compromise and majority rule – and, thus, factionalism became a widespread phenomenon in all segments of the revolutionary movement. If one group of revolutionaries disagreed with another, it usually continued to adhere to its position and fanatically accused its ideological opponents of stupidity, at best, and of reactionary tendencies, at worst. The group would then self-righteously break off from the original organization to form its own faction. Often, its contempt for its erstwhile colleagues would match that of its hatred of the tsarist regime.

That Ukrainians formed no exception to this tendency can be readily seen from the splits that developed in RUP. In 1902 a small segment of the party, influenced by Mikhnovsky's intense nationalism, broke off to form the tiny Ukrainian National party. Two years later, a sizable minority that sided with Melenevsky left the party to join the Russian Social Democrats. The goal of Melenevsky's faction (called Spilka) was to become the leading Marxist party in Ukraine under the sponsorship of the Russian organization. What remained of RUP renamed itself the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers party and continued its efforts to combine Marxism and nationalism.

A noteworthy aspect of RUP activity was its relations with other non-Ukrainian Marxist parties. In their dealings with the Russian Social Democrats, Ukrainian Marxists found confirmation of something that they had long suspected – namely, that Russian revolutionaries shared with the tsarist government the same predilection for centralism. Time after time, whenever the RUP attempted to establish a cooperative working relationship with the Russian Social Democratic party, discussions would collapse because of the Russians' refusal to grant autonomous status to the Ukrainian organization. In contrast, RUP's relations with the Polish socialist party and especially with the Jewish Marxist Bund were excellent. This attitude was reflected in RUP's strong criticism of restrictions against Jews in the empire and in the Bund's support for Ukrainian efforts to gain autonomy in the Russian Social Democratic party.

The moderates Not only did RUP spawn a number of other parties, but it also forced Ukrainian moderates, united in the GUO (General Ukrainian Organization), to take the step that they had long avoided. In 1904, at the urging of Evhen Chykalenko, the GUO voted to transform itself into a liberal political party whose goals would be the establishment of constitutional government, social reform, and full national rights for the Ukrainians in a federated Russian republic. To a large extent the decision of the moderates to take this step was motivated by the fear that the young socialist radicals would take over the Ukrainian movement and lead it on a path that respectable professors,

government officials, and *zemstvo* functionaries would find difficult to follow. Predictably, however, ideological conflicts and factional splits developed and in order to accommodate its left-leaning members, the liberal party renamed itself the Ukrainian Radical Democratic party. Despite the change of name, it remained an essentially liberal party much akin to the Russian Kadets.

Thus, by 1905, the Ukrainian movement had experienced considerable growth. It had developed a variety of parties that offered a range of prescriptions for solving Ukraine's national, political, and socioeconomic problems. But all these parties still consisted mainly of the intelligentsia and they were continually at odds with each other. Moreover, because almost all the Ukrainian intelligentsia were left leaning, the conservative viewpoint was not represented in the Ukrainian political spectrum, forcing Ukrainians of that persuasion to join Russian conservative parties. These drawbacks notwithstanding, it was clear that the Ukrainian movement had finally moved beyond culturalism and had commenced a new, political stage in its development.

The Revolution of 1905

Russia's first revolution began on "Bloody Sunday," 22 January 1905, when police in St Petersburg fired on a large, peaceful demonstration of workers carrying icons and portraits of the tsar and led by a controversial priest from Ukraine, Georgii Gapon. In the melee about 130 people were killed and hundreds more were wounded. As shock and revulsion rolled through the empire, a sudden shift of mood occurred, especially among the previously loyal workers and peasants. The image of the tsar as a well-meaning benefactor was badly tarnished and the gross incompetence of the authorities was clearly demonstrated to all. The general anger at the government was quickly transformed into sympathy for the revolutionaries and into a willingness to protest.

Throughout the following spring and summer, a mounting crescendo of strikes enveloped the country. At its high point in October, close to 2 million workers – 120,000 in Ukraine – staged a mammoth general strike. Meanwhile, in the countryside, widespread disturbances spread rapidly, usually taking the form of pillaging and burning the hated landlords' estates. Even in the armed forces there was unrest and a number of rebellions occurred, the most famous of which was the mutiny on the cruiser *Potemkin* in Odessa harbor. Refusing orders to fire on the strikers on the shore, the crew of the *Potemkin* – which consisted mainly of Ukrainians and was led by Opanas Matiushenko, a native of Kharkiv province – rebelled and took control of the ship. One of the few officers to join the mutineers was O. Kovalenko, a leading member of RUP.

In the face of mounting pressure, Tsar Nicholas II grudgingly agreed to concessions. These culminated in the famous October Manifesto (17 October) that granted his subjects full civil rights and promised the establishment of a par-

liament or *duma*. It appeared that the empire was about to become a constitutional monarchy.

The impact of the revolution in Ukraine For the Ukrainian movement, the revolution brought two crucial improvements: it finally broke the government's resolve to enforce the hated 1876 restrictions on the Ukrainian language and allowed Ukrainians to associate freely. The results were immediate and impressive: in November 1905 there had been only one Ukrainian newspaper and by early 1906 there were already seventeen. The number of publishing ventures jumped from two to seventeen, thirteen of which were based in Kiev. In almost every town there appeared *hromady* or Ukrainian clubs, as they were now called. In the countryside, Prosvita, a cultural institution modeled after a society of the same name in Galicia, proliferated. Although the first Prosvita in Eastern Ukraine was founded in Katerynoslav at the end of 1905, by the middle of 1907 there were thirty-five in the major cities of Ukraine, each with numerous branches in the surrounding villages and also among the emigrants in the Far East. However, even at the height of the revolution, the government restricted the growth and coordination of the work of these societies for the following reason, as stated in one of its circulars: "Bearing in mind that the measures through which Prosvitas wished to influence the people are considered very dangerous in the present unrest ... and also having in mind that Little Russia is a part of one great Russian state, and that the awakening of national political consciousness of the Little Russian people, at this time, cannot be permitted ... the administration of the *guberniia* decided to refuse the registration of the Ukrainian society Prosvita."⁸

Cooperatives, usually headed by Ukrainian activists, burgeoned: in Kiev province their numbers grew from 3 in 1904 to 193 in 1907, in Podilia from 18 in 1905 to 200 in 1908, and in Kharkiv province from 2 in 1905 to 50 in 1907. It became abundantly clear that once restrictions were lifted, the Ukrainian movement had much greater potential for growth than commonly had been expected.

Although the Ukrainian parties, like all the parties in the empire, were caught unaware by the revolution, they worked feverishly to take advantage of the upheaval. Most dynamic was Spilka, the Ukrainian component of the Russian Social Democratic party, which favored the Mensheviks. It was especially effective in mobilizing the peasants for strikes and demonstrations and drew many of them into its membership. The Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' party (USDWP), the successor of RUP, was not as successful in expanding its base of support. Claims by its supporters that its membership reached 3000 during the revolution are probably exaggerated. A noteworthy aspect of its activity, however, was the organization, as a gesture of goodwill to the Jewish Bund, of several units of party members in Poltava and Lubny to maintain order and protect Jewish communities from pogroms. The

Ukrainian liberals (URDP) made few efforts to reach beyond the intelligentsia. However, when elections to the Duma were held in the spring of 1906, their influence increased.

The turning point in the revolution occurred in early 1906 when tsarist concessions led to a split among the revolutionaries. Satisfied with guarantees of constitutional government, the liberals agreed to participate in the elections to the Duma. But the radicals, insisting that a social revolution had not yet taken place, decided on a boycott. As a result, the strongest Ukrainian parties – Spilka and the Ukrainian Social Democrats – did not put candidates forward and only a handful of Ukrainian liberals were elected. However, a considerable number of Ukrainians were elected on the tickets of Russian parties. Of the 497 members of the first Duma, the delegates from Ukraine consisted of 63 Ukrainians, 22 Russians, 5 Poles, 4 Jews, and 1 German. When the Duma convened, the Ukrainians quickly organized a parliamentary club consisting of over forty members to formulate their demands.

First and foremost, the Ukrainians in the Duma insisted on greater autonomy for their country. Somewhat unexpectedly, the Ukrainian peasantry backed these demands wholeheartedly. A more specific and equally popular demand called for the Ukrainization of education, especially at the elementary level. But the government, increasingly more confident, resisted this pressure. Its officials were convinced that granting greater autonomy to the Ukrainians would only whet their appetite for independence. As the minister of interior, Petr Durnovo, informed Tsar Nicholas II: “We should expect that, under the influence of revolutionary propaganda, the peasants of this province [Poltava] will pass a resolution for the separation of Ukraine from Russia based on the principle of autonomy.”⁹

So displeasing did Nicholas II find his first exposure to parliamentary government that he exercised his prerogative and dismissed the first Duma after only seventy-two days. Only after imposing voting restrictions, which skewed the electorate in favor of the more conservative, propertied classes, did the tsar obtain, in the third and fourth dumas, the conservative majority that he could tolerate. As was to be expected, the Ukrainian parties, being all leftists, were excluded from the latter dumas and Ukrainian issues were thus almost totally ignored.

The postrevolution reaction By 1907, the government, backed by a conservative majority in the Duma, was ready to go on the counteroffensive against “revolutionary excesses.” A state of emergency was declared and all demonstrations strictly forbidden. Military courts were established throughout the empire and hundreds of revolutionaries and rebellious peasants were sentenced to death. Political parties were driven underground and their best-known leaders, including many of the old RUP activists, fled abroad. One by one, the Ukrainian clubs disbanded. Only the Prosvitas – their activity re-

duced to staging theatricals – and several scholarly societies were allowed to continue. But Ukrainian periodicals, which had appeared in such profusion in 1905, practically disappeared, and all talk of Ukrainizing education now met with open derision on the part of the authorities.

The anti-Ukrainian policies of the government found strong support among certain sectors of Russian society. Petr Struve, a famous liberal spokesman, wrote a series of articles in 1908 that advocated general support for a “Greater Russia” and sharply criticized the Ukrainian movement for its “lack of patriotism.”¹⁰ As Russian nationalism mounted to chauvinistic levels in the years before the First World War, Ukrainian activists were increasingly perceived by many Russians as advocates of “treacherous separatism” or, to use a favorite term of the Ukrainophobes, “Mazepism.” Repeated rumors and innuendo implied that leading Ukrainians were secretly in the pay of the Germans and Austrians.

In Ukraine, certain Russian newspapers, such as *Novoe Vremia* and *Kievlianin*, made it a point to alert their readers to the “dangers” of Ukrainianism. In 1908 the Club of Russian Nationalists was founded in Kiev for the express purpose of “waging social and cultural war against the Ukrainian movement and defending the foundations of the Russian state in Ukraine.”¹¹

But the Ukrainians were not without their supporters. In 1911, at the All-Russian Congress of *zemstva* workers in Moscow, the representatives of the Kharkiv and Poltava *zemstva* came out strongly in support of the introduction of Ukrainian in the elementary schools. In general, backing for cultural Ukrainianism was widespread among the *zemstva* in Ukraine. In the academic world, such well-known Russian scholars as the philologists Aleksei Shakhmatov and Fedor Korsh defended the Ukrainian movement against its maligners, as did the Polish linguist Jan Bedouin de Courtney. An especially strong supporter of Ukrainian demands for autonomy was the fiery, Odessa-born Zionist Vladimir Zhabotinsky. However, these well-wishers were rare exceptions to the general hostility of Russian society and of the tsarist government to the Ukrainian movement in the years before the First World War.

Cultural Development

In the history of Ukrainian culture, the period from 1861 to 1914 was most creative and fruitful. Largely because of the great social, economic, and political changes that occurred during this time, creative forces emerged that produced imposing achievements, despite government repression. But this burst of creative energy was an all-imperial phenomenon. This period is often called the Silver Age of Russian culture and undoubtedly the momentum that originated in St Petersburg and Moscow had a stimulating effect on Ukraine. In scholarship, literature, and the arts what was produced in Russia and Ukraine at this time compared favorably to similar developments in

Western Europe. Yet, as so much in the Russian Empire, cultural growth in Ukraine was a study in contrasts: while a thin stratum of society benefited from an increasingly sophisticated system of higher education and was culturally on a par with Europe, the overwhelming majority of the country's inhabitants remained illiterate and untouched by cultural developments. Thus, the "high" culture of the intelligentsia, where improvement was most dramatic, remained far removed from the folk culture of the masses, where changes were few.

Education If in the 18th century the level of their general education had been a source of pride to Ukrainians, particularly on the Left Bank, in the 19th century it became one of their greatest shortcomings. The extent of this catastrophic reversal is illustrated by the fact that while in 1768 the three largest counties in Chernihiv province had one elementary school per 746 inhabitants, in 1876 they had only one such school per 6750 inhabitants. The introduction of serfdom and the conviction on the part of the government and the nobles that serfs had no need of education were primarily responsible for this decline. The elementary schools that did exist in the early 19th century were almost all parochial and depended on the contributions of impoverished villagers for their survival.

The situation improved somewhat after the emancipation (1861), especially in the 1870s when the *zemstva* took over responsibility for general education. Frequently staffed by progressive individuals, the *zemstvo* school committees, which provided 85% of the schools' budgets, expanded construction of new schools, improved pedagogical techniques, and introduced subjects such as mathematics, history, and geography in place of the traditional rote learning of religious texts.

The quality of teachers, many of whom were idealistic university students, also improved. Nonetheless, serious problems remained. Because education was not mandatory, about two-thirds of the peasants sent their children to work in the fields rather than to the schools. Despite appeals from the *zemstva*, teachers, and celebrated pedagogues, the government refused to allow the use of Ukrainian in the elementary schools, thereby placing Ukrainian pupils at a distinct disadvantage. Finally, on the Right Bank, where no *zemstva* were allowed until 1911, educational improvements were minimal and the educational level of the region was the lowest in all of European Russia. There was, of course, great variability in the literacy rate in Ukraine: at the turn of the century, while only about 20% of the village population was literate, the rate in cities was about 50% – and among workers in Kiev and Kharkiv it reached as high as 60%.

Secondary education, which consisted mainly of the *gymnazia*, also improved considerably. There were several types of *gymnazia*: Most offered a seven-year course of study, others only a partial four-year course; some were

of the classical type that stressed the study of Greek, Latin, and logic; others emphasized modern European languages, sciences, and mathematics. By 1870 women's *gymnazia*, designed for the preparation of teachers, were formally sanctioned. Almost every provincial center, and even many county seats, had a *gymnazium* and by 1890 there were 129 throughout Ukraine. Yet their growth hardly matched the need. In Kiev province, for example, there was only one *gymnazium* per 560,000 inhabitants.

With the establishment of a university in Odessa in 1865, the number of universities in Ukraine rose to three. Their combined enrollment increased from 1200 in 1865 to over 4000 in the 1890s. The social background of the students also underwent considerable change: in 1865 more than 71% were sons of nobles, but by the 1890s over 60% were sons of the clergy, burghers, and merchants. As of 1878, women gained access to the universities. In the final decades of the 19th century, the most important issues at these universities, which enjoyed a reputation for excellence, were as often political as academic. Worried that they served as a breeding ground for radicals, the government severely limited the autonomy of the universities in 1884, and student strikes and protests against these measures kept tensions high. After 1905, Ukrainian students launched a campaign to introduce the teaching of Ukrainian subjects on the university level. By 1908 they attained some success at the universities of Kharkiv and Odessa where not only courses but several chairs in Ukrainian studies were established. However, the faculty of Kiev University, which was noted for its conservatism, staunchly refused to give in to Ukrainian demands. As the postrevolutionary reaction set in throughout the empire, even the few Ukrainian courses in Kharkiv and Odessa were abolished.

Scholarly achievements Inspired on the one hand by the brilliant scientific discoveries of the early 19th century and reacting against the emotionalism of Romanticism and fuzzy metaphysics of idealism on the other, the intellectuals of the Russian Empire turned in the late 19th century toward positivism, with its promise to provide concrete and verifiable proofs and measurements of physical and social phenomena. This trend was encouraged by the emphasis that Russian universities placed on laboratory training, which stimulated teachers and students to work together in solving scientific problems. It was especially evident in the sciences – chemistry, physics, geology, botany, biology – as well as in mathematics. Another reason for the rising popularity of the sciences (in contrast to the humanities and social studies) was that they were unlikely to result in ideological conflicts with the ever-watchful government.

Some of the scientists of imperial as well as European fame who worked in Ukraine were M. Umov, founder of the school of theoretical physics in Kiev; N. Beketov, an innovative chemist in Kharkiv University; O. Liupanov, a mathematician in Kharkiv; the embryologist A. Kovalevsky, whose work

won the praise of Charles Darwin; and I. Mechnikov who, together with M. Hamaliia, established in Kiev in 1886 the first microbiological laboratory in the empire. Although there were some Ukrainians among the leading scientists in Ukraine, a disproportionately large number of them were Russians. This fact can be explained, in part, by the predominance of Russians in cities where universities were located and their easier access to higher education.

Ukrainians, for their part, were more in evidence in the social sciences. Of the historians, who studied Ukraine's past in and of itself rather than as an adjunct to Russian history, the most famous was the talented, energetic, and ubiquitous Volodymyr Antonovych, one of whose many illustrious students was Mykhailo Hrushevsky. Other Ukrainian historians of note were Oleksander Lazarevsky, Oleksandra Efimenko, and Dmytro Bahalii. Even Russian historians in Ukraine, such as Gennadii Karpov and Mikhail Vladimirsky-Budnov, devoted much attention to the history of the land in which they lived, although (as might be expected) their interpretations differed radically from those of their Ukrainian colleagues. Outstanding Ukrainian scholars in other disciplines were the legal specialist Volodymyr Kistiakovsky, the economists Mykola Bunge and Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovsky, the orientalist Ahatanhel Krymsky, and the linguist Oleksander Potebnia.

Scholars in Ukraine benefited greatly from the numerous scholarly societies, commissions, journals, as well as libraries and archives, that appeared after 1861. A historical commission, the Provisional Committee, which existed from 1843 to 1917 and was chaired for over a decade by the indefatigable Antonovych, published dozens of volumes of archival documents relating to Ukraine's past. In 1873, a historical society, the Society of Nestor the Chronicler, began to concentrate on Ukraine's history, and in 1882 the Ukrainophiles of the Old Hromada established *Kievskaia starina*, a valuable journal of Ukrainian studies (written in Russian). After the revolution of 1905, the Kiev Scholarly Society, which openly proclaimed its intention to develop and popularize various branches of learning using the Ukrainian language, came into being. Its membership rose rapidly from 54 in 1907, to 98 in 1912, and to 161 in 1916. However, the government still found ways to restrain the appearance of Ukrainian books. As a result, of 5283 books published in Ukraine in 1913, only 176 were in Ukrainian.

Literary development Remarkably, Ukrainian literature not only survived but flourished, despite – or perhaps as a response to – the cultural repression that marked the period from 1876 to 1905. As the numbers of university graduates grew, the number of authors and the size of their readership also expanded. Moreover, the vibrant Galician press provided ample opportunities for East Ukrainian authors to bypass tsarist censorship. An indication of how far the literary movement had progressed beyond the handful of authors and read-

ers of Ukrainian literature of the early 19th century was the massive and enthusiastic participation of thousands of Ukrainian intelligentsia and dozens of Ukrainian authors from both Eastern and Western Ukraine in the dedication of a monument to Kotliarevsky in Poltava in 1903.

The vibrant growth of Ukrainian literature was also a result of its successful adoption of new literary styles. Romanticism, which had exerted great influence on Ukrainian culture in the early 19th century with its focus on the national uniqueness of a people, its love of folklore, its fascination with history, and its stress on national language, had faded by the latter part of the century. Inspired by the social utopianism of French thinkers such as August Comte, harangued by Russian literary critics such as Nikolai Chernyshevsky, and confronted by the misery in the village and the factory, authors throughout the Russian Empire now concluded that no longer was art for art's sake a justifiable slogan. Impelled to use art for the purpose of exposing the injustices and evils in society in the hope that this would lead to its improvement, they embraced a new literary approach – Realism.

Although it did contain some elements of Romanticism – notably the focus on the village and the peasant – Ukrainian Realism finally went beyond the limits of the ethnographic and began to explore the social and psychological dimensions of life. One of the first realist authors was Ivan Nechui-Levytsky, who concentrated on the changes that had occurred in the Ukrainian village after the emancipation. Nechui-Levytsky's writing often evoked a sense of betrayal, a puzzled questioning of why life, instead of becoming better, became worse. In his *Kaidasheva simia* one of the characters asks why "God's earth is so gay and beautiful and yet the lives of the people are so ugly." For Nechui-Levytsky, it was the extreme inequality between the rich and poor imposed by the alien bureaucratic-military "Muscovite" regime, and especially its school system, that was responsible for the extreme poverty, ignorance, superstition, and moral degeneration that he saw in village life.

An even more penetrating treatment of the life of the peasantry was provided by Panas Myrny (Rudchenko). Unlike Nechui-Levytsky, Myrny did not limit himself to social inequality but probed deeply into the psychological impact of injustice on the individual. In his *Khiba revut voly ...?* ("Do Oxen Bellow ...?"), he examined how evil begets evil. The protagonist, the decent if rebellious peasant Chipka, is so frequently abused, exploited, and cheated that he abandons his traditional values and turns into a violent predator whose moral nihilism bursts forth in the statement: "If I could, I would destroy the whole world ... so that a new and better one would arise in its place." Another representative of the realist trend was Anatol Svydnytsky, whose novel *Liuboratsky* dealt with the impact of foreign culture, specifically Polonization and Russification, on several generations of a Ukrainian clerical family.

The numerous poets of this period are much more difficult to categorize.

Most noteworthy were Stefan Rudansky, an unusually talented writer best known for his witty, biting, aphoristic work *Spivomovnyk*; Leonid Hlibov, author of popular fables; and Pavlo Hrabovsky, whose poems were so critical of the tsarist regime that he was condemned to spend most of his life in Siberia.

As a new generation of authors emerged by the turn of the century, they attempted more and more frequently to go beyond the rigid, utilitarian strictures of Realism, to apply modernistic techniques, and to express individualistic perceptions. This tendency was reflected most impressively in the work of Eastern Ukraine's two leading literary figures of this period – the novelist Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky and the poetess Lesia Ukrainka. In his *Fata Morgana*, Kotsiubynsky focused on the traditional theme of social strife in the village. However, his method of describing it was extremely innovative. Using words like an impressionist uses paint, he created the sense of suspense and tension that arises in individuals in situations of terror, hatred, and panic. His "Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors" reflected both the real and mythical world of the Hutsul village and explored the constant movement between the conscious and subconscious world of the individual.

Laryssa Kosach-Kvitka, whose pen name was Lesia Ukrainka, was born into one of Ukraine's most cultured families. Her mother was the noted author Olena Pchilka; her uncle was the famous Drahomanov; and she was related to the composer Mykola Lysenko and the playwright Mykhailo Starytsky. Although she had the benefit of an excellent education that included travel to Europe and the study of French, Spanish, English, German, Greek, and Latin, as well as Russian and Ukrainian, she was plagued by poor health, which never allowed her a painless, carefree day in her life.

It is remarkable, therefore, that her deep, finely wrought poetry exudes inspiring strength, vigor, and optimism – qualities captured in her poem *Contra Spem Spero* ("To Hope against Hope"). In her early lyrical poems, such as "Wings of Song" and "Thoughts and Dreams," the influence of Shevchenko is still evident. But gradually Ukrainka turned to new motifs that were not strictly Ukrainian and that showed a desire to address universal issues. This new approach became evident in her "exoticism" – which used themes from ancient Greece, Palestine, Egypt, revolutionary France, and medieval Germany – and in her treatment of the varieties of love, the confrontation between power and liberty, and the relationship between the poet and society. Her dramatic poem "Forest Nymph" is a powerful portrayal of the clash between an exalted ideal and base reality.

Another departure from village-oriented Realism was the work of Volodymyr Vynnychenko, perhaps the most popular Ukrainian writer and playwright of the prerevolutionary era. His early naturalistic works, such as "Rabble" and "Beauty and Strength," sketched the lives of provincial townspeople and hired laborers in a world of dying village traditions and crum-

bling morality. More innovative were his treatments of such rare characters in Ukrainian literature as the revolutionary confronted by psychologically complex (albeit somewhat artificial) situations, as in his novel *Zina*. Vynnychenko's favorite theme, however, was the personality of the cynical egoist (most forcefully presented in his "Memoirs of a Pug-Nosed Mephistopheles"), who in order to be totally honest with himself, finds himself ready to commit any crime so long as his actions are in harmony with his feelings, convictions, and will.

If one adds to the above-mentioned authors such West Ukrainian writers as Vasyl Stefanyk, Olha Kobylanska, and the incomparable Ivan Franko, it is evident that Ukrainian authors, even when measured by West European standards, represented a truly impressive array of talent. Thus, by the turn of the 19th century, Ukrainian literature, which only a generation earlier had been struggling for its right to exist, earned a secure place for itself among the major Slavic literatures.

The theater An especially popular and important medium of Ukrainian culture during this period was the theater. Relying heavily on Ukrainian ethnography at the outset, it offered an attractive combination of acting and singing. A decisive factor in its development, and one of the few concessions made by the regime to the Ukrainian movement, was the government's permission in 1881 to use Ukrainian on the stage. This made the theater the only medium of Ukrainian culture that could develop more or less freely; it therefore quickly became the focus of much creative energy and talent. The impact of the theater went beyond the artistic, for many Ukrainians felt their first spark of national pride and consciousness upon seeing a well-performed play in their often-denigrated native language.

Almost immediately after the government's decision, the first Ukrainian professional theater was founded in Yelysavethrad (Kirovohrad) in 1881 by Marko Kropyvnytsky. One year later, the troupe numbered over 100 members. By the 1890s, there were at least five professional troupes that performed with great success throughout the empire and boasted repertoires of twenty to thirty plays each. Clearly, the theater had come a long way from the 1860s, when it could draw on only a few plays in Ukrainian, such as Kotliarevsky's *Natalka Poltavka*, Shevchenko's *Nazar Stodola*, and Hulak-Artemovsky's "Zaporozhian beyond the Danube."

Credit for this rapid development belongs to a handful of talented, energetic, and enterprising individuals, such as Starytsky, Kropyvnytsky, and the remarkable Tobilevych family, members of which went by the stage names of Ivan Karpenko-Kary, Mykola Sadovsky, and Panas Saksahansky. Not only did each of these individuals organize his own troupe, but all were outstanding actors, directors, producers, and, in the case of Karpenko-Kary, playwrights. A leading "star" of the Ukrainian theater was Maria Zankovetska.



Ideologically and culturally, as well as economically and socially, the turn of the 19th century was a period of accelerating change. On all levels the traditional order was beginning to crumble and everywhere there were signs of a search for new ways. This was especially evident in the intelligentsia's growing concern with ideology. In Ukraine, the two main ideological currents that came to the fore were nationalism and socialism. The more firmly these two ideologies took root, the more crucial became the question of their relationship to each other. For many Ukrainian activists it became clear that without a socialist dimension, the national movement had little chance of moving beyond its limited, cultural parameters. By the same token, many Ukrainian socialists realized that, without addressing the national issue, socialism in Ukraine would remain a weakly rooted movement consisting mostly of non-Ukrainians. Efforts to find a satisfactory combination of the two ideologies, such as those attempted by RUP, did not produce generally acceptable results and – as the Ukrainians entered the 20th century – the relationship between the two ideologies remained unresolved.

Eastern Galicia: A Bastion of Ukrainianism

How much benefit can legal reforms bring to a society that is economically impoverished, socially underdeveloped, culturally stagnant, and politically weak? More specifically, what impact did the constitutional reforms of the 19th century have on the Ukrainians under Habsburg rule? By the late 19th century, West Ukrainians benefited greatly from the new opportunities that a constitution can bring.* But they also realized that there were disappointing limitations to what the laws and constitutions could do to ensure socio-economic and national justice. On balance, however, the impact of the Austrian constitutions of 1848 and especially of 1867 was positive, and it stimulated an unprecedented upsurge within West Ukrainian society of political activism and organizational growth. Indeed, this new activism was so great that it moved the severely handicapped Ukrainians of Galicia to the forefront of the Ukrainian national movement. But if the new constitutional order provided opportunities for communal activity, it was the growing competition with the Poles that served as a major impetus for it. And as both Ukrainian and Polish communities mobilized their forces, the intensity of their confrontation grew.



The Socioeconomic Aspect

After 1848, Galicia, as well as Transcarpathia and Bukovyna, continued to be among the poorest regions of Europe, a fact that prompted some historians to refer to them as “a storehouse of economic absurdities.”¹ One of

* In the late 19th and early 20th century, nationally conscious West Ukrainians began to call themselves “Ukrainians,” a national name that had been adopted by the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the east. There were two basic reasons for abandoning the traditional designation, *Rusyn* (Ruthenian): it was felt that *Rusyn* was too similar to *Ruskyi* (Russian) and, by adopting the name used by their compatriots in the Russian Empire, the West Ukrainians wished to stress their unity with them.

the major economic drawbacks of these provinces was their lack of major exports such as the wheat and sugar beets that fueled economic growth in Russian-ruled Ukraine. An insurmountable barrier to the development of industry, even on a modest scale, was the competition from such heavily industrialized provinces as Bohemia, Lower Austria, and Moravia, which easily overwhelmed the few Galician attempts to industrialize. The policies of Vienna only worsened the situation. Not only did the imperial government show little interest in improving conditions in Galicia, but by means of unbalanced tariffs, it clearly favored the western provinces. Even more so than Russian-ruled Ukraine, the lands inhabited by West Ukrainians were the internal colonies of the Austrian Empire.

The landowning elite of the province, moreover, was not eager to introduce economic changes for it feared that development, particularly industrial growth, might deprive it of cheap and plentiful labor. Thus, Galicia, Bukovyna, and Hungarian-dominated Transcarpathia remained agrarian societies, with little capital accumulation, weak internal trade, low urbanization, minimal industry, and the lowest wages and highest labor surplus in the empire. Only in the final decade of the century did faint signs of improvement appear.

Vienna's neglect of Galicia should not leave one with the impression that it was an insignificant part of the empire. As of 1910, the province accounted for 15% of the population of the monarchy. In fact, population was one of the few growth areas in the lands inhabited by the West Ukrainians. In Galicia it jumped from 5.2 million in 1849 to almost 8 million in 1910. But this was a mixed blessing, for the rising population density in the countryside – 32 people per sq. km in 1780 and 102 per sq. km in 1910 – only exacerbated socioeconomic problems.

Major changes also occurred in the ethnic composition of Galicia, although at first glance they appeared to be more dramatic than they were in reality. Whereas in 1849 Ukrainians constituted over 50% of the population in the province, by 1910 over 58% of the population was listed as Polish and only 40% were Ukrainians. Even in Eastern Galicia, the Ukrainian share of the population dropped to 62%. To some extent, the migration of Poles from the western to the eastern part of the province and the Polish assimilation of non-Poles, especially the Germans, accounted for these changes. Yet the main reason was the growing tendency of the Jews, whose share of the province's population doubled from about 6% in 1831 to almost 12% in 1910, to identify themselves as Poles, at least in terms of language.

There were, however, few changes in the occupational profile of the province's nationalities. Ukrainians remained an overwhelmingly agrarian people. In 1900 about 95% of them were engaged in agriculture. Only about 1% were in industry (what little there was of it) and a mere 0.2% in trade. Ukrainian intelligentsia, including the priests, was a small group, probably number-

ing between 12,000 and 15,000 individuals. (According to the calculations of Volodymyr Navrotsky, in 1876 there were about 5000 Ukrainian intelligentsia, including priests. The Poles had over 38,000, not counting the clergy.)² By comparison, their rivals, the Poles, had 80% of their people in agriculture, 6.5% in industry, 2% in trade. In 1914, the Poles had over 300 high government officials in Galicia, while the Ukrainians had only 25. Thus, despite the Habsburg reforms, it was clear that the Ukrainians had been able to make little progress in overcoming the socioeconomic disadvantages that had dogged them for centuries.

The plight of the peasant As in Russia in 1861, the emancipation of the serfs in the Habsburg empire in 1848, while improving their legal status and political rights, did not improve their economic position. Essentially, the problem was one of rising costs and declining incomes. A major burden on the peasantry was the debt owed on the lands they received in 1848. The Vienna government originally promised to cover the cost of the land transfers itself, but in 1853, after order was restored, it shifted most of the expense upon the peasantry. In addition, the peasants were subjected to direct and indirect taxes including the costs of maintaining schools, roads, etc.

But most infuriating to the peasants was the issue of the so-called servitudes. Under the conditions of the emancipation, the landlords generally retained ownership of the servitudes, that is, forests and pastures to which villagers had previously had access. This meant that the peasant now had to pay whatever price the landlord stipulated in order to obtain firewood and building materials or to feed his livestock. Usually the landowners' price was so high that it seemed to a peasant that he had simply exchanged the legal serfdom of the pre-1848 era for the economic enserfment of the post-1848 period. Anxious to cast off the estate owners' economic stranglehold, peasants by the thousands went to court over the servitudes issue. According to Ivan Franko, of the 32,000 servitudinal court cases between 1848 and 1881, the estate owners won 30,000.³ The outcome of these cases left little doubt about whom the Habsburg system favored.

As their costs mounted, the amount of land owned by peasants – and, therefore, their income – shrank rapidly. In 1859 the average size of a peasant holding in Eastern Galicia was 12 acres; in 1880 it slipped to 7 acres; and in 1902 to 6 acres. Or, to put it differently, the percentage of peasants who could be classified as being poor, that is, who owned less than 12 acres of land, rose from 66% in 1859 to 80% in 1902. The primary reason for this shrinkage was the subdivision of a peasant's land among his children, the average number of which was three to four per family. As peasant holdings became smaller, the large estates grew even bigger as the wealthy bought up the lands of peasants who could no longer survive on their tiny plots. Thus, Eastern Galicia was a land of about 2400 large landowners who held over 40% of the arable land

and hundreds of thousands of tiny peasant plots, which accounted for about 60% of the total territory under cultivation.

For peasants who sought to supplement their incomes, the prospects were not encouraging. If they hired themselves out as laborers to an estate owner, they could expect to receive the lowest wages in the empire – about one-quarter of wages paid in Austria proper. And if they were so desperate as to borrow from local moneylenders – mostly Jewish tavern-keepers in the villages and shop owners in the towns (for there were no banks) – they courted economic disaster. With interest rates ranging from 150 to 250% annually (another reason why capital stayed in moneylending rather than being invested in industry), a small loan taken out by a peasant to tide him over to the next harvest could in a short time turn into a crushing burden. Large debts were also inadvertently incurred by the naive, uncomprehending peasants: local moneylenders would often encourage them to drink or to buy on credit and, after allowing time for interest to accumulate, would present them with huge bills. When peasants could not pay their debts, their creditors either took over their land or auctioned it off.

Although peasants needed little encouragement to drink, their depressing economic plight certainly contributed to the alarming spread of alcoholism. Inducement also came from the estate owners who had a monopoly on alcohol production and from the tavern keepers who sold it. One way of inducing peasants to drink was the aforementioned extension of credit; another method was paying laborers in chits that could only be cashed in taverns. And then there was the great availability of taverns. In 1900 in Eastern Galicia, there was one tavern for every 220 inhabitants (but only one elementary school per 1500 inhabitants).

Not surprisingly, the health of the West Ukrainians was the most neglected of all the empire's subjects. Whereas, in 1900 there was one hospital per 295 inhabitants in Austria, in Galicia the ratio was 1 per 1200. Over 50% of the children died by age of 5, usually as a result of epidemics or malnutrition. But perhaps most shocking was the fact that about 50,000 deaths a year were attributed to malnutrition, that is, famine. In a famous book, "The Misery of Galicia," the Polish author Stanisław Szczepanowski claimed that the productive capacity of a Galician was one-fourth of an average European while his food consumption was one-half.⁴ Little wonder that at the turn of the century the life span of a West Ukrainian male was six years less than that of a Czech and thirteen years less than that of an Englishman.

Being an agrarian, sedentary people, the Ukrainian peasants felt an extremely powerful attachment to their native soil and only the most pressing conditions would force them to leave it. By the late 19th century, it was clear that such conditions were at hand and many peasants were confronted with the heartrending necessity of emigrating. Like their brethren in Russian-ruled Ukraine, the West Ukrainians would have to go halfway around the world in

search of more promising opportunities. However, unlike the East Ukrainians who migrated eastward to the shores of the Pacific, the West Ukrainians moved westward across the Atlantic to Brazil, Canada, and, most often, to the United States.

Towns and commerce Only about 10% of Galicia's inhabitants lived in towns and cities. As might be expected, the percentage of Ukrainians in urban centers was quite small: in 1900 over 75% of the province's urban dwellers spoke Polish; only 14% used Ukrainian and the rest communicated in German. Even in Eastern Galicia, Ukrainians formed only 25–30% of the urban population, about the same percentage as Poles. The Jews, however, constituted between 40% and 45% of the town dwellers in the eastern part of the province; in some towns, such as Brody, more than 70% of the population was Jewish. Population growth in the cities was uneven. While the populace of Lviv, the cultural, administrative, and economic center of Eastern Galicia, rose from 70,000 in 1857 to over 200,000 in 1910, most cities and towns experienced much slower growth.

As everywhere, the main economic function of cities and towns was trade and commerce. And to speak of trade in the West Ukrainian lands is to speak of the Jews because they completely dominated this sector of the economy. It was the Jews who acted as the middlemen between the village and the town. Jewish peddlers brought modern products (such as matches and kerosene) to isolated villages and Jewish merchants bought up peasant crops for sale in the towns. In the towns themselves, almost all the shops and stalls in which a peasant could buy finished products, such as cloth, boots, or iron pots (which were produced by Jewish artisans), were owned by Jews. If the peasant lacked cash to buy these products, the Jewish merchant would offer credit. In short, it was the Jews who pulled the peasantry into the money economy centered in the towns.

In exchange for their services, Jewish merchants attempted to extract the highest possible profits. To many non-Jews it appeared that these gains were not only excessive, but illgotten. For example, after studying the economic relationship between Jews and Ukrainians in Transcarpathia, a Hungarian economist of Irish descent, Edmund Egan, reported to the government that while the administration, magistrates, and estate owners contributed to the woeful plight of the peasantry, the main fault lay with the Jews, who as moneylenders, merchants, and tavern-keepers, were "dispossessing the Ruthenians of their money and their property."⁵ But although the peasantry resented the exploitative practices of many Jewish merchants, it realized that any type of economic activity was practically impossible without Jewish participation. This view was clearly reflected in a secret Habsburg police report, sent to Vienna in 1890, about the attitude of Ukrainian peasants: "Except for their daily bread, the peasants are dependent on the Jew at every stage of their lives. He

serves as their customer, counselor, agent, and factotum, in the full sense of the word. And if we wanted to banish them, the peasants would be the first to demand their return. Although the Jews exploit to the full the advantages accruing from this status and, by granting interest-bearing loans, control not only the peasants but also the clergy, it would be a mistake to speak of a prevalence of anti-Semitism in the sense of racial hatred."⁶

It should be emphasized, however, that most Jews were themselves poverty stricken and had few alternative means of making a living. In the late 19th century, their occupational profile was 15% leaseholders and tavern-keepers, 35% merchants, 30% artisans, and 20% miscellaneous occupations. Most Jewish traders were petty merchants, but a tiny minority was exceedingly wealthy and influential and carried on much of the large-scale trade in Galicia.

Industry Given the competition from the industrialized western provinces, the unfavorable government policies, and the lack of a domestic market, industry obviously had little chance to develop. Moreover, there was a dearth of capital. Until the 1890s, there were no commercial banks, Jewish capital was concentrated in trade and moneylending, and wealthy Poles had their money invested in land. Paradoxically, in Galicia the construction of railroads, which began in 1852, retarded rather than encouraged industrial growth.

Prior to the coming of the railroads, the little industry that did exist, such as glassworks or textile and leather production, was protected from external competition by the province's relative isolation. However, when the railroad brought a flood of western goods, many local industries collapsed. Much of the manufacturing that survived was of the handicraft variety, of which the numerous Jewish tailors and shoemakers were typical representatives. Large-scale enterprises were concentrated mainly in lumbering, encouraged by the presence of vast forests and the great need for building materials in the West, and in alcohol production.

By the 1890s, however, there were signs of improvement. In the preceding decade, three banks were established and they became a source of funding for large industrial projects. Polish magnates, such as Prince Andrzej Lubomirski, lobbied in Vienna for support for industrial development, and in 1901 an association of factory owners was formed. In the 1870s and 1880s, the production of oil in the area of Drohobych and Boryslav, financed mainly by Austrian and English capital, developed rapidly. And prior to the First World War, the Galician oil wells produced close to 5% of the world's oil.

Slowly but steadily, the proletariat grew and by 1902 it numbered about 230,000 full and part-time workers. Of these 18% were Ukrainians, 24% Jews, and the remainder Poles. As in Russian-ruled Ukraine, this very "young" class still had strong ties to the villages and many Ukrainian and Polish workers returned to agriculture after working part of the year in industry. These

changes, however, were gradual and relatively modest in scale and the West Ukrainian lands remained far behind other provinces in the empire in terms of economic development.

The New Political Order

After they quelled the uprisings of 1848, the emboldened Habsburgs attempted to undo the revolutionary reforms and to restore the emperor to absolute power. They disbanded parliament, cancelled the constitution, and ushered in a decade of stifling neoabsolutist rule. In Galicia, where the Ukrainian clergy drifted back to ecclesiastical pursuits, the Supreme Ruthenian Council dissolved itself voluntarily in 1851. One of the few general Ukrainian concerns that enlivened the drowsy 1850s in the province was the construction of the Ruthenian National Home in Lviv, a cultural center that had been funded by public contributions. However, despite this event, passivity and inertia generally replaced the dynamism of 1848. One Ukrainian wit quipped: "As our National Home rose higher, our cultural activity sank lower."⁷

But important changes already were afoot, even if they were not yet readily perceptible. In 1849, Count Agenor Gołuchowski, a wealthy Polish landowner and confidant of Emperor Franz Joseph, was appointed viceroy of Galicia. There were two important aspects to this appointment: first, in line with Vienna's autocratic policy, the new viceroy was given broad powers which included supervision of law enforcement, the economy, education, and religion in the province; second, Gołuchowski was a new type of Pole who believed that concentration on small but concrete gains would improve the Polish position more than heroic but failed revolts. For the next twenty-five years, Gołuchowski, who served thrice as viceroy of Galicia and twice as minister in Vienna, would play a decisive role in fashioning the new political order that would emerge in the province.

The growth of Polish influence While the new viceroy demonstratively emphasized his loyalty to the Habsburgs and his intention of dealing fairly with the Ukrainians, behind the scenes, he quietly and systematically expanded Polish influence in the government of the province. On his advice, Vienna dropped plans for the division of Galicia into separate Polish and Ukrainian parts. His exaggerated reports about Ukrainian sympathies for Russia shook the imperial government's confidence in the "Tyrolians of the East." As his influence grew, Gołuchowski became more open in his pro-Polish and anti-Ukrainian policies. Hoping to eliminate the Ukrainian presence at Lviv University, he pressured Holovatsky to resign his professorship of Ukrainian literature. Convinced that Ukrainians ought to be Polonized, he even attempted to impose the Roman calendar on the Greek Catholic church and, in 1859, to

introduce the Latin script in Ukrainian publications. In this he went too far. Incensed by Gofuchowski's projects, the Ukrainian intelligentsia awoke from its stupor, engaged the viceroy in a fiercely debated "alphabet war," and forced him to retreat on the alphabet issue. On other fronts, the viceroy pushed on, systematically replacing German bureaucrats with Poles and expanding the use of Polish in the schools. Thus, he laid the groundwork for the dramatic rise of Polish influence in Galicia.

In 1859, the Habsburg empire came to another decisive turning point when it suffered a severe defeat against the French and Sardinians in Italy. Weakened externally, the Habsburgs were forced to make concessions internally. As a result, the neoabsolutist regime was dismantled and constitutional, parliamentary government was restored – this time permanently. A central parliament was created in Vienna and each province received its own diet. Up to 1873, delegates to the former were selected from among the members of the latter.

To win the support of the upper classes, Vienna created an electoral system that would greatly favor them. Members of provincial diets were elected by four categories or curia of voters: the great landlords, chambers of commerce, townsmen, and rural communes, each of which was represented by a specific number of delegates. In Galicia's 150-member diet, the great landlords had 44 delegates, the chambers of commerce had 3, the townsmen had 28, and the rural communes (in which landlords could also be elected) had 74. The extent to which the peasants were underrepresented may be seen from the electoral structure: while it took only 52 voters to elect a deputy in the landlords' curia, a deputy from the rural communes needed 8764 voters. For Ukrainians, primarily a peasant people, this was a tremendous disadvantage. Consequently, in the elections to the Galician diet, Ukrainians were usually limited to less than 15% of the diet's membership. They also had a disproportionately low number of delegates in the parliament in Vienna. Clearly, in Galicia it was the Polish nobles who gained most from the parliamentary system.

But the Poles were about to gain even more. In 1867 a familiar pattern was repeated. Defeated in a war with Prussia, the Habsburgs were forced to make far-ranging concessions to the Hungarians, the strongest nationality in the empire. The result was the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, which placed about half of the empire, including Transcarpathia, under direct Hungarian rule. The Habsburg empire now became the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Hungarian success encouraged the Poles to demand complete control of Galicia. While Vienna refused to acquiesce formally, it did agree to an informal political compromise: in return for Polish support the Habsburgs promised not to interfere in the Polish conduct of Galicia's affairs. In effect, Galicia was to become a Polish "state within a state."

The sudden surge in Polish influence in Galician affairs went far beyond their guaranteed majority in the diet. Until 1916 only Poles could occupy the

office of viceroy. When, in 1871, a minister for Galicia was appointed in the central government, he, too, was always Polish. The bureaucracy was purged of Germans and quickly Polonized. The school commission was almost completely in Polish hands, and, in 1869, Polish became the official language of education and administration in the province. On the socioeconomic and cultural level, the Poles were incomparably stronger than the Ukrainians. Their aristocracy owned much of the land; their intelligentsia was relatively numerous, sophisticated, and diversified; their share of the urban population was growing rapidly; and their cultural achievements, even before 1867, were impressive. Little wonder that the Poles expected to get their way in Galicia.

Polish goals in Galicia Having attained power, what did the Poles intend to do with it? To comprehend Polish policies in the 1868–1914 period one must consider the Polish perspective on events, as well as their hopes and goals. The Poles, that is to say, their nobility and intelligentsia – for the Polish peasantry was almost as politically naive as the Ukrainians – were a frustrated people. In the late 18th century, they had been robbed of their statehood and when they rose up to regain it in 1830 and in 1863, their revolts failed dismally. To Ukrainians they may have appeared as arrogant, overpowering opponents, but many Poles were obsessed with their own weakness vis-à-vis the Germans and Russians. After the disaster of 1863, a major shift occurred in Polish thinking, and Gołuchowski was a major proponent of it. Rejecting revolutionary activity as counterproductive, Polish leaders propagated a policy of “organic work”: concrete (if mundane) activity that would strengthen Polish society by modernizing it. The conditions were exceedingly favorable for implementing such an approach in Galicia, which therefore, came to be viewed as a Piedmont or base from which the regeneration of the Polish nation would begin.

And what of the Ukrainians, the Habsburgs’ loyal “Tyrolians of the East”? Vienna’s attitude on this issue was reflected in the cynical words of an Austrian statesman: “Whether and to what extent the Ruthenians may exist is left to the discretion of the Galician diet.”⁸ In other words, the Ukrainians were placed at the mercy of the Poles. Given the plans that Polish patriots (many of whom were quite democratic) had for Galicia, their attitude toward Ukrainian national aspirations was naturally negative. Even more opposed to the Ukrainians were the “Podolians,” arch-conservative Polish landlords from Eastern Galicia who opposed the Ukrainians not only on political but also on socioeconomic grounds: for them, the assertion of Ukrainian rights was synonymous with growth of peasant demands. Thus, to the old social tensions between the Polish noble and the Ukrainian peasant was added the new, even-more-explosive conflict of national interests. This combination would make the Polish/Ukrainian confrontation in Galicia particularly bitter.

Initially, the Polish approach toward the Ukrainians (especially evident

among the conservative "Podolians") was to negate the existence of Ukrainians as a separate nation and to argue that they were merely a Polish subgroup. Hence, the statement of a Polish leader: "There are no Ruthenians; there is only Poland and Muscovy."⁹ When the upsurge of Ukrainian activity in 1848 made it difficult to maintain this position, a new line, formulated by Gołuchowski, was implemented. It called for discrediting the Ukrainians in Vienna, obstructing their national and social development by all means and at every level, and enforcing their Polonization.

The area in which these policies were pursued with special determination was education. After 1867, Polish replaced German as the language of instruction at Lviv University and in all the technical and vocational institutions. The secondary schools, or *gymnazia*, were also thoroughly Polonized; by 1914 there were ninety-six Polish and only six Ukrainian *gymnazia* in the province, that is, one for every 42,000 Poles and every 520,000 Ukrainians. In elementary schools there were three times as many classes available to Poles as to Ukrainians.

Discrimination against Ukrainians existed at every level. For example, in 1907 Polish cultural institutions received ten times as much financial support as did Ukrainian ones. When investments were made, they were usually funneled into the western, Polish part, of the province. At every turn, Ukrainians met not only disinterest but active opposition from the provincial government. They were forced to carry on a bitter, stubborn struggle for each institution, each position, each office, indeed, for each word of Ukrainian.

The all-pervasive, often petty, nature of this confrontation was exacerbated by the deep differences in mentality between Polish and Ukrainian leaders. While the outlook of the Polish intelligentsia bore the imprint of the gentry worldview, that of the Ukrainian intelligentsia was clearly plebian. As Ivan Lysiak Rudnytsky put it: "Every educated Ukrainian was only one or two generations removed from either a parsonage or a peasant hut." The one common trait in the worldviews of educated Poles and Ukrainians was, to quote Rudnytsky again, that "both communities viewed their conflict as if it were similar to the great 17th century wars between the Polish aristocracy and the Ukrainian Cossacks."¹⁰

The Ukrainian Response

If 1848 was a high point for the Ukrainians of Galicia, the 1860s were certainly a low point. Vienna's concessions to the Poles shocked and confounded Ukrainians. During the revolution of 1848 they had confronted the Poles as political equals; now they found themselves completely subordinated to them. For generations they had believed that their unswerving loyalty to the Habsburgs guaranteed them their backing, but in 1867 they painfully realized that this had been a false assumption. Taking stock of the new political situa-

tion in Galicia, the Ukrainian clergy-leadership, usually referred to as the Old Ruthenians, faced exceedingly bleak prospects. Not only did Vienna prove to be unreliable, but as a result its recent military and political defeats, its power and prestige had been greatly diminished. The Poles were stronger than ever. And among their own people, the Ukrainian leaders saw only an impoverished, illiterate mass of peasants. With their confidence badly shaken, they looked around for new sources of support.

The Russophiles In the 1860s the interest and hopes of many educated Ukrainians focused on Russia. This was not surprising, for at this time various Slavic peoples, such as the Czechs, Serbs, and Bulgarians, who were hard pressed by Germans or Ottomans, also looked to their fellow Slavs, the Russians, for help. For its own purposes, Russia encouraged these Slavophile tendencies by establishing cultural contacts with and providing subsidies to these "kindred" peoples. One of the first and most avid Russian cultural missionaries was Mikhail Pogodin, a noted conservative historian, who in 1835 visited Lviv and established contacts with the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Although at the time his pro-Russian exhortations had little impact, in the climate of the 1860s, they began to bear fruit.

An early convert to Russophilism in Galicia was Denys Zubrytsky, a historian and one of the few Ukrainian noblemen. His efforts and those of the indefatigable Pogodin helped attract other educated Ukrainians, most notably Iakiv Holovatsky, one of the members of the Ruthenian Triad, to this tendency. However, the crucial breakthrough for Russophilism in Galicia came in the late 1860s, when the so-called St George circle of Greek Catholic dignitaries in Lviv espoused its tenets. Thereafter, Russophilism spread rapidly among most of the clergy. Indeed, until the end of the 19th century, the priests served as its primary social base. With much of the West Ukrainian elite as its adherents, the Russophile tendency came to play a major role in the cultural and political life of Eastern Galicia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia.

Russophilism was attractive to the Old Ruthenians, not only because of Slavophile propaganda and disenchantment with the Habsburgs, but also because many of the veterans of 1848 believed that the only way they could withstand the Poles was to rely on Russia. Social psychology also played an important role. Even to the casual observer, it was evident that the Ukrainian clergy-elite suffered from an ethnic and social inferiority complex. Like every elite, it yearned for recognition and prestige. Yet Polish noblemen rarely failed to emphasize their social superiority over the Greek Catholic priests. Certainly the peasant nature of Ukrainian society and culture did not provide prestige and after the setbacks of the 1860s, Ukrainianism became even less appealing. Therefore, the opportunity to identify with the mighty tsar, the numerous Russian people and their flourishing culture addressed some of the clergy's deep-seated needs. There was also a pragmatic consideration:

given Austria's weakness and Russia's power, the possibility that the Russians would take over Galicia sooner or later seemed realistic and many educated Ukrainians thought it prudent to climb on the Russian "bandwagon" early.

The Russophilism of the Ukrainians differed from that of the Czechs and other Slavs in that it went much further in stressing the similarity, even the identicalness, of Ukrainians and Russians. According to its leading proponents, such as Bohdan Didytsky, Ivan Naumovych, Mykhailo Kachkovsky, and, in Transcarpathia, Adolf Dobriansky, the Ukrainians were one part of the tripartite Russian nation whose other two components were the Great Russians and Belorussians. The first public statement of this view came in 1866 when *Slovo*, the newspaper of the Old Ruthenian establishment, which was secretly subsidized by the Russian government, stated: "We can no longer separate ourselves by a Chinese wall from our brothers and reject the linguistic, literary, religious, and ethnic ties that bind us with the entire Russian world. We are no longer the Ruthenians of 1848; we are genuine Russians."¹¹

By retreating completely from the positions of 1848, the Old Ruthenians showed that they did not believe in their ability to stand on their own culturally and, even more so, politically. A popular saying caught the essence of their position: "If we are to drown," Russophiles frequently stated, "we prefer a Russian sea to a Polish swamp." Another ramification of this attitude was that the Old Ruthenians, in placing all their hopes on Russian support, concluded that it was pointless to mobilize the Ukrainian masses. Their policies, therefore, came to be characterized by passivity and inertia.

But the Old Ruthenians were not so bold as to reject the Habsburgs openly. While stressing their cultural ties with Russia, they were careful to declare, in the same *Slovo* article of 1866: "We are and always have been unwaveringly loyal to our august Austrian monarch and the illustrious Habsburg dynasty."¹² Some of them, notably the higher clergy, hedged even further, arguing that they were neither Russians nor Ukrainians but a separate Galician people. This muddled self-perception, as well as stress on localism, kowtowing to the powers that be, and attempts to identify with the mighty Russian Empire while reserving certain regional distinctions for themselves, was, of course, not a new phenomenon in Ukrainian history. Essentially, it was a West Ukrainian variant of the Little Russian (*maloros*) mentality that was widespread in Eastern Ukraine.

Among Ukrainians the impact of Russophilism was most clearly evident in the area of language. In line with their elitism, the Old Ruthenians adamantly refused to use the vernacular (or, "the tongue of swineherds and shepherds," as they referred to it) as a basis for a Ukrainian literary language. They wanted their language to have a recognized literary tradition and prestige. Therefore, Church Slavonic, the ancient language of the ecclesiastical texts, together with an admixture of Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian words, was used in their publications.

This unwieldy, artificial linguistic amalgam, or *iazzychie*, as it was called, may have been prestigious but it was also barely comprehensible, especially to the peasantry. Even educated Ukrainians who wrote in it, each according to his own haphazard rules, rarely spoke it, preferring the use of Polish. When asked why they used Polish, an Old Ruthenian responded that "because Little Russian is the language of the peasants and we do not know Russian, therefore we speak in the civilized language of the Poles."¹³ The linguistic detour of the Old Ruthenian Russophiles was a rejection of the literary principles that guided the Ruthenian Triad and of the open espousals of the vernacular that appeared in 1848. So adamant were the Russophiles in their opposition to the vernacular that they even welcomed the ban on Ukrainian publications in Russia in 1876. And it was on this issue of language that the earliest opposition, emanating from among Ukrainian students, developed against the Galician Russophiles.

It was no easy matter for the younger generation to do battle with their well-established elders. The Russophiles dominated almost all the Ukrainian institutions. The National Home, the well-endowed Stauropegian Institute, the publishing house of the Galician-Ruthenian *Matytsia*, as well as much of the press, including the largest newspaper, *Slovo*, were in their hands. In addition, in 1870 the Russophiles founded a political organization, the Ruthenian Council (Ruska Rada), which they claimed was the direct continuator of the Supreme Ruthenian Council of 1848, and they attempted to make it the sole representative of all Ukrainians in Galicia. Thus, even among its own elite, the Ukrainian movement had a determined and powerful opponent.

The Populists (Narodovtsi) In the pre-1848 period, it was the youth, led by the Ruthenian Triad, that espoused the use of the vernacular and, despite the backtracking of their elders, it was youth again that came to the defense of the spoken language in the 1860s. Like the Old Ruthenian Russophiles, many young West Ukrainians also looked to the east. But, while the older generation adulated the tsar, the youth was inspired by Shevchenko. It not only admired the beauty, vitality, and power that he drew from the language of the people, but it also shared his and many East Ukrainians' orientation to the peasantry (*narod*). Hence, the term *Narodovtsi* was commonly applied to the West Ukrainian Populists.

Besides the generational and ideological differences that separated the Russophiles and the Populists, there were also social distinctions. The former tended to be well-placed ecclesiastical and secular bureaucrats and other "solid citizens"; the latter consisted mostly of students, younger clergy, and the rising secular intelligentsia. Yet, one should not exaggerate the initial differences that separated these two emerging camps within the thin stratum of educated West Ukrainians. At the outset, their disagreements focused almost exclusively on linguistic and literary matters. Otherwise, adherents of

both groups shared similar values and backgrounds (frequently clerical) and they viewed their disagreements as a falling out among older and younger members of the same family.

External influences, however, gradually widened the gulf between the two factions. While Russophiles perused the works of conservative Slavophile Russian authors, the Populists avidly read the writings of Shevchenko, Kulish and Kostomarov. This literature drew the latter closer to the Ukrainophiles in Kiev. Especially after the anti-Ukrainian measures of 1863 and 1876, East Ukrainian authors began to publish increasingly in the journals of the Galician Populists. These contacts became even closer when Antonovych, Konysky and Kulish, visited Galicia and, for better or worse, became involved in West Ukrainian politics. Under the impact of the liberal East Ukrainians, the intellectual horizons of the provincial, church-bound West Ukrainians expanded somewhat. In the initial phase of this growing relationship, democratic and secular tendencies even predominated. But there were limits to the intellectual and ideological influence of the East Ukrainians on the Populists. When in the late 1870s the exiled Drahomanov attempted to convert them to his cosmopolitan, socialist and anticlerical thinking, they were repelled by his "godless anarchism." Many of the Populists were young rural clergymen who wanted to broaden their contacts with the village. Therefore, Populists were usually unwilling and unable to go far beyond the mentality of the village priest.

The consensus that emerged among the Populists rested, first and foremost, on the recognition of the Ukrainians as a separate nation that stretched from the Caucasus to the Carpathians and that best expressed itself in its own vernacular. They concluded that the most effective way of emphasizing and developing this national distinctiveness was to cultivate and propagate the use of the Ukrainian language. Therefore, to them the main national issue was the linguistic and literary one. This narrow approach precluded the possibility of addressing social problems, challenging the government, and even engaging in politics. In this respect, the Populists were the West Ukrainian variant of the Ukrainophiles in the Russian Empire. A further similarity was that the Populists, like the Ukrainophiles, had no foreign support, as did the Russophiles. Because they had to rely on their "own people," they were (theoretically) more democratic than their conservative Russophile rivals.

Almost all existing Ukrainian institutions, including the press, were controlled by the Russophiles – and the Populists had little access to them. The only solution was to create new ones. Surreptitiously – the Russophile hierarchy forbade seminarians to join Populist groups or to read their journals – the Populists formed several circles, foremost among them being *Moloda Rus'* established in Lviv in 1861. The main activity of these circles was the publication of journals, a flurry of which appeared in the 1860s: *Vechornytsi* (1862) popularized Shevchenko and reflected the influence of the St Petersburg

burg *Osnova; Meta* (1863–65) proclaimed its goal of educating a secular intelligentsia; *Nyva* (1865) and *Rusalka* concentrated on literature; and *Pravda* (1867–80) was a publication in which East Ukrainians often published their works and which served as an all-Ukrainian forum. Except for *Pravda*, these publications, which were edited by inexperienced young enthusiasts and lacked a broad readership and financial resources, quickly faded.

Meanwhile, a number of Populists worked on Ukrainian grammars and dictionaries. Another form of populist activity was the Ukrainian theater. Established in Lviv in 1864, it became, as in Russian-ruled Ukraine, an especially effective means of spreading national consciousness. In 1868 a group of about sixty Lviv students, led by Anatol Vakhnianyn, founded Prosvita, a society for “learning about and enlightening the people.” And in 1873, the aforementioned Shevchenko Literary Society was established in Lviv with the financial and moral support of East Ukrainians.

Despite this outburst of literary and cultural activity, it soon became obvious that the Populists had, in fact, little contact with the people. In addition to this realization, several other factors caused them to rethink their position. After the Ems Ukaz of 1876, contacts with the more experienced East Ukrainians suddenly increased. The political weakness of the Ukrainians in Galicia was dramatically demonstrated in 1879 when, under the leadership of Russophiles, they managed to send only three delegates to the provincial diet. By 1880, a new kind of leadership, consisting of secular intelligentsia, professors, and lawyers such as Iuliiian Romanchuk, Oleksander Ohonovsky, and the Barvinsky brothers, had emerged.

Under the impact of these developments, the Populists were willing to listen to at least one of Drahomanov’s admonitions: “The Poles have pushed you from the Galician diet; the Russophiles have forced you from your institutions ... we advocate that you give up your policy of compromises and mutual denunciations and go instead to the people and organize.”¹⁴ As for the Russophiles, Drahomanov advised against any contacts with them. The Populists took this counsel to heart. Those that belonged to Russophile institutions or student clubs resigned from them. In 1880 they established a mass-oriented newspaper, called *Dilo* (The Deed) in pointed contrast to the Russophiles’ *Slovo* (The Word). That same year they called the first mass meeting (*viche*) of Ukrainians to discuss the state and needs of Ukrainian society. About 2000 persons, including many peasants, attended. In 1885 Narodna Rada, a representative body, was founded.

The Radicals To some observers, even the new activism of the Populists was not enough to assure them a constructive and progressive role in Ukrainian society. As for the Russophiles, they were so hopelessly reactionary as to be beyond criticism. These, at least, were the views of Drahomanov. As a representative of the intellectually more sophisticated East Ukrainian intelli-

gentsia, the Geneva-based émigré was shocked by the low cultural level, the provincialism, and the pettiness of the Galicians. He opposed especially the predominant and, in his view, negative influence that the clergy exercised on Ukrainian life (in Eastern Ukraine, where the clergy was largely Russified, its impact on the Ukrainian movement was minimal). This committed socialist was incensed by the argument, repeated by many Galician priests in their sermons, that the poverty of the peasants was largely the result of their drunkenness and sloth. Convinced that the older generation of West Ukrainians (among which, in the 1870s and 1880s, he included the Populists) was too retrograde to rehabilitate, Drahomanov concentrated on developing contacts with Galician students.

In a series of epistles that appeared in the Galician student journal *Druh*, he urged the youth to reject the views of their elders, to broaden their intellectual horizons by familiarizing themselves with the best of European and Russian culture and science, and to commit themselves to aid the exploited masses with deeds, not merely words. Among a small but important segment of West Ukrainian youth, his message struck home, sparking what might be called an intellectual revolution. It led the members of this group to search for a third and socially more relevant way of defending the interests of the Ukrainians.

Drahomanov's first adherents came from Sich, the Ukrainian student club in Vienna. In the late 1870s, two student groups in Lviv, the Russophile Akademicheskii kruzhok and the Ukrainophile Druzhnyi lykhvar, began to espouse his ideas. Several small groups of *gymnazia* students in the provinces also declared their support. But the most important converts to Drahomanov's views were two gifted, energetic, and committed students of humble, peasant origins – Ivan Franko, who would become one of the finest Ukrainian writers, and Mykhailo Pavlyk. It was they who would lead the intellectual and ideological revolt, advocated by their Geneva-based mentor, against the narrow-minded, conservative thinking of the West-Ukrainian leadership.

In the time-honored tradition of the intelligentsia, the first harbinger of intellectual change was a journal. In 1876, Pavlyk and Franko took over editorial control of a Russophile student publication, *Druh*. They quickly discarded the *iazychie* it had used, adopted the Ukrainian vernacular, and began to attack the Russophiles. Soon afterward, they extended their criticism to the Populists, castigating them for their mediocre literary production and social conservatism. Shocked by the sharp criticism, radical tendencies, and anticlericalism of the editors, Galician Ukrainians began to cancel their subscriptions (readership dropped from about 500 to 260) and Drahomanov had to step in with financial support for the journal. Pavlyk also became involved in aiding socialist revolutionaries. And in 1878, to the glee of the Galician Ukrainian establishment, he and Franko were put on trial for subversive activities.

Although he received only a mild sentence, Franko was ostracized by Ukrainian society and had to turn to Polish socialists for support. Meanwhile,

new and younger converts to socialism, such as Viacheslav Budzynovsky, Mykola Hankevych, Stanislav Kozlovsky, and Kyrylo Trylovsky, appeared. As a result, a small but active left wing developed among the West Ukrainians in the 1880s. By 1890 these young activists, together with the "old veterans" Franko and Pavlyk, were ready to organize a political party. It would be the first Ukrainian political party in Western and Eastern Ukraine and its appearance (which preceded the East-Ukrainian RUP by a decade) would be symptomatic of the new and dynamic stage of development upon which the Galician Ukrainians had embarked.

The Organizational Upsurge

In modern times, the Ukrainians of Galicia earned a well-deserved reputation for their organizational skill and social discipline, especially in comparison with their compatriots in the east. One reason the Galician Ukrainians developed these traits was that they had the opportunity to practice them. Despite their disadvantages vis-à-vis the Poles, after 1861 the Ukrainians of Austria lived in a constitutional monarchy that allowed much greater freedom of association and expression than was possible in the Russian Empire.

A variety of other factors, however, also contributed to the organizational upsurge that occurred in Eastern Galicia in the late 19th and early 20th century. The West Ukrainians were directly exposed to such paragons of social discipline as the Germans and the Czechs. More immediate was the impact of the Poles who had embarked on a policy of "organic work," which called for the strengthening of their society by mobilizing and developing its economic and cultural resources. If the West Ukrainians wanted to compete with the Poles, it was obvious that they would have to adopt a similar approach. Hence, the slogan of the Populists: "Rely on your own resources." Finally, a new type of leadership, personified by the community activist, or *hromadskyi diiach*, arose among the Ukrainians in the 1880s. Consisting mostly of pedagogues and especially lawyers, it was both idealistic, committing itself wholeheartedly to the welfare of the people, and pragmatic, in that it understood the demands of modern society and sought to prepare the Ukrainian peasant to cope with them.

Educational and cultural achievements The harbinger of this new tendency was the Prosvita society, founded by the Populists in 1868. Committed to raising the cultural and educational level of the peasantry and, more specifically, increasing its literacy, the Lviv-based society, aided by village teachers and parish priests, gradually established a network of reading rooms and libraries throughout Eastern Galicia. In these, peasants were encouraged to read the press – often one literate villager would read to a group of his illiterate neighbors – and discuss political and social issues. The popularity of these reading

rooms was enhanced when, in time, choirs, theatrical groups, gymnastics societies, and cooperatives were formed in association with them. In fact, by the turn of the century they came to rival the church and the tavern as the hub of village life. As a result, they contributed greatly to the rise of political and national consciousness among the peasantry.

Thanks to the dedicated work of such leaders as Anatol Vakhnianyn and especially Oleksander Ohonovsky, by 1914 the Prosvita society had 77 regional branches, close to 3000 reading rooms and libraries, over 36,000 members in its Lviv branch, and about 200,000 members of the village reading rooms. Efforts were also made to organize the village youth. Using the highly successful Czech organizations as a model, gymnastics and firefighting societies called Sokil and Sich were established in 1894. The Radicals, especially Kyrylo Trylovsky, were especially active in this area.

Besides providing young peasants with an opportunity to take part in parades, these youth groups instilled in them an appreciation for discipline, cooperation, patriotism, and education. By 1914 they numbered 974 local branches with over 33,000 members. Organizational growth such as this demonstrated that the Populists were capable of making the transition from activity in ephemeral journals and the loose student groups of the 1860s to the systematic work and broadly based organizations that characterized the 1890s and the early 1900s. To compete with the Populists, the Russophiles established the Kachkovsky Society in 1874, but its membership was much smaller than that of its rivals.

The Galician leadership realized, somewhat belatedly, that in addition to the cultural needs of the peasantry, it would have to address economic issues as well. Given its social position and mentality, it showed little interest in the revolutionary approach, widespread in the Russian Empire, for alleviating economic inequalities. Instead it favored self-help, that is, the cooperative method of improving the plight of the peasants. An initial attempt to mobilize large numbers of peasants for their own welfare occurred in the 1870s, when the clergy launched a campaign to reduce drunkenness in the villages. The massive rallies and communal oath takings helped to reduce the consumption of alcohol, and the campaign became one of the church's most concrete social achievements.

It was, however, the secular intelligentsia that spearheaded attempts at economic improvement. At first, the Prosvita society sponsored cooperative stores, warehouses, and credit unions. But it could not provide the experienced help and specialized cooperatives that were needed. This need was addressed by Vasyl Nahirny, the pioneer of the West Ukrainian cooperative movement, who had spent a decade studying the well-organized cooperatives of Switzerland. In 1883 he organized the Narodna Torhivlia, a consumers' cooperative whose goal was to buy and sell products in large quantities, eliminate the middlemen, and pass on the savings to the villagers. By

means of his organization, Nahirny hoped to accustom Ukrainians to commercial activity.

Other cooperatives followed. In 1899 the Silskyi Hospodar, led by Evhen Olesnytsky, was founded to teach peasants modern methods of farming, and by 1913 it had over 32,000 members. Yet the most numerous cooperatives were the credit unions, some of which were organized as early as 1873. However, only in 1894, with the establishment of the Vira union, were they put on a stable and well-regulated footing. Charging about 10% for loans, these unions, which numbered in the hundreds, soon drove most moneylenders out of business. Another important economic institution emerged in 1895, when Dnister, an insurance company, was established in Lviv. By 1907, it had 213,000 policyholders. The growth of the cooperatives led to the organization, in 1904, of a central association of Ukrainian cooperatives that had about 550 institutional affiliates, mostly credit unions, and 180,000 individual members. On the fortieth anniversary of the founding of Prosvita in 1909, activists of the cooperative movement called a congress attended by 768 delegates – the vast majority of whom were young, secular intelligentsia – to plan for the further development of their nation. Reflecting unaccustomed optimism, many of the delegates voiced the opinion that the Ukrainians were finally gaining control over their own fate.

An important aspect of the cooperative movement as well as the work of the Prosvita society was that it encouraged the development of a close, harmonious relationship between the intelligentsia and the peasantry, something that the intelligentsia in Russian-ruled Ukraine had not been able to achieve. The fact that many members of the growing intelligentsia were themselves either directly from the village or a generation removed aided this process considerably. The success of the Populists in mobilizing the masses also meant that their ultimate victory over the Russophiles, whose cooperative membership was only about one-fifth as large as that of the Ukrainophiles, was assured. Finally, the growth of the cooperatives had serious repercussions for the Jewish community: the boycotts of alcohol, the credit unions, and consumer cooperatives badly hurt the Jewish tavern owners, moneylenders and shopkeepers, heightening tensions between Ukrainians and Jews and encouraging many of the latter to emigrate.

Growth in the urban environment Heartened by its organizational achievements among the peasantry, the intelligentsia also strove to strengthen its position in the more sophisticated urban environment. Education, especially on the secondary and university levels, became the focal point of its concern. As might be expected, Ukrainians were badly underrepresented on all educational levels. In the elementary schools, for example, they had only half as many classrooms and teachers as did the Poles. Disparities were even greater in the city-based *gymnazia* and university, where Poles did everything in their

power to prevent the growth of a Ukrainian educated elite. Thus, in 1897, of the 14,000 secondary-school students in the province, 80% were Poles and only 16% were Ukrainians (in 1854, before the Poles took over control of education, the proportions were roughly equal). While thirty *gymnazia* were Polish, only two were Ukrainian. At Lviv University, Ukrainians, concentrated mostly in the faculties of theology and law, constituted about 30% of its 1700 students. In 1911 in a faculty of about eighty, there were only eight Ukrainian professors. It was clear, therefore, that if they wished to raise their cultural level, the Ukrainians would have to gain greater access to higher education.

Because the establishment of each *gymnazium* required government approval, Poles and Ukrainians carried on a fierce political struggle over every school. By 1914 the latter managed to squeeze four more state-supported *gymnazia* from the government. The Poles, meanwhile, obtained several times as many secondary and vocational schools. Realizing that reliance on the government would not satisfy their needs, the Ukrainians turned to their own community and, by means of private contributions, founded eight more *gymnazia*. To help students, especially those from the village, to study in the expensive urban environment, numerous privately funded dormitories were established near the *gymnazia* and the university.

At Lviv University, as we shall see, the Poles were even more determined to maintain the "Polishness" of higher education. At times, however, they were forced to make concessions. Thus, in 1894, they grudgingly agreed, under pressure from Vienna, to create one more Ukrainian professorship (in history) at the university. Little did they know that this one appointment would have the impact of many. Because qualified candidates were lacking in Galicia, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the 28-year-old student of Antonovych in Kiev, was invited to assume the new post. With the arrival in Lviv of Hrushevsky, a new era began in Ukrainian scholarship.

This greatest of all Ukrainian historians quickly began the publication of his monumental *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* ("History of Ukraine-Rus'") with the express purpose of providing the idea of Ukrainian nationhood with historical legitimacy. Almost single-handedly Hrushevsky reorganized the Shevchenko Society into a de facto academy of sciences. The society soon united almost all the leading East and West Ukrainians and included many famous European scholars in its ranks. By 1913 it published, in addition to numerous other works, 120 volumes of its highly regarded *Zapysky*. Meanwhile, its excellent library and numerous subsections served as a training ground for a new generation of talented scholars.

There were also impressive achievements in literature, associated, first and foremost, with Ivan Franko, one of Ukraine's leading writers. Combining an unwincing, almost photographic perception of reality with an idealistic, optimistic belief in man's better instincts, Franko wrote in an extraordinary variety of genres – novels, narratives, psychological and social sketches, satires,

poems – and covered a broad range of subjects. Besides the obligatory tales of peasant misery, in his novels *Boa Constrictor* and *Boryslav Is Laughing*, he recreated the brutality in the lives of oil workers. His precisely drawn pictures of prison life appeared alongside psychologically perceptive and warm stories about children. And his deep understanding of sociology came through in sketches of the declining nobility and rising intelligentsia. Franko was also an excellent scholar, a courageous polemicist, and, as we have seen, a prominent political activist who was often misunderstood and mistreated by his own community.

Other West Ukrainian writers of note were Vasyly Stefanyk and Olha Kobylanska. The former was renowned for his short, powerful, and highly concentrated sketches of human tragedy as it occurred in the context of village life, while the works of the latter reflected a “longing for beauty” and an “aristocracy of the spirit.” In the arts, such noted painters as Oleksander Novakivsky and Ivan Trush and their many students received encouragement in their work, and were often sent abroad – thanks to the subsidies provided by the new metropolitan, Andrei Sheptytsky. Meanwhile, the world-famous singer Solomea Krushelnytska thrilled the operatic world with her performances, most notably that of Puccini’s *Madame Butterfly* whose success she ensured.

Another indication of the cultural and institutional growth of the Galician Ukrainians was a rapidly proliferating press. Under the able editorship of Oleksander Barvinsky, the Populist *Dilo*, founded in 1880, broke the Russophile dominance of the printed media and became the most influential and widely read Ukrainian newspaper. Not to be outdone, the Radicals and other ideological rivals of the Populists also established their own periodicals as did the various educational societies, professional associations, and religious and youth groups. By 1913 the West Ukrainians boasted eighty periodicals, sixty-six in Galicia and the remainder in Bukovyna and Transcarpathia.

Political parties As ideologies evolved, the organizational infrastructure grew, and the need for coordinated participation in the parliamentary system became more pressing, the stage was set for the rise of political parties that would replace the loose populist and Russophile groupings. Unlike the small, radical, underground parties in Russian-ruled Ukraine, the Galician parties developed openly, legally and – in their attempts to appeal to as many voters as possible – adopted a generally moderate tone. Another difference between East and West Ukrainian political parties hinged on the national issue. While the former agonized over its importance relative to socioeconomic concerns, the latter, even the most socialist among them, clearly stressed their membership in one, large Ukrainian nation, demanded equality with the Poles, and declared that their ultimate goal was independent statehood. The demand for independence was not surprising; other nationalities in the Habsburg empire had long since voiced similar aspirations. With the rising militancy of the West Ukrainians, it was only a matter of time before they would do the

same. Thus, in 1896 when the young Radical Iuliiian Bachynsky first openly advocated the union of all Ukrainians in an independent state in his book *Ukraina Irredenta*, his message had an electrifying effect on nationally conscious Ukrainians.

As we have seen earlier, it was the Radicals who, in 1890, formally constituted themselves into a political organization and thereby laid claim to being the first Ukrainian political party. Guided by Drahomanov and led by Franko and Pavlyk, they espoused "scientific socialism," adopted a critical stance toward the Greek Catholic clergy because of its social conservatism, and advocated cooperation with the Polish workers and peasants. In 1895 they "nationalized" their program by declaring that socialism could be achieved best, in the long run, in an independent Ukrainian state and, in the short run, in a fully autonomous Ukrainian province in the Austrian Empire. However, the enmity of the clergy, which blocked the Radicals from access to the village, the lack of a Ukrainian proletariat, dependence on Polish socialists, and factionalism prevented this dynamic, innovative party from obtaining a broadly based following in Galician society.

In 1899 a regenerated version of the Populists, led by Evhen Levytsky and Volodymyr Okhrymovych (and joined by Hrushevksy and Franko, who had left the quarreling Radicals), formed the National Democratic party. Formulating their program so as to appeal to disgruntled Radicals and disillusioned Russophiles, the National Democrats also made national independence their long-term goal, while autonomy, together with loyalty to the Habsburgs, was their short-range objective. In other respects, the party espoused a typically liberal platform and avoided controversial social issues. Its moderate stance and the backing of such populist organizations as Prosvita soon made the National Democrats the largest Ukrainian party in Galicia.

Two other parties appeared at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum. In 1899, the Marxists Mykola Hankevych and Semen Vityk founded a Social Democratic party to represent the interests of the Ukrainian workers. That same year, some of the clergy formed the Catholic-Ruthenian Alliance. However, both parties had little success because, in the first case, there were too few Ukrainian workers to provide the Marxists with a social base, and, in the second, most of the young Ukrainophile clergy was more attracted by the outspoken nationalism of the National Democrats than by the stodgy conservatism of the clerical party.

In order to attract peasant support, all the parties resorted to the *viche*, public gatherings called by party activists in the countryside to discuss and debate issues of general concern. Often peasants participated in these gatherings in large numbers. During the election campaign of 1905–06, for example, about 20,000 people came to a National Democratic *viche* – a telling indication of the growing political awareness spreading among the peasantry.

As the organizational and political strength of the Ukrainophiles grew, that

of the Russophiles declined. For the younger generation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and even for the semieducated peasants, the *iazychie* language was too artificial, the identification with the Russians too farfetched, the social conservatism of the Russophiles too reactionary, and their dependence on foreign support too demeaning. Russophile attempts to compete with the Ukrainophiles in organizational terms met with little success: in 1914, their Kachkovsky Society had only 300 reading rooms compared to the Prosvita's nearly 3000; while the Ukrainian cooperative union had over 900 institutional members, the analogous Russophile organization had 106. Matters were no better in politics. In 1913, thirty Ukrainophile delegates were sent to the Galician diet and only one Russophile.

Hoping to stem their decline, in 1900 the younger, more-aggressive generation of the Russophiles adopted a "new course" that called for total identification with Russia. They founded the Russian National party, obtained even greater subsidies from the tsarist government, and agitated for the conversion of Galician Ukrainians to Orthodoxy. In order to sow dissension among the Ukrainians, as well as to encourage conservatism, the Polish aristocrats in Galicia began to back the Russophiles. Consequently, the Russophile camp was preserved from complete disintegration largely because of support from tsarist officials and Polish landowners.

Eastern Galicia: a Ukrainian stronghold In 1907 the noted Polish-Jewish liberal Wilhelm Feldman wrote: "The 20th century has seen many nations rise from the ashes but there are few cases of rebirth so rapid and energetic as that of the Ukrainians of Austria ... their unexpected and vigorous growth is mostly the result of self-help and hard-fought gains."¹⁵ While Feldman did not mean to imply that the West Ukrainians had overcome all their troubles – they were still among the empire's poorest and politically most underrepresented peoples – he did stress that they were gaining momentum and quickly developing into a major force. As their organizations proliferated, the West Ukrainians demonstrated that they were finally taking charge of their own affairs and that their national movement was a broadly based, multifaceted phenomenon. In short, it was clear that if and when an opportunity for independent statehood appeared, the West Ukrainians would be ready to grasp it.

The burgeoning national activity in Galicia also had a major effect on relations between East and West Ukrainians. Actually, it was easterners, such as Antonovych, Konysky, Kulish and later Drahomanov and Hrushevsky, who first realized Galicia's potential for functioning as a Piedmont or base of national growth. As early as the 1860s they cooperated with Galician periodicals and financially supported West Ukrainian cultural institutions. As these publications and institutions grew, so, too, did the easterners' participation in them.

By the early 20th century, East Ukrainians were frequent correspondents

and subscribers to the Galician press; scholars and literary figures from both regions often worked together in the Shevchenko Society; students from Russian-ruled Ukraine frequently enrolled in Ukrainian summer courses in Galicia; and, especially after 1905, East Ukrainian émigrés often found refuge and established their headquarters in Lviv. As it observed Ukrainian life in the West, the repressed Ukrainian intelligentsia of the Russian Empire was greatly encouraged to see that what for itself was still a dream was turning into a reality in Galicia. Meanwhile, the Ukrainians of Galicia also benefited from the influx of first-rate intellectuals and from the inspiring feeling that they were not a small, isolated people of only about 4 million, but members of a large nation of 25 million. Thus – because of the rights guaranteed by the Austrian constitution, the pressure to organize in order to compete with the Poles, and the moral and intellectual support of the East Ukrainians – small, impoverished and backward Galicia emerged as a bastion of the Ukrainian national movement.

The Polish/Ukrainian Confrontation

As the political and national development of both Ukrainians and Poles quickened, relations between the two peoples went from bad to worse. On almost every major issue the interests of the two nationalities, at least as interpreted by their leaders, clashed: while the Poles were adamant about preserving the unity of Galicia so that it could serve as the basis of their future state, the Ukrainians demanded its division so that they could create their own base in the eastern part of the province; while in Eastern Galicia the Poles constituted the upper classes, the Ukrainians were identified with the lower. The Ukrainians demanded changes and reforms, while most of the Polish leadership defended the status quo. In short, the Poles were the “haves,” the Ukrainians were the “have-nots” who were unwilling to accept their status any longer.

Because of organizational growth within both nations, greater numbers of people were drawn into political activities and conflicts. No longer could the Poles be identified with a coterie of nobles or the Ukrainians with a handful of clerics and intelligentsia, in contrast to circumstances in 1848. By the early 20th century, as both sides mobilized their societies, the Polish/Ukrainian conflict grew from a struggle between two national elites into an increasingly menacing confrontation between two national communities.

There were, to be sure, attempts at compromise. Ukrainian and Polish socialists, such as Ivan Franko and Feliks Daszyński, castigated chauvinism on both sides and urged workers and peasants of all nationalities to cooperate for the sake of their mutual interests. East Ukrainians, like Antonovych and Kulish, fearful that the conflict might jeopardize their haven in Galicia, tried to mediate between the antagonists. At times, Vienna attempted to arrange

a settlement, hoping to cool tensions on its sensitive eastern borderland. Of the several attempts to reach a compromise, the most publicized was the so-called new era of political peace that was to begin in 1890. As a result of an agreement arranged between the Populists, led by Iulian Romanchuk and Oleksander Barvinsky, on the one hand, and the Galician government represented by the governor-general, Casimir Badeni, on the other, the Ukrainians were to receive concessions (primarily in the cultural and educational fields) in return for their recognition of the political status quo. However, when these concessions were limited to a few new *gymnazia*, and the provincial government continued to manipulate the elections, the agreement broke down and both sides returned to political warfare. Later efforts to reach an understanding, such as the one in 1908, ended similarly.

In the decades preceding the First World War, the Polish/Ukrainian confrontation focused on three main issues: the peasant question, the university controversy, and the demands for electoral reforms. Highlighted by the extraordinarily low wages agrarian workers received on large estates, the peasant question was a perennial problem. By 1900, many peasants were no longer willing to consider emigration as the sole solution to their difficulties. In 1902, in the midst of the harvest season, the peasants (urged on by the Radicals and, somewhat belatedly, by the National Democrats – but criticized by the Russophiles), launched a massive boycott involving over 100,000 agricultural workers of the large estates in Eastern Galicia. Numerous local committees helped to coordinate the strike and to maintain discipline and calm among the participants.

Shocked by this unexpectedly effective demonstration of peasant solidarity, landlords called on the government to “restore order.” Despite the arrest of hundreds, the strikers persevered. The landlords then turned to Polish public opinion with the argument that the strike was actually a Ukrainian attempt to push Poles from their hereditary lands. Thus, an issue that might have united Ukrainian peasants with similarly exploited Polish ones was used with notable success to heighten the national animosities between them. Eventually, the strike ended with a victory for the peasants. The landlords were forced to raise wages and make other concessions. Its broader significance, however, was that it activated many peasants and drew them into the political struggle.

Even more intense, if less widespread, was the conflict at Lviv University. After 1848, Vienna had planned to make the university bilingual – but when the Poles gained control they quickly moved to Polonize the institution. Gradually, the use of Ukrainian, even by professors, was limited and the “Polishness” of the university repeatedly emphasized. Infuriated, Ukrainian students throughout the 1890s mounted a series of protests aimed at reversing this trend. When their protests were ignored, the students raised the demand for the creation of a separate Ukrainian university. The idea caught the

imagination of Ukrainian society, including peasants, and large public gatherings were called to support the student demands. Meanwhile, in the Galician diet and the Viennese parliament, Ukrainian delegates repeatedly and vehemently demanded government action on the issue.

But the Poles persisted with their previous policies and, in the initial decade of the 20th century, the situation at Lviv University turned ugly. Gangs of Ukrainian and Polish students, armed with clubs, fought pitched battles in lecture halls; in 1901 Ukrainian students resigned en masse from the university; in 1907 large demonstrations were organized against university authorities; and in 1910, during a fierce melee, a Ukrainian student, Adam Kotsko, was shot and killed. By now Vienna realized that it had to act, and in 1912 it promised that a separate Ukrainian university would be established within five years. The outbreak of war, however, deprived the Ukrainians of this long-sought-after prize.

Yet it was electoral reform that, in the view of the Ukrainian leadership, seemed to be the issue of greatest importance. For if Ukrainians could win fairer representation in the Galician diet and Viennese parliament, they would be in a much better position to improve their lot. The curial system greatly limited the impact of the Ukrainian vote and the Polish-controlled provincial government was notorious for its heavy-handed manipulation of election results. Manipulation occurred in a variety of ways: voter lists were falsified, the time and place of elections were changed only hours before they were to occur, voting boxes were pilfered (an easy matter because Ukrainians did not have vote-counters), and Ukrainian candidates were often jailed on petty charges to prevent them from campaigning. Electoral abuses reached a high point during the "bloody elections" of 1895 and 1897 that took place during the tenure of Badeni, often called "the iron governor." When Ukrainian peasants protested against the unfair practices, Badeni set the police against them with the tragic result that 10 were bayoneted to death, 30 severely wounded, and over 800 arrested.

But in this area, too, improvements were on the way. At first Vienna and then, in 1907 – after much obstruction and resistance on the part of the Polish leadership – Galicia abolished the curial system and introduced universal suffrage. Although the provincial government still practiced electoral fraud, the number of Ukrainian delegates to both the Viennese parliament and the Galician diet rose steadily thereafter. In 1879 the Ukrainians had three representatives in the former body and after the 1907 election they had twenty-seven; in the Galician diet they had thirteen in 1901 and thirty-two in 1913. Nevertheless, Ukrainians still remained underrepresented, in large part because of the electoral chicaneries of Galician governors.

In protest against these malpractices, Myroslav Sichynsky, a young Ukrainian student, assassinated the governor, Andrzej Potocki, on 12 April 1908. The incident reflected the dangerous point to which Polish/Ukrainian rela-

tions had come. There were, however, more deeply rooted reasons for the rising tensions. Among the Poles, an ultranationalist movement, led by the Polish National Democratic party of Roman Dmowski, was rapidly gaining influence. The Polish National Democrats, like the Ukrainian National Democrats, established a network of organizations among the peasantry and gained great popularity among the urban middle classes, intelligentsia, and students. Their major concern was the growing Ukrainian challenge to Polish control in Eastern Galicia, a foreboding that echoed in the words of the noted Polish social historian Franciszek Bujak: "Our outlook in Eastern Galicia is not promising. The fate of the English in Ireland and the Germans in Czech lands ... is a bad prognosis for us."¹⁶ Therefore, a primary concern of the Polish nationalists in Galicia was the retention of the Polish "state of possession" in the eastern part of the province. This meant that it was no longer the "Podolians," a coterie of East Galician nobles, who confronted the Ukrainians but a broadly based Polish movement that stubbornly refused to grant any concessions.

Led by their own National Democrats, the Ukrainians responded with equal militancy. They energetically continued their organizational work, confronted the Poles in parliament and the diet on every occasion, and held frequent rallies to demonstrate their growing strength. On 28 June 1914, during a massive rally in Lviv at which thousands of Sich and Sokil members performed drills and gymnastic exercises before a huge and appreciative audience, a messenger rushed up to the podium full of dignitaries with the momentous news that the Habsburg Archduke Ferdinand had been assassinated in Sarajevo. Europe was about to plunge into a horrendous war of conflicting nationalisms.

Bukovyna and Transcarpathia

While 80% of West Ukrainians lived in Galicia, the remaining 20% inhabited the two small regions of Bukovyna and Transcarpathia. In certain respects, the life of Ukrainians in these two regions was similar to that of their compatriots in Galicia. The Ukrainians of Bukovyna and Transcarpathia were overwhelmingly peasants; the landowning elites consisted of non-Ukrainians – Romanians in Bukovyna and Hungarians in Transcarpathia. Very few Ukrainians lived in the sleepy towns, which were largely the domain of Germans and Jews; and industry was practically nonexistent. Like Galicia, both Bukovyna and Transcarpathia were internal colonies of the Austrian heartland. Yet in other ways the situation differed notably from the one that prevailed in Galicia.

In Bukovyna, which in 1861 had been separated from Galicia and formed into a separate province, the approximately 300,000 Ukrainians – about 40% of the total population – lived in the hilly northern areas. The remainder of

the population consisted of Romanians (34%), Jews (13%), Germans (8%), and other minorities. Of all the West Ukrainians, the Bukovynian peasants were the best off in terms of landholdings, mainly because the large Romanian landholders did not have the vast influence in Vienna that Poles or Hungarians had. Since it was the policy of Vienna to use the Ukrainians as a counterbalance to the Romanians, the former did have some political leverage. By the late 19th century, this influence resulted in a well-organized Ukrainian school system, access to the university at Chernivtsi, and relatively favorable political opportunities. But there was also a barrier to national and political development. The Bukovynians, like the Romanians, were Orthodox and the hierarchy of the church was largely in Romanian hands. Therefore, unlike in Galicia, the church could not and did not play a major role in the development of Ukrainian national identity in Bukovyna, and the process of nation-building was quite belated in that region.

When that process actually began in the 1870s and 1880s, it was greatly influenced by the proximity of Galicia and the influx of Galician intelligentsia. In 1869 the Ruthenian Society was established in Chernivtsi to promote native culture. One year later, the Ruthenian Council, a political group, was founded to represent the Ukrainians in elections. Originally Russophiles dominated these groups but they were never very strong in Bukovyna. By the 1880s, Ukrainophiles, such as the Galician Stepan Smal-Stotsky (professor of Ukrainian language and literature at Chernivtsi University) and Baron Mykola Vasylo (a wealthy local landowner), took over the leadership of the Bukovynian Ukrainians. Local branches of the Galician National Democrats, Radicals, and Social Democrats soon appeared in the region. The Ruthenian Society, functioning in a manner similar to Prosvita, attracted about 13,000 members by 1914. Meanwhile, a compromise was reached in 1911 with the other nationalities, whereby the Ukrainians were guaranteed seventeen of the sixty-three seats in the provincial diet. In the Vienna parliament, the Bukovynian Ukrainians usually had a respectable five seats. Thus, because of Vienna's more balanced policies in Bukovyna, political compromise was more feasible and national tensions more muted than in Galicia.

In Transcarpathia, in contrast to Bukovyna, there could be no talk of compromise. The Hungarians totally controlled the region, especially after 1867, and Hungarian aristocrats exploited the peasantry at will, while Hungarian nationalists stifled local patriotism in any manner they saw fit. Thus, in almost every respect, the approximately 400,000 Transcarpathians who constituted about 70% of the total population of the region were the most disadvantaged of all West Ukrainians.

The national development of the Transcarpathians also suffered serious setbacks. Immediately after 1848, under the leadership of Adolf Dobriansky and Aleksander Dukhnovych, they gained some influential administrative positions and schools in their native language. But the rise of Russophilism, en-

gendered by the arrival of Russian armies in Hungary in 1848 to put down the oppressive Hungarians, enveloped the small intelligentsia and the Greek Catholic clergy and created a cultural gap between them and the peasantry. After 1867, when the pressure of Magyarization became intense, much of the educated class – lacking a popular base – quickly gave in and became Hungarians or “magyarones” as they were called. The Greek Catholic church, based in the bishoprics of Prešov and Mukachiv, not only failed to halt this process but encouraged it. And because Transcarpathia was isolated from Galicia by the tightly controlled Hungarian/Austrian boundary as well as by traditionally weak contacts, Ukrainophile tendencies could not evolve as they did in Bukovyna. Thus, in the final decades of the 19th century, one Slavic periodical after another disappeared in the region, the number of schools teaching in the vernacular declined from 479 in 1874 to none in 1907, and the Society of St Basil (devoted to fostering cultural growth) barely survived. Only a handful of young populists, such as Iurii Zhatkovych and Avhustyn Voloshyn, attempted to resist the trend toward Magyarization.



When Ukrainians from the Russian Empire visited Galicia in the early years of the 20th century, they were invariably struck by the progress their western compatriots had made. In Kiev it was still forbidden to publish a book in Ukrainian, but in Lviv one found Ukrainian learned societies, schools, headquarters of mass organizations and cooperatives, newspapers, political parties, and parliamentary representatives. In Russian-ruled Ukraine, the Ukrainian intelligentsia still gathered in small, urban-based *hromady* to pursue scholarly, esoteric projects, but the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Galicia and Bukovyna (most of which had emerged only recently from the village) worked closely with the peasantry in Prosvitas, cooperatives, and political parties. Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of the the West Ukrainian experience was that it showed that aspirations and hopes for Ukrainian national development were not simply pipe dreams of idealistic intellectuals but something which could be transformed into reality.

Impressive though it was, the progress of the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovyna should not be exaggerated. Despite their efforts, West Ukrainians as a whole were still mired in poverty; illiteracy was widespread; and the national consciousness of many peasants was practically nil. Moreover, within the tiny, educated elite there were sharp differences between Ukrainophiles and Russophiles – and also among liberals, conservatives, and radicals – about which direction their society should take. Nonetheless, on the eve of the First World War, a sense of optimism was palpable among the West Ukrainians.

This page intentionally left blank



In Search of Work. M. Kuznetsov (1882)



Village Wedding. I. Izhakevych (1896)




West Ukrainian town dwellers

OPPOSITE

top: Ukrainian peasant women at work, late 19th century

bottom: The proletariat: steel workers in Luhansk, late 19th century





Marketplace in Lviv, St George Cathedral in background, early 19th century

Opera house in Odessa, late 19th century





Ivan Kotliarevsky




Volodymyr Antonovych

Mykhailo Drahomanov



Lesia Ukrainka



Taras Shevchenko, after his return from exile

This page intentionally left blank

Part Five

Twentieth-Century Ukraine



This page intentionally left blank

War and Revolution

The First World War was Europe's first shocking experience with modern mass warfare. Even a few statistics reflect the mind-boggling dimensions of this widespread conflict: the thirty-four countries that eventually participated in the war mobilized 65 million soldiers of whom 10 million died and over 20 million were wounded. Civilian casualties were almost as high. Not only was the war massive, but it was total. Entire societies and their economies were harnessed to support the huge armies at the front. But as the losses mounted, the tremendous pressures they created, both at the battlefield and at home, exposed and aggravated the fatal political and socioeconomic weaknesses of Europe's old imperial order. Consequently, for the German, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian empires, which constituted the Central Powers, and for the Russian Empire, which, together with Britain, France, and America was a member of the Entente, the war eventually became an exercise in self-destruction.

The Russian Empire was the first to collapse under the impact of the war. Not unexpectedly, its demise was accompanied by the rapid rise of various Russian parties that had long opposed the tsarist regime and now attempted to impose their models of a new socioeconomic and political order on the disoriented society. But to the surprise of many, the former empire's apparently docile non-Russian nationalities also demanded to arrange their affairs as they saw fit. As a result, the common view of the revolution of 1917 as a titanic class struggle in Russia is inadequate for an understanding of what happened in Ukraine; there, a Ukrainian revolution occurred, and it was national as well as socioeconomic in nature.



Ukrainians in the First World War

For the Ukrainians, who had to fight for both of the warring sides, the impact

of the war was immediate, direct, and devastating. Throughout the struggle Galicia was the scene of the biggest, bloodiest battles fought on the Eastern front. Its populace suffered terribly from the destruction and dislocation that resulted from the fighting, as well as from the brutal wartime administrations of both the Russians and the Austrians.

But along with the physical damage, the war highlighted and exacerbated the plight of peoples, such as the Ukrainians, who had no state of their own to protect their specific interests. Vast numbers of Ukrainians – the Russian army alone had 3.5 million Ukrainian soldiers and 250,000 served in the Austrian forces – fought and died for empires that not only ignored their national interests but, in the case of Russia, actively sought to destroy their national movements. Worse still, as combatants on opposing sides, Ukrainians were forced to kill each other. The only positive aspect of the war was the possibility that it would weaken the warring empires and thus create new political opportunities for their repressed subjects. But at the outset at least, this possibility was too remote to be treated seriously.

The Ukrainians in Austria reacted quickly to the outbreak of hostilities. On 3 August 1914, all their parties formed the General Ukrainian Council (Zahalna Ukraïnska Rada) in Lviv, headed by the respected parliamentarian Kost Levytsky, for the purpose of providing Ukrainians with a single, united representative body. Declaring that “the victory of the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy will be our victory and the greater the defeat of Russia, the sooner will come the hour of Ukrainian liberation,” the council called on Ukrainians to fight for constitutional Austria (their best friend) against autocratic Russia (their worst enemy).¹ Shortly after its formation, the council issued a call for volunteers for an all-Ukrainian military unit. Over 28,000 nationally conscious young men responded, many of them members of the Sich, Sokil, and Plast organizations. Worried by the prospect of large Ukrainian military units, influential Poles in Vienna saw to it that only 2500 men were accepted for service in the Ukrainian Legion (later the name was changed to Ukrainian Sich Riflemen – Ukraïnski Sichovi Striltsi), as the new unit was called. This was the first Ukrainian military formation in modern times. The vast majority of the other Ukrainians who served on the Habsburg side were inducted into regular Austrian units.

The socialist émigrés from Russian-ruled Ukraine also formed a political organization in Lviv in order to act as (self-appointed) spokesmen for their compatriots under tsarist rule. An important, even historic, feature of this organization, called the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukrainy – svU) and led by Volodymyr Doroshenko, Andrii Zhuk, Marian Melenevsky, Oleksander Skoropys-Ioltukhovsky, and Mykola Zalizniak, was that it was the first group that unequivocally announced that its goal was the formation of an independent Ukrainian state. To achieve its purpose, the svU resolved to cooperate with Germany and Austria against Russia.

But even before these organizations began to function, they were forced to flee to Vienna when the advancing Russian armies broke through Austrian defenses and occupied much of Eastern Galicia by early September. This Austrian setback had terrible repercussions for the Ukrainians of Galicia. Looking for excuses for their defeats, Austrian and Hungarian commanders turned a willing ear to accusations made by the Polish provincial administration that their defeat was due to the "treachery of the Ukrainians," who allegedly secretly sympathized with and aided the Russians. As a result, the retreating Habsburg armies, and most notably the Hungarian troops, unleashed a reign of terror among the Ukrainian populace. Initially, Russophiles (but later Ukrainians in general) were arrested by the hundreds and executed without trial. Thousands more were hauled off to Austria, where they were interned in concentration camps. The most notorious of these was Talerhof, where 30,000 Russophiles and Ukrainophiles were kept in squalid conditions and thousands died of disease until the parliament in Vienna, scandalized by this treatment of Austrian citizens, ordered it and the other camps disbanded in 1917.

The fate of Galician Ukrainians who were subjected to Russian occupation was also unenviable. The tsarist government quickly made it clear that it did not consider Eastern Galicia to be a new or temporary acquisition, but rather referred to it as an "ancient Russian land" that was now "reunited forever with Mother Russia." It then set about to transform the myth of Galicia's "Russianness" into a reality. Count Georgii Bobrinsky, a brother of an influential Russian conservative who had long advocated acquisition of Galicia, was appointed governor-general and immediately began a concerted attack on the Ukrainian movement, or "Mazepism" as it was called by tsarist officials. He was enthusiastically supported by the Russophiles, whose leaders, such as Volodymyr Dudykevych, Semeon Bandasiuk, and Iulian Iavorsky, had earlier fled to Russia and now returned with the victorious Russian armies. Russophiles identified and denounced Ukrainian activists (just as the latter had denounced the former to the Austrians a few weeks earlier), who were then arrested and deported deep into Russia. Thus, as Russians persecuted Ukrainophiles and Austrians repressed Russophiles, the mutual denunciations of Galicia's ideologically divided Ukrainians exacerbated their already sorry plight.

On the orders of the tsarist administration, all Ukrainian cultural institutions, cooperatives, and periodicals were shut down. Limits were placed on the use of Ukrainian and efforts were made to introduce Russian into the educational system. The Greek Catholic church, a hallmark of West Ukrainian uniqueness, was attacked with special vigor. Hundreds of Greek Catholic priests were exiled to Russia and replaced by their Orthodox counterparts who urged peasants to convert to Orthodoxy. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, who refused to flee before the Russians, was arrested and exiled to



Map 19 Ukraine in the First World War

Suzdal, north of Moscow. His brave and inspiring behavior throughout the war added greatly to his growing popularity. But before all the Russian plans could be fully implemented, the Austrians counterattacked and by May 1915 recovered most of Eastern Galicia. As the tsarist troops retreated, they took with them as hostages several hundred leading Ukrainians, as well as thousands of evacuees, including many Russophiles whose role in Ukrainian politics now came to an end.

The Russian treatment of Galician Ukrainians, which Pavel Miliukov, the noted Russian statesman, denounced in the Duma as a "European scandal," was consistent with the attitude of the tsarist government toward the Ukrainian movement in the Russian Empire. At the outbreak of war, almost all Ukrainian organizations and newspapers were repressed. When Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the acknowledged leader of the Ukrainians, returned to Kiev in 1916, he was arrested and exiled to the Russian north. With undisguised relish, Sergei Sazonov (the tsar's foreign minister) noted at this time: "Now is exactly the right moment to rid ourselves of the Ukrainian movement once and for all."² However, after its disastrous losses in 1915, the tsarist government lost some of its confidence and softened its tone somewhat. Cautiously, Ukrainian cooperatives, bookstores, scholarly societies, and several newspapers in the Russian Empire began to function again. A semisecret Ukrainian political organization, the Society of Ukrainian Progressives (Tovarystvo Ukraïnskykh Progresystiv – ТУП), resumed its work as the coordinating body of the Ukrainian movement and agitated for constitutional government in the empire and autonomy for Ukraine.

Meanwhile, on the Austrian side of the front, West Ukrainian politicians gathered in Vienna in May 1915 and reestablished their representative body, the General Ukrainian Council. As the war dragged on and Austria-Hungary weakened, the nationalities of the empire, Ukrainians included, grew bolder in their demands. Thus, the General Ukrainian Council announced that its goals were independence for Russian-ruled Ukraine, which it hoped would be conquered by the Austrians, and broad autonomy for Eastern Galicia and Bukovyna. However, when in 1916 Vienna promised the Poles even greater powers in Galicia, the council resigned in protest. Thereafter, the Ukrainian Parliamentary Club in the Vienna parliament, headed by Evhen Petrushevych, represented West Ukrainian interests.

The East Ukrainian émigrés of svu, supported by German and Austrian funds, also carried on their work in Vienna. Their organization dispatched representatives to many European capitals to propagate the cause of Ukrainian independence. Although producing few concrete results, the work of svu with hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian prisoners in Austrian and German captivity, about 50,000 of whom were placed in separate camps, not only raised the soldiers' national consciousness but led to the creation of the so-called Greycoat and Bluecoat divisions that would later fight for the Ukrain-

ian cause. Thus, as the war dragged on, it was clear that the Ukrainians, like other nationalities, were becoming steadily more aggressive in pursuing their own interests and less willing to concern themselves with the fate of the empires that had ruled them for centuries.

By 1917 almost all the combatants in the war were on the verge of exhaustion. But tensions were especially acute in Russia, where the strain of total warfare was compounded by the weaknesses and blunders of an inflexible, corrupt, and backward regime led by the ineffectual Nicholas II. Of all the participants in the war, Russia had the highest military casualties, with over 8 million men killed, wounded, or captured. These horrendous losses caused much bitterness because they had often been the result of careless mistakes on the part of inept commanders who had been appointed by the tsar. Meanwhile, the extent of the corruption and inefficiency in the Russian bureaucracy and among Russian industrialists was demonstrated in the fact that hundreds of thousands of soldiers had been sent against the enemy without even guns or ammunition. Even more widespread were the strains that the war and governmental blundering imposed on the society as a whole. With about half of all able-bodied men drafted into military service, the production of food and finished goods declined and prices rose drastically. Hunger became commonplace, especially among workers in the cities, and as strikes multiplied, a sense of disillusionment spread among the people.

The Russian Revolutions

There were two Russian revolutions in 1917. The first, called the February Revolution, was more of a collapse than an uprising. It began innocuously enough when on 8 March, Petrograd workers went on strike to protest food shortages. But when they were ordered to fire on civilians, the tsarist troops went over to the side of the workers. Within days, much of the capital's garrison did the same. Meanwhile, the population of the city poured into the streets in a show of solidarity with the strikers. It became suddenly apparent that the tsarist government was almost entirely bereft of popular support. As demonstrations spread throughout the empire, Nicholas II abdicated, his ministers and officials dispersed, and the hated police went into hiding. By 12 March, the tsarist regime had crumbled like a house of cards.

Although bringing tsardom down had been surprisingly easy, finding a generally acceptable substitute proved to be incredibly difficult. Two claimants to political authority emerged. One was the Provisional Government, which was formed from liberal members of the Duma and which sought to perform a caretaker role until Russia established some permanent new form of government. With the administration in shambles and the police almost completely dispersed, the Provisional Government had little effective power, despite the fact that it was widely recognized at home and abroad. More-

over, it was saddled with the burden of carrying on the unpopular war. The Provisional Government's rival from the outset was the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Dominated by socialists, among whom the Bolsheviks were initially only a minority, the Petrograd Soviet (council) was an ad hoc assembly of radical intelligentsia, workers, and soldiers that was quickly duplicated throughout the country. Its goal was to "deepen" the revolution by pushing it into a complete transformation of society along socialist lines. As these two bodies constantly clashed, contradicted, and obstructed each other, confusion spread about who possessed ultimate authority in the former empire.

Indeed, this confusion soon became an all-pervasive fact of life in revolutionary Russia. For many, most notably the soviets, the demand for change, which had been sanctified by the revolution, justified an attack on many previously commonly accepted principles and institutions. For example, on 14 March, the Petrograd Soviet issued the notorious Order Number One (which the Provisional Government failed to block) whereby military units were authorized to establish democratically elected councils to run their affairs. The authority of officers was limited to battle situations. This order effectively undermined the already shaky discipline of the army and, as a consequence, it began to disintegrate. By the summer, as millions of armed, demoralized, and radicalized soldiers deserted the front and streamed homeward, public order collapsed. As one observes the often lamentably inadequate attempts to establish and maintain political authority in those chaotic times, it ought to be remembered that those who tried to do so faced a dilemma akin to striving to erect a structure while the ground constantly gave way underneath.

The Revolution in Ukraine

News of the tsarist regime's collapse reached Kiev on 13 March 1917. Within days, representatives of the city's major institutions and organizations formed an Executive Committee which was to maintain order and act as an extension of the Provisional Government. Meanwhile, the Kiev Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies became the center of the radical left. But, unlike in Petrograd, a third player entered the scene in Kiev: on 17 March the Ukrainians established their own organization, the Central Rada (*rada* means "council" in Ukrainian; the Russian equivalent is *soviet*). It was created by the liberal moderates from ТУР, led by Evhen Chykalenko, Serhii Efremov, and Dmytro Doroshenko, together with the Social Democrats headed by Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura. A few weeks later, the new, burgeoning Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary party, represented by Mykola Kovalevsky, Pavlo Khrystiuk, and Mykyta Shapoval, also joined the Central Rada. The well-known and highly respected Hrushevsky, on his way back from exile, was elected president of the Central Rada. Thus, in contrast to the Russians in Kiev who were split between the moderates of the Executive

Committee and the radicals of the Soviet, Ukrainians of all ideological persuasions were united in a single representative body.

To the surprise of many, the Central Rada generated immediate and growing support. In Petrograd and Kiev, Ukrainians staged huge parades to publicize their cause and demonstrate their backing for the Central Rada. On 19 April a Ukrainian National Congress was held in Kiev. Attended by 900 delegates from all over Ukraine, from Ukrainian communities throughout the former empire, and from various economic, educational, military, and welfare organizations, it formally elected 150 representatives to the Central Rada and reaffirmed Hrushevsky's leadership. On 18 May, when over 700 delegates of Ukrainians serving in the army met in Kiev, they instructed their representatives to join the Central Rada. About a month later, close to 1000 delegates at the Ukrainian Congress of Peasants did likewise. Afterwards, the Congress of Workers also joined the Central Rada. Elated by this show of confidence, the Central Rada began to view itself not merely as the representative of the relatively few nationally conscious Ukrainians but as the parliament of Ukraine.

For the most part, the social background of the Central Rada's most avid supporters was, to use a term favored by Marxists, *petit bourgeois*: it consisted of intelligentsia and the so-called half-intelligentsia – village teachers, lower clergy, petty bureaucrats, *zemstvo* officials, junior officers, and well-to-do peasants. Based mostly in the countryside, these people were motivated not only by the Ukrainophile intelligentsia's traditional concerns about preserving and developing Ukrainian culture, but also by the pragmatic belief that a government closer to home would be more responsive to their needs. The Ukrainian peasant believed that the Central Rada would be more effective than a government in far-off Petrograd in helping him obtain more land, while the Ukrainian soldier hoped it would get him out of the war more quickly than a Russian government could.

There were, however, also social and ethnic groups in Ukraine that wanted no part of the Central Rada. Russian conservatives and even moderates feared that the growing Ukrainian political presence might lead to the disintegration of "one and indivisible Russia." Russian radicals, for their part, suspected that the Ukrainian national movement might break up the "unity of the working class." And Jews, many of whom identified with Russian culture and were active in Russian socialist parties, also looked askance at the Central Rada. Thus, much of Ukraine's small but strategically located urban minority was greatly disturbed by the unexpected rise of the Central Rada.

But as the limitations of the Provisional government's power became more obvious, the Central Rada decided to press its advantage. Intent on gaining recognition as the highest political authority in Ukraine, on 23 June it issued its First Universal (manifesto), which proclaimed: "Let Ukraine be free. Without separating entirely from Russia, without severing connections with the Russian state, let the Ukrainian people have the right to order their own

lives in their own land.”³ Shortly thereafter, the Central Rada announced the formation of the General Secretariat, which was to function as the executive branch of government. Headed by Vynnychenko and composed of eight ministries, most of which were held by Social Democrats, the General Secretariat took over responsibility for the administration of Ukraine.

These measures infuriated the Russians in Ukraine and the Provisional Government in Petrograd. In mid July, the latter sent a delegation, led by Aleksander Kerensky, to Kiev to negotiate. But weakened by the disastrous failure of its offensive in Galicia, the Russians were forced, although with strong qualifications, to recognize the General Secretariat as the administration of five Ukrainian provinces (Kiev, Poltava, Podilia, Volhynia, and Chernihiv). This recognition marked the high point of the Central Rada’s influence and authority.

On the promise of far-ranging cultural autonomy, Russian and Jewish parties in Ukraine reluctantly agreed to join the Central Rada. At this point, the Central Rada consisted of 822 seats, about one-fourth of which were held by Russian, Jewish, Polish, and other non-Ukrainian parties. Ideologically, it leaned heavily to the left. With an agreement, albeit shaky, reached with both the Provisional Government and the minorities, the Central Rada was now free to take on the task of governing.

The Central Rada, however, was soon found sorely lacking in leadership. When the Provisional Government attempted to back away from its recognition of Ukrainian autonomy, the Central Rada wasted its time in endless debates about the extent of its authority – neglecting in the process such pressing problems as the maintenance of law and order, the provisioning of the cities, and the functioning of the railroads. It also failed to address effectively the burning issue of land redistribution. Consequently, the initial unity that the Ukrainians had exhibited earlier soon broke down and the political and ideological conflicts between the dominant Social Democrats and the numerous Socialist Revolutionaries in the Central Rada became intense. Immersed in futile debates and feuds and rarely venturing into the countryside (where their authority had always been limited to the environs of Kiev and some of the larger cities) Central Rada members lost the contact with the masses that had been established briefly by means of the various congresses. Each locality now took care of its own affairs as best it could.

Equally damaging was the ideological narrowness of the young, inexperienced Ukrainian politicians, most of whom were in their 20s and 30s. Caught up in their own revolutionary rhetoric, they were intent on dissociating themselves from the old order. A case in point was their attitude toward the military. In summer 1917, about 300,000 Ukrainian soldiers spontaneously reorganized themselves into all-Ukrainian units that swore allegiance to the Central Rada. In a controversial case, General Pavlo Skoropadsky placed at the disposal of the Central Rada a Ukrainized corps of 40,000 men that was ad-

mirably disciplined and equipped when compared to the demoralized Russian troops. However, his gesture was rejected on two counts: first, the ideologues in the Central Rada argued that the revolution eliminated the need for standing armies, and second, they pointed out that Skoropadsky was a rich landowner and therefore untrustworthy. Their attitude toward bureaucrats was similar: they were regarded as the embodiment of the old, repressive "bourgeois" state and Vynnychenko, the head of government, called them the "worst, most harmful people."⁴

But it soon became apparent that without an army and a bureaucracy, government was impossible. Disorder and anarchy spread through Ukraine. Matters worsened in July when the Russian army in Galicia disintegrated, inundating Ukraine (which had been the immediate hinterland of the huge southwestern and Romanian fronts) with millions of heavily armed, radicalized, rampaging soldiers. Their impact was, in the words of a Central Rada member, "worse than that of the Tatar hordes," and it graphically exposed the impotence of the Central Rada.⁵

The Bolshevik Coup and the Central Rada

If the February Revolution was essentially the result of a collapse of power, the second revolution, called the October Revolution, was brought on by a seizure of power. It was carried out by Lenin and the Bolsheviks, a group that only six months earlier would have been considered as most unlikely candidates to rule Russia.

In early 1917, the Bolshevik party in Russia, consisting mainly of Russian and Jewish intelligentsia and workers, numbered less than 24,000 at a time when other socialist parties had hundreds of thousands of members. But the Bolsheviks possessed features that, in those chaotic times, were much more valuable than large membership. They were a disciplined, tightly centralized party of committed, longtime revolutionaries who had, in the person of Lenin, a leader of genius with an unrivaled mastery of revolutionary tactics. Lenin's confidence and sense of direction, as well as his promises to give the masses "peace, bread and land," made his party increasingly appealing to many. By fall 1917, Bolshevik ranks had swelled to 350,000. After wresting control of the soviets from other socialist parties and raising the slogan "All power to the Soviets" on 7 November (25 October, Julian style) the Bolsheviks overthrew the floundering Provisional Government in Petrograd and claimed authority in the name of the workers' and soldiers' assemblies.

Concentrated mainly in the Russian industrial centers, the Bolsheviks were exceedingly weak in Ukraine, where in 1918 there were, mostly in the Donetsk industrial region, about 4000–5000 of them. Thus, of Ukraine's more than 2 million workers, Bolshevik adherents constituted a miniscule portion. By comparison, Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries alone had over 300,000

party members at this time. Moreover, because the Bolshevik message was aimed primarily at the proletariat – in which the Ukrainians were poorly represented – it held little appeal for them. Industrial workers in Ukraine were largely Russian and Jewish, and they formed about 75% of the party. Hence, in the words of the Soviet historian Nikolai Popov: “The Bolsheviks in Ukraine were ... a party of the Russian or Russified proletariat.”⁶

Like most Russians in Ukraine, the Bolsheviks were antagonistic to the Ukrainian movement. As Marxists, they feared that it would undermine the unity of the working class; as members of a dominant minority, they felt threatened by the mobilization of a previously quiescent majority; and as city people, they were contemptuous of a movement based on the peasantry. A leading Bolshevik, Khristian Rakovsky, even had difficulty acknowledging the very existence of a Ukrainian nation. That this attitude was quite widespread in the party was confirmed by Mykola Skrypnyk, one of the few prominent Ukrainian Bolsheviks, when he noted: “For the majority of our party members, Ukraine as a national unit did not exist.”⁷ Georgii Piatakov, one of the most influential Bolshevik leaders in Ukraine, flatly stated that the party “ought to reject completely the slogan of the right of nations to self-determination.”⁸ On another occasion, he argued: “We must not support the Ukrainians, because their movement is not convenient for the proletariat. Russia cannot exist without the Ukrainian sugar, industry, coal, cereals, etc.”⁹

Lenin, however, was too astute a politician to allow such attitudes to mold Bolshevik policies. He realized, somewhat belatedly, that nationalism was a potent force that could be used to the advantage of his party. Therefore, he developed a rather contorted argument to the effect that Bolsheviks should acknowledge and even encourage the rights of suppressed nationalities to cultural development and self-government as long as – and this was an extremely crucial qualification – doing so did not hinder the proletarian revolution. Thus, for example, if Ukrainian nationalism were to lead to the separation of Ukrainian workers from Russian workers, this, according to Lenin, “is bourgeois nationalism against which a merciless struggle is imperative.”¹⁰ In other words, Ukrainian national aspirations were recognized in theory but rejected in practice.

The great merit of this approach was that it allowed Bolsheviks to claim that they were sympathetic to Ukrainian aspirations and deserved Ukrainian support without compromising their commitment to the socialist revolution. The influence of Lenin’s views on his colleagues in Ukraine became evident in August 1917 when ten Bolshevik representatives even joined the Central Rada.

After the Bolsheviks assumed power in Russia, the question arose as to who should rule in Ukraine. Too weak to crush both the Central Rada and the supporters of the Provisional Government in Kiev who gathered around the Army Staff, the Bolsheviks decided, for the time being, to maintain good rela-

tions with the Ukrainians while dealing with the Army Staff. On 10 November fighting broke out in Kiev between the approximately 6000 Bolsheviks and the Army Staff, which had about 10,000 men at its disposal. At a crucial point in the conflict, the Central Rada ordered its 8000 men to aid the Bolsheviks, thus forcing the Army Staff to evacuate Kiev.

But, to the great consternation of the Bolsheviks, the Central Rada announced that it was assuming the highest authority in all nine provinces where Ukrainians were in the majority. This was formally restated in the Third Universal, issued on 22 November, which proclaimed the establishment of an autonomous Ukrainian Republic. Because it was still hesitant about breaking all ties with Russia, the Central Rada declared that one of its goals was to work for the creation of a "federation of free and equal peoples" in the former Russian Empire. Hopeful that the Central Rada might be a stabilizing force amidst the spreading anarchy, Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian parties, most of the soviets, and even the Bolsheviks (the latter only grudgingly and temporarily) acknowledged the authority of the Ukrainian government.

It quickly became apparent, however, that conflict between the Central Rada and the Bolsheviks would be unavoidable. While the Central Rada criticized Lenin's use of violence in taking power in Petrograd, Lenin complained that the Ukrainians were allowing Cossack troops to pass through their territory so that they could gather in the south where a Russian anti-Bolshevik movement was taking shape. Meanwhile, in Ukraine, the Bolsheviks suffered several political setbacks. In the December elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, later disbanded by the Bolsheviks, the Ukrainian parties garnered over 70% of the vote while the Bolsheviks won only 10%. Even more embarrassing was their experience at the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets that they organized themselves in Kiev on 17 December and which they fully expected to control. But the Ukrainian parties brought in their supporters from the countryside and swamped the approximately 100 Bolshevik delegates with over 2000 of their own. Furious, the small Bolshevik faction abandoned the congress, moved to Kharkiv, denounced the Central Rada as the "enemy of the people," and proclaimed the creation of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic. At the same time, Bolshevik troops from Russia began the invasion of Ukraine.

The Bolshevik invasion of Ukraine Led by the talented Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko and his brutal associate Mikhail Muraviev, the Bolsheviks, numbering about 12,000, advanced from the northeast. To oppose them, Symon Petliura, the Ukrainian minister of war, had a force of about 15,000 widely scattered men, consisting of the "Free Cossack" peasant militia, the Sich Riflemen, a unit of former Galician prisoners of war, a few small frontline units, and hundreds of young *gymnazium* students who were sent to the front directly from their schools in Kiev.



Map 20 German/Austrian invasion in 1918

One may well wonder, at this point, about where the 300,000 soldiers of the Ukrainized units were who had pledged support to the Central Rada in the summer. Most of them had returned to their villages and adopted a "neutral" stance, as did many of those who remained under arms. Some went over to the Bolsheviks. The unreliability of the majority of these Ukrainian soldiers – contrasting sharply with the heroic efforts of the relative few who actually fought in support of the Central Rada – was largely a result of the effectiveness of Bolshevik agitators. As Richard Pipes has noted, "In the early months of the Civil War, the population at large was confused, bewildered and hesitant. A good agitator was worth hundreds of armed men; he could sway enemy troops and thus decide crucial conflicts."¹¹ Indeed, the Bolsheviks spared neither men nor money to infiltrate Ukrainized units, many of whose peasant soldiers were exceedingly naive politically, and to persuade them either to desist from fighting or to join the Bolsheviks. Consequently, by December the latter's forces in Ukraine grew to about 40,000 men.

Another advantage the Bolsheviks enjoyed in Ukraine was the diversionary uprisings against the Central Rada staged in almost every large city by their adherents. The most dangerous of these revolts occurred in Kiev on 29 January 1918, when Russian workers seized the Arsenal and tied down Ukrainian troops for several days before giving in. At the same time, not far to the east at Kruty, Petliura's men made their last major stand against Muraviev's advancing forces. After several days of intense fighting, the Ukrainians were forced to retreat. In the process, a unit of 300 schoolboys was surrounded, and, after fierce resistance, slaughtered. Their deaths earned for them a place of honor in the Ukrainian national pantheon. Meanwhile, in Kiev, the Central Rada, which was meeting day and night, rushed through a radical land-reform bill that called for the nationalization of large landholdings. It issued its Fourth and last Universal (although dated 22 January this important document was actually produced on the night of 24 to 25 of that month) proclaiming that the Ukrainian National Republic had broken its ties with Bolshevik Russia and that henceforth it was a free and independent state.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk With defeat imminent, the Central Rada had only one last hope – foreign aid. In general, its sympathies lay with the Entente and from the outset it worked strenuously to gain recognition, especially by France. But the response of the French, who were committed to restoring "one, indivisible Russia," was ambiguous. However, on 22 December 1917, a completely new set of possibilities emerged when Lenin, claiming to represent all the peoples of the former Russian Empire, began peace negotiations with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk. Because the Central Rada was not about to let the Bolsheviks represent Ukraine in the peace negotiations, it sent its own delegation. On 9 February 1918, only hours before news arrived that

the Central Rada had abandoned Kiev to Muraviev's men, its representatives at Brest-Litovsk signed a treaty with the Central Powers. Essentially it consisted of a German commitment to provide military aid to the Central Rada in return for its delivery of large quantities of foodstuffs to the Central Powers.

Within days of signing the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the Germans and Austrians, having divided Ukraine into spheres of influence, marched in with a powerful army of over 450,000. After only three weeks, the Bolsheviks, who boasted that "they brought in Soviet power from the north on the tips of bayonets" and who had instituted a reign of terror during their brief stay in Kiev, were forced to flee.¹² But this did not mean that the Central Rada, which returned with the Germans on 2 March, received a warm welcome.

Almost every segment of Ukraine's population was disillusioned with its policies. Non-Ukrainians were distraught about the severing of bonds between Ukraine and Russia; poor peasants had not gotten the land they expected; rich peasants and estate owners were furious about the nationalization of large properties; and all blamed the Central Rada for bringing the heavy-handed Germans into the land. For their part, the Germans were also losing their patience with the young, inept ideologues who dominated the Central Rada. They soon realized that it had practically no administrative apparatus with which to collect the millions of tons of food that the hungry German and Austrian cities so desperately needed. The interminable squabbles, debates, and crises among the socialist parties in the Central Rada convinced the Germans that the "young Ukrainian utopians" were incapable of governing. Therefore, on 28 April, just as the Central Rada was formulating the constitution of the Ukrainian state, a German unit marched into the hall and disbanded the assembly. A day later the Central Rada fell without a move being made to defend it.



During the one year that the Central Rada had been the major political factor in Ukraine, it achieved notable successes and experienced dismal failures. Considering the weak, repressed, and politically inexperienced state of the Ukrainian intelligentsia prior to the revolution, the creation and growth of the Central Rada was a considerable achievement. By its activity, it finally put to rest long-standing and widely held doubts about the very existence of a Ukrainian nationality. Indeed, it transformed the Ukrainian issue into one of the key issues of the revolutionary period. In strictly political terms, the Central Rada more than held its own in dealing with the Provisional Government.

It also out-manuevered the Bolsheviks of Ukraine, forcing them to turn to Russia for aid. Intent on creating a democratic, parliamentary government, the Central Rada adhered to its goals despite the pressure for arbitrary action. A striking example of this commitment was its precedent-setting grant

of wide-ranging cultural autonomy to the Jewish minority, despite the fact that its representatives were among the severest critics of the Ukrainian government. But perhaps the Central Rada's most far-reaching achievement was that by its stubborn demand for Ukrainian self-government, it seriously challenged the previously untouchable principle of "one, indivisible Russia" and forced both the Provisional Government and, later, the Bolsheviks to retreat (at least in theory) from this shibboleth of Russian political thinking.

The most obvious fact about the Central Rada was, however, that it failed. Among the basic causes of that failure was that it lacked the two main pillars of statehood, namely an effective army and administrative apparatus. Without the latter, the Central Rada was unable to maintain contact with the provinces and countryside where most of its potential support lay. Equally damaging was the lack of consensus on what policies to follow. This deficiency was painfully evident in the bitter feud between Vynnychenko and Petliura, two of the government's key ministers. Vynnychenko argued that the Central Rada should pursue more socially radical policies so that it could "out-socialize" the Bolsheviks and live up to the expectations of the masses for drastic change. Petliura, meanwhile, believed that more emphasis should be placed on building the institutions of a nation-state. Finally, the immediate cause of the Central Rada's demise was its inability to satisfy German demands.

Yet as John Reshetar has demonstrated, in the final analysis, the failure of the Central Rada lay in the underdevelopment of the Ukrainian national movement.¹³ In effect, the Central Rada was forced to begin state-building before the process of nation-building had been completed. Because of the repressive nature of the tsarist regime and the socioeconomic peculiarities of Ukrainian society, most of the educated people in Ukraine were either Russians or Russified. The Ukrainian movement had not yet penetrated the cities and these crucial centers of industry, communications, and skilled personnel functioned as bastions of the Russian and Russified minorities who were often militantly anti-Ukrainian. Hence, there was a critical lack of competent individuals available for organizing and staffing the army and administration of a Ukrainian state. The people who were available were young and inexperienced: Vynnychenko was 38, Petliura was 35, Kovalevsky (leader of the largest Ukrainian party, the Socialist Revolutionaries) was 25, Mykola Shrah (who substituted for Hrushevsky as presiding officer of the Central Rada) was 22. Aware of its lack of human as well as material resources, Serhii Efre-mov, a member of the Central Rada, urged it to refrain from assuming authority, for, he argued, the masses awaited miracles and a Ukrainian government would be sure to disillusion them. In view of these seemingly insurmountable obstacles, it is understandable why Vynnychenko, referring to the Central Rada's efforts, remarked: "Truly, we were like the gods ... attempting to create a whole new world from nothing."¹⁴

The Ukrainian Revolution

After the Bolshevik coup, the revolution turned into a civil war. Gone were the euphoria, the feeling of solidarity, the massive demonstrations, tumultuous assemblies, and heated debates of 1917. For the next three years numerous claimants for power in Ukraine and throughout the former empire were embroiled in a bitter, merciless military struggle, complete with large-scale terror and atrocities, to decide who and what form of government should replace the old order.

For many Ukrainians, the rise of the Bolsheviks in Russia not only ushered in a new, violent phase of the postrevolutionary period but also brought about a radical change in their political thinking. Repulsed by the dictatorial nature of the Bolshevik regime in the north, many Ukrainian leaders abandoned their traditional preference for an autonomous or federal relationship with Russia. Henceforth, independence became their goal. However, Ukrainians, like other peoples of the former empire, became increasingly divided over their other goals and the ways to achieve them. Moreover, because of Ukraine's abundant natural resources and strategic location, almost every participant in the Civil War sought to gain control of the land. Therefore, after the relatively calm hiatus imposed by the German occupation, Ukraine became the scene of the most chaotic, complex events of the Civil War.



The Hetmanate

By spring 1918, significant sectors of Ukraine's populace had had enough of revolution and chaos. As might be expected, these attitudes were most prevalent among the land's propertied classes, the well-to-do peasants, the petty entrepreneurs and businessmen, the factory owners and large landholders, and the upper levels of bureaucracy who constituted about 20% of

Ukraine's population.¹ As well, the Germans and Austrians in Ukraine were exceedingly anxious to restore order so as to expedite the removal of foodstuffs. Therefore, between 24 and 26 April, the representatives of these groups secretly agreed to replace the Central Rada with a conservative Ukrainian government headed by Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky (the title "hetman" was meant to evoke the quasi-monarchical traditions associated with the Cossack hetmans).

Skoropadsky, a scion of an old Cossack *starshyna* family and one of Ukraine's largest landowners, had been a well-placed member of the tsarist establishment, having served as Nicholas II's aide-de-camp and as a highly regarded general during the war. However, during the revolution he had Ukrainized his army corps, and – after the Central Rada had rejected his services – he was elected titular commander of the "Free Cossack" peasant militia. With the rise to power of this Russified "Little Russian" aristocrat who had suddenly recalled his Ukrainian roots, a new phase of the revolution in Ukraine set in, characterized by attempts to restore law and order and to undo some of the Central Rada's "socialist experiments."

On 29 April, at a congress called in Kiev by the League of Landowners, which was attended by about 6500 delegates from all over Ukraine, Skoropadsky was enthusiastically proclaimed hetman and called upon "to save the country from chaos and lawlessness." That same day he and his supporters announced the establishment of the "Ukrainian State" (as opposed to the Central Rada's "Ukrainian National Republic"). The new state rested on an unusual mixture of monarchical, republican, and, most notably, dictatorial features. Its citizens were guaranteed the usual civil rights, with strong emphasis being placed on the sanctity of private property.

While revoking such innovations of the Central Rada as the nationalization of large estates and personal-cultural autonomy, the hetman introduced a distinct category of citizens – the Cossacks – who were actually well-to-do peasants. He hoped they would act as the main social pillar of his regime. Most striking were the vast prerogatives reserved for the hetman: he possessed sole authority to issue all the laws, appoint the cabinet, control foreign affairs and the military, and act as the highest judge in the land. Yet these claims to almost unlimited authority did not hide the fact that it was the Germans (but not the Austrians) who had ultimate power in Ukraine.

As might be expected, the reaction of Ukrainian activists (most of whom were socialists and had belonged to the Central Rada) to the Hetmanate was sharply negative. Therefore, when some well-known Ukrainians were invited to join the Hetman government, almost all of them refused. This left the hetman with no choice but to turn to individuals not associated with the Ukrainian movement to form his cabinet, thereby exposing himself to accusations that his government included no "real" Ukrainians. But although the new cabinet – which was led by the prime minister Fedir Lyzohub (a wealthy

landowner) and included only one well-known Ukrainian activist, the foreign minister Dmytro Doroshenko – was short on nationalists, it did include a number of skilled administrators.

In a matter of months, an effective bureaucratic apparatus was reestablished in Ukraine. In the provinces, Central Rada appointees were replaced by experienced administrators called *starosty*, who were drawn mostly from among local landowners and *zemstvo* officials. Posts in the central government went to professionals, mostly Russians or Russified Ukrainians. There were, however, difficulties in creating an effective army, for the Germans discouraged the creation of a large military force that might challenge their overwhelming influence. A police force, which like the army, attracted many former tsarist officers, was soon operating (for better or worse) at full tilt.

While the Central Rada had had formal diplomatic relations only with Germany, Austro-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire, the Hetmanate exchanged embassies with about a dozen countries. Its main foreign policy concerns were the negotiation of a peace treaty with Soviet Russia, concluded on 12 June 1918, and the fruitless discussion with Austro-Hungary about the possibility of annexing such largely Ukrainian lands as Eastern Galicia and the Kholm region.

The government's achievements in education and in the creation of an infrastructure for scholarly activity were especially impressive. On the elementary school level, several million Ukrainian-language textbooks were prepared and Ukrainian was introduced into most of the schools. About 150 new Ukrainian-language *gymnazia*, many located in rural areas, were founded. In October, two new Ukrainian universities were created in Kiev and Kamianets-Podilskyyi. A national archive and a library of over one million volumes were also founded. The high point of this activity was the establishment of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences on 24 November 1918. Thus, in a matter of months, in the area of culture the Hetmanate had achievements to its credit that the Ukrainian intelligentsia had dreamed of for generations.

But while the Skoropadsky regime could boast of administrative skills and concrete achievements, it was burdened with crushing political handicaps. For the most part, they were an outgrowth of the company the hetman had chosen to keep. First, he was compromised by his dependence on the Germans, whose obvious goal was to exploit Ukraine economically. Second, the hetman was closely associated with the propertied classes, which sought to undo the changes brought about by the revolution. Thus, such extremely unpopular measures as the "punitive expeditions," organized by landlords with the support of German troops to punish peasants for confiscating their lands the previous year, were blamed on Skoropadsky. Third, many Ukrainians considered Skoropadsky to be too supportive of Russians. During his term in office, Ukraine – which was an island of stability compared to Russia – became not only a refuge for vast numbers of the former tsarist elite but also a

center for attempts to rebuild “one, indivisible Russia.” The bureaucracy was inundated with Russians who made no secret of their antipathy to Ukrainian statehood, and most of the cabinet were members of the Russian Kadet party.

Opposition to Skoropadsky began to crystallize from the outset. In mid May, a series of illegal congresses of Ukrainian parties were held and occupational groups such as railroad workers, telegraph operators, peasants, and workers expressed their disapproval of the new government. A coordinating body called the Ukrainian National State Union and led by Vynnychenko arose to act as a center of opposition. Another influential organization, the All-Ukrainian Union of Zemstva, headed by Petliura, also adopted an anti-hetman line. Initially, these groups negotiated with Skoropadsky about ways of implementing a more liberal and nationalist policy, but later they turned to fomenting a rebellion against him.

Ukrainian peasants needed little encouragement to rebel against a government that confiscated their crops, restored lands to rich estate-owners, and sent “punitive expeditions” into their villages. Soon spontaneous, fierce peasant revolts spread through Ukraine. Led by a local, often anarchistically inclined leader called (in the Cossack tradition) an *otaman* or *batko* and armed with readily available weapons, hordes of peasants fought pitched battles with German troops. The scale of these conflicts was huge: for example, in the Zvenyhorod and Tarashchanka regions of Kiev province, peasant forces numbering 30,000–40,000 men, equipped with two batteries of artillery and 200 machine guns, inflicted 6000 casualties on the Germans. However, not all the uprisings were effective. In early August, when the Bolsheviks of Ukraine tried to lead a general rebellion, it collapsed within two days because of the lack of popular support.

By early fall, it was apparent that the Central Powers were about to lose the war. At this point, the hetman was forced to make concessions. Yet another attempt to attract prominent Ukrainian activists into his cabinet failed in late October. Desperately casting about for support, Skoropadsky took a final gamble: on 14 November 1918 he appointed a new cabinet consisting almost entirely of Russian monarchists and announced the Act of Federation, which committed him to link Ukraine with a future non-Bolshevik Russian state. This controversial step was taken in order to gain the support of anti-Bolshevik Russians and the favor of the victorious Entente. That same day, the Ukrainian opposition formed an insurrectionary government, the Directory, led by the two old rivals Vynnychenko and Petliura, and openly declared a rebellion against the hetman.

The Directory’s insurrection grew rapidly. Great numbers of peasant partisans, led by their rambunctious *otamany*, poured into Bila Tserkva, west of Kiev, which served as the headquarters of the anti-Skoropadsky forces. Soon these enthusiastic but poorly disciplined irregulars numbered about 60,000. More important, some of the hetman’s best units – the Sich Riflemen, com-

manded by Evhen Konovalts and his chief of staff, Andrii Melnyk, and the Greycoat Division – went over to the Directory, raising the number of its regular troops to 40,000. By 21 November the insurgents encircled Kiev and, after lengthy negotiations to assure safe passage for the German garrison, on 14 December the Germans evacuated the city, taking Skoropadsky with them. That same day, the Directory's forces triumphantly entered Kiev and announced the reestablishment of the Ukrainian National Republic.

The Hetmanate existed less than eight months during which time real power lay in the hands of the Germans, and its impact was limited. Initially, it was able to attract some support because of its promise to restore law and order, something much of the land's population desired. However, it failed to address adequately the two main issues raised by the revolution in Ukraine: socioeconomic reform and nationalism. Skoropadsky's attempt to restore stability by resurrecting the prerevolutionary socioeconomic order, particularly in the countryside, was his most serious blunder. On the nationality issue, his government was ambiguous: although it had major achievements, such as the Ukrainization of education and culture, to its credit, it nonetheless led Ukrainian nationalists to believe that it was "Ukrainian in form but Muscovite in content."

However, as Viacheslav Lypynsky, the ideologist of modern Ukrainian conservatism, noted, the Hetmanate had a broader significance. It consisted of exposing, and even attracting, some members of the largely Russified socioeconomic elite of Ukraine to the idea of Ukrainian statehood. This, in turn, helped to expand the social base of this idea beyond the thin stratum of Ukrainian intelligentsia to the broader, more reliable, and productive class of the "tillers of the land," that is, the landowning peasants and estate owners. Thus, according to Lypynsky, had Skoropadsky survived, he would have made Ukrainian statehood acceptable to the land's most productive inhabitants rather than having it depend on an "ideological sect," as he called the nationally conscious Ukrainian intelligentsia.²

Anarchy

In 1919 total chaos engulfed Ukraine. Indeed, in the modern history of Europe no country experienced such complete anarchy, bitter civil strife, and total collapse of authority as did Ukraine at this time. Six different armies – those of the Ukrainians, the Bolsheviks, the Whites, the Entente, the Poles, and the anarchists – operated on its territory. Kiev changed hands five times in less than a year. Cities and regions were cut off from each other by the numerous fronts. Communications with the outside world broke down almost completely. The starving cities emptied as people moved into the countryside in their search for food. Villages literally barricaded themselves against intruders and strangers. Meanwhile, the various governments that momen-

tarily managed to establish themselves in Kiev devoted most of their attention and energy to fending off the onslaughts of their enemies. Ukraine was a land easy to conquer but almost impossible to rule.

As he observed the collapse of one authority after another from his self-sufficient village, the peasant's attitude was one of wishing a pox on the city people and all their governments. His prime concern was to keep his land and, if possible, to obtain more of it. The peasant was willing to support any government that seemed able to satisfy these desires. But the moment that government was unable to fulfill his expectations or placed demands on his land and harvest, the peasant turned against it and went over to a rival. The peasant knew that he did not want the return of the old order, yet he was uncertain of what he wanted to replace it. This made him a rather unpredictable element throughout the Civil War.

Peasant attitudes were all the more important because for the first time in centuries the peasantry had the will and ability to fight. During the Hetman period, hundreds of *otamany* and partisan bands, imbued with a spirit of neo-Cossack anarchism, arose throughout Ukraine. Some favored the nationalists, others backed the Bolsheviks, many switched sides frequently, and all were most concerned with protecting the interests of their villages and districts. If in the process they had a chance to plunder "class enemies" or vent their age-old resentment against Jews, so much the better. Like Chinese warlords, their *otamany* scoffed at all authority and acted as if they were a law unto themselves.

Two of the most powerful partisan leaders were based in the steppes of the south where the richest, most self-confident peasants lived. One was Matvii Hryhoriiv (Grigoriev), a swashbuckling former tsarist officer who led a force of about 12,000 in the region of Kherson and maintained close links with the radical Ukrainian left. The other was the legendary Nestor Makhno, a Rus-sified Ukrainian peasant and an avowed anarchist. In mid 1919 his forces, based in Huliai Pole, numbered between 35,000 and 50,000 men, and they often held the balance in the struggle for southern Ukraine. Thus, as regular armies fought for control of cities and railroad lines and partisan forces dominated the countryside, the only regime that was recognized throughout Ukraine was the rule of the gun.

The Directory

After the expulsion of Skoropadsky, the Directory began transforming itself from a successful insurrectionary committee into a government of the newly resurrected Ukrainian National Republic (UNR). Temporarily retaining the highest executive prerogatives for itself, it appointed a cabinet of ministers, led by Volodymyr Chekhivsky. The composition of the cabinet clearly indicated that young politicians, not "elder statesmen" such as Hrushevsky, would play the leading role in the new government.

On 26 December 1918 the Directory issued its Declaration or statement of goals, which indicated that an attempt would be made to strike a balance between revolution and order. A preference for the former was quite apparent, however. One of the main features of the Declaration was the promise to expropriate state, church, and large private landholdings for redistribution among the peasants. Another was the government's commitment to act as the representative of the workers, peasants, and "toiling intelligentsia" – and its intention to disenfranchise the landed and industrial bourgeoisie. To this end it called for a Congress of Workers that would function as the representative and legislative body of the state.

But the new government was able to attain few of its goals before both internal and external problems overwhelmed it. The key internal issue was the split that developed between and within Ukrainian political parties as to whether the government should be a parliamentary democracy (as the moderate socialists wanted) or a Ukrainian variant of the soviet (council) system (as the radical left desired). Led by Vynnychenko, the radical left argued that Ukrainians must pay as much attention to social transformation as to national liberation and that if they adopted the soviet system, they would steal the Bolsheviks' thunder. The more nationalistic moderates, with whom Petliura sympathized, responded that it was exactly this obsession with socialist experiments and the resulting neglect of the army and other state institutions that brought down the Central Rada and that this mistake should not be repeated. Thus, the old dilemma of the Ukrainian intelligentsia – arguing about whether social revolution or national liberation should have priority – again sowed animosity and confusion in its ranks.

This fractious conflict spilled over into the area of foreign relations. In December 1918 the Entente, primarily the French, landed a force of about 60,000 men in Odessa and other Black Sea ports. This unexpected development was brought on by the victorious Western powers' decision to block the spread of bolshevism. Their intention was to lend direct military support to the anti-Bolshevik White forces that were preparing to launch a campaign from the Don in hopes of restoring "one, indivisible Russia." Meanwhile, in the north, there were growing indications that the Bolsheviks were planning to repeat their invasion of Ukraine. The Directory obviously could not confront both intruders and had to come to an understanding with one of them. As might be expected, Vynnychenko and his colleagues from the radical left favored an alliance with Moscow, while the moderates and the army insisted on an agreement with the Entente. However, the issue was decided by the Bolsheviks when – as their representatives conducted peace negotiations with the Directory – their troops attacked Kharkiv.

The second Bolshevik invasion of Ukraine As the Bolsheviks advanced, the Directory acted in a manner similar to that of the Central Rada a year earlier. In the last desperate days before the fall of Kiev, the Directory engaged in

several symbolic demonstrations of sovereignty. On 22 January 1919 it celebrated the union of the Ukrainian National Republic with the newly formed West Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR) in Galicia, a union that the Ukrainian intelligentsia, in both the east and west, had dreamed of for generations. However, with both governments fighting desperately for survival, their future prospects looked bleak. Furthermore, both governments still retained separate administrations, armies, and policies. Hence, it was a union in name only.

Militarily, the performance of the Ukrainian government's troops was as disappointing as it had been a year earlier. Even before the second Bolshevik invasion, the hordes of peasant soldiers who had participated in the overthrow of the hetman returned to their villages, convinced that they had removed the main threat to their well-being and unconcerned about the fate of the Directory. Given the strong pro-Soviet tendencies that were evident in the Ukrainian government itself, Bolshevik agitators were even more successful than before in drawing many of these men to their side. Therefore, the Directory's army, which had numbered well over 100,000 weeks before, had dwindled to about 25,000. And a large part of this force still consisted of *otamany* and their partisans whom the commander-in-chief, Petliura, could barely control. As the military situation deteriorated further, on 2 February the Directory abandoned Kiev and moved west to Vinnytsia. By spring, after a series of military defeats, it was barely able to hold on to a small stretch of territory around Kamianets-Podilskyi.

Once again the hopes of the Ukrainian government rested on another foreign power, France, whose seemingly invincible troops were ensconced in Odessa. In order to appear more acceptable to the French, the Directory purged itself of the radical, pro-Soviet elements. In mid February Vynnychenko resigned and Chekhivsky's socialist cabinet was replaced by moderates led by Serhii Ostapenko. Petliura now emerged as the most influential individual in the government. Soon it became evident that the French, influenced by their White Russian allies – who hated Ukrainian “separatists” as much as Bolsheviks – had no intention of offering aid or recognition to the Directory. By early April the entire issue became moot when the French forces, pressed by Hryhoriiv, one of Petliura's partisan commanders who had just gone over to the Bolsheviks, departed from Ukraine as abruptly as they had arrived.

Under pressure from military defeats and diplomatic disappointments, the ideological conflict among the Ukrainians came to a head. In the two major political parties, the Social Democrats and the Socialist Revolutionaries, small but influential factions on the radical left broke off, constituted themselves as separate parties, adopted a Soviet platform, and joined the Bolsheviks. They took along with them such powerful *otamany* as Anhel, Zeleny, Sokolovsky, Tiutiunnyk, and Hryhoriiv. Among the Social Democrats the secession of the left occurred in January 1919; the Borotbists, who took their name from their

newspaper, *Borotba* (The Struggle), and numbered about 5000, broke off from the Socialist Revolutionaries at about the same time.

The pogroms One of the worst aspects of the anarchy that gripped Ukraine in 1919 was the widespread pogroms. During the revolution, among the anti-Bolshevik forces, both Ukrainian and Russian, old animosities towards the Jews were heightened by the widespread impression that Jews were pro-Bolshevik. Actually most Jews were apolitical and those who were Marxists usually favored the Mensheviks. But it is a fact that Jews were also disproportionately prominent among the Bolsheviks, notably in their leadership, among their tax- and grain-gathering officials, and especially in the despised and feared Cheka (secret police). Therefore, in the chaos, Jews became the targets of old resentments and new frustrations.

Historians estimate that in Ukraine between 35,000 and 50,000 Jews were killed in pogroms in 1919–20.³ Peter Kenez, a specialist on the Civil War in Ukraine and south Russia, notes that

before the advent of Hitler, the greatest modern mass murder of Jews occurred in Ukraine, during the Civil War. All the participants in the conflict were guilty of murdering Jews, even the Bolsheviks. However, the Volunteer Army [the Whites or anti-Bolshevik Russians] had the largest number of victims. Its pogroms differed from mass killings carried out by its competitors; they were the most thorough, they had the most elaborate superstructure, or to put it differently, they were the most modern ... Other pogroms were the work of peasants. The pogroms of the Volunteer Army, on the other hand, had three different participants: the peasant, the Cossack and the Russian officer ... The particularly bloody nature of these massacres can be explained by the fact that these three types of murderers reinforced one another.⁴

Although the White Volunteer Army – which moved into Ukraine from the Don in the summer of 1919 – was primarily responsible for the pogroms, the Directory's forces (especially the *otaman*-led irregulars) also perpetrated a series of pogroms. The most serious occurred in Proskuriv, Zhytomyr, Cherkasy, Rivne, Fastiv, Korosten, and Bakhmach. Of these the most savage was instigated by Otaman Semesenko in Proskuriv in February 1919, when several thousand Jews perished.

In general, the Ukrainian pogroms differed from those of the Whites in two ways: in contrast to the premeditated, systematic undertakings of the Russians, they were spontaneous outbursts of demoralized and often drunken irregulars, and they were committed against the express orders of the high command. Unlike the White Russian generals such as Anton Denikin, the Ukrainian socialists, especially the Social Democratic party to which Petliura belonged, had a long tradition of friendly relations with Jewish political ac-

tivists. Therefore, the Directory renewed Jewish personal-cultural autonomy, attracted prominent Jews such as Arnold Margolin and Solomon Goldelman into its government, appropriated large amounts of money for pogrom victims, and even negotiated with the famous Zionist leader Vladimir Zhabotinsky about the inclusion of Jewish police units into its army.

But while Petliura's attitudes towards the Jews might have been well intentioned, he was unable to control the *otamany* (the court-martial and subsequent execution of Semesenko and other partisan leaders did not improve the situation), and their dreadful deeds were associated with his government. And because many Jews considered themselves to be Russians, they found it easier to lay all the blame for the pogroms on Petliura and the Ukrainians rather than on Denikin and his Russian generals.⁵

The Bolsheviks

After they were expelled by the Germans in early 1918, Ukraine's scattered and disorganized Bolsheviks had almost a year to prepare for their return. The most pressing issue before them was an organizational one: were they to form a separate Ukrainian Bolshevik party so as to broaden their appeal in Ukraine or should they become a "regional" branch of the Russian party as Lenin insisted and Russian centralist traditions dictated? At a party conclave held in April in Tahanrih, where the Ukrainian Skrypnyk and the so-called Kiev faction (which was more sensitive to the nationality issue) predominated, a vote was taken to form a separate Ukrainian party. But at the congress of Ukraine's Bolsheviks held in July in Moscow to establish formally the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine – CP(b)U – the strongly centralist and almost exclusively Russian Katerynoslav faction gained the upper hand. The Tahanrih resolution was rescinded and the CP(b)U was declared to be an integral part of the Russian party based in Moscow.


The fall of the Hetman government, evacuation of the Germans, and rise of the Directory provoked another debate among the Bolsheviks. One faction, led by Dmitrii Manuilsky and Vladimir Zatonsky, considered Bolsheviks in Ukraine to be too weak – in July 1918 they had a mere 4364 members – to attempt a takeover of the land. They argued for negotiating a peace with the Directory in order to gain time to strengthen their organization. But the group led by Piatakov and Antonov-Ovseenko pleaded with Lenin to support an immediate invasion so as not to allow the Directory to consolidate its hold. After much wavering, Moscow sanctioned the formation of another Ukrainian Soviet government on 20 November 1918. Initially, it was led by Piatakov but he was soon replaced by the Russified Bulgarian-Romanian Christian Rakovsky. Almost all the important posts in the government were held by Russians. In December, the Bolsheviks were ready to launch their second attempt to conquer Ukraine.

At the outset, the Bolshevik forces, commanded by Antonov-Ovseenko, consisted of a few Red Army units and scattered irregulars. However, as they moved into Ukraine, one partisan formation after another abandoned the Directory and joined the invaders. On 3 January 1919, Kharkiv fell to the Bolsheviks and on 5 February they marched into Kiev. At this point, their troops numbered about 25,000. But in the next few weeks they more than doubled, when Ukraine's two most important partisan leaders, Hryhoriiv and Makhno, joined them. With their support, by June the Bolsheviks managed to gain control of much of Ukraine.

The second Ukrainian Soviet government lasted about seven months. During this time, it showed that it was fully capable of making as many critical blunders as the other governments that had tried to govern Ukraine. Composed mostly of Russians, Jews, and other non-Ukrainians, it attempted to apply policies in Ukraine that had been developed in Russia, regardless of whether or not they fitted local circumstances. The Russian orientation was especially evident in the "grain crusade," as Lenin called it. Because in 1919 Russian cities were in dire need of food, about 3000 workers from Moscow and Petrograd were dispatched to Ukraine to forage for grain and, much like the Germans had done a year earlier, to use force if necessary to get it. But the Bolsheviks compounded their error. They began an attack on the "bourgeois" principle of private property by introducing collective farms. As might be expected, these measures infuriated not only the kulaks but the middle peasantry as well.

Rakovsky's government also managed to alienate the Ukrainian leftist intelligentsia, such as the Borotbists, by refusing to use the Ukrainian language in administration and ignoring the need for it in education and cultural activity. When criticism and resistance mounted, the Bolshevik response was to loosen the feared and hated Cheka, led by the Latvian Martin Latsis, to arrest and execute "class enemies" at will. The consequences were predictable: after fighting on the Bolshevik side for only a few months, the peasant partisans, led by the Borotbisty and Ukrainian Social Democrats, turned against the Bolsheviks en masse. Especially crucial was the defection in March of the large forces led by Hryhoriiv and Makhno. By the summer, almost the entire Ukrainian countryside was in revolt against the Bolsheviks.

At this point, another invader moved into Ukraine. In June, the White armies led by General Denikin launched an offensive from the Don and by July captured much of the Left Bank. Meanwhile, Petliura's reorganized army attacked on the Right Bank. As Bolshevik resistance collapsed, Lenin ordered the liquidation of the second Ukrainian Soviet government in mid August 1919, and most of its members returned to Moscow. Referring to this second failure in Ukraine in two years, Manuilsky, a member of the former government, remarked dejectedly: "Each spring we equip a successive troupe for the Ukraine which, after making a tour there, returns to Moscow in the autumn."⁶



Map 21 Ukraine in 1917-20

The Struggle in the West

Having suffered a crushing defeat in the war, the Austro-Hungarian Empire began to disintegrate in October 1918, about 20 months after the Russian Empire had collapsed. Even before the Habsburgs acknowledged that the end had come, their subject peoples, the West Ukrainians included, had already made preparations for creating their own independent nation-states. Insofar as the West Ukrainians attempted to establish a Ukrainian state in Eastern Galicia from amidst the ruins of a fallen empire and in the face of fierce opposition, they found themselves in an analogous situation to that of their compatriots in the east. However, in almost every other respect, their efforts at state-building differed radically from those of the East Ukrainians.

As might be expected, the Poles also laid claim to Eastern Galicia. What resulted, therefore, was a conflict of two nations over territory and not, as was the case in the east, a confusing struggle of various governments, parties, and ideologies for the "hearts and minds of men." Perhaps because Austrian constitutionalism had taught the Poles and West Ukrainians to appreciate and participate in government, the fall of the empire did not result in the socio-economic upheaval, chaos, anarchy, and brutality that occurred in the east. For the Ukrainians and the Poles in Eastern Galicia, the issues were clear-cut: national goals were of primary importance and the consideration of socio-economic concerns was postponed until later. The Polish/Ukrainian conflict was fierce but orderly; it was carried on, for the most part, by regular armies, which fought along established fronts and inflicted relatively little damage on the civilian population. In essence, it was a test of strength between the 3.5 million Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia and the 18 million Poles who were simultaneously fighting the Czechs, Germans, and Lithuanians – who also did not want to be included in the Polish state.

As it became evident that Austria was about to fall, on 18 October 1918 the parliamentarians, party leaders, and church hierarchs from Eastern Galicia and Bukovyna formed a Ukrainian National Council to act as a Ukrainian representative body. They also announced their intention to unite all West Ukrainian lands into a single entity that would have an as-yet-unspecified relationship with whatever remained of the Habsburg empire. Meanwhile, the Poles also prepared to take over Lviv and Eastern Galicia. A group of young Ukrainian officers, led by Captain Dmytro Vitovsky of the Sich Riflemen, frustrated by the slow, legalistic approach of the National Council, took matters into their own hands. On the night of 31 October they hastily gathered all the available Ukrainian soldiers serving in the Austrian units in Lviv and vicinity and took control of the city. On 1 November the city's inhabitants awoke to find Ukrainian flags flying from city hall, all major offices in Ukrainian hands, and placards everywhere informing them that they were

now citizens of a Ukrainian state. Similar events occurred throughout the rest of Eastern Galicia.

The Ukrainian population greeted the events of 1 November with enthusiasm. The Jews recognized Ukrainian sovereignty or remained neutral. But as soon as they recovered from the shock, the Poles in Lviv turned to active resistance and bitter house-to-house fighting broke out between the Ukrainian troops and the Polish Military Organization. To the northwest, on the border between Eastern Galicia and Poland proper, the key railroad center of Pere-myshl fell to the Poles. In Bukovyna, Romanian troops occupied much of the land, while in Transcarpathia the Hungarians remained in power. Nonetheless, much of Eastern Galicia remained in the hands of the Ukrainians and they pressed on with the organization of their state. On 9 November, after all the Ukrainian parties agreed to cooperate in the formation of a government, they appointed a provisional council of ministers or General Secretariat which was headed by the experienced parliamentarian Kost Levytsky. Four days later, the new state was formally constituted as the West Ukrainian National Republic (*Zakhidno Ukrainska Narodna Respublyka – ZUNR*).

A crushing blow to the fledgling state came on 22 November 1918 when the 1400 Ukrainian soldiers, mostly teenage peasants who were completely disoriented in a city of over 200,000, failed to quell the uprising of the recently reinforced Poles and were forced to abandon Lviv. In January, Stanyslaviv became the new seat of government. It was here that the first systematic efforts were made to establish a functioning government and an effective army.

For most of its eight-month existence, the ZUNR governed a population of about 4 million of whom close to 3 million were Ukrainians. It quickly replaced the temporary authorities with a full-fledged governmental apparatus. On 22–26 November, elections were held in the Ukrainian-controlled lands for a 150-member Ukrainian National Council that was to function as a representative and legislative body. In terms of social composition, the delegates were mostly middle peasants with a large minority of clergy and intelligentsia; ideologically, the vast majority, even the socialists, adopted a liberal-national stance. The ethnic makeup of the council was almost completely Ukrainian, as the Poles boycotted the elections and the Jews and Germans preferred not to participate lest they become embroiled in the Ukrainian/Polish conflict. The chairman of the council, Evhen Petrushevych (a lawyer and former parliamentarian in Vienna), automatically became the president of the republic.

Unlike the East Ukrainian governments, the ZUNR soon had a local administration in place. It was based on old Austrian models – the Galicians did not engage in the radical experiments common in the east – and was staffed by Ukrainians and, quite often, by Polish professionals. Although engaged in a bitter war, the West Ukrainian state succeeded in maintaining stability and order on its territories. Indeed, this remarkably rapid and effective es-

establishment of an administrative apparatus was a feat that few of the new East European states, not to speak of the East Ukrainian governments, could duplicate. To a large extent it was the result of the Galicians' penchant for social organization, honed to a high degree in the decades before the war.

Among the important legislative acts of the National Council were the guarantee of full voting rights to all citizens of the state and broad guarantees of minority rights, including 30% of the seats in a future parliament. These measures were well received by the Jewish populace: having experienced a three-day pogrom that the Poles had staged in Lviv when they retook the city, the Jews tended to side with the Ukrainians. In fact, an all-Jewish unit of about 1000 men was formed in the West Ukrainian army. The all-important land question was treated in straightforward fashion: all large private landholdings, which were mostly held by Poles, were to be expropriated and the land distributed to peasants with little or no land. From the outset, it was understood that the ZUNR would unite with the East Ukrainian state. On 22 January 1919, the act of unification, which guaranteed the ZUNR complete autonomy, was proclaimed in Kiev.

Probably the most impressive organizational achievement of the West Ukrainian government was the Ukrainian Galician Army. In yet another contrast to the East Ukrainians, the Galicians quickly agreed on the need for a strong, effective regular army. Most Ukrainians in the Austrian army were on the Italian front and had not yet returned home, so there was a lack of trained soldiers. Nonetheless, a general mobilization yielded optimum results and by spring the army had over 100,000 men, of whom 40,000 were battle ready. There were, however, major problems with officers and military materials. Because of their socioeconomic underdevelopment, there were disproportionately few Ukrainian officers in the Austrian army. Thus, only 2 out of 1000 officers were Ukrainians. By comparison, Poles accounted for 27 per 1000. Moreover, the Ukrainian officers were almost all of junior rank. Therefore, the ZUNR turned to East Ukrainians such as General Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko and several other high officers of the former Russian army to take on the posts of commander and general staff. Many Austrian and German officers, now unemployed, were also used to fill staff positions. But most of the officers were Galicians, and it is noteworthy that, in a time of chaos and social tension, unusually close relations existed between them and their men, probably because both were either peasants or recently emerged from that class. Military equipment was largely acquired from Austrian depots or by disarming the hundreds of thousands of German and Austrian troops from the former occupation army in Ukraine that streamed through Galicia on their way home.

The Polish-Ukrainian War The conflict can be divided into three stages. During the initial period which ended by February 1919, it was basically a battle

between the Ukrainian majority and Polish minority in Eastern Galicia. Because of rapid and effective mobilization, the Ukrainians enjoyed a great numerical advantage and forced the Poles onto the defensive. However, thanks to skillful leadership, effective tactics, and spirited fighting, the Poles held off the slow, unimaginative attacks prepared by the Ukrainian command. In its second stage, during March, April, and May, the war expanded into a conflict between the Galician Ukrainians and the forces of Poland proper. As reinforcements from central Poland moved into Eastern Galicia, the Poles gained a decided numerical advantage. The crucial development at this juncture was the deployment of General Jozef Haller's army against the Ukrainians. Formed in France from Polish prisoners of war, this 60,000-man force was superbly equipped and largely led by French officers. Although the Entente dispatched it to Poland to fight against the Bolsheviks, the Poles redirected the army against the Ukrainians, arguing that all Ukrainians were Bolsheviks or something close to it. In April and May, the Poles broke the Ukrainian encirclement of Lviv and pushed back the demoralized Galician army to the Zbruch River.

A surprising Ukrainian counteroffensive, launched on 8 June by the new commander, General Oleksander Grekov, initiated the final stage of the war. Near the town of Chortkiv, the Galicians summoned up the last of their physical, material, and spiritual resources and hurled themselves against the confident and larger Polish forces. The Ukrainian attack almost reached Lviv. But it was not so much the reinforced Poles as the lack of ammunition that halted the Ukrainian offensive. With five to ten bullets per man and no country willing to supply more ammunition, Grekov's forces were forced to retreat again, thereby ending the Galician army's finest hour. By mid July the Poles had re-occupied almost all of Eastern Galicia and the West Ukrainian army was once more pinned against the Zbruch River.

In this catastrophic situation, the civilian leadership – on 9 June President Petrushevych was appointed dictator by general consent in order to make the government more efficient – argued for accepting internment in Romania. However, the army insisted on continuing the struggle for Ukrainian statehood by crossing over into Eastern Ukraine and joining Petliura in the battle against the Bolsheviks. On 16 July 1919, with Polish artillery hammering at their backs, the Galician army and thousands of West Ukrainian civilians crossed the Zbruch into Eastern Ukraine. The military struggle for Eastern Galicia, which cost the Ukrainians about 15,000 and the Poles over 10,000 lives, was over.

The diplomatic activity of the ZUNR During the course of the military conflict and even after it was over, the West Ukrainian government placed great hopes on international recognition of its cause. Its optimism rested on the acceptance by the victorious Entente of President Wilson's famous Fourteen Points,

one of which guaranteed the right of self-determination to all nations. However, if the Entente's political principles favored the Ukrainian position, the political interests of its leading member, France, favored the Poles. Obsessed with preventing the reemergence of a powerful Germany, the French sought to prevent this possibility by creating a powerful Polish state on Germany's eastern border. And if a powerful Poland demanded the absorption of Eastern Galicia, then so be it.

Although the East and West Ukrainians sent a combined delegation to the Paris Peace Conference – which met in January 1919 to redraw the political map of Europe – in practice the West Ukrainians acted separately in the pursuit of their goals. The West Ukrainians sought the recognition of their statehood and the Entente's help in negotiating a settlement with the Poles. However, both Ukrainian delegations found little sympathy at the Paris conference. Only England, which was not enthusiastic about France's Polish plans and which was interested in Galician oil, briefly supported the Ukrainians – but when the government of Lloyd George was defeated in elections, this help evaporated. Meanwhile, the Poles, who developed excellent contacts with the Western powers through the efforts of their fiercely nationalistic (and anti-Ukrainian) leader Roman Dmowski, did their best to discredit the West Ukrainians.

The Poles argued that the Ukrainians were too backward to govern themselves, that their nationality was a German "invention," and that they had Bolshevik tendencies. Because Europeans knew next to nothing about Ukraine and Ukrainians, this Polish propaganda proved to be effective. It was, therefore, not unexpected that on 25 June 1919 the Entente's Council of Ambassadors acknowledged Poland's right to occupy all of Eastern Galicia "in order to protect the civilian population from the dangerous threat of Bolshevik bands."⁷ However, the council did not, as yet, agree to Poland's incorporation of Eastern Galicia. It allowed the Poles to govern the land temporarily on the proviso that they respect the rights of the inhabitants and grant them a measure of autonomy. The ultimate fate of Eastern Galicia was to be decided at some point in the future.

Viewed from the historical perspective, the failure of the West Ukrainians to achieve their goals was not surprising. In Eastern Galicia, where the Ukrainians were best organized and most nationally conscious, the problems were basically of a quantitative nature: 3.5 million Galician Ukrainians simply could not stand up to the Poles, who were six times as numerous and far more advanced politically and socioeconomically. When the Galicians began their struggle they counted on aid from two sources: Eastern Ukraine was to provide the military and material aid that would balance the Polish advantage, and the Entente, which loudly proclaimed its commitment to the principle of self-determination, was expected, at least, to recognize Ukrainian aspirations.

As it happened, the West preferred Poland to principles and the East Ukrainians could not maintain their own state, let alone aid the Galicians. Therefore, the Galician Ukrainians, who had clearly demonstrated their ability to govern themselves, failed to achieve statehood for reasons beyond their control. This is not to say that they were without failings: uninspiring leadership, poor strategic planning, and belated contacts with the West certainly undermined their efforts. Nonetheless, were it not for the overwhelming predominance of the Poles, there is little doubt that the West Ukrainian National Republic would have taken its place among the other new nation-states of Eastern Europe.

The Denouement

The retreat of the Galicians into Eastern Ukraine and their link with the forces of the Directory was a momentous occasion in the history of the Ukrainian national movement. For the first time the West and East Ukrainian nationalists, who had for generations emphasized their fraternal bonds, came into contact with each other on a mass scale. Now, as the Ukrainian Revolution entered its final phase, they would have an opportunity to see how well they could cooperate.

Despite their precarious position in the small stretch of Podilian territory that they controlled, there was hope that these two sorely pressed governments and armies would coalesce into a single and effective force. Militarily, the Ukrainians had never been stronger. The Galician army numbered about 50,000 men. Of all the Ukrainian, Bolshevik, and White Russian armies that fought in Ukraine, it was probably the most disciplined and efficient. As a result of its recent reorganization and the addition of several highly talented commanders, the 35,000-man army of the Directory had improved greatly. In addition, about 15,000 partisans, led by *otamany* such as Zeleny and Anhel, coordinated their activities with those of the Directory's forces. Thus, the Ukrainians had a force of about 100,000 battle-tested troops that made them a contender to be reckoned with.

The influx of conscientious Galician officials also had a positive impact on the Directory's administrative apparatus. For the first time, a semblance of law, order, and stability appeared on the Directory's territory. This rise in administrative effectiveness, as well as the peasants' growing disenchantment with the Bolsheviks, led to an increasingly favorable response to the Directory's mobilization efforts on the Right Bank. However, the lack of arms and provisions forced Petliura to send many of the new recruits back to their homes. At this promising juncture in their struggle, two conditions had to be met in order that the Ukrainians could take advantage of the opportunities that glimmered before them. They had to establish a smoothly functioning

relationship between the two governments and they needed to convince the Entente to supply them with military supplies.

It quickly became apparent, however, that the differences between the two Ukrainian governments went deeper than their ability to resolve them. First, a highly ambiguous relationship existed between Petliura's Directory and Petrushevych's dictatorship. In theory, the Directory was the all-Ukrainian government and therefore it claimed highest authority; in practice, however, it was the West Ukrainian government that had the stronger army and more efficient administration and so was not predisposed to accept policies with which it disagreed. Second, the two governments were at odds ideologically. The Directory consisted almost exclusively of leftist parties, while the West Ukrainian government had the backing of liberal parties with clearly conservative leanings. As a result, the easterners accused the Galicians of being "reactionaries," and the latter returned the compliment by calling the former "near-Bolsheviks." Highly organized and very nationally conscious, the Galicians reacted to the East Ukrainians' organizational looseness, reliance on improvisation, and social radicalism with scorn. For their part, the East Ukrainians considered the Galicians to be provincial, bureaucratic, and incapable of grasping the broader context of the conflict in Ukraine. In the final analysis, it was clear that the vast cultural, psychological, and political differences that accumulated between East and West Ukrainians during the centuries of living in very dissimilar environments were now coming to the fore.

The impact of these differences became apparent during the combined Ukrainian offensive against the Bolsheviks that was launched in early August 1919. It began successfully and, despite stiff resistance, the Ukrainians captured much of the Right Bank by the end of the month. However, the primary reason for the Bolsheviks' retreat was not the Ukrainian attack but the offensive of the Whites. From Siberia, the forces of Admiral Aleksander Kolchak threatened Moscow; in the Baltic area, General Nikolai Iudenich was preparing to attack Petrograd; and most threatening of all was the onslaught of General Denikin's armies from the Don. In the late summer of 1919, it seemed that the collapse of the Bolshevik regime was imminent.

On 30 August, Galician units marched into Kiev, recently evacuated by the Bolsheviks, and the Directory prepared for a triumphal entry the next day. However, later that day advance units of Denikin's army also moved into the city and confronted the Galicians. Confused about how to react to the Whites – the West Ukrainian government often declared that it had no quarrel with Denikin – the Galicians pulled back, to the great dismay of Petliura and the East Ukrainians, who desperately desired the capture of Kiev for symbolic and political reasons. Days later, when Petliura finally convinced the Galicians to engage the Whites, it was too late to retake the city and the Ukrainian armies retreated westward, embittered with each other and involved in

an unwanted conflict with the Whites. In effect, the struggle for Ukrainian statehood ended here. What followed was an extremely confusing and tragic epilogue.

The Whites Led by reactionary generals who were bent on restoring the old social order and “one, indivisible Russia,” the Whites despised the “socialistic adventurer” Petliura and the East Ukrainian “separatist traitors” almost as much as the Bolsheviks. (They had nothing against the Galicians, however, for they considered them to be foreigners.) The Whites’ stand on the Ukrainian issue was bluntly stated by Vasiliu Shulgin, their leading propagandist, when Denikin’s forces captured Kiev: “The Southwest district [Shulgin refused to use the term “Ukraine”] is Russian, Russian, Russian ... we will give it neither to the Ukrainian traitors nor to the Jewish executioners” (a reference to the numerous Jews in the Bolshevik Cheka or political police).⁸

With attitudes like this predominating among the Whites, it is not surprising that the overconfident Denikin refused even to consider several offers by Petliura to cooperate against the Bolsheviks. This response was one of his greatest blunders, for not only did Denikin lose the support of a large Ukrainian army, but by ordering his troops to attack the Ukrainians he created a situation that worked only to the advantage of the Bolsheviks. Such suicidal inflexibility, which was even more evident in the Whites’ reactionary social policies, contributed greatly to Denikin’s defeat in the fall of 1919. Another way in which the Whites undermined the Directory’s efforts was to convince their patrons, the Entente, to reject Ukrainian appeals for recognition at the Paris Peace Conference and, more important, to deny them any material aid.

By fall 1919, the situation of the Ukrainians was truly tragic. The Whites were attacking them from one side, the Bolsheviks were about to strike from another, and in their rear were the aggressive Poles and the hostile Romanians. This constantly shrinking “perimeter of death” became unbearable when, in October, the exhausted, undernourished Ukrainian armies, bereft of supplies and shelter, were struck by a typhoid epidemic. Within a few weeks the vast majority of these troops were dead, dying, or incapacitated by the disease. It was at this point that the once-proud Galician army disintegrated. By the end of October, it reported that it had only 4000 combat-ready men left. Petliura’s soldiers numbered only 2000. Those who remained tried to save themselves as best they could.

On 6 November 1919, the Galician commander, General Myron Tarnavsky, placed his men under the command of the Whites on the condition that they would not have to fight against other Ukrainians and that they be given a chance to recuperate. Meanwhile, Petrushevych and his associates made their way to Vienna, where they established a government-in-exile. Petliura and the Directory, for their part, sought refuge in Poland while their troops trans-

formed themselves into partisan units that operated behind Bolshevik lines. Thus, in a depressing finale, remnants of the two Ukrainian governments and armies found themselves in the camps of each other's enemies.

Petliura's alliance with Poland There was, however, a sequel to the protracted defeat of the Ukrainian struggle for independence. On 21 April 1920, Petliura, after renouncing all claims to Eastern Galicia (a move which enraged the Galician Ukrainians), concluded a pact with the Poles for a combined attack against the Bolsheviks in Ukraine. The Polish motive for entering into this unexpected agreement was their desire to create an East Ukrainian buffer state between themselves and Russia. They hoped that once Petliura's reconstituted army appeared in Ukraine, their offensive would gain the support of the land's anti-Bolshevik peasantry. As usual, matters went well at the outset and by 6 May the allied forces, numbering about 65,000 Poles and 15,000 Ukrainians, took Kiev.

The expected ground swell of peasant support did not materialize, however. Apparently Petliura's personal popularity with many peasants was not great enough to overcome their traditional dislike of his Polish "landlord" allies. By June the Bolsheviks launched a counterattack, which eventually led to Polish/Soviet peace talks and the Poles' abandonment of Petliura. The East Ukrainian army, which had grown to about 35,000 men, fought on alone against the Bolsheviks until 10 November 1920, when it was forced to abandon its small stretch of Volhynia and accept internment in Polish-held territory. Except for several unsuccessful partisan operations that were launched into Soviet Ukraine a year later, the war for Ukrainian independence was finally over.

Bolshevik Victory

After their second defeat in Ukraine in the late summer of 1919, the Bolsheviks reevaluated their policies. The Ukrainians in the party, led by Iurii Lapchynsky, were sharply critical of their colleagues' tendency to ignore Ukrainian particularities. They argued that "Ukraine cannot accept as ready-made the forms of life which have been developed in Russia during one and a half years of Soviet construction."⁹ The party leadership, if not the rank and file, reluctantly agreed that the Bolsheviks had greatly antagonized the peasants with their grain requisitions and had badly underestimated the strength of nationalism in their previous expeditions into Ukraine. Lenin also played a prominent role in this self-criticism, stating that "to ignore the importance of the national question in Ukraine, of which the Great Russians are very frequently guilty (and probably the Jews are guilty of it only a little less frequently than the Great Russians) means committing a profound and dan-

gerous error ... we must struggle especially energetically against remnants (sometimes subconscious ones) of Great Russian imperialism and chauvinism among the Russian Communists."¹⁰

Lenin's advice, however, was not to give in to Ukrainian demands for independence – neither the independent statehood that the nationalists wanted nor the organizational independence that many Ukrainian Bolsheviks desired – but to add more Ukrainian “color” to Soviet rule in that country. Therefore, the formation, on 21 December 1919, of the third Ukrainian Soviet government was accompanied with patriotic rhetoric such as “the free and independent Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic again arises from the dead.”¹¹ Another manifesto announced that one of the main goals of the Communist Party of Ukraine was to “defend the independence and integrity of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Ukraine.”¹² The party's few Ukrainians were given prominent (but not key) positions in the government and instructions went out to party functionaries to use the Ukrainian language whenever possible and to show respect for Ukrainian culture.

To placate the Ukrainian peasantry, the Bolsheviks ceased the collectivization of landholdings, a policy that had met much greater resistance in Ukraine than in Russia. Although they continued to expropriate grain, the Bolsheviks now argued that it was destined for the Ukrainian Soviet army, not for Russia. And greater emphasis than before was placed on tactics that raised tensions among the rich, middle, and poor peasants. Realizing that all attempts to win over the approximately 500,000 kulaks were hopeless, the Bolsheviks concentrated on attracting the middle peasants by assuring them that they could retain their land. The party also expanded its old policy of forming Committees of Poor Peasants (*komnezamy*) in order to neutralize the influence of the kulaks in the village.

Despite these adjustments, it was still the military power of Soviet Russia that assured the ultimate triumph of Bolshevik rule in Ukraine. By fall 1919, the Red Army had 1.5 million men; in spring 1920 it numbered close to 3.5 million, led by about 50,000 former tsarist officers that the Bolsheviks pressed into service. Thus, when the Bolsheviks returned to Ukraine in full force in early December 1919, their victory over their enemies was practically assured. Nonetheless, even when the last of the Ukrainian and White armies were pushed out in November 1920, Bolshevik control of the Ukrainian countryside was far from secure. Large numbers of peasants, especially the kulaks, remained vehemently opposed to communism and they continued a stubborn but uncoordinated guerrilla war against the Bolsheviks.

The anti-Bolshevik partisans, who formed more than 100 major units, numbered over 40,000. In the south, the famous Makhno, benefiting from widespread support, held out until August 1921. In the Kiev region, some of Petliura's *otamany*, such as Iurii Tiutiunnyk, led large, well-armed units

of 1000–2000 men and maintained steady contact with the exiled Ukrainian government in Poland. Only after the Bolsheviks committed over 50,000 men, most of whom were members of Cheka, did they manage to break the back of the partisan movement in late 1921. And only then could the Bolsheviks claim not only that they had conquered Ukraine, but that they actually controlled it.



At a time when empires collapsed and almost all the peoples of Eastern Europe, including such small subject nations of the tsars as the Finns, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, gained their independence, why was it that the 30 million Ukrainians did not? The question is all the more pertinent because the Ukrainians probably fought longer for independence and paid a higher price in lives than any other East European nation.

In considering the general reasons for the Ukrainian defeat, it is necessary to distinguish between internal and external factors and the East and West Ukrainians' situations. In terms of internal factors, the basic dilemma of the Ukrainians - and this applies mainly to the East Ukrainians - was, to repeat a crucial point, that they were forced to begin the state-building process before they had completed nation-building. The delay and underdevelopment of nation-building was a result of tsarist suppression and of nation-building's weak social base. Of all the social groups and classes in Ukraine, the intelligentsia was most prominent in the national movement and the state-building effort. However, the intelligentsia made up only 2–3% of the general population and only a small part of it was involved in the Ukrainian cause. Many of these intellectuals were as deeply steeped in Russian as in Ukrainian culture and it was psychologically difficult suddenly to sever their bonds with Russia. Hence their wavering on independence and their attraction to autonomy and federalism. Finally, even in the course of the revolution and the Civil War, many Ukrainian intelligentsia were still unsure as to which goal was more important: social transformation or national liberation. Therefore, in Eastern Ukraine, the revolution placed idealistic, patriotic but inexperienced intellectuals into positions of leadership and forced them to act before they were sure of what they wanted or how to get it.

In assuming the leadership in the struggle for independence, the Ukrainian intelligentsia counted on peasant support. However, this huge reservoir of potential backers did not live up to its expectations. Uneducated, parochial, and politically immature, the peasant knew what he was against but was not sure of what he stood for. He could understand that he was an exploited toiler. Hence the early success of Bolshevik propaganda. Yet the more complex idea of nationhood was difficult for him to grasp and it was only late in the Civil

War that many of the better-educated peasants definitively began to favor national self-government. But by that time the best opportunities for independence had already passed.

Even when the peasant was willing to support the cause of independence, organizing this support was exceedingly difficult. Unlike the small but compact groups of workers who were concentrated in a few of the largest cities and thus easily accessible to the Bolsheviks, the peasants were scattered in thousands of villages. Convincing them to cooperate was a logistical problem with which the inexperienced intelligentsia found it difficult to deal. If the support that the Ukrainian nationalists had among the intelligentsia and peasants was problematic, the support they lacked in the cities – this applies to Galicia as well – was decisive. Unable to count on the workers, the urban bourgeoisie, and the administrators, officers, and technicians, the Ukrainian armies had great difficulties holding on to cities, which were the centers of communication, transportation, and administration. Thus, the sociological weaknesses of the Ukrainian movement in 1917–20 became strategic disadvantages that had a major impact on the outcome of the struggle.

Although the internal weaknesses of Ukrainian nationalism were considerable, external factors were decisive in its defeat. In the case of the Galician Ukrainians, whose national movement was as strong as those of other East European countries that attained independence, it was clearly not internal weakness but the overwhelming strength of the Poles that was primarily responsible for its failure. In Eastern Ukraine, it was Bolshevik Russia – not the weak Bolsheviks of Ukraine – that blocked the attainment of independence. Late in 1920, Leon Trotsky, the commander of the Red Army, freely admitted that “Soviet power in Ukraine has held its ground up to now (and it has not held it well) chiefly by the authority of Moscow, the Great Russian Communists and the Russian Red Army.”¹³

The success of Lenin’s party was due not only to its excellent leadership and formidable organization, but also to the fact that it had the vast financial, administrative, industrial, and human resources of Russia at its disposal. The Bolsheviks could count on the support of the Russian and Russified workers in the cities of Ukraine, which allowed them to mobilize adherents when and where it counted most. And the East Ukrainians had another implacable enemy: the Whites. To defeat such enemies would have required greater strength than most emergent national movements could muster.

Confronted with overwhelmingly powerful enemies, both the East and West Ukrainians were unable to gain the recognition and aid of the victorious Entente powers. Among the reasons why the Entente – which was quite forthcoming with military and diplomatic support for the anti-Bolshevik Whites and numerous new East European nation-states – turned its back on the Ukrainians were the following: ignorance of actual conditions in Ukraine, the

energetic and effective anti-Ukrainian propaganda of the Poles and Whites, the association of the Central Rada and Hetmanate with the Germans, and the leftist ("Bolshevik") tendencies of the Directory. Finally, the extremely chaotic conditions that existed in Ukraine in 1917–21 greatly impeded the establishment of national self-government.

Yet the Ukrainians emerged from the revolution and Civil War with gains as well as losses. National consciousness, which had been limited to a part of the intelligentsia, spread to all segments of Ukrainian society. On the one hand, the peasant, who had demonstrated his ability to bring down governments and fight for his interests, gained confidence and a sense of self-worth. With this came his desire for greater respect and consideration for his language and culture. On the other hand, the rise of Ukrainian governments taught peasants to identify themselves as "Ukrainians." Therefore, in a mere four years, the nation-building process moved forward tremendously. In this sense, the upheaval of 1917–21 was not only a socioeconomic but also a national revolution.

While the struggle for national self-determination accounted for the distinctive features of the Ukrainian Revolution, the socioeconomic transformation of the land linked it with the all-Russian Revolution. In Ukraine, as elsewhere in the former tsarist empire, the old order disappeared and the peasants distributed much of the confiscated lands among themselves. Thus, while the dreams of independence were unfulfilled, many Ukrainians had reason to believe that they did not emerge from the upheaval empty-handed. All depended on whether the Soviet government would allow Ukrainians to consolidate and expand on the gains of the revolution.

Soviet Ukraine: The Innovative Twenties

Almost seven years of war and civil strife had left the Bolshevik-controlled parts of the former Russian Empire in shambles. In Ukraine alone the fighting, executions, and epidemics associated with the upheaval, especially the Civil War, took about 1.5 million lives. Lack of food, heating materials, and employment forced hundreds of thousands to abandon the cities for the villages. The production of goods practically ceased. Completely exhausted, the society was clearly not ready for the radical social transformations that the Bolsheviks envisaged.

Despite their victory, the Bolsheviks – a tiny minority in the midst of a huge and largely antagonistic populace – were in no position to proceed as they wished. Lenin's death in 1924 precipitated a leadership crisis that was exacerbated by a fierce debate in the Communist party about which direction it should take in attempting to create a communist society. Under the circumstances, the party was cautious and pliant in pursuing its goals throughout the 1920s. As long as individuals and groups did not openly challenge the Soviet political system, government interference in their affairs was limited.

Ukrainians profited from Soviet flexibility during this period in two ways: from concessions the government made to the peasantry in general and from Soviet attempts to gain broader support among non-Russians. As a result, during the 1920s, Ukrainian self-confidence and aspirations experienced a surprising resurgence and this period has come to be viewed by many as the golden age for Ukrainians under Soviet rule.



War Communism and NEP

Bolshevik policies during the Civil War had contributed greatly to the economic collapse. Intent on immediately establishing a socialist economic or-

der and at the same time providing food for the Red Army and the starving Russian cities, the Bolsheviks introduced harsh economic policies that went under the name of War Communism. These included the nationalization of large estates and industry, the forced mobilization of labor, the rationing by the government of food and goods, and the most hated measure of all, the expropriation of grain from the peasants.

Backed by armed units, Bolshevik officials descended on villages like locusts and confiscated grain from the peasants for government use. Individual peasants were allowed to keep only about thirty pounds of grain a month for themselves. To aid in these confiscations, the party organized Committees of Poor Peasants (*komnezamy*) whose members received priority in the distribution of land, exemption from taxes, and 10–25% of the “take.” Most peasants and workers responded by stopping all production. As the shortfalls in foodstuffs increased, drought hit large parts of southern Russia and Ukraine. The result was the famine of 1921–22 that took hundreds of thousands of lives in Ukraine and even more in the Volga region of Russia.¹ But unlike its behavior a decade later, the Soviet government acknowledged the famine of 1921–22 and organized a massive domestic and international relief effort to aid the hungry.

The catastrophic economic conditions gave rise to a ground swell of dissatisfaction with the Bolsheviks, manifesting itself in military mutinies, violent workers’ strikes, and huge peasant uprisings that engulfed Russia and Ukraine in 1921. Although the Red Army and the Cheka ruthlessly suppressed these rebellions, Lenin was forced to admit that War Communism was a failure and that concessions would have to be made, especially to the peasantry.

Once more Lenin’s vaunted tactical skill, his willingness to take one step back in order to move socialism forward two steps later – the famous Lenin tango – came into play. On 21 March 1921, at the Tenth Party Congress, he persuaded his reluctant associates to accept the New Economic Policy (NEP) – but only after the dangerous Kronstadt revolt (which occurred at the time of the congress) vividly demonstrated how unpopular current Soviet policies were. This policy was a compromise, a temporary retreat from socialism, a chance for the country to recuperate from the Civil War. The main feature of NEP was the attempt to appease the peasantry and to provide it with incentives for raising food production. Instead of requisitioning grain, the government imposed a moderate tax on the peasantry. After paying the tax, the peasant could sell his surplus grain at whatever price the market would bear. Poor peasants did not have to pay a tax at all. The policy of creating collective farms was also abandoned. In Ukraine most of the lands the Central Rada had nationalized back in 1918 were now redistributed to the poorer peasants.

To invigorate other segments of the economy, NEP removed government controls over internal trade, leased small factories back to their former own-



Map 22 Soviet Ukraine during the interwar period

ers, and even encouraged foreign investment. However, although Lenin was willing to compromise with capitalism temporarily, he had no intention of abandoning his dream of creating a socialist economy. Therefore, the government retained control of the "commanding heights" of the economy, such as heavy industry, banking, transportation, and foreign trade.

NEP proved to be a great success. Assured that they could sell their produce to hungry urban dwellers at good prices, Ukraine's 5 million peasant farms quickly raised their productivity. By 1927, there was already 10% more land under cultivation than in 1913. Meanwhile, the consumer-oriented industry, invigorated by the so-called NEP-men or small entrepreneurs who operated with government permission, also reached prewar levels. Only the government-controlled heavy industry lagged behind. As prosperity returned and memories of the nightmarish Civil War years faded, the Ukrainian peasant began to make his peace with the Bolshevik regime that he had previously viewed with such great mistrust.

The Creation of the Soviet Union

Although Lenin and the Bolsheviks had been slow to recognize the importance of nationalism, they treated it with circumspection once they gained power. On the one hand, they came out in favor of national self-determination during the Civil War, "even to the point of separation and formation of independent states." On the other hand, they attempted to crush national movements, arguing that they were led by "bourgeois elements" that would not and could not act in the interests of the working class. But with the defeat of the "bourgeois nationalists," the Bolsheviks (whose hold on the populace was still quite insecure) had to come to terms with the Soviet-led governments of the non-Russian nationalities they had established.

Although the Moscow-based Communist party completely controlled the Ukrainian Soviet government, it was not in a position to dismantle or absorb it. The precedents militating against this move were too great. At Brest-Litovsk, Bolshevik Russia had recognized the Central Rada and its General Secretariat as the sovereign government of an independent state. If they had gone so far as to recognize the sovereignty of a Ukrainian "bourgeois" government, the Bolsheviks could hardly do less for a Ukrainian Soviet government. Therefore, the Ukrainian Soviet government had to be treated, at least in theory, as if it were a sovereign power. Consequently, up to 1923, the Soviet government of Ukraine conducted foreign relations separately from Soviet Russia (concluding forty-eight treaties on its own), carried on foreign trade, and even began to lay the foundations for a separate Ukrainian Soviet army.

Precedents notwithstanding, there were also important groups among the Bolsheviks in Ukraine that agitated for Ukrainian Soviet statehood. They consisted mostly of the Borotbisty and Ukapisty, who had broken away in 1919

from the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary and Ukrainian Social Democratic parties, respectively, and had gone over to the Bolsheviks. Of the two, the Borotbisty, led by Oleksander Shumsky, Vasył Blakytny, and Mykola Shynkar, were by far the more numerous and influential. Because they were an essentially populist party, they had much better ties with the Ukrainian peasantry than did the Bolsheviks. In fact, after the defeat of the second Soviet government in Ukraine in late summer 1919, the Borotbisty even attempted to replace the Bolsheviks as the leaders of the communist revolution in Ukraine. To this end they renamed themselves the Communist Party of Ukraine (Borotbisty) and in early 1920 applied for admission to the Communist International as a separate party. But when the Moscow-controlled Communist International refused their request, the Borotbisty were forced to disband. Because the Bolsheviks sorely needed Ukrainian-speaking members, about 4000 Borotbisty were subsequently accepted into the party and given high posts in the Soviet Ukrainian government. This action allowed many of these nationally conscious leftists to continue the struggle for Ukrainian statehood from within the Soviet regime.

The several hundred Ukapisty underwent a similar experience. They, too, tried to steal the Bolsheviks' thunder by copying them. Calling themselves the Ukrainian Communist party, they attempted, also without success, to gain admittance into the Communist International. In 1925 they were forced to disband and a number of them, including their leaders Mykhailo Tkachenko and Iurii Mazurenko, joined the Bolshevik party for the same reasons as did the Borotbisty: to influence the Ukrainian policies of the party from within.

Unlike these latecomers to the Bolshevik ranks with their divided loyalties, there were a few longtime Ukrainian members of the party who sincerely wanted communism to succeed in Ukraine. They believed that the best way to achieve this goal was to "Ukrainianize" bolshevism in order to make it more appealing to Ukrainians. This meant, first and foremost, that the Soviet government would also have to be a Ukrainian government. Mykola Skrypnyk, a close associate of Lenin and a leading figure in all three Soviet Ukrainian governments, was the most outstanding representative of this group. Finally, there were a number of non-Ukrainian Bolsheviks who had a vested interest in preserving Ukrainian self-government. An example was Khristian Rakovsky, the Russified Romanian-Bulgarian head of the Ukrainian Soviet government, who in 1919 had treated Ukrainian national aspirations with scorn but in 1922 concluded that the more authority a Ukrainian Soviet government had, the more power he personally would wield. Therefore, he, too, became an avowed anticentralist and defender of Ukrainian autonomy.

The above-mentioned views and attitudes were not only widespread among pro-Soviet Ukrainians; they also flourished among the members of the newly formed Soviet governments in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Even Moscow agreed that the ad hoc military alliances and mutual-aid pacts that

had formally linked the Soviet republics (the Red Army and the party were the actual forces that held them together) during the Civil War were no longer adequate. Therefore, in the final months of 1922 the party began a major discussion in Moscow on what the permanent form and nature of the relationship between the Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Transcaucasian Soviet republics should be.

Because he was gravely ill, Lenin's participation in these important debates was limited. This circumstance allowed Josef Stalin, the increasingly powerful commissar for nationalities and general secretary of the party, to play a key role. Although a Georgian by birth, Stalin was an avowed centralist and antinationalist. With the backing of many Russian members of the party, he proposed that the non-Russian republics be absorbed into a single Russian Soviet socialist state. To appease the nationalities, he offered them cultural autonomy within the Russian republic. The proposal caused a furor among the non-Russian Bolsheviks. Skrypnyk and other Ukrainians denounced it as thinly disguised Russian chauvinism. The entire Central Committee of the Georgian Bolshevik party resigned in protest. Sultan Galiev, the spokesman of the Central Asian Bolsheviks, accused the party of sponsoring "Red imperialism."

At this point, Lenin stepped in. He realized that if a Russian Soviet state were to swallow up the other Soviet republics, it not only would erode the very weak support the Bolsheviks had in the non-Russian republics, but also would create a very poor impression of the Soviet system among the colonial peoples of the world. If Russian nationalism and centralism endangered the prospects for global revolution, Lenin declared himself ready "to challenge Great Russian chauvinism to mortal combat."² He proposed, therefore, that all the Soviet republics form a "union of equals."

To demonstrate that the union was voluntary, Lenin proposed that every republic have the *right* of secession from the union. And this point was enshrined in the Soviet constitution of 1924. Governmental prerogatives were so arranged that certain affairs remained the exclusive domain of a given republic; other jurisdictions were to be shared by both republican and all-union ministries; still others were to be handled by the all-union government alone. Thus, the Ukrainian Soviet government had, in theory, exclusive jurisdiction in its republic over agriculture, internal affairs, justice, education, health, and social welfare. It was to share authority with the all-union government over matters relating to food, labor, finance, inspections, and national economy. Foreign affairs, the army and navy, transport, foreign trade, and communications were to be the exclusive domain of the all-union government based in Moscow.

But, on Lenin's insistence, a crucial qualification was made to this plan. The all-important right to secede, that ultimate proof of a republic's sovereignty, could be exercised only if the Communist party agreed to it. Because the

Communist party remained a highly centralized and overwhelmingly Russian organization based in Moscow, it was extremely unlikely that any such agreement would be forthcoming. Thus, Lenin's plan allowed for the creation of a federalist structure (or facade, as some have called it) to assuage the non-Russians, while assuring that complete political control remained in the hands of the Moscow-based party.

Although the non-Russians, Ukrainians in particular, had serious reservations about them, Lenin's proposals were clearly preferable to those put forth by Stalin. Therefore, on 30 December 1922, they were endorsed by the representatives of the Russian, Belorussian, Transcaucasian, and Ukrainian Soviet republics and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) came into being.

Upon its entry into the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian republic constituted its second-largest component (the Russian republic being the largest by far). It encompassed a territory of 450,000 sq. km and a population of over 26 million. Kharkiv was selected as the capital of the republic because it was not as closely associated with former national governments as was Kiev. Originally, the republic was divided into 12 *gubernii*; in 1925 an administrative reorganization created 41 *okruhy*; and in 1939 it was reorganized again into 15 *oblasti*. Of the more than 5 million non-Ukrainians in the republic, many inhabited the 12 administrative regions set aside for them.

Various interpretations have been offered to explain why the USSR took on a pseudo-federal form. Some Western scholars argue that this was a clever camouflage for the Russian center's reassertion of control over the non-Russian periphery. Others believe that the federal structure was a concession that the victorious, yet weak, Soviet regime had to make to the nascent national consciousness of the non-Russian nationalities. Soviet authors view their federal system as a successful attempt to create a new and better structure within which various nationalities could coexist harmoniously and develop freely.

But the structure of the USSR did not allow the various nationalities to conduct their affairs as they desired. Ultimate decision-making regarding Ukraine still rested with Moscow, not Kharkiv. Nor had Ukrainians as a whole been consulted about the very formation of the union. Basically, the tiny and predominantly Russian party decided what the relationship between Ukraine and Russia would be.

It would be inaccurate to say, however, that the Ukrainians and other non-Russian nationalities emerged empty-handed from the Soviet federal arrangement. Under the tsars, Ukrainian language, culture, and national identity had been viciously suppressed. The very boundaries of Ukraine had been ill defined and it had been called by such vague terms as "the Southwest" or "Little Russia." Under the Soviets, in contrast, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (URSR) became a well-defined national and territorial entity, possessing its own administrative center and apparatus. Thus, the Ukrainians finally obtained a territorial-administrative framework that reflected their national

identity. It was something they had not had since the Cossack Hetmanate of the 18th century.

Ukrainization

Despite Bolshevik promises made during the Civil War to respect the principle of national self-determination, and despite the formation of nationally based Soviet republics and the ostensibly federal structure of the Soviet Union, the Communist party still lacked meaningful support among the non-Russians during the early years of its rule. It remained a tiny and overwhelmingly Russian, urban-based organization that perched precariously atop uncertain masses of peasants and non-Russians of dubious loyalty. Ukraine in particular, as Stalin himself openly acknowledged, was “a weak point of Soviet power.” Therefore, after appeasing the peasants with NEP, the party initiated an attempt to win acceptance and to broaden its support among the non-Russians.

In 1923, at the Twelfth Party Congress, the party leadership embarked on a policy of indigenization or *korenizatsia* (“taking roots”). It called for a concerted effort to recruit non-Russians into the party and state apparatus, for Soviet officials to learn and use local languages, and for state support of cultural and social development among the nationalities. The Ukrainian version of this policy was called Ukrainization.

Before Ukrainization could be implemented, however, changes had to be made in the party leadership in Ukraine. As it stood, this leadership consisted mostly of Soviet officials sent in from Russia or local Jews. By and large, they showed little understanding for Ukrainization and even less inclination for putting it into effect. Indeed, many of them made a point of espousing Russian superiority over the “locals.” For example, one of the highest officials of the Ukrainian party, Dmitrii Lebed, was a Russian who made no effort to conceal his hostility to the Ukrainian language, customs, and Ukrainization in general. He enunciated the “Theory of the Struggle of Two Cultures,” which held that because Russian culture in Ukraine was associated with the progressive proletariat and the city – while Ukrainian culture was tied to the backward peasantry and the countryside – Russian culture would inevitably triumph, and it was the duty of Communists to support this “natural process.”

Although Lebed’s ideas were shared by many of his superiors in Moscow, they were considered untimely, and he and a number of other prominent non-Ukrainian party officials were recalled. Their posts were filled by such loyal and disciplined representatives of Moscow as Lazar Kaganovich, a Ukrainian Jew who took over leadership of the party apparatus in Ukraine and was ready to follow the party’s line on Ukrainization, or else by Ukrainians who sincerely wanted Ukrainization to succeed. Among the latter were Vlas Chubar, who replaced Rakovsky as the head of the Ukrainian Soviet govern-

ment; Oleksander Shumsky, a former Borotbist, who assumed responsibility for the department of agitation and propaganda; and the ubiquitous Old Bolshevik Mykola Skrypnyk, who became commissar of justice. Only after the hard-line "Russian bureaucrats and chauvinists," as Lenin called them, were removed from their posts was the Ukrainian Soviet government ready to implement the new policy.

The first measures introduced under the Ukrainization policy were aimed at expanding the use of Ukrainian, particularly in the party and government. The need for doing so was obvious: in 1922, for every one member of the Ukrainian party who regularly used Ukrainian, seven functioned only in Russian, and in the government the ratio was one to three. In order to deal with this imbalance, government and party officials were instructed in August 1923 to take specially organized Ukrainian-language courses. Those who failed to complete them successfully were threatened with dismissal. By 1925 bureaucrats received instructions to use Ukrainian in all government correspondence and publications. And in 1927 Kaganovich declared that "all party business will be conducted in Ukrainian."³ Despite the notable lack of enthusiasm among the numerous non-Ukrainians in the government and party, the new policies produced impressive results. Whereas in 1922 only 20% of government business was conducted in Ukrainian, by 1927 the figure rose to 70%.

At the same time, the number of Ukrainians in the political establishment of the republic increased. In 1923 only 35% of government employees and 23% of party members were Ukrainian. By 1926–27 the respective percentages rose to 54% and 52%. Yet, although they had gained a majority in both organizations, as newcomers, Ukrainians were largely concentrated in the lower levels of government and the party. In the late 1920s, their representation in the party's Central Committee was not more than 25%.

The Ukrainization drive penetrated all aspects of life in Soviet Ukraine. Its greatest impact was on education. Unlike the tsarist regime, the Soviets placed a high priority on education, and their achievements in this area were truly impressive. Several factors help to explain the Soviet emphasis on education: from the ideological point of view, Soviet society had to be well educated if it was to serve as a model of the new order; furthermore, an educated populace greatly increased the productive capacity and power of the state; and finally, education provided excellent opportunities for indoctrinating the new generation with Soviet values. Most dramatic were Soviet strides in the elimination of illiteracy. At the time of the revolution, about 40% of the urban populace was literate; ten years later the figure rose to 70%. In the countryside, the literacy rate during this period rose from 15% to over 50%. Because this massive education drive was conducted in Ukrainian, the spread of education meant the spread of Ukrainization among the country's youth.

The driving force behind the Ukrainization of the school system was Skryp-

nyk, who headed the Commissariat of Education from 1927 to 1933. Working with almost obsessive zeal, he was able to announce in 1929, at the high point of Ukrainization, that over 80% of general-education schools, 55% of vocational schools, and 30% of university-level institutes offered instruction in Ukrainian only. Over 97% of Ukrainian children were taught in their native language. The Russian and Jewish minorities had the opportunity to study in Russian but were expected to take some courses in Ukrainian. Before the revolution, when Ukrainian schools were practically nonexistent, Ukrainophiles could only have dreamt of such conditions; a decade later, Skrypnyk made them a reality.

The success of these measures was all the more imposing in view of the attendant difficulties, particularly the lack of qualified teachers. The Ukrainization program called for 100,000 teachers but only 45,000 were available. In desperation, Skrypnyk attempted to import several thousand teachers from Galicia, but he failed to get Moscow's permission, perhaps because of Soviet fear of the Galicians' highly developed national consciousness. Also, many textbooks were still unavailable. Another problem, evident especially at the university level, was the refusal by many Russians (who constituted the majority of the faculties) to use the "peasant" language for purposes of higher education. Professor Tolstoi in Odessa expressed a typical attitude when he commented, "I consider ... all comrades who have switched to lecturing in the Ukrainian language as renegades."⁴ Nevertheless, even in the universities, Ukrainian students soon became the majority. This rapid Ukrainization of the schools gave rise to a general mood of national optimism, which the writer Borys Antonenko-Davydovych captured in his comment: "In the march of millions on their way to the Ukrainian school" he could see "the fire of a great revival."⁵

This same sense of revival was evident in the Ukrainian-language media, which had been harshly repressed by the tsarist regime and treated poorly in the early years of Soviet rule. In 1922 only 27% of the books published in Ukraine appeared in Ukrainian and there were fewer than 10 newspapers and periodicals in that language. By 1927, well over 50% of new books appeared in Ukrainian; and by 1933, of the 426 newspapers in the republic, 373 were in the native language.

Largely as a result of Skrypnyk's complaints that the Red Army acted as an agent of Russification, Ukrainian was introduced into officer-training schools and large reserve units in Ukraine. There were even plans to reorganize the army on a territorial basis. Surprisingly, such well-known non-Ukrainian commanders of the Red Army troops in Ukraine as Mikhail Frunze and Iona Iakir supported these projects.

For Ukrainization to achieve long-lasting results, it had to break the Russian cultural monopoly in the cities. The socioeconomic changes that took place in the 1920s and 1930s encouraged Ukrainizers to believe that such a re-

sult was possible. The Soviets' vast industrialization drive, launched in 1928, created a great need for urban workers. Simultaneously, collectivization policies in the countryside forced many peasants from the land. Consequently, masses of Ukrainian peasants poured into the cities, greatly altering the ethnic composition of the proletariat and of the urban population as a whole. Thus, although in 1923 Ukrainians in such important industrial centers as Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Dnepropetrovsk had constituted 38%, 7%, and 16% of their populations, respectively, ten years later these percentages had increased to 50%, 31%, and 48%. By the mid 1930s, Ukrainians were the majority in most of the large cities. And they were encouraged by the Ukrainization programs to retain their native language rather than to adopt Russian, as had been done previously. It seemed, therefore, that in Ukraine, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the culture and language of the rural majority was going to overwhelm that of the urban minority.

The success of the policy of Ukrainization, which did not go as far as Skrypnyk and his associates would have wished, was a result, first and foremost, of the fact that it was linked to the general process of modernization. It was not primarily patriotism or traditionalism that caused Ukrainians to retain their native language; rather, it was because, better than any other language, Ukrainian allowed them to obtain an education, to obtain useful information from newspapers and books, to communicate with officials, and to perform their jobs. Because of the Ukrainization programs, Ukrainian language and culture ceased being a romantic, esoteric obsession of a tiny intelligentsia or the hallmark of a backward peasantry. Instead, Ukrainian was well on its way to becoming the primary means of communication and expression of a modernizing, industrializing society.

National Communism

As a result of the variants of communism that have evolved in such countries as China and Yugoslavia, the idea that a nation can pursue "its own road to communism" is well established today. As we have seen, it was the Ukrainian, as well as the Georgian and Turkic, Bolsheviks that had helped bring the Soviet regime to power in 1917–20 and first struck out in this direction, pioneering the phenomenon of national communism. Adherents of this trend were dedicated communists who sincerely believed that Marxism-Leninism was humanity's surest route to salvation. Yet, they also thought that for communism to achieve optimal results, it had to adapt to specific national conditions. This view implied that the Russian way was not the only way and that approaches to communism chosen by other nations were equally valid. In other words, an attempt should be made to harness the forces of nationalism for the building of socialism by providing communism with a "national face."

Given the close ties that the Ukrainian national movement in Eastern Ukraine had long had with socialism, national communist ideas came easily to many Ukrainians in the Bolshevik camp. As early as 1918, two Communists, Vasyl Shakhrai (the first Soviet Ukrainian commissar of foreign affairs) and his colleague Serhii Mazlakh (an Old Bolshevik of Jewish origin), bitterly attacked the party for its hypocritical attitude towards nationalism in general and Ukrainians in particular. With a clear reference to the Russian nationalism that permeated the Bolshevik party, they stressed in their pamphlets, "Revolution in Ukraine" and "On the Current Situation in Ukraine," that "so long as the nationality question is not resolved, so long as one nation rules and another is forced to be subordinate to it, what we have is not socialism."⁶

A year later, national communist views again surfaced in the CP(b)U in the so-called federalist opposition, led by Iurii Lapchynsky. This group called for "the total independence of the Soviet Ukrainian state, which must command its full measure of power, including regional military and economic authority as well as an independent party center in no way subordinate to the Russian Communist party."⁷ When Moscow refused to consider these demands, Lapchynsky and his associates caused a furor by resigning from the party.

When the Ukrainization drive began to gain momentum, national communist tendencies in Ukraine, usually identified with the names of their main proponents, again came to the fore.

Khvylovyism The most direct and emotional call for rejecting the "Russian road" was sounded by Mykola Khvylovy. This remarkable individual, whose real name was Fitylov, grew up in Eastern Ukraine as the son of a petty Russian nobleman. A committed internationalist, he joined the Bolsheviks during the Civil War in hopes of helping to create a truly universal and equitable communist society. After the Civil War, Khvylovy became one of the most popular Soviet Ukrainian writers, an organizer of the avant-garde literary organization Vaplite, and a frequent commentator on Ukrainian/Russian relations, particularly in the area of culture.

An idealistic communist, Khvylovy was bitterly disillusioned by the glaring discrepancies that existed between Bolshevik nationality theory and practice, and also by the Russian chauvinism of party bureaucrats, who, as he put it, masked their bias "behind Marx's beard." To save the revolution from the pernicious impact of Russian nationalism, Khvylovy resolved to expose it. Couching his message in literary terms, he claimed that "passive-pessimistic Russian literature had reached its limits and stopped at the crossroads" and he advised Ukrainians to distance themselves from it: "Insofar as our literature can at last follow its own path of development, the question before us is: toward which of the world's literatures must it chart its course? In no case toward the Russian. This is absolute and unconditional ... The essence of the matter is that Russian literature has weighed us down for centuries. Being

the master of the situation, it accustomed our psyche to slavish imitation. For our young art to nourish itself [on Russian literature] would mean stunting its growth. Our orientation is toward the art of Western Europe, toward its style, toward its reception."⁸

To emphasize that Ukrainians were fully capable of creating socialist art on their own, he stated that "the young Ukrainian nation – the Ukrainian proletariat and its Communist intelligentsia – are the bearers of the great revolutionary socialist ideas and they must not orient themselves on the All-Union Philistinism: on its Moscow sirens."⁹ Khvylovy's impassioned pleas for Ukrainians to strike out on their own gave rise to the famous slogan: "Away from Moscow!"

While Khvylovy directed his ideas primarily at young writers searching for literary models, his message clearly had political implications. It should be stressed, however, that his anti-Russianism was not so much a product of Ukrainian nationalism as of revolutionary internationalism. Khvylovy was convinced that the global revolution would never succeed if one nation, in this case the Russians, attempted to monopolize it.

Shumskyism The danger that Khvylovy's views posed to the Soviet regime was heightened by the support that they found not only in Ukrainian literary circles, but also within the Communist party of Ukraine as well, particularly among the former Borotbisty. The leader of the latter was Oleksander Shumsky, the commissar of education, who, despite demands from Moscow loyalists that he condemn Khvylovy refused to do so and came forward with his own criticism of Moscow. The former Borotbisty had their own reasons for believing that the party's approach to the national question was hypocritical. When they first joined the Communist party, Shumsky and his associates were given high government posts so as to provide the Soviet government with a "Ukrainian flavor." But promptly after the Bolshevik victory, almost all of them were demoted or expelled from the party. With the advent of Ukrainization, some of the survivors – most notably Shumsky – were once again raised to high office at Moscow's behest, in order to create the impression that Ukraine was governed by Ukrainians. This time, however, the commissar of education resolved to expose Moscow's machinations.

While he, too, denounced Russian chauvinism, Shumsky's main goal was to attack the sacred Bolshevik principle of centralism. In a letter written to Stalin in early 1926, he pointed to the burgeoning Ukrainian national renaissance and argued that, for the party's own good, such a dynamic, broadly based movement should be controlled by Ukrainian Communists and not by non-Ukrainians. Otherwise, the increasingly nationally conscious Ukrainians, who had never been particularly well disposed to the Bolsheviks, might turn against what they perceived to be a foreign regime and overthrow it. To avoid this possibility, Shumsky proposed that Ukrainian Communists such

as Hryhorii Hrynko and Vlas Chubar be appointed to lead the Ukrainian Soviet government and the Communist party of Ukraine and that such non-Ukrainian appointees of Moscow as Emmanuil Kvirng (a Latvian) and Lazar Kaganovich (a Russified Jew) be recalled. Presented as a means of ensuring the growth of communism, the proposal called for nothing less than the selection of Ukraine's political leadership in Ukraine, not Moscow.

Shumsky also denounced the Ukrainians who, under the self-serving guise of loyal service to the party, made Moscow's centralism possible. At a meeting of the Ukrainian Communist leadership in May 1927, he declared that "in the party the Russian Communist governs with suspicion and unfriendliness ... He rules by receiving support from a contemptible Little Russian who, throughout all historical epochs has been basically hypocritical, servilely deceitful and treacherously underhanded. Now he sings his faulty internationalism, defies with his indifferent attitude everything that is Ukrainian and is ever ready to spit at it (sometimes in Ukrainian) if this only would give him the possibility of obtaining a better position."¹⁰

Shumsky's critique caused an uproar among Communists both within and outside the Soviet Union. Stalin noted that "Comrade Shumsky does not realize that in Ukraine, where the indigenous Communist cadres are weak, such a movement ... may assume in places the character of a struggle ... against 'Moscow' in general, against the Russians in general, against Russian culture and its greatest achievement, Leninism."¹¹ While Shumsky's ideas were harshly condemned by party loyalists in Kharkiv and Moscow, they found support in the Galicia-based Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU). The West Ukrainian Communist leader Karlo Maksymovych brought Shumsky's arguments to the forum of the Communist International and used the occasion to attack Moscow's treatment of the Ukrainians. Even some West European socialists showed an interest in the "Shumsky Affair." The German Social Democrat Emil Strauss proclaimed that "European socialism has all the grounds to support morally the struggle of the Ukrainian people for freedom. Since Marx, it has been in the best socialist tradition to struggle against any social and national oppression."¹²

Volobuevism In early 1928, a new "deviation" appeared among the Ukrainian Communists. Its exponent was a young Ukrainian economist of Russian origin, Mykhailo Volobuev. As did Khvylovy in literature and Shumsky in politics, Volobuev sought to reveal the disparity between Bolshevik theory and practice in the field of economics. In two articles that appeared in *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, the official theoretical journal of the Ukrainian party, Volobuev argued that, under Soviet rule, Ukraine continued to be an economic colony of Russia just as it had been under the tsars. To buttress his point, he carried out a careful analysis showing how, to the detriment of the Ukrainian periphery, heavy industry continued to be built in the Russian cen-

ter. In addition, Volobuev claimed that the economy of the USSR was not a uniform, single unit, but a complex of economic components of which Ukraine was but one. Not only was each of these economic components capable of surviving on its own, but each clearly had the capability of becoming a part of the world economy by itself without the intermediary of the Russian economy.

Meanwhile, the Communist party had been ready to make concessions such as Ukrainization. It had even acknowledged some of its failings, such as the prevalence of Russian chauvinism in its ranks. But it could not allow the views of Khvylovy, Shumsky, and Volobuev to spread, for in all probability, this dispersion would lead to a challenge of its control over Ukraine. Even Skrypnyk, the great proponent of Ukrainization, believed that these "nationalist deviations" were a mortal threat to the party, and he led the counterattack against their supporters. Therefore, shortly after each of these "deviations" surfaced, their exponents were put under severe pressure to retract their views and confess to a variety of errors. After expressing varying degrees of defiance, all three complied. By late 1928, Khvylovy returned to strictly literary pursuits; Shumsky was shipped off to a minor party post in Russia; and Volobuev slipped into oblivion. However, during the Stalinist purges in the 1930s, their "sins" would be remembered and would cost these national communists their lives.

Finally, to put these national communist tendencies in proper perspective, they ought to be viewed in conjunction with developments in the party itself. After the death of Lenin in 1924, an intense struggle for power and leadership developed among the Bolshevik elite in Moscow. As a result, party control and discipline loosened, allowing various factions and ideological currents to proliferate. But this period of relative liberalism and pluralism, of an open struggle between conflicting ideas, was about to come to an abrupt end.

The Cultural Upsurge

The 1920s were a time of extraordinary growth, innovation, and ferment in Ukrainian culture. Some writers even refer to it as a period of cultural revolution or renaissance. This multifaceted outburst of creative energy was possible because the Communist party, concerned primarily with maintaining its political hegemony, had not as yet attempted to control cultural development. And the spread of Ukrainian-language education had established a broad basis for Ukrainian culture that had long been lacking in Eastern Ukraine. For the first time, Ukrainian culture could count on state support because important agencies such as the Ministry of Education were controlled by ardent Ukrainians such as Hrynko, Shumsky, and Skrypnyk.

It was, however, the effects of the revolution that provided the major thrust for this renaissance. Although the emigration of a large part of the old intel-

ligentsia was a setback for cultural growth, it was more than offset by the emergence of a vast new pool of creative talents. Some of these young artists were apolitical and believed in the idea of "art for art's sake." Others were ardent revolutionaries who were associated with the Borotbisty and Ukrainian communists. When their hopes for independent statehood were frustrated, many of them saw cultural growth as an alternative means of expressing the national distinctiveness of their people.

The revolution also injected into cultural activity a sense of newness, a feeling that the old world and its restrictions had been swept away. Challenging and stimulating questions arose about the direction Ukrainian cultural development should take, the models it should utilize, and the kind of culture it ought to be. Inspired by a sense of mission and by a growing audience, writers, artists, and scholars plunged enthusiastically into the creation of a whole new cultural universe.

Literature Nowhere was this vibrant new mood so evident as in literature. The Marxist writers espoused the view that in order to fulfill itself, the revolution would have to reach into the cultural as well as social and political realms. That is, the "bourgeois" art of the past would have to be supplanted by a new proletarian art. They were quick to add, however, that "proletarian art can attain international unity only by national paths."¹³

In Russia the attempt to create a proletarian culture led to the formation of a literary organization called Proletcult, which was based on two key principles: that it was possible to create a proletarian culture without regard to the traditions and standards of the past, and that the masses should participate in the creation of this culture. Because Proletcult identified with urban Russian culture, the organization made little headway among Ukrainians. Still, its ideas were influential in the rise of the so-called mass literary organizations in Ukraine.

In 1922, Pluh, the first of the mass literary organizations, emerged in Kharkiv under the leadership of Serhii Pylypenko. Declaring that the masses (which in Ukraine meant primarily the peasants) should produce the kind of literature they wanted, the organization established a network of writing workshops that soon attracted about 200 writers and thousands of aspiring writers. A spokesman for the organization defined its attitude toward art: "The task of our time in the realm of art is to lower it, to bring it down to earth from its pedestal, to make it necessary and intelligible to all."¹⁴ A year later, Vasyl Ellan-Blakytny organized Hart, a literary group that also wished to work for the formation of a proletarian culture in Ukraine. However, the members of Hart were wary of the idea of "massivism," fearing that it might lead to a lowering of standards in the arts.

Alongside these Marxist organizations, small groups of ideologically uncommitted or "nonproletarian" writers and artists also sprang up. Of the

Symbolists, Pavlo Tychyna was the most prominent. The Futurists were led by Mykhailo Semenko. Maksym Rylsky and Mykola Zerov were foremost among the Neoclassicists. By and large, these writers agreed with the view of the Symbolist Iurii Mezhenko that “a creative individual can create only when he holds himself higher than the mass, and when, although independent of it, he still feels a sense of national identity with it.”¹⁵ Because the Marxist and non-Marxist groups and organizations published journals that espoused their views and criticized those of dissenting writers, literary debates and controversies abounded.

When Blakytny died in 1925, Hart disintegrated. However, that same year many of its former members – led by Khvylovy and including the playwright Mykola Kulish, the poets Tychyna and Bazhan, and the prose writers Petro Panch, Iurii Ianovsky, and Ivan Senchenko – formed Vaplite (Free Academy of Proletarian Literature), an elitist literary organization. Worried that the pedagogic-enlightenment mentality (*prosvitiantstvo*) and “massivism” of Pluh only encouraged Ukrainian provincialism, Khvylovy and his colleagues raised the demand for literary and artistic excellence in Ukrainian literature. They called for its orientation toward Europe and the traditional sources of world literature, and for a declaration of Ukrainian cultural independence from Moscow. Khvylovy’s forceful statement of these views sparked an important and far-ranging debate that lasted from 1925 to 1927 and is usually referred to as the “Literary Discussion.”

Not only did Pylypenko and other adherents of Pluh disagree with Vaplite, but the members of the Communist leadership in Ukraine also joined in the criticism of Vaplite’s “bourgeois-nationalist ideology.” Even Stalin pointed out the dangerousness of Khvylovy’s ideas. To combat the spread of nationalist ideas in literature, a pro-Soviet organization, VUSPP (the All-Ukrainian Association of Proletarian Writers), was formed in 1927 and the Communist party’s surveillance of literary activity increased.

In the midst of this ferment, there appeared literary works of high quality. Pavlo Tychyna and Maksym Rylsky, the two outstanding Ukrainian poets of the period, flourished at this time. Tychyna was immediately acclaimed a poet of genius when his first lyrical collection, *Soniashni kliarnety*, appeared in 1918. In subsequent publications, such as *Zamist sonetiv i oktav* (1920) and *Viter z Ukrainy* (1924), his artistic use of language, ability to evoke the rhythm and melody of folk songs, and lyrical descriptions of the countryside left no doubt that his works represented a milestone in the development of Ukrainian poetry. The son of a prominent 19th-century Ukrainophile, Rylsky presented a striking contrast to Tychyna. Rylsky’s poems, which appeared in such collections as *Pid osinnymy zoriamy* (1918), *Synia dalechin* (1922), and *Trynadtsiata vesna* (1926), were reserved, philosophical, and deeply rooted in Western classical traditions. Noteworthy among the many other poets that appeared at this time were Mykola Zerov, Pavlo Fylypovych, Mykhailo Drai-Khmara,

Evhen Pluzhnyk, Volodymyr Sosiura, Mykola Bazhan, and Teofil Osmachka.

The predominant themes in the works of the prose writers were the effects of the revolution and Civil War on the individual and society. Written with a refined feeling for the power of words and with a mixture of romanticism and brutal realism, Khvylovy's *Syni Etiudy* (1923) extolled the revolution, while his *Osin* (1924) and *Ia* (1924) reflected its contradictions and a growing sense of disillusionment. Hryhorii Kosynka, of poor peasant origin (as were many of his colleagues), masterfully portrayed the determination of peasants to resist outsiders in works such as *V zhytakh* (1926). In his novel *Misto* (1928), the skeptical, pessimistic Valerian Pidmohylny depicted how a Ukrainian peasant managed to prosper in the foreign city by shedding the best of his peasant values and retaining the worst. Ivan Senchenko, a master of satire, ridiculed the spineless flunkies that the Soviet system encouraged in his *Iz zapysok kholiuia* (1927). Meanwhile, Iurii Ianovsky's novel *Chotyry Shabli* (1930) evoked the spirit of the Zaporozhian Cossacks with its vivid descriptions of peasant partisans. By far the most popular of the prose writers was the humorist Ostap Vyshnia whose irreverent feuilletons were read by millions.

Among the playwrights, Mykola Kulish was the most outstanding. His three most famous plays, *Narodnyi Malakhii* (1928), *Myna Mazailo* (1929), and *Patetychna Sonata* (1930), were sensations because of their modernistic form and tragicomic treatment of the new Soviet reality, Russian chauvinism, the "Little Russian" mentality, anachronistic Ukrainian nationalism, and the spiritual immaturity of doctrinaire communists. The first two plays were staged by Les Kurbas and his famous Berezil troupe. Scandalized party officials, however, banned the showing of *Patetychna Sonata* in Ukraine, although it played in Leningrad and Moscow to enthusiastic audiences. In the new field of filmmaking, Oleksander Dovzhenko achieved world fame with his *Zvenyhora* (1927), *Arsenal* (1929), and *Zemlia* (1930), all of which were based on the impact of the revolution and Soviet rule on Ukraine.

Education and scholarship Experimentation and innovation were also widespread in education. Because its goal was the creation of a new socioeconomic order, the Soviet government encouraged the establishment of new types of schools and approaches to teaching that would hasten the break with the "bourgeois past." Soviet educators argued for the need to link education with the inculcation of communist values and ideology. Consequently, curricula that emphasized the combination of work and study, communal learning, and technical education were introduced into the schools. Meanwhile, the classics and the humanities in general were deemphasized and the study of religion completely banned. The theories of the famous pedagogue Antin Makarenko, stressing the predominance of environment over heredity in the development of children, gained in popularity.

Although the educational value of some of these experiments may have been questionable, the government was clearly successful in making education more accessible than it had ever been. Education in the basic seven-year school, as well as in the specialized vocational and secondary institutions, was free – and children of peasants and workers were encouraged to attend. As a result, between 1923 and 1925 alone, the number of schoolchildren in Ukraine jumped from 1.4 to 2.1 million. Concomitantly, the literacy rate during the 1920s rose from 24% to 57%. Nevertheless, millions of adults still remained illiterate and over 40% of school-aged children received no formal education.

Higher education also underwent major change. The universities were reorganized into numerous institutes (Institutes of Popular Education – ІНО) that specialized in medicine, physics, engineering, agronomy, or pedagogy. Their goal was the preparation of specialists for the work force. Although most of these institutes charged fees, children of poor workers and peasants (who formed the majority of institute students) were exempted from payment. Of the approximately 30,000–40,000 institute students in Ukraine in the late 1920s, about 53% were Ukrainians, 20% were Russians, and 22% were Jews. In general, Ukrainians were concentrated in such fields as agronomy and teaching, Russians in administrative studies and the sciences, and Jews in medicine and commerce.

Scholarship, and especially Ukrainian studies, enjoyed a renaissance during the 1920s comparable to that in literature. As we have seen, the Ukrainian national governments had been quick to establish scholarly institutions, in part because scholarship in the humanities had played such an important role in the rise of Ukrainian national consciousness throughout the 19th century. Anxious to demonstrate that they stood for progress, the Bolsheviks also encouraged scholarship. In 1919, they not only co-opted the Academy of Sciences in Kiev that had been established by the Skoropadsky government, but they even claimed that it was their creation. During the next several years, the academy and its affiliates – not the universities – were transformed into centers of research. As long as their ideas did not directly challenge the Soviet system, scholars were given relative freedom to pursue their research, present their views, and develop foreign contacts.

Even though almost all the prominent scholars in Ukraine were non-Communists and some even open sympathizers of Ukrainian nationalism, the Soviet government had no choice but to make them the core of the academy. With the implementation of the Ukrainization policies of the mid 1920s, the Ukrainian Communists in control of the Ministry of Education made a concerted effort to induce many leading scholars who had gone abroad during the Civil War to return to their homeland. Consequently, in 1924, the dean of Ukrainian studies (and a political opponent of the Communists), Mykhailo Hrushevsky, returned to Kiev to become a full member of

the academy, where he launched the systematic study of Ukrainian history. Numerous other scholars who lived abroad or in Western Ukraine followed Hrushevsky's example. Thus, while the prestige of the academy rose rapidly, it remained a bastion of "bourgeois-nationalist" tendencies.

The first president of the academy was the renowned scientist Volodymyr Vernadsky. However, much of the academy's growth resulted from the tireless efforts of its longtime vice-president Serhii Efremov and secretary Ahatanhel Krymsky. By 1924 the academy had 37 full members and about 400 associates. Its publications rose from 32 in 1923 to 136 in 1929. Of its three sections – the historical/philological, the physical/mathematical, and the socio-economic – the first, in which Hrushevsky played the dominant role, was the most dynamic and important. It consisted of dozens of chairs, commissions, and committees that systematically studied all aspects of Ukrainian history, literature, and language. The section sponsored the publication of *Ukraina*, the leading journal of Ukrainian studies, and its members published a series of other periodicals as well as hundreds of monographs. Besides Hrushevsky, other important members of the section were the historians Dmytro Bahalii, Mykhailo Slabchenko, Oleksander Ohloblyn, and Osyp Hermaize; the literary specialists Serhii Efremov and Volodymyr Peretts; the ethnographer Andrii Loboda; the art historian Oleksii Novytsky; and the orientalist Krymsky.

In the socioeconomic section, Mykola Vasylenko produced an important work on the history of Ukrainian law, while Konstantyn Vobly pioneered the study of Ukraine's economic geography. Although the science section of the academy was at the outset not as prominent as it became later, it, too, included a number of outstanding scholars, some of whom had international reputations. Among these were the mathematician Dmytro Grave, the physicist Mykola Krylov, and the chemists Lev Pysarzhevsky and Volodymyr Kistiakovsky. But while the academy in Kiev was the major center of scholarship in Ukraine, it was not the only one. Two of its members, the historians Bahalii and Slabchenko, set up research centers in Kharkiv and Odessa, respectively. Many smaller cities, such as Poltava, Chernihiv, and Dniepropetrovsk, also established research institutions.

To counterbalance the influence of the many non-Marxist scholars in the social sciences and humanities, the Soviet government founded the Institute of Marxism in Kharkiv in 1929. Its goal was to prepare specialists in philosophy, economics, and history who would teach their subjects from the Marxist point of view, study the history of the party and the revolution, and act as ideological defenders of the regime. The leading figure in this institute was Matvii Iavorsky, a Galician who attempted to interpret Ukrainian history in Marxist terms and who created a school of Ukrainian Marxist historians.

Ecclesiastical Activity

The Orthodox church in Ukraine had been a pillar of the tsarist regime. After the metropolitan of Kiev was placed under the authority of the patriarch of Moscow in 1686, it adopted Muscovite ecclesiastical usages, reinforced Russification, and preached loyalty to tsar and empire. And although by the end of 19th century, national and social consciousness had begun to spread among the lower clergy and especially among students in the seminaries, the Ukrainian intelligentsia remained generally ambivalent toward the church, viewing it as a bastion of social conservatism and anti-Ukrainianism.

The revolution and the concomitant desire for national self-expression were bound to have an impact upon the church in Ukraine. At the eparchal assemblies and congresses of soldiers and peasants that were held in 1917–18, proposals were raised advocating that the church in Ukraine sever its ties with Moscow and constitute itself as an independent (autocephalous) body. The idea appealed to the lower clergy and the urban intelligentsia in particular. Consequently, in January 1918, an All-Ukrainian Church Council was formed to work toward this goal. However, the left-leaning Central Rada showed little interest in the matter and it was the conservative government of Hetman Skoropadsky, especially his ministers of religion, Vasyl Zinkivsky and Oleksander Lototsky, who unequivocally advocated severing ecclesiastical ties with Moscow. After the fall of Skoropadsky, the Directory also came out in favor of ecclesiastical independence. But because both governments were short-lived, their support did not produce concrete results.

Paradoxically, the drive for an independent Ukrainian Orthodox church reached its high point under Soviet rule. Because the Soviets perceived the Russian Orthodox church, led by the newly chosen Patriarch Tikhon, as their most dangerous religious opponent, they were not averse to the appearance of religious groups that undermined the influence of the established church. Hence their early tolerance of ecclesiastical Ukrainization.

Opposition to this tendency was nonetheless significant. It consisted primarily of Patriarch Tikhon in Moscow and almost all the Orthodox hierarchy in Ukraine. Using the threat of excommunication and anathema, the hierarchy repeatedly blocked all attempts of the All-Ukrainian Church Council to expand its influence. This sharply negative attitude discouraged many priests and members of the laity from casting their lot with the Ukrainizers.

These obstacles notwithstanding, on 21 October 1921, at an assembly attended by about 500 delegates (including 64 priests), the council took a radical step. Disregarding canonical law and ignoring threats by the hierarchy, the council elected one of its members, the priest Vasyl Lypkivsky, as metropolitan; he immediately consecrated an archbishop and four bishops. These, in turn, anointed several hundred priests and deacons. The council then reaf-

firmed an earlier decision to create the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church (UAOC).

The new church grew rapidly. By 1924 it boasted 30 bishops, about 1500 priests, over 1100 parishes (out of a total of approximately 9000), and millions of adherents. Many Ukrainian parishes in the United States, Canada, and Europe joined its ranks. In contrast to traditional Orthodoxy, which prided itself on conservatism, the Ukrainian church introduced numerous innovations, such as the use of the Ukrainian language instead of Church Slavonic in church services. It modernized the appearance of its clergy by banning the traditional robes, long hair, and beards. A radical departure from ancient practice was the church's acceptance of married bishops. Reflecting the spirit of the times, the Ukrainian church also adopted a democratic approach to self-administration. It rejected the authoritarianism of the patriarchal system and vested the highest authority in the church in an elected council of bishops, priests, and representatives of the laity. It also extended the elective principle to the selection of bishops and parish priests. Implicit in these reforms was an attempt by the new church to draw closer to the faithful and to involve them in its activity. These efforts to a large extent explained the early success of the UAOC.

Its achievements, however, could not obviate the fundamental weaknesses of the new church. Its radical departure from canonical practice, the repeated declarations by Patriarch Tikhon that it was illegal, and the failure of Orthodox patriarchs outside the USSR to recognize it imposed upon the UAOC an aura of illegitimacy that confused and alienated many early adherents. Furthermore, the UAOC's espousal of elective and democratic principles gave rise to numerous anarchic conflicts between the clergy and laity. Because of its newness, the church had almost no economic base. Even more serious was the problem of personnel. The hurried, haphazard consecration of bishops and priests meant that unsuitable or poorly trained individuals often rose to responsible positions. In time, they proved to be especially vulnerable to government pressures. As these weaknesses surfaced, the UAOC's growth slowed. And although it continued to pose a serious challenge to the Patriarchal or Russian Orthodox church (which was backed by the clergy and especially the monks, the Russian minority, and conservative elements in the Ukrainian population), it retained the loyalty of the vast majority of the Orthodox in Ukraine.

A more menacing set of difficulties arose as a result of government policies. Worried by the unexpected strides made by the Ukrainian church, the Soviet authorities made it a target of their divide-and-rule tactics. They encouraged the rise of dissident church groups in Ukraine that not only undermined the Russian Orthodox church but its Ukrainian rival as well. In the early 1920s, they backed a "progressive" group called the Activist Church of Christ, which

was a breakaway faction of the Patriarchal church. When this group failed to make headway in Ukraine, the authorities patronized the newly formed Counciliar-Episcopal church, which emerged in 1925 under the leadership of Teofil Buldovsky. Although this church espoused Ukrainian ecclesiastical independence, which it proposed to attain by canonical means, it adopted an openly progovernment stance.

Despite these tactics, the government failed to destroy or subjugate the UAOC. On the contrary, its weaknesses notwithstanding, the UAOC continued to grow. Therefore, in 1926, the Soviets launched a frontal attack by imposing extremely heavy taxes on the Ukrainian parishes and restricting the activities of their clergy. Soon thereafter, they accused Metropolitan Lypkivsky and a number of his associates of Ukrainian nationalism, had them arrested, and dissolved the All-Ukrainian Church Council. Although the UAOC was allowed to exist for several years more, it was evident that its future, as well as that of religion in general in the USSR, was grim.



The relative weakness and restraint that the proponents of communism exhibited in the 1920s assured that nationalism (or at least national consciousness), which spread rapidly among Ukrainians during the revolution and Civil War, would continue to grow. Because the Communist party was intent on achieving a monopoly in the political sphere, Ukrainian national tendencies in this area were limited. However, the fact that the Ukrainians did obtain a semblance of statehood should not be underestimated, for it encouraged among them a feeling that they were a full-fledged nation with all the rights and aspirations that status implied.

The main arena in which the nationalism that had been frustrated from 1917 to 1920 found an outlet was culture. A large number of gifted writers, poets, artists, and scholars transformed Ukrainian culture from being a concern of a small, prerevolutionary intelligentsia to a matter of interest for large segments of the populace. The process of Ukrainization not only disseminated cultural achievements among the people but it identified Ukrainian culture with education, socioeconomic modernization, and even the state. Consequently, it seemed that a creative symbiosis of nationalism and communism was about to emerge that could address the Ukrainians' national as well as socioeconomic needs. But subsequent events would prove that this symbiosis was not to be.

Soviet Ukraine: The Traumatic Thirties

By the end of the 1920s the Bolsheviks were ready to resume the drive for the creation of a truly communist society. Under the leadership of Stalin, they revoked the concessions made during the NEP period and proceeded to impose socioeconomic and political changes on Soviet society that were so vast and radical that they are often referred to as the “Second Revolution.” But along with the massive transformations of the 1930s, there was also a return to certain traditional aspects of Russian politics, in particular rigid centralization and one-man rule. For Ukrainians, this cataclysmic reversal put an end to their efforts to develop their own “road to communism.” Once again, as in the days of the tsars, Ukraine would become little more than a part of a larger whole. But, as never before in their history, Ukrainians would be forced to pay a dreadfully high price to attain goals they had not set for themselves.



Stalin and Stalinism

In 1927 Stalin emerged as the victor in the bitter power struggle that had raged among party leaders since Lenin’s death. Born in 1879 in Georgia of poor parents, Stalin (his real name was Dzhugashvili) was an early convert to Bolshevism. Prior to the revolution, he had played a relatively minor role in the Bolshevik party. As one of the party’s few non-Russians, his assignments had included dealing with the theoretical implications of the nationalities problem – a matter of secondary concern to most Bolsheviks. His expertise in the field, however, would serve him (if not the nationalities) well in later years. An unobtrusive personality – early observers only remember him as a “grey blur” – Stalin lacked the outstanding skills as a writer and orator that characterized many of the leading Bolsheviks. Consequently, he had gravitated toward organizational work during the revolution and, as secretary-general,

came to control the recruitment and promotion of party cadres. His control of the party apparatus, as well as his extraordinary cunning, enabled him to eliminate rivals and to become the unchallenged leader of the party – a *vozhda* surrounded by “yes” men.

As Stalin exercised tyrannical dominance of the party, it, in turn, systematically expanded its control over all aspects of society. Open criticism of (let alone resistance to) Stalin became impossible as a powerful and growing secret police methodically terrorized and later liquidated real, imagined, or potential opposition. Some scholars describe this Russian-Marxist combination of personal dictatorship and monolithic organization as totalitarianism. Others simply call it Stalinism. The Soviets view it as a necessary phase in the building of socialism and have long praised Stalin for his leadership, iron will, and realism. But critics have invariably stressed his ruthlessness, incredible disregard for human suffering, and murderous paranoia (which caused him to see enemies and plots everywhere). As Nicholas Riasanovsky remarks about Stalin, there was, as in the case of Ivan the Terrible, whom Stalin admired, madness in his method.¹

Probably more than other Bolsheviks, Stalin had an exceedingly low opinion of peasants, for he considered them to be incurably conservative and a major barrier to revolutionary change. In the words of his successor, Nikita Khrushchev, “For Stalin, peasants were scum.”² Although Stalin was not an ethnic Russian, he embraced Russian nationalism as a means of strengthening the Soviet empire. And because Ukrainians were an overwhelmingly peasant people among whom native nationalism was on the rise, they were doubly vulnerable to his designs.

The Great Transformation

A visitor to Soviet Ukraine in the mid 1920s would have been struck by the important changes that had already been brought about by the Soviets. The new ideology, government structure, economic organization, legal order, education, and high culture attested to their far-ranging innovations. But equally striking would have been the realization that much of the old still remained. Ukraine continued to be a land of innumerable villages, of peasants working as before, of the church dominating spiritual life, and of traditional values retaining their hold. In effect, one would have found a society in which two cultures coexisted uneasily. In the cities, Soviet ways seemed to predominate; in the countryside, where the majority of the population lived, changes were relatively few. Perhaps most galling for the Bolshevik revolutionaries was the fact that the peasant showed little inclination for sharing their dreams of a communist utopia. There was, therefore, a real possibility that, despite the revolution, the Soviet Union might remain a backward, predominantly agrarian society. This result would have saddled the party with

the frustrating task of trying to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat in a land of peasants.

Stalin perceived the situation as not only depressing, but threatening. Under NEP, the kulaks, bitter enemies of the new regime, had been growing stronger economically. More ominous was the danger of an attack that, Stalin warned, the capitalist countries were planning against the fledgling socialist state. Among party members these perceptions gave rise to a sense of urgency, to a feeling that radical action was needed to preserve the revolution and fulfill its promise.

Despite the fact that he was not a strong theorist, Stalin produced an appealing formula at this critical juncture. Rejecting as unrealistic the appeals of his rival Leon Trotsky for a renewed effort to spread the revolution abroad, Stalin urged the party to build "socialism in one country," in other words, to transform the USSR – as quickly as possible and regardless of the cost – to a modern, industrial, and completely socialist society. If such a rapid transformation were carried out, the Soviet Union would be able to withstand its capitalist enemies and to prove that communism was the most effective road to progress. Because it was unlikely that peasants would support such a program (only 1 of 125 peasants was a Communist), Stalin called for a "revolution from above," that is, one imposed by him, the party, and the government.

The first Five-Year Plan Adopted by the party in 1928, the initial design for the great transformation was called the first Five-Year Plan (FYP). Its general goal was to "catch up with and bypass the capitalist world" economically. Emphasizing the development of heavy industry, it set stunning objectives for the country: a 250% increase in overall industrial development, with a 330% expansion of heavy industry alone. The other important part of the plan called for the collectivization – the formation of large, communally owned farms – of 20% of all peasant households. It was envisaged that agricultural production would rise by 150%. Eventually, collectivization was to encompass almost all peasant households, thereby removing the "pernicious, bourgeois influence" of private ownership of property.

The plan aimed, in effect, at transforming the entire labor force in the countryside as well as the city into employees of state-controlled enterprises. This structure would not only give the state complete economic control of its citizens but it would also greatly expand its political dominance of the formerly self-sufficient peasants. Stalin expected some resistance to the plan, especially from the peasants who were to be deprived of their lands. But he cynically dismissed it with the famous comment, "You can't make an omelet without breaking eggs."

Industrialization In terms of industrial development, Ukraine fared well in the first FYP. It received over 20% of the total investment, which meant that of

the 1500 new industrial plants built in the USSR, 400 were located in Ukraine. Some of these plants were constructed on a gigantic scale. Completed in 1932 by 10,000 workers, the Dnieper hydroelectric plant was the largest in Europe. The new steel combine in Zaporozhia and the tractor factory in Kharkiv were also among the largest in their categories. In the Donbas–Kryvyi Rih region, so many new plants were being built that the entire area looked like one huge construction site.

In the second and third FYPs, however, the republic received a disproportionately small amount of investment. Arguing that in the event of war, the industrial centers of Ukraine would be too vulnerable to attack, the economic planners in Moscow decided to concentrate on the development of industrial centers in the Urals. Thus, of the 4500 plants built during the second FYP (1932–37), only 1000 were in Ukraine. In the next FYP the drop in Ukraine's share of investment funds was even more marked: it received a mere 600 of the 3000 new plants built. Nevertheless, the construction of thousands of new plants in little more than a decade did turn Ukraine into a major industrial country.

Never before in history had a society attempted such a vast economic transformation in so short a time period. Whereas in the industrial boom of the 19th century, it had taken decades to construct several dozen industrial plants in Ukraine, in the 1930s, the Soviets were building hundreds of plants every year. But achievements like these were possible only if workers were pushed to their limits. It was necessary, therefore, to create an atmosphere of tension, of titanic struggle, of economic war with capitalism in which the outcome depended on the exertions of each and every worker. Stalin set the tone in his famous 1931 speech: "To slow down the tempo [of industrialization] means to lag behind. And those who lag behind are beaten ... We are behind the leading countries by 50–100 years. We must make up this time in ten years. Either we do it or we go under."³ This appeal to Soviet patriotism (and Russian nationalism) urged Soviet citizens to "show" the world that theirs was the superior system.

Various techniques were used to arouse enthusiasm for this effort. References to economic activity were couched in military terminology: the "breakthrough on the tractor-building front," "the victories of workers' shock brigades," and the "storming of new quotas." Outstanding workers were honored as "heroes of socialist labor." Plants, cities, and even republics competed with each other in the race to fulfill the plan. To a considerable degree, these methods were successful. Among many workers, especially members of the party or Komsomol (Communist Youth League), there was genuine pride in and excitement about what was being achieved and they willingly committed themselves to the challenging tasks set for them by the party. Others who were less enthusiastic were subjected to a battery of coercive measures. Unauthorized lateness, absenteeism, or neglect of duties became a criminal offense that could lead to the loss of food rations (thus raising

the prospect of starvation) or housing, and even to imprisonment in Siberian labor camps.

The media's constant exhortations for workers to fulfill their quotas and meet their timetables did not mean that the industrialization drive was conducted in an orderly manner. As early as 1930 it was evident that the frenzied pace of construction was frequently accompanied by astounding confusion, ineptitude, and waste. In some cases, new factories stood empty because the machinery for them was lacking; often machines could not be housed in poorly designed plants. While untrained operators ruined new machines in one factory, experienced workers sat idle in another for lack of the proper equipment. Moreover, the quality of many products was poor.

Ukraine's Communist leadership had its own particular criticisms of the industrialization drive. After the first FYP, its input into the formulation of subsequent FYPS was practically nil and was reflected in the steadily decreasing level of investment in Ukraine. Nor were Ukrainians entirely pleased with the nature of industrial development in their land. Moscow's planners assigned to Ukraine the task of producing raw materials, while Russia's industries monopolized the finished products, especially consumer goods, that were shipped back to Ukrainian markets. Thus, as late as 1932, a few bold Ukrainian economists complained that the "colonial" relationship between Russia and Ukraine that had existed in tsarist days had not altered appreciably. Finally, the geographical distribution of industry in Ukraine was most uneven. While the traditional industrial areas in Donbas and the Dnieper region continued to expand, the heavily populated Right Bank remained economically stagnant.

Despite these drawbacks, the achievements of the first FYPS were impressive. By 1940 Ukraine's industrial capacity was more than seven times greater than in 1913 (Russia's increased ninefold). The productivity of individual workers also increased (but their real earnings generally decreased). Thus, as the USSR as a whole rose from being the world's fifth largest industrial power to the second, Ukraine (with a productive capacity roughly equal to that of France) became one of Europe's most advanced industrial countries.

Urbanization The great growth of industry in the 1930s had an effect not only on the number of Ukrainians who were employed, but also on where and how they lived. For centuries one of the great themes in Ukrainian history had been the confrontation between the Ukrainian village and the non-Ukrainian city. As a result of the FYPS, this relationship began to change as millions of Ukrainians poured into cities to work in industrial enterprises. One might well ask why Ukrainians participated in such great numbers in the industrialization drive of the 1930s, having been conspicuously absent from the initial wave of industrial growth in the 1890s. Because the scale of the Soviet effort was so vast, it created a general labor shortage throughout the USSR. Rus-

TABLE 4

Percentage of Ukrainians in industrial centers, 1923–33

Cities	Percent in 1923	Percent in 1933
Kharkiv	38	50
Zaporozhia	28	56
Dniepropetrovsk	16	48

sian workers no longer came south in search of work in great numbers, so the newly built factories of Ukraine drew on the local work force. As well, conditions in the countryside were calamitous and because the Ukrainian peasant no longer had the option of moving eastward in search of land as he had in the 1890s, he was forced to leave his cherished soil for employment in the city. The irreversible flow from the countryside into the cities which accelerated at this time would bring about momentous changes in the way of life that had defined Ukrainians for millennia.

The expansion of the cities was dramatic. Growing at a rate of about four times that of the population as a whole, the number of urban dwellers in Soviet Ukraine doubled between 1926 and 1939. At the outset of this period, only one in five had lived in an urban environment in Ukraine; before the outbreak of the Second World War, the ratio was one in three. Ethnic Ukrainian participation in the urbanization boom was equally remarkable. In 1920 Ukrainians constituted 32% of the urban population, living mostly in the smaller cities. By 1939, they represented over 58% of urban dwellers and many had moved into large industrial centers. As table 4 indicates, it was in the latter that the influx of Ukrainians was most apparent. The percentage of Ukrainians in the proletariat also rose. Although in 1926 they were a mere 6% of workers, in 1939 almost 30% of all Ukrainians were classified as members of the proletariat.

Most of the expanding industrial centers were located not on the Right and Left banks, where the core of the Ukrainian population lived, but in the Donbas and the south, which had large Russian and Jewish minorities. Later, when the government adopted a policy of Russification, this factor would be of considerable importance. Initially, however, there were simply too many Ukrainians pouring into the cities to be assimilated into Russian culture and it appeared that the traditional Russian hold on the cities was seriously threatened.

The huge influx of new inhabitants created exceedingly difficult living conditions in the cities, especially in regard to housing. Frequently separated from their families, the newcomers were quartered in crowded dormitories, sometimes for years. Those who brought their families along often had no choice but to live in squalid huts on the outskirts of town. Food was scarce and rationed. The only satisfaction that many of these workers could derive

from their new situation was that, bad as it was, it was better than what the peasants faced in the villages.

Collectivization Even more dramatic and sweeping than the changes in the cities was the transformation of the countryside. Here, however, the “Second Revolution” was accompanied by such brutality and horror that it can only be described as a war waged by the regime against the peasantry. In fact, it can safely be said that collectivization, with its devastating consequences, was one of the most traumatic events in Ukrainian history.

The Bolsheviks always argued that collective agriculture eventually had to replace small peasant farming. They were aware of the fact that convincing the peasantry to accept their views would be a lengthy and difficult process, especially after the concessions peasants had won during NEP. Peasant response to the collective and state farms established in the 1920s had not been promising, attracting less than 3% of agricultural workers in the USSR. Therefore, when drafting their first FYP, the Bolsheviks estimated that at best they would be able to collectivize 20% of peasant households (in Ukraine the target was 30%). With its attention focused on industrialization, the Soviet leadership apparently preferred not to take on the massive burdens that would be associated with a radical transformation of agriculture.

It soon became evident, however, that industrialization as the Soviets envisaged it demanded extensive collectivization. Stalin appears to have come to this realization during the grain procurement crisis of 1928. Soviet plans for industrial expansion were based on the assumption that the state would be able to buy grain cheaply from the peasants. Doing so would allow it both to feed the growing work force in the cities and to sell grain abroad at a profit that, in turn, would be used to help finance industrialization. But the prices that the state offered – often as little as one-eighth of the market price – were considered too low by the peasants and they refused to sell their grain. Infuriated by peasant recalcitrance, which he termed “sabotage,” Stalin decided that for the FYP to succeed, both political and economic control of the peasantry was essential. Therefore, with practically no advance preparation, he ordered an all-out drive for total collectivization.

Liquidation of the kulaks Realizing that the wealthier peasants would resist collectivization most bitterly, Stalin called for the “liquidation of the kulaks as a class.” This classic divide-and-conquer tactic was calculated to isolate the most successful peasants from the mass of poor peasants. However, defining just who was a kulak (Ukrainian: *kurkul*) was not a simple matter. Officially, kulaks owned more land than the average peasant and hired labor to work it. It was estimated that they made up about 5% of the peasantry. But the government’s depiction of kulaks as “blood-sucking usurers” and “exploiters” of their fellow peasants rarely fit reality.

Usually a wealthier peasant owned 10–15 acres, several horses and cows, and some sheep. His net worth measured in current dollars was probably no more than \$600–800. Since many of the old kulak families had been destroyed in the Civil War, kulaks were frequently former poor peasants who, by dint of hard work, had prospered during NEP. When it came to deciding who was a kulak – and this was generally done by a *troika* consisting of a secret police representative, the head of the village Soviet (council), and the party secretary – envy, personal grudges, and (very often) opposition to collectivization also played a role. Consequently, many middle and even poor peasants were designated as kulaks or their “helpers.”

What did “liquidation as a class” actually mean? Those kulaks who resisted most stubbornly were shot, and a large number were deported to forced labor camps in the Arctic and Siberia. The rest were deprived of all their property (including their homes and personal belongings), barred from the collective farms, and told to fend for themselves. The “dekulakization” process reached its high point in the winter of 1929–30. Its most widespread feature was the deportations. Hundreds of thousands of peasants and their families were dragged from their homes, packed into freight trains, and shipped thousands of miles to the north where they were dumped amidst Arctic wastes, often without food or shelter.⁴

Of the more than 1 million Ukrainian peasants that the Soviet regime expropriated in the early 1930s, about 850,000 were deported to the north where many, especially children, perished. But some of the deportees, notably young men, escaped from exile. Together with those who managed to avoid deportation, they surreptitiously entered the urban labor force (factories were forbidden to hire kulaks). In this way, a large part of Ukraine’s most industrious and efficient farmers ceased to exist. “Not one of them was guilty of anything,” a Soviet author noted, “but they belonged to a class that was guilty of everything.”⁵

To achieve its goals in the countryside, the regime needed assistance, but the number of Communists in the villages was clearly too small to suffice. Initially, the government placed its hopes on the revived Committees of Poor Peasants, assuming that they had little to lose from “dekulakization” and collectivization. But it soon became apparent that being poor did not mean that a peasant was willing to participate in the destruction of his better-off neighbors. Therefore, the government dispatched thousands of urban workers, frequently Russian and Jewish Communists or Komsomol members, to implement its policies in the villages.

In the fall of 1929 about 15,000 workers were sent into the Ukrainian countryside; in January 1930 approximately 47,000 more arrived. At the same time, the “25,000ers” (mostly workers from Russia who were fanatically dedicated to the “building of socialism” regardless of the cost) appeared in Ukraine to lead the local “dekulakization” drives or to act as heads of the newly orga-

nized collective farms. The assignment of outsiders, although assuring the implementation of government policies, added to the brutality with which they were carried out.

Restructuring agriculture: phase one As the kulaks were being crushed, Stalin launched his attack on the peasantry as a whole. Instructions went out to party activists to begin the immediate and total organization of collective farms. Although often hazy on precisely how this massive transformation was to be carried out, Stalin's orders were clear on one point: it must be done rapidly and without regard to protests, difficulties, or costs. Usually the process consisted of party workers descending on a village and calling a meeting during which they browbeat several peasants into agreeing to form a collective. A party activist usually shouted: "Anyone opposed to the collective farm is opposed to the Soviet government. Let's vote. Who is against the collective farm?" And then there was a demand that all the villagers pool their land and surrender their cattle to the collective farm.⁶

These measures produced pandemonium and outrage in the villages. Officials were frequently beaten and shot. Particularly widespread were the so-called *babski bunt* – riots raised by women demanding the return of their property. In several cases, large uprisings of armed peasants forced the regime to send in regular army and OGPU (political police) units to quell them. However, the most widespread form of protest was the slaughter of farm animals. Determined not to let the government have their livestock, peasants preferred to kill their animals and either consume the meat or sell it. The extent to which such acts were committed was staggering: between 1928 and 1932 Ukraine lost about 50% of its livestock. Many peasants fled the collectives and sought work in the cities. To the dismay of Soviet officials, many poor and middle peasants, who had improved their condition during NEP, were often among their most bitter opponents.

To reinforce its officials, the regime sent in the OGPU to arrest the more vociferous protesters and deport them to Siberia. With such coercion, it was only a matter of time before Soviet authorities would impose their will on the peasantry. By March 1930 about 3.2 million peasant households in Ukraine had surrendered to the invaders of their villages and had sullenly entered the collective farms to await their fate.

But the calamitous disruption of the rural economy (not the human cost) worried Stalin. Suddenly, on 3 March 1930, he published an article entitled "Dizziness with Success." In it he claimed that "the fundamental turn toward socialism in the village may be considered already secured." This remark was followed by an astounding assertion: "It is impossible to establish collective farms by force. To do so would be stupid and reactionary."⁷ Stalin's intent was clear: first, he wanted to send a message to party activists to ease the pressure for a time, and second, by blaming the lower officials who had

obediently followed his directives, Stalin tried to distance himself from the disasters brought on by collectivization.

Interpreting Stalin's statements as a retreat from collectivization, the peasants responded accordingly by abandoning the collective farms in droves. Within three months almost 50% of the collectivized peasants in Ukraine had returned to individual farming. It seemed that the great drive to transform the countryside was an economic and political fiasco.

Restructuring agriculture: phase two Stalin's retreat helped to stabilize the situation in the villages. It soon became apparent, however, that this was only a temporary maneuver and that the regime intended to continue imposing collectivization, only using different tactics. Its new approach was to make individual farming economically unfeasible. Peasants who left the collective farms were often prevented from taking their farming implements and surviving livestock with them. They received meager plots that were difficult to farm, while the collectivized farmers retained all the best land. Taxes on individual farmers doubled and tripled, while the collectivized farmers were absolved from payment for several years. Furthermore, there was still the possibility that stubborn resisters might be called kulaks and deported. Consequently, many peasants had no choice but to join the collective farms, which by 1932 accounted for about 70% of farming households. By 1940 almost all Ukraine's peasants belonged to its 28,000 collective farms.

Although owned in theory by the peasants, the collective farms were obliged to deliver assigned amounts of produce to the state and were controlled by its officials. Only after a collective farm had fulfilled its obligations to the state were its members allowed to divide what remained among themselves. The less-numerous state farms (*radhospy*) were essentially state-owned agricultural factories in which peasants worked as hired labor, while the Machine Tractor Stations (MTS) provided mechanized aid to the collective farms. The government's monopoly on tractors and other farm machinery also served as a means of coercing the peasants. Indeed, this entire system was designed to give the regime not only economic but also political control over agriculture and those who engaged in it.

Although adept at coercion, Stalin and his cohorts were astoundingly inept when it came to farming. Frequently, the party activists who headed the collective farms would order the planting of inappropriate crops. As was the case in industry, they often succumbed to a mania for the gigantic and created huge, unmanageable agro-enterprises. Because of poor transportation facilities, much of the stockpiled grain spoiled or was eaten by rats. Even more serious was the lack of draught animals, many of which had been slaughtered earlier. Government officials were confident, however, that they could provide enough tractors to replace the missing horses and oxen. But the production of tractors fell badly behind schedule and a very high percentage of

those delivered broke down almost immediately. As a result, in 1931, almost one-third of the grain yield was lost during the harvest; by 1932 the total area sown in Ukraine contracted by a fifth. To make matters worse, a drought hit southern Ukraine in 1931.

All these factors contributed to the steadily deteriorating conditions. But the decisive factor was Stalin's ruthless policy of grain procurement. The regime was in desperate need of grain to finance industrialization and continued to impose high grain quotas on the peasants, deteriorating conditions notwithstanding. Because there was not enough grain to meet both government demands and peasant needs, in 1931 Ukrainian Communists beseeched Moscow to lower its quotas. Although Stalin agreed to a small reduction, the new quota he set was still unrealistically high.

To ensure that all the grain required by the regime would be collected, Stalin dispatched two of his closest lieutenants, Viacheslav Molotov and Lazar Kaganovich, to supervise grain procurements in Ukraine. Once again party activists were mobilized and sent into the countryside to confiscate the peasants' grain. Many apparently balked at the task, for about one-third of all those who held responsible positions in the collective farms had to be purged at this time. To reinforce the activists, Soviet officials used regular troops and the OGPU units, which mercilessly crushed villages that refused to give up their food. Even seed grain needed for sowing next year's crop was expropriated. In spite of these measures, by late 1932, the regime had collected only 70% of its quota. In a speech delivered in January 1933, Stalin ordered the party apparatus to redouble its efforts: "Do not allow your attention to be overshadowed by worries about all sorts of funds and reserves; do not be diverted from the main task; develop the grain procurement campaign ... and speed it up. The first commandment is – fulfill the grain procurements."⁸

The Famine of 1932–33

The famine that occurred in 1932–33 was to be for the Ukrainians what the Holocaust was to the Jews and the Massacres of 1915 for the Armenians. A tragedy of unfathomable proportions, it traumatized the nation, leaving it with deep social, psychological, political, and demographic scars that it carries to this day. And it cast a dark shadow on the methods and achievements of the Soviet system.

The central fact about the famine is that it did not have to happen. Stalin himself proclaimed that "nobody can deny that the total yield of grain in 1932 was larger than in 1931."⁹ As Conquest and Krawchenko have pointed out, the harvest of 1932 was only 12% below the 1926–30 average.¹⁰ In other words, food was available. However, the state systematically confiscated most of it for its own use. Despite the pleas and warnings of Ukrainian Communists, Stalin raised Ukraine's grain procurement quotas in 1932 by 44%. His deci-

sion, and the regime's brutal fulfillment of his commands, condemned millions to death in what can only be called a man-made famine.

The regime's disregard for the human costs of its policies was evident in a series of measures implemented in 1932. In August, party activists received the legal right to confiscate grain from peasant households; that same month the infamous law that carried a death penalty for the theft of "socialist property" was enacted. Any man, woman, or child caught taking even a handful of grain from a government silo or a collective farm field could be, and often was, executed. Under extenuating circumstances, such "crimes against the state" were punished by ten years of hard labor. To prevent peasants from abandoning collective farms in search of food, a system of internal passports was put into effect. In November, Moscow enacted a law stipulating that no grain from a collective farm could be given to the peasants until the government's quota had been met.

In January 1933 Stalin ordered his plenipotentiary, Pavel Postyshev, to castigate the Ukrainian Communists for their "lack of Bolshevik vigilance" and to speed up the collection of grain. Under his leadership, gangs of party activists conducted brutal house-to-house searches, tearing up floors and delving into wells in search of any grain that remained. Even those already swollen from malnutrition were not allowed to keep their grain. In fact, if a person did not appear to be starving, he was suspected of hoarding food. In retrospect, a party activist has described his motivations at that time in the following manner: "We believed Stalin to be a wise leader ... We were deceived because we wanted to be deceived. We believed so strongly in communism that we were ready to accept any crime if it was glossed over with the least little bit of communist phraseology."¹¹

Famine, which had been spreading throughout 1932, hit full force in early 1933. It is estimated that at the outset of the year an average peasant family of five had about eighty kilograms of grain to last it until the next harvest. In other words, each member had to survive on about 1.7 kg a month. Lacking bread, peasants ate pets, rats, bark, leaves, and the garbage from the well-provisioned kitchens of party members. There were numerous cases of cannibalism. According to a Soviet author, "The first who died were the men. Later on the children. And last of all, the women. But before they died, people often lost their senses and ceased to be human beings."¹² Even as whole villages died out, party activists continued confiscating grain. One of them, Victor Kravchenko, later wrote: "On the battlefield men die quickly, they fight back, they are sustained by fellowship and a sense of duty. Here I saw people dying in solitude by slow degree, dying hideously, without the excuse of sacrifice for a cause. They had been trapped and left to starve, each in his home, by a political decision made in a far-off capital around conference and banquet tables. There was not even the consolation of inevitability to relieve the horror ... The most terrifying sights were the little children with skeleton

limbs dangling from balloon-like abdomens. Starvation wiped every trace of youth from their faces, turning them into tortured gargoyles; only in their eyes still lingered the reminder of childhood."¹³

Of course, Stalin and his associates saw things differently. In 1933, Mendel Khataevich, another of Stalin's lieutenants in Ukraine and the leader of the grain-procurement program, proudly stated: "A ruthless struggle is going on between the peasantry and our regime. It's a struggle to the death. This year was a test of our strength and their endurance. It took a famine to show them who is master here. It has cost millions of lives, but the collective farm system is here to stay. We have won the war!"¹⁴

Soviet statistics for the period are notoriously unreliable (displeased with the results of the census of 1937 that revealed shockingly high mortality rates, Stalin had the leading census takers shot). And Soviet archival materials dealing with the Stalin era are still generally inaccessible. It is, therefore, difficult to establish conclusively how many died in the famine. Based on demographic extrapolations, estimates usually place the death toll in Ukraine at between 3 and 6 million.¹⁵

While famine raged in Ukraine, especially its southeastern regions, and in the north Caucasus (where many Ukrainians lived), much of Russia proper barely experienced it. One of the factors that helps to explain this peculiarity is that, according to the first FYP, "Ukraine ... was chosen to serve as a colossal laboratory for new forms of socioeconomic and productive-technical reconstruction of the rural economy for the entire Soviet Union."¹⁶ Ukraine's importance to Soviet economic planners was also proclaimed in a *Pravda* editorial (7 January 1933) entitled "Ukraine – The Deciding Factor in Grain Collection." Consequently, the demands on the republic were inordinately great. As demonstrated by Vsevolod Holubnychy, although Ukraine accounted for 27% of the total all-union grain harvest, it bore 38% of the grain quotas.¹⁷ Krawchenko contends that Ukrainian collective farmers were paid only half of what their Russian counterparts received.¹⁸

Given their tradition of private ownership of land, Ukrainians tended to resist collectivization more fiercely than did the Russians. Therefore, the regime made a point of pushing its policy – with its horrible consequences – faster and further in Ukraine than elsewhere. As Vasili Grossman, a Soviet novelist and former party activist, put it: "It was clear that Moscow was basing its hopes on Ukraine. And the upshot of it was that most of the subsequent anger was directed against Ukraine ... We were told that in Ukraine they had an instinct for private property that was stronger than in the Russian republic. And truly, truly, the whole business was much worse in Ukraine than it was with us."¹⁹

Others argue that the famine was Stalin's way of weakening Ukrainian nationalism. Certainly the relationship between the peasantry and nationalism was not lost on the Soviet leadership. Stalin stated that "after all, the peasant

question is the basis, the quintessence of the national question ... In essence, the national question is the peasant question."²⁰ A leading Communist paper in Ukraine in 1930 carried the equation further when it declared that "collectivization in Ukraine has a special task ... to destroy the social basis of Ukrainian nationalism – individually-owned peasant agriculture."²¹ One can conclude therefore that, at best, Stalin viewed the deaths of millions as a necessary cost of industrialization. At worst, he consciously allowed the famine to wipe out resistance in a particularly troublesome region of his empire.

A noteworthy aspect of the famine was the attempts to erase it from public consciousness. Until very recently, the Soviet position was to deny that it occurred at all. If the full extent of the tragedy had become generally known, it would obviously have done serious damage to the progressive image Moscow was attempting to project both at home and abroad. Therefore, the regime has long suppressed open discussion of the famine in the USSR.²²

Although some newspapers in the West informed the public about the famine, here, too, the realization of its horrendous scope was stifled. Soviet export of grain in the early 1930s and the regime's refusal to accept any foreign aid made it difficult for many Westerners to believe that a famine could be raging in Ukraine. After completing carefully staged tours of the USSR, Western luminaries such as George Bernard Shaw and the former French premier Edouard Herriot returned with glowing accounts of Soviet achievement and of contented, well-fed peasants. To curry Stalin's favor, Walter Duranty, the Moscow-based reporter of the *New York Times*, repeatedly denied the existence of a famine in his articles (while privately estimating that about 10 million people may have starved to death). For the "profundity, impartiality, sound judgment and exceptional clarity" of his dispatches from the USSR, Duranty received the Pulitzer Prize in 1932.

Although Western governments knew about the famine, their attitudes in this regard were similar to the one expressed in a British Foreign Office document: "The truth of the matter is, of course, that we have a certain amount of information about famine conditions in the south of Russia [sic], similar to that which has appeared in the press ... We do not want to make it public, however, because the Soviet government would resent it and our relations with them would be prejudiced."²³ Moreover, during the Great Depression, many Western intellectuals evinced strong pro-Soviet sympathies and vigorously dismissed all criticism of the USSR, especially on the question of the famine. As Conquest notes, "the scandal is not that they justified Soviet actions, but that they refused to hear about them, that they were not prepared to face the evidence."²⁴

The Great Terror

Industrialization and collectivization brought with them increased centralization of power in Moscow. In Ukraine this meant that the dreams, illusions,

and actual strides toward self-government that characterized the promising 1920s were doomed. Intent on the systematic destruction of almost all aspects of autonomy, Stalin sought to transform the republic into a mere administrative unit of the Soviet Union. And all who stood in his way were marked for liquidation.

In the first phase of Stalin's attack on potential opposition in Ukraine (there was very little actual resistance), the main target was the old Ukrainian intelligentsia, especially those who had been associated with the national governments and non-Bolshevik parties of 1917–20 and who were prominent in areas of culture and scholarship. After fabricating "secret anti-Soviet organizations," the OGPU forced its victims, by means of physical and/or psychological torture, to admit membership in them at highly publicized show trials. In this manner the political police justified the punishment of the accused, discredited all who shared their views, and prepared the way for more arrests.

In Ukraine this tactic was first applied in 1929–30 when forty-five leading scholars, writers, and other intellectuals, including Serhii Efremov, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, Andrii Nikovsky, Osyp Hermaize, Mykhailo Slabchenko, Hryhorii Holoskevych, and Liudmyla Starytska-Cherniakhivska, were accused of belonging to a secret nationalist organization called the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (Spilka Vyzvolennia Ukrainy – svu). The goals of the alleged organization were supposedly the separation of Ukraine from the USSR with the aid of foreign powers and émigrés, the organization of peasant resistance to collectivization, and the assassination of Stalin and his associates. Having used the trial to create an atmosphere of suspicion and insecurity, Soviet authorities now launched a broadly based offensive against the intellectual elite.

As might be expected, the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was one of the first institutions to bear the brunt of the attack. After the svu trial, in which many members of the academy were implicated, the government began to censor the academy's publications, close down its most active sections, and expel "bourgeois nationalists." In 1931 Hrushevsky's history sections were abolished, and he was implicated in yet another secret organization and exiled to Russia, where he died in 1934. Many of his colleagues and almost all of his students were treated much more harshly.

The svu trial also signaled the destruction of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church. Accused of collaborating with that secret organization, the church leadership was forced to call a *sobor* (church council) in January 1930 and to dissolve itself. Soon afterward, the metropolitan (Mykola Boretsky), dozens of bishops, and hundreds of priests were sent to labor camps.

Even before the first wave of repression had run its course, Stalin launched another in 1933. This time it was directed primarily against party members. Purges or "cleansings" were not a new occurrence; in the 1920s they were initiated periodically to "purify" the party by expelling inactive, opportunistic,

lax, or otherwise unfit members. But in the 1930s they took on an ominous, terrifying aspect. Party members were purged mostly because of "ideological mistakes and failings," that is, because they disagreed or were perceived to disagree with Stalin. Expulsion from the party usually entailed execution or exile. Consequently, terror became a part of life not only for the masses but even for the Communist elite.

In the Soviet Union as a whole, the high point of the Stalinist purges came in 1937–38, but as Lev Kopelev noted, "In Ukraine 1937 began in 1933."²⁵ It was probably the threat of national communism on the one hand, and the demoralization of the Ukrainian Communists by the horrors of collectivization and the famine on the other, that singled out the Ukrainians for special attention. The coming storm was heralded by an ideological shift in Moscow. For years the party had officially reiterated that Russian chauvinism was the primary threat to the Soviet system, while the nationalism of the non-Russians was less dangerous because it was essentially a reaction to the former. However, in 1933 Stalin's spokesmen, arguing that Ukrainian nationalism had greatly increased as a result of kulak support, labeled it as Ukraine's most serious problem. Thus, the way was cleared for the persecution of those Ukrainian Communists who had been closely linked with Ukrainization.

Stalin's dissatisfaction with Ukrainization was not surprising. The Ukrainian countryside had never supported the Bolsheviks and as masses of peasants poured into the cities – traditionally the bases of Communist support – the possibility that these centers would become breeding grounds for Ukrainian nationalism and separatism became real. A more immediate reason for Stalin's intention to "cleanse" the CP(b)U was its supposedly poor performance during collectivization. Having decided to make Ukraine's Communists the scapegoats for the disasters of 1932–33, Stalin sanctioned the open criticism of Ukrainian Communists. As a result, editorials in *Pravda* and resolutions of the All-Union Central Committee condemned the Ukrainian Communists for "lack of vigilance" and softness in dealing with kulaks and grain procurements.

The Ukrainian Communists' dilemma was tragic. Confronted by Stalin's demands on the one hand, and the terrible plight of Ukraine's populace on the other, they could neither satisfy the former nor help the latter. Deprived of Moscow's good graces and lacking popular support, the CP(b)U was helpless. The most painful blow came in January 1933 when Stalin appointed Pavel Postyshev to act as his personal representative and, in effect, viceroy of Ukraine. Along with Postyshev came Vsevolod Balitsky, the new head of the OGPU, and thousands of Russian functionaries. It was clear that the days when Ukrainian Communists had "run their own show" in Ukraine were over.

Postyshev's mandate was to complete collectivization regardless of the cost, purge the Ukrainian party, and end Ukrainization. He replaced thou-

sands of local officials in the countryside with his own men. Simultaneously, he launched an attack on the Ukrainizers. Denouncing the emphasis on "national specificity" as a "refusal to submit to all-union interests," he described Ukrainization as a "cultural counter-revolution" whose aim was to fan "national enmity among the proletariat" and "to isolate the Ukrainian workers from the positive influence of Russian culture."²⁶

The primary target of these attacks was Skrypnyk, the commissar of education. Rather than retract his support for Ukrainization, Skrypnyk committed suicide on 7 July 1933. Several months earlier, Khvylovy had done the same. The other ideologue of Ukrainian national communism, Shumsky, died in exile. As Postyshev's reign of terror gained momentum, members of the new Soviet intelligentsia that had emerged in the 1920s were executed or exiled by the thousands. According to some estimates, 200 of 240 authors writing at this time in Ukraine disappeared. Of the 85 scholars in the field of linguistics, 62 were liquidated. Philosophers, artists, and editors were denounced as spies or terrorists and arrested. Matvii Iavorsky and his associates at the Ukrainian Institute of Marxism-Leninism who tried to develop a Marxist history of Ukraine were sent to the Siberian camps. Kurbas' experimental Berezil Theater was shut down and he, too, disappeared into a labor camp, as did the playwright Kulish. Dovzhenko's world-famous films were removed from circulation and he was forced to move to Moscow. Several hundred *kobzari* (wandering bards) were invited to a congress, arrested, and reportedly shot. To save themselves, some writers like Bazhan and Tychyna began writing according to the dictates of Moscow.

The destruction of Ukrainian institutions, begun in 1930, now reached its high point. The commissariats of education, agriculture, justice, the Agricultural Academy, the editorial boards of newspapers, literary journals, encyclopedias, and film studios were denounced as "nests of nationalist counter-revolutionaries" and purged. Summing up the results of his work in November 1933, Postyshev boasted that "the discovery of Skrypnyk's nationalist deviation gave us the opportunity to rid ... the structure of Ukrainian socialist culture of all ... nationalist elements. A great job has been done. It is enough to say that we cleaned out 2000 men of the nationalist element, about 300 of them scholars and writers, from the People's Commissariat of Education alone."²⁷

But Postyshev's purge was aimed at Ukraine's political elite as well as its cultural activists. Over 15,000 people holding responsible positions were purged on charges of nationalism. In addition to nationalism, party members were accused of "fascism," "Trotskyism," "lack of Bolshevik vigilance," and links with émigrés and foreign powers. Consequently, between January 1933 and January 1934, the CPU lost about 100,000 members. In his report, Postyshev noted that "almost all the people removed were arrested and put before the firing squad or exiled."²⁸ Even Trotsky admitted that "nowhere do repres-

sion, purges, subjugation and all types of bureaucratic hooliganism in general assume such deadly proportions as in Ukraine in the struggle against powerful subterranean strivings among the Ukrainian masses towards greater freedom and independence."²⁹

While the waves of repression that rolled across Ukraine in the early 1930s were mainly directed against Ukrainians, the Great Purge of 1937–38 encompassed the entire Soviet Union and all categories of people. Its goal was to sweep away all of Stalin's real and imaginary enemies and to infuse all levels of Soviet society, especially upper echelons, with a sense of insecurity and abject dependence on and obedience to the "Great Leader." In a series of sensational show trials, almost all the "founding fathers" of bolshevism (and the potential rivals of Stalin) were discredited and subsequently executed. The political police, now referred to as the NKVD, repeatedly fabricated plots and terrorist groups to implicate ever broadening circles of people. The usual sentence was summary execution or, at best, lengthy terms in Siberian concentration camps. To assure themselves of an endless supply of "traitors," the NKVD interrogators concentrated on two questions: "Who recruited you?" and "Whom did you recruit?" The "confessions" often doomed casual acquaintances, friends, and even family. Even at a time when the threat of war in Europe was rising, much of the military leadership – the only remaining base of potential opposition – was executed. It was at this point that Stalin's method began to show definite signs of madness.

Again Ukraine was among the worst-hit areas. Unlike the purges of 1933, during which opponents of collectivization and Ukrainizers had been purged, in 1937 Stalin decided to liquidate the entire leadership of the Ukrainian Soviet government and the CPU. The factors that influenced this decision were surprising. Apparently after the famine, Postyshev (the ruthless Russian implementer of the purge of 1933) began to have doubts about Stalin's methods and to identify with Ukraine and Ukrainian interests. More important, both Postyshev and the Ukrainian Communist leadership had refused to carry the purge as far as Stalin wished. Even after the removal of Postyshev and the arrival in Ukraine of Stalin's personal representatives – Viacheslav Molotov, Nikolai Ezhov, and Nikita Khrushchev – in Kiev in August 1937, Ukraine's Communist leadership, consisting of Stanislav Kossior, Hryhorii Petrovsky, and Panas Liubchenko, continued to oppose the purge. As a result, by June 1938 the top seventeen ministers of the Ukrainian Soviet government were arrested and executed. The prime minister, Liubchenko, committed suicide. Almost the entire Central Committee and Politburo of Ukraine perished. An estimated 37% of the Communist party members in Ukraine – about 170,000 people – were purged. In the words of Nikita Khrushchev, Moscow's new viceroy in Kiev, the Ukrainian party "had been purged spotless."

The NKVD slated for extermination entire categories of people, such as kulaks, priests, former members of anti-Bolshevik armies, those who had been

abroad or had relatives abroad, and immigrants from Galicia; even average citizens perished in huge numbers. An indication of the vast scope of the Great Purge was the discovery, during the Second World War, in Vinnytsia, of a mass grave containing 10,000 bodies of residents of the region who were shot between 1937 and 1938. Given the lack of complete data, it is difficult for Western scholars to establish the total loss of life brought about by the Stalinist terror. Adam Ulam and others estimate that in the Soviet Union as a whole, about 500,000 were executed in 1937–39 and somewhere between 3 and 12 million were sent to labor camps.³⁰ One can assume in light of the above-mentioned factors that Ukraine's share of those who were victimized was disproportionately high.

By the late 1930s, the limited self-government that Ukrainians (and other non-Russians) had possessed earlier was almost totally obliterated. Control over all aspects of life was now completely centered in Moscow. Ignoring the prerogatives, wishes, and protests of Ukrainian Communists, Stalin ruled Ukraine by means of his personal emissaries, such as Postyshev and Khrushchev. Despite its economic importance, Ukraine lost all control over the allocation of its resources and investment, the development of industry, and, most important, agricultural policy. In fact, at the height of the famine, the Ukrainian Soviet government could not dispose of one pound of grain without permission from Moscow. Cultural institutions that developed Ukrainian "specificity" were abolished or emasculated. The distinctive features of the republic's system of higher education were removed, and all-union models replaced the school textbooks Skrypnyk had introduced. Indeed, centralization and standardization had gone so far that on several occasions Stalin and his closest associates even discussed abolishing the Soviet Union's republican structure altogether.

Stalin liked to mix crushing policies with minor, propagandistic concessions. Thus, in 1934, in the midst of the centralization drive, the capital of Ukraine was moved from Kharkiv to Kiev, the traditional center. In 1936 Stalin repeated the ploy. On the eve of the Great Purge, he presented the people of the USSR with a new constitution that assured them of all the civil rights enjoyed by citizens of "bourgeois democracies." He declared the Supreme Soviet or parliament, which consisted of a Soviet of the Union and a Soviet of Nationalities, to be the highest organ of state power. He reiterated the right of republics to secede and expanded their number from four to eleven by subdividing the Central Asian and Caucasian regions. A famous example of Stalin's cynicism was his statement, made in the midst of the horrors of the 1930s, that "life has become better, comrades, life has become gayer."

The End of Ukrainization

With centralization came Russification. Initially, in 1933, it took the form of

an influx into Ukraine of thousands of Russian functionaries to reinforce the collectivization drive. By the end of the decade, after the purge of the national communists, much of the top party and government leadership in Ukraine, with Nikita Khrushchev at its head, was Russian. Indeed, some scholars have characterized these changes in Ukraine's political elite as "the return of the Russians."

Behind the personnel changes was the decisive shift in Moscow's nationality policy that occurred in 1933 when Stalin declared local nationalism (not Russian chauvinism) the main threat to Soviet unity. This ideological reversal signaled the end of Ukrainization and ushered in a policy of systematic discrimination against Ukrainian culture. The number of Ukrainian-language schools was reduced; the percentage of Ukrainian teachers and researchers declined markedly; outstanding works of Ukrainian scholarship and literature were removed from library bookshelves; hundreds of Ukrainian plays were banned and scores of Ukrainian theaters closed; and museum staffs received orders to stop "idealizing Cossack history." At every opportunity the authorities disparaged "the nationalist theory of the specificity of Ukraine."

Simultaneously, there was a glorification of all aspects of Russian culture and an emphasis on Russia's leading role in the USSR. However, all this was done under the guise of fostering internationalism, proletarian solidarity, and the "friendship of peoples." Thus, in 1936, Stalin argued that the distinctions between Soviet nations were declining: "The characteristics of the peoples of the USSR have been changed at their very roots ... the spirit of distrust among them has disappeared, the spirit of cooperative friendship has developed, and ... in such a manner there has been constructed the present brotherly cooperation of peoples in a system of a single union state."³¹

Not unexpectedly, Soviet ideologists then concluded that the Russian language and culture were best suited for fostering international friendship, cooperation, and progress. In a typical statement, one of them claimed: "The Russian language is studied by the toilers of the whole world. In his time Marx paid tribute to the mighty Russian language, studying it and utilizing in his work primary sources in the Russian language ... In our situation the Russian language is the language of the international community of peoples of the USSR. Knowledge of the Russian language enables the peoples of the USSR to acquire the highest cultural values."³²

Sullivant notes that not only was their language praised, but also the Russians themselves were idealized for their revolutionary successes and "clothed with the mystical cloak of Marxian superiority over the other peoples in the Soviet Union and throughout the world."³³ An example of this new propaganda line was the following statement: "The Russian people are a great people. They have advanced the movement of all mankind toward the triumph of democracy and socialism. Under the leadership of their working class, the most advanced in the world, the Russian people have been the

first in history to be liberated from capitalist oppression and exploitation. The Russian working class has helped to liberate from national, political and economic oppression the whole numerous family of peoples inhabiting former tsarist Russia."³⁴

With claims such as these, Soviet ideologists could argue – and they do so to this day – that Stalin's new policy was not a return to traditional Russian chauvinism, but a quicker way to progress, socialism, and internationalism. By implication, they also suggested that the culture of Ukrainians and other non-Russians fostered backwardness and provincialism.

Consequently, in the late 1930s the study of Russian became compulsory in Ukrainian schools; the Ukrainian alphabet, grammar, and vocabulary were drawn closer to the Russian; and the use of Russian in Ukraine generally increased. As early as 1935, Postyshev admitted that "members [of the Communist Party of Ukraine] have begun to de-Ukrainianize themselves and even to stop speaking in Ukrainian."³⁵ In the printed media there was a similar development: whereas in 1931 about 90% of the newspapers and 85% of the journals had appeared in Ukrainian, by 1940 the respective figures had dropped to 70% and 45%. In literature it became a matter of policy to extol great Russian writers such as Pushkin, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy, and to emphasize how such Ukrainian authors as Shevchenko had developed under their beneficial influence. In sharp contrast to the late 1920s, when the authorities supported the Ukrainization of the cities, a decade later they energetically worked to expand Russian cultural influences into the countryside.



Stalin's "revolution from above" introduced staggering changes in the conditions under which Ukrainians and other peoples of the USSR lived. Industry became the main component of the economy. The cities began the remarkable growth that several decades later made them the main abode of the land's inhabitants. Agriculture underwent a radical transformation, one of the key elements of which was the liquidation of private landholding. Such changes, and particularly collectivization in Ukraine, were accomplished through the unprecedented use of coercion and at the cost of tremendous loss of life. Whatever benefits Soviet modernization brought to Ukraine, they will always invite the rejoinder that the costs were needlessly high.

In addition to material changes, Stalin exerted an incalculable impact on the political and cultural life of Ukrainians. The two social bases of Ukrainian nationalism, the intelligentsia and the peasantry, were exactly the groups that bore the greatest losses in Stalin's terror campaigns. As a result, the drive for Ukrainian self-assertion, which appeared to be gathering momentum in the 1920s, lost untold numbers of supporters. This setback was most apparent among two generations of the Ukrainian intelligentsia – those who were

active before the revolution and those who came to the forefront in the 1920s. It was these two generations of intelligentsia who had a crucial role to play in nation-building and it was they who were decimated by Stalin. The draining effect of the tremendous demographic losses in the 1930s helps to explain the relative weakness of political will and cultural stagnation that Soviet Ukrainians would evince in the coming years. Finally, Stalin reversed a very important and promising trend in Ukraine. In the 1920s modernization and Ukrainization had merged to a large extent. But when Stalin destroyed the Ukrainian elite in the 1930s and renewed Russification, modernity took on a Russian guise again. Ukrainian culture, meanwhile, was manipulated into focusing once more on its traditional identification with the conservative, backward village.

Western Ukraine between the Wars


A new political order emerged in Eastern Europe after the First World War as nation-states replaced the empires that had, until recently, ruled the region. But although it had won universal acceptance, the principle of national self-determination had been applied unevenly with the result that not all nations obtained statehood. Those that did had large, restive national minorities. Thus, during the interwar period, the nationality question remained unresolved; as tensions between dominant nationalities and disadvantaged minorities increased, it became an explosive issue. And the socioeconomic problems that had plagued the region from the age of the empires only aggravated the situation.

Approximately 7 million West Ukrainians, mostly former subjects of the Habsburg empire, were the only major nationality in Eastern Europe that did not achieve independence at this time. The majority was incorporated into Poland; the rest lived in Romania and Czechoslovakia. As the target of discriminatory policies everywhere, but most of all in Poland and Romania, the West Ukrainians developed an almost obsessive desire for self-rule, which they regarded as the solution to their political, socioeconomic, and cultural problems. Because their aspirations clashed with the assimilationist policies of the states in which they lived, the politics of national confrontation dominated the lives of the West Ukrainians throughout the interwar period.



The New Status of the West Ukrainians

Although Poland won the military conflict in Eastern Galicia in 1919, from the points of view of international law and the Entente powers, its right to rule the West Ukrainians remained at issue. Given its formal commitment to the principle of national self-determination, the Entente could not ignore the



Map 23 Western Ukraine during the interwar period

protests of the West Ukrainians against the imposition on them of Polish rule. Therefore, until 1923, the Western powers – primarily England and France – continued to deliberate over the permanent status of Eastern Galicia. In the meantime, however, they acquiesced to Poland's administration of the land on the condition that it grant the region autonomous administration and respect Ukrainian national rights.

A phrase that best describes the tense relationship in Eastern Galicia existing between the Ukrainian majority and the new Polish administration during the unsettled period of 1919–23 is "mutual negation." Until the Council of Ambassadors in Versailles reached its decision, the Ukrainians in Galicia refused to recognize the Polish state as their legitimate government. They boycotted the census of 1921 and the elections to the Polish *sejm* (parliament) in 1922. More radical elements among them turned to terror tactics and sabotage against Polish officials and government installations. For its part, the Polish government acted as if Eastern Galicia were a completely Polish land, imposing Polish control over the political, cultural, and economic life of the region, and totally ignoring Ukrainian concerns.

For the sake of international opinion, however, the Poles repeatedly claimed their readiness to respect the national rights of the Ukrainians and other minorities in their new state. In fact, this commitment was enshrined in their constitution. Consequently, in 1923, after the Polish government once again assured the Western powers that it would grant Eastern Galicia autonomy, allow the use of Ukrainian alongside Polish in administration, and establish a university for the Ukrainians, the Council of Ambassadors recognized Polish sovereignty over Eastern Galicia. The decision was a demoralizing setback for the Galician Ukrainians because, in their view, it placed them at the mercy of their worst enemies.

Its discriminatory policies notwithstanding, Poland was a state based on constitutional principles. While elections to its bicameral parliament were manipulated at times, for the most part they were relatively free. Even after 1926, when Marshal Józef Piłsudski staged a military coup, the rule of law remained in effect (although it was often interpreted in favor of Polish state interests). Consequently, Polish laws provided Ukrainians with the means, albeit limited, of opposing or at least protesting against state policies. This meant that, despite their second-class status, the Ukrainians in Poland were politically better off than their compatriots in the USSR.

The newly formed Polish state contained one of the highest percentages of national minorities in all Europe. In 1921, about one-third of its 27 million inhabitants were Ukrainians, Jews, Belorussians, Germans, and other non-Poles. The Ukrainians were by far the largest national minority, numbering well over 5 million and constituting about 15% of the state's inhabitants (minority statistics were a highly controversial matter in interwar Poland and Polish sources claimed that there were only about 4.5 million Ukrainians,

while Ukrainians insisted that they numbered over 6 million). Thus, the numerical preponderance of the Polish majority was not so vast as to allow them to ignore completely and consistently the aspirations of the non-Poles.

Ukrainians in Poland constituted two distinct communities (and the government did everything in its power to emphasize these distinctions). The majority lived in the former Habsburg land of Eastern Galicia or Eastern Little Poland (Małopolska Wschodnia), as it was now called. In 1920 this region was subdivided into the three *województwa* or provinces of Lviv, Ternopil, and Stanyslaviv. Overwhelmingly Greek Catholic, the more than 3 million Galician Ukrainians were nationally conscious and relatively well organized. The rest of the Ukrainians inhabited western Volhynia, Polissia, and Kholm, areas that Poland had acquired from Russia. They numbered approximately 2 million and were mostly Orthodox; they were also politically, socioeconomically, and culturally underdeveloped.

Poland's Policies toward the Ukrainians

Polish claims to the lands inhabited by the West Ukrainians rested on historical arguments. In the late 18th century, these territories had been part of the Polish Commonwealth and the Poles believed that they should also be part of the Polish state that emerged in 1919. The presence in these lands of substantial and dominant Polish minorities reinforced this view. As for the vast majority of the inhabitants in the eastern borderlands (*kresy*) who were not Polish, the government's intention was to Polonize them. Belief in the efficacy of Polonization rested on two assumptions: that the attractiveness of Polish culture was so great that non-Poles would willingly adopt it and that the national movements among the minorities were too weak to withstand Polish pressure. As it happened, the Poles erred on both counts.

Although generally repressive, Polish policy toward the Ukrainians did have its variations. While the powerful, ultranationalist National Democrats, led by Roman Dmowski and supported by the Polish minority in Eastern Galicia, consistently advocated militantly anti-Ukrainian policies, some highly respected Poles, such as Leon Wasilewski and Tadeusz Hołowko, urged moderation and flexibility in dealing with the minorities. The central authorities in Warsaw from time to time announced concessions to the Ukrainians, but hard-line local administrators, police officials, and army commanders refused to implement them. There were also regional differences. The governor of Volhynia, Henryk Józewski, attempted to entice Ukrainians into supporting the state by granting them limited concessions, while the government's repressive measures in neighboring Galicia reached a high point of brutality. Finally, there was the glaring contradiction between the Polish government's support of the Warsaw-based East Ukrainian government-in-exile (which could be useful in case of war with the

USSR) and its refusal to recognize the political aspirations of West Ukrainians.

In the final analysis, however, the Polish government pursued a policy of confrontation in its dealings with the large Ukrainian minority. In 1924 the government passed a law banning the use of Ukrainian in government agencies. That same year, the openly anti-Ukrainian minister of education, Stanisław Grabski, introduced reforms – the notorious *Lex Grabski* – that transformed most Ukrainian-language schools into bilingual institutions in which Polish predominated. Ukrainians were excluded from Lviv University; its Ukrainian chairs were abolished; and the promise to establish a Ukrainian university at government expense was never fulfilled.

An especially galling feature of these early Polish policies for the Ukrainian peasantry was the colonization program. In order to strengthen the Polish presence in the eastern borderlands, in 1920 the government began to bring Polish settlers into Eastern Galicia and Volhynia. Initially, army veterans made up most of the colonists, especially in Volhynia; later, civilian newcomers predominated. Despite the fact that Galicia was one of the most overpopulated agricultural regions in Europe, the Polish settlers received large allotments of the best land as well as generous financial subsidies. Those who chose not to work on the land obtained privileged positions as village policemen, postal and railroad employees, or petty officials. Ukrainian sources claim that by 1938 about 200,000 Poles had moved into the villages of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia and another 100,000 settled in the towns; Polish writers place the total number of colonists at less than 100,000. In any case, while it was too small to alter decisively the ethnic composition of the eastern lands, the influx of Polish newcomers was large enough to arouse fierce Ukrainian resentment.

Although the Piłsudski coup of 1926 ushered in a more authoritarian Polish government, there were initial indications that relations between it and the Ukrainians might improve. The personification of this new approach was Henryk Józewski, who was appointed governor of Volhynia in 1927. He succeeded in winning some goodwill among the Ukrainian peasants by distributing much of the government's parceled lands to the local inhabitants. He also made limited concessions to the political leadership of the Volhynian Ukrainians, while attempting to isolate them from the "destructive influences" of the more nationalistic Galicians. But religious discrimination against the Orthodox Volhynians and the adamant opposition of local officials and Polish nationalists eventually undermined Józewski's efforts.

Ukrainian/Polish relations deteriorated badly during the Great Depression, which struck the Ukrainian-inhabited agricultural areas especially hard. Peasants suffered not so much from the lack of employment as from the disastrous decline in their incomes resulting from a drop in demand for their produce. During these years of economic crisis, the net return per acre on

small peasant landholdings dropped by 70–80%. Under the circumstances, the Ukrainian peasants' resentment of the well-subsidized Polish colonists and the wealthy Polish landowners reached new heights. Dissatisfaction among the Ukrainian intelligentsia, and especially among its young (and unemployed) members, also grew because the few government positions that were available invariably went to Poles. Therefore, when the radical Ukrainian nationalists called for active resistance to Polish domination, they found a ready response among Ukrainian youths.

The Pacification In the summer of 1930 there was a wave of attacks against Polish property in Galicia. These usually took the form of burning the produce on Polish estates. About 2200 such acts of sabotage were recorded. The government's response was massive and brutal. In mid September, large Polish police and cavalry units descended on the Ukrainian countryside and commenced a "pacification" campaign intended to restore order. Employing the principle of collective responsibility, armed units moved into about 800 villages, demolished Ukrainian community centers and libraries, confiscated property and produce, and beat those who protested. Over 2000 Ukrainians, mostly schoolboys, students, and young peasants, were arrested and about one-third of them received lengthy prison sentences. The Ukrainian deputies to the parliament were placed under house arrest to prevent them from participating in the elections that were taking place at this time and their Ukrainian constituents were terrorized into voting for Polish candidates.

Ukrainian protests to the League of Nations made the plight of the Ukrainian minority in Poland in general, and the "pacification" in particular, an international cause célèbre. But while European (and especially British) politicians condemned Polish behavior, a committee of the League of Nations blamed Ukrainian extremists for provoking the "pacification." Although the Polish government soon quelled the disturbances, in the long run its actions only intensified Ukrainian bitterness, encouraged extremists on both sides, and made the search for constructive solutions even more difficult.

While the "pacification" brought a semblance of order to the countryside, it did not break the determination of the young, radical nationalists to resist the Polish regime. The OUN (Orhanizatsiia Ukrainykykh Nationalistiv – Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) merely changed tactics and in the early 1930s concentrated its efforts on the political assassination of leading Polish politicians and government officials, as well as on attacks on post offices to obtain funds for its activities. The government, for its part, maintained its uncompromising stance toward the Ukrainians. It abolished self-government in the villages and placed them under the administration of Polish officials. In 1934 a concentration camp was established in Bereza Kartuzka for about 2000 political prisoners, most of whom were Ukrainians. Later that year, Poland repudiated the commitment it had made to the League of Nations to safeguard the rights of its national minorities.

These policies of the government reflected the swing to the extreme right taking place in Poland during the 1930s. In 1935 a new constitution concentrated power in the hands of Marshal Piłsudski, curbing the authority of parliament and declaring the interests of the state to be paramount. The electoral process was reorganized to give the government the prerogative of accepting or rejecting candidates for elected office. After the death of Piłsudski in that same year, military cliques played an increasingly dominant role in the conduct of government. Consequently, the Polish state "completed the transition from a democratic-parliamentary framework to a totalitarian one."¹

Attempts at compromise There were, however, moderates in both the Polish and Ukrainian camps who grew impatient with the continuing and fruitless Polish/Ukrainian confrontations. On the Ukrainian side, UNDO (Ukrainian National Democratic Union), the largest Ukrainian political party, emerged as a proponent of compromise. Its leaders were clearly disillusioned with OUN violence and the reprisals that it provoked against Ukrainians as a whole. They were also under pressure from the strong Ukrainian cooperative movement (which needed stability to function effectively) to work toward a rapprochement. On the Polish side, there were also indications of a willingness to compromise. In 1933 the government established the *Polish-Ukrainian Bulletin*, a journal that sought to emphasize the positive aspects of Ukrainian/Polish relations. Soon afterwards, the prime minister, Waclaw Jędrzejewicz, publicly admitted that mistakes had been made by "both sides." Paradoxically, the OUN's assassination in 1934 of Bronisław Pieracki, the minister of the interior, hastened the rapprochement because, to the government's great satisfaction, both the UNDO and Metropolitan Sheptytsky strongly denounced the act. Thus, in 1935, the stage was set for a limited agreement between the government and UNDO, which came to be known as "normalization."

The arrangement called for the Ukrainians to recognize formally the primacy of Polish state interests and to vote for the new budget. In return, the government allowed UNDO's candidates to stand for election, thus greatly increasing Ukrainian representation in parliament. After the elections, the government made several more concessions. Vasyl Mudry, the leader of UNDO, was chosen vice-marshal (speaker) of the *sejm*. Most of the Ukrainian prisoners in Bereza Kartuzka were freed. And some Ukrainian economic institutions and cooperatives received financial credits. For many members of UNDO it seemed that life under Polish rule could become bearable, especially in view of the horrors that Ukrainians under Soviet rule were experiencing at this time.

But "normalization" was not universally accepted by the Ukrainians. Dissident members of UNDO and other Ukrainian parties attacked the UNDO leadership for "accepting crumbs from the Polish table." Not unexpectedly, the radical nationalists rejected "normalization" and continued their revolution-

ary activities. Finally, the deep-seated mistrust of Poles in Ukrainian society as a whole fueled widespread skepticism about the success of the rapprochement. Polish attitudes and actions also served to undermine "normalization." Despite the central government's concessions, in the eastern provinces almost every governor, county administrator, and even local police chief adhered to his own, invariably harsh, method of "handling" the Ukrainians. The officials usually had the support of the local Polish minority for this approach. Indeed, when Polish mobs demolished Ukrainian institutions, they often did so in secret collusion with local Polish officials. Polish youths, organized in the armed, paramilitary units of *Strzelcy*, frequently harassed Ukrainians under the guise of helping to maintain law and order. In 1938, the feared border police carried out a "mini-pacification" of areas along the Soviet border inhabited by Ukrainians.

Perhaps the most adamant opponent of "normalization" was the Polish military. As the threat of war increased in the late 1930s, the army leadership came to view the disaffected Ukrainians as a major security problem. To eliminate or reduce this problem, the army applied "divide-and-rule" tactics. In 1938 it launched a campaign to encourage the Ukrainian-speaking Hutsuls, Lemkos, and Boikos of the Carpathian highlands to view themselves as distinct peoples and not as part of the larger Ukrainian nation. Attempts were made to develop the Lemko dialect into a separate language and Lemkos were urged to convert from Greek Catholicism to Orthodoxy in order to create a barrier between them and the Galician Ukrainians. A variant of this approach was the army's efforts to persuade the impoverished or "barefoot" Ukrainian gentry, which, except for its treasured titles of nobility, was identical to the Ukrainian peasantry, that it was both nationally and socially distinct from it.

Meanwhile, in Volhynia, Polish authorities continued their attack on the Orthodox church, the main pillar of Ukrainian identity in the region. Arguing that most of the churches in Volhynia and the Kholm region had once belonged to the Greek Catholics or Roman Catholics, the authorities transferred about 150 Orthodox churches to the latter and destroyed another 190. Thus, of the 389 Orthodox churches in Volhynia in 1914, only 51 survived in 1939. Similar pressures were applied in neighboring Kholm and Polissia regions where armed bands of colonists called *Krakus* terrorized the local inhabitants into converting to Catholicism and where the administration of the Orthodox church, theological training, and even sermons were conducted in Polish.

Socioeconomic Conditions

Despite the vast political transformations experienced by West Ukrainians

as a result of the collapse of the Austrian and Russian empires, the struggle for independent statehood, and their inclusion into Poland, the socio-economic conditions in which they lived remained essentially unchanged. The Ukrainian-inhabited lands, which constituted about 25% of Poland's territory, remained underdeveloped agrarian borderlands or internal colonies that supplied cheap raw resources to the core areas of Poland and bought their high-priced finished products.

Even by Polish standards, the Ukrainians were extremely agrarian: about 80% were peasants compared to the Polish average of 50%, and only 8% were industrial workers compared to the Polish average of 20%. In addition to these structural disadvantages, the Ukrainian populace had to deal with such problems as the wartime devastation; the government's discriminatory economic policies towards them; and the impact of the Great Depression. In short, the socioeconomic plight of the West Ukrainians under Polish rule remained as unsatisfactory as their political status.

As might be expected, the main economic difficulties lay in agriculture, where old problems, such as rural overpopulation and tiny plots, persisted from pre-First World War days. In the Ukrainian-inhabited provinces of Poland, about 1.2 million peasant households owned 60% of the land. The problem was especially acute in Galicia, where the size of over 75% of the peasant plots was less than 10 acres. Meanwhile, about 2000 large estates, owned by Poles and sometimes consisting of 10,000–20,000 acres, controlled close to 25% of the land. In Volhynia, where there were fewer large Polish landowners, the soil was richer and peasant plots were larger, so that conditions in the countryside were somewhat better.

To alleviate the acute shortage of land, the government encouraged the subdivision of large estates in the 1920s. However, the program was of little benefit to Ukrainians in Galicia because most of the subdivided lands went to Polish peasants and newly arrived colonists. Emigration also proved to be less effective than before in alleviating the rural overpopulation because, during the interwar period, the United States and, to a lesser extent, Canada reduced the numbers of immigrants they were willing to receive. As a result, only about 170,000 West Ukrainians emigrated during that time.

Industry continued to offer few options to a Ukrainian peasant anxious to better his lot. The eastern borderlands had a disproportionately small share of Poland's weakly developed industry; it grew even smaller in the 1930s when the government supported industrial growth in central Poland while neglecting the largely non-Polish provinces. Only about 135,000 West Ukrainians were employed as workers, mostly in the forestry and oil industries. Lviv, with a population of about 300,000, most of which was Polish and Jewish, remained the largest urban center in Galicia.

As before the First World War, the intelligentsia continued to provide the political, cultural, and even socioeconomic leadership in West Ukrainian soci-

ety. But unlike in the 19th century when priests constituted much of this class, during the interwar period the overwhelming majority of the intelligentsia was secular. According to Polish scholars, in the 1930s about 1% of the West Ukrainian working population or about 15,000 individuals belonged to the intelligentsia (among Poles the analogous figure was 5%).² A major reason for the comparatively small number of educated Ukrainians was the Polish government's policy of hindering access to higher education for non-Poles. Thus, in Lviv University, Ukrainians constituted less than 10% of the student body.

For the most part, the members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia earned their living as teachers or white-collar workers in the rapidly growing cooperative movement. Some Ukrainians began to enter professions such as law, medicine, pharmacy, and engineering, where Poles and Jews had long held a monopoly. Yet, one of the most common white-collar careers in Eastern Europe – government service – was practically closed to qualified Ukrainians, all such positions being reserved for Poles. A positive aspect of this frustrating situation was that many educated young Ukrainians were forced to abandon their attempts to find employment in the cities and went to work in the countryside, resulting in the impressive cultural and socioeconomic development of the Ukrainian villages. Nonetheless, difficulty in finding appropriate employment, especially during the depression of the 1930s, added greatly to the already precarious material plight of the intelligentsia. It also fueled resentment toward the Polish regime among educated Ukrainians and encouraged in them a conviction that these problems could be solved only if Ukrainians had a state of their own.

The Ukrainian Response

Because it was basically the Polish government that defined the nature of Polish/Ukrainian relations during the interwar years, Ukrainian activity during this period was essentially either a response or a reaction to Polish initiatives. Ukrainians generally remained opposed to the Polish regime and expressed their opposition in one of two ways: either by legal means, which would not jeopardize their already unenviable position, or by violent, revolutionary tactics, which had no regard for the consequences. Of the two, the first approach was by far the most widespread.

Although the "legalists" never abandoned the goal of eventually uniting all Ukrainians in an independent state, they concentrated on preserving the gains that Ukrainians had made under Austrian rule against the discriminatory policies of the Polish state. They participated in the Polish political system by means of legal Ukrainian parties, rebuilt and expanded the cooperative movement, and sought to protect Ukrainian schooling. By developing this "organic sector" of Ukrainian society, the "legalists" hoped that Ukraini-

ans would be better prepared to achieve independence when the next opportunity arose. Such constructive albeit mundane activities attracted mostly the older, more stable elements of Ukrainian society, such as members of the prewar establishment, the clergy, much of the intelligentsia, and the well-to-do peasants.

Political parties An unusually fractious society, Poland had ninety-two registered political parties in 1925 of which thirty-two were represented in parliament. This tendency for political differentiation was also evident among the Ukrainians. Spanning the ideological spectrum from extreme left to extreme right, the Ukrainians had about a dozen political parties, which also reflected the very different political traditions of the "Austrian" Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia as opposed to the "Russian" Ukrainians of Volhynia, Polisia, and Kholm.

There was one party, however, that was larger and more influential than all the others put together – UNDO. It had been formed in 1925 from the merger of the Labor (*Trudova*) party and several smaller groups. Despite the name change, UNDO was actually the direct descendant of the prewar National Democrats, the leading West Ukrainian party prior to and during the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918–19. Essentially a liberal party, it was committed to constitutional democracy and Ukrainian independence. To prepare Ukrainians for statehood, it supported the policy of "organic development" and agrarian reform. Relatively flexible in its tactics, it initiated the attempt at "normalizing" Ukrainian/Polish relations. But, with Polish repression on the one hand, and Ukrainian nationalist extremists on the other, UNDO found it difficult to maintain its middle-of-the-road policies.

Because most Ukrainian activists, including the vast majority of the intelligentsia and clergy, belonged to UNDO, it was the party of the West Ukrainian establishment. Its members controlled many Ukrainian financial, cooperative, and cultural institutions, including the most influential West Ukrainian newspaper, *Dilo*. During elections, it drew about 600,000 votes and won the vast majority of Ukrainian-held seats to parliament. Some of the party's most important leaders were Dmytro Levytsky, Vasyl Mudry, Stefan Baran, Ostap Lutsky, Milena Rudnytska, and Ivan Kedryn.

Socialist tendencies among the West Ukrainians were strong but fragmented. Their main representative was the Radical party, the oldest of all Ukrainian parties. Its program called for an equitable distribution of land among the peasants, limits on private ownership, and separation of church and state. But it also emphasized that these goals could not be attained until an independent state that united all Ukrainians was established. Therefore, in the 1920s–1930s, the Radicals, who had been strong supporters of the West Ukrainian People's Republic, strongly opposed Poland and the USSR, the main opponents of Ukrainian independence.

In the 1930s the Radicals had about 20,000 members, most of whom were peasants, agricultural workers, and some intelligentsia. In the elections of 1928, the party received about 280,000 votes. Although based in Galicia, the Radicals made a strong effort to expand their influence into Volhynia, Polissia, and Kholm, uniting in 1926 with the smaller Volhynian-based Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary party to form the Ukrainian Socialist Radical party. Among their best-known leaders were such veterans as Lev Bachynsky and Ivan Makukh. While the Radicals inclined toward nationalism, the other pre-war Ukrainian socialist party – the small and weak Social Democrats led by Lev Hankevych – veered toward communism.

During the 1920s, pro-Soviet views spread rapidly in Western Ukraine. To a large extent, this was a reaction to the Western powers' favoritism of the Poles and to Poland's oppression of its minorities. Moreover, the Ukrainization policies in Soviet Ukraine as well as the resurgence of the peasantry under the NEP also appealed to West Ukrainians. To encourage these tendencies, the Soviets appointed Ukrainians as their consuls in Lviv and tried to woo West Ukrainian intellectuals and students, boasting of Soviet Ukrainian achievements, and promising them responsible positions and a warm welcome in Ukraine.

Consequently, a number of leading West Ukrainian intellectuals and scholars, such as Mykhailo Lozynsky, Antin Krushelnysky, and Stepan Rudnytsky, as well as hundreds of students immigrated to Soviet Ukraine (where almost all of them perished in the purges of the 1930s). Although the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv did not have formal contacts with the Soviet government, it did develop close ties with the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev. West Ukrainian cooperatives exchanged expertise and data with their Soviet counterparts. The exiled West Ukrainian government of Ievhen Petrushevych adopted an openly pro-Soviet line after 1923, as did an influential segment of the UNDO leadership. But these pro-Soviet tendencies were short-lived, and in the 1930s, as news about the horrors of collectivization, the famine, and the purges filtered into Western Ukraine, they quickly diminished.

In its ascendancy, however, pro-Soviet feeling gave rise to a number of legal and illegal political organizations. In 1919 a small group of Galicians, most of whom had been prisoners of war in Russia during the revolution, formed the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia. When the Red Army briefly occupied part of Galicia in 1920, these Galician Communists, who consisted of Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews, formed an ephemeral "government." In 1923 the party changed its name to the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU) and, bowing to pressure from the Communist International, became an autonomous part of the Polish Communist party. Even so, the Ukrainian leaders of this multiethnic party, such as Karol Maksymovych and Roman Kuzma, insisted on maintaining its Ukrainian character and exhibited a surprising de-

gree of independence. They vigorously supported Shumsky and the national communist tendencies in Soviet Ukraine, making an issue of it in the international communist movement. This stance led to the removal of the KPZU's Ukrainian leadership but did not end the fierce factionalism in the party. In 1938 it was dissolved on the orders of Stalin. In the 1930s, the KPZU had over 4000 members, about half of whom were Ukrainians, while the remainder were Poles and Jews who lived in Western Ukraine.

Because it was an illegal, underground party, in 1926 the KPZU encouraged the formation of a legal, broadly based front organization called Ukrainian Workers'-Peasants' Socialist Union (Sel-Rob) for the purpose of gaining greater access to the masses. At the outset it was led by a leftist Russophile, Kyrylo Valnytsky, and by Pavlo Vasylichuk, a Ukrainian socialist from Volhynia. Internal conflicts, similar to those that had wracked the KPZU, soon split the organization into a right faction, which supported Ukrainian national goals, and a left faction, which sided with Moscow. In 1928, at the high point of their influence, Sel-Rob's two wings had about 10,000 members and garnered close to 240,000 votes, most of which came from Volhynia and Kholm and supported the nationally conscious rightists. However, Stalin's policies undermined support for Sel-Rob and when the Polish government dissolved it in 1932, there was little protest.

The remainder of the Ukrainian parties were small, weak, and inclined to cooperate with the Polish government. One of these was Bishop Hryhorii Khomyshyn's Ukrainian Catholic party, which attempted, without success, to mobilize support for a clerical conservatism. The rapidly declining Russophiles established the Russian Peasant and the Russian Agrarian parties, which merged in 1931. This did not, however, prevent many of their rank and file from going over to the Ukrainian parties.

The cooperative movement "Rely on your own resources!" was the slogan of the activists in the "organic" sector of West Ukrainian society. It implied that since no one – and certainly not the Polish government – would aid Ukrainians in their endeavors, they had to help themselves. Cooperatives were seen by Ukrainians as one of the best ways of achieving such a goal. Before 1914 the cooperatives' main function had been economic development. Under Polish rule, this function was greatly expanded: the cooperative movement came to view itself as a school for self-government and an instrument of economic self-defense. Indeed, one of its slogans proclaimed: "In the cooperatives the people learn to be masters of their own land."

A major factor in the expansion of the cooperatives' role was the thousands of Ukrainian army veterans who joined them. Patriotic, politicized, and frustrated by their defeat, they saw the cooperatives as a means of continuing the struggle for the Ukrainian cause: "By working in the cooperatives we are once again the nation's soldiers." Every cooperative that was organized,

every product or service that it provided, and every penny that landed in Ukrainian rather than Polish pockets represented for them a blow against the Polish enemy and a step closer to independence. There was also a practical aspect to involvement in the cooperatives: in many cases the cooperatives provided the only employment opportunities available to the veterans.

The cooperatives quickly established an elaborate organization. Credit unions were united in an association called Tsentrobank; rural consumer and marketing unions formed Tsentrosoiuz; the union of dairy cooperatives was called Maslosoiuz; and Narodna Torhivlia represented the urban retailers. The umbrella organization that united all the cooperatives, audited their accounts, trained their personnel, and provided general guidance was RSUK (Audit Union of Ukrainian Cooperatives). The authority of RSUK was greatly enhanced by the high quality and dedication of some of its leaders, most notably Ostap Lutsky and Iuliian Pavlykovsky.

In the interwar period, rural consumer and marketing cooperatives dominated the movement because they addressed the main problem experienced by the peasants – the low prices they received for their produce and the high prices they had to pay for finished goods – by uniting them into larger, more-effective bargaining units. The dairy cooperatives of Maslosoiuz were most successful in marketing their products and they dominated the West Ukrainian, and even large parts of the Polish, markets.

Statistics testify to the dramatic growth of the cooperatives. In 1921 there were about 580 Ukrainian cooperatives in Eastern Galicia; in 1928 their number jumped to 2500; and by 1939 there were close to 4000. The total membership in the cooperatives on the eve of the Second World War was over 700,000, and they provided employment for over 15,000 Ukrainians. However, close to 90% of the cooperatives were in Eastern Galicia; in Volhynia, Kholm, and Polissia, Ukrainians were forced to join Polish cooperative associations. Nonetheless, Ukrainians had twice as many cooperatives per capita as did Poles, even with the advantage of government support enjoyed by the latter.

But the Ukrainian cooperatives also had serious problems. Alarmed by their growth, Polish government officials made a point of obstructing their further development. Polish tactics included allegations that reports were filled out incorrectly and building or hygienic codes were violated. Although the Ukrainian cooperatives were numerous and well organized, they were far less wealthy than those of the Poles and the lack of capital limited their economic impact. These difficulties notwithstanding, the cooperative movement accelerated social mobilization and national integration among the Ukrainians of Galicia and reflected their desire to take charge of their own affairs.

Education As might be expected, education was an extremely sensitive and important issue in the Ukrainian/Polish confrontation. Besides providing

their children with an education, Ukrainians wanted the schools to raise Ukrainian national consciousness and cultural development. The Poles, for their part, expected the educational system to make non-Poles into loyal citizens of the Polish state. The Poles expanded education on the elementary level, especially in underdeveloped areas such as Volhynia, Polissia, and Kholm; by the 1930s illiteracy had dropped to 28% in the Ukrainian-inhabited areas of the Polish state (although it remained considerably higher in Volhynia). At the same time, however, the Ukrainian-language schools that had been established under Austrian rule were systematically eliminated under the guise of transforming them into bilingual schools. Of the more than 2400 Ukrainian elementary schools existing in Eastern Galicia in 1912, only 352 remained in 1937. In Volhynia the decline during this period was from 440 Ukrainian schools to 8. On the secondary level, the situation was also grim for the Ukrainians: in 1931 there was one Polish *gymnazium* for every 16,000 Poles but only one Ukrainian *gymnazium* per 230,000 Ukrainians.

Anti-Ukrainian discrimination in education was also obvious at the university level. The government never fulfilled its promise to establish a separate university for the Ukrainians and it systematically obstructed Ukrainians from obtaining a university education. Therefore, in 1920, the Ukrainians established a "secret" university in Lviv. Organized without the permission of the authorities, it offered a broad range of improvised courses that were taught in conspiratorial manner in secluded rooms and basements. At its high point, the university had 54 professors, 3 faculties, 15 departments, and about 1500 students. After the government closed down the courses in 1925, many Ukrainian students left to pursue their studies abroad, especially in Czechoslovakia. The net effect of these discriminatory government policies was that many educated Ukrainians became militantly anti-Polish and politically radicalized.

An attempt to meet Ukrainian needs at the secondary-school level was made by *Ridna Shkola*, an educational society, which by 1938 established about 40 *gymnazia*, lycées, and vocational schools. Dues from its membership, which jumped from 5000 in 1914 to over 100,000 in 1938, and contributions from immigrants in the United States and Canada provided much of the funding for its efforts. General cultural needs remained the domain of the venerable *Prosvita* society, the "mother" of all West Ukrainian organizations; in 1939 it had over 360,000 members. It supported a vast network of reading rooms, published educational materials, established day-care centers, and conducted a variety of courses.

The Galician penchant for organization carried over into other spheres as well. A variety of prewar youth organizations, such as the village-based *Sokil* and *Luh* (the old *Sich*), continued their activities while new ones, such as *Plast*, the scouting movement founded in 1911, attracted the children of the urban intelligentsia and groomed them for leadership positions in society.

Convinced that the scouting movement was a hotbed of nationalism, the government banned it in 1930. An important organizational development in the interwar period was the growth of the women's movement. Committed to creating a new, nationally conscious, culturally developed, and socioeconomically progressive woman, the *Soiuz Ukrainok*, founded in 1920, had over 45,000 members a decade later. Under the able leadership of Milena Rudnytska, a member of parliament, it carried on extensive charitable, educational, and cultural activities. It also had well-developed contacts with international feminist organizations.

The churches The largest, wealthiest, and most influential West Ukrainian organization was, of course, the Greek Catholic church. But striking changes occurred in the relative importance of this institution in Galician society. Unlike in the 19th century, when the church had been the only institution that the Ukrainians of Galicia had, in the interwar period it was only one, albeit the largest, of many and, therefore, could no longer count on the unquestioning loyalty of all Galician Ukrainians.

In the late 1930s, the church had over 4 million faithful in about 3000 parishes. The church also possessed a network of youth organizations and women's societies, periodicals, and even its own political organization, the Ukrainian Catholic National party. An indication of its ability to mobilize the youth, particularly from the villages, was the massive Youth for Christ rally in 1933, which drew over 50,000 participants. The church also made progress on the educational level. In 1928 it established the only Ukrainian institution of higher learning in Poland, the Theological Academy in Lviv, the rector of which was Josyf Slipy. Three new seminaries were also founded.

The greatest asset of the Greek Catholic church during the interwar period was undoubtedly its leader, Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky. Universally respected for his strength of character, breadth of vision, and humanity, the metropolitan was the single-most influential figure in West Ukrainian society. His conviction that the Greek Catholic church was a distinctly Ukrainian institution that should preserve its Eastern ecclesiastical traditions and support the national aspirations of its people added to his popularity. This attitude brought him into conflict with a part of the church hierarchy, led by Bishop Khomyshyn and the Basilian Order, that preferred to stress ties to Roman Catholicism rather than the church's distinctiveness.

The metropolitan also exerted considerable influence on political affairs. In 1930 he energetically protested the "pacification" campaign and five years later he supported the policy of "normalization." While maintaining close relations with the moderates of UNDO, he chastised both nationalist extremists and Communists, constantly appealing for the need for higher values and broader vision.

In Volhynia, Polissia, and Kholm, the Orthodox church included about 2

million Ukrainians. Unlike the Greek Catholic church, it did not have the protection of Rome and was, therefore, more exposed to repressive Polish policies. In 1924, on the insistence of the government, the Orthodox church in Poland broke its ties with the Moscow patriarchate and declared autocephaly (ecclesiastical independence). Although old Russophile sympathies still survived at the upper levels of the church hierarchy, Ukrainian influences increased markedly at the grass-roots level as Ukrainian came to be used in the liturgy, religious publications, and the seminaries. Alarmed by these developments, the Polish government insisted on the use of Polish in church services and began a campaign, accompanied by the widespread destruction of Orthodox churches, to convert the Orthodox to Catholicism. Although Polonization did make some inroads, notably in the liturgy, conversions to Catholicism were rare.

The Revolutionary Movement

The new nationalism A qualitatively different variety of Ukrainian nationalism emerged in the interwar period. In the 19th century, the nationalism of the largely liberal or socialist Ukrainian intelligentsia was a rather amorphous combination of national consciousness, patriotism, and humanist values. Although the movement became more focused in the 1917–20 period when it accepted national statehood as its goal, it continued to advocate democratic or socialist principles. Indeed, during the war for independence many Ukrainian politicians often wavered when it came to choosing between nationalist or socialist goals. However, in the 1920s there developed among many young Ukrainians, as among many other European peoples, an extreme variety of nationalism often called integral nationalism.

In the Ukrainian case, the genesis of integral nationalism lay primarily in the setbacks of 1917–20. As Alexander Motyl notes: "In essence, Ukrainian nationalism was an attempt to explain why Ukrainian statehood had been lost and how it was to be regained."³ Convinced that socialist and democratic approaches encouraged the party strife, poor leadership, conflicting purposes, and lack of direction that led to their defeat, young veterans of the war for independence rejected the old ideologies. Instead they called for the creation of a new type of Ukrainian, one who was unconditionally committed to the nation as a whole and to independent statehood. These tendencies were most forcefully articulated by Dmytro Dontsov, an East Ukrainian émigré and former socialist, who became the principal ideologue of Ukrainian integral nationalism.

The ideology Ukrainian integral nationalism was not based on a closely reasoned system of ideas; rather it rested on several key concepts whose main goal was not to interpret reality but to incite people to action. Dontsov ar-

gued that the nation was an absolute value and that there was no higher purpose than the attainment of independent statehood. Because politics was essentially a Darwinian struggle of nations for survival, conflict was unavoidable. It followed that the end justified the means, that willpower predominated over reason, and that action was preferable to contemplation. To dramatize and inculcate these views, integral nationalists mythologized Ukrainian history, emphasizing a cult of struggle, of sacrifice, and of national heroes. Racism was a relatively minor component of the ideology and although traces of anti-Semitism could be found in the writings of some proponents, it was not emphasized.

Integral nationalism espoused collectivism, which placed the nation above the individual. Nonetheless, it also urged its proponents to be "strong individuals" who would stop at nothing to attain their goals. One goal was to have the nation function as an integrated whole, not as disparate parties, classes, or regional groups. Hence the all-encompassing scope of the movement, its stress on *sobornist* (national unity), its rejection of regionalism, and its desire to control all aspects of Ukrainian society. Integral nationalists were urged to "force their way into all areas of national life, into all its recesses, into all its institutions, societies, and groups, into every city and village, into every family."⁴ Along with this need to monopolize all aspects of national life came intolerance. Convinced that theirs was the only way to attain national goals, integral nationalists were ready to do battle with all who stood in their path.

Dontsov and other ideologues of the movement were vague about the type of state and society they wished to have once independence was achieved. They had little to say about socioeconomic organization, noting only that it would be basically agrarian and would rest on cooperation between the state, cooperatives, and private capital. The political system of the future state would be based on the rule of one nationalist party. A hierarchy of proven "fighters" or "better people" would form the core of the party and its leadership. At the pinnacle of the movement and the future state was the supreme leader or *vozhd*, whose authority was unquestionable and unlimited.

Ukrainian integral nationalism clearly contained elements of fascism and totalitarianism. These tendencies were spreading throughout Europe in the 1920s and their influence, especially that of Italian fascism, was widespread in Eastern Europe. But, as Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky has argued, Western fascism, which developed in urban, industrialized surroundings, was not the closest relative of Ukrainian integral nationalism.⁵ The latter was far more similar to the radical rightist movements in agrarian East European societies, such as the Iron Guard in Romania, the Ustashi in Croatia, the Arrow Cross in Hungary, and related movements in Slovakia and Poland. In the final analysis, however, Ukrainian integral nationalism was genetically independent, that is, its primary sources lay within its own society. Confronted with the tragic plight of Ukrainians under Polish and Soviet rule, having lost faith in tradi-

tional legal methods, and disillusioned with the Western democracies, which had ignored Ukrainian pleas for support and were themselves mired in crisis, Ukrainian integral nationalists believed that they had nothing to gain from the status quo and that they had to use radical means to change it.

The organization Even before the final formulation of their ideology, scattered groups of future integral nationalists had appeared in Galicia and especially among the émigrés in Czechoslovakia. In 1920, a small group of officers in Prague established uvo (Ukrainska Viiskova Orhanizatsiia – Ukrainian Military Organization), an underground organization that sought to continue the armed struggle against Polish occupation. Soon afterward, Colonel Ievhen Konovalets, a Galician who had led the crack Sich Riflemen units in the East Ukrainian armies and a prominent leader in the struggle for independence, was chosen to be uvo's commander. An excellent organizer and a sophisticated politician, Konovalets quickly became the undisputed leader of the integral nationalists during the interwar period.

Initially, uvo was strictly a military organization with a military command structure. It secretly prepared demobilized veterans in Galicia and interned soldiers in Czechoslovakia for a possible anti-Polish uprising, and it carried out operations designed to destabilize the Polish occupation. The most notable of its operations were the attempted assassination of Piłsudski, the Polish head of state, by Stepan Fedak in 1921 and the widespread sabotage campaign of 1922. Consisting of an estimated 2000 men, the organization maintained contacts with both the East and West Ukrainian governments-in-exile and secretly received funding from West Ukrainian political parties.

But in 1923 uvo's position changed drastically. When the Allied recognition of Polish rule in Eastern Galicia raised doubts among many West Ukrainians about the sense of continuing armed resistance, many seasoned members left uvo. The organization, however, refused to modify its demand for militant action against the Poles, thereby alienating the legal parties that now rejected terrorist tactics. Polish police pressure forced Konovalets and much of the leadership to flee Galicia and establish their headquarters abroad.

The ensuing crisis caused a major reorientation in uvo. Konovalets turned to foreign powers, especially Poland's enemies, Germany and Lithuania, for political and financial support. Back in Eastern Galicia, uvo began to recruit *gymnazium* and university students to replenish its dwindling ranks. To propagate its hard-line views in Galicia, the organization smuggled in its journal, *Surma*, from abroad. Most important, uvo established contacts with several student groups, such as Ukrainian Nationalist Youth in Prague, the Legion of Ukrainian Nationalists in Podebrady (Czechoslovakia), and the Association of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth in Lviv, for the purpose of forming an expanded nationalist organization. After several preparatory conferences, the representatives of uvo and the student groups met in Vienna in 1929 and es-

tablished the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Most of its cadres were Galician youths, and Konovalts and his associates provided the leadership from abroad.

The role the OUN took upon itself was much broader than that of UVO. Like its predecessor, OUN remained an "underground army." It adhered to military principles of leadership, conspiratorial techniques, and strict discipline and engaged in a campaign of political terror against the Polish state and its representatives. But it also strove to become a broadly based ideological/revolutionary movement, whose objective was the achievement of integral nationalist goals. It made a special effort to popularize its views, especially among the youth, and attempted to dominate all the West Ukrainian social, political, and economic organizations. Those Ukrainians who obstructed the OUN's plans were vulnerable to the same terrorist attacks as Polish officials.

Undoubtedly OUN's greatest success was its ability to attract widespread support among Ukrainian youth. Its stress on revolutionary action, radical solutions, and the creation of a new breed of "super" Ukrainians appealed to youths who felt victimized by the Polish government, frustrated by lack of employment, and disillusioned by the failures of their elders. Initially, OUN attracted a large portion of the university and upper-*gymnasium* students in Eastern Galicia. Almost every secondary school and every university in Poland and abroad where Ukrainians studied had OUN cells. The dormitory (Akademichnyi dim) of the Ukrainian university students in Lviv, who were led by Bohdan Kravtsiv, Stefan Lenkavsky, Stepan Okhrymovych, Ivan Grabrusevych, and Volodymyr Ianiv, became a regular integral nationalist stronghold. When some of these youths returned to their native villages, they spread integral nationalist ideas in the countryside.

In order to expand its influence, OUN also infiltrated various economic, educational, and youth organizations; organized massive patriotic demonstrations, student protests, and boycotts of Polish goods; published numerous newspapers and brochures; and energetically spread its message among the students, peasants, and workers of Galicia and Volhynia. In this work it enlisted the aid of a number of talented young poets, such as Ievhen Malaniuk, Oleh Olzhych-Kandyba, Olena Teliha, and Bohdan Kravtsiv. The major forum for integral nationalist views was the Prague-based journal *Rozbudova Natsii*. With time, however, a series of other publications came under integral nationalist influence.

Although it is exceedingly difficult to establish the size of the OUN's membership, on the eve of the Second World War it is estimated to have had about 20,000 members. The number of sympathizers was many times greater. In any case, the preponderance of youthful, energetic, idealistic, and committed members in its ranks quickly made OUN the most dynamic factor in West Ukrainian political life during the interwar period.

Throughout the 1930s, OUN continued its "war" against the Polish regime, attacking government agencies and post offices in order to obtain funds for its activities, and engaging in sabotage against government property and assassinations. But OUN (and UVO) did not see violence or terror as an end in itself. Its members believed that they were waging a national-liberation struggle by revolutionary means, much like the Irish in the anti-English Sinn Fein and Piłsudski's prewar anti-Russian underground organization. The immediate objectives of such tactics were to persuade Ukrainians that resistance was possible and to keep Ukrainian society in a state of "constant revolutionary ferment." In 1930 an integral nationalist publication elaborated on this concept of "permanent revolution": "By means of individual assassinations and occasional mass actions, we will attract large segments of the population to the idea of liberation and into the revolutionary ranks ... Only with continually repeated actions can we sustain and nurture a permanent spirit of protest against the occupying power and maintain hatred of the enemy and the desire for final retribution. The people dare not get used to their chains, they dare not feel comfortable in an enemy state."⁶

In the early 1930s, besides hundreds of acts of sabotage and dozens of "expropriations" of government funds, OUN members staged over sixty actual or attempted assassinations. Among their most important victims were Tadeusz Hołowko (1931), a well-known Polish proponent of Polish/Ukrainian compromise; Emilian Czechowski (1932), a Polish police commissioner in Lviv; Aleksei Mailov (1933), a Soviet consular official in Lviv who was killed as a response to the famine of 1932–33 in Soviet Ukraine; and Bronisław Pieracki (1934), the Polish minister of the interior, who was held responsible by the OUN for the pacification of 1930. Many assassination attempts were directed against Ukrainians who disagreed with OUN policies. Of these, the most notable was the killing in 1934 of Ivan Babii, a respected Ukrainian pedagogue.

But the policy of violence and confrontation cost OUN dearly. In 1930 Iulian Holovinsky, the leader of its "combat unit," was assassinated by a police agent. A year later, two young workers, Vasyl Bilas and Dmytro Danylyshyn, were hanged for killing an official during an "expropriation." After the assassination of Pieracki in 1934, the Polish police launched a widespread crackdown that netted the entire *krai* (regional) leadership of OUN in Galicia, including Stepan Bandera and Mykola Lebed, who had organized the attack. After a much publicized series of trials, the youthful leaders received lengthy sentences in the Bereza Kartuzka concentration camp. They were joined by hundreds of OUN rank-and-file members who were rounded up at this time.

These setbacks were only part of OUN's troubles. It soon became evident that the police had infiltrated the organization, a development that was to be expected once OUN began to recruit on a mass scale. Even more demoralizing was the growing criticism that OUN encountered from its fellow Ukrainians. Parents were incensed that the organization exposed their inexperienced

teenagers to dangerous activities that often ended tragically. Social, cultural, and youth organizations resented the OUN's attempts to take them over. The legal political parties blamed the integral nationalists for giving the government an excuse to restrict legal Ukrainian activities. And Metropolitan Sheptytsky sharply denounced OUN's "amorality." These accusations and counter-accusations reflected the tensions that had arisen between the generation of fathers in the legal or "organic" sector and that of their children in the revolutionary underground.

Generational tensions emerged in the OUN itself, especially among the leadership. Brought up in the more "civilized" prewar era and tempered by age and experience, the older generation of Konovalets and his associates from the 1917–20 period, such as Dmytro Andrievsky, Omelian Senyk, Mykola Stsi-borsky, and Roman Sushko, led the movement from abroad. Although they had their doubts about some OUN tactics, especially the assassinations, they often found it difficult to control their subordinates from a distance. While they did not reject the use of violence, Konovalets and his staff preferred to concentrate on obtaining foreign, especially German, support.

By contrast, the subordinate regional (*krai*) leadership in Galicia, which included Stepan Bandera, Mykola Lebed, Iaroslav Stetsko, Ivan Klymiv, Mykola Klymyshyn, and Roman Shukhevych, was committed to revolutionary action. Mostly in their early twenties, they had not fought in the war for independence and had grown up under the demeaning conditions and frustrations of Polish rule. Their youthfulness and constant exposure to foreign oppression predisposed them to a violent, heroic type of resistance and they were contemptuous of the relative moderation (and more comfortable lifestyle) of their elders abroad. This resentment deepened after 1934, when the entire Galician leadership was incarcerated in the Bereza Kartuzka concentration camp and it was rumored that their capture was the result of the carelessness or even betrayal of some members of the leadership abroad.

Yet the authority, prestige, and diplomatic skills of Konovalets were great enough to prevent the simmering conflict from deepening. It was, therefore, a great setback to the integral nationalist movement when Konovalets was assassinated in 1938 in Rotterdam by a Soviet agent. Thus, on the eve of cataclysmic events, the OUN found itself without an experienced and generally acknowledged *vozhda* (supreme leader). But it is a telling indication of the commitment, dynamism, and discipline of its rank and file that, despite these setbacks, the organization not only avoided disintegration but continued to expand.

Ukrainians under Romanian Rule

Another state that acquired a significant number of Ukrainians during the chaotic 1918–19 period was Romania. According to Romania's statistics, in

1920 there were about 790,000 Ukrainians within its borders, constituting 4.7% of the population. Ukrainians formed three distinct subgroups. One group – about 450,000 Ukrainians – lived in the southeast corner of the country, in the former Russian province of Bessarabia (present-day Moldavia), which bordered on the Black Sea. In 1919, near Khotyn, these poor peasants staged a Bolshevik-led uprising against the Romanian government; but after its failure, they showed little political activity. Another small group of Ukrainians lived in Maramorosh, a former Hungarian territory, and were also politically inactive.

The third group was the most vibrant Ukrainian community: the approximately 310,000 Ukrainians of Bukovyna. Romanian occupation resulted in a drastic political decline for the Bukovynians. Under Austrian rule, Bukovyna had been an autonomous province and Ukrainians, its largest national group, had relatively strong political representation in Vienna, extensive local self-government, and a well-developed system of Ukrainian-language education. All this was lost when the Romanians annexed the region. From being the most favored West Ukrainian community, the Bukovynians became the most oppressed.

Romanian intolerance of its numerous minorities was even greater than that of the Poles. After 1920, when the Western allies formally recognized the Romanian claim to all of Bukovyna, the Romanian government shut down all Ukrainian schools and even refused to recognize the Ukrainians as a distinct nationality. The educational measures of 1924, which Romanized the schools, referred to Ukrainians as “citizens of Romanian origin who had forgotten their native language.” By 1927, all traces of Bukovyna’s former autonomous administration had been removed and it was treated like any other Romanian province.

There were three distinct phases in the twenty-two years that Ukrainians spent under Romanian rule. During the first phase, which lasted from 1918 to 1928, the Romanian government imposed martial law on the province. For the Bukovynian Ukrainians, who were accustomed to the well-ordered constitutional Austrian system, the brutal liquidation of their rights and the Romanization of their cultural life represented a disorienting shock. They recovered somewhat during the relatively liberal period between 1928 and 1938. But when the military came to power in Romania in 1938, as it did in Poland, a period of harsh, almost totalitarian, rule ensued.

Under the circumstances, it was only during the brief period of 1928–38 that Ukrainian organizational life could be revived, and only modestly at that. Essentially, the members of the small Bukovynian community responded to Romanian rule in a fashion similar to their compatriots in Poland. The older, more-established members opted for legal “organic” work and compromise with the regime. They reestablished cultural societies, choirs, theatrical troupes, student groups, and several publications. In 1927, under the

leadership of Volodymyr Zalozetsky, they even formed the Ukrainian National party. However, by 1938, both the party and many Ukrainian organizations had been disbanded. The "revolutionary" or Nationalist camp, led by Orest Zybachynsky, Petro Hryhorovych, and Denys Kvitkovsky, emerged in the mid 1930s. More selective in recruiting its membership than the OUN in Galicia, the organization, while not large numerically, soon dominated the student, youth, and sports societies. Because of its conspiratorial structure, OUN was the only Ukrainian organization in Bukovyna not only to survive government repression but also to expand on account of it.

Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia

In surveying the generally depressing condition of Ukrainians during the interwar period, it is heartening to focus on one, albeit tiny, fragment of this nation – the Ukrainians of Transcarpathia – whose fortunes improved markedly during that time. Isolated from their compatriots by the Carpathian Mountains, the Carpatho-Ukrainians (or Rusyns as they still called themselves) were among the most politically, socioeconomically, and culturally underdeveloped of all Ukrainians. When the fall of Austria-Hungary brought an end to oppressive Hungarian rule, their region was incorporated into Czechoslovakia. In contrast to the forced annexation of other West Ukrainian lands, the Carpatho-Ukrainian association with Czechoslovakia was a voluntary one. As a result of an agreement concluded in Scranton, Pennsylvania, in November 1918 with Czech leaders, emigrants from Transcarpathia accepted incorporation of their homeland into the new Czech state on the condition of Transcarpathian autonomy.

Of all the newly formed states in Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia was the most democratic. Consequently, it did not follow the openly discriminatory and assimilationist policies toward its minorities that Poland and Romania did. This is not to say that relations between the central government and the populace of Transcarpathia were devoid of conflict. The issue of autonomy, as we shall see, brought about serious tensions between Prague and its easternmost province. Nonetheless, the Czechs allowed the Carpatho-Ukrainians a greater degree of political and cultural self-expression than they had ever had before.

In 1921 there were about 455,000 Carpatho-Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia. Of these, 370,000 lived in the Czech part of the state, and 85,000 inhabited the area of Prešov in the Slovak part of the federation. Committed to modernizing all regions of their new state, the Czechs made an effort to raise the standard of living in Transcarpathia as well. In the 1920s, the large Hungarian-owned estates were broken up and about 35,000 peasant households received additional plots averaging more than two acres each. In sharp contrast to Poland and Romania, the Czech government invested more in its Ukrainian-

inhabited areas than it extracted from them. However, the investment was too small to relieve significantly the abject poverty in the region. When the depression of the 1930s set in, the populace of Transcarpathia suffered badly, at times experiencing widespread hunger and even starvation.

In terms of education and culture, Czech policies were a welcome change from the intense Magyarization the Hungarians had practiced. There was, first of all, a dramatic growth in the number of schools. Between 1914 and 1938, the number of elementary schools jumped from 525 to 851 and *gymnazia* increased from 3 to 11. Moreover, the Czech government allowed its population to use the language of its choice in the schools. Such liberalism led to the rapid growth of cultural societies, such as Prosvita and the Russophile Dukhnovych Society. Theatrical troupes and choirs flourished. Writers such as Vasyl Grendzha-Donsky, Andrii Karabelesh, and Aleksander Markush helped to ignite a modest cultural renaissance.

But the cultural life of Transcarpathia was not without its complexities and conflicts. As education became more widespread and the populace was exposed to a democratic political process, the issue of national identity, by this time already resolved in most Ukrainian lands, came to the fore in Transcarpathia. As usual, the resolution of this question became the concern primarily of the budding intelligentsia. And as was generally the norm in the early stages of nation-building, the intelligentsia was divided on this issue.

Nationality issues Among the older members, who were mostly Greek Catholic clergy, a Russophile tendency evolved in circumstances analogous to those that had obtained earlier in Galicia. Although the Russophiles, who included many leading local inhabitants, established numerous organizations and societies (the most notable of which was the network of reading rooms of the Dukhnovych Society), they suffered from a crucial drawback: try as they might, they could not negate the fact that in terms of language and folk culture they were not Russian. This circumstance led to a growing sterility in their ideology and political orientation and explained why they had difficulty in attracting support among the educated youth.

Another tendency stressed localism, that is, the idea that the Slavic population of Transcarpathia was a distinct Rusyn nationality. Many of its supporters were Magyarized clergymen, who, with the arrival of the Czechs, found it prudent to camouflage their pro-Hungarian attitudes under the cloak of localism. However, the idea of creating a separate nationality out of several hundred thousand people was very tenuous, especially because the Transcarpathians were obviously and closely related to the Ukrainians who lived on the other side of the Carpathians. Consequently, the localist or Rusyn option was the weakest of all.

The Ukrainophile current, which predominated among the new, secular intelligentsia of teachers and students, was clearly the most dynamic. As

in 19th-century Galicia, it first began as a populist movement in which the young intelligentsia sought to strengthen its links with the peasantry. As the similarity of language, folk culture, and Eastern Christian traditions between the populace on both sides of the Carpathians began to be felt, and as the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia grew stronger, the populists of Transcarpathia became Ukrainophiles.

Their burgeoning influence was reflected in organizational growth, especially in the 1930s. Led by Avhustyn Voloshyn and Mykhailo and Iulii Brashchaiko, the Ukrainophiles founded the Prosvita educational society, which soon overshadowed the Dukhnovych Society, its Russophile rival. Plast, the 3000-member Ukrainian scouting organization, became especially popular among the young intelligentsia. In 1934 the Ukrainian Teachers' Association counted about 1200 members or two-thirds of all pedagogues in Transcarpathia. University and *gymnazium* students became especially avid supporters of Ukrainianism. Because the Ukrainians of Transcarpathia could express their political and national aspirations openly, the conspiratorial OUN did not have a strong presence in the region for most of the 1930s. While most of the Ukrainophiles became supporters of Ukrainian integral nationalism, a significant segment adopted pro-Soviet positions.

Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy Dissension among the Carpatho-Ukrainians suited Czech interests and Prague used it as an excuse to delay granting autonomy to the region. However, in 1938, international developments greatly weakened the Czech government. As a result of the Munich Pact, Nazi Germany obtained a German-inhabited part of Czechoslovakia; with the silent acquiescence of the Western powers, it planned the further dismemberment of the Czech state. Backed by the Germans, the Slovaks obtained autonomy within the Czechoslovak republic. Seeing the Prague government faltering, the leaders of the three Transcarpathian factions united and also demanded autonomy. The Czechs had no choice but to agree. On 11 October 1938, Transcarpathia received its self-government.

Although Russophiles such as Andrei Brodii and Stefan Fentsik led the first autonomous administration, they were quickly discredited when it became known that they were agents of Hungary and Poland. To replace them, Prague appointed a new cabinet, headed by Voloshyn and consisting of Ukrainophiles. The Voloshyn government immediately commenced the work of transforming Transcarpathia, or Carpatho-Ukraine as it was officially called, into an autonomous Ukrainian state. The educational system, publications, and administration were Ukrainized. In February 1939, elections were held for the regional parliament and the Ukrainophiles received the support of 86% of all eligible voters. Meanwhile, a military organization, the Carpathian Sich, was organized and soon had about 5000 men in uniform.

There were pressing reasons for establishing a military force, for as Czechoslovakia slowly disintegrated, neighboring Hungary demanded the return of its former Transcarpathian lands. Indeed, just as the Carpatho-Ukrainian government was being formed, Hungarian troops occupied a southern portion of the region, forcing the Ukrainians to move their capital from Uzhhorod to Khust. Throughout its brief existence, the Carpatho-Ukrainian government continued to face the threat of a Hungarian invasion.

The creation of a Ukrainian government in Transcarpathia had a great impact on the West Ukrainians, especially those in neighboring Galicia. Many saw it as the first step in the imminent creation of an independent, united Ukraine. Eager to protect the first Ukrainian land to gain its freedom, many young integral nationalists from Galicia illegally crossed the border and joined the Carpathian Sich. However, the OUN leadership was divided on what policy to follow. While the young radicals in Galicia demanded immediate and full involvement in Carpatho-Ukraine, their older, foreign-based superiors, aware of German plans, urged restraint.

The reason for the caution of the older integral nationalists soon became apparent. As a result of a secret pact, Hitler agreed to a Hungarian occupation of all of Transcarpathia. And on 14 March 1939, the Hungarian army moved into the region. Hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned, the Carpathian Sich rendered brave but futile resistance. On 15 March, in a symbolic gesture, the Voloshyn government proclaimed the independent Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine. Only hours later it was forced to flee from its homeland.

The Carpatho-Ukrainian experience was paradoxical. Of all the West Ukrainian lands, it was among the least developed in socioeconomic, cultural, and political terms. Yet, it was the only region that achieved a measure of self-government. Brief as it was, the existence of a Ukrainian government in Carpatho-Ukraine had an impact similar to that of the Ukrainian governments in the 1917–20 period: it helped to turn much of the region's population, especially the youth, into nationally conscious Ukrainians. The episode also had important implications for German/Ukrainian relations, for it served as a graphic illustration of how little Ukrainians could depend on the goodwill of Hitler.



National inequalities and socioeconomic difficulties, as well as the imposing growth of Nazi Germany and the USSR, led to a disillusionment with democracy and to the spread of political extremism throughout Eastern Europe during the interwar period. This radicalization increasingly involved not only the intelligentsia, but also the traditionally passive peasantry. Limited though it was, modernization raised the peasants' self-respect and expectations, mak-

ing them less willing to accept national discrimination and the falling living standards of the 1930s. Moreover, it pushed them, as never before, to political activism, especially of the radical type.


Frustrated in their attempts to gain statehood or self-rule, the West Ukrainians were particularly susceptible to these general trends. Although they put much effort into "organic work," it was clearly the integral nationalism of OUN that became their most dynamic movement, especially among the youth. In sharp contrast to their compatriots in Soviet Ukraine, the West Ukrainians did not experience dramatic socioeconomic changes. Yet, despite their dreary standard of living, it was not communism, which had been discredited by Stalinism, but integral nationalism that captivated them. It was, therefore, in the generation that reached adulthood in the 1930s in Western Ukraine that Ukrainian nationalism reached its high point, eliciting a mixture of fanaticism and idealism.



Mykhailo Hrushevsky




Pavlo Skoropadsky



Evhen Petrushevykh




Symon Petliura



Mykola Skrypnyk

Kiev during the proclamation of Ukrainian Independence, 25 January 1918



Ukrainian Greycoat Division



Bolshevik troops enter Odessa, February 1920




Bolshevik officers



Nestor Makhno and his staff

Propagandists on a collective farm, early 1930s





Construction on the Dnieper, early 1930s

Destruction of a church by Red Army men, early 1930s





Dead and dying peasants on the streets of Kharkiv during the Great Famine, spring 1933



Evhen Konovalts (seated center) at first congress of OUN, Vienna 1929



Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky



Peasants on pilgrimage in Transcarpathia in mid 1930s

Ukraine during the Second World War

It seemed, as Europe moved toward the Second World War, that Ukrainians had little to lose from the radical changes that it promised to bring. Still traumatized by Stalinist excesses and the increasing Polish, Romanian, and Hungarian repression in the western regions, Ukrainians had reason to believe that any change – even that brought on by war – would favorably alter the conditions under which they lived. But those who thought so would be sadly mistaken, for although the war radically transformed the situation of Ukrainians, their plight changed from bad to worse. The collapse of Poland at the outset of the war led to the imposition in Western Ukraine of the even-more-repressive Soviet regime. But when the German invaders swept away the Soviets, they brought with them a Nazi regime that in Ukraine reached the heights of brutality and inhumanity. Caught between the Nazi and Soviet regimes and lacking, for all practical purposes, a state to protect their interests, Ukrainians were especially vulnerable to the devastation of the war and the ruthless policies of its totalitarian protagonists.



The War in Ukraine: Phase One

From the Ukrainian point of view, the Second World War took place in two distinct phases. The initial phase began on 1 September 1939 when the Germans attacked Poland and the Soviets occupied its eastern territories soon after. The main feature of this stage, which involved only the West Ukrainians, was the appearance in their lands of new occupying powers, the foremost of these being the Soviets. The second phase, which will be discussed later, commenced with the German invasion of the USSR on 22 June 1941 and lasted until the Soviet expulsion of German troops from Ukraine in the fall of 1944. This phase encompassed all of Ukraine and exposed its inhabitants to the worst horrors of the war.

Among the numerous factors that brought on the war, two diplomatic agreements, both of which had a direct impact on Ukrainians, were of critical importance. With the signing of the Munich Pact on 30 September 1938, the Western powers, led by England, attempted to appease Hitler by allowing him to dismember Czechoslovakia (and Transcarpathia). But rather than satisfying Hitler's demands, this display of Western spinelessness only whetted the Nazi appetite for territorial acquisitions. Even more directly linked with the outbreak of the war was the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 23 August 1939, one of history's most astonishing treaties. Hitler, who made no secret of his loathing for the Soviet system or of his territorial ambitions in the East, needed to neutralize the Soviet Union before launching an attack against his opponents in the West. Stalin, for his part, eagerly desired a nonaggression and neutrality treaty with Hitler, hoping thereby to redirect Nazi aggressiveness against France and England, and thus gain time to build up his own strength while the "capitalists" exhausted themselves in a war. In addition to addressing these immediate needs of the two powers, the Nazi-Soviet Pact also included provisions for the exchange of raw materials and armaments. More important, it contained a secret protocol in which Hitler and Stalin agreed to a division of Eastern Europe into their respective spheres of influence and occupation. According to this arrangement, almost all the West Ukrainian lands were allotted to the Soviet Union.

Assured of Soviet neutrality, Hitler launched the attack on Poland that began the Second World War. Eager to claim their part of the tottering Polish state, Soviet armies entered eastern Poland on 17 September and occupied almost all of the lands inhabited by the West Ukrainians and Belorussians. Within four weeks, the Polish state ceased to exist.

The Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine At the outset of their initial, twenty-one-month-long occupation of Western Ukraine, the Soviets went out of their way to win "the hearts and minds" of the populace. They proclaimed that they had arrived as the "flagbearers of high humanitarian principles" and justified their collaboration with the Nazis in the dismemberment of Poland by their desire to aid its oppressed minorities, especially their "brothers," the Ukrainians and Belorussians. A special effort was made to impress West Ukrainians with the new regime's "Ukrainianism." The Soviet troops that entered Galicia were called the Ukrainian Front and were led by Semen Tymoshenko, a general with an obviously Ukrainian name. These symbolic gestures were intended to portray the Soviet invasion as a case of Ukrainians coming to the aid of their fellow Ukrainians.

The new regime also attempted to appear democratic. On 22 October 1939 it organized an election during which the populace was pressured to vote for the single slate of candidates supporting the annexation of Western Ukraine to the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, about 93% of the voters cast their ballots

according to the regime's wishes. In June 1940, the USSR forced Romania to cede Bessarabia and Bukovyna. Thus, over 7 million inhabitants of Western Ukraine were added to the Soviet Ukrainian republic.

Some Soviet policies brought concrete improvements to the West Ukrainians. Much was done to Ukrainianize and enhance the educational system. By mid 1940 the number of elementary schools in Western Ukraine jumped to about 6900, of which 6000 were Ukrainian. Lviv University, long a stronghold of Polish culture, was renamed after Ivan Franko, adopted Ukrainian as the language of instruction, and opened its doors to Ukrainian students and professors. Health care, especially in the villages, improved markedly. The largely Polish- and Jewish-owned industrial and commercial enterprises were nationalized. But perhaps the most popular measure was the Soviet expropriation of the Polish landlords and the promise to redistribute their land among the peasants.

Simultaneously with these reforms, however, the Soviets began to dismantle the political, socioeconomic, and cultural infrastructure that the West Ukrainians had built up. Soon after their arrival, the NKVD arrested West Ukrainian political leaders and deported them to the east. UNDO and the other large Ukrainian political parties were forced to disband. Many cooperatives were eliminated and others were reorganized along Soviet lines. The Prosvita society's reading rooms and libraries had to cease operation. Realizing that they were living on borrowed time, between 20,000 and 30,000 Ukrainian activists fled to German-occupied Poland. With the elimination of the individuals, organizations, and political parties that represented middle-of-the-road, liberal tendencies among West Ukrainians, the latter were left with only one viable political organization – the underground network of the OUN.

The conduct of the numerous Soviet officials who poured into Western Ukraine did little to improve the image of the new regime. Accustomed to acting in the "proletarian" style, they often struck the "westerners" as primitive, boorish bullies rather than as representatives of "advanced socialism." The almost universal use of Russian by the representatives of Soviet Ukraine quickly dissipated illusions about its vaunted Ukrainianism.

Support for the Soviets came primarily from local Communists who had emerged from the underground and were now especially useful to the new regime in helping it to "unmask" Ukrainian nationalists. Because Jews were disproportionately numerous among these Communists and because there were also many of them among the officials who arrived from the Soviet Union, anti-Jewish feeling rose among both West Ukrainians and Poles. But soon many local Communists also became disillusioned with the Soviets, especially after Stalin had some of them arrested and executed on suspicion of Trotskyism.

With time, however, the less attractive aspects of the early Soviet reforms became apparent. Lands that had been expropriated from Polish landlords

and "given" to the poorest peasants were declared to be liable to collectivization and about 13% were actually collectivized. When this event occurred, the vast majority of the peasants, who had been wary of the Soviets from the outset, turned against the new regime. The intelligentsia, many of whom were initially pleased with the employment they found in Soviet educational and cultural institutions, soon realized that they were little more than tightly controlled functionaries and mouthpieces of the regime and that they faced arrest and deportation if they did not follow instructions.

Aware of the West Ukrainians' commitment to their church, the new regime initially treated the Greek Catholic church with caution, imposing only relatively minor restrictions at first. Priests were obliged to carry special passports and the government demanded high rents for the use of churches. But gradually these restrictions grew more ominous. Soviet authorities removed religious instruction from the schools, confiscated church lands, and increased antireligious propaganda. Similar policies were applied to the Orthodox church in Volhynia where, moreover, efforts were made to place it under the patriarch of Moscow.

In spring 1940 the Soviets dropped their democratic guise and repressions began against both Ukrainians and Poles on a massive scale. The most widespread and feared measure was deportation. Without warning, without trial, even without formal accusation, thousands of alleged "enemies of the people" were arrested, packed into cattle cars, and shipped to Siberia and Kazakhstan to work as slave laborers under horrible conditions. Many of these deportees, including entire families, perished.

The first waves of deportees consisted of leading Polish, Ukrainian, and Jewish politicians, industrialists, landowners, merchants, bureaucrats, judges, lawyers, retired officers, and priests. Later, anyone identified with Ukrainian nationalism was liable to arrest. In the final stages, in the spring of 1941, the regime deported people indiscriminately. Those who had relatives abroad or who corresponded with them, those who were visiting friends when they were arrested, those who were denounced for personal reasons, or who, by accident, happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, were all deported. "No one, literally no one," wrote an eyewitness to these events, "was sure that his turn would not come the next night."¹

According to Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, the Soviets deported about 400,000 Ukrainians from Galicia alone.² The Poles, and especially the colonists, suffered even more, for their government-in-exile contended that, during the Soviet occupation of Poland's eastern territories, about 1.2 million people, the majority of whom were Poles, were deported to the Soviet east. This catastrophe reflected the dramatic plunge in the political fortunes of the once-dominant Poles, who, deprived of government backing, suddenly found themselves transformed from oppressors into the oppressed.

The incorporation of Western Ukraine into the Ukrainian SSR was undoubt-

edly an event of major historical significance, for it united Ukrainians in a single state structure for the first time in centuries. But, because of its limited duration, this forced unification did not result in deep-rooted changes in either Western or Soviet Ukraine. Nonetheless, it did have an immediate impact: West Ukrainians found their first exposure to the Soviet system to be a generally negative experience and many concluded that “Bolshevik” rule had to be avoided at all costs.

Ukrainians under German occupation While the vast majority of West Ukrainians came under Soviet rule during the 1939–41 period, some found themselves under German occupation. About 550,000 Ukrainians who lived in the Lemko and Kholm regions on Poland’s eastern border were included in the German zone of occupation. Surrounded by Poles and isolated from the centers of Ukrainian activity, the inhabitants of these regions were socioeconomically, culturally, and politically among the most underdeveloped of all Ukrainians. However, between 1939 and 1940 about 20,000–30,000 Ukrainian political refugees from Galicia fled to these areas to escape Soviet persecution. Some settled among their compatriots; others congregated in nearby Cracow, the center of Ukrainian refugee activity, and sparked an upsurge of communal activity in the Lemko and Kholm regions of the General Government (Gouvernement), as this part of German-occupied Poland was called.

The governor-general of the General Government, Hans Frank, was expressly ordered by Hitler to treat the area as a German colony and to grant the inhabitants only a minimum of rights. Although theoretically all power rested in the hands of Frank, who acted on instructions from Hitler, in practice the Gestapo (the Nazi political police) was often as influential as Frank himself in governing the region.

Soon after the Germans arrived, dozens of self-help committees, staffed largely by OUN members or sympathizers who had fled from Galicia, sprang up to look after the basic economic and educational needs of the Ukrainian populace in the General Government. In spring 1940, with the acquiescence of Frank, these committees formed a coordinating body in Cracow called the Ukrainian Central Committee (UCC) and elected Volodymyr Kubijovyč, a well-known geographer, as its head. The UCC was a Ukrainian social-welfare agency whose mandate was to look after the sick, the aged, and homeless children, to care for public health and education, to help prisoners of war, and to represent the interests of the Ukrainian workers from the General Government who were sent to Germany. The Germans made it very clear that the UCC was not to have any political prerogatives whatsoever.

But in fulfilling these functions, the UCC also sought to satisfy its own hidden agenda, which consisted of countering the strong Polonizing influences on its isolated Ukrainian constituents and raising their national consciousness. The Nazis were aware of these objectives and, to a limited extent, en-

couraged their attainment in hopes that the growth of Ukrainian national consciousness would act as a counterweight to the more numerous Poles. For this reason, the Germans often favored the appointment of Ukrainians to low-level administrative posts or to the police in ethnically mixed communities. When Ukrainians sometimes used their new positions to avenge themselves on Poles for the wrongs they suffered before the war, the Germans were not dismayed by the communal tensions that arose.

Under the able leadership of Kubijovyč and with the help of the refugees from Galicia, the approximately 800 officials of the ucc soon organized Ukrainian schools, cooperatives, and youth groups in almost all localities where there were considerable numbers of Ukrainians. They also established a publishing house in Cracow and greatly expanded the Ukrainian press in the region. Its activities not only helped Ukrainians in these isolated regions to make up for the losses they had suffered during years of Polish repression, but also alleviated some of the heavy burdens that war and German occupation had brought upon them. After the German invasion of the USSR and the incorporation of Galicia into the General Government, the ucc extended its activity into Galicia. Throughout the war, it was the only Ukrainian organization that could, albeit to a very limited extent, defend the socioeconomic interests of Ukrainians in the General Government.

Ukrainians under Hungarian occupation After the invading Hungarian army brought down the Carpatho-Ukrainian government in March 1939, Transcarpathia was incorporated into Hungary, of which it remained a part for the duration of the war. Because the approximately 550,000 Ukrainian inhabitants of the region had, by and large, bad memories of the centuries-long Hungarian rule that had ended in 1918, they did not welcome the return of the Hungarians. In an attempt to create a favorable initial impression, the Hungarian government promised to grant Transcarpathia autonomy. But all too soon it became apparent that it would not fulfill this commitment and that Transcarpathia's populace would instead be slated for gradual Magyarization.

Almost immediately, the Hungarians launched a concerted attack against the Ukrainophiles. Hundreds were executed, thousands were arrested, and about 30,000 fled to neighboring Galicia (where many were, in turn, deported by the Soviets to Siberia). All Ukrainian publications and organizations, including Prosvita, were banned. But while it was committed to stamping out the growing Ukrainian movement in Transcarpathia, the Hungarian government was not yet ready to introduce total Magyarization (although it steadily increased Hungarian cultural influence, especially in the schools). It chose instead a transitional, or Rusynophile, option, which rested on the premise that the local populace was a distinct Rusyn nationality that for centuries had been organically linked with the Hungarians. Two local politicians and long-time

agents of the Budapest government, Andrei Brodii and Stepan Fentsik, became the leading proponents of this approach, and its main social base of support was the heavily Magyarized Greek Catholic clergy.

Hungarian rule was not only politically oppressive, but it also brought about a decline in educational opportunities and a rise in the economic exploitation of the region. The one positive aspect of the six-year-long Hungarian occupation of Transcarpathia was that it spared the region from Nazi rule and, consequently, the devastation that struck much of Ukraine. It did not, however, save the region's more than 100,000 Jews, most of whom perished in the Nazi death camps.

The great rift in the OUN With the outbreak of the war, the tensions that had long been brewing within the OUN surfaced. A sharp division had developed between the older veterans of the 1917–20 struggle, who constituted the foreign-based leadership of the OUN, and the young Galician radicals, who had joined the organization in the 1930s. The latter group had led the bitter struggle against the Polish government on West Ukrainian territory and had often landed in Polish jails. The two camps did not disagree on matters of principle, for both subscribed to the basic tenets of Ukrainian integral nationalism; however, generational differences, personality clashes, and tactical issues did divide them. After the assassination of Konovalets in 1938, his close associate, the gentlemanly and reserved Andrii Melnyk, was nominated as his successor. The young radicals, for their part, argued that their own colleague, the dynamic, strong-willed Stepan Bandera, who had recently been freed from Polish imprisonment, was better qualified to lead the OUN in the critical times that lay ahead.

Even before Bandera and his colleagues emerged from prison, their supporters aimed a barrage of criticism at the OUN leaders abroad. The leaders were condemned for relying too heavily on foreign support, especially that of Germany, while neglecting the development of "organic" ties with the masses in Western Ukraine, for being too slow and passive in dealing with the rapidly changing political scene, and for allowing "political speculators and opportunists" to hold leadership positions. In September 1939, Bandera demanded that the OUN form a military underground force that would be ready to fight against anyone – even Germans if need be – who stood in the way of Ukrainian independence. He insisted that the OUN develop contacts with Western Allies as well as with the Germans. But Melnyk and his associates steadfastly defended their positions, arguing that the emphasis on ties with Germany had to continue because Western powers had shown no interest in supporting Ukrainian aspirations and because the creation of a military underground would only bring German retaliation rather than military or political gains.

But it was the question of who should constitute the new OUN leadership that really enflamed passions. In August 1939, while many of their rivals were

still imprisoned, the Melnyk faction called a conference in Rome and formally proclaimed Andrii Melnyk as *vozhda* of OUN. However, on 10 February 1940, Stepan Bandera convened another conference in Cracow, where his faction rejected the decisions of the Rome meeting. Unable to reach a compromise, each group proclaimed itself to be the only legitimate leader of the OUN. Those who sided with Bandera, and these included the youthful majority of the organization, came to be called the OUN-B or OUN-R (revolutionary) or simply Banderites; supporters of Melnyk, who consisted of the more moderate integral nationalists, were referred to as OUN-M or Melnykites.

This schism in the OUN was clearly a great setback for the integral nationalist cause. Antagonism between the two factions reached such heights that they often fought each other as ferociously as they did the enemies of Ukrainian independence. Thus, as Ukrainian integral nationalists prepared to face the great tests set before them by the war, they were badly divided. Moreover, their bitter infighting damaged the Ukrainian integral nationalist movement as a whole, for it lowered its moral authority.

The War in Ukraine: Phase Two

On 22 June 1941, Nazi Germany launched its surprise attack against the USSR. As the two totalitarian systems clashed, a struggle of titanic proportions and unprecedented brutality commenced. Along a 2000-mile front, stretching from the White Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south, over 3 million German and allied troops stormed Soviet forces numbering over 2 million men. Because of Stalin's great faith in Hitler's commitment to the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Soviets had disregarded numerous warning signals of the onslaught and were, consequently, caught completely off guard. Moreover, Stalin's generals committed the strategic blunder of stationing too many troops too close to the border. This allowed swift-moving German tank columns to encircle and destroy them in huge pincer movements. As the Soviets suffered one disastrous defeat after another, as panic enveloped the Soviet leadership, including Stalin himself, and as chaos reigned in the government, it appeared that the collapse of the Soviet Union was imminent.

The largest part of the invading force, the German army group South led by Field Marshal Karl von Rundstedt, was assigned to Ukraine. And it was in Ukraine that the Germans scored some of their most impressive early successes, the largest of which was the destruction of a huge Soviet force around Kiev in September 1941 and the capture of over 650,000 prisoners. As a result, about four months after launching their invasion, the Germans occupied almost all of Ukraine. By December 1941 they controlled about 80 million people, or 42% of the Soviet Union's population, and a large part of its economic facilities. They took 3.8 million Soviet military prisoners (of whom an esti-

mated 1.3 million were Ukrainians). The relative ease with which these men were captured was an indication of the indifferent attitude many Red Army men had about fighting in defense of the Soviet system.

Lack of support for the Soviets was even more pronounced among Ukraine's civilian population. In Western Ukraine, where Soviet rule was especially unpopular, Germans were often welcomed as liberators. In Eastern Ukraine the general reaction to the Germans was more guarded, but the feeling was widespread that their coming would lead to improvements over the Stalinist regime. Hence, the frequent photographs that appeared in the German press of cheerful Ukrainians greeting the arriving Germans with the traditional bread and salt.

The Soviets' hurried retreat had tragic consequences for thousands of political prisoners in the jails of Western Ukraine. Unable to evacuate them in time, the NKVD slaughtered their prisoners en masse during the week of 22–29 June 1941, regardless of whether they were incarcerated for major or minor offenses. Major massacres occurred in Lviv, Sambir, and Stanyslaviv in Galicia, where about 10,000 prisoners died, and in Rivne and Lutsk in Volhynia, where another 5000 perished. Coming on the heels of the mass deportations and growing Soviet terror, these executions added greatly to the West Ukrainians' abhorrence of the Soviets.

Overcoming their initial disarray, the Soviet authorities began to organize a more orderly retreat. In traditional Russian fashion, they instituted a "scorched earth" policy, which, in Stalin's words, called for making "life in the rear of the enemy unbearable." As a result, all economic enterprises that might be useful to the Germans were marked for destruction. Kiev, for example, suffered more damage from the retreating Soviets, who blew up many of its major buildings, than from the advancing Germans. In the Donbas, most of the mines were flooded and the huge Dnieper hydroelectric works, as well as all the fifty-four blast furnaces in Ukraine, were destroyed by the Soviets.

A remarkable feature of the Soviet retreat was the massive evacuation of munitions plants, skilled labor, and important intellectuals beyond the Urals and to Soviet Central Asia. In what was perhaps the largest evacuation in history, the Soviets moved about 1500 factories and over 10 million people – more than a third of these from Ukraine – beyond the grasp of the Germans. Ufa, the capital of the Soviet Bashkir republic situated in the Urals, became the wartime seat of the Ukrainian Soviet government. This massive transfer of industrial enterprises and population contributed greatly to the Soviet ability to continue the war.

Particularly active during the course of the evacuation was the NKVD. Suspecting all those who sought to avoid resettlement of disloyalty to the Soviet state, it arrested and executed large numbers of people. Jailed prisoners with sentences over three years were shot so as not to leave behind any anti-Soviet elements who might be of potential use to the Germans. Also, many NKVD



Map 24 The German invasion of 1941

agents were left behind to infiltrate the German administrative apparatus, especially the police, and to observe the behavior of those who had not been evacuated.

The OUN and Nazi Germany

Ukrainian integral nationalists greeted the German attack on the USSR with enthusiasm, viewing it as a promising opportunity to establish an independent Ukrainian state. But although the OUN and Germans shared a common enemy, their goals and interests were far from compatible. In the view of the Germans, the OUN's main usefulness was as a diversionary force that could wreak havoc behind Soviet lines. For their part, the integral nationalists, recently disillusioned by Hitler's treatment of Carpatho-Ukraine, had no intention of serving as the tools of Berlin; their goal was to use the war to spread their own influence throughout Ukraine. Thus, each side sought to use the other for its own, often contradictory, purposes.

The tenuous relationship between the OUN and Nazi Germany had other complications. Among the Germans there were strong differences of opinion regarding the OUN: the *Abwehr* (military intelligence) of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, which had ties of long duration with the OUN, favored cooperating with the OUN, but the Nazi party apparatus, headed by Martin Bormann, contemptuously refused to treat them as a serious political factor. Moreover, those Germans who wished to deal with the integral nationalists had the problem of deciding which faction to support – the relatively moderate yet weaker Melnyk wing (OUN-M) or the dynamic, more numerous but recalcitrant Bandera supporters (OUN-B). Competition for German support fueled the rivalry between the two factions: each sought to establish itself as the sole representative of the Ukrainian people.

A product of German/OUN collaboration was the creation, shortly before the invasion of the USSR, of a Ukrainian military unit in the German army called the Legion of Ukrainian Nationalists. Composed mainly of pro-Bandera Ukrainians recruited in German-occupied territories, this force consisted of about 600 men divided into two units that bore the code names *Nachtigall* and *Roland*. The Germans planned to use these units for diversionary purposes but the OUN-B hoped that they would become the core of a Ukrainian army, as well as a means of extending the Bandera faction's influence.

Within days of the German entry into Ukraine, the conflict of interests between the integral nationalists and the Germans came to the fore. In an audacious move, which verged on the foolhardy, the OUN-B (supported by members of the *Nachtigall* unit) decided – without consulting the Germans – to proclaim, on 30 June 1941, the establishment of a Ukrainian state in recently conquered Lviv. Bandera's close associate, Iaroslav Stetsko, was chosen to be

premier. The OUN-B gambled that the German military commanders would accept this action as an accomplished fact, rather than risk a confrontation with Ukrainians at the outset of the invasion.

The OUN-B not only bypassed the Germans but also attempted, with some initial success, to convince the confused Ukrainian populace that its actions had the support of Berlin. The aged and bedridden Metropolitan Sheptytsky was manipulated into issuing a statement of support for the proclamation. Although the OUN-B had not been far off the mark in its prediction of the indecisive manner in which the German military would react to its bold move, it completely miscalculated the response of the Nazi political leadership. Within days of the proclamation, Bandera and his associates were arrested by the Gestapo and incarcerated. Meanwhile, the OUN-M, which had been careful not to antagonize the Germans, sought to benefit from its rival's misfortune. However, within several months, it too ran afoul of the Nazis.

As part of the strategy to confront the Germans with accomplished facts, both OUN factions – again without German agreement – planned to organize and control the local administration in the newly conquered parts of Ukraine. For this purpose they assembled about 2000 of their members, most of whom belonged to OUN-B, divided them into “expeditionary groups” (*pokhidni hrupy*), and instructed them to follow the advancing Germans into Ukraine. In each locality these groups were to search out nationally conscious Ukrainians and build a local administration around them. Although this drive to organize Soviet Ukrainians for the integral nationalist cause produced many examples of bravery and enterprise on the part of the young “expeditionary group” members, it also brought out some of the uglier aspects of the struggle between the two OUN factions. The most noteworthy was the assassination, by a member of the OUN-B, Melnyk's followers claimed, of two leading members of OUN-M – Omelian Senyk and Mykola Stsiborsky – in September 1941 in Zhytomyr. After this episode, assassinations and mutual denunciations to the Germans were not uncommon in the bitter conflict between the two factions of the OUN.

But after the hasty departure of the Soviets, East Ukrainians usually did not need the OUN groups to prod them into action. Because German military authorities were relatively civil in their treatment of the populace during the early months of German occupation, many Ukrainians spontaneously established local administrations. Expecting the Germans to liquidate the hated collective farms and to redistribute the land to individual owners, peasants brought in the harvest under exceedingly difficult conditions. Teachers organized schools and workers often ran factories on their own.

Priests who had somehow managed to survive the 1930s emerged to serve mass and baptize children and young adults en masse. With the religious revival came church politics. The Orthodox church of Volhynia split into two entities – the Autonomous and Autocephalous churches – which then extended their influence into central and eastern Ukraine. The former was more

traditionalist and, while not breaking its links with the Moscow patriarchate, supported ecclesiastical autonomy for Ukraine only as long as the patriarchate remained under Soviet rule. The latter revived some of the traditions of the UAOC (Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church) of the 1920s, supported the independence of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, and tended to attract the more nationally conscious Ukrainians into its ranks.

Over 100 non-Communist newspapers appeared throughout Ukraine. In large cities, especially Kiev, Ukrainian literary, scholarly, and social groups sprang up in great numbers. There were even attempts at political organization. In October 1941 in Kiev, members of the OUN-M, who had recently established themselves in the city, took the initiative in forming a Ukrainian National Council, composed largely of East Ukrainians, in hopes that it might become the central governmental body in Ukraine. Civic organizations also appeared in Kharkiv and Dnepropetrovsk. In short, as Soviet rule disintegrated, a spontaneous upsurge of Ukrainian social, cultural, and economic activity occurred, fueled by the expectation that the Germans were about to establish a Ukrainian state.

The Nazis had different plans, however. Annoyed that the integral nationalists had failed to draw the proper conclusions from their liquidation of the OUN-B attempt to establish a government on 30 June 1941 in Lviv, the Nazi political administration, which had arrived to replace the military authorities, resolved to repeat the lesson more forcefully. In September 1941, SS police units arrested and executed many members of the OUN-B "expeditionary groups." About two months later, the Gestapo turned on the OUN-M, concentrating on the influential group in Kiev. Over forty leading members of OUN-M, including the poetess Olena Teliha, were shot, and the popular newspaper, *Ukrainske Slovo*, was shut down. The Kievan press was turned over to pro-Russian groups who obediently followed German instructions. Nazi authorities then executed the Ukrainian mayor of Kiev, Volodymyr Bahazy, and purged outspoken Ukrainians from the administration, police, and press. The Ukrainian integral nationalists went underground; it was clear that their brief honeymoon with the Nazi regime was over.

Nazi Rule in Ukraine

The opinion of Alexander Dallin and other specialists on the Second World War on the eastern front is that "of all the Eastern areas conquered by the Third Reich, the Ukraine was by far the most important. It was the largest Soviet republic which the Germans occupied in full and ... as a provider of food and manpower, it was second to none."³ In dealing with this valuable prize, the Nazi leadership considered two basic options. The first, usually identified with Alfred Rosenberg, a leading Nazi ideologist, was to gain the support of the Ukrainians against the Kremlin by offering them their own state, which



Map 25 Ukraine under German rule 1941-44

would remain, however, under German tutelage. The other, favored by most of the Nazi hierarchy, was to ignore the interests of the Ukrainians altogether and to exploit them ruthlessly for the benefit of the Nazi empire.

As the only member of the Nazi leadership who had firsthand knowledge of Eastern Europe, Rosenberg initially appeared to be the man who would formulate Nazi policy in the newly conquered lands. His appointment as head of the Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories strengthened this impression. Rosenberg had an understanding of the aspirations of the region's stateless peoples (which did not preclude their economic exploitation by Germany). His well-known conviction that the most effective way of dealing with Russia, Germany's most dangerous rival, was to break up its multinational empire gave the Ukrainian integral nationalists reason to believe that they could come to an understanding with the Nazis. What the integral nationalists did not realize, however, was that Hitler had a low opinion of Rosenberg's theories in general and of his plans for Ukraine in particular.

Nazi racial doctrines held that all Slavs were subhumans (*Untermenschen*) and that their only role was to serve the German master race. Hitler and most of his party associates viewed Ukraine as the primary area for German colonial expansion (*Lebensraum*) and Ukrainians as the future slaves of the German colonists. His early victories encouraged Hitler in his view that concessions to the Ukrainians were unnecessary. Consequently, when the time came to appoint the Nazi ruler of Ukraine, Hitler chose Erich Koch, a notoriously brutal and bigoted administrator known for his personal contempt for Slavs. Koch's attitude toward his assignment was evident in the speech he delivered to his staff upon his arrival in Ukraine in September 1941: "Gentlemen, I am known as a brutal dog. Because of this reason I was appointed as *Reichskommissar* of Ukraine. Our task is to suck from Ukraine all the goods we can get hold of, without consideration of the feelings or the property of the Ukrainians. Gentlemen, I am expecting from you the utmost severity towards the native population."⁴ On another occasion, Koch emphasized his loathing for Ukrainians by remarking: "If I find a Ukrainian who is worthy of sitting at the same table with me, I must have him shot."⁵ This was the man who more than any other was instrumental in turning Ukrainians against the Germans.

Nazi attitudes toward the Ukrainians were soon reflected in their policies. In August 1941, completely ignoring Ukrainian national aspirations, Hitler ordered the breakup of Ukraine into separate administrative units. The largest of these, which included the Right Bank and much of the Left Bank, was called Reichskommissariat Ukraine, and was placed in the hands of Koch. Refusing to establish his "capital" in Kiev, the traditional Ukrainian center, Koch chose instead the small provincial Volhynian city of Rivne. In a move that was deeply resented by its Ukrainian inhabitants, Galicia became a district of the General Government of Poland rather than being attached to the rest of Ukraine. Bukovyna and a part of southwest Ukraine, which in-

cluded Odessa, was given to Germany's ally Romania and called Transnistria. Finally, the easternmost areas in the vicinity of Kharkiv, which were close to the front lines, remained under the jurisdiction of the German army. These actions clearly reflected the view of high Nazi officials that "Ukraine does not exist ... it is merely a geographical concept."⁶

The structure and extent of the German civilian administration in Ukraine left no doubt that the Nazis intended to retain total control. An unusually large number of officials were assigned to Ukraine. But because it was one of the last countries to be conquered, Ukraine received only the dregs of German officialdom. Consequently, German arrogance was often compounded by ineptitude. An inviolable principle of Nazi rule was that all important administrative and economic positions down to the county level should be staffed by Germans. Ukrainians were allowed to hold only the lowest administrative positions, such as village elders, mayors of small towns, and auxiliary policemen.

Early indications of the nature of the Nazi regime were its treatment of Jews and prisoners of war. Because the Soviets had made no special effort to evacuate Ukraine's Jewish population (and remained silent about its persecution), most Jews fell into the hands of the Nazis, who established 50 ghettos and over 180 large concentration camps in Ukraine. Within months of their arrival, the Nazis, and especially the SS execution squads (*Einsatzgruppen*), killed about 850,000 Jews. In Kiev about 33,000 Jews were executed in Babyn Yar (Babi Yar) in two days alone.

Nazi treatment of Soviet prisoners of war was almost as inhuman. In the first six months of the war, millions of Red Army men had surrendered, many willingly, to the Germans. Confident of victory and anxious to eliminate "surplus" Slavs, Nazi authorities herded the prisoners into open-air camps encircled by barbed wire and allowed them to die of exposure, disease, and hunger. Often they simply executed their captives. Consequently, by the end of the war, of the 5.8 million Soviet prisoners who had fallen into German hands, about 3.3 million had perished. About 1.3 million of these fatalities occurred in Ukraine. This treatment of prisoners was not only inhuman, but also stupid. As news of their comrades' fate filtered back to Red Army men on the other side of the front, their resistance stiffened and German casualties rose.

In August–September 1941, the Germans began to introduce policies that had a profound impact on Ukraine's population as a whole. Disregarding the advice of Rosenberg and his staff, Koch decided that the exploitation of Ukrainian agriculture – his main economic goal – could be conducted most efficiently if the collectives were maintained, albeit under German supervision, in somewhat altered forms, and under different names. The Ukrainian peasantry was thus quickly disabused of its dream that the new regime would abolish the collective farms. At the same time that Koch lowered the peasants'

income, he demanded that they work from dawn to dusk. These viciously exploitative measures help to explain why about 85% of the food supplies Nazi Germany obtained from occupied Soviet territories came from Ukraine.

Anti-German feelings increased even more when the Nazis decided to use Ukraine not only as a major supplier of food, but also as their main source of forced labor for the undermanned industries and farms of Germany. Initially, Ukrainians had volunteered to work in the Third Reich in order to escape poor conditions at home or to learn a trade. However, as word spread about the harsh labor discipline, humiliating treatment of *Ostarbeiter* (eastern workers), and ridiculously low wages, people tried to avoid the labor drafts by all means possible. By early 1942, Koch's police had to stage massive manhunts, rounding up young Ukrainians in bazaars or as they emerged from churches or cinemas and shipping them to Germany. The extent to which Ukrainians were "favored" for this type of onerous work is evident from the fact that out of the 2.8 million Soviet *Ostarbeiter* in Germany at the end of the war, 2.3 million were from Ukraine.

The staggering brutality of Nazi rule was also evident in the cities and in the treatment of the intelligentsia. Koch drastically limited the flow of foodstuffs into the cities, arguing that Ukrainian urban centers were basically useless. In the long run, the Nazis intended to transform Ukraine into a totally agrarian country and, in the short run, Germany needed the food that Ukrainian urban dwellers consumed. As a result, starvation became commonplace and many urban dwellers were forced to move to the countryside. Kiev, for example, lost about 60% of its population. Kharkiv, which had a population of 700,000 when the Germans arrived, saw 120,000 of its inhabitants shipped to Germany as laborers; 30,000 were executed and about 80,000 starved to death during the course of the war.

Under the circumstances, the educational opportunities of Reichskommissariat Ukraine's inhabitants were severely limited. Indeed, Heinrich Himmler, the chief of the SS, proposed that "the entire Ukrainian intelligentsia should be decimated."⁷ Koch believed that three years of grade school was more than enough education for Ukrainians. He even went so far as to curtail medical services in order to undermine "the biological power of the Ukrainians."⁸ German-only shops, restaurants, and sections of trolley cars were established to emphasize the superiority of the Germans and the racial inferiority of the Ukrainian *Untermenschen*.

In order to gain a proper perspective on Nazi rule in Ukraine, it is important to understand that it was in Reichskommissariat Ukraine that the Nazi regime exhibited its most extreme form. Although similar conditions existed in other areas of German-occupied Ukraine, these regions were also marked by appreciable differences in administrative practice. In Galicia, for example, which became a district of the General Government of Poland, German rule was less severe than in the eastern regions. It is true that many of the most

hated policies, such as conscription of labor, expropriation of food from the villages, and semi-starvation of the cities, were also implemented there. But Galicians, unlike their compatriots in the east, were allowed to form a representative body in Lviv called the Ukrainian Land Committee. Headed by Kost Pankivsky, it was subordinated to Kubijovyč's Ukrainian Central Committee (UCC) in Cracow in March 1942.

To protect the Ukrainian population from repression, the expanded UCC adopted a policy of avoiding confrontations with the Nazis and concentrated on strengthening the Ukrainian presence in the cities and on developing a modern labor force. However, when the need arose, the UCC vigorously defended Ukrainian interests. For example, when several Ukrainian villages were wiped out in a German operation in February 1943, Kubijovyč, the head of the UCC, boldly protested to the Nazi authorities, remarking to Frank: "One has finished executing Jews and is now beginning to execute Ukrainians."⁹ Another advantage that the Ukrainians in the General Government enjoyed was the existence of an extensive elementary, secondary, and vocational system of education. They also were able, on a limited scale, to maintain their cooperatives and to engage in cultural activities. As was customary, the Germans monopolized all the key administrative positions in Galicia. But Ukrainians were generally favored over Poles in appointments to positions in the local administration. This policy exacerbated the already deteriorating relations between the two communities, much to the satisfaction of the Germans.

In the easternmost regions of Ukraine, which remained under military jurisdiction, conditions were similar to those in Reichskommissariat Ukraine except that police terror was less prevalent and some Ukrainian civic organizations, notably the one led by Volodymyr Dolenko in Kharkiv, were allowed to exist. Compared to German occupation, that of the Romanians in southwestern Ukraine (Transnistria) was relatively lax. The Romanians delivered Jews to the Nazis rather than exterminating them themselves, refrained from widespread political terror, and allowed free trade. But they vigorously repressed all manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism, banned Ukrainian publications, and tended to favor pro-Russian groups.

Nazi policies in Ukraine were brutal and irrational. Rarely has an occupying power managed to turn an initially friendly, or at least expectant, populace against it so quickly and completely as did the Nazis in Ukraine. The extent to which the Nazis allowed their theories of racial superiority to cloud their perception of political realities will always remain puzzling. Even some high-ranking officials of the Third Reich seemed to be taken aback by the magnitude of German blunders. For example, as early as 1942, a close associate of Rosenberg, Otto Brautigam, admitted that "the forty million Ukrainians who greeted us joyfully as liberators are today indifferent to us and are already beginning to swing into the enemy camp."¹⁰ But even when they ad-

mitted their mistakes, the Nazis did little to correct them. In the view of many modern historians, this Nazi failure to utilize effectively the non-Russian nationalities, and particularly the Ukrainians, against the Soviet regime was one of their greatest political blunders in the war.

Collaboration In dealing with the Nazis, the Ukrainians had two alternatives: to obey or to resist. As throughout all of German-occupied Europe, the vast majority chose obedience. And when obedience went beyond the limits of the passive fulfillment of German commands, it usually became collaboration. In Western Europe, where loyalty to one's state was taken for granted and the Nazis were the one and only enemy, collaboration with the Germans was generally viewed as a form of treason. But in Ukraine, collaboration was a much more complicated issue. It was, first of all, unclear as to how much loyalty Ukrainians owed to Stalin's regime or to the Polish state that had mistreated them. Who was the primary enemy? Was it the Stalinist system, which inflicted such great suffering in the 1930s, or the Nazi regime, which was currently (but perhaps only temporarily) in power? Finally, given the extreme ruthlessness of both regimes in Ukraine, collaboration was often the price of survival for many Ukrainians.

For Ukrainians the war posed the problem of how to make the best of what was essentially a no-win situation. From an average individual's point of view, success generally meant the preservation of one's life. For Ukrainian leaders and their organizations in German-occupied territories the goal – or rather, the puzzle – was how to preserve Ukrainian interests from both the Nazis and the increasingly stronger Soviets. Distasteful as it was, some Ukrainian leaders decided to side with one totalitarian system in order to withstand the other. Because the Soviets appeared to be the greater long-term threat, almost all Ukrainian organizations in the Third Reich collaborated with the Germans at one time or another, but always to a limited degree and for strictly tactical reasons. As a people without a state of their own, Ukrainians operated from a position of weakness. They were unable to formulate policy or influence events. Consequently, Ukrainian collaboration with the Nazis was insignificant compared to that of Germany's allies. Finally, although there were opportunists, anti-Semites, and ideological fanatics among the Ukrainians, there is no evidence indicating that their number was proportionately greater than among other nationalities.

On the individual level, collaboration with the Germans usually took the form of participation in the local administration or the German-supervised auxiliary police. Motives for taking such positions varied. In Western Ukraine, where, before the war, Poles had excluded Ukrainians from even the lowest administrative positions, the desire to have at least a minimum of authority in Ukrainian hands and to turn the tables on hated rivals was often a major motive. The need to find employment or to satisfy personal ambitions was,

as always, an important consideration. The most notorious form of collaboration was to act as a concentration camp guard. Invariably, guard positions were held by Soviet prisoners of war, who had the difficult choice of accepting the task or perishing in the camps.

Given the lowly position of Ukrainian collaborators in the Nazi apparatus and the SS monopoly on the actual extermination of Jews, Ukrainian participation in the massacres was neither extensive nor decisive. When it did occur, it usually took the form of auxiliary policemen herding Jews into ghettos. However, there were also many Ukrainians who risked the death penalty by aiding Jews. Metropolitan Sheptytsky was an outstanding example: not only did he shelter hundreds of Jews in monasteries but he also used his sermons to decry the Nazi slaughter of Jews. In 1943 an SS report to Himmler stated that the metropolitan was adamantly opposed to the Nazi anti-Semitic outrages and that he had come to consider Nazism to be an even greater evil than communism.¹¹

Aside from the abortive interlude between the OUN and the Germans in the early days of the war, the most important case of Ukrainian cooperation with Hitler's regime on the organizational level was the formation of the SS volunteer Galicia Division. In spring 1943, after the stunning German defeat at Stalingrad, Nazi authorities belatedly decided to recruit non-German "easterners" into their forces. Consequently, Otto Wächter, the governor of Galicia, approached the Ukrainian Central Committee (UCC) with a proposal to form a Ukrainian division in the German army. After much debate and despite opposition from the OUN-B, Kubijovyč and his associates agreed. Their immediate reason for the creation of such a division was the hope that it might help to improve German treatment of the Ukrainians. The specter of 1917–20 was also extremely influential in persuading the UCC leadership, for Kubijovyč and his associates (as well as Metropolitan Sheptytsky himself) were convinced that it was the lack of a well-trained army that had prevented Ukrainians from establishing their own state after the First World War. Realizing that the defeat of Germany was probable, they were determined that this time Ukrainians would not be caught in the ensuing chaos without a regular military force. It should be emphasized that both the Ukrainian organizers of the division and its members were motivated primarily by patriotic and anti-Soviet motives, not by pro-Nazi sympathies.

In the negotiations leading up to the formation of the division, the UCC insisted that the unit fight only against the Soviets. Wächter, on Himmler's instructions, demanded that the entire higher divisional command be German and, in order not to irritate Hitler, that the division be called Galician rather than Ukrainian. When the UCC called for volunteers in June 1943, over 82,000 men responded. Of these, 13,000 eventually became members of the SS Volunteer Galicia Division.

The men of the Galician Division were not the only Ukrainians in Hitler's armies. Scattered among the approximately 1 million former Soviet citizens who wore German uniforms in 1944 were about 220,000 Ukrainians (most of

the others were Russians). To put these numbers into perspective, it should be remembered that about 2 million Ukrainians fought on the Soviet side and that large numbers also fought in Polish, Romanian, Hungarian, Czech, American, and Canadian forces. Such was the fate of a stateless people.

Resistance

As elsewhere in occupied Europe, underground resistance to the Germans in Ukraine developed soon after their arrival, primarily in response to Nazi policies. It was aided by the fact that the Germans did not have enough troops to control the vast areas they conquered. Furthermore, there already existed in Ukraine underground networks organized by the OUN, the Soviets, and, in the northwest, the Poles, all of which were capable of putting partisan forces into the field. Recruits for anti-German partisan warfare were not lacking and were drawn from the large numbers of Red Army stragglers, fugitive Ukrainian nationalists, Communist party members, Jews, turncoat policemen, and escapees from forced-labor contingents who took to the forests to escape the Germans. They were joined by those who simply wanted an opportunity to strike a blow against the Nazis. Because much of Ukraine is steppe and, therefore, unsuitable for partisan warfare, most activity was concentrated in the northwestern part of the country, in the forests of Volhynia, the swamps of Polissia, and the Carpathian Mountains.

The UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) It was in Polissia and Volhynia that the first Ukrainian nationalist partisan units appeared and, surprisingly, at the outset they were not associated with OUN. As soon as the Nazi-Soviet war broke out, Taras Bulba-Borovets, a local Ukrainian activist linked with the UNR-Petliurist government-in-exile in Warsaw, formed an irregular unit called "Polissian Sich," later renamed the UPA (Ukrainska Povstanska Armia – Ukrainian Insurgent Army), for the purpose of clearing his region of the remnants of the Red Army. When the Germans tried to disband his unit in late 1941, he took his men into "the woods" to fight both the Germans and the Soviets. In 1942, members of both OUN-M and OUN-B, who were fleeing Koch's repression, also established small units in Volhynia.

In late 1942, the OUN-B decided to form a large-scale partisan force and thereby lay the foundation for a regular Ukrainian army, which they believed would be needed when the Nazi-Soviet war came to an end. There were also extremely pressing immediate reasons for such a step: first, as German repression of the local populace increased, the villagers demanded that the OUN take steps to protect them, and, second, as Soviet partisans from Belorussia began to penetrate into northwestern Ukraine by late 1942, it was necessary for the OUN to assume the role of the "people's army" in order to prevent the Soviets from doing so.

In order to unite all the nationalist units, the OUN-B forcibly incorporated

the units of Borovets and OUN-M into its own forces for which it now usurped the name UPA. Roman Shukhevych, a member of the OUN-B leadership and the highest-ranking Ukrainian officer in the recently disbanded *Nachtigall* unit, was appointed commander-in-chief of the expanded force. Benefiting from the extensive and efficient OUN-B underground network, UPA quickly grew into a large, well-organized partisan army, which took control of large parts of Volhynia, Polissia, and, later, Galicia. Although many Ukrainian émigré and even some Soviet sources claim that, at its high point in late 1943 to early 1944, its numbers reached over 100,000, well-substantiated estimates place the figure at between 30,000 and 40,000 fighters.¹² Compared to other underground movements in Nazi-occupied Europe, the UPA was unique in that it had practically no foreign support. Its growth and strength were, therefore, an indication of the very considerable popular support it enjoyed among the Ukrainians.

The rapid growth of UPA necessitated the broadening of its political base. Although the OUN-B provided much of UPA's leadership, it was clear that one integral nationalist faction could not claim to be representative of Ukrainians as a whole. Therefore, in July 1944, at the initiative of OUN-B, delegates from various prewar West Ukrainian political parties (but not the OUN-M) and spokesmen for the East Ukrainians met secretly near Sambir in Galicia to form the UHVR (Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada – Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council). The platform of the new organization was noteworthy because it reflected the changes that the war, and especially the contacts with Soviet Ukraine, had exerted on the thinking of the integral nationalists.

Some of these ideological changes were already evident in 1943, when an OUN-B congress declared: "The OUN is fighting against imperialism and against empires ... for this reason, the OUN is fighting against the USSR and against Germany's 'New Europe.'"¹³ Emphasizing its support for an anti-Nazi and anti-Soviet position, the UHVR also proposed several important amendments to integral nationalist doctrine. It called for greater tolerance of non-integral nationalist ideologies, rejected racial and ethnic exclusivity, and paid much greater attention to socioeconomic issues, which were of greatest interest to Soviet Ukrainians. Furthermore, UHVR urged the non-Russian nationalities of the USSR to unite against Moscow. It soon became evident, however, that no matter what adjustments the integral nationalists made, they would find it extremely difficult to survive in the tightly controlled Soviet system.

The Ukrainian/Polish massacres Not only did UPA take on both the Nazis and the Soviets, but in the mixed Ukrainian/Polish areas of Volhynia, Polissia, and Kholm, it also became involved in an exceedingly brutal conflict with the Poles. Regardless of the outcome of the war, Ukrainian integral nationalists were determined to drive the Poles (many of whom were colonists from the interwar period) out of areas where Ukrainians were a majority. For its part,

the Polish nationalist underground army, the *Armija Krajowa* (AK), was just as determined to retain control of lands that had been part of the Polish state. The result was a murderous struggle – often encouraged by the Germans and provoked by Soviet partisans – between Ukrainian and Polish forces for territory and to settle old scores.

Tragically, it was the civilian population that bore most of the costs. According to Polish sources, in 1943–44 about 60,000–80,000 Polish men, women, and children were massacred in Volhynia by Ukrainians, especially the SB, the security units of the OUN.¹⁴ Ukrainians claim that massacres of their people began earlier, in 1942, when Poles wiped out thousands of Ukrainian villagers in the predominantly Polish areas of Kholm, and that they continued in 1944–45 among the defenseless Ukrainian minority west of the San River. In any case, it is clear that both Ukrainian and Polish armed units engaged in wholesale slaughter, bringing to a bloody climax the hatred that had been increasing between the two peoples for generations.

Soviet partisans in Ukraine Soon after the German invasion, Communist party officials began to organize underground units behind enemy lines. Throughout the war Soviet partisans were tightly controlled by the Kremlin. Because the Soviet underground developed slowly and achieved few successes in 1941 and early 1942, it was reorganized by the Central Partisan Staff in Moscow in May 1942. A month later the Ukrainian Partisan Command was established, led by Timofei Strokach, a high NKVD official. After the victory at Stalingrad, the numbers and activity of Soviet partisans grew considerably, especially in the desolate, swampy regions of Belorussia.

But in Ukraine, Soviet partisans never became as significant as they were in Belorussia. Much of the open Ukrainian countryside was unsuited for partisan warfare. And in Western Ukraine, where the OUN was well established, Soviet partisans had no popular base for their activity. So most of their operations in Ukraine were confined to parts of Volhynia and Polissia.

The goals of the Soviet partisans were to disrupt German communications (they were especially effective in the so-called “railroad war,” that is, impeding the flow of German reinforcements to the front); to tie down much-needed German troops; to spread insecurity and disorder behind enemy lines; and to maintain a Soviet presence in occupied territories. A favorite tactic of the Soviet (as well as the UPA) partisans was to launch lengthy raids from the “partisan republics,” that is, large, inaccessible areas in Polissia and Volhynia controlled by them. The Soviet partisans often clashed with the UPA, seeking to eliminate its leaders and to undermine its base of support.

Among the major Soviet partisan commanders in Ukraine were Sydir Kovpak, Aleksander Saburov, and Petro Vershyhora. The celebrated Kovpak established himself in Polissia early in 1943. With a staff of well-trained officers and supplies delivered to secret airfields, he built up a force of several

thousand men. In the summer of 1943, he launched a lengthy raid into the Carpathians. It did not achieve its main military goal – the destruction of the Carpathian oil fields – and most of the unit was destroyed. But the psychological and political impact of this raid was considerable, for it demonstrated the Germans' inability to secure their hinterland and raised the possibility of a Soviet return.

Soviet authors are quick to note that their underground in Ukraine was a massive internationalist movement, consisting of sixty-two nationalities. But according to Soviet data, Ukrainians were clearly underrepresented in Soviet partisan ranks.¹⁵ Although Ukrainians were close to 80% of the population, they constituted only 46% of the fighters in the five major Soviet partisan units in Ukraine (only one-third of Kovpak's men were Ukrainians). Russians were overrepresented, accounting for more than 37% of the partisans. Some Soviet works claim that the number of Soviet partisans in Ukraine was as high as 250,000 and even 500,000, while others put it at less than 50,000. Western specialists usually accept the last figure.¹⁶ In any case, Soviet depiction of its partisan movement as a massive, patriotic rallying of the Ukrainian masses against the Germans is misleading (as is the nationalist treatment of UPA, which makes similar claims). The vast majority of Ukraine's population during the war remained politically uncommitted and was concerned not so much with resistance as with survival.

The Soviet Return to Ukraine

In 1943 a decisive shift occurred in the Nazi-Soviet war: as the German offensive lost impetus, the Soviets began a huge counteroffensive. The first indication that Hitler's armies had overextended themselves came at the dramatic Soviet victory at Stalingrad on the Volga in January 1943. Marshaling the remainder of their reserves, the Germans made their last great attempt to recapture the initiative in the summer of 1943 at the Battle of Kursk. But here, too, they were defeated. Meanwhile, the Soviets benefited from their vast manpower reserves, improved war production, and a huge influx of Allied war matériel. Immediately after their victory at Kursk, they launched a counterattack whose major goal was to recapture Left-Bank Ukraine.

The Soviet push into Ukraine was massive, involving over 40% of the Red Army's infantry and 80% of its tanks. According to Western historians, the Red Army enjoyed a three-to-one advantage in overall manpower and – thanks to American supplies – an estimated five-to-one advantage in equipment. Soviet sources, however, claim that their numerical advantage was less than two to one and that it was their valor and skill, rather than their overwhelming numbers, that brought them success. In any case, unlike the blitzkrieg of 1941, which had allowed the Germans to overrun Ukraine in four months, the Soviet "bulldozer" moved forward sector by sector, methodically

pounding its opponents into exhaustion. In a little more than a year, it had reconquered all of Ukraine.

In late summer and fall of 1943, Soviet forces, led by Ivan Konev, Nikolai Vatutin, and Radion Malinovsky, took the Left Bank and Donbas regions. On 23 August, the Germans lost Kharkiv for the second, and final, time; in September and October, after vicious fighting, the Red Army breached the powerful German defensive line along the Dnieper; and on 6 November, Vatutin entered Kiev. After a brief pause, in January 1944, about 2.3 million Red Army men launched the drive to force the Germans out of the Right Bank and Crimea. An important victory near Korsun-Shevchenko assured them of achieving this goal and, by March, only Western Ukraine remained in German hands.

The third stage in the reconquest of Ukraine began in mid July 1944. Near Brody, the Soviets encircled and destroyed eight German divisions, totaling about 60,000 men. Included among the latter were the 10,000 men of the Galician Division who had the misfortune of receiving their baptism by fire under these catastrophic conditions. About 5000 members of the Galician Division managed to break out of the encirclement, but over 3000 were killed, wounded, or captured. An estimated 2000 eluded captivity and many of them later joined the UPA. After this victory, Soviet forces quickly overran Galicia, capturing Lviv, Peremyshl, and Stanyslaviv on 27 July. In September they crossed the Carpathians and by October 1944 all ethnic Ukrainian territory was in Soviet hands.

Just as the Soviets had done in 1941, the Germans applied a scorched-earth policy during their retreat from Ukraine. In Himmler's orders to his troops, he emphasized: "It is necessary that in retreating from the regions of Ukraine we do not leave behind a single person, head of livestock or measure of grain ... The enemy should find there a completely burned and devastated land."¹⁷ Consequently, in a 200-mile-wide strip along the left bank of the Dnieper, hordes of people were forcibly evacuated from their homes and large parts of Poltava, Dniepropetrovsk, Kremenchuk, and other cities were burned. The right bank of the river was spared the large-scale devastation, although not the massive evacuations.

Stalin's propaganda offensive Unlike Hitler, Stalin was willing to learn from his mistakes. After seeing how ambivalent Soviet citizens had been toward his regime at the outset of the war, he launched a propaganda campaign. It was designed to encourage Soviet citizens in occupied areas to resist the Germans and to portray his regime in a new light, implying that it would be more tolerable after the war. Because in the fighting against the Germans, nationalism was clearly a stronger motivating force than Marxism, it became the major theme of the campaign. Russian nationalism received the most attention as images of the Russian Empire's glories, of its struggles against foreign

invaders in the past, and of its great heroes were repeatedly conjured up. But Stalin also made a strong effort to assure himself of Ukrainian sympathies.

To create the impression that the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was a sovereign state, supplementary Ukrainian ministries of foreign affairs and defense were formed. Like other republics, Ukraine was given the right – but not the opportunity – to engage in foreign relations. Prominent Ukrainians received high government posts. For example, the playwright Oleksander Korniiichuk became minister of foreign affairs and the lionized partisan leader Sydir Kovpak was chosen to be minister of defense. There were even indications that Ukraine would have its own military units. Although this possibility never came to pass, the southern sector of the front was renamed the Ukrainian front and a prestigious award for valor was named after Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Control of Ukrainian cultural activity loosened perceptibly and Volodymyr Sosiura's patriotic poem "Love Ukraine" even received the Stalin Prize.

Having noted how quickly and enthusiastically people had turned to religion in the German-occupied regions, Stalin made his peace with the Russian Orthodox church on Soviet territory by eliminating many restrictions on its activities and by disbanding the antireligious propaganda organization, League of Militant Atheists. The Orthodox church returned these favors by encouraging its faithful to fight the Germans and by excommunicating those who cooperated with them.

The Soviet return to Western Ukraine Because Western Ukraine had been under Soviet rule only briefly, the return of the Red Army had a markedly different effect there than in the Sovietized east. In sharp contrast to their relatively cautious policies of 1939, the Soviets were determined to impose their rule on the nationalistic West Ukrainians quickly and uncompromisingly when they arrived in Western Ukraine in 1944. They mobilized all men between 18 and 50 years of age and sent them – poorly trained and badly armed – into battle. Repression against the Greek Catholic church began immediately. Metropolitan Sheptytsky was put under house arrest when Lviv was occupied and he died several months later. His successor, Josef Slipy, was sent to a Siberian concentration camp. Preparations were also begun for the forced incorporation of the Greek Catholic church into the Moscow-controlled Russian Orthodox church.

Over 30,000 party workers and 3500 specially trained propagandists poured into Western Ukraine to begin once again the process of Sovietizing the region. The intelligentsia was the most nationally conscious segment of the population and Soviet authorities made a concerted effort to alienate it from the peasants and workers. Because Soviet propagandists promised to give "special attention" to those who did not have a Soviet education and who had been brought up in "bourgeois" schools, a large part of the

West Ukrainian intelligentsia fled, together with the retreating Germans, from areas that were not yet occupied by the Red Army.

The arrival of the Red Army in Western Ukraine placed before the leadership of the UPA the difficult question of whether to continue their fight against Stalin's overwhelming forces. Initially the OUN had assumed that, in their struggle for empire, the Nazis and Soviets would bring each other down in a manner similar to 1917–18. When it became clear, however, that the Soviets were going to emerge the victors in the east, the OUN hoped that the defeated Germans and the Western powers would form an alliance to thwart Soviet expansionism. It was this false hope that, to a large extent, convinced the UPA/OUN leadership to continue the struggle against the Soviets.

After the main forces of the Red Army had rolled through Western Ukraine, the UPA staged attacks designed to disrupt mobilization efforts, to prevent deportations of "unreliable elements," and to stem the repression of the Greek Catholic church. Its special targets were the NKVD, Communist party members, and those who collaborated with the Soviets. In spring 1944 in Volhynia, a UPA unit mortally wounded the famous Red Army general Nikolai Vatutin. To eliminate the UPA, Soviet forces staged huge blockades of partisan territories, sent agents to infiltrate UPA units and to assassinate their commanders, and formed special antipartisan battalions. Soviet propagandists also launched an intense campaign to portray the OUN and UPA as the henchmen of the Nazis – a campaign that continues to this day.

Some of the Soviet clashes with the UPA were on a large scale. In April 1944 near Kremianets in Volhynia, for example, about 30,000 Soviet troops participated in an anti-UPA operation. Most clashes, however, were small but frequent. According to Soviet sources, in the fall of 1944 in Volhynia, the UPA carried out 800 raids. In the Stanyslaviv region of Galicia alone it killed about 1500 Soviet activists. During this period, the Soviets claimed to have wiped out thirty-six UPA "bands" totaling 4300 men.¹⁸ As might be expected, the fighting was fierce and no quarter was given by either side. Wounded UPA soldiers frequently committed suicide rather than fall into enemy hands. As the war ended on 9 May 1945, Soviet control of the West Ukrainian countryside was still far from complete.



Even a cursory listing of losses reflects the terrible impact that the Second World War had on Ukraine and its inhabitants. About 5.3 million, or one of six inhabitants of Ukraine, perished in the conflict. An additional 2.3 million had been shipped to Germany to perform forced labor. Over 700 cities and towns and 28,000 villages were totally or partially destroyed, leaving close to 10 million people homeless. A graphic indication of the extremes of Nazi brutality experienced in Ukraine was that for one village that was destroyed and

its inhabitants executed in France and Czechoslovakia, 250 villages and their inhabitants suffered such a fate in Ukraine. Because Ukraine suffered more damage in the war than any other European country, the economic losses were staggering. The complete or partial destruction of over 16,000 industrial enterprises and 28,000 collective farms meant that Ukraine lost much of what had been gained at such great cost during the 1930s. Estimates place the total damage to Ukraine's economy at about 40%. Thus, for a second time in little more than a decade, Ukrainians had suffered greatly from the brutal excesses of totalitarian regimes.

Although more nationally conscious than they had been in the 1917–20 period, Ukrainians during the Second World War were caught between the Nazis and Soviets. To the great disillusionment of the integral nationalists, they had practically no opportunity to pursue their own interests. In contrast to the 1917–20 period, Ukrainians were in a position only to react to events in 1939–45 – not to influence them. Yet, despite horrendous losses and setbacks, the final outcome of the war did have some positive features from the Ukrainian point of view. Most noteworthy was the fact that, as a result of the Soviet conquest of Western Ukraine, all Ukrainians were united in a single political entity for the first time in centuries: in the USSR, or more specifically, in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). Moreover, Stalin's temporary concessions to the national aspirations of the non-Russian nationalities gave rise to hopes that after the war "things would be different." Finally, as part of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was included among the victors in the war. For many Soviet Ukrainians the exhilaration of victory gave rise to a feeling of hope, expressed by a Soviet officer in 1945: "The entire atmosphere was charged with the expectation of something new, something magnificent and glorious. None of us doubted in the brightness of the future."¹⁹

Reconstruction and Retrenchment

The impact of the Second World War on Ukraine was not only devastating but unusually far-reaching. In many crucial ways, the Ukraine that emerged from the war was very different from what it had been previously. Its borders had been greatly expanded; its political and economic significance in the USSR grew; the composition of its population changed radically; and, most important, for the first time in centuries all Ukrainians found themselves within the borders of a single state. Both Ukrainian society and the Soviet regime sought to adjust to these changes and their attempts to do so constitute the major theme in the history of postwar Ukraine.



Territorial Settlements and Population Changes

For the Ukrainians the most important territorial settlement brought about by the war was the incorporation of Western Ukraine into the USSR. To the great dismay of the Poles, Stalin persuaded Great Britain and the United States to accept his annexation of lands in which West Ukrainians constituted the majority of the population. Consequently, at the Yalta conference in 1945, the Soviets were able to pressure the newly reestablished Polish state to give up its claims to almost all of Galicia and Volhynia and to draw the border with Soviet Ukraine along the so-called Curzon Line. Especially painful to the Poles was the loss of Lviv, long a bastion of Polish culture and dominance.

Why was Stalin so insistent on annexing Western Ukraine? Formally, his argument was that it was only natural that the oppressed West Ukrainians should be united with their brethren in Soviet Ukraine. But since Stalin's concern for Ukrainian needs was questionable, political self-interest clearly played a role. Because the Poles were in no position to challenge him militarily or otherwise, Stalin simply felt no need to return Galicia and Volhynia to



Map 26 Territorial gains of Soviet Ukraine, 1939-54

them. Moreover, possession of Western Ukraine gave the Soviets a convenient strategic position with respect to Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Finally, Stalin was anxious to destroy Ukrainian nationalism and to do so he needed to control its hotbed in Western Ukraine.

The territorial settlement with the Poles also included provisions for an exchange of populations. Therefore, between 1944 and 1946, the Soviets allowed about 1 million Poles (including a significant number of Jews and Ukrainians masquerading as Poles) to move from Galicia and Volhynia to Poland. In return, close to 520,000 Ukrainians, who had found themselves on the Polish side of the new border, immigrated, voluntarily or under duress, to Soviet Ukraine. This most recent exodus of the Poles concluded their long, drawn-out retreat from Ukraine that had begun back in 1648 when the Polish nobles lost control of the Left Bank. The retreat had continued throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, when these nobles first lost political control of the Right Bank and then their socioeconomic dominance in the area. It concluded after the Second World War, when the Soviets ejected them from Galicia and Volhynia where, 600 years earlier, their advance into Ukraine had begun. With the withdrawal of the Poles, an important, though frequently antagonistic and often invigorating relationship ceased to exist in Ukrainian history – but not before it produced, in 1947, a final and characteristically tragic sequel.

Shortly after the war, Moscow also persuaded Czechoslovakia and Romania to surrender their claims to Transcarpathia and Bukovyna, respectively. Thus, Western Ukraine, with its more than 7 million inhabitants and 110,000 sq. km of territory, was permanently incorporated into the USSR. By late 1945, the territory of Soviet Ukraine expanded to over 580,000 sq. km, inhabited by about 41 million people.

The Poles were not the only ethnic minority whose presence in Ukraine decreased sharply as a result of the war. Prior to 1939 there were about 650,000 Germans in Ukraine, mostly descendants of 18th-century colonists. Fearful lest they join their invading compatriots, Stalin had almost all of them evacuated to Central Asia. A similar fate befell the approximately 200,000 Crimean Tatars whose homeland was later incorporated into the Ukrainian republic. Convinced that they had been overly cooperative with the Germans, Stalin ordered their mass expulsion from the Crimea in 1944. Brutally ejected from their homes in that year, only about one-half of the Tatars survived the journey to Central Asia. But the most tragic fate awaited the Jews of Ukraine. As a result of the Nazi extermination policies, mass evacuations, and population exchanges, of the approximately 2.7 million Jews who had lived among the Ukrainians in the 1930s, only about 800,000 remained.

In sharp contrast to these shrinking minorities, the Russian minority in Ukraine increased dramatically in size. After the war, there was a great shortage of industrial workers, government bureaucrats, and party functionaries in Ukraine, especially in the newly annexed western lands. Encouraged

by the Soviet government, hundreds of thousands of Russians moved into Ukraine, particularly into the cities, to fill these positions. Their rapidly rising numbers are evident from the following statistics: in 1939 there were 4 million Russians in Ukraine constituting about 12% of the population; by 1959, the figure had grown to 7 million or 16%. In Western Ukraine, where there had been practically no Russians before the war, by 1959 their number had risen to 330,000, representing 5% of the population.

In the radical restructuring of Ukraine's ethnic composition that took place after the war, peoples such as the Poles, Jews, and Crimean Tatars, who had long played a crucial role in the history of Ukraine, adding greatly to its cultural and ethnic mosaic, faded in importance or practically disappeared. Their places were taken largely by the Russians. Meanwhile, the incorporation of the West Ukrainians did not greatly raise the proportion of Ukrainians in the land because they only made up for the population losses suffered by Ukraine during the war. In this process, Ukraine changed from a multinational into a largely binational society, one in which a demographically stagnant Ukrainian majority existed side by side with a continually growing Russian minority.

Reconstruction

Four years of the most destructive war in history left the Soviet Union with the colossal task of economic reconstruction. Industrial production in Ukraine in 1945, for example, was only 26% of the 1940 level. As might be expected, the Soviet approach to rebuilding its shattered economy began with the formulation of the fourth Five-Year Plan (1946–50). Once again the plan drew on the great advantage of a totalitarian system: the ability to allocate resources without taking the desires or needs of the people into account. Hence its staggering demands: it called on the people to rebuild the ravaged areas, to restore industry and agriculture to prewar levels, and even to surpass those levels – all in less than five years. Stalin proposed a number of grandiose “transformation-of-nature” projects, which in Ukraine included the construction of a huge dam on the Dnieper and the creation of large forested zones in the steppe to control drought. Despite the sacrifices and exhaustion of the war, Soviet workers were expected to work harder than ever because the plan demanded a 36% rise in productivity.

Economic reconstruction As in the 1930s, the fourth Five-Year Plan produced uneven results. In heavy industry, which received 85% of investment, the reconstruction effort was remarkably successful. By 1950 the industrial output of Ukraine was 15% higher than in 1940. In Western Ukraine, which had practically no heavy industry before the war, progress was especially impressive: by 1950 the industrial output of the region rose by 230%. In the 1950s

Ukraine once again became one of the leading industrial countries of Europe. It produced more pig iron per capita than did Great Britain, West Germany, and France (only West Germany smelted more steel), and it mined almost as much coal as West Germany. But although Ukrainian industry became even stronger than it had been before the war, its share of total Soviet production declined because the new industrial centers that had arisen beyond the Urals grew at an even faster rate.

More and bigger factories, however, did not lead to a significant improvement in the standard of living. The traditional Soviet neglect of consumer goods reached such extremes that the purchase of a pair of shoes, a toothbrush, or even a loaf of bread was fraught with difficulty. By 1950 light industry had reached only 80% of its prewar level. Buying consumer goods became even more difficult because of a currency "reform" in 1947 that devalued the ruble and wiped out personal savings.

Nowhere were the failings of the reconstruction effort more evident than in agriculture, a chronic weak point of the Soviet economy. True, with the loss of most of the livestock and equipment during the war, agriculture was damaged to an even greater degree than industry. But the low priority it was accorded by Soviet planners and the counterproductive agricultural policies applied by Soviet officials greatly impeded improvements in the countryside. To make matters worse, there was a catastrophic drought in 1946 and, for the third time under Soviet rule, Ukrainian peasants experienced famine.

Despite its obvious and chronic problems, Soviet leaders were committed to restoring collectivization and even intensifying it. In 1946 steps were taken to take back from the peasants the land and equipment they had managed to "privatize" during the war. The next year, Nikita Khrushchev first launched in Ukraine, the Soviet Union's agricultural laboratory, an ambitious project to solve agricultural problems. It called for the consolidation of small collective farms into huge "agro-cities" that, in theory, would make most efficient use of the very scarce farm machinery, while providing the approximately 5000 inhabitants with all the amenities of city life. The project also called for the elimination of the private garden plots on which peasants had grown much of their food. Finally, it promised to give the regime even greater control over the rural population. But the proposed elimination of their tiny but crucial plots was too much for the peasants: so widespread were their passive resistance and vocal protests that the government had to drop the "agro-city" scheme. Moreover, the chaos and bitterness that this project engendered only hindered grain production. Thus, by 1950, grain production in Ukraine had reached only about 60% of the 1940 level and food remained a scarce commodity.

Political reconstruction The Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) weathered the war surprisingly well, although, at the outset of the conflict, its condition was

grim indeed. Much of the onus for the early defeats, mistakes, and staggering losses was laid at the feet of the party, resulting in a drastic decline in its prestige and authority. Mobilization and casualties reduced the number of Ukraine's Communists from over 600,000 in 1940 to less than 200,000 in 1945. Most had been evacuated during the Soviet retreat so that only about 15,000 actually remained in Ukraine during much of the war. However, as Soviet fortunes improved, so also did those of Ukraine's Communists.

A striking characteristic of the party members, especially their leadership, who concentrated on Ukrainian affairs during the war, was the strong sense of solidarity they developed. To a great extent this effect was a result of the camaraderie that flourished in the ranks of the partisan movement that many of them had organized and led. This close-knit coterie of Ukraine's top Communists was often called the "Partisan clan" and many of them later became members of the Ukrainian "mafias" associated with Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

After the war, as Communists returned from military service or evacuation and as new recruits poured in, the party's membership in Ukraine shot up again, and by 1950 it was over 700,000. Still, the number of Communists in Ukraine remained comparatively low: only 20 out of 1000 people belonged to the party, while the all-union average was 30 out of 1000. Significant changes also occurred in the CPU's ethnic composition. Anxious to be part of the victorious Soviet regime, ambitious Ukrainians showed a greater interest than ever in joining the party. Thus, while in 1920 Ukrainians constituted only 19% of the CPU, by 1958 the figure was over 60%. True, Russians were still heavily overrepresented at the uppermost levels, but even there the Ukrainian presence was making itself felt. Another characteristic of the postwar Ukrainian (as well as all-union) party was its tendency to attract an ever-increasing portion of the new Soviet socioeconomic elite. Thus, in the 1950s every fifth doctor and every third engineer was a party member, while only one out of thirty-five workers and one out of every forty-five collective farmers were members. Clearly, the postwar party was assuming the role of a well-entrenched establishment.

The Ukrainian Communists may have been pleased with their quick resurgence after the war, but Stalin expected more of them. Compared to that of other areas of the Soviet Union, Ukraine's industrial reconstruction had progressed slowly; its all-important agricultural sector was in catastrophic condition, and nationalism, especially in Western Ukraine, was far from extinguished. Therefore, in March 1947, Stalin again dispatched his troubleshooter Kaganovich to replace Khrushchev as leader of the CPU. Apparently the unpopular Kaganovich had little success and Nikita Khrushchev, who, although a Russian, exhibited some signs of local patriotism, returned to Kiev once more.

On the governmental level, the most noteworthy effect of the war was the

unexpected – although very limited – emergence of Ukraine on the international stage. At Stalin's insistence, in April 1945, Ukraine and Belorussia, along with the USSR, were included among the forty-seven founding states of the United Nations. It is commonly accepted that the main reason for Stalin's position was his desire to obtain extra votes in the UN (originally he had demanded that each of the sixteen Soviet republics have a vote). However, there are indications that the move was also Stalin's way of responding to the Ukrainians' pride in their role in defeating Nazi Germany. In any case, since 1945, a Ukrainian mission has functioned at the UN. According to Soviet sources, by 1950 Ukraine had also become a member of twenty international organizations and concluded sixty-five treaties on its own.¹ However, in the UN as elsewhere, Ukraine has never deviated from positions taken by the USSR. When in 1947, Britain approached Soviet Ukraine about establishing direct diplomatic ties, it never received a response. Western scholars conclude that the function of the Ukrainian foreign ministry is merely "ceremonial, ornamental, and symbolic."

In evaluating the potential significance of Ukraine's international exposure, Yaroslav Bilinsky writes: "The international representation of the Ukrainian SSR, complete with anthem, national flag, and foreign minister undoubtedly belongs to the category of Soviet constitutional trappings ... Should the regime prove successful in emasculating Ukrainian nationalism, no constitutional provisions will be able to reinvigorate it. Should it fail in doing so, such colorful trappings as an international representation will provide food for thought and, under favorable circumstances, may also provide a spark for action."²

The Absorption of Western Ukraine

Since 1654, when the tsars began steadily to extend their control over Ukraine, Ukrainians had lived in two distinct worlds: one ruled by the Russians and the other by Poles or Austrians. The contrast between the two Ukrainian societies, as we have had numerous occasions to observe, clearly went far beyond that of political systems and rested on major historical, cultural, socio-economic, and psychological differences. As a result of the Second World War, the East/West Ukrainian dichotomy, finally ceased to exist, at least on the political level. After the war (the 1939–41 period had been too brief to leave lasting traces), the Soviet regime sought, for better or worse, to bring the West Ukrainians into conformity with the Soviet system and their eastern, Soviet compatriots. This process of amalgamation – of unification of two long-separated branches of the Ukrainian people – was not only a major aspect of the postwar period, but an event of epochal significance in the history of Ukraine.

In achieving their goals, the Soviets had the great advantage of overwhelm-

ing military and political might. Nevertheless, their task was still a difficult one, for in Western Ukraine they confronted a society whose major components were antagonistic to them: the Greek Catholic church, the paramount West Ukrainian institution, was clearly incompatible with the new regime; the peasants, who constituted the vast majority of West Ukrainians, were terrified by the prospect of collectivization; and the youth, many of whom were committed to nationalism, saw in the Soviets their greatest enemy.

The liquidation of the Greek Catholic church Because it was the West Ukrainians' strongest link to the West and because it functioned as the national church par excellence, the Greek Catholic church became an early focus of attack by the Soviet regime. The signal for the anti-Greek Catholic drive was the death, on 1 November 1944, of the immensely popular Metropolitan Sheptytsky. With Sheptytsky out of the way, articles began to appear in the press accusing the church of collaborating with the Nazis and of supporting the Ukrainian underground. Particularly vicious were the writings of the West Ukrainian Communist Iaroslav Galan. The defamation campaign was followed by the arrest and exile to Siberia of the entire Greek Catholic hierarchy, including its new head, Josef Slipy, on a series of patently fabricated charges.

As the hierarchy was being liquidated, a well-known priest, Gabriel Kostelnyk, was persuaded by the Soviets to organize a group of Greek Catholic priests to agitate for the abolition of the union with Rome. Opposition to the group's activities was stifled by a campaign of terror launched by the NKVD among the clergy. On 8 March 1946, the group called a synod – a totally uncanonical act in view of the absence of bishops – to consider its links with Rome. The result was a foregone conclusion: the 216 priests and 19 laity who attended proclaimed the dissolution of the Union of Brest of 1596, a break with Rome, and the "reunion" of the Greek Catholic church with the Russian Orthodox church. Somewhat later, a similar process, accompanied by the seemingly accidental death of Bishop Teodor Romzha, was carried out in Transcarpathia, and by 1951 the Greek Catholic church in that region was also destroyed.

Confused by the disappearance of their hierarchs, cowed by Soviet terror tactics, and fearful about the fate of their families, many priests went over to Orthodoxy. Those who refused were removed from their posts and usually exiled to Siberia. Yet one should not suppose that the Soviets succeeded in simply decreeing the Greek Catholic church out of existence. Many of the priests and laity that supposedly accepted Orthodoxy continued to practice Greek Catholic rites and holidays surreptitiously. Certainly, the continuing flood of Soviet propaganda against the Greek Catholic church indicates that the loyalty of West Ukrainians to their ancient church is far from dead.

The struggle against the UPA Despite the Soviet occupation of Galicia and Vol-

hynia, the UPA continued to grow. In 1944–45, it had more recruits than it could equip. A major source of manpower was the members of the OUN underground, which continued to exist parallel to the UPA. Many recruits were men and women who had resisted the mass deportations or collectivization. Red Army deserters and those who fled to the forests to avoid mobilization also entered the UPA in great numbers, preferring its ranks to serving as Soviet cannon fodder at the front. Thus, while the victorious Red Army was storming Berlin, in Western Ukraine large, battalion-size units of anti-Soviet partisans gained control of considerable areas where they established an elaborate administrative structure of their own. At this point, the policy of the UPA and of its political superstructure, the UHVR, was to await developments in the West (and to hope for a new war between the Allies and the Soviets). At the same time, it meant to disrupt the establishment of the Soviet system in its homeland. This widespread activity of the UPA was the result of, on the one hand, its popular support and effective organization and, on the other, of the shortage of Soviet troops in Western Ukraine.

After Germany capitulated in May 1945, however, the Soviets were able to mount a systematic and extensive effort to destroy the UPA. In 1945–46 their forces – which consisted mostly of MVD and NKVD troops because regular Red Army units contained many Ukrainians who were reluctant to fight against the UPA – blockaded and swept through huge areas of Volhynia and the Carpathian foothills, where the partisans were concentrated. In order to terrorize the West Ukrainian populace and deprive the UPA of popular support, the NKVD utilized a variety of ruthless tactics. It depopulated areas where the UPA had base camps, deporting to Siberia the family of anyone associated with the resistance, and even entire villages. It is estimated that, between 1946 and 1949, about 500,000 West Ukrainians were exiled to the north. Informers were planted in almost every village. In order to discredit the partisans, units of the NKVD, masquerading as UPA soldiers, pillaged, raped, and murdered Ukrainian villagers. The often-ruthless extermination of pro-Soviet elements by the SB, the OUN security police, lent some credibility to these Soviet provocations. Simultaneously, the Soviets showered the partisans, who lived close to starvation in underground bunkers during the winter, with propaganda about the hopelessness of their situation and repeatedly offered them amnesty.

Suffering from heavy losses, the UPA attempted to adjust to the growing Soviet pressure by breaking down its large units into small, maneuverable squads. By 1947–48, when it became obvious that an American-Soviet war would not occur, many of these units disbanded on the orders of the UPA command. Some UPA members joined the OUN civilian underground, but because many of the latter's members had been killed, captured, emigrated or lost their "cover" during the period of open struggle, the OUN's secret network was also no longer as effective or extensive as it had been previously.

Another serious blow to the UPA was the spread of collectivization because, unlike the individual peasant households, the strictly controlled collective farmers could not serve as sources of provisions for the partisans.

In this final stage, the UPA units and the OUN underground, which had in the meantime established loose, sporadic links with the British and American secret services, concentrated on anti-Soviet propaganda and sabotage. They disrupted collectivization, deportations, and the establishment of the Soviet administrative apparatus, and they assassinated NKVD officers, party activists, and those suspected of collaborating with the Soviets. Thus, in 1948, Father Gabriel Kostelnyk was shot, allegedly by OUN members (some accounts implicate the NKVD), for his role in the dissolution of the Greek Catholic church. A year later, the OUN underground killed the noted Soviet propagandist-journalist Iaroslav Galan. But in March 1950, the UPA suffered a decisive setback when its commander, Roman Shukhevych (General Taras Chuprynka), was killed in a skirmish near Lviv. Although some small UPA units continued to operate until the mid 1950s, for all practical purposes UPA and OUN in Ukraine ceased to exist as organizations after Shukhevych's death.

A separate chapter in the history of the UPA was its activity on the Polish side of the border, in the area inhabited by the Ukrainian Lemkos. Between 1944 and 1947, the OUN enjoyed strong support and maintained a powerful presence in the area: thanks to careful studies of the UPA by Polish military historians (which are incomparably more informative than the propagandistic tracts of their Soviet counterparts), we know that its forces included about 2000 UPA soldiers and a network of over 3000 OUN members.³ Repeated efforts by the Polish military to dislodge the Ukrainian partisans were thwarted with heavy losses to the Poles. In March 1947, when one of its units ambushed and killed Karol Świerczewski, a famous Polish general and vice-minister of defense, the UPA in the region scored one of its greatest successes and at the same time set the stage for its own demise.

Angered by the event, the Polish government resolved to liquidate the "Ukrainian problem." In April 1947, it launched an operation under the code name Wisła which had both a military and a civilian dimension. About 30,000 Polish troops, supported by large numbers of Czech and Soviet forces, surrounded the Ukrainian partisans and, in fierce fighting, killed or captured many of them. Some partisans managed to break through to Soviet Ukraine, and several hundred fought their way through Czechoslovakia and reached the Allied zone in Germany. The fate of the Ukrainian Lemko population that had sheltered the partisans was equally tragic: without warning, almost all the Lemkos, numbering about 150,000, were uprooted from their ancestral villages and resettled throughout Poland in order to prevent the UPA from ever reestablishing itself in the region again. In this manner, the Poles finally rid themselves of the Ukrainian problem that had plagued them for centuries.

Collectivization It was only in 1947–48, after the Soviets had broken the UPA resistance, that collectivization could begin full swing. In general, it followed the pattern set in Soviet Ukraine two decades earlier. Initially, the prosperous peasants (kulaks) were singled out and taxed so heavily that it became impossible for them to retain their farms. As usual, the most recalcitrant were deported to Siberia. Then the mass of the peasantry was harangued by Soviet agitators and pressured during lengthy individual sessions to join the collectives. Political control over the collectives, which was especially tight in Western Ukraine, was exerted by party cells that were established in the Machine Tractor Stations (MTS). Fortunately for the West Ukrainians, the collectivization of their lands was not accompanied by a famine. Another difference between collectivization in Western and Eastern Ukraine was that in the former it was accompanied by the armed struggle of the weakened but nonetheless lethal UPA. In the words of a Soviet source: "The greatest enemies of the working peasant – the kulaks and bourgeois nationalists – bitterly resisted the growing collectivization movement in the western territories, burning down farm buildings on the collectives, killing activists and spreading rumors among peasants designed to raise doubts about the collectives."⁴ But resistance was to no avail for by 1951 almost all Western Ukraine's 1.5 million peasant households belonged to collective farms, which numbered about 7000. A major pillar of the Soviet socioeconomic system was thus firmly in place in the newly annexed Ukrainian territories.

As was to be expected, collectivization was accompanied by industrialization. Under Austrian and Polish rule, Galicia had been an impoverished, economically exploited agrarian region, which served as a dumping ground for finished products but which produced few of these itself. Realizing that they could derive great political benefit by improving this situation, the Soviets invested heavily in the industrial development of the region. Old industries such as oil production were expanded and a series of new industries, which included the production of cars, buses, radios, and light machinery, were established. Because the factories were new and often outfitted with machines expropriated from Germany, the West Ukrainian enterprises possessed some of the most modern equipment in the USSR. By 1951 the industrial production of Western Ukraine jumped 230% over the 1945 level and accounted for about 10% of the republic's industrial production, compared to less than 3% in 1940. Rapidly growing Lviv became one of the major industrial centers of the republic.

Along with industrialization came social changes. The initial lack of specialists and experienced workers required to staff the numerous new factories brought a flood of Russians into the region. But a local Ukrainian working class also developed rapidly. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, about 20,000–30,000 new workers were being trained annually in Western Ukraine.

In Lviv the number of industrial workers rose from 43,000 in 1945 to 148,000 in 1958. A stratum of heretofore nonexistent Ukrainian technical experts also appeared. Thus, under the aegis of the Soviets, the long-delayed socio-economic modernization of Western Ukraine moved rapidly forward.

Perhaps the most popular aspect of Soviet rule was the greatly expanded educational opportunities that it brought. To win the sympathies of West Ukrainians, the new regime expanded and Ukrainized elementary education in 1945 as it had done in 1939. Higher education also expanded rapidly, and in 1950 about 24,000 regular and 9000 corresponding students were enrolled in Western Ukraine's twenty-four institutions of higher learning. However, the rise in educational level also entailed greater Russification. By 1953, instruction in all institutions of higher learning in Western Ukraine was in Russian, a clear indication that the modernization that the Soviets introduced was also meant to encourage Russification.

While education was the feature of the Soviet regime that was most readily accepted, the Communist party was not. Even after the Soviet victory, West Ukrainians showed little interest in joining it. In 1944 there were only 7000 members and candidates to the party in all Western Ukraine, and only several hundred of them were workers. In 1946 the number rose to 31,000 and in 1950, after an intense recruitment campaign, the number grew to 88,000 – still a tiny fraction of the general population. Most of these party members were newcomers from the east. For example, of the 23,000 members of the Lviv party organization in 1950, only 10% were of local origin. In the countryside, Communists were exceedingly few. Thus, although the party organization monopolized political power, it still lacked roots among the West Ukrainian population. Consequently, the latter had the distinct impression that it was living under foreign rule.

Stalinist Retrenchment

Despite the great boost to Soviet morale that victory in the Second World War had brought, Stalin was convinced that the war had inflicted serious ideological damage to Soviet society. In order to raise the fighting spirit of their people during the war, Soviet authorities had encouraged Russian and non-Russian nationalism and loosened restrictions on religion. What was most worrisome for the regime, however, was the fact that about 70 million Soviet people – those who lived in the German-occupied areas, forced laborers, and prisoners of war – had been exposed to the West and Western ways. Soviet annexations had also incorporated into the Soviet Union millions more who were opposed to or at least skeptical about its ideology, political system, and economic order. Therefore, in Stalin's view, the regime needed to tighten its grip on society once again, especially in the ideological realm.

The man to whom Stalin entrusted the task of reestablishing ideological pu-

urity was his close aide, Andrei Zhdanov. In summer 1946, Zhdanov launched his offensive against those who longed for a freer cultural climate and admired the achievements of Western civilization. Such an attitude, he claimed, implied criticism of and dissatisfaction with Soviet culture. And this view was unacceptable. "Our job," he announced, "is to ... attack bourgeois culture, which is in a state of miasma and corruption."⁵ But if their aim was to reject Western culture, Zhdanov and his associates had to provide their people with a more impressive alternative. Hence, the other major thrust of Zhdanov's ideological campaign was the glorification of Russian cultural and scientific achievements. For every invention of the West, Soviet propagandists came up with a Russian who had had the idea earlier; for every major Western author, there was a Russian one who was better; and for every famous Western statesman, there was a Russian counterpart whose achievements were more praiseworthy. The emergence of this new, expanded form of Russian nationalism was not unexpected: already in May 1945 Stalin had foreshadowed it in his famous toast to the Russian people in which he hailed it as "the most outstanding nation ... the leading force in the Soviet Union."⁶

As so often in the past, Ukrainians found themselves especially vulnerable to Stalin's initiatives. Exposed to Nazi occupation longer than the Russians, it was mostly they who had been taken to Germany as forced labor and it was in Western Ukraine that anti-Sovietism was most virulent. West Ukrainians had been most extensively "tainted" with Western influences. Stalin's remark that he would have deported all Ukrainians to Siberia if there had not been so many of them certainly did not bode well. Indications of the coming crackdown in Ukraine were evident in July 1946, when the Central Committee of the party in Moscow ominously blamed the Ukrainian party for failing "to devote proper attention to the selection of cadres and their ideological-political education in the fields of scholarship, literature and arts where ... hostile bourgeois-nationalist ideology" and "attempts to reinstate Ukrainian nationalist concepts" existed.⁷ This was the death knell for the modest post-war revival of Ukrainian culture.

A month later, when Ostap Vyshnia, an immensely popular humorist who had been suppressed in the 1930s, dared to express the opinion that an artist, in his search for creativity and originality, had the right to make mistakes, a storm of accusations of "ideological laxity" came from Moscow. Taking this event as his cue, Ukraine's Communist party leader Nikita Khrushchev and his deputy in charge of ideology, K.Z. Lytvyn, immediately fired several salvos against the Ukrainian intelligentsia as a whole, accusing it of "bourgeois nationalism." Meanwhile, Lytvyn concentrated on specifics, notably the recently published "History of Ukrainian Literature." According to him, the work had very serious "shortcomings" because it viewed the development of Ukrainian literature in isolation from the class struggle, exaggerated West-

ern influences, and did not go far enough in emphasizing the positive influence of Russian literature. A year later, Lytvyn subjected the new "History of Ukraine" to similar criticism, demanding that it be expurgated of all signs of Hrushevsky's influence.

Scathing attacks were also launched against Ukrainian composers for using traditional Ukrainian themes. The opera *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* was criticized for not giving the Russians a prominent-enough role, and Ukrainian literary journals and encyclopedias were denounced for concentrating on "narrow" Ukrainian topics. The witch-hunt for real or alleged Ukrainian nationalism was particularly severe during the brief stay in Ukraine in 1947 of Kaganovich, who apparently derived perverse pleasure from terrorizing the members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

A high point in this ideological tightening of the screws came in 1951 when Sosiura's poem *Liubit Ukrainu!* ("Love Ukraine"), written in the midst of the patriotic fervor of 1944 and awarded the Stalin Prize, was denounced for its "nationalism" and its author was forced to publish a degrading recantation. The search for cases of ideological deviation became even more grotesque – and deadly – as Jews were singled out for persecution. Many leading Jewish authors, scholars, and artists were executed on charges of "rootless cosmopolitanism." The secret police even fabricated a "plot" in which a group of Jewish intellectuals allegedly conspired, with the aid of "international Jewry," to take over the Crimea and break away from the Soviet Union. It was at this time that the ludicrous claim appeared, which has since become a shibboleth of Soviet propaganda, that Ukrainian nationalists and Jewish Zionists were cooperating against Soviet interests.

As indications that Stalin was preparing another murderous purge mounted, panic gripped the intelligentsia of Ukraine. Creative activity practically ceased as intellectuals rushed to admit their mistakes and beg forgiveness. A characteristic example of the demeaning spectacle was the speech of Korniichuk, who together with his Polish wife, Wanda Wasilewska, had written the libretto for the opera *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*:

We must be more alert since we can never forget that the Imperialists and their agents will use every opportunity to harm us. To my regret I must admit that during the last several years we in Ukraine have been rather lame in our struggle against backsliding into Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism in literature and the arts. *Pravda*, the organ of the Central Committee of our Party, discovered serious ideological regressions and mistakes in the works of certain Ukrainian authors ... We authors must take this criticism to heart and draw practical conclusions from it. A thousand thanks to our Party for its loving and patient guidance to us authors and artists. Thanks to our Party which rightfully criticized the libretto of the opera *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*

and offered instruction on how one should present the history of our people correctly ... Long live the great Party of Lenin and Stalin, long live our beloved leader and teacher, the great comrade Stalin.⁸

It was apparent that the Ukrainian intelligentsia had learned its lessons in the 1930s: namely, that it was better to give in today if one wished to live and write tomorrow. But just as many were bracing themselves for another Stalinist purge, on 5 March 1953, the "Great Leader" died. The sigh of relief in Ukraine was almost audible.



For Ukrainians who had lived under Soviet rule prior to 1939, the aftermath of the war brought a sense of *déjà vu*. Again they were plunged into vast, exhausting construction projects; again they experienced the depressing transition from a period of relative ideological and cultural flexibility to one of severe reaction and orthodoxy; and again they faced the very real prospect of famine and purge.

For West Ukrainians, however, the postwar years ushered in a new era, exposing them to an entirely different world, one with which they had had only a brief, traumatic encounter in 1939–41. Their incorporation into the USSR meant that they were henceforth separated from the political and cultural values of Europe. It also resulted in the loss of West Ukrainian society's most important asset, its extensive organizational network – of which the Greek Catholic church was the oldest, most-important component and of which OUN/UPA was the most recent – that for generations had been its main defense against foreign rule and the most clear-cut expression of Ukrainian nationhood. But the consequences of Soviet annexation were not all negative: as a result of Stalin's dictates, the Polish/Ukrainian conflict, which had long sapped the energies of both societies, had finally been resolved. Moreover, the Soviets initiated the long-overdue social and industrial modernization of the region. And, of course, it was they who, for better or worse, finally united all Ukrainians in a single state.

The Thaw

Stalin's death introduced a new era in Soviet history. Exhausting, wasteful, and irrational, the dictator's method of ruling by terror and duress could not be maintained indefinitely. Even the Soviet elite yearned for change. The need for a general relaxation of Stalin's rigid controls was obvious and pressing. It was essential that the people of the USSR finally derive appreciable material benefits from the vast political and economic power the Soviet state had amassed. But as the Kremlin cautiously relaxed its grip, issues that had been apparently resolved earlier reemerged and the quest by Stalin's successors for new solutions often created new problems. Although the retreat from Stalinism and the search for fresh approaches to the building of communism were evident in all the republics of the Soviet Union, in Ukraine these changes were especially numerous and noteworthy.



The New Leadership

An early if transitory sign of the coming changes was the "collective leadership" that replaced Stalin's one-man rule. Composed of top party and government functionaries, this rule-by-committee was only a short-lived, transitional phase that allowed a new strongman to establish himself. Initially, it seemed that Lavrentii Beria, the feared chief of the secret police, might triumph. Hoping to broaden his base of support, Beria signaled the non-Russian nationalities, the Georgians and Ukrainians in particular, that he was willing to grant them major concessions. But Beria overreached himself and paid for his failure with his life (it was, however, the last time that an unsuccessful political rival was executed). For a short while, Georgii Malenkov, a spokesman of the government and technocratic bureaucracy and an advocate of economic reforms, moved into the forefront. But the final win-

ner was Nikita Khrushchev, a man whose career was closely linked with Ukraine.

Khrushchev, a Russian, was born in a small village on the Russian-Ukrainian border. A jovial but ruthless party "apparatchik" (functionary), he rose to power thanks to his quick wit, abject subservience to Stalin, and the openings created in the party hierarchy by the purges. As we have seen, in 1938 he was sent to Ukraine to complete the Great Purge and to begin rebuilding the Ukrainian party. A year later he oversaw the incorporation of newly occupied Western Ukraine into the Soviet Union. During the war he helped to organize and lead the Communist partisans in Ukraine. And in the post-war years, Khrushchev supervised the economic reconstruction, the second incorporation of Western Ukraine, and the struggle against the Ukrainian nationalists. Although merciless in fulfilling Stalin's instructions, Khrushchev gained some personal popularity by paying attention to "local color," often appearing in Ukrainian embroidered shirts and demonstrating his affection for Ukrainian songs.

After his transfer to Moscow in 1949, Khrushchev retained his close, mutually beneficial relationship with the Ukrainian party. Consequently, it was the first republican party organization that backed him in the struggle for power and it remained his secure base of support. Khrushchev returned the favor. Only months after Stalin's death, the unpopular Leonid Melnikov, first secretary of the Ukrainian party and a Russian chauvinist, was removed from his post on charges of Russifying higher education in Western Ukraine and discriminating against its local cadres. His replacement was Oleksii Kyrychenko, the first ethnic Ukrainian to hold the post (since then only Ukrainians have held the first secretaryship). Other Ukrainians also received high offices: Demian Korotchenko became head of the republic's government and Nykyfor Kalchenko chaired the council of ministers. The reign of the "three Ks" was reinforced by other appointments that were pleasing to Ukrainians. The maligned playwright Oleksander Korneichuk and Semen Stefanyk, the son of the famous West Ukrainian novelist, received high government positions. In Western Ukraine, Bohdan Dudykevych, an old prewar Communist leader, was placed at the head of the regional party organization.

These personnel changes were accompanied by an upsurge in the numerical strength of the party in Ukraine: in 1952 it had about 770,000 full and candidate members, but by 1959 its membership was close to 1.3 million – of whom 60% were Ukrainians. In sharp contrast to the days of Stalin, when Ukrainians were discriminated against, it was evident from these promotions and their numerical growth that the Ukrainian Communists were being openly wooed by the new leadership in the Kremlin.

Not only did Ukrainian Communists expand their influence in their own republic, but a number of them rapidly rose to prominence on the all-union level. In the military, Rodion Malinovsky, Andrii Grechko, and Kyrylo



Map 27 Administrative division of Soviet Ukraine ca 1960

Moskalenko attained the exalted rank of marshal of the USSR and the first two also were ministers of defense of the USSR. Volodymyr Semichastny rose to head the all-union secret police; and four Ukrainians – Oleksii Kyrychenko, Mykola Podhorny, Dmytro Poliansky, and Petro Shelest – became members of the eleven-member Politburo, the highest ruling body in the USSR. The main reason for their rise was their close ties with Khrushchev, not the fact that they were Ukrainians. As careerists who sought to rise to the top of the Soviet system, these men generally paid little heed to ethnic loyalties. Nonetheless, their presence at the pinnacles of power attested to the growing importance of Ukrainians and their republic.

Ukraine: Second among Equals

Borys Levytsky aptly described Ukraine's enhanced position in the USSR during the Khrushchev era with the phrase "second among equals."¹ Certainly indications mounted that an implicit understanding had been reached between the Kremlin and Kiev in which the Ukrainians, in return for their support and cooperation, had been offered the role of junior partners – the Russians, of course, were the senior partners – in the running of the Soviet empire. For those Ukrainians who had no confidence in or desire for self-rule, this modern version of the Little Russianism of the 19th century seemed to offer many career opportunities for them as individuals. For the Kremlin, winning the support of the Ukrainians was essential because they were not only the second most numerous nation in the USSR but also the only ones who could seriously challenge Russian hegemony. The close linguistic and cultural ties between the two peoples encouraged and facilitated cooperation.

To celebrate the Russian/Ukrainian partnership, in 1954 the 300th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Treaty was marked throughout the Soviet Union in an unusually grandiose manner. In addition to numerous festivities, myriad publications, and countless speeches, the Central Committee of the all-union party even issued thirteen "theses," which argued the irreversibility of the "everlasting union" of the Ukrainians with the Russians: "The experience of history has shown that the way of fraternal union and alliance chosen by the Russians and Ukrainians was the only true way. The union of two great Slavic peoples multiplied their strength in the common struggle against all external foes, against serf owners and the bourgeoisie, against tsarism and capitalist slavery. The unshakeable friendship of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples has grown and strengthened in this struggle."² To emphasize the point that the union with Moscow brought the Ukrainians great benefits, the Pereiaslav anniversary was crowned by the Russian republic's ceding of Crimea to Ukraine "as a token of friendship of the Russian people."

But the "gift" of the Crimea was far less altruistic than it seemed. First, because the peninsula was the historic homeland of the Crimean Tatars whom Stalin had expelled during the Second World War, the Russians did not have

the moral right to give it away nor did the Ukrainians have the right to accept it. Second, because of its proximity and economic dependence on Ukraine, the Crimea's links with Ukraine were naturally greater than with Russia. Finally, the annexation of the Crimea saddled Ukraine with economic and political problems. The deportation of the Tatars in 1944 had created economic chaos in the region and it was Kiev's budget that had to make up the losses. More important was the fact that, according to the 1959 census, about 860,000 Russians and only 260,000 Ukrainians lived in the Crimea. Although Kiev attempted to bring more Ukrainians into the region after 1954, the Russians, many of whom were especially adamant in rejecting any form of Ukrainization, remained the overwhelming majority. As a result, the Crimean "gift" increased considerably the number of Russians in the Ukrainian republic. In this regard, it certainly was an appropriate way of marking the Pereiaslav Treaty.

De-Stalinization

The efforts of the new leadership to expand its support among the non-Russians, particularly the Ukrainians, were a part of a much broader plan of reforms. Stalin's approach to modernization – a combination of terror, ideology, and forced industrialization – was an effective but artificial method of pushing Soviet society forward. Khrushchev realized that, in the long run, it was persuasion not coercion, efficiency not stifling control, managerial skills not revolutionary fervor, that would ensure the Soviet Union's continued growth. To make this transition to a new approach it was first necessary to break with the old one.

At the 20th Party Congress held in 1956, Khrushchev delivered one of the most dramatic speeches in Soviet history. To the surprise and consternation of party stalwarts, he launched a lengthy, detailed, and blistering attack on Stalin and his crimes. This "secret speech" signaled the beginning of de-Stalinization. It was followed by a marked change in the atmosphere in the Soviet Union. Ideological orthodoxy was relaxed, leading to a "thaw" in cultural life. The policy of isolation was deemphasized as foreign travel to, and especially tourism within, the USSR was encouraged (but carefully monitored). Among the non-Russian peoples the blatant Russification was toned down. And preparations for introducing major changes in the economy began. This is not to say that the totalitarian features of the regime were dismantled; they remained very much in place. However, the all-encompassing fear and the paralysis of creativity that characterized the Stalin period eased considerably.

Changes in Ukraine Initially, Ukrainians reacted to these changes with caution, a trait they had learned to cultivate during the Stalin years. But when it was clear that the attack on the Stalin "personality cult" was genuine and

widespread, they joined in with a flood of their own complaints and demands. As might be expected, it was in the field of culture, with its many eloquent spokesmen, where the dissatisfaction was the most vocal. An early and oft-repeated recrimination decried the sorry state of the Ukrainian language. Intelligentsia, students, workers, and even party officials repeated the same refrain: acknowledging that Russian deserved special status in the USSR, they stressed that this did not mean that Ukrainian should be discriminated against. Slogans such as "Defend the Ukrainian Language" and "Speak Ukrainian" were heard with increasing frequency throughout the republic, especially among the university students.

The decline in the quality of Ukrainian scholarship was another issue that emerged. Historians – as opposed to the numerous party hacks who called themselves historians – protested that Moscow's tight ideological control over their field had led to "an impoverishment of history." This privation was characterized by provincialism, abject observance of party guidelines, and an exaggeration of the links and similarities with Russia, while downplaying "Ukrainian historical specificity." Literary specialists lodged similar complaints about developments in their own field.

Apparently the Kremlin was listening. In 1957 Ukrainian historians received permission to establish their own journal, the *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal*. Two years later, the first Soviet Ukrainian encyclopedia began to appear, partially in response to a similar project launched earlier by Ukrainian émigrés in the West. These were followed by impressive, multivolume publications, such as a dictionary of the Ukrainian language, a history of Ukrainian literature, a survey of Ukrainian art, and a detailed survey of Ukrainian towns and villages, which even the Russians did not have.

In its quest to upgrade Ukrainian scholarship and thereby raise the prestige of Ukrainian culture, the intelligentsia not only concentrated on the traditional humanities but also demanded facilities in the republic for the development of modern areas of knowledge such as nuclear research and cybernetics. Thus, in 1957, a computer center was established in Kiev followed by an institute of cybernetics in 1962, which made Ukraine a leader in these fields in the USSR. In the meantime, numerous Ukrainian-language journals in the natural and social sciences appeared. It was evident that the Ukrainian intellectual elite was intent on utilizing the opportunities created by de-Stalinization to introduce modern knowledge in a Ukrainian rather than a Russian guise.

Since Khrushchev acknowledged that many of Stalin's victims were unjustly persecuted, the pressure for their rehabilitation mounted. The first to be considered for a posthumous return to good standing were purged Communists. In Ukraine demands rose for the rehabilitation of such national communists as Skrypnyk, Khvylovy, and the members of the KPZU. Soon such key cultural figures as the playwright Mykola Kulish, the theater director Les Kurbas, the world-famous filmmaker Oleksander Dovzhenko, and the

outstanding 19th-century intellectual Mykhailo Drahomanov – all characterized by their successful efforts to enrich Ukrainian culture and raise it beyond provincialism – were proposed for rehabilitation. Because the reinstatement of these individuals touched on such politically sensitive issues as Ukrainian cultural independence and Ukraine’s “own road to communism,” the party’s response was cautious and ambiguous. But the fact that the Ukrainian intelligentsia continued to press for rehabilitation of such people indicated that the ideas of the repressed still exerted a strong appeal.

For the millions of Ukrainians incarcerated in the Siberian forced labor camps, de-Stalinization brought an unexpected reprieve: many of them were amnestied and allowed to return to their homes. This partial dismantling of the huge camp system was hastened by a series of prisoner revolts, such as those in Vorkuta and Norilsk (1953) and Karaganda (1954), in which many former members of the OUN and UPA played a leading role. However, the Kremlin made it clear that it would not tolerate the OUN type of nationalism. In 1954, in the midst of the Pereiaslav celebrations, it announced the execution of Vasyl Okhrymovych, a prominent émigré OUN leader that the Americans had parachuted into Ukraine. And in 1956 there were several well-publicized trials of former OUN members that resulted in death sentences. It was clear that the regime was still ready and willing to repress anyone considered to be too extreme in defending Ukrainian interests.

Nationality issues But perhaps the most telling indication of Khrushchev’s determination to adhere to certain basic principles of Soviet nationality policy – even while simultaneously making concessions of secondary importance – was the educational reform of 1958. An exceedingly controversial part of this vast restructuring of Soviet education dealt with the study of native languages. Up to 1958, students in the USSR were required to study their native language as well as Russian. Khrushchev’s seemingly liberal reform proposed that parents be given the right to choose their children’s language of instruction. In effect, this meant that one could be educated in Ukraine without learning Ukrainian. Given the variety of formal and informal pressures to learn Russian, it was to be expected that many parents would choose to have their children study in Russian and not to burden them with a second, albeit native, language. Despite a storm of protest and indignation in which even Ukrainian party officials joined, the regime pushed through this blow to the study of non-Russian languages, indicating that even in times of liberalization it was ready to modify but not abandon completely its policy of Russification.

The impact of de-Stalinization, however, reached far beyond the politico-cultural currents and countercurrents that involved the Kremlin politicians and Kievan intellectuals. The general loosening of ideological controls revealed a new mood emerging among the educated, urban youth. While an

earnest minority was determined to set aright the wrongs of the Stalin period, the vast majority appeared to have little interest in ideological or political issues. Yet, a spirit of defiance against authority and a craving for individualistic approaches to life, so long repressed by Stalinist orthodoxy, were clearly on the rise among the youth. For example, in 1957 the newspaper *Radianska Ukraina* noted with alarm that "during a party conference at Shevchenko University, it was ascertained that there were numerous cases of lack of discipline and amoral behavior among the students and that unhealthy moods are making themselves felt."³

Party publications described another university meeting in Kiev as consisting of many "destructive student types," "demagogues," and "loudmouths." Young people bemoaned the monotony of Soviet life, the outdated morality, the old-fashioned dress codes, and the ideology-laden education. To the great consternation of their elders, they developed a liking for Western jazz and "pop" music. Some, the so-called *stiliagi* (stylish ones), even flaunted their predilection for outlandish (by Soviet standards) clothes and "antisocial behavior." A materialist, self-centered "me" generation, already much in evidence in the West – and very different from the previous generation, which had produced such fervent communists and nationalists – was beginning to emerge in Ukraine and throughout the USSR.

Economic Experimentation

Stalin's successors placed great emphasis on improving the economic performance of the Soviet system. Much depended on this success, for if the Soviet Union could outperform the West economically, it could solidify its popular support at home, while proving abroad that communism was truly the superior system. Paradoxically, to prove that communism was superior economically, Khrushchev realized that the party would have to become a less ideological and a more managerial organization.

In the days of the "collective leadership" there were intense debates in the Kremlin about which direction and what form economic reforms should take. But there was general agreement that the chronic weak point of the Soviet economy was agriculture. A simple statistic underlined this fact: between 1949 and 1952 the output of Soviet industry rose by 230% but agricultural production improved by a mere 10%. This statistic was not only an embarrassment to the Soviets but a serious economic, political, and ideological handicap. Poor agricultural productivity meant food shortages, which obviously raised doubts (both at home and abroad) about the superiority of the Soviet system. Therefore, Khrushchev, a self-proclaimed agricultural specialist by virtue of his long years in Ukraine, made a great effort to improve the situation in the countryside. For Ukraine, the breadbasket of the USSR, these changes would be especially important, because, once again, Ukraine would serve as a laboratory for much of the agricultural experimentation.

Agricultural projects The most ambitious of Khrushchev's experiments was the "virgin-lands" project, which involved bringing about 40 million acres of unused land in Kazakhstan and Siberia under cultivation. The project, initiated in 1954, involved a huge investment of human and material resources, and Ukraine was expected to provide a large share of it. By 1956 thousands of tractors and about 80,000 experienced agricultural workers from Ukraine were transferred to the "virgin lands." Many of these workers settled there permanently. Meanwhile, every spring hundreds of thousands of students from Ukraine "volunteered" for short-term work in the east. While the results of the project were uneven, it clearly siphoned off Ukrainian resources and weakened the republic's agricultural production.

Another experiment involved a sudden switch, involving about 70 million acres throughout the USSR, to raising vast amounts of corn. Following American examples, it was to be used as fodder, which would help to raise the listless livestock production. Several years later, the Kremlin ordered the collective farmers to switch to a new system of crop rotation. As usual, Ukraine bore much of the burden imposed by these complex and costly innovations.

A reform that did have grass-roots support in Ukraine – indeed, in which Ukrainians took the initiative – involved the MTS, the depots providing farm machinery (and political supervision) to the collectives. Because of constant conflicts between the MTS and the collective farms about how the land should be worked, Ukrainians convinced the government to abolish the MTS and to sell their machines to the collectives.

The growing complexity of farming demanded well-educated and technologically proficient people. And these were greatly lacking in the Ukrainian countryside. In 1953, of the 15,000 collective-farm chairmen in Ukraine, less than 500 had a post-secondary education. To improve this situation, experienced technicians from the cities were encouraged to take positions on the collective farms. Those farms that lagged behind were linked with city-based industrial "brother" enterprises, which provided technical aid. As a result, a new and more-sophisticated social group, the "agricultural technocracy," appeared in the countryside. Meanwhile, the government raised the income of the farmers and slowly the earnings gap between the industrial and agricultural workers began to narrow.

Radical changes and grandiose experiments notwithstanding, agricultural production failed to expand as rapidly as expected. The Kremlin still refused to provide the collective farmers with enough incentives to work harder, bureaucrats in far-off Moscow still decided which crops a collective farm should plant and how the planting should be done, and the peasant was penalized for working his own tiny (but exceedingly productive) plot. The disappointing performance of agriculture had major political ramifications for Ukraine's Communists. Khrushchev counted heavily on them in helping to make his agricultural reforms a success. Meanwhile, in Kiev, dissatisfac-

tion mounted with the disproportionately great demands that were placed on Ukraine. The warm relations between Khrushchev and the Ukrainian Communists began to cool.

Changes in industry Ukraine's industry, like that of the Soviet Union as a whole, had performed very well in the early 1950s. In fact, this was its golden age. But by the late 1950s it began to slow down. Another problem facing the Kremlin leadership was whether to continue emphasizing heavy industry or to invest more heavily in light industry that would benefit the deprived Soviet consumer. Khrushchev opted for heavy industry but, unlike Stalin, he could not totally ignore the consumer, especially since he had promised that the Soviet Union would catch up and bypass the West economically by the 1980s. Consequently, in the early 1960s televisions, vacuum cleaners, refrigerators, and even cars began to appear in the government stores. However, they were exceedingly scarce and of abysmally poor quality.

To deal with the problem of dropping industrial productivity, in 1957 Khrushchev expanded the controversial *sovnarkhoz* (economic council) reform, one of the most radical organizational changes in the Soviet economy since the 1920s. This attempt to shift the center of economic planning and management from the ministries in Moscow to regional bodies, was meant to bypass the bureaucratic bottlenecks and top-heavy bureaucracy. Over 10,000 industrial enterprises were put under the control of the Ukrainian *sovnarkhoz* in Kiev and by the end of 1957, it supervised 97% of the factories in the republic (compared to 34% in 1953). Not surprisingly, Ukrainian economic planners and managers began to emphasize their republics' needs and interests rather than those of the Soviet Union as a whole. By the early 1960s, as the economic autonomy of Ukraine and the other republics reached a high point, Moscow grew alarmed. Charges of "localism," that is, preferring local interests over all-union interests, began to surface. It was evident that here, too, Khrushchev's reforms ran into unexpected complications. As might be expected, Ukraine's fling with economic self-assertiveness would be short-lived.

Although Khrushchev's reforms did not live up to expectations, they did, nevertheless, bring about considerable improvements. In sharp contrast to the days of Stalin, the impressive growth of the Soviet GNP – which outpaced that of the United States until the 1970s – helped to raise the standard of living. In Ukraine, for example, between 1951 and 1958, the income of the average worker rose by 230%. And it was the long-suffering collective farmer who received the proportionately highest raises. Put differently, in the Stalin era personal consumption rose by about 1% a year; during the Khrushchev years the increase was about 4% annually.

Because millions of additional acres of land were put under cultivation, food became more available and varied. At long last, the diet of the average

Soviet family, which was usually based on such staples as bread and potatoes, expanded to include, with some regularity, vegetables and meat. Even such exotic delicacies as citrus fruits appeared in the shops. Running water, electricity, and transportation reached remote villages. The daunting task of the Soviet housewife, who generally held a full-time job, was eased somewhat by the appearance of (relatively) modern appliances. And televisions, an excellent medium for propaganda as well as entertainment, became a regular household fixture. In the urban centers, housing still remained a major problem, mainly because about 2.5 million Soviet citizens poured into the cities every year. But while the standard of living was still far below Western standards, for the Soviet people, whose expectations were low and who compared their current situation with that of the recent and dreadful past, these changes were a great step forward. Certainly there was less reason to complain about the Soviet system in the Khrushchev years than during the Stalin era.

Intellectual Ferment

In 1961 Khrushchev launched a new wave of de-Stalinization that culminated in the removal of the dictator's tomb from the Kremlin mausoleum. An attack on Stalin was always good news to the Ukrainians. Other developments also added to their confidence. Because the republic's harvest was unusually plentiful that year, Ukraine's party leaders were in a good position to demand further concessions from the Kremlin. Anxious to play down the tensions that had arisen between him and the Ukrainians over agricultural production, Khrushchev made a much-publicized pilgrimage to the grave of Taras Shevchenko in May 1961. Meanwhile, the cultural "thaw" picked up momentum as Russian authors took some daring steps, such as arranging for the publication abroad of Pasternak's *Dr. Zhivago*, which celebrated the triumph of human rather than strictly Soviet values, and Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, which described in grisly detail the life of inmates in Stalin's concentration camps. The appearance of these works seemed to indicate that, despite angry rumblings from the Kremlin, further liberalization in literature and culture was possible.

In Ukraine, the cultural elite, and most notably the writers, renewed their efforts to use de-Stalinization as a means of broadening the limits of creative self-expression. Again they emphasized the great harm that Stalin had inflicted on Ukrainian culture. For example, in 1962 the author Oles Honchar declared that Stalinism did more than shackle creativity: "Another reason why the memories of these days weigh heavily on us is that, at the time, some deep wounds were inflicted on us and our culture by the physical annihilation of a number of gifted artists."⁴ Writers of the older generation continued to press for the rehabilitation of their persecuted colleagues. Thus, Korniiuchuk called for the publication of a "Library of the Great 1920s" to popularize the

works of Blakytny, Kulish, Kurbas, and other victims of the purges. Others wished to do the same for the victims of Kaganovich in the late 1940s. All decried the continued advance of Russification.

But most noteworthy was the emergence of a new generation of writers, critics, and poets, such as Vasyl Symonenko, Lina Kostenko, Ievhen Sverstiuk, Ivan Dziuba, Ivan Drach, Mykola Vinhranovsky, and Dmytro Pavlychko, who demanded a correction of the “errors” committed by Stalin in the past and assurances that their nation’s cultural development would not be stifled in the future. In their view, these goals could best be achieved by emphasizing a “return to the truth.” Impatient with the wavering and inconsistent progress of de-Stalinization, these young writers demanded the end of the party’s meddling in art and literature, the right to experiment with various styles, and the recognition of the central role of the Ukrainian language in education and cultural activity of the republic. By the early 1960s members of this new literary generation, which came to be called the “sixtiers,” rejected not only the interference of party bureaucrats but denounced the hypocrisy, opportunism, and caution of their older colleagues. Rejection of their elders bristled in Vinhranovsky’s short ephithet:

Enough, Enough! I am weary from shame for the apes
 who learned to speak, slowly, dully, dumbly, presumptuously
 Who speculated with our age’s name!⁵

The rebelliousness of these talented young people, directed against both party controls and the behavior of their elder colleagues, was clearly pushing far beyond the bounds of liberalization that Khrushchev had established. Moreover, support for this new literary cohort was significant and growing, especially among the young intelligentsia.

The Reaction

The alarming restlessness that spread through Soviet society worried Khrushchev and his associates in the Kremlin. In December 1962 he called in a group of leading Russian writers and warned them not to push liberalization too far. Several months later, several Russian intellectuals were subjected to a vicious attack in the press. It was clear that the regime was about to launch a crackdown against the liberal intelligentsia. Taking their cue from Moscow, party officials in Kiev prepared to rein in the “immature elements” in the Ukrainian literary community.

In spring 1963, Andrii Skaba, the Ukrainian party official responsible for ideological purity, launched the attack by harshly criticizing the work of such literary critics as Sverstiuk, Svitlychny, and especially Dziuba. Soon afterward, the party journal *Komunist Ukrainy* declared that “only a weakening of

political vigilance can explain why our literary and artistic criticism did not provide a timely evaluation of these false and ideologically immature works ... Some of our newspapers ... as well as publishing houses and theatres neglected the principles and demands of the party. This also contributed to the propagation in art of works that were of no use to the people."⁶

Valentyn Malanchuk, the ideological watchdog in Western Ukraine, warned against young and inexperienced writers who slipped into the "role of foremost fighters against the [Stalin] personality cult, paid excessive attention to the negative phenomenon of this [Stalin] period and, furthermore, praised the works of Western authors."⁷ Besides sounding the obligatory call to struggle against all manifestations of Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalism," he proudly announced his successes in the antireligion campaign – the number of church weddings in his region had decreased – and promised to replace religious feast days with such Soviet "holidays" as the "Day of the Hammer and Sickle" and the "Evenings of Workers' Glory."

Another indication that certain aspects of Stalinism were making a comeback was the appearance of several semiofficial anti-Semitic publications. The most notable of these was the tract by T.K. Kichko, *Judaism without Embellishment*, published in 1964 by the Ukrainian Academy of Science, most likely on instructions from Moscow. As in the final days of Stalin, the propaganda apparatus churned out materials that attempted to show intimate links and close cooperation between Ukrainian nationalists and Zionists. The liberal Ukrainian intelligentsia severely criticized the Kichko book. But in May 1964 its indignation reached a high point when word spread that the library of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, which housed thousands of invaluable books and documents dealing with Ukrainian history and culture, had burned down. The self-confessed arsonist who was responsible for this "felony without parallel in the history of world culture" was a psychotic Rusophile named Pohruzhsalsky, who apparently wanted to destroy the major monuments of Ukrainian cultural identity. Suspicions that the arsonist was linked to the security organs were widespread.

These events were a telling indication of Khrushchev's determination to restore discipline among the intelligentsia. However, the new get-tough policy came too late. A series of foreign and domestic setbacks, which included the Cuban missile debacle, the split with China, the disorganization caused by the reforms, and the disastrous harvest of 1963, fatally weakened the Soviet leader's position. In October 1964 his colleagues lost patience with Khrushchev and forced him to resign. An era of reform, experimentation, and liberalization came to an end.



The era of Khrushchev was clearly a transitional phase in Soviet history. De-

spite the numerous setbacks, disappointments, and unexpected results that his experiments and reforms elicited, they did succeed in transforming Soviet society from one ruled by the terror and draconian measures of Stalin to a more rational, managerial system attuned to an advanced industrial society. This transition was deeply felt in Ukraine, where Stalinism had reached its worst extremes.

What changed and, of equal importance, what did not during the Khrushchev years? Most obvious was the discontinuation of the mass arrests, terror tactics, and purges. The secret police, with its prerogatives limited, now called in "dangerous elements" for a "heart-to-heart" talk, and usually threatened them with the loss of a job or curtailment of educational opportunities for their children. Only if these confrontations did not have the desired effect did arrests (but no executions) follow. Discipline in the workplace became far less rigorous. The standard of living slowly improved. Writers, poets, and other cultural figures obtained, for a time, more leeway in expressing themselves. In Ukraine, in addition to the above-mentioned developments, there was a rise in the self-assertiveness of the republic's Communist leadership and a recognition of Ukraine's economic importance within the USSR. But most striking, especially in view of the terrible losses suffered by the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the 1930s, was the emergence of a new, promising generation of cultural activists.

Many basic features of Soviet life remained unchanged, however. Censorship continued to limit severely what one could read, see, and hear. The Communist party retained an absolute monopoly on political power. Despite the reforms, the economy was still directed by bureaucrats, while everyone worked in government enterprises and institutions and shopped in government stores. Improvements in Ukraine's relative importance in the USSR or the political successes of individual Ukrainians did not alter the fact that Ukrainian interests were completely subordinated to those of the Soviet empire as a whole.

Stagnation and Attempts at Reform

During its early decades in power, the Soviet regime was the most radical and innovative in the world. By the 1960s, however, extreme conservatism became a hallmark of its internal policies. Fearful of the unpredictable and undesirable consequences of change, the aging, bureaucratic elite of the USSR opted for maintaining, in a somewhat milder form, the system that Stalin had put into place. For Ukraine this meant that Moscow, not Kiev, continued to make all the major decisions that affected Ukrainians. And the role of Russification in holding the numerous nationalities of the USSR together not only continued but increased.

Yet even the omnipotent and omnipresent Soviet governing apparatus could not exert complete control over society. Dissent, impossible in the Stalin years, emerged among the intelligentsia. More surprising was that the views and policies of the Ukrainian Communist party leadership diverged clearly, if only briefly, from those of the men in the Kremlin. Although the Soviet system remained firmly in place, skepticism about its effectiveness, especially its ability to raise living standards, spread among the populace. By the mid 1980s, the need for change was undeniable and pressing. Consequently, the Soviet oligarchy chose one of its own to usher in reforms – carefully. In Ukraine the impact of these changes was slow in coming and limited in extent. It was enough to reveal, however, that many of the political, cultural, and economic problems the regime claimed to have eliminated in Ukraine were far from resolved.



The Men at the Top

Leonid Brezhnev, like his predecessor Khrushchev, was a Russian whose rise to power was closely associated with Ukraine. Unlike the impetuous and con-

frontational Khrushchev, the careful Brezhnev exerted influence by building a consensus for his policies within the Soviet oligarchy and by assuring this elite of stability and continuity. Consequently, his eighteen-year tenure was marked by conservative tendencies that, although no longer totalitarian – the noted Sovietologist Merle Fainsod has drolly described the slow Soviet retreat from Stalinism as “the law of diminishing dictators” – were clearly authoritarian. But while the exercise of power was more measured than in the days of Stalin, there was no doubt that it was still concentrated in the party and that it was to be used to expand Soviet might abroad and to exert complete control at home.

Shelest and Shcherbytsky During the Brezhnev era, Ukraine had two Communist party leaders, Petro Shelest and Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, whose policies, though differing, illustrated the issues confronting Soviet Ukrainian leaders and the context in which Ukrainian, that is, republic-level, politics are played out in the USSR today.

Shelest's tenure as the first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist party lasted from 1963 to 1972 and it featured a resurgence of Ukrainian self-assertiveness. From the skimpy evidence that is available to Western analysts, it appears that this assertiveness was primarily a result of Shelest's attempts to defend Ukrainian interests within the Soviet Union. Shelest was not, however, a crypto-nationalist. Indeed, in many ways he was more of a hard-line Communist than his superiors in Moscow. There are indications that he was adamantly anti-Western, supported the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 lest its reformist tendencies “infect” Ukraine, neglected Western Ukraine, opposed concessions to workers, and preferred to concentrate on heavy industry rather than consumer goods. Apparently even Brezhnev found some of these inflexible positions bothersome.

But there was another aspect to Shelest that concerned the Kremlin even more. It seems the Ukrainian leader took seriously the promise of Ukrainian autonomy enshrined in the Soviet constitution and the principle that all nations within the USSR are equal. Hence, he was loath to acknowledge the Russians' “elder brother” role within the Soviet Union. Probably the status Shelest wanted to attain for Ukraine was similar to that of Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary, that is, of a thoroughly communist society but one whose specific economic and cultural needs were recognized by Moscow.

Ukraine's economic interests were a major concern for Shelest. He demanded more Ukrainian input into the Soviet Union's economic planning process and showed little enthusiasm for the economic development of Siberia, which meant the reduction of investment in Ukraine. When a group of Ukrainian economists provided him with data showing that Ukraine was being shortchanged in its economic relationship with the Soviet Union as a whole, Shelest became a strong proponent of reciprocity, that is, the principle

that Ukraine should obtain funds, goods, and services from the USSR that were of equal value to those it contributed to the USSR.

Shelest was even more outspoken in defending Ukrainian linguistic and cultural rights. His speeches contained exhortations to Ukrainians to “treasure” their “beautiful Ukrainian language.” In 1965, Iurii Dadenkov, the Ukrainian minister of higher education and a close Shelest associate, called for the expanded use of Ukrainian in the universities and institutes. And in 1970, Shelest’s book, *Our Soviet Ukraine*, stressed, directly or by implication, the historical autonomy of Ukraine, the progressive role of the Cossacks, the tsarist exploitation of Ukraine, and the impressive achievements of Soviet Ukraine. Clearly, Shelest’s pride in his republic’s rapid transition from a backward agrarian land into a modern, industrialized, and technologically advanced society was unusually fierce and evident.

How can one explain such “particularism” in a disciplined, experienced, and apparently sincere Communist – a member of the Politburo, the Soviet Union’s highest ruling body? In all probability, Shelest and his many supporters in Ukraine took Soviet pronouncements about national equality within the USSR at face value. They saw no contradiction between the achievement of general Soviet goals, the modernization of Ukraine, and the retention of its national culture. Much like Skrypnyk in the 1920s, Shelest seemed to believe that the satisfaction of Ukrainian economic and cultural needs, not their suppression, was the most effective means of ensuring Soviet success in Ukraine. Shelest may have also concluded that his own personal success in effectively ruling Ukraine depended on the cooperation of the Ukrainian cultural, scientific, and political elite. And this meant paying attention to its specific concerns.

In May 1972 Shelest was removed from his post in Kiev on charges of being “soft” on Ukrainian nationalism and encouraging economic “localism.” His successor was Shcherbytsky, an ethnic Ukrainian, a long-time member of Brezhnev’s “Dnieper” clan, and a fierce political rival of Shelest. In a fashion reminiscent of the fratricidal political infighting among contestants for the hetman’s office in 17th- and 18th-century Ukraine, Shcherbytsky helped to undermine Shelest by repeatedly denouncing him to Moscow for his “local patriotism.” Since the fall of his rival, Shcherbytsky has managed to retain the position of the Communist party boss in Ukraine, and his lengthy tenure in this post is a record. What are the reasons for this success? To a large extent they result from a policy of complete subservience to Moscow. So obedient has he been in fulfilling Moscow’s instructions, so willing to sacrifice Ukraine’s economic interests, and so cooperative in exposing Ukraine to Russification that Shcherbytsky may well go down in history as the Little Russian (*Maloros*) par excellence.

Aided by his watchdog for ideological issues, Valentyn Malanchuk, and the chief of the Ukrainian KGB, V.V. Fedorchuk, Shcherbytsky conducted a rel-

atively mild purge in 1973 that eliminated about 37,000 members from the Communist party ranks, many of whom were probably supporters of Shelest. In sharp contrast to his predecessor, Shcherbytsky has made a point of speaking Russian at official functions and supporting the renewed centralization of the Ukrainian economy and the heavy investment in Siberia. He has also been a proponent of harsh, uncompromising treatment when dealing with dissent.

Yet these efforts did not bring him what he seems to have desired most – elevation to a top position in Moscow, perhaps even nomination as Brezhnev's successor. Therefore, by the early 1980s there were indications that Shcherbytsky was paying more attention to his position in Ukraine by improving relations with its cultural elite and becoming somewhat less assiduous in pushing Moscow's assimilationist policies. With the rise of the reform-minded Mikhail Gorbachev to power in 1985, speculation was rife that Shcherbytsky's days as the Ukrainian party leader were numbered. But to the surprise of many observers, he continued to retain his position, probably because of support from antireformists in the Kremlin.

If one takes the policies of these two important Ukrainian political leaders into account, what conclusions can one draw about their views of Ukraine and its role in the Soviet Union? Clearly, both Shelest and Shcherbytsky envisioned Ukraine's future only in terms of communist ideology and within the context of the Soviet system. Neither was ready even to consider the idea of Ukraine's independence. And each in his own way was an example of the tight control that Moscow exerts over Ukraine's Communist leadership.

Yet the careers of these two men indicate that even in the strictly monitored Soviet political system surprisingly contrasting attitudes and policies toward Ukraine can emerge. As a proponent of equality of nations in the USSR and of a just balance in their economic relations, Shelest wanted Ukraine to be treated as an autonomous state within a genuine Soviet federation. On the one hand, the considerable support Shelest enjoyed not only among the Ukrainian intelligentsia but within the Ukrainian party apparatus reveals that national communism, or at least a territorial or republican patriotism, is deeply rooted in Ukraine. On the other hand, Shelest's downfall is a reminder that such views are still unacceptable to Moscow.

In some ways, the behavior and policies of Shcherbytsky can be likened to those of a Western corporate executive. For such a person, the USSR is probably not unlike a huge Moscow-based corporation. In this context, Ukraine is probably seen as a region of important branch plants, which, if run successfully (that is, according to the wishes of the men in the Kremlin), can catapult its manager to the height of the corporate power structure. Thus, when the interests of the "corporation" have demanded standardization (Russification) in Ukraine, Shcherbytsky has readily complied, arguing that adherence to "local particularities" (national culture) impeded efficiency and progress. When

Ukraine was required to draw on its assets to aid the development of another unit of the "corporation," Shcherbytsky has been forthcoming, thereby demonstrating his ability to "think big." A problem with this branch-plant mentality – which may be considered a modern form of the old Little Russianism – is that those who espouse it often forget that they are dealing not only with administrative and socioeconomic units but with nations.

The Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) The influence and importance of Shelest and Shcherbytsky reached far beyond the Ukrainian republic. The former was, and the latter continues to be, a major political player on the all-union level – as a result largely of the growth spurt experienced by the Communist Party of Ukraine after the Second World War, particularly after the death of Stalin. After Khrushchev came into power, membership in the Ukrainian party expanded rapidly. This growth, which was greater in Ukraine than in the other republics, continued throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. Thus, while in 1958 the party in Ukraine had 1.1 million members, by 1971 the number had risen to 2.5 million. The membership also became more evenly distributed throughout the republic. Earlier much of it was concentrated in the heavily Russian Donbas and Dniepropetrovsk areas in the southeast. During the Khrushchev era representation of the largely Ukrainian central and western parts of the republic improved perceptibly in the party membership.

The rise of a new generation of political leaders in Ukraine soon reflected this development. Leadership included more Ukrainians than ever before. Thus, in 1964, out of thirty-three top party officials in the republic, thirty were Ukrainians. The percentage of party members from Ukraine in the Central Committee of the USSR rose to an unprecedented high of 20% in 1961. Given its unusually rapid growth and its close ties with the Kremlin, the CPU earned a reputation as a "model" party in the USSR. But it was exactly this new sense of confidence and importance that led to frustration within the Ukrainian elite with the hypercentralized political and economic policies of the Kremlin. Hence Shelest's autonomist tendencies. That these had the support of the vast majority of the Ukrainian party apparatus is evident: only three of the twenty-five Ukrainian *oblast* (regional) party secretaries voted for his ouster.

The fall of Shelest was also a setback to the Ukrainian party. Its numerical growth slowed and its representation in the Central Committee of the Soviet Union dropped to 15%. Nonetheless, the ability of the hard-liner Shcherbytsky to remain in power in Kiev for so long indicates that the Ukrainian party, which he leads, is still a factor of major importance in the Soviet political system.

Dissent

A remarkable phenomenon surfaced in the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s, when a small but growing number of individuals, commonly called

dissidents, began to criticize government policies openly and to demand greater civil, religious, and national rights. After decades of terror and in view of the tight controls and relentless indoctrination the regime has had at its disposal, how could this surprising challenge to it emerge? To a great extent, dissent was an outgrowth of de-Stalinization, of the loosening of the "paralysis of fear" that Khrushchev had initiated. The limited revelations of the horrendous crimes of the Stalin era aroused widespread disenchantment and skepticism about other aspects of the regime. Consequently, when Brezhnev attempted to impose limits on liberalization, he evoked protest and dissent, especially among the intelligentsia.

Dissent in the USSR flowed into three frequently overlapping currents. Because of its access to the Western media, the best known was the Moscow-based civil rights or democratic movement, which consisted mostly of Russian intelligentsia and counted among its leaders such luminaries as the novelist Aleksander Solzhenitsyn and the nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov. Religious militancy was another form of "deviant" behavior. In Ukraine and other non-Russian regions, dissent crystallized around nationality-oriented as well as civil rights and religious issues.

Initially, the core of the Ukrainian dissidents consisted largely of the "sixtiers," the new and creative literary generation that was just coming into prominence. It included Lina Kostenko, Vasyl Symonenko, Ivan Drach, Ivan Svitlychny, Ievhen Sverstiuk, Mykola Vinhranovsky, Alla Horska, and Ivan Dziuba. Later they were joined by Vasyl Stus, Mykhailo Osadchy, Ihor and Iryna Kalynets, Mykola Horbal, Ivan Gel, and the Horyn brothers. A striking characteristic of this group was that its members were generally model products of the Soviet educational system and well on the way to promising careers. Some were committed communists. Although concentrated mostly in Kiev and Lviv, they stemmed from various parts of Ukraine. While the majority were East Ukrainians, many of them had a West Ukrainian connection, having either studied or worked in the region. Another noteworthy feature was that a large proportion of the dissidents were the first generation in their families to leave the village and to enter the ranks of the urban intelligentsia. Hence the naive idealism and sophisticated argumentation that often characterized their statements. By and large, they were a very loose, unorganized conglomeration of people. There were not more than 1000 active dissidents in Ukraine.¹ However, supporters and sympathizers probably numbered in the many thousands.

What grievances did the Ukrainian dissidents have? And what goals did they want to achieve? As with any group of intellectuals, there was great variety and fluidity in their views. Ivan Dziuba, a literary critic and one of the most prominent of the dissidents, apparently desired civil liberties as much as national rights. His goal was clearly stated: "I propose ... one thing only: *freedom* – freedom for the honest, public discussion of national affairs, freedom

of national choice, freedom for national self-knowledge, self-awareness, and self-development. But first and foremost, comes freedom for discussions and disagreement."² A national communist, Dziuba was disturbed by the great gap between Soviet theory and reality, especially in the area of nationality rights, and urged the authorities to repair it for the good of the Soviet system as well as the Ukrainian nation. The historian Valentyn Moroz, in contrast, reflected the intellectual traditions of Ukrainian integral nationalism and made no secret of his disgust with the Soviet system and hope for its demise. In general, however, the Ukrainian dissidents called for reforms in the USSR, not revolution or separation. They were against national repression in Ukraine and for civil rights in the USSR.

Among Western analysts of Ukrainian dissent there are divided opinions about the conditions that led people to protest openly. Alexander Motyl has argued that in Ukraine, as in the USSR in general, it was primarily the political policies of the Soviet leadership – specifically Khrushchev's "thaw" and Brezhnev's attempts to reverse it – that led to dissent.³ Certainly Shelest's openly pro-Ukrainian line provided Ukrainian intellectuals with an added incentive to express their dissatisfaction. Wsevolod Isajiw and Bohdan Krawchenko have stressed that dissent in Ukraine was closely and primarily related to socioeconomic tensions.⁴ Given the huge, Moscow-supported influx of Russians into Ukraine, they believe that competition for good jobs grew between privileged Russian newcomers and upwardly mobile Ukrainians, leading many of the latter to join or to support the dissidents' call for greater Ukrainian self-determination. In any case, in its Ukrainian context, dissent was clearly the latest manifestation of the generation-old confrontation between the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the bureaucracy of a Russian-dominated empire.

Manifestations of dissent The earliest manifestations of Ukrainian dissent appeared in the late 1950s and early 1960s when several small, secret groups in Western Ukraine were organized. The most noteworthy of these was the so-called "Jurists' Group," led by the jurist Levko Lukianenko. It called for Ukraine to use its legal right to secede from the Soviet Union. After discovering these groups, the authorities imposed harsh sentences on their members in a series of closed trials.

But the momentum of de-Stalinization continued to produce unrest among the intelligentsia. In 1963, an official Conference on Culture and Language, held at Kiev University and attended by over 1000 people, turned into an open demonstration against Russification. At about this time, students and intelligentsia began to gather regularly at the statue of Shevchenko in Kiev, ostensibly to hold public readings of the poet's works, but also to criticize the regime's cultural policies. The suspicious fire in 1964 that destroyed the Ukrainian manuscript collection at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences li-

brary elicited a storm of protest by leading literary figures. Fearful that matters were getting out of hand, the Kremlin decided to crack down on dissent throughout the USSR. In Ukraine this policy resulted in the arrest in late 1965 of about two dozen of the most vocal protesters. Hoping to intimidate the dissidents' colleagues, the authorities put the latter on open trial. However, the tactic backfired and led to even greater protest and dissent.

After observing the trials in Lviv, Viacheslav Chornovil, a young journalist and committed Communist, produced his revelatory "Chornovil Papers," a collection of documents that exposed the arbitrary, illegal, and cynical manipulation of the judicial system by the authorities. Dziuba denounced the arrests in a fiery speech before a large audience in Kiev. He also submitted to Shelest and Shcherbytsky his "Internationalism or Russification?" a perceptive, erudite, and damning analysis of the theory and mechanics of Russification in Ukraine. In 1970, after his arrest for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, Moroz wrote his "Report from the Beria Reserve," an emotional and powerful denunciation of the cruelty of Soviet officialdom and its degradation of individuals as well as nations. To prevent the authorities from isolating the dissidents from each other and society and to inform the world about the details of Soviet repression, in 1970 the Ukrainian dissidents began the surreptitious distribution of the *Ukrainian Herald*. Although the KGB was able to restrict the circulation of these materials in Ukraine, it could not prevent them from being smuggled to the West. There, with the aid of Ukrainian émigrés, these works were published and publicized, to the consternation and embarrassment of Soviet authorities.

After the fall of Shelest in 1972, Shcherbytsky, in cooperation with the Ukrainian KGB chief Fedorchuk and ideologist Malanchuk, launched a massive "pogrom" of the dissenting intelligentsia that led to hundreds of arrests and far harsher sentences than in 1965–66. Outspoken dissidents and those members of research institutes, editorial staffs, and university faculties who were suspected of "unreliable" views were removed from their positions. This wave of persecution recalled the days of Stalin, traumatized a whole generation of Ukrainian intelligentsia, and led many, including Dziuba, to recant or to give up their dissident activities.

The Ukrainian Helsinki Group Reduced in number but still determined, dissidents received fresh impetus in 1975 when the USSR signed the Helsinki Accords and formally agreed to respect the civil rights of its people. Taking the Kremlin at its word, dissidents organized open and, in their view, legally sanctioned groups whose task was to monitor the Kremlin's observance of civil rights. The first Helsinki Committee was established in Moscow in May 1976. Soon afterward, in November 1976, a Ukrainian Helsinki Group emerged in Kiev. Similar groups also sprang up in Lithuania, Georgia, and Armenia.

The leader of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group was the writer Mykola Rudenko, a political commissar during the Second World War and a former party official in the literary field. His close associate was Petro Hryhorenko (Grigorenko), a much-decorated and (forcibly) retired general of the Red Army. The group, which numbered thirty-seven people in all, was unusually varied in terms of background. It included dissidents such as Nina Strokata, Vasyl Stus, Levko Lukianenko, Ivan Kandyba, Nadia Svitlychna, and Viacheslav Chornovil, who had already served prison terms; former nationalists (who had survived decades in Stalin's labor camps) such as Sviatoslav Karavansky, Oksana Popovych, Oksana Meshko, Iryna Senyk, Petro Sichko, Danylo Shumuk, and Iurii Shukhevych (the son of the commander of the UPA, Roman Shukhevych); and religious activists, such as the Orthodox priest Vasyl Romaniuk.

Two important features distinguished the Ukrainian Helsinki Group from previous dissidents in Ukraine. One was that the group was an open, civic organization, which, while not controlled by the regime, nonetheless claimed the legal right to exist. This view was unheard of in Eastern Ukraine since the imposition of Soviet rule. The other precedent-setting feature was that the Ukrainian group established contacts with similar groups throughout the USSR, attempting thereby to "internationalize" its concern for civil and national rights.

New thinking was also evident in the group's programmatic statements. They emphasized legality, seeing the solution to society's problems in the rule of law, in general, and in respect for the rights of the individual, in particular. For this reason, the group's members often described their activities as the "movement for the defense of civil rights" (*pravozakhysny rukh*). As Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky noted, this emphasis on legality and genuine democracy rather than on ideologies, such as nationalism or Marxism, which had heretofore captivated the Ukrainian intelligentsia, was an important turning point in the history of Ukrainian political thought.⁵

Although some members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group remained committed, to a greater or lesser degree, to Marxism or to nationalism, an excerpt from the memoirs of Danylo Shumuk, who was both a former communist and nationalist, and who spent close to forty years in Polish, Nazi, and Soviet prisons, probably captures the view of its majority:

Only democracy can save mankind from the dangers of the rightist as well as of the leftist brands of tyranny. Only the unrestricted right, guaranteed by law, for all citizens to express, advertise, and defend their ideas will enable the people to control and direct the policy of the government. Without such a right, there can be no talk of democracy and of democratic elections to a parliament. Where there is no legal opposition, endowed with equal rights in the parliament and among the

people, there is no democracy ... I have reached these conclusions after many years of thinking, stocktaking, and analysis, and they have led me ... to adopt a critical attitude to both communists and Dontsovian nationalists.⁶

In sharp contrast to the xenophobia that characterized the OUN brand of nationalism, the ardent patriotism of the Ukrainian dissidents did not imply hostility to other peoples, even the Russians. In 1980 one of their declarations stated: "We understand what it means to live under colonial oppression and therefore proclaim [that] the people who live in our country will be assured the broadest political, economic and social rights. All the rights of national minorities and various religious associations will be guaranteed unconditionally."⁷ Given their legalistic views, the members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group argued that Ukraine's independence could best be achieved by exercising the right, guaranteed by the Soviet constitution, to secede from the USSR. In their view, the most effective manner of "decolonizing" the Soviet Union was to allow its peoples to hold genuinely free elections.

But neither the Helsinki Group's moderation nor the West's insistence that the USSR honor its commitment to the Helsinki Accords prevented Soviet authorities from again decimating the dissidents. By 1980 about three-fourths of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group were imprisoned with sentences ranging from ten to fifteen years. The remainder were exiled from Ukraine or, to appease foreign opinion, allowed to emigrate.

Religious dissent A distinct type of dissent in Ukraine is based on religion. In theory, freedom of worship is guaranteed by the Soviet constitution. But the regime has used a variety of means to discourage religious beliefs and practices. Such measures include limiting religious publications, forbidding religious education of children and exposing them to atheistic indoctrination, placing its agents within the priesthood and religious hierarchy, closing down places of worship, and imposing social, economic, and educational penalties on those who stand up for their faith. However, the spiritual barrenness of Soviet ideology on the one hand, and resentment against the regime's heavy-handed tactics on the other, have led to a renewed interest in religion, especially in the countryside. With it has come a greater militancy on the part of believers.

The regime's fierce persecution of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic church ("the church in catacombs") failed to obliterate it completely. In recent decades about 300–350 Greek Catholic priests, led by several bishops, have been secretly ministering to the faithful in Western Ukraine. Even hidden monasteries and secret printing presses continue to exist. In 1982, Iosyp Terelia organized the Committee for the Defense of the Ukrainian Catholic Church to

demand its legalization. Although the regime has responded by arresting the activists, loyalty to their ancient church is still strong among the Ukrainians of Galicia and Transcarpathia.

The Orthodox church in Ukraine, which is officially called the Russian Orthodox church, is in a more advantageous position because it is tolerated by the Soviet government. But this comes at the price of cooperation with and subservience to the authorities. Consequently, corruption, hypocrisy, and the favoring of state interests over religious concerns are widespread in the Orthodox church, particularly in its hierarchy. This state of affairs has led a few members of the lower clergy, notably the much-persecuted Vasyl Romaniuk, to denounce both their superiors and the Soviet state for manipulating and undermining Orthodoxy.

Probably the most militant and dynamic religious denominations in Ukraine today are the Baptists and other Protestant sects, such as Pentecostals, Adventists, and Jehovah's Witnesses. They practice their faith in autonomous congregations, insist on educating their children according to the dictates of their religions, and often refuse to register with the government, thereby making it difficult for the authorities to control them. Their fundamentalist views, grass-roots organization, and fierce commitment to their faith have attracted numerous converts, particularly in Eastern Ukraine. In recent years they have constituted a disproportionately large part of the "prisoners of conscience" in the USSR. Until his immigration to the United States, Pastor Georgii Vins was the foremost leader of the Baptists.

Suppression of dissent Although their bravery and idealism were inspiring and the behavior of their persecutors was odious, the dissidents in Ukraine and elsewhere in the USSR failed to attract widespread support. One reason was that, besides denouncing the regime and stressing the need for the rule of law, they did not formulate a coherent political program. Further, the matters they addressed were not bread-and-butter issues of concern to the majority of the population: the workers and collective farmers. Therefore, the social base of the dissidents was narrow, resting almost exclusively on the intelligentsia.

Even more decisive in explaining the failure of the dissident movement was the nature of its opposition. Mustered against the dissidents were all the vast powers of the Soviet system, particularly the all-powerful KGB. Possessing a monopoly on communication, the regime usually prevented information about the dissidents from reaching the public. When information did emerge, it was usually distorted to cast the dissidents in a negative light. With hundreds of thousands of officers, plainclothes agents, and informers at its disposal, the KGB seemed to be everywhere and to know everything, preventing any collective activity from occurring without government supervision. But unlike in the days of Stalin, the secret police was no longer fanatical about physically destroying all real or potential dissidents. In recent times


it has sought to isolate the dissidents from society and, by means of escalating pressures, to intimidate them into recanting or remaining silent. Critics of the regime were denied jobs, educational opportunities for their children, and even shelter. Those who persisted were given long prison terms or incarcerated in psychiatric hospitals and given mind-altering drugs. By destroying the few, the KGB successfully intimidated the many.

In Ukraine, the secret police worked under fewer constraints than in Moscow. Isolated from the Moscow-based Western media, the Ukrainian dissidents did not have the relative protection of the "publicity umbrella" that their prominent Russian and Jewish colleagues enjoyed. Moreover, the issue of Ukrainian national rights aroused little interest in the West. Meanwhile, the regime's fear of Ukrainian nationalism led to particularly harsh repression in Ukraine. Hence, the reputation of the Kiev KGB as being the most vicious in the USSR and the disproportionately large number of Ukrainian "prisoners of conscience."

Russification

Viewed from the perspective of the Kremlin, the nationality issue in the USSR is a daunting and complex one. In a society that encompasses about 100 different nationalities – which occupy their own territories and possess sharply variegated histories, cultures, social values, and economic interests – Soviet leaders must find ways to mold a sense of common identity and purpose. To this end Soviet ideologists in the post-Stalin era have produced a number of concepts that are meant to deemphasize the national particularities of their peoples and to stress common Soviet features. Of these concepts, four have been of special importance: *rastsvetanie*, the claim that all nationalities in the USSR have experienced a flowering or development under Soviet rule; *sbliuzhenie*, the assertion that these nationalities are drawing together because of the creation of common political, economic, and cultural institutions in the USSR; *sliianie*, the fusion of the Soviet nationalities into a single nation; and the emergence of a new type of historical community – the Soviet people (*sovetskii narod*).

Behind the ideological double-talk, which implies that nations can "flower" while losing their identity, is a hidden agenda: Russification. Because Russians are in the majority, because they created the Bolshevik party and the Soviet system, because they occupy most of the top positions, and because their language is the primary means of communication in the USSR, they are seen as the cement that holds the USSR together. Apparently the Soviet leadership believes that the more the other nationalities of the USSR are like the Russians, the greater their feeling of mutual solidarity will be. Hence the view held by many Western scholars and non-Russian dissidents in the USSR that *sbliuzhenie* (drawing together), *sliianie* (fusion), and *sovetskii narod* (Soviet people) are simply code-words for Russification of the non-Russians.



Map 28 Russian speakers in Soviet Ukraine, 1970

Russification in Ukraine, as we have seen, was a key grievance of the Ukrainian dissidents. They rejected the claims that the predominance of Russian language and culture is a necessary by-product of the progressive, inspiring task of creating a new type of "brotherly, international community, the Soviet people." In their view, the emphasis on Russian was simply old wine in new bottles. Dziuba argued in his "Internationalism or Russification?" that what was behind Russification was old Russian chauvinism and colonialism packaged in pseudo-Marxist terminology. "Colonialism," he wrote, "can appear not only in the form of open discrimination, but also in the form of 'brotherhood,' and this is very characteristic of Russian colonialism."⁸ By extensively quoting Lenin, he tried to show that there was no basis in Marxist-Leninist ideology for the Kremlin's preference for Russian.

In Ukraine assimilatory pressures have been particularly intense in recent decades, partly because of the Ukrainians' linguistic and cultural proximity to the Russians, which makes the former promising targets for Russification. Also, Ukraine's economic importance to the USSR demands that its people do not develop "separatist" tendencies. Because of their relatively large numbers, the Ukrainians have the potential for being a "swing vote" in nationality relations: should they adhere to the Russians, ethnic politics will probably remain stable in the USSR. But if they side with the non-Russians, Russian predominance might be undermined and radical changes could occur in the Soviet political system.

The language issue In the struggle of the Soviet leadership to create a new Soviet nationality and of the Ukrainians to preserve their national identity, the main battlefield is language. During Brezhnev's years in office, the Kremlin launched a sophisticated, systematic campaign to expand the use of Russian in Ukraine, while discouraging the use of Ukrainian. In pursuing its objectives, the Soviet leadership could count on strong supporters such as the 10 million Russians living in Ukraine and the additional millions of "Little Russians," who are of Ukrainian background but Russian in culture and language. It also had persuasive arguments: Russian is the language of the most numerous and important people in the USSR, it is the only common means of communication among its diverse nationalities, and it is a medium of science and international intercourse.

The authorities have at their disposal a variety of direct and indirect pressures to make people use Russian. Its use in Ukrainian schools has increased rapidly and educational success depends on the mastery of Russian. The same holds true for career opportunities. In Ukraine the most interesting and important publications appear in Russian, while boring, irrelevant subject matter is frequently relegated to Ukrainian periodicals. When the circulation of the latter declines, the authorities have a good excuse to shut down these periodicals. Thus, between 1969 and 1980 the percentage of journals

published in Ukrainian decreased from 46% to 19%; between 1958 and 1980 the percentage of books published in Ukrainian dropped from 60% to 24%.

In the cities, social pressure to use Russian is intense and Ukrainian is denigrated as the language of "country bumpkins." The regime has consciously fostered the inferiority complex toward their language and culture that exists among many Ukrainians. And this feeling is reflected in the fact that it is Ukrainians who frequently demand Russian-language education for their children. "What good is Ukrainian? My children need a mastery of Russian to succeed" is a remark one often hears among former (and still socially insecure) Ukrainian peasants who are trying to get ahead in the Russified cities. Some Soviet Ukrainian intellectuals claim, only half-jokingly, that if Ukrainization were imposed today, Jews could be Ukrainized in a year, Russians in Ukraine would accept the policy after about three years, but it would take at least ten years to convince an upwardly mobile Ukrainian *khokhol* to use his native language.

If one persists in using Ukrainian, it may even raise doubts about one's political loyalty. For example, the Soviet police lent great credence to the following statement of a prosecution witness against the dissident poet Vasyl Stus: "I knew right away that Stus was a nationalist because he always spoke Ukrainian."⁹

How effective has linguistic Russification been? In Ukraine between 1959 and 1979 the proportion of Ukrainians who declared Ukrainian to be their native language dropped from 93.4% to 89.1%. Today well over 2 million Ukrainians consider Russian to be their mother tongue. Meanwhile, only one in three Russians living in Ukraine has bothered to learn Ukrainian. Does this mean that the demise of the Ukrainian language is only a matter of time? If present trends continue, the future of Ukrainian certainly appears grim. Yet pessimists have predicted the imminent demise of Ukrainian for centuries.

Optimists, though, argue that if, despite the persistent efforts to eradicate it, the language has not died out yet, it never will. They point out that the status of Ukrainian is not as bad as it seems. True, in certain areas, such as the Donetsk industrial belt, in the Kharkiv region, and along the Black Sea coast, the use of Ukrainian is minimal and declining. However, because of the influx of Ukrainians from the countryside into Kiev in recent years, the use of Ukrainian in the republic's capital has risen slightly. And in Western Ukraine, Ukrainian is much more widespread than before the Second World War. Thus, the language question, which has historically been of crucial importance in Ukraine, is far from being resolved.

Russians in Ukraine Another major method the regime has used to advance Russification in Ukraine has been to encourage the in-migration of Russians and the out-migration of Ukrainians. Generally this policy has been implemented under the guise of "the fruitful exchanges of personnel" between

the republics. Thus, while huge numbers of Russians have been brought into Ukraine to enrich it with their skills, equally large numbers of educated Ukrainians have been directed to jobs in other parts of the USSR (where they often identify with Russians). These huge demographic shifts are meant to intermingle the peoples of the USSR and to encourage the growth of a common identity. Russians, it should be noted, have shown a marked proclivity for leaving their republic. Experts explain this trend by the relative poverty in the Russian countryside and by the widely held belief in the USSR that Russians tend to get the best jobs in non-Russian areas. For Russians, Ukraine in particular is a favorite objective: it has a good climate and a high level of socioeconomic and cultural development, and is culturally and linguistically familiar.

Predictably, these migration processes have led to a dramatic increase in the number of Russians living in Ukraine. In 1926 there were 3 million Russians in the republic; in 1959 their numbers rose to 7 million; and in 1979 the figure was close to 10 million. As always, Russians in Ukraine tend to concentrate in large cities, particularly in the Donbas industrial region and in the south. Today, they constitute about 21% of Ukraine's inhabitants and their influence is far greater than their proportion of the population.

The rapidly increasing number of Russians in Ukraine is not only a result of in-migration, however. Minorities in Ukraine, such as the Jews, Greeks, and Bulgarians, have been assimilating into the Russian nationality. And, as we have seen, so have Ukrainians. This process is reinforced by the high rate of intermarriage between Ukrainians and Russians. In 1970 about 20% of all marriages – 30% in the cities and about 8% in the countryside – were ethnically mixed. By way of comparison, in the early 20th century, when most Ukrainians still lived in isolated villages, only 3% of the marriages in Ukraine were between different ethnic groups.

In view of the rapidly increasing Russian presence in the republic, it is possible to speak, as Roman Szporluk does, of two Ukraines: one heavily Russian and the other still basically Ukrainian.¹⁰ In geographic terms, the "Russified Ukraine" encompasses the industrialized Donbas and the cities of the south, areas that were never a part of historical Ukraine. Meanwhile, in such regions as the Right Bank, parts of the Left Bank, and Western Ukraine, which were always predominantly inhabited by Ukrainians, the language and culture remain predominantly Ukrainian, especially in the countryside. But the line between Russian and Ukrainian languages and cultures in Ukraine can be drawn on a different level as well. The world of the large cities – of the political, economic, and scientific elite, of modernity in general – is basically Russian. The world of the countryside – of collective farmers, of folk customs – is largely Ukrainian. Such was the situation in the days of the tsars. With the aid of more sophisticated tactics, such is the situation that the Soviet leadership encourages today.

But even though the policies of Russification are more insidious and pervasive than ever, they have not stifled the process of Ukrainian nation-building. Two generations ago, most East Ukrainians still called themselves "Little Russians," "*khokhols*," or "locals"; one generation ago, many West Ukrainians defined themselves as Lemkos, Hutsuls, or Rusyns, that is, in terms of their regional cultures. Today their children and grandchildren are self-declared Ukrainians. In short, they are no longer the ethnographic mass they were at the onset of the century. Even non-Ukrainians have become Ukrainians. For example, the Poles who remained in Ukraine have tended to assimilate with Ukrainians. Many Russians who have lived in Ukraine for several generations also have developed a strong sense of territorial patriotism.

Even urbanization can no longer be viewed as a one-way road to denationalization. The Soviet scholar V.V. Pokshishevsky argues that while the city does expose the newcomer to assimilationist (Russifying) currents, it also stimulates a "sharpening of ethnic awareness."¹¹ Citing the increased Ukrainian presence in Kiev, he states that it is the result of the city's attraction to all Ukrainians and also of "the further consolidation of the Ukrainian nation and a strengthening of ethnic consciousness." Pokshishevsky also notes: "It may be supposed that some Kievans, after some hesitation whether to consider themselves Ukrainian, later did so with absolute conviction; more children of mixed marriages have also declared themselves Ukrainian."¹² Thus, as with language, the ultimate success of the Kremlin's homogenizing policies in Ukraine is still open to question.

Social Change

A momentous development occurred in Ukrainian social history in the 1960s: during that decade the percentage of Ukrainians living in cities reached 55%, that is, the majority of them had become city dwellers. And according to Soviet estimates, by the year 2000, over 70% of Ukrainians will be living in urban centers. Of course, rapid urbanization has been a worldwide phenomenon for generations and it was only a matter of time before it would catch up with the Ukrainians. Nonetheless, because Ukraine's inhabitants have always been considered to be agrarians par excellence, and because their culture, mentality, and national consciousness were heavily imbued with the peasant ethos, the evolution of this society of village dwellers into city dwellers can truly be called the Great Transformation.

What has led Ukrainians to leave their villages in such large numbers and to move to the cities? In general, the reasons are similar to those anywhere in the world: better job opportunities, greater access to higher education, an attractive variety of leisure activities, and more convenient conditions for family life. As a result of this influx of Ukrainians into urban centers, the cities of the land, long the bastions of non-Ukrainians, have finally attained Ukrain-

ian majorities. And the traditional dichotomy between the Ukrainian village and the Russian (or Polish/Jewish) city may possibly begin to fade.

There are, however, noteworthy aspects to the process of urbanization in Ukraine. Although rapid, it has still not moved ahead as quickly as in other parts of the USSR. Thus, urbanization in Russia, which in 1970 reached 62%, has proceeded at a rate comparable to that of Japan and Western Europe; in Ukraine, meanwhile, it has advanced at a rate similar to that of Eastern and Southern Europe. Moreover, urbanization in Ukraine is geographically imbalanced, for it is concentrated primarily in the eastern, heavily industrialized (and Russified) areas of Donetsk, Voroshilovhrad, Dnepropetrovsk, and Zaporozhia. Recently, however, there have been indications that the rate of urbanization in the east has slowed while it has been rising in Western Ukraine. The outstanding fact remains that Ukrainians are pouring into cities and the Ukrainian peasant, long the archetypal inhabitant of the land, is now becoming an endangered species.

This development is of immense ideological as well as sociological importance. As the role of the peasant in Ukrainian society has diminished, the populism that was the hallmark of Ukrainian ideologies in the 19th and early 20th centuries has also faded. One can even argue that today the concept of the *narod* - in the traditional sense of the poor, oppressed peasant masses - no longer occupies a central place in the political thinking of Ukrainians.

The economy Tightly interwoven with that of the Soviet Union as a whole, the economy of Ukraine is highly developed. Ukraine is well endowed with natural resources and has both a very strong agricultural sector and a well-established industrial capacity. How does it compare to the rest of the Soviet Union? As might be expected, it is more oriented to agriculture than the Soviet Union as a whole. The industrial capacity of Ukraine is somewhat less than the Soviet average because of the great imbalance between the highly industrialized provinces and the far less developed western areas.

Ukraine's industry accounts for a major part of the Soviet Union's industrial production (17%). Ukraine is an important industrial area on the global scale as well. Producing about 40% of the Soviet Union's steel, 34% of its coal, and 51% of its pig iron, Ukraine has a GNP comparable to that of Italy. Soviet scholars like to point out that in 1972 Ukraine's industrial production was 176 times higher than in 1922. But, as might be expected, Ukraine's industry has had its ups and downs. In the booming 1950s and early 1960s, when the growth rate was an incredible 10% a year, it performed better than the Soviet average; in the 1970s and 1980s, however, when the growth rate plunged to about 2-3% annually, its industrial growth was even below the average. To a large extent, this slowdown is linked to the the aging and inefficient "smoke-stack" industries located in Ukraine, a development similar to the one that has occurred in the industrial heartlands of America and Western Europe.

The economic slowdown in Ukraine, and the Soviet Union as a whole, has made the issue of capital investments more acute than ever. While economic planners in Moscow have emphasized huge, new industrial projects in Siberia, Ukraine's industries have been generally neglected. In the days of Shelest, Ukraine's economists were especially vociferous about their republic's declining share of investment funds. Although Shcherbytsky has been reluctant about raising the issue, it has certainly not gone away. There are, however, some bright spots in Ukraine's economic future: greater Soviet emphasis on international trade means that the Black Sea ports will continue to grow rapidly and, because of its proximity to Eastern Europe, Western Ukraine will probably be producing more goods geared for export.

Agriculture Despite the fact that industry is now the main occupation of Ukrainians, their land has remained the breadbasket of the Soviet Union. It produces as much grain as Canada (only the United States and Russia produce more), more potatoes than West Germany, and more sugar beets than anywhere else in the world. Ukraine has 19% of the Soviet Union's population, but produces more than 23% of its agricultural products. Nonetheless, because of government policies, Ukrainians have to cope with frequent food shortages.

In an effort to raise the already high agricultural productivity in Ukraine, the government has invested heavily in farm machinery and fertilizers in the republic. But the chronic problems that have plagued Soviet agriculture persist. Bureaucratic controls and ill-conceived reorganization schemes often bring more havoc than gain. Even though the wages paid to collective farm workers have increased substantially in recent years, they are still at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder and their enthusiasm for working on the collective and state farms has not increased. Instead, agricultural workers, particularly those in Ukraine, prefer to concentrate their efforts on their tiny, private one-acre plots. Consequently, in 1970, this private sector of the agricultural economy, which included only 3% of all the land under cultivation, produced 33% of the Soviet Union's meat output, 40% of its dairy products, and 55% of its eggs. In Ukraine, in 1970, for example, private plots provided 36% of total family income (the comparable figure for Russia is 26%).

Another problem is the rapid decline in the rural labor force brought about by urbanization: in 1965 there were 7.2 million agricultural workers in Ukraine, in 1975 the figure sank to 6.4 million, and in 1980 it stood at 5.8 million. Thus, the Ukrainian countryside, where living conditions have improved markedly, continues to lose its young people to the cities. On many collective farms it is the weathered old women who provide the main source of manual labor.

The issue of economic exploitation A perennial issue in discussions of Ukrain-

ian economic history, the question of whether Ukraine is economically exploited by Moscow is exceedingly complex. On the one hand, it is obvious that Ukraine has experienced tremendous economic growth during Soviet rule. And, on the other, there is strong evidence that it has consistently contributed more to the budget of the USSR than it has received in return. The Soviets refuse to make available statistics that might elucidate this issue.

Soviet spokesmen stress Ukraine's rapid economic progress, arguing that it would have been impossible to achieve without the huge investments, technical expertise, and labor that the "fraternal peoples" of the USSR, most notably the Russians, provided. By implication, they take the position that it is now the turn of Ukrainians to provide economic assistance to other, less-developed regions of the USSR. From the Soviet point of view, there is, therefore, no basis to even raise the issue of economic exploitation.

Some Western economists view the matter very differently. They acknowledge the impressive economic progress that Soviet rule has brought to Ukraine. And they agree that Moscow is intent on developing such relatively poor areas as Central Asia or resource-rich regions as Siberia. But they argue that Ukraine has contributed and continues to contribute more than its share to the economic growth of the USSR. The American economist Holland Hunter states: "The siphoning off of current income from Ukraine for use elsewhere in the USSR is a basic feature of Ukrainian economic history."¹³ And the British scholar Peter Wiles estimates that Ukraine regularly contributes 10% more to the Soviet budget than it receives in return.¹⁴ Thus, Volodymyr Bandera and Ivan Koropecykj argue that while Ukraine continues to make economic progress in absolute terms, relative to Moscow, to other regions of the USSR, and to neighboring countries, it is falling behind economically.¹⁵

Regardless of the position one takes in the debate over exploitation, the discussion highlights the fundamental question regarding Ukraine's experience under Soviet rule: Who makes the decisions regarding the economic future of Ukraine and whose interests are primarily taken into account when these decisions are made? On this point, at least, the answers are more conclusive: it is clear that the economic fate of Ukraine is decided in Moscow, where Ukraine's economic interests are not a primary consideration.

Demographic conditions In modern times, the tempo of population growth in Ukraine has changed dramatically. Throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Ukraine's population was among the fastest growing in Europe. Then came two disastrous demographic setbacks: between 3 and 6 million lives were lost in the Famine of 1932–33, purges, and deportations of the 1930s and about 5.3 million inhabitants of Ukraine died during the Second World War. Thus, within little more than a decade, about 25% of Ukraine's population – the mortality rate was especially high among men – perished. Today, the population growth of the country is one of the lowest in the USSR.

In 1983, for example, there was in Ukraine a net increase of 4 per 1000; by comparison, among the rapidly growing populace of Soviet Central Asia, the increases ranged between 25 and 30 per 1000. If these current demographic trends continue, the Ukrainians' share of the Soviet population, indeed that of the Slavs in general, will be drastically reduced.

In part, Ukraine's slow population growth results from demographic disasters: there are simply fewer people to have children. However, the impact of urbanization has also been great. Living in extremely cramped quarters and with the vast majority of women working full-time, urban Ukrainians have opted for small families of one or, at most, two children. In many respects Ukraine's population resembles that of other developed countries: aging and growing slowly, it has a steadily increasing percentage of retirees and a decreasing percentage of full-time workers. But there are also striking demographic particularities in Ukraine and the USSR as a whole. In stark contrast to other industrialized countries, the life span of males has become shorter and infant mortality has risen in recent years. Experts speculate that this is related to widespread alcoholism among both males and females.

Compared to other areas of the USSR, Ukraine is a densely settled land. While in the European parts of the Soviet Union there is an average of 34 inhabitants per square kilometer, in Ukraine the figure is 82 per sq. km. But population is unevenly distributed in the republic. It is dense and growing rapidly in the eastern industrial regions and especially in the Crimea, the "Florida" of the USSR, whose balmy climate is especially appealing to Russians. In Western Ukraine, population growth is about average; but in the Right and Left Bank it is far below average and there are *oblasti* (regions) where the population is decreasing steadily. Nonetheless, taken as a whole, the demographic condition of Ukraine is satisfactory: the republic's population, which in 1987, numbered 50.8 million, is not so small as to hamper economic development and not so large as to stifle it.

Changes in social structure As we have seen, industrialization, urbanization, and modernization in general have greatly altered the traditional class structure of Ukraine. In 1970, out of a total work force of 16 million people, about two-thirds were classified as industrial workers. From being a distinct minority, blue-collar workers became the overwhelming majority of Ukraine's workers within a single generation. Not only has the proletariat in Ukraine grown rapidly but it has become more Ukrainian in terms of ethnic composition: while in 1959 Ukrainians made up 70% of the industrial work force, in 1970 this figure rose to 74%. Russians are no longer disproportionately numerous among the blue-collar rank and file.

White-collar workers in Ukraine have also greatly increased, especially in recent decades. Between 1960 and 1970, their number doubled, rising from 700,000 to 1.4 million. But here the Russians maintained their disproportion-

ately large presence, accounting for more than one-third of this social group. Thus, while the Soviet educational boom has raised the number of highly trained specialists in Ukraine to levels comparable to and even higher than those in most West European countries, Ukrainians as a nationality have not benefited as much as might be expected. While Ukrainians constitute 74% of the population in their republic, they make up only 60% of the student body in institutions of higher learning.

What are the reasons for this Ukrainian underrepresentation in higher education and among the technical and cultural intelligentsia? Some Western specialists argue that because many Ukrainian youths still obtain their elementary and secondary education in the countryside, where the schools are often of inferior quality, they are handicapped in comparison to city-bred Russians in the fierce competition for places in institutes and universities. Because many Ukrainians have an imperfect command of Russian, they are at a further disadvantage. Finally, since it is government policy to encourage Ukrainian specialists to seek employment outside their republic – and an estimated 25% have done so – the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Ukraine is smaller than it might be. And so is the number of their children who usually obtain a higher education. Meanwhile, those children of the Ukrainian intelligentsia who are educated outside their republic are often Russified.

The standard of living As we have frequently noted, Soviet Ukraine is a major industrial power, richly endowed with natural resources. Yet the living standards of its people are far below those in other industrialized countries. Granted, comparing living standards is exceedingly difficult. What a Soviet Ukrainian may lack in cars, videos, or fashionable clothes, he might have in free higher education and medical care that is unavailable to his American counterpart. Nonetheless, according to a variety of elaborate measurements set up by Western economists, it is evident that the Soviet economic system is unable to satisfy material wants and needs as well as the Western economies do for their people. Thus, in 1970 the per capita consumption in the Soviet Union was about one-half that of the United States. This statistic does not take into account the generally lower quality of goods and services that one receives in the USSR. Put another way, in 1982 a typical weekly shopping basket that cost 18 hours of work in Washington, DC, required approximately 53 hours of work in Kiev. Although rents in the USSR are among the lowest in the world, housing is so difficult to come by that often three generations of one family live in a two-room apartment. The Kremlin's preference for investment in heavy industry and military spending and its habitual neglect of the consumer industry are largely responsible for this state of affairs.

Optimism regarding the Soviet ability to catch up with Western living standards ran high in the 1960s and early 1970s, when the economic productivity of the country was impressive. But when Soviet economic performance

plummeted in the 1980s, so did hopes for rapidly raising living standards.

Within the USSR itself, Ukraine occupies fifth place in terms of consumer spending: Russia and the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania rank higher. Because Ukraine has a surplus of labor, wages in the republic are about 10% lower than the Soviet average. However, prices are also relatively low. In the last two decades, Soviet wage policies have brought noteworthy benefits to many Ukrainians. Intent on reducing the wage differences between rural and urban workers, the government awarded collective farmers a hefty pay increase. Consequently, between 1960 and 1970, farmers' salaries rose by 182%, while those of industrial workers increased by only 38%. Because disproportionately many Ukrainians are farmers, they benefited from this attempt to equalize earnings among Soviet workers. But despite ongoing attempts by the government to improve the plight of Soviet consumers, citizens must still deal with shoddy goods, poor service, and cramped quarters. The living standards of the average Soviet Ukrainian are far below those of West Europeans and North Americans and even lag behind those of Communist Eastern Europe.

Soviet Ukrainian attitudes What are the views and attitudes of Soviet Ukrainians toward the Soviet political and socioeconomic system? A question such as this is, of course, always difficult to deal with, especially in the case of a society that is only now beginning to publicize the results of public opinion polls dealing with carefully selected issues. Nonetheless, numerous articles and discussions in the Soviet media, interviews with Soviet émigrés, and accounts of travelers to the USSR allow one to establish certain salient features that characterize the mood and thinking of Soviet Ukrainians.

By and large, it seems that most Soviet Ukrainians accept the Soviet regime as their legitimate government and identify with it. Because of the government's monopoly on information and intensive propaganda, they are, at best, only vaguely aware of the hardships that Ukrainians have suffered at Soviet hands in the "ancient" past. Much more influential in shaping their attitudes is the fact that the Soviet system has brought large increases in their income, imposed relative equality among socioeconomic groups, greatly improved social services and access to education, and created numerous opportunities for upward mobility. Many Soviet Ukrainians take pride in the power and prestige of the USSR of which they are an important part.

Intermixed with these generally positive attitudes towards the Soviet system are elements, real and potential, of dissatisfaction. The current economic slowdown has raised such sensitive issues as the economic favoritism of Siberia and Central Asia at the expense of Ukraine. Opportunities for social advancement are less numerous now. Ukrainian party leaders, bureaucrats, and economic managers are increasingly resentful of Moscow's monopoly over decision making. Furthermore, the Ukrainian cultural elite has again

begun to protest Russification. According to a 1984 Soviet sociological study, researchers reported that the level of dissatisfaction in Ukraine is higher than in the USSR as a whole. To the question why this is so, the scholars could only reply: "We can give no definite answer."¹⁶

Especially unsettling for the Soviet leadership is the growing disinterest in Marxist-Leninist ideology throughout Ukraine and the USSR as a whole. Since the 1960s, Western intellectuals have been discussing the "death of ideology" and the coming of a "post-ideological age" in the industrialized West. It appears that a similar ideological waning is now evident in the Soviet Union. Although Soviet authorities are loath to acknowledge this phenomenon, Western analysts have attempted to provide an explanation. Put simply, it argues that the process of modernization, which occurred in Europe during the 19th and early part of the 20th centuries, was accompanied by tumultuous transformations. The resulting insecurity and confusion created the need for ideological analyses, explanations, and guidelines. But, judging by the social climate in industrialized societies, once modernity arrived, it brought with it relative stability. Consequently, the need for an ideology which served to orient adherents in times of rapid change became less pressing.

Be that as it may, it is clear that, despite constant indoctrination, the influence of Marxism-Leninism on the thinking of Soviet Ukrainians is fading. Of course, Ukrainian nationalism, especially of the extreme, integral variety, had been expunged from the Ukrainian worldview decades earlier. Thus, the two main ideological currents in modern Ukrainian history are no longer as influential as they once were.

Because the ideological commitment of its people is a major requirement of the Soviet system, the waning of this commitment has led to a perceptible loss of optimism, purpose, and sense of direction among thoughtful Soviet citizens. To fill the void, the government has redoubled its efforts to instill Soviet patriotism. Hence the recent all-pervasive emphasis on heroic Soviet exploits in the Second World War. But for many, religion has become a more satisfying means of filling the spiritual and ideological void that confronts them in the 1980s.

Among the vast majority, however, there is a growing commitment to what in the West is called middle-class or bourgeois values and consumerism. Instead of building a new society, Soviet surveys indicate that its youth are generally interested in obtaining lucrative, prestigious professional jobs and would like to be engineers (the most popular), factory managers, scientists, and physicians. Few want to be proletarians. Most young people's thoughts and many of their efforts are committed to obtaining high-quality Western consumer goods. Whether this means that the attitudes, values, and goals of Soviet Ukrainian youth are becoming ever more similar to those of their counterparts in the West is still unclear. But it is obvious that they are far from becoming what Lenin wanted them to be.

The Gorbachev Era

The death of Leonid Brezhnev in 1982 ushered in a period of transition in the Soviet leadership. Brezhnev's immediate successor was the sophisticated Iurii Andropov, a former head of the KGB, who appeared ready to introduce radical changes. When he died after less than two years in power, his successor, the aging, ailing Konstantin Chernenko, was a representative of the old regime, who was unwilling to introduce the reforms that the USSR clearly needed. But he, too, died shortly after attaining power. The spectacle of one elderly Soviet leader after another dying in office clearly emphasized the need for younger, more energetic, and innovative leadership. Consequently, in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev, a protégé of Andropov, was selected by the party leaders to lead the USSR on a new course. With his accession to power, a new breed of party *apparatchiki* (functionaries) came to the fore. Sophisticated and pragmatic, Gorbachev and his associates were the first generation of Soviet leaders whose rise to power did not occur under the aegis of Stalin.

Despite deep-rooted opposition from conservatives in the party and the society as a whole, Gorbachev launched his attempt to make the Soviet system, particularly its stagnant economy, more efficient, stronger, and productive. To achieve his objectives, Gorbachev adopted a new "democratic" style of leadership. He strove to create the impression that his regime was closer, more accessible, to the people and called for more openness (*glasnost*) in the conduct of government and for a restructuring of its economy (*perestroika*).

Chernobyl Before the impact of Gorbachev's reforms reached Ukraine, however, the country was shaken by a catastrophe of huge proportions and global significance. On 26 April 1986, a reactor at the huge Chernobyl nuclear plant, located about 130 km north of Kiev, exploded. A huge cloud of radiation, incomparably larger than that produced by the bombing of Hiroshima, covered the environs of Chernobyl and then spread over parts of Belorussia, Poland, and Scandinavia. The world was confronted by what it feared most – nuclear disaster.

In traditional fashion, Soviet authorities initially attempted to cover up the catastrophe, which, as was established later, resulted from human error, gross negligence, and the faulty design of the reactor. When the cover-up proved to be impossible, Moscow admitted the scope of the disaster and called for advice and assistance from Western experts. Soviet engineers succeeded in extinguishing the burning reactor by encasing it in concrete and burying it in a gigantic "tomb." According to Soviet sources, the catastrophe resulted in 35 deaths (many Western specialists believe that the number of fatalities was much higher), the hospitalization of hundreds of people, and the exposure to high levels of radiation and increased risk of cancer for hundreds of thousands. About 135,000 people, most of them Ukrainians from the Chernobyl

region, were forced to abandon their homes – in many cases, permanently. The ecological damage to the environs of Chernobyl and to areas as far away as Lapland was extreme and long term.

From 1970, when the construction of the plant began, there had been opposition in Ukraine to Moscow's decision to build the huge nuclear plant in the energy-rich republic and in the vicinity of Kiev. Consequently, resentment of the high-handed and irresponsible manner in which Moscow forced the plant on Ukraine was widespread in the republic. In addition, there were indications that the disaster gave rise to tensions between the all-union and the Ukrainian party leaderships, as each strove to blame the other for the accident. Nonetheless, it is evident that Moscow is not about to alter its plans; it still intends to expand the Chernobyl plant and to make Ukraine the center of its growing nuclear industry. This has elicited strong protests from the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Indeed, it appears that environmental issues may become another point of contention between the Kremlin and the Ukrainians.

Gorbachev's "glasnost" and Ukraine In Moscow, evidence of the reforms that Gorbachev has attempted to implement in the face of considerable opposition from hard-liners in the establishment and a skeptical public has been widespread and often dramatic, especially in the realm of culture. Major newspapers now reflect a new mood of openness and self-criticism: the popular magazine *Ogonek*, whose recently appointed editor is the erstwhile Ukrainian poet Vitalii Korotych, has repeatedly attacked the Stalin cult and abuses of power by the police and bureaucracy; Russian poets espousing militantly anti-Soviet views have been published; and Pamiat, a civic organization that propagates a militant and most un-Marxist Russian nationalism and anti-Semitism, has not been suppressed.

By comparison, in Kiev, signs of the "new spirit" have been rare and relatively muted. The reticence of the Ukrainians is understandable. Kiev is the bailiwick of Shcherbytsky, an avowed conservative, who is the last holdover in the Politburo of the old, regressive Brezhnev regime. Moreover, the Ukrainian KGB is reputed to be the most repressive in the USSR. Finally, the Ukrainian intelligentsia remembers all too well how badly it was "burned" when it enthusiastically embraced Khrushchev's reforms in the 1960s.

Despite these inhibitions, some signs of restiveness have surfaced among the Ukrainian intelligentsia. In the fall of 1987, a Ukrainian Culturological Club was established in Kiev. Many of its leading members are former dissidents who wish to test the limits of *glasnost* by openly discussing such politically sensitive issues as the Famine of 1932–33, the millennium of Christianity in Ukraine, and the struggle for independence in 1917–20.

In Lviv, the center of the nationally conscious West Ukrainians, *glasnost* evoked a more dramatic and broadly based response. In June and July 1988

several huge, unsanctioned, and unprecedented public gatherings were held that attracted tens of thousands of participants. Organized by former dissidents such as Chornovil, the Horyn brothers, Ihor and Iryna Kalynets, and a new activist, Ivan Makar, the demonstrations called for the erection of a fitting monument to Shevchenko in Lviv as well as one to the victims of Stalinism. These organizers rejected the party bureaucrats who had chosen themselves to represent Lviv in the upcoming party congress in Moscow. And they gave vent to the numerous national grievances of the Ukrainians. In August the Lviv KGB reacted in typical fashion: it accused the organizers of "anti-Soviet activity" and arrested some of them. It appears that genuine democracy is still a long way off for the Ukrainians.

Somewhat earlier, the representatives of the establishment Writers' Union of Ukraine (which has a vested interest in preventing the decline in the use of Ukrainian) also clashed with the party conservatives grouped around Shcherbytsky over the perennial issues of Russification and the status of the Ukrainian language. In June 1986, a number of well-known Ukrainian writers, including Oles Honchar, Dmytro Pavlychko, Ivan Drach, and S. Plachynda, decried the declining use of Ukrainian in the republic's schools and the Writers' Union formed a committee to maintain contacts with educational institutions. In April 1987, M. Fomenko, the minister of education of the Ukrainian republic, presented a disheartening but not surprising report to the committee about Ukrainian-language education. According to him, there are currently 15,000 Ukrainian-language schools in Ukraine, that is, about 75% of all schools. But the 4500 Russian-language schools, which constitute less than 22% of the total, enroll over 50% of all pupils. In Kiev, the situation is even more abnormal: of 300,000 pupils, only 70,000 study in Ukrainian.

Apparently these statistics are not disturbing to party functionaries. Shcherbytsky's only noteworthy comment on this issue has been an expression of hope that the use of Russian will not decline. In general, it seems that while the party establishment in Ukraine is becoming more receptive to some aspects of Gorbachev's modernization, it has no intention of changing its nationality policy in Ukraine. This position has led to the sharp confrontation between the writers and party functionaries that occurred at the all-Ukrainian conference of teachers held in Kiev in May 1987. Frustrated by the party's reluctance to respond to Ukrainian cultural and linguistic aspirations, while accepting changes in other areas, members of the Writers' Union have become increasingly explicit in expressing their dissatisfaction.

In March 1987, at a meeting of the Writers' Union presidium, Ivan Drach stated that in the schools "Ukrainian language and literature have become the objects of the jokes and insults of an arrogant bourgeoisie with chauvinistic [Russian] tendencies, which hides behind the shield of internationalism and disparages the roots from which it itself emerged."¹⁷ Dmytro Pavlychko demanded that the government of the republic see to it that the study of Ukrain-

ian be enforced in the schools. He added that "if the attitude not only to our language but to all the non-Russian languages does not change ... we will not reach our greatest, most sacred goal – the friendship of nations – for only those nations which retain their own character can enter into a friendship."¹⁸



As the 20th century draws to a close, it is clear that Ukrainians have entered the ranks of the modern, industrialized nations. The historical role of their country as the richly endowed but underdeveloped borderland appears to be over. And the Soviet regime deserves much of the credit for effecting this epochal transformation. It also carries the responsibility for its tragically high costs. By the same token, Ukraine is characterized by what may be called the Great Discrepancy. Despite its large economic role, both in the USSR and in global terms, and its numerous, well-educated population, Ukraine is still unable to decide its own fate. Indeed, the political profile of Soviet Ukraine abroad is so low that many people in the world are still unaware of its distinctiveness. This, too, is largely a result of Moscow's policies.

With the repression of nationalism and the atrophy of communism, the influence of the two great ideologies that for generations molded the thinking of Ukrainians and guided their actions has faded. Meanwhile, changes in the USSR appear to be in the offing. Under the new conditions that seem to be emerging, questions abound. Where will Ukrainians look for guidelines to their future development? Will they be able to correct the anomalies of their condition? And, most important, do they have the will to do so? There are at the moment very few indicators that might help to clarify the situation. Therefore, as has been true so often in the past, a cloud of uncertainty hangs heavily over Ukraine and the Ukrainians.

The Immigrants

During the last century, millions of Ukrainians left their homeland in search of more favorable conditions elsewhere. Most did so for socioeconomic reasons. Vast numbers of East Ukrainians moved, or were moved, to Russia's Asian lands. Because these Ukrainians remained within the confines of the Russian Empire and, later, the Soviet Union, they were not emigrants in the usual sense of the word. By contrast, West Ukrainians headed westward, across the oceans to the New World where they encountered not only unfamiliar lands but radically different political, socioeconomic, and cultural systems. It is they who are generally considered to be Ukrainian emigrants par excellence. Other Ukrainians abandoned their homes primarily for political reasons. Unwilling to accept Soviet rule, they preferred exile. Together these emigrants and political émigrés formed the three distinct waves of Ukrainians that fate has, up to now, brought to foreign shores.



The First Wave: The Pre-1914 Immigration

Ukrainians who immigrated to the New World prior to the First World War invariably sought to improve their wretched socioeconomic condition. To do so, they generally chose one of two approaches. Most came to the United States where they found work in the burgeoning factories and mines that were located in or near large cities. Consisting mainly of single, young men, these immigrants initially planned to stay in the United States only until they accumulated enough money to return to their native villages, purchase adequate land, and establish a household. But, in time, prospects in the United States became more appealing and promising than those at home. And as Ukrainian women came to join the men, Ukrainian communities sprang up in many urban centers of the northeastern United States.

The other category of early Ukrainian immigrants was made up of those who left their villages with the intention of continuing an agricultural way of life in countries where land was cheap and available. From the outset, these immigrants – who usually arrived with their families – intended to stay in their new homelands permanently. Because such lands were usually located in unsettled regions, such as remote parts of Brazil and Canada, these immigrants faced a backbreaking, solitary struggle against nature.

Immigration to the United States Individual Ukrainians found their way to America long before the massive wave of immigration in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Ukrainian names appear among the founders of the Jamestown colony in Virginia as well as among the combatants in the American Revolution and Civil War. When Russia established colonies in Alaska and California in the early 19th century, Ukrainian Cossacks and civilians were among their inhabitants. However, the man who is commonly recognized as the first nationally conscious Ukrainian in America is Ahapii Honcharenko, an Orthodox priest from the Kiev region, who had been personally acquainted with Taras Shevchenko and had espoused revolutionary ideas. In 1867–72, this original and adventurous individual served as the editor of the *Alaska Herald*, the first American publication that carried some information about Ukraine and its inhabitants. Later, Honcharenko became a prominent figure in California, where he attempted to establish a Ukrainian socialist colony in the early years of the 20th century. Another colorful individual was Nicholas Sudzilovsky-Russel, a physician and revolutionary from Kiev who settled in California in the 1880s and later moved to Hawaii, where he became the president of the Hawaiian senate. He too attempted to attract Ukrainians to his new homeland.

But the first large group of Ukrainian immigrants to the United States was very different from these picturesque forerunners. Composed mostly of hard-working peasants, it originated in Transcarpathia and the Lemko regions, the westernmost and least developed of Ukrainian lands. News about the semi-mythical land far across the sea where one could earn ten to twenty times as much as at home first reached the Lemkos and Transcarpathians from their Slovak, Polish, and Hungarian neighbors. In 1877, an opportunity arose to test the veracity of these tales. That year, a Pennsylvania coal company, confronted by a strike, decided to bring in cheap labor from the poorest areas of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to act as strikebreakers. When its agents offered young Lemkos and Transcarpathians money for the journey – to be deducted later from their earnings – the company found many eager takers. As encouraging news (often exaggerated by agents of the steamship companies) and impressive amounts of money began to arrive in their home villages from the early immigrants, the exodus to America grew rapidly.

Like countless immigrants who preceded and followed them, the young

men who made the long, arduous journey to the United States quickly realized that while the country offered many opportunities, it also demanded backbreaking work. From the outset, most of the newcomers were shunted off to the coal mines and steel mills of western Pennsylvania, and the area became the heartland of early Ukrainian immigration. Others found employment in the factories of New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Ohio, and Illinois.

The early years were difficult: the erstwhile villagers were confronted by a strange land and an incomprehensible language; they were thrust into bustling, confusing cities and towns, where they labored among huge, constantly moving, noisy machines. Prior to the First World War, the average earnings of a factory worker or miner were about \$1–2 for a nine-to-ten-hour working day. Usually they lived in crowded company shacks or in boardinghouses. Because the early immigrants intended to return home as soon as they saved several hundred dollars, they were often extremely frugal and spent little money on food, clothing, and other necessities. But many found it difficult to resist the lure of the *korchma* (tavern). The Ukrainian immigrants were generally a self-sufficient and law-abiding group; compared to the other immigrant groups, they had one of the lowest percentages of people on charity (0.04%) or accused of breaking the law (0.02%). In contrast, 4% of the Irish, 1.8% of the German, and 1% of the Polish immigrants were charged with criminal offenses.¹

The seemingly temporary nature of the early immigrants' stay in the United States greatly influenced their attitude toward American society: they neglected to learn English, to establish contacts with Americans, or to obtain United States citizenship. Few showed any interest in the American political process. Their orientation remained focused very much on their homeland. But as immigration continued and grew, changes set in. More and more of the newcomers decided to stay in the United States. Also, Ukrainian women began to arrive in greater numbers, although as late as 1905, they still made up only 25–30% of the immigrants. Usually they worked as domestic help, often for Ukrainian- or Polish-speaking Jewish families. Later, many of them found employment as seamstresses in clothing factories. As families were established in the United States and wives and children came to join their husbands and fathers, Ukrainian communities and neighborhoods evolved.

To service them, the more enterprising immigrants established small businesses such as boardinghouses, groceries, and butcher stores. Not surprisingly, the most lucrative businesses were taverns, and their owners were often the richest and most influential men in the communities. But generally, Ukrainian immigrants were slow to explore ways of making a living except as laborers. Little wonder, for few were prepared to work as anything else. For example, in 1905, a peak year, when 14,500 Ukrainians arrived, only 7 had a higher education (4 of them were priests), 200 were skilled workers or artisans, and the rest were peasants and unskilled laborers. Few went into

farming, for this undertaking required a long-term commitment and considerable capital. The only significant group that did so were the Stundists (a Protestant sect) from Russian-ruled Ukraine who arrived in the 1890s and settled in Virginia and North Dakota.

It is difficult to establish how many Ukrainians there were in the United States prior to the First World War. A complicating factor is that some immigrants made multiple trips between their new and old homelands. Because many Ukrainians were uneducated and their national consciousness was low, they were classified by American immigration authorities and census-takers as Hungarians or Austrians, that is, according to the states from which they had come. Some identified themselves with related and more established groups, such as Slovaks. And because the traditional name for West Ukrainians was Rusyns, many were called Russians. In any case, most estimates place the number of Ukrainians in the United States in 1914 at about 250,000–300,000. About half of these were Transcarpathians and Lemkos, who had started to arrive in the 1880s and 1890s, and the other half were mostly Galicians, who came in appreciable numbers about a decade later. They constituted only a tiny fraction of the approximately 25 million immigrants who arrived in the United States between 1861 and 1914.

Immigrant institutions and organizations In the Ukrainian village, the church was the focus of spiritual and social life. All the major events in a peasant's life – his christening, wedding, and funeral – and most communal festivities were associated with religion. When they arrived in the United States, Ukrainian immigrants sorely missed their churches, without which their lives seemed meaningless, monotonous, and gray. Consequently, the earliest forms of communal organization they set up among themselves were churches and parishes.

In 1884, Ivan Voliansky, an energetic priest from Galicia, arrived in Pennsylvania to minister to his brethren. Within a year he built the first Ukrainian church in America in the town of Shenandoah. He also helped to organize several other parishes in central Pennsylvania. Voliansky was soon joined by a growing number of priests from Galicia and, later, from Transcarpathia. In the final decade of the 19th and the early decades of the 20th century, a wave of church building and parish organizing swept through the evolving immigrant communities. In 1907, the rapidly growing number of Greek Catholic parishes forced the Vatican to establish a Greek Catholic eparchy (diocese) based in Philadelphia and to appoint the Galician monk Soter Ortynsky as its first bishop. By 1913, the Greek Catholic diocese numbered 152 parishes, 154 priests, and about 500,000 parishioners.

But the churches not only served as the focus of communal life, they also became an arena for bitter conflicts engendered by the new American environment. Indeed, for the early immigrants, "church politics" were usually

the only politics that mattered. A major problem, which became acute before the appointment of Ortynsky, was the strained relations that developed between the Greek Catholic immigrants and the largely Irish hierarchy of the Roman Catholic church. Ignorant of the particularities of the Greek Catholic rite and contemptuous of all East Europeans, Roman Catholic bishops often made matters difficult for them. For their part, Greek Catholic parishes frequently refused to surrender the deeds to their newly built churches to the "foreign" bishops as was the practice in the Roman Catholic church. Often the results were bitter lawsuits, forced evictions of parishioners by the police, minor riots, and a deepening of ill feeling on both sides.

Greek Catholic priests who came to the United States with their families had additional reasons for being dissatisfied with the Roman Catholic hierarchy. Because Roman Catholic priests, unlike their Greek Catholic colleagues, were not allowed to marry, Roman Catholic bishops refused to recognize married clergymen from Transcarpathia and Galicia as legitimate priests. As the case of Alexis Toth illustrates, the controversial issue of celibacy soon had major repercussions for both Greek and Roman Catholicism in America.

A respected professor of theology in Transcarpathia, a consecrated priest, and a widower, Toth arrived in Minneapolis in 1889 to serve as the pastor of the local Greek Catholic parish. But because he had been married, the Roman Catholic archbishop excommunicated him. Unable to gain redress and convinced that the ancient Byzantine traditions of his rite, which Rome had recognized, were being trampled, Toth and his 365 parishioners made a dramatic decision in 1891 – they went over to Orthodoxy. In the following decades, tens of thousands of Lemko, Transcarpathian, and Galician immigrants, urged on by the well-financed Russian Orthodox Mission in America, opted for membership in the Russian Orthodox church. By 1914 they constituted the overwhelming majority of the Orthodox in the United States, and Alexis Toth was hailed as the "father of Orthodoxy" in that country.

The rush to Orthodoxy had important national/ethnic implications for the Ukrainian-Rusyn immigrants. Because many of them came from the most underdeveloped and isolated Ukrainian regions, such as Transcarpathia, they were generally untouched by the developing sense of Ukrainian national consciousness. Russophilism was also widespread among their clergy, as it had been in the "Old Country." Consequently, when the uneducated Rusyns entered the Russian Orthodox church in the United States, its hierarchy usually succeeded in convincing them that they were ethnic Russians. Today, at a time of heightened consciousness of ethnic origins, the Americanized descendants of these pseudo-Russians are often at a loss to explain why their "Russian roots" lead back to patently Ukrainian lands.

The Galician/Transcarpathian schism Another divisive conflict that developed within the context of the church was the Galician/Transcarpathian schism.

Transcarpathia, which was ruled by Hungarians until 1918, was one of the areas least exposed to the Galicia-based Ukrainian national movement. Initially, the immigrants who arrived from Transcarpathia and, somewhat later, from Galicia established their communities and churches together because they shared a common language, folk customs, the Greek Catholic rite, and their traditional Rusyn identity. But gradually tensions arose between their respective clergies.

Competition for well-established parishes first divided the two factions. Later, the appointment of Ortynsky, a Galician, as bishop infuriated the Transcarpathian clergy, and they launched a vicious campaign against him and all Galicians. In order to alienate their parishioners from Ortynsky, the Transcarpathian clergy exaggerated the differences between Transcarpathians and Galicians. Because their competitors were nationally conscious Ukrainians, the Ukrainian national movement became a major focus of their attacks. Ortynsky and all Galicians were accused of caring more about nationalism than religion. They were denounced as traitors to Rusyn traditions for adopting the modern term Ukrainian. For good measure, the socially conservative and elitist Transcarpathian priests warned their parishioners that the Galician clergy, many of whom were social activists, were godless, socialist radicals.

For their part, the Galician priests denounced their Transcarpathian rivals as Magyarones who were more loyal to Hungarian interests than to those of their own people. In fact, the Transcarpathian clergy generally did speak Hungarian at home and, quite often, even in church. Some continued to receive money from the Budapest government even after they arrived in the United States. Many openly cooperated with the Hungarian government in its efforts to prevent the spread of Ukrainian national consciousness among Transcarpathian immigrants. In the United States, as in the "Old Country," this undermining was usually done by arguing that the Transcarpathian Rusyns constituted a distinct nationality from their Galician compatriots.

Unable to have one of their own appointed bishop, the Transcarpathian clergy demanded that the Vatican create a separate Greek Catholic diocese. In their words, they could not "acquiesce in being ecclesiastically united with the Galician Ukrainians" because "under the guise of the Catholic church, they might be thrown into the slavery of Ukrainianism."² Anxious to eliminate the constant feuding, the Vatican gave in. In 1916, it created a separate diocese, based in Pittsburgh, for what came to be called the Byzantine Ruthenian Catholic church. In 1924 it consisted of 155 churches, 129 priests, and about 290,000 parishioners. Meanwhile, the original Philadelphia diocese became the base of the Ukrainian Catholic church, which numbered 144 churches, 129 priests, and about 240,000 parishioners. Thus, the Transcarpathian/Galician split became institutionalized.

In the decades after the split, the Transcarpathian church vacillated over which national orientation it should adopt. Unable to decide, it opted to avoid

the issue altogether. Consequently, today it deemphasizes ethnicity and urges its faithful to identify themselves primarily in terms of the Greek Catholic (Byzantine) rite. But the legacy of this bitter Transcarpathian/Galician feud of the late 19th and early 20th centuries remains: although the people in Transcarpathia today consider themselves to be Ukrainians, their distant relatives in the United States still subscribe to the view that they are "anything but Ukrainians."

As a result of these religious and regional controversies, about 20% of the early immigrants from West Ukrainian lands called themselves Orthodox "Russians," another 40% identified themselves as Greek or Byzantine Catholic Ruthenians/Rusyns, and the remaining 40% were Ukrainian Greek Catholics.³

Fraternal organizations Having established their churches, the Ukrainian immigrants next attempted to find communal ways of dealing with their pressing practical needs. Foremost among them was the desire for at least a minimal sense of economic security. Work in the mines and factories was exhausting and dangerous. The hours were long and by American standards, the pay was poor. As might be expected, cases of serious illness, loss of limbs, and fatal accidents were all too frequent. Furthermore, there were no company or government plans to aid those who were incapacitated or their families. In response to the problem, fraternal benefit societies or brotherhoods (*bratstva*) emerged among the various immigrant groups to aid their members.

For a modest monthly payment, these fraternal associations provided insurance in case of illness, incapacitation, or death. Moreover, as their membership and capital grew, they usually sought to address the cultural and educational needs of their members. For the immigrants, the appeal of the fraternal associations was both economic and social: they brought together people of their "own kind" and used their native language. Unlike the churches, the fraternal associations had no roots in the "Old Country"; they were an organic response to the environment encountered by the immigrant in the United States.

In 1885, Reverend Voliansky organized the first Ukrainian fraternal benefit society in America. Consisting of several dozen members, its primary goal was to provide burial costs for deceased colleagues. When Voliansky returned to Galicia, the society disbanded. But others cropped up throughout Pennsylvania. In 1892, the Union of Greek Catholic Russian (Rusyn) Brotherhoods was established and in time grew to considerable size. However, it soon fell under the domination of the pro-Hungarian Transcarpathian clergy and adopted an increasingly hostile attitude toward nationally conscious Ukrainians.

The impetus to found an avowedly Ukrainian fraternal benefit society came from a group of eight young, dynamic, and committed priests who had

recently arrived from Galicia and came to be called the "American Circle." Imbued with the activist spirit of the Galician intelligentsia, the group formed the backbone of the Greek Catholic church's drive for ecclesiastical autonomy. Two of its members, Ivan Konstantynovych and Hryhorii Hrushka, became the founders, in 1894, of a fraternal benefit society called the Russkyi Narodnyi Soiuz (Ruthenian National Union), based in Jersey City. In 1915, this organization changed its name to the Ukrainian National Association. Today, with close to 85,000 members, it is the largest and wealthiest Ukrainian secular organization outside the borders of Ukraine.

During the First World War, it became evident that the immigrants had reached a higher level of political sophistication. In 1914, two central organizations, the Federation of Ukrainians in the United States and its rival, the Ukrainian Alliance of America, gathered substantial amounts of money for refugees displaced by the war in their homeland. Later, in 1919, the Ukrainian National Committee worked closely with diplomats from the various Ukrainian national governments in publishing English-language materials about the Ukrainian question. It also made a concerted effort to convince the White House and Congress to recognize Ukrainian independence.

Immigration to Brazil Initially, Brazil was the most popular destination for West Ukrainians in search of land. In 1895, when agents of Italian shipping companies appeared in Galicia with promises of cheap, fertile land in Brazil, the "Brazilian fever" took hold. Over 15,000 impoverished peasants, who had only the vaguest idea where Brazil was, made their way to that country. But instead of the promised black soil, they received plots of uncleared jungle in the state of Parana, near the town of Prudentopolis.

Left to their own devices, exposed to a debilitating climate, confronted by hostile Indians, and, worst of all, bereft of medical facilities and supplies, many of them perished soon after arrival. Others returned home. The remainder set about making a home in the wilderness. Despite the demoralizing difficulties, the dream of cheap land continued to attract Galicians to Brazil. In the years before the First World War another wave of about 15,000–20,000 Ukrainian immigrants arrived in the Parana region. However, as word of more favorable conditions in the United States and Canada spread, immigration to Brazil shrank. In the interwar period, only 9000 Ukrainians, mainly from Volhynia, went there. After the Second World War, another 7000 joined them. But many of these later left for North America. Today, the Ukrainians in Brazil number an estimated 150,000. Close to 80% of them live in a compact mass in the province of Parana in an area known as "Brazilian Ukraine." The city of Prudentopolis is the center of Ukrainian life in the country. As might be expected, the Ukrainian Catholic church in Brazil, which includes 17 parishes and 52 priests, is by far the strongest Ukrainian institution in the land.

In recent times, a significant and growing minority of Brazil's Ukrainians have become professionals, businessmen, and educators. But the majority of the Ukrainians are still poor farmers, who live much like the early immigrants did. This relative lack of change makes them unique among the Ukrainian communities abroad. Provided with poor land, engaged in unprofitable occupations, and inhabiting underdeveloped and isolated regions, Brazil's Ukrainian farmers are isolated from the modern sectors of Brazil's economy. They continue to live in villages and cottages that look much like those of their ancestors. Although over 90% are Brazilian born, lack of contact with non-Ukrainians has allowed them to retain their language. In many ways, their rural communities are the closest approximation that exists of the 19th-century Galician village.

Immigration to Canada While Brazil was a disappointment, Canada – in time and after tremendous effort – more than lived up to the expectations of Ukrainian immigrants. Its vast prairies soon became the major destination of the land-seeking peasants from Galicia and Bukovyna. The adventurous Ivan Pylypiw and Vasyl Eleniak are commonly considered to be the first Ukrainian immigrants to Canada. The two set out for western Canada in 1891 and liked what they saw. Upon his return to Galicia, Pylypiw convinced six families from his home village of Nebyliw to move to Canada. Consequently, in 1892, the “Nebyliw Group” established the first permanent Ukrainian settlement in Canada in the locality of Edna-Star, near Edmonton in Alberta.

But the individual who was most responsible for transforming the early trickle of immigrants to Canada into a massive migration was Iosyf Oleskiw. A professor of agriculture and a populist committed to aiding the peasantry, he visited Canada in 1895 to observe conditions firsthand. Impressed by the opportunities the Canadian west offered for agricultural settlement, Oleskiw published a number of widely circulated pamphlets that discouraged immigration to Brazil and advised peasants to go to Canada instead. In his successful efforts to popularize immigration to Canada, Oleskiw received support from Canadian authorities. The minister of the interior, Clifford Sifton, was particularly impressed by the suitability of the hardy Ukrainians for taming the wild prairies: “I think a stalwart peasant in a sheepskin coat, born on the soil, whose forefathers have been farmers for ten generations, with a stout wife and half a dozen children, is good quality.”⁴ In time, glowing letters from Canada, which often painted conditions in overly rosy colors, and the exhortations of agents for steamship companies served as the major impetus for the growing immigration to the prairies.

Canada clearly had much to offer. The soil of the prairies was rich, although it did require backbreaking work to clear it of thick brush. Water was plentiful. Wood, scarce and highly prized in the “Old Country,” was abundantly available for fuel and construction. And the climate was much like at home.

Anxious to populate the uninhabited prairies, the government was practically giving land away at the nominal cost of \$10 per 160 acres. Ukrainians were allowed to settle in blocs, so that for miles around they had people of their own kind as neighbors. An added attraction was that Canada's political system was stable and democratic, while its society and economy were modern and expanding.

The opportunities that Canada offered were great, but so was the effort required to take advantage of them. The newcomers arrived in a foreign land with little or no money, unable to speak English and often illiterate. After a long, exhausting journey, they were left to fend for themselves amidst cold, uninhabited plains. Simple survival was the first and most daunting task. To provide shelter against the harsh climate, they built primitive, one-room huts. Lacking money and unable to plant crops until the land was cleared, they faced the threat of constant hunger and even starvation. To earn money for necessities, men crisscrossed the countryside in search of work. Meanwhile, the women were left on their isolated homesteads to improve dwellings or to build new ones, to somehow feed and care for the children, and to begin the backbreaking task of clearing the land. Unable to afford machinery or even draught animals, the immigrants accomplished their work by hand. Usually several years passed before the first crops were ready. And to clear an entire homestead often took fifteen to twenty years of exhausting work.

To make matters worse, the immigrants had to face overt discrimination. Although Sifton and a few government officials recognized the usefulness of Ukrainian immigrants, many Canadians did not. Confronted for the first time by immigrants who were not Anglo-Saxons, the population of western Canada protested against the "dumping of filthy, penniless and ignorant foreigners" in its communities. Many newspapers fulminated against bringing in the "scum of Europe," which would lower the moral and intellectual standards of Canadian society. The fact that the immigrants lived in compact communities, continued to wear traditional clothes, spoke their own language, and worshiped in the Byzantine rite added to their unwelcome foreignness.

Despite these difficulties, the Ukrainian immigrants slowly established themselves. In time they brought millions of acres under cultivation. Their neat, white, thatched cottages and onion-domed churches dotted the broad Canadian plains. When grain prices rose rapidly prior to the First World War, many Ukrainians prospered. As their reputation as hard workers and dedicated farmers grew, public hostility towards them slowly abated. Indeed, Canadians gradually began to recognize the crucial role the hardy Ukrainian immigrant played in transforming the uninhabited prairie into one of the world's most productive grain fields.

By the time the First World War broke out, about 170,000 Ukrainians had come to Canada. Of these, over 85% settled in the prairies. Those Ukrainians who chose to settle in a city usually chose Winnipeg, which became the major

center of Ukrainian-Canadian communal life. Because the total population of the Canadian west in 1896 was only about 200,000, it is evident that the newcomers could not but exert a major impact on the region. If the war had not interrupted the flow of Ukrainians to the Canadian prairies, it might well have become a largely Ukrainian region.

Religious issues As elsewhere, churches were the earliest and strongest institutions established by the immigrants. In Canada, as in the United States, their growth was also accompanied by bitter controversies. Totally lacking Greek Catholic priests, the newcomers turned to their brethren in the United States for help. In 1897, responding to their appeal, Reverend Nestor Dmytriw traveled from Pennsylvania to visit the pioneers on the prairies and to celebrate the first Greek Catholic mass on Canadian soil. In subsequent years, several other Ukrainian priests from Pennsylvania made similar visitations. But these stop-gap measures were clearly incapable of providing stable ecclesiastical leadership and organization for the immigrants.

For its part, the local Roman Catholic hierarchy, which was French Canadian, attempted to impose its jurisdiction over the newcomers. However, in the face of opposition, it retreated. Later, it showed a greater tolerance of Greek Catholics than did the Irish bishops in the United States. Nonetheless, problems remained. Most pressing was the lack of priests. Because a papal edict in 1894 forbade married Greek Catholic priests from serving in North America and because the few celibate priests who emigrated from Galicia usually went to the United States or Brazil, Canada could not depend on the "Old Country" for clergymen. To deal with the dilemma, French and Belgian priests, some of whom accepted the Greek Catholic rite, were assigned to work among the immigrants.

But this measure was unsatisfactory. The immigrants found it difficult to communicate with their non-Ukrainian priests; the celibacy issue was a constant irritant; and the perennial problem of the immigrants' reluctance to deed their churches to Roman Catholic bishops also flared up in Canada. Imbued with the spirit of the New World, many wanted their church to be free of all outside influence.

In 1903, Bishop Serafim, a Russian Orthodox cleric of dubious background, came to Winnipeg from the United States. Backed by a group of radical intelligentsia seeking to create a Ukrainian church that would be independent both of Roman Catholicism and of Russian Orthodoxy, he established the so-called Independent Greek church. His solution for the lack of clergy was straightforward but canonically questionable: he simply ordained about fifty educated and semi-educated community leaders as priests in the new church. These men spread throughout the countryside preaching a brand of Orthodoxy that rejected the authority of any patriarch and accepted trustee ownership of church property. This message obviously appealed to the immigrants,

for in two years the new church gained over 60,000 adherents. However, this allegiance was a transitory phenomenon, and within several years Serafim's church disintegrated.

The threat of losing its faithful to a hybrid form of Orthodoxy galvanized the Greek Catholic church. In 1910, Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, the hierarch of the Greek Catholic church in Galicia, toured the Ukrainian-Canadian communities in a morale-boosting and fact-finding mission. Several years later he convinced the Belgian Redemptorist Order to establish a Greek Catholic rite branch in Galicia. Some of its celibate members were then sent as missionaries to Canada's Ukrainian communities. Responding to Sheptytsky's appeals, in 1912 the Vatican appointed Nykyta Budka as the first Greek Catholic bishop in Canada. Unlike Ortynsky in the United States, Budka received far-ranging authority from the outset. Soon, Greek Catholic churches, parishes, and schools multiplied in the prairies. By 1931, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic church encompassed about 58% of Ukrainians in Canada and had 100 priests and 350 parishes. But because about 80% of immigrants had originally been Greek Catholic, it was evident that Budka's church had suffered serious losses.

Many of those who rejected Greek Catholicism entered the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox church, formed in 1918. The base of support for this church was varied. It included the rising Ukrainian-Canadian intelligentsia (mostly bilingual teachers) who espoused the anticlericalism of the Galician Radical party, Orthodox Bukovynians, and the former members of Serafim's defunct church. Because its clergy was Ukrainian and because it was committed to retaining Ukrainian ecclesiastical traditions and practices, the Orthodox church in Canada became closely associated with the growth of Ukrainian national consciousness, which greatly added to its popularity. Thus, while only 15% of the Ukrainians who came to Canada were originally Orthodox, by 1931, over 24% of Ukrainian Canadians belonged to the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox church. The Presbyterian church, which actively proselytized among the Ukrainians, also attracted a considerable number of the immigrants.

Secular organizations Like the churches, the first secular organizations among the immigrants were transplants from the the "Old Country." As they did in the villages of Galicia and Bukovyna, the Prosvita societies, reading rooms (*chytalni*), and community centers (*narodni domy*) spread throughout the prairies. By 1925, there were about 250 such cultural/educational organizations in Canada.

In terms of formal education, the Ukrainian Canadians briefly enjoyed an advantage that no other Ukrainian immigration possessed. Because their rural communities were totally or overwhelmingly Ukrainian, they were allowed to establish publicly financed bilingual school systems. Approximately 400 such school districts, located mostly in Manitoba, were in existence by

1916. To provide teachers for these schools, the Manitoba government established the Ruthenian Training School in Winnipeg in 1907. Well-versed in both English and Ukrainian, its graduates formed a core of secular, educated community leaders.

But the First World War and a mounting anti-foreigner hysteria brought an end to the bilingual school systems. Nevertheless, the immigrants were determined that their children should receive a Ukrainian-language as well as an English-language education. In part, private Greek Catholic schools founded by the Basilian Order and the Serving Sisters responded to this need. Parish-based *ridni shkoly* also proliferated. However, members of the anticlerical intelligentsia sought other options. In 1916, they founded the Mohyla Ukrainian Institute in Saskatoon. Essentially, the institute was a student residence (*bursa*) whose main function was to provide a Ukrainian environment, including courses in the Ukrainian language, literature, and history, for rural students who had come to the city to complete their education. Similar institutes or *bursy*, usually affiliated with various religious denominations, were also organized in Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Toronto. Members of these institutes also added greatly to the growing ranks of Ukrainian political and cultural activists.

Although prior to the First World War most Ukrainians in Canada had been unsophisticated peasant-farmers, signs of a growing political awareness had emerged among them. One form of political activity reflected the ideological trends spreading in their homeland. In 1907 prominent Ukrainian-Canadian leaders, such as Kyrilo Genyk-Berezovsky, Ivan Bodrug, Ivan Negrych, Myroslav Stechishin, and Taras Ferley (all socialists of the Galician Radical party mold), founded the Ukrainian Socialist Union. Simultaneously, they and others became involved in local Canadian politics. Given their majority in many localities, by 1902 the Ukrainians had already elected their countrymen to municipal office. In 1913, Andrew Shandro won a seat in the Alberta provincial parliament.

Canadian political commentators noted, with some alarm, that "one fact stands out with tremendous clearness – the Ruthenians have become a force ... throughout the prairies."⁵ But if Ukrainians assumed that they were fully integrated into the Canadian political system, they were rudely disabused of this notion during the First World War. Because many of the immigrants still held Austrian passports, about 6000 were classified as "enemy aliens" and incarcerated in detention camps for the duration of the war.

The Second Wave: Immigrants and Émigrés of the Interwar Period

During the interwar period Ukrainian immigration to the West continued. However, it was notably different from the pre-1914 phase. A most striking feature was that the number of immigrants declined. Prior to the First World

War, well over 500,000 Ukrainians had immigrated to the West; in the interwar period the number dropped to about 200,000. The Great Depression and the resultant lack of employment in the United States and Canada was primarily responsible for the decline.

There were also considerable differences in the destinations available to the emigrants. Canada remained a favorite goal. But poor economic conditions in the farming regions and more restrictive immigration policies limited the number of new Ukrainian arrivals to 70,000 during the interwar period. Many tended to settle in cities such as Winnipeg, Toronto, and Montreal rather than in the western prairies. A more dramatic change occurred in the United States. There, extremely restrictive measures were taken against immigration during the depression years. Consequently, only about 10,000 Ukrainians entered the country between the wars, a drastic drop from the hundreds of thousands who crowded to its shores before 1914.

Although some countries no longer needed cheap labor, others continued to welcome it. In South America, Argentina opened its doors to immigrants, which it needed both to settle its vast expanses of territory and to work in the factories of its growing cities. About 40,000 Ukrainians immigrated there. Meanwhile, France, which also needed workers for the factories and mines in the north of the country near Metz, also accepted approximately 30,000–40,000 West Ukrainian laborers.

The Ukrainian émigrés Perhaps the most striking feature of the interwar exodus was that it also contained a new type of Ukrainian emigrant – the political émigré. After the defeat of the various Ukrainian governments in 1918–20, tens of thousands of their supporters – soldiers, officers, government functionaries, and, mainly, the nationally conscious intelligentsia and their families – followed them into exile. Initially, they numbered close to 100,000. But in 1923, when the situation in Galicia stabilized, most of the West Ukrainian émigrés returned home. Thereafter, the political emigration, numbering about 40,000–50,000, consisted largely of easterners from Soviet-occupied Ukraine.

These refugees had been forced to flee because of their political convictions. Although many of them were simple soldiers, a large portion were members of the pre-1917 Ukrainian national intelligentsia. Indeed, they included some of its most illustrious representatives. Ideologically committed, frequently idealistic, and obsessed with the mistakes of the recent past, they were often people who had held responsible positions. For many, the desire to help Ukraine achieve independence remained an overriding concern. In order to be close to their homeland, most settled in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Like all political emigrants, these Ukrainians were prone to extensive fragmentation and infighting. Supporters of the various governments-in-exile often laid more blame on each other for their defeats than on the Bolsheviks.

And they expended much time and effort in attempts to secure for their respective factions the mantle of national leadership. Some became political adventurers and opportunists in the service of foreign governments. Yet, given the many well-educated, talented, and committed individuals in their ranks, they also had noteworthy achievements to their credit. By means of numerous publications and scholarly institutions, they introduced West Europeans to Ukrainian national aspirations. They expressed these aspirations in terms of new, sophisticated ideologies. Their varied cultural activities were often of high quality – an impressive fact because they were carried out amidst dire economic difficulties and political instability.

The majority of the East Ukrainian émigrés left their homeland in the fall of 1920, when the army of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) retreated into Poland. About 30,000 were interned in a series of camps. Meanwhile, the Petliura government-in-exile set up its headquarters in Tarnow. But by 1923, when the Poles withdrew their support for Petliura, Poland was no longer a hospitable refuge. Some émigrés remained, especially in Polish-occupied Volhynia; most, however, moved on to Czechoslovakia. Because of the Czechs' humane treatment of refugees in general, and the help it provided young Ukrainians in obtaining a higher education in particular, Prague soon became the major center of Ukrainian political emigration.

With the financial support of the Czech government, institutions such as the Ukrainian Free University in Prague and the Ukrainian Academy of Husbandry and Technology in Podebrady were established. During the interwar period, they produced hundreds of graduates. Meanwhile, Ukrainian scholarly research institutes were founded in Berlin and Warsaw. Numerous newspapers and publishing enterprises also came into being.

The various defeated Ukrainian governments continued a precarious existence in exile. While part of Petliura's UNR government remained in Warsaw, Petliura himself moved to Paris where a UNR diplomatic mission, led by Oleksander Shulhyn, was still active. There, in 1926, he was assassinated by Samuel Shwartzbart, a Jew whom Ukrainian émigrés considered to be a Bolshevik agent. (For their part, Jews praised Shwartzbart as an avenger of the pogroms that had occurred in Ukraine during the Civil War.) Hetman Skoropadsky and the Ukrainian monarchists established themselves in Berlin. After the West Ukrainian government dissolved itself in 1923, Petrushevych also settled in the German capital. Later, Konovalets and the OUN had their headquarters in Berlin for a time. Ukrainian socialists led by Mykyta Shapoval, and liberals such as Dmytro Doroshenko, congregated in Prague. As we have seen, an important contribution of the East Ukrainian émigrés was their elaboration and expansion of Ukrainian ideologies. In Galicia, Dontsov became the ideologue of integral nationalism, while in Vienna, Lypynsky expounded his influential and original views on Ukrainian monarchism and conservatism.

The politicization of Ukrainians abroad Events in Ukraine in 1917–20 aroused interest in Ukrainian political issues, even among those who had emigrated for socioeconomic reasons. This interest was further heightened when new, ideologically committed arrivals joined their communities in the 1920s. A variety of political organizations emerged wherever Ukrainians were concentrated. Soon ideological confrontations began to overshadow religious rivalries as the major bone of contention among the immigrants.

The first to organize were the socialists. As we have seen, already in 1907 a Ukrainian Marxist group was founded in Canada. That same year a socialist club, called the Haidamaks, emerged in New York. Its appeal was that its members addressed, in Ukrainian, concrete issues such as better wages and working conditions for laborers and fairer pricing policies for farmers. The group also provided an organizational base for those who resented the powerful influence that priests wielded in the Ukrainian communities.

After the First World War, impressed by the Ukrainization and modernization process in Soviet Ukraine and disillusioned by the depression in the West, about 1000 Ukrainians entered the Canadian Communist party in which they constituted over one-third of the membership. In 1918, those Ukrainians who were pro-Communist, but preferred to belong to purely Ukrainian organizations, established the Ukrainian Labor Temple Association. For decades, it was the largest pro-Communist ethnic organization in Canada. Dynamic and well organized, the association carried on educational and cultural work as well as ideological indoctrination. By 1939, it boasted over 10,000 committed members. Although the pro-Communists encompassed only about 5% of Ukrainian Canadians, their influence in the Ukrainian-Canadian community was far-reaching.

By the late 1920s, nationalist organizations began to emerge. Consisting largely of post-1920 émigrés, they espoused the cause of Ukrainian independence and were uncompromisingly anti-Communist. Among the first to organize were the supporters of Hetman Skoropadsky. Committed to establishing a Ukrainian monarchy and intent on imbuing Ukrainians with military (“Cossack”) virtues, in 1924 they established a network of Sich organizations in the cities of Canada and the United States. Although never numerous, they were well organized. Their smartly uniformed members often participated in military maneuvers. Some branches even owned their own airplanes. The conservative ideology of these Ukrainian monarchists appealed to the Ukrainian Catholic clergy, which lent them its support.

It was, however, the OUN brand of nationalism that exerted the strongest appeal among Ukrainians abroad. At the initiative of Konovalts, pro-OUN organizations, which usually included a mixture of urban-based first- and second-wave immigrants, were created in all major Ukrainian communities in the West. Thus, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, UNO (Ukrainian National Union) was founded in Canada and ODWU (Organization for the Rebirth of

Ukrainian Statehood) in the United States. Similar organizations appeared in France and Argentina. Their numerous members preached ultranationalism, protested against Polish and Soviet mistreatment of their compatriots, and collected funds for the OUN. The vast majority of Ukrainian community activists in the interwar period belonged to or sympathized with one or another of the nationalist organizations.

Assimilation While some immigrants were deeply immersed in Ukrainian politics, many grew increasingly estranged from things Ukrainian. This was especially so in the United States, where immigrants were systematically urged to assimilate into the American "melting pot." Exposed to intense assimilationist pressures in the schools and repulsed by the constant infighting and bickering in their communities, young Ukrainians often opted to dissociate themselves completely from their ethnic roots. In Canada, where Ukrainians lived in self-contained communities, assimilatory pressures were weaker. But even here, the national consciousness of the early immigrants was weaker than that of recent arrivals. It was evident that wherever Ukrainians settled, assimilation into the dominant culture became, to a greater or lesser degree, an inescapable fact of life.

The Third Wave: The Post-Second World War Displaced Persons

When the Second World War ended, Germany and Austria teemed with over 16 million foreign workers, prisoners of war, and refugees. Of these, about 2.3 million were Ukrainians. The overwhelming majority of them were the *Ostarbeiter*, mostly young boys and girls from Soviet Ukraine who had been forcibly torn from their homes and subjected to years of exhausting and demeaning labor in Germany. As soon as hostilities ceased, the Soviets sent in repatriation missions composed of officers and propagandists to convince Soviet citizens, by all means possible, to return home. During the repatriation process, most of the *Ostarbeiter* returned, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to the USSR. But about 210,000 Ukrainians refused under any circumstances to do so. More than 2.5 million East Europeans also did not go back to their Soviet-dominated homelands. These people came to be called displaced persons (DPS).

To care for the masses of homeless refugees, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) was formed in 1945. Two years later, the International Relief Organization (IRO) took over this role. Basically, these organizations sought to provide the DPS with a modicum of food and shelter until they could be permanently resettled. Often grouped by nationality, the refugees were concentrated in "camps," that is, requisitioned schools, army barracks, and public buildings. Because they were allowed to elect their own leadership to look after administration as well as educational and cultural af-

fairs, these camps, which were located in the American-, British-, and French-occupied zones of Germany, were often referred to as "DP republics."

About two-thirds of the Ukrainian refugees lived in the camps, eighty of which were all-Ukrainian. The remainder found private accommodations. Some of the major camps were located in American-occupied Bavaria, specifically in Munich, Mittenwald, Regensburg, Berchtesgaden, and Augsburg. On the average, these large camps had a population of 2000–4000.

The Ukrainian DPs were highly heterogeneous. A minority of about 20% were political refugees par excellence. Consisting largely of members of the intelligentsia, they rejected the Soviet system and fled, often under harrowing circumstances, before the advancing Red Army. The vast majority were workers, who had been forcefully brought to Germany during the war. By refusing the Soviets' insistent repatriation attempts, they, too, became refugees. About two-thirds of the DPs were from Galicia and belonged to the Greek Catholic church, and the remaining third were from Soviet Ukraine and were Orthodox. Other important subgroups among the DPs were émigrés from the 1920s period; Ukrainian students in Germany; former German prisoners of war; and released inmates of the concentration camps. In Italy, there were about 10,000 members of the interned Galicia Division. And in 1947–48, several hundred UPA soldiers, who had fought their way from the Carpathians through Czechoslovakia to Germany, also joined the DPs. Thus, this largest of all Ukrainian political emigrations reflected Ukraine's various regions, religions, social classes, and cultural and political traditions.

Unlike previous emigrations, the DPs had a large pool of well-educated people among them. The numerous professionals included about 1000 teachers, 400 engineers, 350 lawyers, 300 physicians and an equal number of clergy, and close to 200 scholars. There were also more than 2000 university students. Judging by these numbers, it was clear that a large part of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia had chosen not to stay under Soviet rule.

For many of the camp inhabitants, the two to three years they spent there was a unique and not altogether unpleasant experience. The "DP republics" had a surfeit of young, energetic, and educated people. Although simple food and shelter (terribly crowded) were available, jobs in the shattered German economy were practically impossible to find. Therefore, partly in response to pressing needs, partly to express what had been long repressed, and partly to avoid boredom, the DPs generated an extraordinary amount of organizational, cultural, educational, and political activity.

Statistics underscore this point. Despite very limited material resources, the Ukrainian DPs maintained 2 university-level institutions, about 40 *gymnazia* (high schools), and over 100 elementary schools. They also operated dozens of vocational courses, established 85 parishes, and rebuilt Plast, the scouting organization. Cultural activity was especially great. The camps had 35 libraries, 41 choruses, 13 orchestras, 33 theatrical groups, and 3 profes-



Map 29 Destinations of Ukrainian emigrants

sional theatrical troupes. They staged over 1400 plays, 900 concerts, and 350 cultural-commemorative events (*akademii*). A vibrant if qualitatively uneven press produced about 230 periodicals and over 800 books. Young DPS also plunged into other activities. Forced to delay marriages and childbirth by the conditions of war, they established families at a rapid rate.

But the hothouse atmosphere of the camps also brought out negative features among the DPS. Forced to live in close proximity, West and East (Soviet) Ukrainians became painfully aware of the considerable social, cultural, and psychological differences between them. The Catholic/Orthodox split only exacerbated the problem. Most destructive were the feuds that broke out among the numerous political parties that emerged in the camps. Especially bitter, even murderous, was the unabated conflict between the Bandera and Melnyk factions of the OUN. Intent on establishing its political and ideological hegemony over the entire emigration, the numerous Bandera faction was particularly aggressive and domineering. Although the Banderites failed to gain a substantial following among the intelligentsia, they did exert a strong influence among the peasants and workers, who constituted the majority of the refugees. Among refugees from Eastern Ukraine, the Revolutionary Democratic party led by the noted author Ivan Bahriany had a substantial following.

Between 1947 and 1951 the resettlement of the DPS to their permanent homes occurred. The approximate numbers of those who left Germany and Austria for various countries were: United States 80,000; Canada 30,000; Australia 20,000; Great Britain 20,000; Belgium 10,000; France 10,000; Brazil 7000; Argentina 6000. Many of those who went to Britain, France, Belgium, and Latin America eventually settled in North America.



The decision to leave their homeland was one of the most crucial that individual Ukrainians made. Its influence on the socioeconomic, cultural, psychological, and political aspects of their lives was deep and dramatic. Invariably, the question arises of who made the more fortunate choice, those who left or those who stayed behind. Because no empirical studies of this fascinating question have been conducted, one is forced to respond through impressionistic observations.

It would appear that in material terms at least, those who emigrated fared better than those who did not. The emigrants also avoided many of the catastrophes that befell their former homeland in modern times. They enjoyed the priceless advantage of living in free and open societies. But the costs of leaving the homeland were considerable; usually they included gnawing homesickness, psychological insecurity, alienation, and discrimination. For the political émigrés, who had held responsible positions at home, there was often a precipitous drop in social status as a result of their inability to find work

in their fields of specialization. Nonetheless, it seems that for those who emigrated, the decision brought a net gain. Ukraine's society, however, probably suffered a net loss. Judging by the emigrants' organizational activity alone, it is evident that Ukraine lost some of its most energetic inhabitants. And in their host countries the contribution of the hard-working Ukrainians has been clearly positive – in Canada, dramatically so.

The Ukrainian Diaspora

Today over 2.5 million people of Ukrainian descent live outside the borders of the Soviet Union. In terms of ethnic consciousness, they can be divided roughly into three categories. The largest consists of those whose forefathers left their homeland three, four, and even five generations ago. By and large, they no longer speak Ukrainian, have little or no contact with Ukrainian organizations, and are often only vaguely conscious of their ethnic roots. Another category, usually a generation or two removed from the homeland, is familiar with and even fond of Ukrainian culture but does little to preserve it. The third category is the small but committed minority that still manages to preserve its ethnic heritage. Composed largely of the post-Second World War émigrés and their children, but also including some members of earlier immigrations, it forms the core of the Ukrainian communities in the West.



The Ukrainian Americans

As might be expected, the most numerous, best-organized, and dynamic Ukrainian communities abroad are to be found in the United States and Canada. Surveying first the situation in the United States, it is apparent that a strong point of Ukrainian Americans is their relatively large numbers. Most Ukrainians who left their homeland came to the United States, and their immigration was well spaced. The earliest arrivals established the organizational backbone of the community – the churches and fraternal organizations – which were expanded during the interwar period by another wave of immigrants. The post-Second World War World War immigrants arrived just in time to replace the “old” immigrants. With many institutions and organizations already in place, they were able to concentrate on forming new ones. Thus the Ukrainians in the United States have been able to maintain a sense of conti-

nity and growth. They are fortunate to live in a society that provides them with numerous opportunities and resources for developing their communal life.

But for those who wished to maintain their ethnic heritage, the United States also had its drawbacks. Economic constraints forced Ukrainians to settle in urban centers where it was difficult to maintain the traditions of a peasant people. Until recently, the educational system was geared to assimilating immigrants into the American melting pot. Although numerous compared to their compatriots elsewhere in the West, Ukrainians are relatively insignificant among the many ethnic groups in the United States. In terms of numbers, they rank twenty-first nationally and ninth in the Middle Atlantic states where they are concentrated. And their political influence is even less than might be expected. The large influx of *DPS* has had a generally positive impact. It reinvigorated the Ukrainian community and greatly expanded its range of activities. However, the *DPS*' high degree of politicization, particularly the Melnykite/Banderite feud, has made the Ukrainian-American community the most politically fragmented in the West.

What socioeconomic features distinguish the Ukrainian American from the average American? Traditionally, the Ukrainians have been marked by a relatively low level of education. This circumstance is not surprising because the early and most numerous immigrants arrived from one of the most backward regions in Europe and with an illiteracy rate of about 50%. Consequently, even American-born Ukrainians have long been overrepresented in blue-collar jobs and underrepresented in white-collar occupations. But recent studies indicate that the situation is changing. If current trends among younger Ukrainians continue, it is likely that they will surpass both the white population in the United States and some of the other East European ethnic groups in terms of educational level. The children of the post-Second World War refugees have been particularly successful in attaining managerial and professional status. Thus, it is safe to say that Ukrainians are now solidly ensconced in the American middle class.

On the whole, Ukrainian families are less "modern" than the average American family: they have fewer single-parent families and more of them have parents and other elderly relatives living with them. They marry later, delay childbearing longer, and stay single more often. As befits their generally rural roots, they tend to be conservative in their politics and mores.

Observers have noted that the Ukrainian-American community has a strikingly large number of organizations. Indeed, some argue that it is over organized. The highly developed Galician/Bukovynian tradition of communal organization, the fact that each wave of immigrants established its own organizations, and the attempts of the *DPS* (many of whom were community activists in Galicia) to reconstruct in America many of the organizations they led at home help to explain this phenomenon.

Today, the strongest Ukrainian institutions in the United States are those that the earliest immigrants established, that is, the churches and the fraternal associations. The Ukrainian Catholic church encompasses about 200 parishes and 285,000 faithful, the various Ukrainian Orthodox churches have about 125,000 members, and the Baptists claim a membership of 50,000. Among the fraternal, the Ukrainian National Association (UNA), with 85,000 members, is by far the largest and richest. It publishes *Svoboda*, the oldest and most widely read Ukrainian daily in the West, and the lively, informative English-language *Ukrainian Weekly*. The Ukrainian Fraternal Association (previously called the Ukrainian Workingmen's Association) has about 25,000 members and publishes *Narodnia Volia* and the well-edited *Forum* magazine. The Providence Association of Ukrainian Catholics has 19,000 members and its press organ is the daily *Ameryka*. The list of other periodicals is too lengthy to enumerate.

Until recently, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA) functioned as the representative and coordinating body for all the Ukrainian organizations in the United States. However, when the Bandera faction and its sympathizers gained control of it in 1980, a counter organization, the Ukrainian American Coordinating Council, was formed. As a result of this split, Ukrainian Americans were deprived of a single, generally recognized body that could legitimately claim to represent them all.

Continuing in the Galician tradition and responding to local needs, the post-Second World War immigrants to the United States have established a growing network of savings and loan associations and credit unions. Together with similar institutions in Canada and elsewhere in the world, they have a membership of about 120,000 and combined assets of close to \$1 billion. Another carryover from the "Old Country" is a well-organized women's association, the Ukrainian National Women's League (3700 members and 83 branches in the United States). Of the numerous youth organizations, the strongest are the scouting association Plast and the more nationalistic, pro-Banderite Association of Ukrainian Youth (SUM). Both have a membership of about 4000. Numerous professional societies unite Ukrainian engineers, physicians, professors, teachers, writers, journalists, and businesspeople. Young people are often drawn to the dance ensembles and choruses that are usually found in Ukrainian communities.

Teaching their children the Ukrainian language, history, and culture has always been a major concern of the immigrants. The Ukrainian Catholic school system, which in 1970 consisted of fifty-four parochial schools, six high schools, and two junior colleges, with a total of about 16,000 students, provides varying degrees of ethnic education in addition to its English-language and religious curriculum. The so-called Saturday schools stress exclusively Ukrainian subjects. In 1970 there were about fifty such schools with approximately 3700 students and 200 instructors. On the scholarly level, two in-

stitutions, the Shevchenko Scientific Society and the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences, strive to carry on the traditions of their Lviv- and Kiev-based namesakes. Clearly the most impressive achievement of the Ukrainian American community in terms of preserving its cultural heritage was the endowment in 1970 of three chairs in Ukrainian studies at Harvard University. Subsequently, the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute was established. The leadership of Omeljan Pritsak of Harvard, as well as the generosity of over 10,000 Ukrainian donors, was largely responsible for the successful completion of this \$6 million project.

Another high point in the recent history of the Ukrainian Americans was the raising of a statue of Taras Shevchenko in Washington in 1964, which drew together about 100,000 Ukrainians. In the 1970s, many Ukrainians protested against the Russification of their homeland and demonstrated on behalf of Soviet Ukrainian dissidents. The release and arrival in North America of such dissidents as Valentyn Moroz, Petro Grigorenko, Sviatoslav Karavansky, Nina Strokata-Karavansky, Nadia Svitlychna, Leonid Pliushch (to France), and, most recently, Raisa and Mykola Rudenko greatly buoyed the spirits of the Ukrainian community. But these were deflated in the 1980s when the issue of war crimes during the Second World War, and especially the controversial John Demjanjuk case, raised tensions between the Ukrainian and Jewish communities. In 1983, as they marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Great Famine, Ukrainians succeeded in familiarizing many Americans with this catastrophe. And in 1988 they marshaled their forces to mark the millennium of Christianity in Ukraine.

Clearly the past looms large in the consciousness of Ukrainians in the United States. Some might argue that this orientation on the past exists, in part at least, because their future as a community is not promising. New immigration has practically ceased. Links with their Soviet-controlled homeland are tenuous and fraught with mutual suspicion. Many organizations are obviously on their last legs. And assimilation is moving apace. In 1980, of about 730,000 people of Ukrainian descent in the United States (this number does not include the approximately 500,000 descendants of the Transcarpathian/Ruthenian/Rusyn immigrants) only 123,000 declared Ukrainian to be their primary language. But there are also hopeful signs. Unlike its predecessors, the post-Second World War immigration, thanks to its many youth-oriented organizations, has had notable success in raising a new generation of community activists. Most of them are professionals by occupation and know the American environment well. Meanwhile, a new tolerance for ethnic diversity has emerged in the United States. Finally, many American-born Ukrainians are beginning to discover the psychological and social advantages of belonging to an ethnic in-group. It is, therefore, possible that the century-old Ukrainian community in the United States has more life in it than many pessimists contend.

The Ukrainian Canadians

Of all the Ukrainian communities in the West, the Ukrainian Canadians are in the most advantageous position. Numbering about 750,000 (of whom 530,000 have parents who are both Ukrainians), they are close to their compatriots in the United States in terms of numbers. But their profile and influence in their country are much greater. Because the population of Canada is only one-tenth that of the United States, the Ukrainian Canadians are, in effect, a bigger fish in a smaller pond. Ukrainians in the United States hold the twenty-first position in terms of ethnic group size, but in Canada they rank fifth, constituting 3% of the total population. As the people that settled much of the Canadian prairies, they lay claim to pioneer status. Some Ukrainians even argue that they are one of the “founding nations” of the country. Because they settled in solid blocs, the early immigrants to Canada have withstood assimilation much better than their counterparts in the United States. This homogeneity is reflected in the relatively large number of Ukrainians of the third, fourth, and even fifth generation that still speak the language of their forefathers and participate in Ukrainian community affairs.

Yet foreboding developments also confront Ukrainian Canadians: modernization is threatening their sense of community. The global trend toward urbanization is breaking up the rural bloc settlements in the prairies, the bastions of Ukrainian life in Canada. In 1931 over 80% of Ukrainian Canadians lived in a rural setting; today over 75% are city dwellers. Edmonton, Winnipeg, and especially Toronto, where many DPs settled, are now the centers of Ukrainian life in Canada. Although each of these cities has a large and active community of about 70,000–80,000 Ukrainians and part-Ukrainians, urban life in Canada is clearly not conducive to the retention of Ukrainian ethnic identity. A variety of statistics bear out this assertion. In 1921, over 90% of Ukrainian Canadians declared that their mother tongue was Ukrainian; in 1971, only 49% did so, and the percentage has been dropping rapidly since then. In 1931, over 80% intermarried within their own group; today, less than 50% do so. Even the churches face an uncertain future. In 1931 the Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox denominations encompassed 82% of Ukrainians; today, the figure is only 52%.

But if Ukrainian Canadians have problems similar to those of their compatriots south of the border, they are better equipped to deal with them. In general, they are more effectively organized than the latter. For example, Ukrainian Canadians have managed to preserve a single, generally recognized umbrella organization – the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC). Moreover, Toronto is the base of the WCFU (World Congress of Free Ukrainians). Many of the organizations that the DPs established in the United States can also be found in Canada. And the ties between them are close. However, in the United States many of the “old-immigrant” organizations – except for the

churches and the fraternal associations – have faded, whereas in Canada a considerable number continue to exist. As well, Canada has a strong network of Ukrainian professional and business clubs, which have been able to attract a young, upwardly mobile, professional membership. Especially popular with the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the early immigrants are the numerous dance ensembles. In western Canada alone, there are over 150 such groups with about 10,000 members. But the organizational strength of the Ukrainians in Canada should not be exaggerated. Only an estimated 10–15% belong to the community organizations. In order to attract new members, some groups are deemphasizing political and nationalist features and concentrating on cultural and social activities.

Unlike their compatriots in the United States, Ukrainian Canadians have developed a cultural tradition of their own. Writers such as Iliia Kiriak have skillfully depicted, in both Ukrainian and English, the experiences of the pioneer generation. The nationally famous painter William Kurelek frequently utilized Ukrainian motifs. The architect Radoslav Zhuk has intertwined traditional and modern elements in the architecture of Ukrainian churches. On the debit side, however, Ukrainians in Canada, particularly those in the west, tend to be more provincial and strictly folklore-oriented in their approach to Ukrainian culture than those in the United States. This may be a result, in part, of the fact that a smaller portion of the Ukrainian intelligentsia that emigrated came to Canada than to the United States.

Like the Ukrainian Americans, the Ukrainian Canadians also have a network of Saturday schools and *ridni shkoly*, which are geared primarily toward the children of DPs. However, it is also possible to study Ukrainian as a subject in public schools in Canada and about 10,000 pupils do so. Recently, bilingual Ukrainian-English schooling was introduced in the prairie provinces. Another contrast lies in the sources of support for Ukrainian studies on the university level. Unlike the privately funded Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, its counterpart in Canada, the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (established in 1976 and initially headed by Manoly Lupul), is supported by the government of the province of Alberta. Ukrainian studies at universities in Toronto, Winnipeg, Saskatoon, and elsewhere are also publicly funded to a large extent.

A striking feature of the Ukrainian-Canadian community is the relatively large number of its members that have gained political office on various levels. Ukrainians have been mayors of such large cities as Edmonton and Winnipeg. Close to a 100 Ukrainian Canadians have been elected to provincial legislatures, primarily in the prairie provinces. About thirty have been members of the federal parliament. There have been five Ukrainian senators and dozens of federal and provincial cabinet ministers. Although far from being a major political force in Canada, the Ukrainian Canadians wield more political influence than any other Ukrainian community in the West.

During the Second World War, about 35,000–40,000 Ukrainians, roughly 15% of their total number, volunteered for the Canadian armed forces. Ukrainian Canadians still point with pride to this high percentage. But after the war, Ukrainian Canadians again turned on each other. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the struggle between the pro-Communists and nationalists flared up anew. Benefiting from their association with the victorious Soviets, the Ukrainian pro-Communists were in a strong position. Membership in the Ukrainian Labor Temple Association was at an all-time high of 13,000 in 1946. It was, therefore, with some confidence that they tried to block the immigration of nationalistic and anti-Soviet Ukrainian DPS to Canada. These efforts failed, however, and other setbacks followed. As the Cold War and postwar prosperity set in, communism lost its appeal. Many of the genuine Ukrainian patriots among the pro-Communists became disillusioned by Russification in Ukraine and by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Gradually, the more dynamic, articulate DPS became the dominant force in the Ukrainian-Canadian community. Today a handful of aging Ukrainian pro-Communists, who are heavily involved in commercial transactions with the USSR, is all that is left of their once-powerful movement.

Another major concern of the Ukrainian-Canadian community was multiculturalism, an issue that emerged in the 1960s. Influenced by the new militancy of the French in Quebec, ethnic groups that belonged to the so-called third element, that is, the non-English and non-French segments of Canadian society, confronted the government with their cultural demands. Ukrainians were in the forefront of those who successfully pressured the government to formulate a policy of multiculturalism and, in 1987, to enshrine multiculturalism in the constitution.

Highlights in the activity of the Ukrainian-Canadian community during the 1970s and 1980s have been the growth of Ukrainian studies at the university level and the publication of the English-language *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, a major project of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies which is based on Volodymyr Kubijovyč's original ten-volume work in Ukrainian. Support for Soviet Ukrainian dissidents led to the release and arrival in Canada in 1987 of Danylo Shumuk and Iosyp Terelia. In the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Great Famine of 1932–33, Ukrainian Canadians produced a widely acclaimed documentary film about the famine. As in the United States, in the mid 1980s the war crimes issue aroused passions and raised tensions between Ukrainians and Jews.

Ukrainian Communities beyond North America

The Ukrainian immigrant communities that exist outside North America may be divided into two categories. One is characterized by a prevalence of largely assimilated "old immigrants," with a small admixture of DPS. It includes the Ukrainians of Brazil, Argentina, and other Latin American countries. By and

large, these communities are worse off economically than others in the West. Even today, a huge proportion of their members are poor farmers. Although their numbers are considerable, they are organizationally weak. In these communities, the churches are the main, and often the only, focus of communal life. Because of the preponderance of pre-Second World War immigrants, the Ukrainians in France may also be included in this group. However, they differ from the aforementioned in that their descendants are mostly employed in industry and maintain a relatively high West European standard of living. France has also provided a home for small but important segments of both the so-called Petliurist and DP emigrations. For example, in the post-Second World War period, Sarcelles, outside of Paris, became a major center for DP scholars. There, under the leadership of Volodymyr Kubijovyč, and with the financial support of Ukrainians throughout the West, the Ukrainian-language "Encyclopedia of Ukrainian Lore" (*Entsyklopedia ukraïnoznavstva*) was produced.

The other category of Ukrainian immigrant communities consists almost exclusively of DPs and their children. And the Ukrainians of Germany, Britain, and Australia fall into this group.

Germany In Germany, the community is composed primarily of the tiny portion of refugees and their descendants who, for a variety of reasons, did not join the great exodus from the DP camps in the late 1940s. Some were too old to begin life anew. Others were associated with political parties that retained their headquarters in Germany because of its proximity to Ukraine. For Stepan Bandera, the leader of OUN(R), and for another prominent nationalist, Lev Rebet, staying in Germany proved to be fatal. In 1957, Bohdan Stashynsky, a Soviet agent, stealthily assassinated Rebet; two years later he killed Bandera.

In Munich, the Ukrainian Free University, an émigré institution that dates back to the 1920s, continues to function. Thus, while Germany has been the home for a considerable (albeit dwindling) number of political leaders, community activists, and scholars of the DP emigration that were loath to leave Europe, its Ukrainian community lacks a broad demographic base.

Great Britain The Ukrainians in Great Britain are, to some extent, in a position that is the reverse of the German one. Most were members of the Galicia Division that were captured by the British and transported to England after the war. While many of their comrades eventually moved to North America, a portion of the division's rank and file stayed on to work in British industrial towns, such as Manchester, Coventry, Bradford, and Nottingham. Unlike in Germany, members of the intelligentsia were relatively scarce among them. Because there was a severe shortage of eligible Ukrainian women, many Ukrainians in Britain married non-Ukrainians. Nonetheless, militant Ukrain-

ian nationalism and the influence of the Banderite OUN are strong among these former members of the Galicia Division.

Italy A small but important center of the Ukrainian diaspora is Rome. After the Soviet government banned the Ukrainian Greek Catholic church in 1946, many of its institutions were transferred to Rome. Monastic orders with links to Ukraine, such as the Basilians, Serving Sisters, and Studites, established their headquarters there. In 1959, the so-called Little Seminary was founded. Largely because of the efforts of Cardinal Slipy, the head of the Ukrainian Catholic church from 1944 to 1984, the Ukrainian Catholic University was established in the late 1960s and the cathedral of St Sophia was completed in 1969. The presence of these institutions in the Eternal City serves as a reminder that Soviet attempts to liquidate the Ukrainian Greek Catholic church have been far from successful. This fact was underscored when, in the summer of 1988, thousands of Ukrainian Catholics from all over the world gathered in Rome to celebrate the millennium of Christianity in Ukraine. It might be added in passing that the Soviet authorities chose to mark this epochal event primarily in Moscow, depriving Kiev of its momentous and rightful anniversary.

Australia Another Ukrainian community that traces its origins to the DPS is the Australian one. Despite its geographic isolation, it is one of the best organized and most active in the diaspora. By 1951, about 10% or roughly 21,000 of the DPS arrived here. Young and energetic, they included almost as many East Ukrainians as West Ukrainians, an unusual feature because the latter generally predominate abroad. Although the majority were laborers, they also included a significant number of members of the intelligentsia. As in Britain, men outnumbered women by a considerable margin. The newcomers generally settled in such large cities as Sydney, Melbourne, and Adelaide. As always, the beginnings were difficult and even the most highly educated immigrants worked as simple laborers. But given Australia's well-developed and expanding economy, the Ukrainian immigrants steadily moved up the socioeconomic ladder. Today their 30,000-member community enjoys a relatively high standard of living and boasts numerous professionals.

Unlike in Canada and the United States, where "old-immigrant" institutions were already in place, in Australia the Ukrainian DPS had to build communal organizations from nothing. Nonetheless, they have achieved notable success in this area. The community's small size and sense of isolation also made cooperation among its various segments a necessity. Consequently, in 1953 the Federation of Ukrainian Organizations was established to represent and coordinate the activity of its seventeen constituent bodies. As usual, the strongest Ukrainian institutions in Australia are the Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox churches. Other important groups include a women's association (about 700 members), the Plast and SUM youth organizations (about 800

members each), and a variety of professional societies and cultural groups. A system of Saturday schools attempts to provide the youth with some familiarity with the Ukrainian language and cultural heritage. Annual enrollments in the schools have averaged about 1000, although they have been declining of late. Initially, the Shevchenko Scientific Society was the meeting ground for Ukrainian scholars. Following the American and Canadian examples, Ukrainian studies programs were established at Monash and Macquarie universities in the late 1970s.

Despite their achievements, the Ukrainians in Australia confront similar problems to those of their compatriots elsewhere in the West. Among the youth born in Australia, assimilation is increasingly evident. As the older generation passes away and no new immigrants arrive, an uncertain future looms before Australia's Ukrainian community.

The Ukrainians of Eastern Europe

The position of the approximately 450,000 Ukrainians who live in Eastern Europe is quite different from that of their compatriots both in the West and in the USSR. Those in Czechoslovakia and Romania continue to inhabit their ancestral lands, which for a variety of reasons Stalin chose not to annex to Soviet Ukraine. In Poland, as we have seen, the Ukrainians were driven from their homes but continue to live within the borders of that state. And in Yugoslavia, the Ukrainians are early forerunners of the migratory movements of modern times. These will be considered first.

Yugoslavia In the mid 18th century, after the Austrians pushed the Ottomans out of the Bačka and Banat regions of present-day Yugoslavia, they encouraged peasants from Transcarpathia to move into these depopulated lands. Consequently, Ukrainian colonies arose in the Bačka region, especially around such towns as Ruski Krstur and Novi Sad. In the early 20th century, the Ukrainian presence in the region grew, when about 10,000 Ukrainian emigrants from Galicia settled in Bosnia, primarily in the area of Banja Luka. Almost all these Ukrainians, or Rusyns, as some still call themselves, were peasants and lived in self-enclosed village communities. This situation, as well as their Greek Catholic rite, helped the approximately 20,000–30,000 descendants of these immigrants in Yugoslavia to reinforce a strong sense of Rusyn/Ukrainian identity to this day.

Romania The Ukrainians of Romania, numbering an estimated 70,000, are probably the worst off of all Ukrainians in Eastern Europe, both in socio-economic and in national terms. Scattered in such regions as southern Bukovyna, Dobrudja, Maramarosh, and Banat, they are isolated from each other and

from Ukrainians in the USSR and in the West. Most are indigent peasants. Because Romania is one of the poorest East European countries, its Ukrainian inhabitants have limited opportunities to improve their socioeconomic status.

The discriminatory policies of the Bucharest government make matters worse. Up to 1947 the government refused to recognize Ukrainians as a distinct nationality. Matters improved somewhat during the relatively liberal 1948–63 period, when Ukrainian-language schools were allowed to function in the villages. About 120 were established with an enrollment of over 10,000 pupils. At the University of Bucharest, a section of Ukrainian language and literature came into being. But in 1964 a reaction set in and the government gradually nullified many gains of the previous years. Today, the cowed Ukrainian minority in the country does not possess a single communal organization.

Czechoslovakia By comparison with their compatriots in Romania, the Ukrainians (or Rusyn/Ukrainians) of Czechoslovakia are much better off. Numbering an estimated 100,000 (official statistics list only 40,000), they inhabit about 300 villages around the town of Prešov in the Carpathian foothills. Although currently the region lies within the borders of the Slovak part of the state, historically it has been closely linked with Transcarpathia, which is now in Soviet Ukraine.

Recent history has not been unkind to the Rusyn/Ukrainians of the Prešov region. The existence of an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine in prewar Czechoslovakia set a precedent that was difficult to ignore. After the Second World War ended, a newly formed Prešov Region Ukrainian National Council arose to represent the region's populace and to claim autonomy within the Czechoslovak state. Both the Czechs in Prague and the Slovaks in Bratislava refused these political demands. They did, however, make significant cultural and educational concessions.

By 1948, the Rusyn/Ukrainians had their own school system, newspapers, publishing house, youth organization, and theater. Because Russophilism was still prevalent among the region's intelligentsia – isolated Prešov was the last region where this confusing and once-widespread phenomenon still survived – many of the above-mentioned institutions still used Russian. However, by the early 1950s, a program of Ukrainization, introduced by the new Communist government of Czechoslovakia, pushed the Ukrainian literary language and national orientation to the fore. Meanwhile, a new, apolitical organization, the KSUT (Cultural Association of Ukrainian Workers), emerged as the representative body of the Rusyn/Ukrainians.

With the transformation of Czechoslovakia into a communist state in 1948 came collectivization and the replacement of the Greek Catholic church by a Moscow-linked Orthodox church. However, when the Dubček government attempted to “put a human face” on communism in the late 1960s, the Greek

Catholic church was again legalized. But now Slovak influence in the church was greater than before.

As in all of Czechoslovakia, Dubček's innovations sparked an outburst of enthusiasm and activism among the Rusyn/Ukrainians. In spring 1968, plans were made to call a Ukrainian national council. The Ukrainian-language newspapers were filled with calls for political, economic, and cultural autonomy. The literary production of a talented, new generation of Rusyn/Ukrainian intellectuals reached unprecedented heights. And the patriotic Ukrainian tone of Prešov's Ukrainian-language radio programs worried Kiev as well as Bratislava and Prague. But all this came to an abrupt, disillusioning end in August 1968, when about half a million Soviet and satellite troops poured into Czechoslovakia to smash Dubček's promising "revolution."

The harsh repression that engulfed Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 1980s did not lead to a total dismantling of Rusyn/Ukrainian cultural institutions. The museum in Svidnik, the Ukrainian section at the university in Prešov, the Ukrainian press, and KSUT continue to function. They are, however, closely monitored by the Slovak government. And pressure for Rusyn/Ukrainians to adopt Slovak nationality has increased. Those who wish to stress the positive side of the current situation point out that materially the Rusyn/Ukrainians are better off than before. It is true that in recent decades the government has brought in electrification, new roads, and industry to the once-isolated and backward Prešov region. And today, less than 50% of the area's Ukrainians work in agriculture. Most are employed in industry, the bureaucracy, and the professions. Nonetheless, as of 1968, the average earnings of the Rusyn/Ukrainians were still 40% below the Czechoslovak national average. Thus, in terms of material welfare, as well as national rights, they remain among the underprivileged.

Poland Of all the Ukrainian communities, that of Poland has suffered the cruelest fate. In 1947 the Polish government forcibly expelled about 170,000 Ukrainians, mostly Lemkos, from their ancestral lands in the Carpathian foothills and dispersed them throughout Poland. Most were resettled in the former German lands that the Poles had acquired. Thus, today, approximately 60,000 Ukrainians live in the Olsztyn region, formerly East Prussia; another 40,000 inhabit the Koszalin region in the northwest; and close to 20,000 are located in the vicinity of Wrocław in the southwest. Because about 20,000 remained in their ancestral lands around Lublin and Peremyshl (Przemyśl) in the southeast, it is evident that the Ukrainians have been neatly dispersed to the four corners of Poland.

Even in their new villages, the government saw to it that the Ukrainians did not form compact communities. Only a few families were assigned to every village. Initially, they received no land and were forced to work for Polish farmers. In the early 1950s, they were allowed to acquire the worst of the for-

mer German lands. To make matters worse, the Ukrainian newcomers were exposed to a fierce anti-Ukrainianism, which was especially prevalent among the many Poles who had been expelled from Western Ukraine. For fear of discrimination and insults, Ukrainians were forced to camouflage their nationality, refrain from using their native language, and even conceal their background from their children. In short, the small and vulnerable Ukrainian minority in Poland was made to pay for the centuries of bitter Polish/Ukrainian antagonism.

In 1956, Warsaw granted the Ukrainians some concessions. Perhaps it was because the government realized that they no longer presented a threat to the security of the state. Or perhaps the authorities drew a lesson from the mistakes that the intolerant prewar government had made in its nationalities' policies. In any case, that year a Ukrainian newspaper, *Nashe Slovo*, was allowed to appear. And the USKT (Ukrainian Social Cultural Association) was established. Needless to say, it is closely supervised by the Ministry of the Interior. Nonetheless, both the newspaper and the association receive considerable government subsidies. Today, *Nashe Slovo* has about 8000 subscribers and USKT has approximately 4500 members.

Scrupulously nonpolitical, USKT concerns itself mainly with sponsoring about fifty Ukrainian choirs and dance ensembles. Every year it organizes well-attended festivals of Ukrainian song and music. But the association's efforts to expand Ukrainian educational facilities have had only limited success. In 1970, only about 5% of Ukrainian children in Poland had access to Ukrainian-language education. There is a Ukrainian lycée in Legnica and a pedagogical lycée for teachers of Ukrainian in Bartoszice. However, because of the lack of Ukrainian schools, most of their graduate teachers cannot find employment. At the University of Warsaw, the philology department has a Ukrainian section, as do several such departments in provincial universities. There is a group of well-trained Ukrainian scholars who hold positions in these institutions. As well, several Polish scholars have shown that they can deal with Ukrainian topics dispassionately and well.

Nevertheless, it is evident that the old wounds have not yet healed. While some improvement is noticeable among the members of the Polish intelligentsia, anti-Ukrainianism is still widespread. Books, articles, and films castigating the "barbarism of UPA bandits" (and, by association, all Ukrainians) appear frequently. Successful careers are open to Ukrainians, but it is advisable for them to downplay their national background. Efforts of resettled Ukrainians to return to their ancestral lands are continually blocked.

The position of the Greek Catholic church, to which about 50% of Poland's estimated 200,000–250,000 Ukrainians belong, is an especially sensitive issue today. The premeditated neglect and even wanton destruction of numerous, centuries-old Ukrainian churches in the Lemko region has aroused the ire of Ukrainians in Poland and in the West. Equally disturbing is the reluctance

of the Polish Catholic hierarchy to support the appointment of a bishop for the Ukrainian Catholics. However, in fairness to the Poles, it should be noted that they, like the Czechs and Slovaks, are not the only ones who set policy toward their respective Ukrainian minorities. Moscow keeps a close watch on all the Ukrainian communities in Eastern Europe. And it is always ready with forceful advice on how its East European satellites should deal with Ukrainian issues.



A major function of Ukrainian communities abroad, and specifically those in the West, has been to preserve the political and cultural values and traditions of non-Soviet Ukraine. Another has been to speak up for Ukrainian interests, when compatriots in Soviet Ukraine were forced to be silent. Were it not for the efforts of Ukrainians abroad, their homeland would be an almost unknown entity beyond the borders of the USSR. Not surprisingly, the relationship between Soviet Ukraine and the Ukrainian diaspora has been generally an antagonistic one. The early socioeconomic emigrants were bound to their churches, while the DPS were ardent nationalists. Both had grounds to view the Soviets with suspicion at the very least. Meanwhile, propaganda emanating from Soviet Ukraine constantly portrayed Ukrainians as "lackeys of capitalism, fascism, and Rome." Thus, unlike some relationships between homeland and diaspora that have been mutually beneficial – Armenia is a good example – the Ukrainian one has brought neither party much benefit. Soviet Ukrainians have been unable to utilize the Ukrainian communities abroad as a sorely needed window to the West, while the Ukrainian diaspora has been deprived of the cultural and demographic revitalization that it desperately requires.

Despite the fact that most Ukrainians abroad have entered the mainstream of their respective host societies, some still gain psychic as well as concrete benefits from belonging to their ethnic in-groups. But time is not on the side of the Ukrainian diaspora. The growing irrelevance of things Ukrainian for people who have little or no contact with Ukraine is having an effect. Everywhere the specter of assimilation into the culture of the host societies looms large. It is to be hoped that Ukrainians abroad and in Ukraine will be able to develop a fruitful relationship, while there is still time to be of use to each other.

Ukrainians welcoming German troops, June 1941



OPPOSITE

A church destroyed by retreating Soviets, Kiev, June 1941

Identifying the victims of the retreating NKVD, Lviv, June 1941






Andrii Melnyk



Stepan Bandera



Volodymyr Kubijovyč




Nazis executing OUN members, Stanyslaviv, September 1943

Ukrainian *Ostarbeiter* being sent to Germany for forced labor





Roman Shukhevych (General Taras Chuprynka), UPA commander



UPA unit, 1946



Sydir Kovpak (with pointer), commander of Soviet partisans



Soviet troops retaking Kiev, 1943



Identifying the victims of the retreating Nazis, Kerch, 1943



Kaganovich and Khrushchev in Kiev, 1947



Brezhnev and Shcherbytsky in late 1970s



Aged female collective-farm workers: the backbone of the agricultural work force




Village schoolgirls, early 1960s



Ukrainian immigrants arriving in Canada in the early 20th century




Members of the banned Ukrainian Greek Catholic church celebrating mass in a forest, summer 1987



A meeting organized in Lviv by Ukrainian activists
in the era of *glasnost*, July 1988





Statue of St Volodymyr overlooking the Dnieper

The New Era

A major theme in the history of the 20th century has been the struggle of nations against empires. Much like the ancient dinosaurs, the empires, which seemed to have been with us since the dawn of time, became too large, too unwieldy, and too ineffective to survive in a rapidly changing world. One after another they failed to prevent their subject nations from breaking away and establishing independent states. The Romanov, Habsburg, and Ottoman empires disintegrated after the First World War. After the Second World War, the British, the French, and other European powers were forced to abandon their overseas domains. By the end of the 20th century had come the turn of the world's last empire, the USSR. In a desperate effort to adapt to modernity, the Soviet leadership attempted to introduce far-reaching reforms. But the reforms only allowed the long-repressed forces of nationalism and the inherent desire for self-determination among the Soviet Union's myriad nationalities to emerge and hasten the collapse of the ossified structure.

Ukraine had been a cornerstone of the Russian and Soviet imperial systems. As is usually the case with imperial rule, the centuries-old experience was not without its benefits. But with time the glaringly negative features of Soviet rule had come to the fore: the deteriorating economy and falling standard of living, the ecological devastation of the land, the past crimes of the regime, now being revealed for the first time, and the repression of civil rights and of the national consciousness and culture of the Soviet Union's many peoples. When the opportunity to choose independence arose, therefore, the people of Ukraine overwhelmingly embraced it. It was a decision of monumental significance, for it sounded the death knell of the USSR. And the disintegration of this regime provided Ukraine with the opportunity to return to the mainstream of global history. Together with the entire community of nations, Ukrainians commenced a new epoch, one in which empires were a thing of the past.



Reform and Its Unintended Results

The goal of Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika* was to modernize the Soviet system in order to preserve it. But because change threatened the interests of the well-entrenched party apparatus, many of its members sought to block genuine reform by all means possible. This was especially so in the Ukraine of the arch-conservative Volodymyr Shcherbytsky. By contrast, the impact of *glasnost*, the new freedom of expression, was immediate and dramatic. Originally intended to restore the credibility of the regime and to prod the bureaucracy into action, it produced results that Gorbachev neither wanted nor expected. Instead of revitalizing the regime, *glasnost* became a means for the nationalities of the USSR to voice their grievances and aspirations.

In Ukraine, widespread anger at the government's handling of the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl brought on the first major wave of criticism of the system. Resentment focused on the criminally negligent manner in which bureaucrats in Moscow had made decisions that directly, and tragically, affected the lives of the population in Ukraine. Moreover, the Chernobyl disaster roused the people to an awareness of other ecological crimes – manifest in the befouled air, the dying rivers, the poisoned soil – that Soviet economic planners had perpetrated in their land. The new revelations, together with the declining standard of living, forced even the most loyal to question the merits of the system in which they lived.

Their appetite for criticism having been whetted, Ukrainians turned to other grievances. The rapidly deteriorating status of the Ukrainian language was a pressing and perennial concern, and not only were leading Ukrainian writers encouraged to speak out more boldly in protest, but on 11 February 1989, they created the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society, the first large-scale organization in the republic that was not controlled by the party. An important by-product of the numerous, heated discussions regarding the ecology and the status of the Ukrainian language was that they mobilized many well-known members of the literary establishment and propelled them to the forefront of criticism of the status quo.

Attempts to deal with the "blank spots" in Ukrainian history followed. Notably, it was writers and journalists, not historians, who boldly broached topics that had long been considered taboo. Most dramatic and shocking were revelations concerning the Famine of 1932–33, the memory of which Soviet historiography had long sought to repress. Along with these revelations came sensational reports of the discovery of mass graves of Ukrainians shot by the NKVD in the 1930s and 1940s. As awareness of the extent to which their recent history had been falsified spread, many Ukrainians

developed a thirst for non-Soviet, nationally oriented interpretations of their past. Interest in Cossackdom as a quintessentially Ukrainian phenomenon grew, culminating in massive celebrations in the summer of 1990 commemorating the 500th anniversary of the founding of the Zaporozhian Sich. Articles appeared presenting Mazepa's attempts to break away from Moscow as an act of patriotism rather than an incarnation of treachery. The efforts of the once-derided Ukrainian governments of 1917–20 to attain independence were now interpreted as the expression of legitimate national aspirations. Even the bitterly anti-Soviet struggle of the UPA was glorified, especially in the western regions.

As the nationally oriented interpretations of Ukraine's past gained in favor, so did national symbols. To the great indignation of the authorities, the long-banned blue and yellow flag of the national movement appeared in the spring of 1989, first in western Ukraine and then in Kiev, with increasing frequency. More Ukrainians learned the words of the proscribed national anthem and sported the nationalist trident on their lapels. These symbols seemed to perform a dual function: they indicated an individual's support for national aspirations and disdain for the Soviet system.

During 1989, the slowly but steadily growing tide of change in Ukraine crossed a critical threshold: it moved from verbal expression to political activity. A major breakthrough were the elections to the all-Union Congress of Peoples Deputies, which took place on 26 March. By Western standards, the elections in Ukraine were far from fair: they were accompanied by numerous cases of vote rigging and intimidation by the party apparat. Nonetheless, the establishment candidates suffered many embarrassing setbacks. Moreover, widespread resentment over the party's attempts to manipulate the elections prompted opponents of the party to prepare more carefully for the next electoral campaign.

Rukh Throughout the year, "informals," that is, organizations not legally sanctioned, grew in number and variety throughout the USSR. Estimates placed their total number at about 30,000. In Ukraine, informals such as the Lions' Society (*Tovarystvo Leva*) were most active in the western oblasts. In early 1989, a number of these "informal" organizations, supported by well-known writers and scholars in Kiev, formed the Popular Movement for Restructuring in Ukraine (*Rukh*). As an indication of its support, the newspaper of the Writers Union, *Literaturna Ukraina*, published a draft of the program of the new movement. By the time the organization held its founding congress in Kiev, on 8–10 September 1989, it had about 280,000 members, and the number was growing daily. In its program, *Rukh* committed itself to upholding the sovereignty of the Ukrainian republic, to promoting the Ukrainian language and culture, to voicing ecological concerns, and to supporting the democratization of the political, social, and

economic systems. Special stress was placed on the need to maintain the solidarity of all ethnic groups in Ukraine, and consequently, a significant number of Russians, Jews, and members of other ethnic groups joined the movement. Thus, although Rukh was a broadly based social, political, and national organization, it was not primarily a nationalistic one. The emergence of Rukh created a fundamentally new political situation in Ukraine: for the first time since the establishment of Soviet rule, the Communist party's monopoly on power was being challenged.

Popular support for Rukh grew rapidly, but it was unevenly distributed. To an overwhelming extent it was based in western Ukraine and among the Kiev intelligentsia. In eastern and southern Ukraine, where the party maintained an iron grip, support for Rukh was minimal. To publicize its goals and attract new members, Rukh made use of another new feature of the *glasnost* era, the mass demonstration. As early as 1988, mass demonstrations in support of national issues, involving as many as 50,000, even 200,000, had taken place in Lviv. In the next year, they became frequent in Kiev. The largest mass demonstration was the Rukh-sponsored human-chain organized on 21 January 1990 to commemorate the union of the ZUNR and UNR in 1919 and to symbolize the solidarity of all Ukrainians. It stretched for 300 miles from Lviv to Kiev and attracted about 300,000 participants.

Rukh was not the only widespread anti-establishment movement to appear in Ukraine. In July 1990, the miners of heavily Russian and Russified Donetsk and Dniepropetrovsk staged a massive strike that eventually involved 250,000 workers. They too came out against the privileged position of the Communist party. Initially, they were unwilling to ally themselves with Rukh, considering it to be too nationalistic. But in time and as a result of the mediation of the more nationally conscious miners from Lviv oblast (Chervonohrad), the miners and Rukh seemed on the verge of finding common ground.

The new politics In this climate of unprecedented activism and excitement, Ukraine prepared for its first relatively free elections. They were held to select deputies to the republic's parliament (*Verkhovna Rada*) and the local councils. The contenders were, on the one hand, the candidates of the newly formed Democratic Bloc, which included Rukh, the Helsinki Watch Committee, ecological groups, and numerous "informal" organizations and, on the other hand, the Communist party candidates. While the latter had control of the media, positions of influence, means of exercising coercion, and huge financial resources, the former counted on momentum, enthusiasm, and the protest vote to offset the Communist advantages. The results of the elections, held in several stages on 4–18 March, were ambiguous: as expected, the Communists won the majority of seats. But the Democratic Bloc did surprisingly well, especially in Kiev and, even more, western Ukraine,

where almost all the elective positions were won by non-Communists. Especially noteworthy was the fact that former political prisoners such as Levko Lukianenko, Viacheslav Chornovil, Bohdan and Mykhailo Horyn, and Iryna Kalynets won convincing electoral victories. As a result, 90 of the 450 seats in the new parliament went to the Democratic Bloc, while the hard-line Communists, often referred to as the "group of 239," retained the majority. Despite the fact that they greatly outnumbered their opponents, for the first time Communists had to face a legal opposition in a parliamentary setting. They clearly found the experience disconcerting. Indeed, the very formation of the new parliament was an event of great significance: before, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine had been the most powerful political body in the republic; now, like other countries in the world, Ukraine had a parliament where popularly elected deputies, under public scrutiny, were expected to represent the interests of their constituents. The parliament soon became a new locus of political power in the land.

Capitalizing on the euphoria of the moment and the confusion of its opponents, the Democratic Bloc achieved a major victory in parliament when, on 16 July 1990, it pushed through the historic declaration of Ukrainian sovereignty, which formally announced the country's intention to control its own affairs.

The Communists Accustomed to an orderly, predictable, and tightly controlled political system, the Communists were shocked by the previously unimaginable developments of 1989 and early 1990. Moreover, from their point of view, matters went from bad to worse. On 28 September 1989, soon after the Rukh founding congress, the ailing Shcherbytsky finally stepped down from his post, and shortly afterward he died. Communist hopes that his successor, Volodymyr Ivashko, might stabilize the situation crumbled in July 1990, when Ivashko unexpectedly abandoned the Ukrainian party for a high party position in Moscow. Leonid Kravchuk, the former secretary for ideology in the Communist party, was chosen to replace Ivashko as chairman of the republic's parliament, and Stanislav Hurenko became leader of the Communist party. Meanwhile, thousands of members began to abandon the demoralized party. Widespread hostility to the Communists, who were ever more frequently accused of parasitism and self-interest, reached a point where in western Ukraine statues of Lenin began to be removed.

But although these developments in Ukraine, as well as in the USSR as a whole, threw the Communist establishment off-balance, they did not fundamentally weaken its control of the major levers of power and influence – the media, the police, the KGB, the military, industry, and the collective farms. So when students in Kiev staged a successful hunger strike in early October 1990 in support of Ukrainian sovereignty and forced the resignation of

Vitalii Masol, the Communist chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, the Communist establishment in Ukraine decided that matters had gone too far. An indication of its new, get-tough approach was the arrest, on clearly contrived charges, of Stefan Khmara, a west Ukrainian deputy noted for his radically nationalistic and anti-Communist views.

Meanwhile, serious weaknesses, exacerbated and exploited by the Communists, began to appear among the proponents of change in Ukraine. After its initial successes, Rukh, suffering from poor organization, a shortage of fresh ideas, and in-fighting among its leaders, began to lose momentum. Its strength was further sapped by the appearance of several political parties that, with the exception of the relatively strong Ukrainian Republican party, led by Levko Lukianenko, were small and weak and fragmented the democratic forces.

Opponents of Ukrainian sovereignty were able to capitalize also on the fact that for centuries Ukrainians had been prevented from developing a sense of national solidarity and territorial integrity. Conservatives did not find it difficult to play on the differences between east and west Ukrainians. In the heavily Russified Donbas and Donetsk regions as well as in Odessa and other parts of southern Ukraine, voices were heard advocating separation from Ukraine. In Transcarpathia, there were some who argued that the autochthonous population were Rusyns, not Ukrainians. And Crimea, largely Russian and completely controlled by Communist hard-liners, actually declared its autonomy from Kiev.

Religious activity Radical changes occurred also in other areas of society, most notably in the sphere of religion. As the Communist ideology rapidly lost its appeal and Communist political control weakened, religious life revived with surprising speed. In western Ukraine the banned Greek Catholic church emerged from the "catacombs" and demanded restoration of its former status. Its new-found confidence was based on mounting popular support, reflected in the increasing number of west Ukrainians, both the young and the elderly, who returned to the open practice of their traditional religion. The festive and massive celebrations of the Christmas holidays in January 1990 were an especially telling demonstration of the Ukrainian Catholic church's resurgence. Soon afterward, on 26 January, the Catholic hierarchy, led by Bishop Volodymyr Sterniuk, called a synod, which declared the forced liquidation of the church in 1946 to be null and void. Immediately thereafter, the hierarchy launched a drive for the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic church and the restoration of its former properties. Meanwhile, about 2000 parishes in the western oblasts returned to Catholicism, and the democrat-controlled Lviv oblast council sanctioned, despite Orthodox protests, the return of St George's cathedral in Lviv to the Catholics. In March 1991, Cardinal Myroslav Lubachivsky, the highest-

ranking Ukrainian Catholic prelate, left Rome and returned to Lviv to lead the 5 million members of his church. An impressive high point in the revival occurred in August 1992, when close to a million faithful participated in the transfer of the venerated Patriarch Iosyf Slipy's remains from Rome to Lviv.

Fearful of losing ground to the resurgent Catholics at a time of reviving national consciousness, the Russian Orthodox church in Ukraine changed its name to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in January 1990. It continued, however, to recognize the leadership of the Patriarch of Moscow. In the spring of 1990, a new contender for Orthodox loyalties appeared when the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church (UAOC), banned since the 1930s and based abroad, reemerged. At a synod in June, the clergy and about 1650 parishes that had defected from the Moscow patriarchate chose the venerable Mystyslav Skrypnyk, leader of the UAOC in the West, as its patriarch. In October 1990, he returned to Kiev after a forty-six-year absence.

The revival of religion, however, brought some difficulties with it, notably the renewal of old religious feuds between Catholics and Orthodox. The feuds were especially bitter in the western regions, where communities were often split over the question of whether to remain Orthodox or to return to Catholicism. Conflicts about which group had title to church property added fuel to the fire. There was also growing friction within the ranks of Ukraine's 35 million Orthodox, with some choosing to join the newly re-instituted UAOC and others remaining faithful to the Moscow-controlled Ukrainian Orthodox church. Even this last body became fragmented. The controversial Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev broke with Moscow in the spring of 1992 and proclaimed himself leader of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate. Although he had the support of President Kravchuk and parliament, only about 350 parishes recognized his authority. Meanwhile, the majority of Ukraine's Orthodox, led by thirty bishops and numbering more than 5000 parishes, proclaimed their loyalty to the newly elected Metropolitan Volodymyr of the Ukrainian Autonomous church (formerly the Russian Orthodox church). For better or worse, pluralism now became a fact of life in religion as well as politics.

Change and its opponents By the end of 1990, the euphoria, optimism, and activism of the previous year had waned considerably. In their place came a growing concern about the rapidly deteriorating economic situation, which, many Communists argued, was the result of the "ill conceived and chaotic reforms" introduced by Gorbachev and his reformers. Unsettling contradictions permeated many aspects of life in Ukraine and the USSR in general. On the one hand, five years of *perestroika* and *glasnost* had brought radical changes. The Communist ideology, the very basis of the Soviet system, was increasingly acknowledged to be fatally, irreparably flawed.

The legitimacy of the Communist party's claim to a leading role in society (and to control of much of its wealth) was therefore called into question. The once-scorned market economy was viewed with mounting favor. A revival of national consciousness, spurred by strong anti-centrist attitudes, was clearly evident in Ukraine and all the other republics of the USSR. And, perhaps most decisive, there was a noticeable waning of the psychology of fear that had for so long allowed the few to intimidate the many.

On the other hand, the years of *perestroika* had brought relatively little in the way of concrete structural change in Soviet society. The Communists still dominated the social, economic, and political establishment. Indeed, they seemed to occupy a no-lose position: if structural reforms remained minimal, they would retain their privileged positions, and if a market economy were introduced, they were best positioned to take advantage of new opportunities. The tyranny of the bureaucrats remained unshaken. Moreover, empty store shelves frequently confronted the harried consumer, and the price of the few goods and services available continued to rise at an alarming rate. Little wonder that large segments of the population, particularly the less sophisticated, blue-collar workers and villagers, not to mention the hard-line Communists, appeared ready to accept a return to the "old ways."

Nationally conscious Ukrainians, however, could point to some positive developments during this period. Support for Ukrainian sovereignty appeared in unexpected quarters. Characteristically cautious and circumspect, Leonid Kravchuk more frequently expressed his commitment to self-determination. In parliament, a small but growing faction of Communist deputies, the so-called sovereignty-Communists, emerged as a contemporary version of the national-Communists of the 1920s. Moreover, as the referendum of 17 March indicated, many Russians and other non-Ukrainians in the republic were not averse to sovereignty if it would improve their standard of living.

On the international level also, there were encouraging developments. For generations the world had remained oblivious to Ukraine and Ukrainians. But as it became apparent that the USSR was disintegrating, the aspirations of its second-largest republic, which equaled in size and population the major countries of Europe, attracted greater interest. A reflection of the new attitude was the visit of the American president, George Bush, to Kiev in July 1991, even though the president disillusioned many of his listeners by lecturing them on the dangers of nationalism and separatism.

By the summer of 1991, the sense of general apathy, political paralysis, and debilitating self-doubt had deepened. The economy continued to deteriorate, raising doubts about the state's ability to feed its population in the coming winter. Three key political issues loomed large in Ukraine: the drafting of a new constitution, the election of a president, and, most important, the new union treaty, which was to give the republics greater power

in a fundamentally restructured and decentralized Soviet Union. The significance of the proposed union treaty for Ukraine could hardly be exaggerated: at issue was the question of whether or not Ukraine would become a full-fledged sovereign and independent state. It was clear that crucial decisions would have to be made soon. The question was who would make them and how they would be made.

The attempted coup On 19 August 1991, Communist hard-liners in Moscow made a desperate attempt to forestall the fundamental restructuring of the Soviet system. After detaining Gorbachev in Crimea, they proclaimed a state of emergency and formed an Emergency Committee to run the country. The hastily formed committee counted on supporters in the Communist party leadership, the military, and the KGB to help it preserve as much as possible of the old order. But astonishingly poor planning and the determined opposition of Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Republic, and his supporters in Moscow foiled the plotters. In sharp contrast to Yeltsin, in Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk adopted a cautious, ambiguous policy: while declaring that the state of emergency was inapplicable to Ukraine, he refrained from openly opposing the Emergency Committee. By 21 August, it was clear that the attempted coup had failed. Yet despite the brevity and comic-opera flavour of the event, its consequences were epochal.

The attempted coup accelerated the processes that it had sought to forestall. It totally compromised the defenders of the old order, specifically the Communist party, which was implicated in the conspiracy. Moreover, the hallowed principle of Soviet (and Russian) centralism, which allowed a small clique in the Kremlin to decide the fate of the numerous nations that made up the Soviet Union, was dealt a fatal blow. In short, the failed coup created an opportunity for those who were dissatisfied with Moscow's rule to cast it off. Ukraine, particularly the democrats in parliament, seized the opportunity in dramatic fashion: on 24 August 1991, the Ukrainian parliament, by an almost unanimous vote, proclaimed the independence of the republic. The panicky and disconcerted Communist deputies managed to add the qualification that a referendum on the issue be held in December. An even more painful blow to the old order came on 29 August, when parliament banned the Communist Party of Ukraine for its involvement in the coup. Gorbachev resigned from the party in Moscow, and Kravchuk did likewise in Kiev. One by one, the other republics also issued declarations of independence, and in September the Baltic republics formally withdrew from the USSR. The Soviet Union's days were numbered.

Independence

The abortive coup of August 1991 brought the Communist experiment to an

end. It also resulted in the disintegration of the world's last great empire. In its place there emerged fifteen new states. Unprepared for self-sufficiency, they inherited the enormous problems that the Soviet regime had failed to resolve. It was now the responsibility of Ukraine and the other newly independent states to make the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, from a planned economy to one based on market forces, from isolation vis-à-vis the world community to integration. Most pressing, they had to reverse the alarming decline in the standard of living that affected all the former Soviet republics. All this had to be achieved at the same time that the new states were attempting to reorganize themselves into viable political and economic units.

The dilemmas faced by Ukraine and the other republics were unique. Independent states that had emerged elsewhere during the 20th century had usually focused on transforming themselves from underdeveloped to developed societies. But most of the former Soviet republics were already relatively developed societies. Indeed, that was the problem. They evolved as components of a complex political and economic system designed to bind them together. For these new states to extricate themselves from the myriad ties that bound them to the wreckage of the Soviet Union, especially its economy, was difficult enough. But in the process they had to rebuild, simultaneously and totally, their societies so that they could function effectively in a new, competitive world dominated by democracies with market-oriented economies. And rebuilding complex but deteriorating structures is a much more difficult and frustrating task than starting anew.

The political dimension In Ukraine, post-coup developments revolved around two issues: independence and economic crisis. As far as the first issue was concerned, the changes were truly ground-breaking. But proclaiming independence was far from realizing it. First, the referendum of 1 December had to establish whether or not the citizens of Ukraine actually supported the declaration of independence. Moreover, presidential elections were to be held on the same date. The inhabitants of Ukraine thus were given an unprecedented opportunity to choose who should lead them and in which direction they should move.

Momentum in favor of independence grew quickly in the fall of 1991. It was fueled by both historical arguments and current considerations. Previously, most Ukrainians had been inundated with claims about the benefits of living in the Soviet Union. Now, for the first time many realized the full costs of the experience. Exposés of Stalinist crimes, particularly with regard to the Famine of 1932–33, added greatly to the people's resentment of Moscow, which the Chernobyl disaster had first aroused. But for the majority of citizens perhaps the most convincing argument for independence was that their rich land would allow them to lead a more prosperous life if it

were freed from Moscow's exploitative grip. Even Communists had reason to vote for separation: they hoped it would insulate them from Russia, where Yeltsin threatened to prosecute the party for its crimes. The example of the Baltic withdrawal from the USSR encouraged Ukrainians to withdraw likewise. Independence, long viewed as utopian and unrealistic, became logical, desirable, and attainable.

The referendum of 1 December was another watershed event. Over 90% of the voters cast their ballots for independence, a result far surpassing even the most optimistic projections. Equally surprising and encouraging was the fact that the vast majority of Russians, Jews, Hungarians, Poles, and other non-Ukrainians, as well as the Russified oblasts in the east and south, also cast their votes for independence. In the presidential elections, Leonid Kravchuk emerged with an impressive majority of 62%, and the former dissident Viacheslav Chornovil came in a respectable second. The voting, carried out in a calm, orderly fashion, left no doubt as to the will of the people. For the moment, at least, there was widespread satisfaction, even euphoria.

The repercussions of the referendum were immediate, dramatic, and far-reaching. Although the withdrawal of the Baltic states from the USSR and Russia's proclamation of sovereignty had indicated clearly that the Soviet Union was on the verge of disintegration, it was the results of the Ukrainian referendum that delivered the death blow. Gorbachev himself proclaimed that "the Soviet Union without Ukraine is inconceivable."¹ On 7-8 December, the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus met near Brest and formally dissolved the USSR, creating in its place the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). But although these leaders were unanimous in their desire to abolish the centralized Soviet system, it would soon become evident that they were sharply divided as to the exact role the new entity they had created was to play.

For Ukraine, the next great issue was the world's reaction to its proclamation of independence. Some neighboring states, such as Poland and Hungary, immediately welcomed it. For them a Ukrainian state could serve as a convenient counterweight to a powerful and threatening Russia. Canada, with its large and influential Ukrainian community, was also among the first to extend recognition. However, the world's most powerful country wavered. Until the very end, the Bush administration tried to preserve the USSR, believing that its continued existence would best guarantee stability in Eurasia. Moreover, many of its policy-makers remained staunchly Russocentric in their thinking and could not conceive of the disintegration of the "one and indivisible." But on 25 December, Washington finally gave in to the inevitable and recognized Ukraine's independence. Within several months, most countries in the world had done likewise. Ukraine's lengthy isolation from the world finally was over.



Map 30 Results of the referendum on Ukrainian independence, 1 December 1991

Russia's response to the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state was an issue of special concern. In view of the overwhelming popular support independence had received in the referendum, the Yeltsin government had no choice but to recognize it. Nonetheless, for many Russians the "loss" of Ukraine was a painful shock. The event called into question their most treasured historical concepts. It threatened Russia's position as a great power and disrupted an already deteriorating economy. In psychological terms, it undermined the satisfaction many Russians had gained from their traditional role as "elder brothers." Moreover, it cut off the 11 million Russians in Ukraine from their brethren in the north. Understandably, from the outset relations between Kiev and Moscow were tense and even antagonistic.

Almost immediately, deputies in the Russian parliament raised the issue of Ukraine's borders, despite the fact that the Russian government had agreed to respect them. Specifically, they questioned the inclusion of Crimea in the new Ukrainian state, arguing that the transfer in 1954 of the peninsula from Russia to Ukraine had been an unconstitutional act. Their protests were reinforced in Crimea itself, where Communist hard-liners, allied with Russian nationalists, retained control. For its part, Ukraine insisted on the inviolability of its borders. The Crimean issue gave rise to another, that of the Black Sea fleet. Stationed in Sevastopol, this fleet of approximately 300 ships and 60,000–70,000 men was a concrete manifestation of Russia's age-old drive for warm sea ports. Because the ships were based on formally Ukrainian territory, Kiev laid claim to this holy-of-holies of Russian imperial history. Initial negotiations between Kiev and Moscow failed to resolve the issue, and accusations and counter-accusations multiplied.

But the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation that caused most alarm throughout the world involved nuclear weapons. Even before the collapse of the USSR, Washington and Moscow had agreed in the START talks to reduce their nuclear arsenals. With the formation of CIS, Ukraine declared its willingness to transfer the thousands of nuclear weapons on its soil – at the time it was the third-largest nuclear power in the world – to Russia for destruction. However, in return for disarming itself totally and voluntarily of nuclear weapons, it demanded adequate financial aid and security guarantees. Because this position threatened the ratification of the treaty concluded by Moscow and Washington, both turned their ire on Kiev.

Yet another complex problem that strained relations between Russia and Ukraine involved CIS. Essentially, Moscow envisaged CIS as a supra-national organization, with its own bureaucratic structure, that would coordinate the military, political, and, especially, economic policies of most of the former republics of the USSR. But Kiev, fearful that such an organization would be dominated by Russia, preferred to view CIS as a means for obtaining a "civilized divorce" from the former USSR or, at most, as a forum for discuss-

ing common, primarily economic, problems. President Kravchuk was clearly unwilling to allow the organization to impose any limits on Ukraine's sovereignty.

In the summer of 1992, some progress was made in defusing several of these dangerous confrontations. In June and August, Kravchuk and Yeltsin met in Crimea and agreed to place the Black Sea fleet under dual control for five years. Early in 1993, there were indications that Kiev and Moscow might agree on the division of the debts and assets of the former Soviet Union and on economic cooperation. There was also some movement on the issue of nuclear disarmament. Nonetheless, much remained to be done in the delicate task of restructuring the complex, asymmetrical relationship between Russia and Ukraine.

Domestic politics While the achievements of the new state on the international level were considerable, the same cannot be said about its domestic accomplishments. Here the government could take pride in two major successes. Confronted with a potentially dangerous situation, it managed to maintain political stability and to avoid the ethnic conflicts that broke out in a number of former Soviet republics. Despite the fact that about 70% of the officer corps were Russians, the government also made progress in reorganizing the approximately 700,000 former Soviet soldiers in the republic into a Ukrainian army. Konstantyn Morozov, the minister of defense, planned to scale down this huge force to about 400,000 men by 1995 and to 200,000 by the year 2000. Nonetheless, Ukraine would have one of the largest armies in Europe. Yet these achievements were overshadowed by the government's inability to deal with the deteriorating economic situation. The problems it faced in this area were overwhelming, and none of the former Soviet republics, all of which confronted similar difficulties, had had notable success in dealing with them. Nonetheless, for over a year the administration of Prime Minister Vitold Fokin responded phlegmatically and unproductively to this pressing situation. In fact, it aggravated it by allowing corruption and abuse of office to reach unprecedented heights. The time wasted and the opportunities lost would cost Ukraine's citizens dearly.

Even the most basic aspects of state-building were neglected. A constitution, which might have provided guidelines for democratic behavior, was not completed. As a result, the question of whether Ukraine was to be a presidential or a parliamentary republic was left unanswered. That meant that the division of powers between the executive and the legislative branches of government remained unclear. Initially, President Kravchuk attempted to expand his powers and to establish a precedent for strong executive rule. He appointed presidential representatives in the oblasts, created an advisory council, or Duma, and issued decrees claiming the force of law. But by the fall of 1992, the parliament, presided over by Ivan

Pliushch, had begun to challenge him. Soon afterward, when Leonid Kuchma became prime minister, a triangle of contenders for political power emerged. Uncertainty spread as to who had the power to do what.

The question of whether Ukraine was to be a unitary, centralized state such as France or a federated republic such as Germany was also unresolved. It was complicated by the desire of former Communist party bosses to retain control of their old bailiwicks and by the hostility of some segments of society, especially in the Russified southeast, to what they perceived as the over-nationalistic policies of Kiev. As a result, separatist tendencies continued to simmer in such areas as the Donbas, Transcarpathia, and, most notably, Crimea. Encouraged by support from Russia, Communist hard-liners in Crimea forced Kiev on 30 June to agree to expand the already extensive autonomous status of the peninsula.

Increasingly, politics acquired a clear duality. On the one hand were ministries, laws, presidential representatives, and decrees. But they were often ignored. On the other hand was actual power on the local level. It rested in the hands of oblast councils, factory directors, and collective farm chairmen, most of whom were unreconstructed Communists who "ran their own show." The increasingly chaotic situation prompted some observers to quip that in Ukraine only two laws were operative: one was Murphy's law, the other was the law of the jungle.

Adding to the confusion was the proliferation of political parties. For many former Soviet citizens, learning to live with political pluralism did not come easily. They remembered, with some nostalgia, the much simpler times when one party controlled everything. The appearance of an opposition movement like Rukh had already disconcerted them. But when, after one year of independence, approximately fifteen political parties emerged, many citizens had difficulty distinguishing between pluralism and anarchy. Because the new parties were weak, small, and disorganized, they were unable to mobilize significant support among the people, especially as economic conditions worsened and apathy about political issues deepened. Nevertheless, they became a new focal point of political activity, one bound to complicate politics but without which the movement toward democracy was impossible.

Political and ideological diversity was most widespread in the so-called democratic camp. Like other mass movements, such as Solidarnosc in Poland or Sajudis in Lithuania, Rukh experienced an identity crisis after achieving, at least formally, many of its objectives in 1991. Some of Rukh's leaders, such as Ivan Drach, Dmytro Pavlychko, and Mykhailo Horyn, urged it to remain an umbrella organization of democratic associations and parties whose priority was to create a political base of support for the new Ukrainian state. It followed that Rukh's basic position ought to be one of cooperation rather than confrontation with the government. However,

another faction, led by Viacheslav Chornovil, argued that because the new state was still basically controlled by the old Communist establishment, no genuine reforms were possible until that establishment was removed from power. This group called for Rukh to transform itself into an opposition political party. These differences, aggravated by personal ambitions and animosities among Rukh's leaders, confused and disillusioned many rank-and-file members and resulted in a sharp drop in membership. Attempts at compromise failed, and at its fourth congress, on 6 December 1992, Rukh in effect transformed itself into a party, led by Chornovil and consisting of about 55,000 members. In influence and popular support, it was now only a shadow of its former self.

Meanwhile, other leaders in the democratic camp were forming their own parties. Of these, the largest and best organized was the 12,000-member Ukrainian Republican party, led initially by Levko Lukianenko and then by Mykhailo Horyn. Other parties included the Democratic party, led by Pavlychko, and the Peasant Democratic party. In August 1992, these parties, together with the Prosvita Ukrainian Language Society and the Union of Ukrainian Students, formed a coalition called the Congress of National Democratic Forces whose main goal was to support President Kravchuk and the state-building process. Another coalition that emerged in 1992 was Young Ukraine. Its driving force was the Party for the Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine, led by Volodymyr Filenko. Other members of the coalition were the Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine, the Green party, and some representatives of trade unions and industrial as well as business interests. The coalition's main concern was the acceleration of economic reforms. On the extreme right, several ultra-nationalist parties, such as the Ukrainian Nationalist Union, the Ukrainian National Assembly, and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, emerged that were supported, in varying degrees, by the Bandera and Melnyk factions of the diaspora-based OUN. Some estimates placed the total membership of the aforementioned parties at about 45,000.

But what of the banned Communist party and its 3 million members? Since most rank-and-file Communists belonged to the party for career reasons, they left in droves when membership no longer offered any advantages. The banning of the party on 29 August 1991 frightened off many others. Despite these setbacks, however, it was to be expected that such a massive and ubiquitous organization would retain a considerable number of hard-core supporters, especially among the older generation. Within a month of the Soviet collapse, they emerged, proclaimed their continuing loyalty to communism, and organized themselves into the Socialist party, led by Oleksander Moroz. Although initially the party numbered a relatively modest 30,000, it could count on varying degrees of sympathy and support from displaced members of the former Soviet establishment and

conservative elements in the population. Moreover, their sympathizers, the "group of 239," held a majority in parliament.

On 19 January 1993, Socialist deputies, together with those representing the directors of some of the country's largest plants and factories, tried to force President Kravchuk to sign a CIS treaty, which he had described as a step backward toward the restoration of the Soviet Union. The attempt failed. But it was a clear indication that the conservatives were preparing for a comeback. Soon afterward, the Socialists launched a recruiting drive and claimed that, in a matter of several weeks, they had raised their membership to 230,000. As the economic situation worsened and disillusionment with the new order grew, the Socialists demanded, with increasing self-assurance and vehemence, a return to the old ways.

Political and ideological divisions in Ukraine also had an important regional dimension. Democratic and ultra-nationalist parties were strongest in western Ukraine, where anti-Communist feeling was strong. The attitude was a reflection of nationalism's deep roots in the region, a tradition of anti-Soviet resistance, and the relative brevity of Communist rule in the region. In eastern and southern Ukraine, where national consciousness was much weaker and Soviet rule had existed considerably longer, pro-Communist sentiment was widespread. Clearly a product of the age-old East-West dichotomy, these regionally based ideological differences were a unique and crucial feature of the Ukrainian political scene.

The deteriorating economy For the average citizen of Ukraine these political developments were of steadily decreasing interest and relevance. Indeed, many developed a revulsion from politics in general. Underlying their attitude was the failure of politics and politicians, Soviet or democrat, to ease the steadily growing misery of daily life. The inability of the Soviet regime to resolve this problem had hastened its demise; now there was a danger that if it failed to deal effectively with the economic crisis, the newly established Ukrainian state might meet a similar fate.

One of the most widespread arguments for independence had been that, by eliminating Moscow's exploitation, independence would materially improve the lot of Ukraine's inhabitants. This view was strengthened by the traditional stereotype of "rich Ukraine," a land blessed with an abundance of resources, that would bloom if properly treated. Many who voted for independence did so in the expectation that it would raise their standard of living. But that did not happen; the economic situation continued to worsen, and by early 1993, it was catastrophic.

Statistics provide only a pale approximation of the depressing reality. According to World Bank estimates, in 1992 alone Ukraine's economy contracted by 20% while inflation leaped by 2500%.² The incentive to work, chronically weak, declined even more as salaries rapidly lost their value. A

major cause of inflation was that the government, in order to avoid massive unemployment, had printed ever-greater amounts of money to subsidize the numerous unproductive industries. Another source of inflation was the huge price increases on essential imports, especially oil and gas from Russia. Decision-makers confronted a no-win situation: either accept hyper-inflation or risk massive unemployment.

For those people who could afford to pay the high prices, many necessary consumer goods were extremely difficult to find. But most people had only enough money to pay for food, and obtaining it became the main preoccupation of much of Ukraine's population. As far back as 1988, a Soviet government report had indicated that most Ukrainians were undernourished, that is, that they ate less than the recommended amounts of meat, fish, and dairy products. By 1992, their food supply had been reduced even further. Only the availability of relatively large quantities of bread and grain supplies prevented major food shortages. Whereas in 1989 about 15% of the population had lived below the poverty line, three years later the figure stood at over 50%.³ Particularly hard hit were pensioners and children, among whom signs of malnutrition appeared more frequently. The effects of Chernobyl, furthermore, still haunted much of the population. These miserable conditions discouraged childbirth, and as a result, in the early 1990s, Ukraine's death rate was higher than its birth rate. Moreover, corruption and crime reached epidemic proportions as many offenses, including murders, went unpunished. Often they were not even investigated by the understaffed, poorly paid, and frequently corrupt police force. As if all this were not enough, in 1992 Russia drastically reduced the amount of oil and gas that it was willing to sell to Ukraine. The resulting energy crisis grounded airplanes and immobilized buses, private cars, and even ambulances. As Ukraine entered its second year of independence, the sense of malaise deepened among the people.

Opponents of independence were quick to blame Ukraine's withdrawal from the Soviet Union for these problems. The energy crisis had been brought on by independence, they maintained; in addition, factories had been cut off from their sources of raw materials in other republics, producers and customers had been separated by new borders, currency complications had arisen, and trade restrictions had been imposed. The republican components of the Soviet economic system, they claimed, were so interdependent as to be inseparable. Only the collectively undertaken efforts of all the former republics could solve their economic problems. For proponents of independence, the economic collapse was proof of the fundamentally flawed and irreparable nature of the Soviet economic system. They stressed that the economic decline had begun in the 1980s and had steadily gained momentum. While agreeing that economic cooperation with the former republics, notably Russia, was essential, they argued that each country must

find its own way out of the economic dilemma because each had its own configuration of needs and problems. Increasingly, however, in spite of the divisions of opinion, independence forced Ukraine's citizens to evaluate their economic condition more realistically, and heightened their realization that they themselves must find solutions to their problems.

At first glance, Ukraine's economic strengths still appeared impressive. The country possessed several important industries, notably coal mining, metallurgy, and machine-building. Only a few years earlier, it had produced over half the USSR's chemicals. The shipbuilding industry also was extensive. By Soviet standards, agriculture was well developed, producing in 1989 about 21% of the former union's total agricultural output and more than half its sugar. Ukraine, moreover, has about 30% of the world's rich black earth. Labor was relatively cheap and plentiful, and the labor force contained a large percentage of people with secondary and higher education. The country had many scientists whose expertise could be utilized productively in industry.

Yet, upon closer perusal, many of these strengths proved to be illusory. Although the natural resources, particularly iron ore and coal, were in vast supply, the industries that exploited them were near collapse. Because of outdated technology, the costs of mining coal were greater than the profits generated. The steel industry, also in desperate need of modernization, was stagnant and uncompetitive on the world market. To modernize those industries required massive amounts of capital, which were not available. Attempts to find new ores were unpromising, and the indication was that Ukraine's role as a major supplier of raw materials might soon be over. Moreover, the steadily worsening energy crisis painfully demonstrated the Ukrainian economy's dependence on Russian oil and gas, a fact that had major political implications.

The litany of sorrows did not end here. Workers in heavy industry were disgruntled, and many were unskilled. About 70% of Ukraine's industrial output was concentrated in heavy industry, and close to 40% of that served the erstwhile Soviet military sector. Only 30% of industry produced consumer goods. Moreover, most factories were a source of pollution. Designed and formerly run by Moscow, the industrial base for which Ukraine now assumed responsibility was inefficient, unbalanced, and ecologically dangerous – a drag on the economy rather than an asset.

The vaunted agricultural sector could not make up for industry's weakness. In fact, its production declined by 15% in 1992 alone. Because the money that collective farms received for their produce continually lost value, there was no incentive to raise production. The energy crisis paralyzed the transportation and distribution of food products. Moreover, the villages produced a disappointing surprise. For ages, a peasant's greatest dream had been to own his own land and to have as much of it as possible.

But now, when opportunities to return to private farming appeared, there was little enthusiasm for it. The opposition of collective farm officials fearful of losing their influence, difficulties in obtaining farm machinery, jealous neighbors, and the prospect of hard work discouraged many. Equally disquieting was the loss of the peasants' traditional sense of self-reliance, reflected in their failure to strike out on their own. Clearly this was yet another by-product of the collective farm system. Even more debilitating to agriculture was the continuing decline of the rural population. Between 1975 and 1990, it shrank by some 16%, from about 20 million to 17 million people.⁴ Although the countryside's economic importance remained very substantial – as reflected in the fact that many urban families with ties to the village and its productive gardens were able to weather the hard times – it declined significantly.

Unfortunately, there were few promising developments on the horizon. While projects for reforming the economy were plentiful, their implementation was painfully slow. The main problem was that the bureaucrats charged with introducing change were mostly former Communists who had little understanding of the reforms and even less desire to make them succeed. As for the West, the interest of Western businessmen in Ukraine was slow to develop. First, Western economies were themselves experiencing a slowdown; second, investment opportunities elsewhere in the world were more attractive than those in Ukraine; and third, until questions about ownership were resolved and a banking system had begun to function, few were willing to risk investing in Ukraine. By the end of 1991, there were only 250 joint ventures in the republic, employing a mere 20,000 people. Americans were involved in 56 of them, Germans in 42, and Austrians, Poles, Hungarians, and Bulgarians in about 20 each. Kiev attracted 75 of the ventures, Odessa had 34, Lviv and Donetsk had about 25 each.⁵ It did not appear that foreign investment could provide the impetus for an economic turnaround.

Because the lack of progress on reforms was no longer tolerable, on 30 September 1992, Vitold Fokin resigned, and on 13 October, parliament confirmed Leonid Kuchma, a deputy and a highly regarded factory director from Dnipropetrovsk, as the new prime minister. From the outset, the new prime minister applied an energetic, realistic approach to the daunting tasks before him, declaring forthrightly that "Ukraine does not have an economic crisis; it has a catastrophe."⁶ After obtaining sweeping powers for a six-month period to address economic problems, he introduced a series of measures that promised to enliven the stalled reforms. For many, the Kuchma government appeared to be Ukraine's last hope. But his determined moves aroused the opposition of the Socialists and other former Communists, who, with increasing aggressiveness, called for a return to the old order. Their actions, in turn, rallied the fragmented democratic camp to the

defense of the government. A mixture of tension and despair gripped the land.

The diaspora and independence The changes in Ukraine elicited great excitement in the diaspora. For generations, it had steadfastly espoused the cause of Ukrainian independence. Indeed, much of its organizational infrastructure was geared toward working for this goal. Therefore, for many emigrants, especially those who belonged to the strongly politicized post-Second World War wave, the emergence of a genuinely independent Ukrainian state represented the culmination of their personal and communal aspirations. The euphoria in Ukrainian communities abroad was all the greater because it was not dampened by the depressing realities of everyday life in a post-Soviet environment.

The diaspora in the West mobilized its resources to help the homeland even before the proclamation of independence. The initial catalyst in this effort was the Chernobyl disaster. Despite the fact that in 1986 the Communists still firmly controlled Ukraine, communities abroad, most notably in the United States and Canada, dispatched shipments of medicine, clothes, and food to the victims, especially the children. As the Kiev government acknowledged these efforts, the image of the diaspora held by Ukrainians in the homeland began to change. Previously, Ukrainians abroad, except for the tiny pro-Communist cohort, had been largely ignored by the Soviet media. If they were mentioned at all, it was invariably as treacherous lackeys of capitalism and imperialism. After the Chernobyl relief effort, however, the diaspora increasingly came to be viewed as consisting of long-lost brethren who were ready and willing to offer assistance in a time of need.

Aid from the diaspora soon expanded to include those individuals and movements in Ukraine who called for independence and the rejuvenation of national culture. Thus, when Rukh was formed, Ukrainian Canadians established a well-organized support group, the Canadian Friends of Rukh, which provided valuable financial and technical assistance to the reformist forces. Similar groups were established in the United States. Meanwhile, contacts between the long-separated diaspora and homeland expanded rapidly. Generally, they took the form of family reunions, visits by business people to their homeland to explore investment opportunities, tours by leading reformers from Ukraine of the communities abroad, and reciprocal visits by musical ensembles. Especially fruitful were the contacts and exchanges established between Ukrainian scholars and students in the West and those in Ukraine. One of the by-products was the establishment of the International Association of Ukrainianists, which, in turn, organized the first International Congress of Ukrainian Studies, in Kiev in August 1990.

After the proclamation of independence, the diaspora continued to

provide significant aid to the new state. Ukrainians in the United States and Canada vigorously lobbied their governments to grant recognition to Ukraine. Because Russia took over the former Soviet embassies and Ukraine lacked the foreign currency to purchase new ones, the diaspora helped by providing offices for Ukrainian diplomats in England and Australia and collected funds for the Ukrainian embassy in Washington. In Canada, the Huculak family of Toronto funded the purchase of Ukraine's embassy in Ottawa. Many Ukrainians trained in the West placed their expertise at the disposal of the new state and some served in advisory positions in the government. In an effort to mobilize Ukrainians abroad to even greater exertion in behalf of the homeland, on 21 August 1992, the first anniversary of Ukrainian independence, the government organized the World Forum of Ukrainians in Kiev.

Many in the diaspora had always believed that their primary obligation vis-à-vis Ukraine was to preserve those institutions and values that had been repressed by Soviet rule. With the attainment of independence, many concluded that the moment had arrived to return much of what they had preserved to its place of origin. The most obvious examples were the return to Ukraine of ecclesiastical leaders such as Cardinal Lubachivsky of the Ukrainian Catholic church and Patriarch Mystyslav of the UAOC. In the political sphere, Mykola Plaviuk, president of the Ukrainian National Republic's government-in-exile, presented his mandate to President Kravchuk in recognition of the fact that the diaspora accepted the legitimacy of the Kiev government. Meanwhile, the Bandera faction of the OUN, led by Slava Stetsko, attempted to expand its diaspora-based organizational network to Ukraine. Organizations such as the scouting movement Plast and the Union of Ukrainian Women (*Souiz Ukrainok*) also proceeded to reestablish branches in the homeland.

But it was not long before some in the diaspora concluded that their efforts were unappreciated, ineffective, or subject to exploitation. Many others worried that the limited resources of the diaspora had reached the point of exhaustion. In Ukraine, many were disillusioned when promises of aid from abroad were not fulfilled, or when help fell below expectations. The new situation also raised conceptual issues. During much of the 20th century, community activists in the West had viewed themselves as the sole and genuine spokespersons for Ukrainian national interests and concerns. But when the Kiev government took over this role in fact as well as in theory, confusion spread among these community leaders as to what their new role should be. Indeed, questions about the future of the diaspora and the need to maintain its traditional "preservative" function were raised with increasing frequency. Nonetheless, in both the diaspora and the homeland there was widespread satisfaction that the sterile confrontations of the past had been replaced by productive cooperation.



At the beginning of this book, we noted that statelessness and foreign control of the socioeconomic modernization in Ukraine would be its central themes. To a large extent they helped to elucidate why such a potentially rich land remained poor and oppressed, why Ukrainians, despite their long and colorful history, had a weak sense of national identity, and why they were virtually invisible in the world community. Today Ukraine has corrected one of the two great anomalies of its history: it has attained independence and been recognized as a full-fledged member of the community of nations. But the problem of modernization, of improving living standards, remains unresolved. In the present depressing economic circumstances, some call for a return to the security of the old ways; others want to press on more energetically toward the new and untested; many are willing to go in any direction that promises relief from the bleakness and misery of daily life. Failure to implement modernization clearly threatens what has been achieved in terms of independent statehood. Indeed, in this period of crisis, a sense of foreboding haunts many Ukrainians as they recall the collapse of previous, short-lived, attempts at independence. But unlike in the past, a new and heartening condition exists today: for the first time in centuries, the fate of Ukraine's people rests in their own hands.

This page intentionally left blank





OPPOSITE

Levko Lukianenko, a longtime dissident, a deputy to parliament, and, later, Ukraine's ambassador to Canada, tossed in the air by a jubilant crowd after Ukraine's proclamation of independence

The Ukrainian blue and yellow flag is ceremoniously brought into parliament by national-democratic deputies at the conclusion of the session that declared Ukraine's independence, 24 August 1991.





Voting in the referendum on Ukrainian independence, 1 December 1991






Cadets in Kiev swear an oath of loyalty to the new Ukrainian state, January 1992.



Speakers during the third congress of Rukh, February–March 1992



Roman Popadiuk, the first ambassador of the United States in Ukraine, arrives in Kiev, June 1992.



Donetsk miners walk out on strike in June 1993 to protest worsening economic conditions.

A scene that reflects the especially difficult circumstances in which the elderly found themselves during the worsening economic crisis of 1992–93



This page intentionally left blank

The Troubled Transition

In the decade after 1991, the paramount feature of life in the new Ukraine was change. Change is usually gradual and incremental. In Ukraine, it was neither. Throughout the century, the country experienced either too much or too little change. The Revolution and Civil War of 1917–20, the Stalinist “Second Revolution” of the 1930s, and the devastation of the Second World War brought upheavals of the most radical and traumatic kind. Moreover, in the second half of the century, stagnation transformed the Soviet Union into one of the most conservative societies in the world. A similar dichotomy between transformation and stagnation emerged in the 1990s. This time, however, the two phenomena were compressed into a narrow time span; not only did they occur simultaneously, but they were often inter-related.

After independence, many Ukrainians hoped for a swift transition to democracy and a market economy. But this required revolutionary changes in the Soviet system. And in 1991 there was no revolution: there was a collapse. What followed was the disintegration of the old order, especially its social, economic, and institutional structures. It was this depressing experience – the slow, painful disappearance of a way of life – that most touched the lives of ordinary Ukrainians throughout the decade. Simultaneously, elements of the new order – independent statehood, democratic forms, if not practices, disparate elements of a market economy (or, at least, of consumerism) – appeared. The benefits of these transformations were slow to reach the general populace. Indeed, many blamed them for the grinding poverty, corruption, profiteering, and crime that inundated society. Especially among the elderly, nostalgia for the old order was widespread. Thus, much of the decade witnessed a precarious wavering between old and new, of leaving one shore and not reaching the other, of society cast adrift and barely staying afloat.



International Relations

The emergence of an independent Ukraine was an event of major geopolitical significance. However, the international community was slow to realize it. The Kremlin was convinced that Ukrainian independence was a passing phenomenon, doomed to fail as it had in the past. Initially, the Western powers, led by the United States, also viewed Ukrainian independence with skepticism, even trepidation. In the early 1990s their analysts frequently raised the possibility that ethnic and regional conflicts would lead to the collapse of the new state. Since Ukraine was the world's third-largest nuclear power, these internal conflicts could conceivably lead to a nuclear catastrophe of global proportions.

By the mid-1990s, Western and, more slowly and reluctantly, Russian statesmen began to consider the ramifications that a Ukrainian state, strategically located between Russia and Europe, would have for the greatly altered geopolitical chessboard of Eurasia. The influential American analyst Zbigniew Brzezinski put it most succinctly: "without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire," adding that if Russia subordinated Ukraine, it would become an empire again.¹ Soon, contacts between Washington and Kiev began to expand. East European countries such as Poland and Hungary realized the usefulness of having Ukraine serve as a buffer between them and an unpredictable Russia. Moreover, West European states came to view Ukraine as a possible bridge to its huge northern neighbor. For Russia, a key goal of its foreign policy became the prevention of Ukraine's entry, be it political, economic, or military, into the western camp. For a country that only a decade earlier had been a nonentity on the geopolitical map, this rise to international significance was a remarkable change indeed.

Despite the fact that Kiev had practically no experience in conducting international affairs, it did remarkably well. The major goal of Ukrainian statesmen was to maintain a benign international environment that would allow them to concentrate on the country's massive internal problems. To achieve this, a policy of neutrality or non-bloc status was adopted from the outset. Indeed, it was enshrined in the constitution. Such an approach was not only a matter of principle but of expediency. Since the various political forces in Ukraine could not agree on which geopolitical orientation to adopt, all accepted that neutrality, for the time being, was the best option. In concrete terms, this resulted in a multivector foreign policy – that is, seeking support of and cooperation with all major power blocs while committing to none.

Russia Undoubtedly, the paramount issue in Ukraine's foreign policy was the country's relationship with Russia. As the disarray caused by the disin-

tegration of the USSR settled, Russia's new (and not so new) policy towards the former Soviet republics emerged. Its goal was, first, to establish Russia's primacy in the former Soviet space and, second, to integrate, politically, economically, and militarily, the newly independent states into a Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Ukraine's position was diametrically opposed: it insisted on equality in its relations with Russia and steadfastly rejected any aspects of the CIS that might infringe on its sovereignty. In dealing with Russia, Ukraine's first two presidents differed in style: Leonid Kravchuk (1991–4) was more belligerent while Leonid Kuchma (1994–) was more cooperative, especially in economic affairs. But neither was willing to compromise on the key issue of sovereignty. As a result, tensions and confrontations between the two countries occurred throughout much of the decade.

Dismayed by Ukraine's refusal to recognize Russia's regional primacy, Russian politicians – the Duma and Iuri Luzhkov, the powerful mayor of Moscow, were especially outspoken – responded by threatening Ukraine's territorial integrity. In 1991–2, they questioned the validity of Ukraine's borders and, specifically, the legality of the 1954 act that attached Crimea, with its Russian majority, to Ukraine. What made the loss of Crimea especially painful to Russians was that it included Sevastopol, the strategically valuable base of the Black Sea Fleet.

Another source of friction was economic relations. Ukraine depended on Russia for about 90% of its oil and 77% of its natural gas needs, accumulating huge debts for these energy supplies. When Russia threatened to cut off supplies, as it did during the so-called energy war in 1993–4, or to raise prices and demand payment, Ukrainians complained that this was done in order to exert political pressure. By the late 1990s, Russian gas and oil companies began to demand repayment, if not in cash, which Ukraine did not have, then in kind. They expected Kiev to sign over ownership to Russian companies of the refineries and the pipelines that carried Russian oil and gas through Ukraine to the West. If this option were unacceptable, Russian energy companies demanded ownership of other attractive industrial objects in Ukraine. The threat that Ukraine's industry might become increasingly foreign-owned loomed large.

Russian pressure on Ukraine was all the more threatening because it was abetted by influential elements within the country, notably the resurgent Communist party – a dominant force in Parliament – and many Russian-speakers in the eastern regions. Both wanted Ukraine to join the Russian–Belarus union. To counter this pressure, Ukraine began to develop closer ties with the United States and NATO. Confronted with a stalemate, both sides decided to introduce some stability into their tense relationship by signing, in May 1997, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership. Moscow acceded to a key Ukrainian demand: it recognized Ukraine's

borders and territorial integrity, including its sovereignty over Crimea and Sevastopol. In a separate accord, Russia received 80% of the Black Sea Fleet and the use of facilities in Sevastopol on a 20-year lease. Although the treaty removed some major irritants in the relationship between the two countries, it did not solve all problems. The contentious issues of Ukraine's relationship with the CIS and NATO still remained, as did Ukraine's dependence on Russia for energy.

The United States, NATO, and the West To a large extent, Ukraine's relationship with the West was a function of its relationship with Russia. If its independence were to have any real meaning, Ukraine had to balance the preponderant and unavoidable Russian influence by developing closer ties with the West. But this had to be done in a manner that would not exacerbate tensions with its huge northern neighbor. Other factors also played a role in the development of contacts with the West. Ukrainians viewed themselves as Europeans and, for the most part, supported the idea of "a return to Europe." (Whether Europe welcomed this "return" was another question.) Moreover, the West's high standards of living added greatly to its attractiveness. Indeed, from the all-important economic point of view, only the West could provide the investment needed to resuscitate Ukraine's collapsing economy.

It was, as might be expected, the relationship with the United States that was most crucial for Ukraine. Clearly this global superpower was best suited to serve as a counterweight to Russia. However, matters did not begin auspiciously. The United States was obsessed with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Ukraine, convinced that only its status as a nuclear power guaranteed its security and ensured that it would merit attention internationally, refused to ratify Salt II and to disarm its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, after the Soviet collapse, Washington adopted a "Russia first" policy on the assumption that Moscow was best able to restore stability in the former USSR. For its part, Ukraine consistently rejected the idea that Russia had a natural claim to primacy, in the CIS or otherwise. The fact that reforms in Ukraine moved more slowly than in Russia only added to the American perception of Ukraine as a "spoiler republic."

Beginning in 1994, however, U.S.-Ukrainian relations improved dramatically. The turning point was the Trilateral Treaty, signed by the United States, Ukraine, and Russia in January 1994. In it Ukraine agreed to give up its nuclear arsenal, shipping the weapons to Russia for destruction. In return, it received assurances – Ukraine viewed them as guarantees – of its security and territorial integrity. Also, the United States agreed to provide Ukraine with substantial economic aid. With the nuclear issue resolved, the way was open for broader relations between the two countries. The election of Kuchma, who promised to introduce radical economic reforms, encouraged the rapprochement. Meanwhile, relations between the United States

and an increasingly assertive Russia cooled. It was, therefore, in the American strategic interest to support Ukraine and, indeed, the two countries began to describe their relationship as a "strategic partnership." In 1996, the Kuchma-Gore Commission was established to review periodically the gamut of contacts between Ukraine and the United States. Meanwhile, President Bill Clinton visited Kiev, and Kuchma made several visits to Washington. Despite occasional strains in the relationship, by 2000 Ukraine had attained an important place in American global strategy, and this was reflected in the fact that it became a major recipient of U.S. foreign aid.

Another important aspect of Ukraine's relationship with the West was its contacts with NATO. The decision of this military-political alliance to accept such former Soviet satellites as Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic into its ranks confronted Kiev with a dilemma: an expanding NATO on one side and an assertive Russia on the other left neutral Ukraine in a highly vulnerable position. Initially, Ukraine expressed its doubts about the wisdom of NATO expansion. But here also a sudden and radical shift occurred. On 8 February 1995, Ukraine became the first CIS country to accept NATO's invitation to enter its Partnership for Peace program, which called for limited cooperation between the alliance and non-member countries in the area of military training and security arrangements. Ukrainian troops participated with NATO forces in maneuvers in Crimea and western Ukraine. They were also involved in peace-keeping duties in Yugoslavia. To Russia's great chagrin, in 1997 these ties with NATO were expanded at the Madrid Summit. Increasingly, both NATO and Ukraine began to refer to their "special relationship." However, Ukraine was not about to give up its neutrality. Nor did it appear likely that it would be invited to join NATO in the near future. Nonetheless, cooperating with NATO clearly bolstered its security.

East Central Europe If history were a guide, then Ukraine might have expected serious problems with its immediate neighbors to the west, especially Poland, Hungary, and Romania. In the past, all of these states had been strongly, even uncompromisingly, opposed to the very idea of Ukrainian independence. Moreover, after 1991 there was the potential for conflicts arising over territorial claims and the treatment of minorities. Fortunately, not only were confrontations avoided but relations with these neighbors developed, for the most part, surprisingly well. Kiev perceived in these countries, some of which were about to be accepted into NATO and the European Union, potential supporters of its efforts to "return to Europe." They, in turn, realized the value of having Ukraine serve as a buffer between them and Russia. This view was enunciated by Jacek Kuron, the prominent Polish intellectual and politician when he stated, "There can be no independent Poland without an independent Ukraine."²

In April 1993, Kravchuk attempted to entice the so-called Vishegrad

Countries of Eastern Europe into a broadly based mutual security arrangement that pointedly excluded Russia. Because the East Europeans were intent on entering NATO, they politely rejected this proposal. But in 1996 they did invite Ukraine to join the Central European Initiative, a grouping of ten central and southern European countries whose goal was to foster greater regional economic and political cooperation. In 1999 President Kuchma hosted a conference of presidents from these countries in Lviv.

In terms of bilateral relations, Ukraine's unusually close and productive ties with Poland were by far the most important. Poland had been the first state to recognize Ukrainian independence. As their contacts broadened, the two states signed, in May 1997, a Declaration of Understanding and Unity, which called on their citizens to set aside the animosities of the past and to concentrate on cooperative relations. As it had in the past, Poland served as Ukraine's primary link with Europe. It was in Poland's interest to encourage Ukraine's western orientation. Poland's policy of keeping its borders open to Ukrainians was only one example of these cordial relations. Ukraine's relations with Hungary also developed well. To a large extent, this was due to Kiev's liberal treatment of Ukraine's Hungarian minority of about 160,000, which was concentrated in Transcarpathia.

Ukraine's relations with its other neighbors were more problematic. In the early 1990s, its relations with Romania were strained by Romanian claims that northern Bukovyna, southern Bessarabia, and oil-rich Serpent Island had been illegally annexed to Ukraine as a result of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. Because of its desire to join NATO, Romania was anxious to avoid controversy with its neighbors, and it eventually dropped its territorial claims. In June 1997, the two countries signed a Treaty on Cooperation and Good Neighborly Relations. Another potential trouble spot was Moldova, where pro-Russian elements established the so-called Dniester Republic, a separate mini-state. Here Ukraine attempted to play the role of honest broker between the separatist elements and the Moldovan state. The one neighbor Ukraine was clearly at odds with – in terms of policies, not actual confrontations – was Belarus. The attempts of Belarussian president Aleksander Lukashenka to preserve as much as possible of the Soviet system and, especially, the entry of Belarus into a union with Russia set an example that many leftists in Ukraine wanted to follow. But it was contrary to what the Ukrainian political elite and, apparently, the majority of Ukrainians desired. Consequently, relations between these two closely related neighbors remained correct but cool.

Although Ukraine's policy of drawing closer to the West was certainly aided by its diplomatic successes, there was no guarantee that this goal would be achieved. Repeatedly Ukrainians heard from their western partners that the true measure of Ukraine's readiness to "return to Europe" would be not diplomatic arrangements but progress in domestic, particu-

larly economic, reforms. Here success would be much more difficult to achieve.

State- and Nation-Building

After the disintegration of the British, French, and other European colonial empires, the process of building new, independent states was frequently repeated throughout the world. Almost nowhere did it take place smoothly or easily. It was usually accompanied by political, social, and economic disorganization, incompetence, and corruption, and by political tensions.

State-building Not surprisingly, state-building in Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries also experienced the childhood maladies of newly and hurriedly established states. There were, of course, singular features in the Ukrainian experience. The non-violent disintegration of the USSR meant that the former Soviet elite in Ukraine was not displaced. In 1990–1, the pro-independence forces realized that they were not strong enough to attain their goal on their own. Therefore, they reached an informal agreement with the more flexible elements of the Communist establishment, led by Kravchuk. Essentially, it allowed the Communist elite to retain its dominant political, administrative, and economic positions in return for its support of independence. No longer controlled by Moscow and the Communist party, this elite could pursue its own interests at will. Discredited Communist ideals were quickly abandoned by the more flexible (or opportunistic) members of the *nomenklatura*, as the Soviet elite was called. But long-denigrated nationalism was still too alien to embrace. Consequently, most of the Ukrainian leadership adopted pragmatic, non-ideological positions.

The result was that ambiguity in ideals, goals, and even policies became the distinguishing feature of the leadership's views on the entire spectrum of issues and problems that faced Ukrainian society. This, in turn, meant that in organizing the new state, the political elite would have to work without ideological guidelines, a rare occurrence in post-imperial state-building. In short, those who began creating the new state were unclear as to what kind of state it was to be.

In certain ways, the leaders of the new Ukraine were better off than the builders of postcolonial states. Ukraine had many features of a modern society: a highly educated workforce, health and welfare systems, efficient communications, extensive urbanization, and a highly developed industrial and agricultural base. It had a bureaucracy in place, especially at the local level. But what this largely modern society lacked were the traditions and institutions of self-government, decision-making, and policy formulation. Until 1991, Kiev had been, in political and institutional terms, little more than a branch office of a highly centralized corporation based in Moscow. For gen-

erations, the most talented Ukrainian *apparatchiki* had been drawn to the greater opportunities afforded by the Soviet metropolis. Those who remained in Kiev concentrated on following instructions from Moscow. Therefore, initially, state-building in Ukraine would be very much a venture into the unknown.

Most of the external attributes of statehood were put in place quickly. Without quite realizing the impact of its decision, parliament (*Verkhovna Rada*), which was the highest authority in the land, established the office of president in July 1991. On 9 September, Ukraine introduced its own provisional currency. One month later, parliament passed the law on citizenship, which granted full rights of citizenship to all who resided in Ukraine. By early 1992, state symbols, adopted from the short-lived national state of the 1917–21 period, were accepted, but not without the momentarily subdued grumbling of the disorganized Communist hardliners. About 50 central ministries, staffed by about 13,000 officials from the old regime, were reorganized. However, their authority over the roughly 450,000 local bureaucrats was poorly defined, which at first caused considerable disruption.³

Especially important was the formation of the Ministry of Defense in September 1991. It faced the delicate task of transforming the huge contingent of 726,000 former Soviet troops stationed in Ukraine – most of whom, especially the senior officers, were Russians – into a Ukrainian army. This was accomplished with a remarkable lack of friction. Initially, a National Guard, consisting of the most reliable elements in the army, was formed. Then those who wished to take an oath of allegiance to Ukraine were enrolled in its army; those who did not were allowed to return to their homes. Gradually, the size of the armed forces was reduced. By 1999, they numbered 371,000 and were staffed and led largely by Ukrainians. Even with these reductions, Ukraine's army was one of the largest in Europe. However, due to the deteriorating economy, it was catastrophically financed, poorly supplied, and in pressing need of modernization.

In Soviet times, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was an essentially symbolic institution, consisting of about 150 officials who staffed Ukraine's mission to the United Nations. Soon after independence, however, it established embassies in over 180 countries and hosted close to 120 missions in Kiev. As embassies proliferated, ministries grew, and numerous foreign delegations and leaders made official visits, Kiev began to take on the appearance of a genuine capital. Indeed, regional elites, who had lobbied, unsuccessfully, for the introduction of a federal system, complained that the new ministries in Kiev, called the cabinet of ministers and headed by the prime minister, were as much concerned with maintaining a centralized, unitary state as Moscow had been.

At the outset, parliament, consisting mostly of Communist deputies who were elected in 1990, considered itself to be the highest authority in the land. However, while president, both Kravchuk and Kuchma insisted on expand-

ing the as-yet-undefined prerogatives of their office. Their primary goal was to gain control of the administrative structure. One of the first steps in this direction was the appointment of presidential representatives, who actually functioned as governors, in the 25 *oblasts* of the land. Furthermore, a presidential administration, consisting of close advisors to the chief executive, was formed. Soon it exerted its influence on policy-making, greatly complicating relations with the office of prime minister and the cabinet of ministers. The undefined and increasingly antagonistic relations among president, prime minister, and the 450-member parliament dramatically emphasized the need for a new constitution. After prolonged confrontations and negotiations, a new constitution became the law of the land on 28 June 1996. It defined Ukraine's political system as a mixture of presidential and parliamentary forms of government, and regulated, less than perfectly, the relationship among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In practice, however, the executive branch would prove to be more equal than the others. Elated by the passage of the constitution, Kuchma declared, on the fifth anniversary of independence and somewhat optimistically, that the state-building phase had been completed.

Nation-building One of the central themes of Ukrainian history has been the extraordinarily tortuous process of nation-building. Due to the nature of tsarist and Soviet rule in Ukraine, this process was among the most repressed, delayed, and deformed in Europe. As a result, when independence and statehood finally came, Ukrainians were far from constituting a well-defined national community. This, in itself, was not unusual. Many states were established before nation-building had been completed, as the famous statement by Massimo d'Azegli, one of the founders of the Italian state, attests: "We have made Italy; now we must make Italians."⁴ However, in Ukraine the problem had an added dimension: given the extraordinary difficulties and delays that Ukrainians experienced in developing their national consciousness, there was a question of whether the nation-building process was not irreparably debilitated. Even with the existence of an independent state, could a national identity and solidarity be consolidated?

A major complication was that, from the outset, there were divided opinions within the political elite as to what kind of nation should be formed. Many, especially in the western part of the country, focused on Ukrainian ethnicity as the cornerstone of the nation-building process. Since Ukrainians were the indigenous population, since they formed the vast majority, and since they, it was assumed, would be most committed to the new state, they, their language, and culture should define the nation. This position was forcefully expressed by a historian of the older generation, who argued that "of course, Ukraine should be for Ukrainians. After all, for hundreds of years it was for everybody but Ukrainians."⁵

Others, especially in the eastern part of the country, adopted a very different point of view: for them, citizenship should define who was and who was not a Ukrainian. A young historian argued that the new state should “create a new Ukrainian nation, which is based not on an exclusive ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural principle but on the principle of the political, economic and territorial unity of Ukraine.”⁶ The irreconcilable differences between the ethnic and civic views of nationhood created major complications for politicians. One was terminological: how should they refer to the population of the new state – as “the Ukrainian people” or as “the people of Ukraine”? Stressing the civic/ethnic distinction, however, led many to miss the point: ethnic and civic states are ideal types that rarely exist in reality. Usually citizenship is defined in civic terms, but most states have an ethnic core. The issue in Ukraine was actually whether this ethnic core would be Ukrainian or some vague East Slavic or Ukrainian-Russian amalgam.

In 1991 it appeared that the new government would attempt to make up for centuries of national repression by instituting a systematic program of Ukrainization. At this point, the brief upsurge of national pride and consciousness that coalesced around the Rukh movement in 1989 was still a force to be reckoned with. Consequently, Kravchuk, who vacillated between the ethnic and civic concepts of nationhood, laid greater stress on the use of Ukrainian in government and the media. Education became a special focus of the Ukrainizing effort. In schools and universities – but not at home or on the street – the use of Ukrainian rose perceptibly.⁷ But soon the narrow base of support for Ukrainization began to show. It was concentrated in western Ukraine and among the literati of Kiev, and it was these elements, together with Rukh, whose influence in government began to wane.

In eastern and southern Ukraine, meanwhile, disillusionment with independence and resistance to linguistic Ukrainization grew. Here the expectation had been that Ukraine, once it shook off Moscow’s exploitative rule, would have economic dividends to share among its citizens. Instead the country experienced an economic collapse. This greatly weakened support for independence and the national idea that stood behind it. Furthermore, the new state was increasingly associated with incompetence and corruption. Moreover, since most of its officials were former members of the russified *nomenklatura*, they often had little interest in implementing Ukrainization. A major reinforcement to the rising anti-Ukrainization tide was the legalization of the previously banned Communist party in October 1993. Militantly critical of nationalism, independence, and Ukrainization – to the point that, in 1994, 64 of their deputies in parliament refused to swear allegiance to Ukraine – the Communists became the leading spokesmen for disaffected elements in eastern and southern Ukraine, especially those who wanted recognition of Russian as a second official language, dual Russian-Ukrainian citizenship, and closer ties with Russia.

In the populous and economically vital Donbas, where the Communists were most influential and Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians were in the majority, anti-Kiev attitudes spread rapidly. In order to win over the disgruntled eastern regional elites, Kravchuk and, later, Kuchma offered them positions in the central government. As east Ukrainians accepted more and more senior positions, the threat to the unity of the state diminished, but government support for nation-building also declined. Furthermore, the government made a point of adopting a very liberal policy towards the country's ethnic minorities, most notably its 11 million Russians. While laudable in terms of human rights, this meant, in effect, the acceptance of a multicultural model of society. Meanwhile, many in the western regions of the country remained staunchly committed to making Ukraine more Ukrainian. Consequently, the perennial dichotomy between the nationally conscious West and the nationally ambivalent East became ever more glaring.

Promising to take the attitudes of easterners into account, Kuchma won the presidential election in July 1994. A typical product of the *nomenklatura* system – and, moreover, one who hardly spoke Ukrainian – the new president openly declared “that the national idea has not worked.”⁸ For the new state to survive, he argued, it should concentrate on economic development, not issues of identity. These statements reflected the cosmopolitan views, which included a pro-Russian or so-called Eurasian orientation for Ukraine, espoused by many of the new president's advisors. They also clearly appealed to many east Ukrainians, to the 11 million Russians in Ukraine, and to the various minority groups who, for the most part, had voted for the new president.

Despite these attitudes, the Kuchma administration could not ignore the fact that close to 75% of the population was ethnically Ukrainian. In time, the presidential team realized that if Ukrainian society was to consolidate and if it was to possess a distinct cultural identity, it would have to preserve key aspects of Ukrainian ethnicity. The logic of a national state was undeniable: if the existence of a Ukrainian nation led to the formation of a Ukrainian state, then the state was obligated to cultivate a sense of Ukrainian national identity. Consequently, the longer Kuchma, who quickly learned Ukrainian himself, stayed in office, the more his administration attempted to encourage a synthesis of civic and ethnic elements of nationhood. Parliament adopted a similar approach. This was reflected in the 1996 constitution, which referred to both “the Ukrainian nation” and “the people of Ukraine.” Despite Communist pressure to give Russian equal status with Ukrainian, the latter remained the single official language of the state.

Official policy notwithstanding, the general use of Ukrainian – commonly viewed as a bellwether of national consciousness and distinctiveness – showed little progress. Throughout the 1990s somewhat less than half of the country's inhabitants, mostly in the West and in the villages, spoke Ukrain-

ian, while slightly more than half, primarily in the East and the cities, used Russian. Of course, a large proportion spoke both, and many, especially the less educated, used *surzhyk*, an ungainly mixture of the two languages.

Many critics of linguistic Ukrainization did not object to it in principle. Rather, they wanted it to be applied gradually so as to cause a minimum of inconvenience and disruption. Since many Russian-speakers staunchly and regularly supported Ukrainian interests and independence, it would be unjustified to view them as less patriotic. But the fact remained that, with the widespread use of Russian, the task of creating a sense of national solidarity and distinctiveness was that much more difficult.

There were old and new reasons for the appeal of Russian: education, habit, and inertia played a role, as did the traditional identification of the language with the city and modernity. Moreover, in the post-Soviet period, burgeoning consumerism had a major impact. Russian capital was stronger and Russian products were more attractive. Therefore, they dominated the products of mass culture – music, popular literature, and print and electronic media – in Ukraine. Moreover, Ukrainian dependence on Russian markets meant that the language of business and therefore of computers and technology was also Russian. As a result, Ukraine remained essentially bilingual. Indeed, in certain ways Russian was more widespread than before.

The language issue highlighted another complex problem, that of regionalism. Given the regional diversity of the country, some, notably in the East and specifically the pro-Russian, Kharkiv-based Interregional Bloc for Reforms, argued that the new state should be organized as a federation of regions. Surprisingly, this federalist option did not gain much support. The Soviet tradition of centralized government might have been part of the reason. The argument used in Kiev that Ukrainian society was too weakly integrated to allow for governmental decentralization was also effective. Certainly, public opinion in both the East and West strongly supported the country's territorial integrity and evinced little sympathy for decentralization, although the idea of creating special economic zones had some appeal.

This is not to say that regionalism did not pose difficulties for Kiev. It did, most notably in two areas, the Donbas and especially in the Crimea. The Donbas, with its two cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, is a crucial region. It accounts for close to 20% of the country's industrial production, 17% percent of its population, and 9% of its territory. Its multi-ethnic population consists mainly of russophone Ukrainians and Russians. But the Russians are mostly long-time inhabitants whose ties are primarily to the Donbas, not to Russia. Indeed, even after 1991, many in the Donbas considered themselves to be neither Ukrainian nor Russian; they preferred to describe themselves as Soviets. The disintegration of the USSR was particularly painful for the Donbas. Its huge industries had been a Soviet showcase and its miners were

among its most highly paid workers. Economic collapse hit the region especially hard. Blaming Ukrainian independence for their problems, many called for the re-establishment of closer ties to Russia. The openly pro-Russian Civic Congress called for the adoption of Russian as an official language, dual Ukrainian-Russian citizenship, and federalism. Although widespread, these views did not lead to a serious separatist movement. This was due, in part, to Kiev's caution in pursuing Ukrainization in the region and, largely, to its policy of co-opting members of the regional elite into the central government. When Kuchma, the favored candidate in the Donbas, won in 1994, the region's commitment to the Ukrainian state became even stronger.

Crimea was a much more difficult problem for Kiev. It was generally recognized that the sunny peninsula, transferred to the Ukrainian SSR only in 1954, had a strong claim to special status. First, it had been autonomous prior to 1945. Second, it was the only region in Ukraine with an overwhelmingly Russian population: over 65% of its inhabitants were Russians, about 24% were mostly russophone Ukrainians, and about 10% were Tatars. Expelled en masse by Stalin in 1944, about 250,000 to 300,000 Tatars had returned to their Crimean homeland since 1989. Most of the Russians, many of whom were retired military officers or party officials, were relatively recent arrivals, as were the Ukrainians, who were concentrated in northern agrarian regions. Indeed, it has been estimated that roughly three-fourths of the 2.5 million inhabitants had settled in the peninsula only after the Second World War. The fact that the Russian Black Sea Fleet was based in Sevastopol, the scene of heroic wartime exploits by Russian imperial and Soviet forces, added greatly to the delicacy of the Crimean problem.

As might be expected, the Russian majority in Crimea reacted negatively to its inclusion in an independent Ukrainian state. In May 1992 the Crimean parliament declared independence with the intention of joining Russia and the CIS. Kiev rejected the declaration as unconstitutional. This initiated a protracted war of nerves, which reached a dangerous highpoint in 1994 when a Crimean president and parliament were elected. Kiev had backed Nikolai Bagrov, candidate of the local "party of power," while the pro-Russian elements, united in the broadly based Russia Bloc, of which the Republican party was the key element, supported the party's leader, Iuri Meshkov. The latter won overwhelmingly. In his campaign, Meshkov promised immediate economic benefits from breaking away from Ukraine and uniting with Russia.

It quickly became apparent that Meshkov could not deliver on his promises. Little concrete support was forthcoming from Russia: involved in a war with separatists in Chechnya, it could hardly support separatism in Crimea. Meanwhile, the peninsula's complete dependence on Ukraine for subsidies, energy, and water became ever more apparent. When Meshkov became

embroiled in fierce conflict with his own parliament, public opinion turned against him and his policies. This allowed Kuchma to step in, abolish the office of president, and install a pro-Kiev prime minister. Under pressure from Kuchma, the Crimean parliament passed a constitution in May 1996 that, while formalizing wide-ranging autonomy, clearly recognized the peninsula as an integral part of Ukraine and subject to its laws. The situation further stabilized in 1997, when Russia and Ukraine signed a bilateral treaty that apparently settled the vexing question of Sevastopol and the division of the Black Sea Fleet. As in all of Ukraine, in the Crimea and the Donbas the focus of attention turned to economic issues.

Politics

Like all former Communist countries, Ukraine adopted a democratic form of government. But since almost all of its political leaders were products of the Soviet, totalitarian school of politics, during the first decade of independence the essence of internal politics was the shifting, uneasy confrontation between democratic forms and authoritarian tendencies. The demands placed on Ukrainian politicians were great: throughout their careers they had internalized two basic principles of political success: absolute obedience to Moscow and unquestioning acceptance of the pervasive, monopolistic control by the party. Suddenly, these principles became irrelevant. Politicians had to learn, on the job, to function according to completely different rules.

The new elite Although the new political elite emerged largely from the old Soviet *nomenklatura*, it possessed significant differences from its predecessor. By and large, the highest levels of the Communist party leadership were shunted aside. In their place came younger, ambitious, better educated second- or third-rank *apparatchiki*, frequently with a background in the Komsomol (Communist Youth League). They were joined by a much smaller but significant cohort of national-democrat politicians who rose to prominence during the 1989–91 period. In time, a third element consisting of “businessmen” or so-called oligarchs, many of whom had acquired their money dishonestly, emerged as a major force both in national and regional politics. For oligarchs, the most attractive aspect of election to public office was that it protected them from prosecution for wrongdoing. The relationship between business and politics is close everywhere, but in Ukraine, and other post-Soviet states, business was often associated with criminality. This could not but have a negative effect on the nature of politics.

The values and attitudes of this political elite were another mixture of the old and the new. Its Soviet background encouraged a tendency towards authoritarianism; it believed that maintaining social stability was the pri-

mary, even exclusive, goal of government, and it was, by and large, ambivalent in its attitude to nation-building. The new times also led to a lack of interest in ideological issues in general. Politicians became more insular and oblivious to the public. Although many of them, national-democrats excluded, cared little about national identity, they supported independence because it allowed them to control Ukraine's affairs without interference from Moscow or competition from Russian oligarchs.

Throughout the 1990s the primary issue that confronted the Ukrainian political establishment was the redistribution of power, an especially thorny problem for those raised in the Soviet system of clear-cut political hierarchy. It was reflected, most importantly and dramatically, in the recurrent confrontations between parliament and the president. Initially, parliament assumed that it was the pinnacle of power: it promulgated sovereignty in 1990 and it declared independence in 1991. Parliament also initiated the creation of the major institutions of statehood – including the office of president – and passed the key laws of the land. Because parliament was the bastion, especially after 1994, of Communists and their allies, it appeared well placed to block any reforms that were not to the party's liking. Indeed, the leftist majority in parliament repeatedly demanded that the government be organized according to the Soviet system of councils, of which parliament was the pinnacle.

Not surprisingly, Ukraine's two presidents, especially Kuchma, viewed matters differently. Kravchuk attempted to establish his representatives as the highest authorities in the *oblasts*, but parliament blocked these efforts. When Kuchma was elected, he also tried to consolidate presidential power. On 18 May 1995 he pushed through the Law on Power, which was designed to establish a vertical chain of command with the president over the administration. The law also attempted to reach a compromise on two contentious issues: the right of the president to dissolve parliament and the right of parliament to impeach the president. Nonetheless, neither side was satisfied and the struggle continued. The president repeatedly argued that economic reforms were impossible without political reforms, particularly a stronger executive. Meanwhile, the leftists, who controlled parliament under the leadership of Oleksander Moroz, accused Kuchma of attempting to establish a dictatorship. As a result, the government was paralyzed and crisis loomed.

In order to avoid a bloody confrontation between president and parliament such as that which occurred in Russia in 1993, on 7 June 1995 the two sides concluded the so-called Constitutional Agreement. Its goal was to establish temporary principles for the division of power that would apply until a new constitution was formulated. Alarmed by the president's growing power, the Communists and their leftist supporters in parliament continued to block all attempts to prepare a constitution that might enshrine these powers. Matters were complicated even more by the conflict that

raged on within parliament between the national-democrats, who supported the president, and the anti-presidential left. As frustrations grew, Kuchma threatened to initiate a referendum that would allow him to disband parliament. Given the public disenchantment with parliamentary bickering, chances were good that the public would support him. This forced the legislators to act: on 28 June 1996, after a dramatic all-night session, they passed the long-debated constitution.

The presidential-parliamentary system of government, which the new constitution established, gave the president the right to form and lead the government without interference by the legislative branch, and it gave parliament the right to pass laws without intrusion of the executive branch. The constitution defined Ukraine as a unitary state, although an exception was made for Crimea, which received autonomous status. The document also ensured a wide range of civil liberties for Ukraine's citizens, established Ukrainian as the official language of the state, and adopted national symbols. In somewhat vague terms, it recognized the right of private property and business activity. With the passage of this new, fundamental law of the land, the Soviet era in Ukrainian history came to an end.

Even with the new constitution, tensions between president and parliament did not subside. Because the Communists, especially after the 1998 parliamentary elections, formed the largest faction – but not a majority – in parliament, they repeatedly blocked the passage of legislation that Kuchma needed. Finally, the denouement came in early 2000. Again using the threat of a referendum, the president prodded the non-leftist majority – ironically referred to as the “Bolsheviks” – to unite and, in another dramatic confrontation, to eject the leftists, including the pro-Communist speaker, Oleksander Tkachenko, from their influential positions in parliament. The non-leftist majority, led by the new speaker, Ivan Pliushch, signalled its willingness to engage in constructive cooperation with the greatly strengthened president. It seemed that an important phase in the political wars had come to an end.

Political parties In democratic societies, political parties are the links between society and the state. They educate, activate, and integrate citizens into the political system. Without them, democracy is impossible. A major problem in Ukraine's political system throughout the 1990s was that political parties were weak and slow to develop. Given the society's Soviet heritage, this was not surprising. For many, the very word “party” was associated with all the negative features of the oppressive and intrusive Communist party. Even when new parties did emerge, their performance in parliament and elsewhere only disillusioned the general populace. Finally, the importance of parties was undermined by election laws, which initially allowed factories or civil organizations the same right as parties to nominate

candidates for office. Despite these great disadvantages, political parties not only emerged in the period of independence but multiplied in great numbers. This, however, was not necessarily a sign of healthy political development.

When Article 6 of the Soviet Ukrainian constitution, which proclaimed the Communist party's monopoly on power, was removed in mid-1991, the development of a multiparty system became possible. But the emergence of political parties did not reflect a consolidation of political forces; rather, it was the result of their splintering. The process was most striking within Rukh, the mass movement that at its high point in 1991 had the support of hundreds of thousands. In 1992, Viacheslav Chornovil overcame the bitter opposition of many members of the leadership and led the transformation of Rukh into a political party. But his victory was extremely costly. Masses of members, disillusioned with the infighting and Rukh's subsequent policies, left not only the party but politics altogether. In 1999, Rukh was further weakened when, after the tragic death of Chornovil, it split into two fiercely antagonistic factions.

Other parties on the right had a membership of only several thousand each. Based mainly in western and central Ukraine, supportive of Ukraine's integration in Europe, and strongly committed to state- and nation-building, this group of parties, referred to as National Democrats, formed the core of the right wing of the political spectrum. The extreme right, most notably UNA and its militaristic affiliate, UNSO, participated in several highly publicized incidents and frequently issued demagogic statements, but its influence on society was very limited.

The left wing of the political spectrum emerged from the remnants of the Communist party. Several months after the party was banned in August 1991, the Socialist party, led by Oleksander Moroz and consisting of many national communists, was founded to fill the void on the left. Its membership was about 90,000. Soon afterward, the Peasant party, in which Oleksander Tkachenko was a key figure, was created to serve the interests of the collective farm elite. Although intent on preserving many aspects of the Soviet system and leery of reforms, these two parties accepted the principle of Ukrainian independence.

In October 1993, the Communist party was resurrected in Donetsk, a city that suffered greatly from the economic decline caused by the disintegration of the USSR. Led by Petro Symonenko, it attracted many disgruntled communists in the largely russified East who were unable to adjust to or profit from the new realities. Consequently, it was militant in its call for the restoration of the Soviet system, including close ties to Russia, the rejection of Ukrainian independence and the introduction of Russian as the second official language. The party's mission was to block all reforms, especially those that encouraged a market economy. Because the old Communist party in

Ukraine had had about 3.5 million members, its successor had a large base of recruits, and soon its membership reached more than 120,000, by far the largest party in Ukraine. Like its Soviet predecessor, the party was noted for its discipline and tight organization. The more the economy declined, the greater the party's appeal. But it had serious weaknesses: it was backward-looking, dependent on the elderly for support, and lacking an imaginative leadership. Nonetheless, the Communists, benefiting from the protest vote, did well in elections and dominated parliament. They formed the strongest opposition to their erstwhile colleagues who now constituted the Ukrainian political and economic establishment.

The center of the Ukrainian political spectrum was amorphous, splintered, and ill-defined. It consisted of numerous small parties that were formed primarily to serve the interests of the "party of power" – a loose, informal, and fractious grouping of the former Soviet *nomenklatura* who now held high government positions. Other members of this constituency were business magnates, directors of industrial enterprises, and the regional elites from industrialized centers such as Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk, and Kharkiv. These parties carried misleadingly democratic and populist names: the Workers Congress was actually a party of businessmen, the Party of Labor consisted mainly of factory directors, the Social Democratic party had hardly any workers in its ranks, the Liberal party represented the interests of the Donetsk political and business elite, while the Hromada party did the same for the rival oligarchic clan from Dnepropetrovsk. The Revival of Regions party was the political vehicle of a group of oligarchs closely linked with the presidential administration. Only the Kharkiv-based Party of Democratic Revival seriously espoused liberal ideas and values. For the most part, these parties were extremely small, rarely possessing more than 1000 members. As groupings of the elite, they were clearly not interested in mass membership. They were, however, extremely influential. This was reflected in the fact that President Kuchma and many of his closest associates came from their ranks.

When elections approached, the centrist parties attempted to form larger blocs. Thus, prior to the 1994 election, they formed the New Ukraine electoral bloc, led by Volodymyr Hryniov. In 1996, a number of centrist parties merged into the People's Democratic party (NDP). In general, their main interests were highly pragmatic and selective: they concentrated on obtaining government support for their enterprises and maintaining their members on or close to the pinnacles of power. Such emotion-laden issues as relations with Russia, national symbols, or language policy, which greatly agitated the right and left, were of little concern to them.

The existence of numerous parties – by 1999 there were 71 – was not an indication of a fully functional democracy in Ukraine. Not only were most parties small, but they lacked a well-defined social base. Hence, their

responsibility to a specific constituency was limited. What factors most influenced one's choice of a party to support? Usually, region played a crucial role, with westerners favoring parties on the right, easterners those on the left, and central Ukraine wavering between the two. Consequently, almost all parties were regional, not national, in scope. Divorced from society, limited in their activity to parliamentary in-fighting, and focused on narrow partisan and personal interests, political parties were viewed with great skepticism by the general public. A telling indication of their inability to attract popular support was the fact that in a society of 50 million, only about 350,000–400,000 were members of political parties. In a poll taken in 1995, only 31.2% of respondents believed in the necessity of a multiparty system and only 8.8% were willing to grant power to any single party. Nonetheless, elections did demonstrate the need for political parties. And by end of 1990s there were indications that these parties were developing a better sense of what role they should play in society.

Elections In Ukraine, elections were those rare moments when the political elite was forced to pay attention to the general populace. The parliamentary elections in 1994 had two noteworthy features: they were the first since independence, and they were the first to occur on a multiparty basis. In general, these elections were fair and calm, but because they took place amidst a collapsing economy and plummeting living standards, they were highly disappointing to incumbents. First, most incumbents were not re-elected. Second, due to poor voter turnout, only 338 of 450 seats in parliament were filled. Third, political parties in general, hamstrung by an election law that worked to their disadvantage, did very poorly: more than half of the new deputies were independents. Fourth, the left surged back to prominence. Based in the industrialized East and using the economic crisis to their own advantage, the Communists won 20% of the seats. With their Socialist and Peasant party allies, they formed the largest bloc in parliament. However, while numerous enough to block legislation, the left was not strong enough to have its way. Consequently, parliament proved to be incapable of engaging in constructive activity.

Although the center did most poorly in the elections to parliament, it was from its ranks that the two major candidates in the presidential elections of 1994 emerged. The incumbent president and favored candidate, Kravchuk, campaigned on a platform that appealed to some elements in the "party of power" and especially to the nationally conscious population of the western and central regions: he stressed the achievements of independence, the need for state- and nation-building, and an orientation towards Europe. His rival, Kuchma, had the support of the eastern businessmen and enterprise directors, united in the Interregional Bloc for Reforms. A former director of Pivdednmash, the largest missile factory in the world, and a former prime

minister, Kuchma was the classic representative of the east Ukrainian, largely russified *nomenklatura*. His campaign stressed economic issues and the need for closer ties with Russia, Ukraine's main trading partner. He also promised his primary constituency, the urbanized, industrialized, russified East, that Russian would be introduced as a second official language. Even the Communists and their leftist allies, realizing that their candidate, Moroz, was unelectable, threw their support behind Kuchma. In July 1994, the final result of the presidential election was a close and unexpected victory for Kuchma.

The election results dramatically emphasized key features of the Ukrainian political landscape: the most obvious was the great difference between the nationally conscious West and the pragmatic East. But now it was clear that the far more populous East was the decisive element. Nonetheless, those who expected Kuchma to retreat from independence and to lead them back to the stagnant stability of the Soviet days – and there were many, notably the Communists, who did – were soon disillusioned. Within weeks of his election, Kuchma announced a promising program of pro-market reforms and, quickly learning Ukrainian, demonstrated his commitment to independent statehood. Soon, a radical reversal occurred: the president's strongest supporters could be found in the West and in the national-democratic camp, while his erstwhile allies on the left became his fiercest opponents.

An indication of how Ukraine's multiparty system was evolving came in the parliamentary election of 1998. In terms of issues, little was new, except that less emphasis was placed on issues of geopolitical orientation and language and even more on the economic crisis. There was, however, a crucial change in the electoral process: parties that received more than 4% of the total vote received a proportionate number of half of the seats in parliament. The other half went to the individuals who received the most votes in an electoral district. Since this raised the importance of political parties, the vast majority of new deputies chose to be affiliated with them.

Another feature of these elections was the participation of a greater number of businessmen and regional elites. The new Hromada party, led by Pavlo Lazarenko and based in Dnipropetrovsk, placed well, as did the Social Democrats, led by Hryhorii Surkis, Viktor Medvedchuk, and former prime minister Ievhen Marchuk. Another surprise was the strong showing of the Green party. This was not due to a rise in environmental concerns but to the backing, for pragmatic reasons, of business circles. In these elections, media exposure and ample funding played a greater role than previously. Nonetheless, it was the two bitter rivals, the Communists and Rukh, that still attracted the greatest numbers of voters: the former garnered about 25% of the vote while the latter attracted about 10%. The results of the vote were indecisive, with the Communists and their allies receiving about 42%

and the parties on the right and center getting the rest. However, the better-organized left acquired a dominant position in parliament. Its candidate, Tkachenko, was elected speaker, and it dominated most of the parliamentary committees.

The second presidential elections in independent Ukraine occurred in 1999. Because of his inability to deal with the economic crisis, it appeared that Kuchma's chances of re-election were extremely limited. Yet, in a scenario very reminiscent of Yeltsin's recent success in the Russian presidential election, the unpopular incumbent won a relatively easy victory. How was this achieved? Taking advantage of his office to an extreme degree, Kuchma used administrative pressure to hobble his opponents. Moreover, the oligarchs, anxious to maintain the status quo, provided him with unprecedentedly large financial resources. This allowed the president to employ modern western techniques of influencing public opinion. Because he had almost total control of the media, sometimes to the point of censoring or blocking his opponents' point of view, the president was able to refurbish his initially unappealing image. A coalition of four left-centrist candidates, the so-called Kaniv Four (Marchuk, Moroz, Tkachenko, and Volodymyr Oliynyk) briefly posed a threat. But their inability to cooperate effectively gave the president what he wanted – the lacklustre Communist leader, Symonenko, as his final opponent.

Constantly stressing the theme that his Communist opponent represented the return of the Red Menace, the president's image-makers presented their candidate as the guarantor of stability and order. Confronted with two unappealing choices, the Ukrainian electorate voted for the status quo: Kuchma was re-elected with 56% to his opponent's 37% of the vote. As in 1994, western Ukraine gave the incumbent president its complete support, proving the adage that the more populous East elects presidents, but the more nationally minded West supports them. The base of Communist support shifted markedly. It weakened in the East, especially in large cities, but strengthened in the villages of central Ukraine. Thus, the glaring East-West dichotomy of 1994 became somewhat less marked. While the electorate gave the left considerable support, this was more in protest against the dismal state of affairs than an expression of sympathy with Communist ideals. In any case, the voters clearly were not willing to vote the Communists into power. With the left defeated and the right disunited, Kuchma emerged from the election stronger than ever.

Recurrent themes Even though a pro-presidential majority was formed in parliament in January 2000, this was not enough for Kuchma. In a move calculated to assure his dominance over parliament, the president pushed through a referendum in April 2000. Its results supported proposals to create a bicameral parliament and to give the president the right, under certain conditions, to disband the legislature. It also deprived the deputies of their

prized immunity from prosecution. The referendum marked a fundamental shift in Ukrainian politics. No longer was the division of power at issue; the president now had most of it, and there were those who feared that the threat of authoritarianism would confront Ukraine in the near future. But because the outcome of the referendum needed a two-thirds majority of parliament to be included in the constitution, many doubted that presidential-parliamentary confrontations were a thing of the past.

Soon after the presidential election, the language issue again came to the fore. Given the dominance of Russian, ukrainophones often complained that they felt like a "psychological minority" in their own country. The new Kuchma administration, which received its strongest support in the Ukrainian-speaking West, took some cautious steps to redress the situation. Support for this tendency came in December 1999, when the Constitutional Court upheld the article stipulating the Ukrainian should be the single official language – to the great dismay of the Russian government, which protested that this could lead to discrimination against russophones in Ukraine. There were ominous rumblings of discontent in Luhansk and especially Crimea. Nonetheless, supporters of Ukrainian were given positions of influence in the government, and it appeared that another attempt at Ukrainization would be made. However, even its staunchest supporters realized that in this complex, lengthy endeavor, success could not be guaranteed.

Economy

The most striking – and depressing – aspect of life in the new Ukraine was the dismal state of its economy. It overshadowed all other issues, problems, and achievements of the first decade of independence. Its catastrophic condition raised doubts, both at home and abroad, about the ruling elite, the political system, and the very viability of the state itself. Perhaps most disturbing, the prolonged economic crisis shook the confidence of Ukrainians in themselves.

Between 1991 and 2000, the country's GDP had sunk over 63%, one of the worst declines in the former USSR. Its trade plummeted, debts burgeoned, and foreign investment was little more than a trickle. In an American survey that measured the "freedom" of economies to develop, Ukraine ranked 125th out of 156 countries.⁹ Many of the country's huge, uncompetitive factories barely functioned, its dangerous mines were unprofitable, and its collective farms could hardly sustain themselves. Villages were neglected and the urban infrastructure was in disrepair. People were badly fed, shabbily dressed, inadequately housed, and in poor health. The standard of living plummeted to the point where about 70% of population were close to or below the poverty line. Worse still, prospects for improvement were bleak. How and why did such a catastrophic state of affairs develop?

Even before independence, the deficiencies of the Soviet economy were coming to the fore, and astute observers of the USSR concluded that economic decline was unavoidable. As a key part of the Soviet economic system, Ukraine was, therefore, highly vulnerable. Moreover, the economic costs of the abrupt separation in 1991 were unexpectedly high. Russia was the main – indeed, almost exclusive – market for Ukrainian products. When the two countries were separated by tariffs, duties, and other barriers to trade, this crucial market became less accessible. It also became apparent that Ukraine's industry was dangerously lopsided. Heavily concentrated in the military-industrial sector, what it produced was exactly what was no longer needed.

There were other serious economic problems as well. A key one concerned the industrial structure. A central, and politically motivated, principle of Soviet economic planners had been that the production cycles of most goods manufactured in a republic should be incomplete – that is, a product could not be completed in a republic without using the resources or facilities of other republics. Consequently, when the USSR disintegrated, Ukraine discovered that a great majority of its industrial products depended on materials or parts located in what were now foreign states. Another economic shock was energy costs. In Soviet times, Ukraine's huge and inefficient factories received artificially cheap oil and gas from Russia. But after 1991, Russia began to charge world prices, and Ukrainian industry, indeed, the entire economy, was traumatized by sky-rocketing energy costs. Finally, Chernobyl continued to be a serious drain on the budget.

Economic dislocations associated with the disintegration of the USSR were only part of the dilemma. Another factor was that the people who had presided over a collapsing Soviet economy were now charged with transforming Ukraine into a market economy. The situation was comparable to engaging Wall Street "sharks" to transform a capitalist economy into a communist one. Obviously, most of the new/old Ukrainian elite had neither the will nor the ability to introduce effective economic reforms. And if it did introduce reforms, they were usually ones that served its own interests.

Even among those few members of the new elite who realized the need for reforms, there was a lack of consensus. Some argued for a radical approach or "shock therapy," which had been applied successfully in neighboring Poland. Others believed that a gradual, sequential approach would be more effective. And still others believed that a "third way," a particularly Ukrainian approach, could best solve the country's economic difficulties. The ongoing conflicts among the president, prime minister, and leftist-controlled parliament only added to the confusion and sense of paralysis.

Kravchuk policies There were important variations in the leadership's attempts to deal with the economic crisis. Kravchuk paid relatively little

attention to the issue; he concentrated on state- and nation-building. Another reason why he avoided serious economic reforms was that he feared their destabilizing effect on society. For him, social and political stability was clearly more important than economic reform. When he did introduce economic measures, their goal was to ensure the economic sovereignty of Ukraine – that is, to reduce the impact of the Russian economy. Thus, in November 1992, Ukraine formally withdrew from the ruble zone, and its provisional currency, the *karbovanets* or coupon, was introduced.

When production began to plummet, the administration, led by Vitold Fokin, resorted to old Soviet remedies: it provided money-losing factories with large subsidies and allowed them to run up huge deficits. The goal was to keep up production at all cost, even if no one wanted the goods that were produced, and to avoid unemployment. The result was predictable: inflation rose dramatically. In January 1992 alone, it jumped 435%, and this was only the beginning. Bowing to public discontent and pressure, in September 1992 Kravchuk replaced Fokin with Kuchma.

To the surprise of many, this classic “Red director” asked for emergency powers and introduced strict monetary controls. Subsidies were reduced, deficits no longer tolerated, and tax collection expanded. Moreover, the privatization of state property was seriously considered. It seemed, briefly, that inflation was under control. But strict monetary policy also meant that salaries were unpaid or delayed, welfare payments slashed, and pensions postponed. Popular discontent grew even greater, culminating, in June 1993, in the Donbas miners’ strike, which threatened to plunge the economy into chaos. Meanwhile, Kravchuk, worried by the growing influence of his forceful prime minister, distanced himself from his policies. Parliament, only too happy to take advantage of the tensions between president and prime minister, proposed its own economic policies. Politicians of all stripes announced, in principle, their support for reforms. Few, however, were ready to back concrete changes. Clearly, the political base of support for reforms was simply lacking. Frustrated, Kuchma resigned in September 1993.

As his successor, Kravchuk chose Iukhym Zviahliksky, a “Red director” from the politically important Donbas. Reflecting the conservatism of his caste and supported by the president, the new prime minister reintroduced rigid state controls and halted privatization. He raised subsidies to factories and especially to collective farms, where many of Kravchuk’s supporters lived. These huge expenditures by the government led to a catastrophic burst of hyperinflation: in 1993 prices surged by over 10,000%. Although salaries also rose, they could not keep pace with prices. Consequently, goods remained unsold, production sank even further, and the specter of unemployment or underemployment emerged. Another painful effect of hyperinflation was that, in one fell swoop, it wiped out the savings of millions of

frugal, hard-working citizens. Especially hardhit were the elderly who had carefully set aside funds for their retirement. Thus, within a year, millions in Ukraine became virtually penniless.

While masses plunged into poverty, the well-placed elite used the fiscal chaos to accumulate tremendous riches. Some well-placed officials simply transformed Communist party funds and property into private holdings. Others accumulated wealth in more roundabout ways. For example, factory directors obtained, with the help of old Communist party colleagues, huge government loans or subsidies, ostensibly to keep their enterprises in operation. They then illegally changed the amounts into dollars and waited for the Ukrainian currency to lose value. Using a fraction of their dollars to buy the greatly devalued coupons, they repayed the original amount. The remaining dollars, often amounting to millions, they kept for themselves and their cronies. With these funds they could later buy their enterprises or, in the case of the most intrepid, whole industrial sectors. Another technique was to buy large quantities of raw materials produced in Ukraine, which were still very cheap by world standards. With the help of friends and bribes, they then obtained hard-to-come-by export licenses and sold the material at tremendous profit on world markets. The fact that these illegal practices created shortages of resources and stoked inflation hardly worried the enterprising "businessmen."

Practices of this sort were feasible only if one occupied high positions or had the right connections. Indeed, connections were more important than capital. They resulted in the rapid transformation of the most intrepid members of the old Soviet *nomenklatura* into incredibly wealthy oligarchs. However, unlike the robber barons of early capitalism, these new "captains of industry" acquired their wealth by undermining rather than expanding the economy.

Kuchma policies In 1994, the key element in Kuchma's election platform was his commitment to improve the economy. Almost immediately after taking office, the new president announced a program of radical reforms. It included privatization of state property, elimination of subsidies to unprofitable enterprises, liberalization of prices, reduction of social expenditures, and stabilization of the currency. The heart and soul of the reforms was privatization: it was assumed that the sooner government-owned enterprises passed into private hands, the faster market conditions would begin to operate. After a slow start, small-scale privatization – which included shops, restaurants, and service facilities – accelerated, and by mid-1997 about 90% of Ukraine's 45,000 small enterprises were privatized (at this time, Poland had two million). But this sector accounted for only 2% of the GDP. In the privatization of the 18,000 medium and large enterprises, many of which had thousands and even tens of thousands of workers, there was

almost no progress. Opposition in parliament was a major reason: the national-democrats worried that Russian oligarchs, who were much richer than their Ukrainian counterparts, would buy up Ukrainian industry. At the same time, the Communists fiercely opposed large-scale privatization because it paved the way to capitalism. Conflicts among various oligarchic clans about how to divide the spoils also derailed the process.

The appointment of Ievhen Marchuk as prime minister in 1995 signalled a retreat to a more gradual approach. The new prime minister insisted, however, on limiting subsidies and salaries. Wages declined to \$55 a month, among the lowest in the CIS (in the Baltic countries the comparable figure was \$200, in Russia it was \$140). Unemployment rose inexorably: the government claimed that it was about 10%, but reliable estimates put the rate at about 33%. This figure did not reflect the large percentage who were on payrolls but were not being paid or who were indefinitely furloughed from their jobs. Social tensions mounted and so did conflicts between Kuchma and Marchuk. In what was fast becoming a standard response to frustrating problems, Kuchma dismissed his prime minister. His place was taken by Lazarenko, a leading member of the Dniepropetrovsk clan, which was the traditional recruiting ground of the Soviet and post-Soviet Ukrainian elite. Kuchma himself was one of its products. Soon over two hundred of the top positions in government were occupied by members of the Dniepropetrovsk clan, to the great dismay of the rival Donetsk clan. When Lazarenko was implicated in corruption, he was replaced by another Dniepropetrovsk product, Valeri Pustovoitenko. It seemed that responsibility for reforms lay in the hands of the unreformed.

Unable or unwilling to control its growing deficits, the government sought to increase its income. It raised taxes, especially on business activity, to astronomical heights. In many cases, businesses were expected to pay a 90% tax. The result was that much privately conducted economic activity moved underground. This shadow economy grew so rapidly that, by some estimates, it was close to half of the GDP. However, much of it remained in oligarchic or "Mafia" hands. Since it did not pay taxes, this budding sector was of little help in alleviating government deficits. Furthermore, much of the illegally acquired wealth was sent, for safe-keeping, outside of the country, resulting in a massive flight of capital. Some estimates placed the amount sent abroad in the \$25–50 billion range, a sobering indication of the scope of the illegal, parasitical operations carried out by the rapacious oligarchs. Meanwhile, given the corruption, exorbitant taxation, and stifling regulation, Ukraine had extreme difficulties in attracting foreign investors. In 1997, foreign direct investment was only \$27 per capita in Ukraine, compared to \$48 in Russia, \$250 in Poland, \$696 in the Czech Republic, and \$1376 in Hungary. Finally, the country faced a cash drought. One of the few bright spots on the dreary economic horizon was the successful introduc-

tion, in 1996 and thanks to the able efforts of Viktor Iushchenko, head of the National Bank, of a new and relatively stable currency, the *hryvnia*.

As its financial troubles mounted, Ukraine turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for help. As a result, its foreign debt began to grow: in 1992, foreign indebtedness was a relatively insignificant \$1.4 billion, but by 1998 it shot up to \$12.5 billion. Meanwhile, the IMF, troubled by the lack of reforms, became increasingly hesitant about providing new loans or rescheduling debt payments. To make matters worse, rising energy costs pushed Ukraine's debt to Russia even higher. By 1999, Ukraine faced the real danger of bankruptcy. The appointment of Iushchenko as prime minister in December 1999 raised hopes that this highly regarded banker would resume the stalled reforms. Another hopeful sign was a 5.6% rise in the GDP, the first since independence, in early 2000. But the parasitical dominance of the oligarchs in the Ukrainian economy limited the optimism.

Agriculture, traditionally a key sector of the economy, also continued its steep decline. Between 1990 and 1997, gross agricultural production decreased by 44%. Quite simply, agricultural production became economically unfeasible because the cost of production rose, due mainly to soaring energy prices, six times faster than what the produce could be sold for. Reformers hoped that the liquidation of the collective farm system, privatization of land, and encouragement of private farming would revitalize this crucial area of the economy. But many more opposed the abolition of the collective farms than supported it. For the left, privatization of land was anathema and, in parliament, it used every means possible to block it. The powerful collective farm directors feared it because private landownership would undermine their power and income. And the peasants, who had once so fiercely resisted collectivization, proved to be surprisingly reluctant to abandon it. In 1997, out of approximately 4.6 million agrarian workers, Ukraine had only about 35,000 independent farmers. A country that possessed the richest farmland in Europe faced the possibility of importing food to feed its population.

Even when measured against the poor performance of most other former Soviet republics, the attempted economic reforms in Ukraine were highly disappointing. Granted, the task of transforming a highly developed, planned economy to a complex market economy was extremely difficult, especially in a country that had practically no capitalist institutions and traditions. Nonetheless, Ukraine's leaders bore the responsibility for the incompetence, vacillation, and lack of commitment that characterized their efforts.

Kravchuk failed to realize the importance of economic reform. When problems arose, he attempted to resolve them by using clearly discredited Soviet methods, thereby making matters even worse. Initially, Kuchma's

efforts were promising: he focused his attention on the economy and opted for radical change. But his long-term goal of introducing market conditions ran afoul of his short-term goal of maintaining inefficient enterprises and limiting unemployment. Unwilling to impose short-term pain, he failed to achieve long-term gain. As his approach to reform became ever more gradual, Ukraine's transition process appeared to grind to a halt, mired in a stagnating situation that was neither a planned nor a market economy but that had the worst elements of both. Fear spread that the so-called Ukrainian way, which called for "a socially oriented market economy," was actually leading the country into a semi-permanent, painful state of economic stagnation, similar to that which existed in numerous Third World societies.

Clearly, opposition to reform was strong. The leftist-controlled parliament repeatedly frustrated the president's economic program. At the same time, the new oligarchs, who financed electoral campaigns, realized that a prolonged, indecisive transition provided them with the best opportunities to enrich themselves. The stifling bureaucracy was also antagonistic because reforms called for the deregulation of the economy, and this meant fewer opportunities to supplement their meager salaries with bribes. Finally, large sections of society, especially the elderly, longed for a return to the security of Soviet times. In short, the political base for radical economic reforms was simply lacking, and the political will among the leadership to enforce reforms was also absent.

Society

Soviet society was regimented, oppressive, and, in its final decades, stagnant. Nonetheless, it was not without positive features. Many Soviet citizens accepted the official view that their society, consisting of the worker and peasant classes and a stratum of intelligentsia, was not divided into rich and poor, exploiters and exploited. Of course, the distinctions between the party and bureaucratic elite, the intelligentsia, and the many varieties of workers and peasants were much greater than many cared to admit. However, thanks to an accessible education system, upward social mobility was widespread. Moreover, salary differences between high officials and lowly workers were relatively modest (it was in the unofficial "benefits" associated with a higher position that the great differences lay). This resulted in a vast "middle class" – that is, a majority who had roughly equivalent incomes and living standards. Moreover, a social welfare system extended from cradle to grave, education and health care were free, and employment was assured. All this fostered a strong sense of personal security and predictability in the life of the average Soviet citizen.

This changed radically, and for the worse, in the 1990s. Most striking was the rapid and blatant growth of socioeconomic inequality. The emergence of

a new elite became a glaring fact of life. Its upper echelons, possessing both wealth and power, probably constituted much less than .5% of the population. Below them was another category, consisting mostly of former Soviet blackmarketeers turned "businessmen," top bureaucrats and directors of vast enterprises, and even some genuine entrepreneurs. Its members, encompassing perhaps 2% of the population, possessed wealth but lacked the political power of the top stratum. Unlike in Soviet times, this elite no longer attempted to camouflage the attributes of its privileged status. It built luxurious homes, acquired expensive foreign cars, and engaged in other forms of conspicuous consumption. It also strove to isolate itself from the masses by inhabiting exclusive neighborhoods, sending its children to private schools, often abroad, and travelling in chauffeured cars, often accompanied by bodyguards. And, unlike in Soviet times, its members assiduously strove to transform themselves into a hereditary class.¹⁰

About 10% of the population managed to acquire some of the features of a Western middle class: they were small businesspeople, managers and directors, employees of foreign firms, well-placed administrators, and professionals – in short, people who profited, in a modest fashion, from the market economy. While not wealthy in Western terms, they had enough income to live in relative comfort and even enjoy some luxuries, such as a comfortable apartment, an automobile, a foreign vacation, or imported clothes. However, this stratum was far too small to constitute a genuine middle class that could function as a stable core of society. But, like the elite, it did have reason to be satisfied with the status quo.

The vast bulk, about 75%, of the population, however, experienced an unmitigated socioeconomic disaster. This formerly secure Soviet middle class was abruptly plunged into a bitter struggle for survival. It was, first of all, bereft of money. Hyperinflation wiped out its savings, the economic crisis meant that salaries were not paid or were postponed, rising prices put goods out of reach, and unemployment or underemployment grew steadily. More and more of its members sank into poverty, a characteristic of which was spending more than half of their income on food. By 1996, over 33% of Ukraine's population, or 17 million people, could be described as being poor or very poor. And most of the rest of the old middle class barely managed to stay above the poverty line.¹¹

The problem lay not only in the lack of money; the social services and welfare that the state once provided also deteriorated drastically. Cuts in health care were so great that hospitals could not buy the most basic medicines, and patients were advised to bring their own. The pensions of the elderly shrank to an average of \$8–12 a month. The costs of education became ever more burdensome, especially since unpaid teachers often expected some "support" from parents, and unscrupulous university officials demanded bribes to assure admission to their institutions. All this was frequently

accompanied by shortages of electricity and fuel, which left entire cities dark and homes unheated. Moreover, the environment, even discounting the aftereffects of Chernobyl, was polluted to the extreme. Certain segments of the former middle class were especially vulnerable to this avalanche of hardships: the humanities intelligentsia – scholars, pedagogues, artists – lost the generous state support they had enjoyed and found it difficult to adjust to new conditions. The weak – the elderly, single mothers, and orphans – were also hard hit. In 2000 there were over 100,000 homeless minors in the country. The bottom 10–12% of society – the derelicts, the alcoholics, the imprisoned, and the mentally and physically impaired – were often reduced to begging for their sustenance. With the vast majority of Ukraine's population destitute and disillusioned, it was, indeed, a wonder that a violent social upheaval did not occur.

To cope with these setbacks, Ukraine's citizens adopted a variety of survival tactics. Those who were fit and energetic sought additional jobs, often working at two or three, usually in the shadow economy, to make ends meet. Many, especially elderly women, engaged in petty trade, standing for many hours in subway entrances or local bazaars to sell one or two cheap items. Others, notably the young, travelled to neighboring countries, especially Poland and Turkey, to engage in small-scale commerce. Hundreds of thousands also sought work abroad, working for minimal wages and in terrible conditions. As might be expected, some young males turned to crime, joining the "Mafia" gangs that controlled much commercial activity. But by far the most widespread means of supplementing one's livelihood was the ubiquitous garden plot that most citizens acquired in the final years of the USSR. Because they were a major source of food, they were assiduously worked by young and old, educated and uneducated, urban and as well rural inhabitants. Indeed, the garden plot became the primary focal point of "leisure time" activity.

The demographic costs of these hardships were catastrophic. In 1989 the average lifespan of men and women in Ukraine was 66 and 75 respectively; by 2000 it sank to 63 and 73. Men lived ten years less than North American males. Such a precipitous drop in longevity in an industrialized country was unprecedented. Only Russia experienced worse. Previously controlled diseases spread rapidly: between 1990 and 2000, the incidence of tuberculosis rose by 75%. HIV, acquired mostly from injecting drug use, soared from 400 cases in 1994 to an estimated 250,000 in 2000. Given these conditions, Ukrainian families were loath to have children. During the 1990s there were only .79 children per family; one in four families had no children at all. Not surprisingly, the desire to emigrate was intense and widespread, especially among the young. Only the reluctance of countries to accept immigrants prevented a mass exodus. Nonetheless, over 500,000 of Ukraine's inhabitants, often the best and brightest, left the country during the decade. Emi-

gration rates were especially high among the country's Jews, about 300,000 of whom emigrated to Israel.¹² Because of the early deaths, low birth rates, and emigration, Ukraine's population declined dramatically. In 1989 it was almost 52 million; by 2000 it had sunk to 49.7 million. Predictions were that by 2026, it would be only 42 million.¹³ This, on top of the horrendous population losses in 1917–21, 1933, and 1941–5, and the aftereffects of Chernobyl, led many to wonder how much demographic punishment one nation was capable of handling.

Civil society A vast and widening gulf, usually expressed in terms of "us" and "them," existed between the state and those who controlled it, on the one hand, and the vast majority of the population, on the other. Given their alienation from and distrust of the state, what means did various segments of Ukrainian society have to defend their interests? Political parties, as noted above, were unable to fulfill this function. For a brief period, Rukh appeared to be a genuine mass movement that could and did affect the course of events, but internal conflicts, poor policy decisions, and weak leadership led to its rapid decline and fragmentation.

There were, however, huge organizations, rooted in Soviet times, that professed to represent the interests of large segments of society. By far the largest was the Federation of Labor Unions (FPU). In 1994, it consisted of about 20 million members – that is, 40% of the labor force and 97% of all unionized workers. But instead of defending the interests of workers before the country's largest employer, the state, the FPU sought to maintain the status quo. As in Soviet times, many factory directors were also elected as union leaders because they could easily pressure workers to vote for them. As directors of state-owned enterprises, they cultivated close links with the government. Moreover, the government provided funds for the FPU social welfare fund, the federation's most appealing feature. Consequently, the union leadership was loath to challenge the government and the ruling elite. With leaders such as these, it was little wonder that the ostensibly huge and potentially powerful labor unions remained an essentially conservative force, one that had limited political impact and that did little to improve the lot of its apathetic membership. The independent union of miners, based in Donetsk and numbering about 65,000, was an exception. In 1991, 1993, and 1996 it staged disruptive strikes, but these failed to attract widespread support and brought few benefits to the strikers.

In the countryside, social activism was even weaker. There, another Soviet holdover, the Kolhoz Council, which encompassed almost all of Ukraine's 9000 collective farms, reigned supreme. Its purported goal was to defend the interests of collective farmers and, specifically, to obtain funds and equipment for them from the state. But here also, it was the collective farm directors who controlled the organization. Since they desperately needed to

maintain the collective farm system, they used the council to obstruct agrarian reforms and especially the emergence of private farms. Close links between the council and the Ministry of Agriculture made it difficult to distinguish between representatives of the agricultural workers and the government. In contrast, the Ukrainian Farmers Organization, founded in 1994 and consisting of 15,000 private farmers, was a genuinely grass-roots organization. However, it was numerically too weak to have an impact. Nonetheless, by the end of the 1990s there were indications that the old guard's monolithic control of the countryside was beginning to crack. This was especially evident in divisions that appeared among the collective farm leadership. The majority, united in the Peasant party, still opposed reforms, but a more liberal or flexible minority, associated with the breakaway Agrarian Party for Reform, rejected the unbending conservatism of their colleagues. In the short term, however, it did not seem likely that the long-suffering collective farm workers would experience any major improvement in their depressed condition.

Not surprisingly, the segment of society that was most effective in defending its interests consisted of the big industrialists and businessmen. The Ukrainian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (USPP) was founded in 1990. Its 14,000 members employed about 4.5 million people. Essentially this was the umbrella organization of the new oligarchy. Ostensibly it supported reforms and the drive towards a market economy, its primary function was actually to obtain subsidies from the state. Therefore, a significant number of its well-financed members sought and obtained important positions in government. But fissures appeared within this interest group also. More-liberal elements supported the reforms proposed by Kuchma, a former member of their organization, while others continued to obstruct them. Conflicts between regional clans, such as those from Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk, also limited the efforts of this potentially powerful sector to present a united front.

During the 1990s a qualitatively new type of social organization, the non-governmental organization (NGO), appeared. Realizing the government was unable to address many of their needs, social activists began forming youth groups, social service societies, arts and professional associations, and women's organizations. Previously, activities of this type were state-controlled; now individuals and groups spontaneously undertook them. Democrats warmly welcomed the appearance of such groups because they saw in them the roots of civil society, of people taking charge of their own affairs and not waiting for the state to address their needs. By 1999, there were over 19,000 NGOs registered in Ukraine. However, only about 5000 actually functioned. After the initial enthusiasm waned and funds, always scarce, dried up, most NGOs maintained only a formal existence.

It soon became evident that, due to Soviet paternalism, which encouraged

a reliance on the state, many Ukrainians lacked the inclination and the skills needed for community organization. This was especially the case in eastern and southern Ukraine. In the West, where there was a strong tradition of community organization, the situation was somewhat more encouraging. The stifling, intrusive bureaucracy also complicated matters. Moreover, the fact that some businesses attempted to use NGOs as a means of avoiding taxes or that organizers tried to have them serve their personal interests added to skepticism about NGOs. Nonetheless, some not only survived but expanded. Noteworthy among them were Plast, a 10,000-member scouting organization that was transplanted to Ukraine from the Diaspora; student and professional associations, especially that of the lawyers, a new profession; social service groups dealing with disadvantaged children; and hundreds of local and several national women's organizations.

Certainly women needed organizations that could address their concerns and defend their interests. Bearing the dual burden of job and family, they frequently encountered traditional patriarchal views as to their role in society and the "glass ceiling" when it came to promotion at work. In the harsh economic environment, they were particularly vulnerable. Many were single mothers with poorly paid jobs. Among the unemployed, about 75% were women, two-thirds of them with a higher education. An estimated 400,000 women had to seek employment abroad, where they were often ensnared in the sex trade. Although women were in the majority in medicine, the civil service, and the judiciary, as well as in primary and secondary education, they rarely reached the top positions in these fields. In 1995, of the 65 ministers and heads of key government committees, not one was female. And of 270 vice-ministers, only 6 were women.¹⁴

Traditional attitudes, fatigue, and lack of time explained, in large part, why 97% of women did not participate in politics (the participation rate among men was not much higher). The large women's organizations such as the Women's Union (*Souiz Zhinok*) and the Women's Community (*Zhinocha Hromada*), both of which were established in 1992–3 and were originally associated with the national-democratic camp, concentrated on social services for the disadvantaged and did little to encourage greater political activism. Except for the establishment of several centers for gender studies at universities in Kiev, Lviv, and Kharkiv, feminism made little headway in Ukraine. The potential for women's organizations to play a leading role in the creation of a civil society remained unfulfilled.

Hopes that the media might evolve into a strong, independent means of expressing social concerns and defending public interests were also disappointed. Ukraine's media network was considerable, but it was far from independent. Of the 5500 registered print media in Ukraine, 70% were government-affiliated or -owned. Another 25% belonged to "workers collectives," a euphemism for oligarchic ownership. Only 700 newspapers and

journals had subscription rates of over 10,000, and 451 newspapers were national in scope. Of the 700, only 208 were published in Ukrainian. Because of economic hardship, subscription rates for print media declined dramatically: in 1996 they were only one-fourth of what they were in 1992.¹⁵ This increased the impact of television and radio. Here, too, most channels and stations were government-owned, although the level of private ownership in the electronic media was higher than in print.

Given the state's overwhelming presence in the media, a pro-establishment bias was the norm. Although the ideologically based propaganda of the Soviet type was a thing of the past, various forms of censorship and intimidation, exercised by the state or the oligarchs, continued to exist: a number of reporters and editors died in mysterious circumstances, programs critical of the government were forced off the air, and recalcitrant newspapers were blackmailed frequently with threats of "tax audits." Government intimidation of the media was particularly widespread during the 1999 presidential elections, raising serious doubts about Kuchma's commitment to democracy.

Religion An area of broadly based, if not always benevolent, activity was religion. In the final years of the USSR, there was a major upsurge in religious activism in Ukraine: for example, in 1988–9 the number of parishes grew by 53%, and in 1990–1, their number expanded by 20% more. By 1996 there were over 16,000 parishes and religious communities in Ukraine. Polls indicated that, despite decades of anti-religious propaganda, over half of the population were believers and about one-quarter practiced their religion. Of religious believers, about 52% were Orthodox, 20% were Greek Catholic, and 20% were Protestant. By the middle of the decade the expansion of parishes and religious communities abated noticeably. Meanwhile, religious conflicts and divisions within these communities multiplied.

During the Kravchuk administration, the government harbored hopes that religion, and specifically Orthodoxy, might help to consolidate a disoriented society. Consequently, it supported the idea of creating a single, state-supported Orthodox church. To fulfill this function, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Kiev Patriarchate (UOC, К-Р), was created. It consisted of parishes in Ukraine that had broken away from the Moscow-centered Russian Orthodox Church, rejected the ecclesiastical overlordship of the Moscow patriarch, and demanded ecclesiastical independence (autocephaly) for Orthodoxy in Ukraine. But the undertaking encountered major difficulties. Patriarch Filaret of Kiev, the UOC, К-Р's leader, failed to gain the loyalty of many of the hierarchs and faithful. Moreover, the Russian Orthodox Church, which prior to 1991 had two-thirds of its parishes in Ukraine, strongly opposed the new church. As a countermove, it created an autonomous Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which continued to recognize the Mos-

cow patriarchate (UOC, M-P). Finally, the Orthodox in western Ukraine refused to recognize either of these churches and proclaimed loyalty to the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC). Meanwhile, the rejuvenated Ukrainian Catholic Church maintained a totally separate existence. It soon became apparent that, instead of consolidating Ukrainian society, religious denominations only fragmented it all the more. Consequently, Kuchma adopted a neutral, hands-off policy in regard to religious issues, all the more so since the constitution of 1996 declared that all religions were to be treated equally and the separation between church and state maintained.

To a large extent, regional variations influenced the extent and nature of religious activity in Ukraine. The western regions were the most dynamic: although they encompassed only about 20% of the population, they accounted for about 40% of its parishes. For example, the Ternopil region had one parish or religious community for every 807 inhabitants; in the Dnipropetrovsk region there was one for every 16,900. The strong national consciousness in these regions indicated a mutually supportive relationship between religious belief and a sense of national identity. Galicia remained the stronghold of the Greek Catholic Church, which again grew to the more than 3000 parishes that it had had prior to 1939. However, its attempts to establish its own patriarchate and expand eastward were frustrated by the Vatican's complex arrangements with the Moscow patriarchate. Nonetheless, Ukrainian Catholics did manage to establish an eparchy in the Kiev region and some parishes in eastern Ukraine. Meanwhile, in a totally new development, strongly religious Galicia also became a major base of Orthodoxy, and specifically of the patriotic UAOC, which had 650 parishes. In central Ukraine, the UOC, K-P, with about 1300 parishes, was most influential; in the russified East and South, it was the UOC, M-P.

With well over 6000 parishes, the UOC, M-P is the largest church in Ukraine, although, because many of its parishes are small, the numerical strength of this church is not as great as the number of parishes might indicate. From the point of view of nation- and state-building, it is highly problematic: it owes its allegiance to a leader based in Moscow; it employs not Ukrainian, but Church Slavonic in its services; and it espouses a pan-Eastern Slavic religious and cultural unity. Ironically, one of its strongest political supporters is the Communist party. In the long run, this association with Moscow and the left might prove to be one of the weak points of this church. And it might lead it to negotiate with the other two Orthodox churches on the issue of Orthodox unity in Ukraine. But, despite the urging of the political leadership for the creation of a single Orthodox church in Ukraine, such a development is not likely to occur in the near future.

Other denominations also experienced rapid growth in the early 1990s. By 1996 there were close to 4000 various Protestant, primarily Baptist, churches in Ukraine. National minorities also established their own religious commu-

nities: most numerous were the Roman Catholic churches of the Polish minority. Based mostly in the Right Bank and Galicia, they numbered close to 700. Muslims – that is, the Crimean Tatars – had 176 places of worship, primarily in Crimea and southern Ukraine. In Transcarpathia, the Hungarian Reform Church had 91 churches. Finally Jews, who benefited greatly from foreign support, established 79 synagogues.¹⁶

In the face of widespread deprivation and poverty, the establishment of such a number and wide variety of parishes and religious communities was truly remarkable. Indeed, of all former Soviet republics, Ukraine was the scene of the most intense religious activity. Whether the religious pluralism that surfaced is a sign of weakness or strength in the society is debatable, but it clearly indicated that a demoralized and exhausted population was in great need of spiritual regeneration.



In the 20th century, many post-imperial states emerged; almost all encountered great difficulties in establishing themselves. Because Soviet Communism was a system that left an especially deep imprint on society, the post-Soviet transitions were particularly difficult. Moreover, the suddenness of the Soviet Union's collapse left its inhabitants totally unprepared for major changes. The fact that it occurred without violence allowed the former Soviet elite to remain in place: this, in turn, meant that the task of introducing the new order fell to the pillars of the old regime – not an optimal situation. Ukraine's historical legacy – provincial isolation, unconsolidated social and national identity, deep regional divisions, and no tradition of statehood – complicated matters all the more. The result was a prolonged, blundering, and unusually painful process of transition.

Despite a decade of difficulties, there were grounds for long-term optimism. Numerous skeptics notwithstanding, an independent Ukraine not only survived but was accepted in the community of nations. In its tortuous transition from Soviet communism, it has passed the point of no return. In early 2000 there were signs of stabilization in its economy and political system. Much of the country's rich resources, human and material, were still in place, but perhaps most promising was the new generation coming to the fore. Possessing the freedom, confidence, and opportunities that its elders had lacked, it presents Ukraine's great hope for a better future.



Demonstrators demanding Ukraine leave the CIS, Kiev, 1993

Communist demonstration, Kiev 1994





President Kuchma welcomes President Clinton in Ukraine, May 1995

Presidents Kuchma and Yeltsin toasting agreement on Black Sea fleet, July 1995






Riots during funeral of Patriarch Volodymyr of the УОС-КР, Kiev, 1995

Protests against government censorship, Kiev, 1995



National Guard on parade, August 1996





Signing ceremony of the NATO-Ukraine Charter, July 1997

Celebrating Independence Day, Kiev 1997



This page intentionally left blank

The Age of Globalization

An independent Ukraine arose amidst the disintegration of the old Soviet system. Despite widespread hopes that changes for the better would soon follow, the 1990s were characterized by economic collapse, political ambiguity, and the lingering influence of the old Soviet elite. As a result, the transition to a new order was slow and limited. In the early 2000s, however, the process of transformation accelerated markedly. Fundamental changes began in politics, economics, and society. This did not mean that many of the country's deeply rooted, intractable problems were resolved. On the contrary, some of them even grew, continuing to impede the transformation. Nonetheless, Ukraine began to acquire, sometimes laboriously and at other times dramatically, features of the European states and societies that increasingly served as its models. In the process its integration into the global society began.



Domestic Politics

The Kuchma Years The political order that existed in Ukraine during Leonid Kuchma's second term in office was characterized by ambiguity, a feature present in much of Ukrainian behaviour in the post-1991 period. Some called Ukraine a "political grey zone"; others stressed the "hybrid" nature of its politics. On the one hand, Ukrainian politics had features that were typical of most post-Soviet states: domineering presidents, over-centralization of authority, opaque decision-making, and ineffective checks and balances. But, on the other hand, Ukraine did have a constitution, political pluralism that allowed for an active opposition, and a growing civil society. Therefore, politics in this presidential-parliamentary system were, to a large extent, a confrontation of these two contradictory tendencies or an attempt to satisfy them both.

As in other post-Soviet countries (except for the Baltic republics) and unlike most East European states, it appeared that regressive, undemocratic tendencies were paramount. Kuchma's presidential powers were extensive: except for choosing the prime minister, for which he needed the approval of parliament, the president could appoint and dismiss all other ministers; he appointed all governors, he had the right to dissolve parliament, and there were few checks on his control of the government bureaucracy. On the local level there was hardly any sign of opposition. And most parties in parliament were controlled by oligarchs who were eager to reach an understanding with the president. Moreover, the Communist Party, greatly weakened in the 1999 election, was also willing to cooperate with the president. Kuchma seemed to be all-powerful. Little wonder that the vast majority of Ukrainians did not consider their country to be a democracy.

As if to emphasize this point, 2001 began with depressing developments for the reform-minded. In January, Deputy Prime Minister Tymoshenko, an oligarch turned reformer, attempted to force other oligarchs in the coal and gas industries to pay the required taxes. She was not only dismissed but also arrested for a brief period. In April, despite widespread support, Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, who oversaw the country's economic revival, was also dismissed. However, although careful about challenging Kuchma openly, Yushchenko continued to lead those who opposed him. At about the same time, Kuchma drew increasingly closer to the authoritarian Putin, meeting with him eight times in a single year. Meanwhile, several scandals underlined the murky ways in which he operated. In addition, the murder of an anti-establishment reporter, Hryhorii Gongadze, and the authorities' reluctance to search for the perpetrators of the crime, raised suspicions about those in power.

The parliamentary elections on 31 March 2002 were, however, a setback for the president. Despite threats and pressures exerted by the pro-Kuchma forces, the turnout, almost 70%, was very large. The opposition did quite well. Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party won 112 parliamentary seats. His ally, Tymoshenko, also did well. Although not enough to control parliament, these results indicated that the opposition was vibrant and determined. Clearly, Kuchma and his supporters had badly underestimated the impact of freedom of association, right to demonstrate, growing civic organizations, and close monitoring of elections. However, the president was not ready to retreat. In June he appointed the tough and unscrupulous Viktor Medvedchuk to head the presidential secretariat.

Soon after, *temnyki* (secret instructions) issued by the presidential secretariat began to muzzle the media. A concerted if not entirely successful effort was made to buy over parliamentary deputies to the pro-president camp. Moreover, government tax officials began to harass opposition businessmen. Even the huge demonstrations, the largest since 1991, numbering

about 50,000 protestors, that were staged in Kiev in September failed to deter Kuchma. The secret sale of arms to Iraq, which alienated the United States, only encouraged his pro-Russian orientation. The year 2002 was declared the Year of Russia in Ukraine. Moreover, agreements were reached with Russia and Germany to expedite the delivery of gas to Europe via Ukraine. This rapprochement with the Kremlin led to Kuchma's becoming the president of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the first non-Russian elected to the post. As 2002 came to an end, negotiations were proceeding for Ukraine to become a member of the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC). It seemed that both authoritarian and democratic forces were rushing to reach their goals.

Much of 2003 was spent in preparing for the presidential elections the following year. Despite indications that he might run again – the Constitutional Court allowed him an unconstitutional third term – Kuchma decided to retire in 2004. Consequently, his major concern was to find a reliable successor. Three oligarchic clans – the Kiev group led by Viktor Medvedchuk and Hryhorii Surkis, the Dnipropetrovsk group of Viktor Pinchuk, and the powerful Donetsk clan headed by Viktor Yanukovych – competed in proposing candidates for the position. After much hesitation, Kuchma decided to back the candidacy of Yanukovych, who had strong backing in eastern Ukraine. Never one to leave matters to chance, Kuchma also wanted to weaken the next president by strengthening parliament, in case his choice for the post did not win. Such changes, and the likelihood of a fragmented parliament, would assure hard-line influence and limit the new president's ability to prosecute Kuchma for his alleged crimes and misdemeanours. Hence Kuchma's desire to alter the constitution, transforming Ukraine into a system in which parliament became more powerful and the president correspondently weaker. To secure Moscow's supports for his plans, Kuchma brought Ukraine into the EEC in early 2003 and made generous concessions to Russian businessmen investing in Ukraine. In October a short-lived obstacle to this pro-Russian policy developed when Russia attempted to gain control of Ukraine's strategic Tuzla Island in the Azov Sea. Ukrainians, even those in the east and south, reacted very negatively to this attempted encroachment, and it failed.

Clearly being groomed to become the next president, Yanukovych replaced Anatoliy Kinakh as prime minister in December 2003. As numerous members of the Donetsk clan moved to Kiev and began occupying key government posts, it seemed that the country was preparing for the reign of the retrograde Easterners. In March 2004 constraints were imposed on Radio Liberty broadcasts in the country. And in August Yanukovych proposed removing Ukrainian troops from Iraq. Meanwhile, Kuchma continued dispensing favours. In June his son-in-law, Viktor Pinchuk, purchased the huge Krivorizhstal steel plant for an absurdly low price. Perhaps more disturbing was a

mayoral election in Mukachevo, in Transcarpathia, an oblast controlled by the Medvedchuk clan. In a highly controversial election, the pro-government candidate, with help from Kuchma himself, claimed victory. It appeared to be a promising test case for something much more important – the presidential election of 2004.

On 31 October 2004 the presidential elections began. They were preceded by another highly disturbing event: it was revealed that, after having supper with government officials, the opposition candidate, Yushchenko, had been, as it became evident later, administered dioxin poison. The poison did not kill him and he continued campaigning. However, the election itself, accompanied by numerous cases of government intimidation and interference was, according to Western observers, patently unfair. Even so it did not bring Yanukovych a victory: the results were about 40% each for both Yanukovych and Yushchenko. Since neither won a majority, a run-off election was called for 21 November.

The Orange Revolution In the final months of 2008 vast numbers of Ukrainians participated in a series of dramatic events that were unexpected, inspiring, and bore great promise. The so-called Orange Revolution was both spontaneous and planned, enthusiastically supported by some and sullenly rejected by others. Be that as it may, it shook the established order and won the attention, even admiration, of the world. No matter how one viewed these events or what followed, it was clear that what occurred at this time would remain a pivotal moment in the history of Ukraine.

The tensions that were building between Yanukovych, who was backed by Kuchma, and Yushchenko and his national-democratic supporters, came to a head when the run-off election between the two rivals took place. Official results showed that Yanukovych had won by 3%. The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, who, together with the many Russian political specialists who worked for the Yanukovych campaign, hurriedly recognized him as the new president of Ukraine. However, exit polls carried out expressly to prevent tampering with election results showed that actually Yushchenko enjoyed an 11% lead. Additional evidence poured in indicating that the election results had been manipulated. It was a crucial moment. The Kuchma-Yanukovych camp had assumed that it could have its way with the election but it miscalculated. Massive protests against the falsified election results began on 22 November. A day later, about 500,000 demonstrators, determined but peaceful, marched on parliament, wearing orange ribbons or carrying orange flags, the colour of the Yushchenko campaign.

Lviv and several others cities refused to recognize the election results. An even more serious confrontation with the government occurred shortly thereafter. To emphasize his rejection of the election results, Yushchenko appeared in parliament, which was half empty because Yanukovych's sup-

porters had abandoned it, and he took a symbolic presidential oath of office. Although it was not legally binding, the taking of the oath demonstrated that Yushchenko and his growing number of supporters were clearly moving from massive protests to open confrontation with their opponents. Some of Yushchenko's moderate supporters criticized him for this step. But more fiery allies, led by the charismatic Tymoshenko, who now emerged as co-leader of the protestors, not only welcomed it but demanded an even more radical stance. Both sides were clearly moving toward a fierce and bloody clash.

In southern and eastern Ukraine, and especially in his home base of Donetsk, Yanukovich's many supporters held firm. Local officials mounted several large demonstrations backing his election as president. Moreover, at the Severodonetsk conference, there were frequent threats to subdivide Ukraine into a federation – an option that was not sanctioned by the constitution – or even to break off and form a separate state. An effort was also made to bring large numbers of miners from the Donbas to Kiev. However, outnumbered by the masses of Yushchenko supporters, the miners had little impact in the capital. Nonetheless, on 24 November the Central Election Commission, itself implicated in the falsification of election results, declared that Yanukovich was officially recognized as the victor of the election.

This decision only deepened the crisis. Despite freezing weather, pro-Yushchenko demonstrations continued, sometimes bringing close to a million people into the streets of Kiev. Supporters, especially numerous from western and central regions, poured into the city. An extraordinary atmosphere reigned in the capital. Constant streams of newcomers were housed in public buildings and in private homes, fed in hastily established public kitchens or by generous, supportive Kievans, and, most impressive, they remained calm, polite, considerate, but clearly determined to attain their goal – a fair election. About 10,000 protestors, mostly young people from all over Ukraine, established a tent city on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) and main avenue, Khreshchatyk, indicating their determination to protest as long as necessary. Numerous members of the emerging middle class, concentrated in the capital, came out to protest. The sight of vast crowds of people demanding, in a civilized but committed fashion, their rights as citizens sparked the imagination of many. Among many Ukrainians political activism replaced the traditional passivity. Patriotism – many first learned the national anthem during these heady days – replaced the usual cynicism. Determined to force the government to concede, vast numbers in the central and western parts of the country joined in demonstrations, strikes, and sit-ins in their cities and towns. In order to prevent an illegitimate government from taking power, Yushchenko formed the Committee of National Salvation and declared a nationwide political strike. Clearly, an unprecedented and imposing display of “people power” was taking place in Ukraine.

Political developments reflected the extraordinary events. On 1 December the parliament strongly criticized the unconstitutional federalist and separatist threats of the Yanukovych supporters who had gathered in Severodonetsk. More importantly, it passed a vote of no-confidence in the government of Prime Minister Yanukovych. This was the equivalent of demanding its resignation. However, because the parliament had no means to enforce its decisions, Yanukovych and Kuchma ignored them. A decisive break in the political logjam occurred on 3 December. That day the Supreme Court, functioning under extreme pressure, announced that the recent election could not be recognized because of widespread fraud. Therefore, another run-off election between Yanukovych and Yushchenko was to be held on 26 December. A few days later parliament passed the necessary laws required to hold a new election.

The opposing sides, meanwhile, negotiated. Yushchenko, Yanukovych, and Kuchma – joined by President Aleksander Kwasniewski of Poland, President Valdas Adamkus of Lithuania, Javier Solana of the European Union, and Boris Gryzlov of Russia who served as mediators – spent long, tense hours in round-table bargaining. Finally, a compromise was reached: with great reluctance Yanukovych and Kuchma agreed to a new election. In return, at the insistence of Kuchma, who feared a strong president might wreak vengeance on his opponents, Yushchenko agreed to important changes in the constitution that weakened the powers of the new president. The stage was set for a new election.

The Ukrainian crisis had by now attracted widespread international attention. More than 12,500 observers from all over the world volunteered to go to Ukraine to ensure that the election was, indeed, fair. Canada alone dispatched 500 official observers, the largest group of election observers it had ever sent anywhere. With the whole world watching, the election, except for relatively minor problems, took place in a calm and orderly fashion. Yushchenko won 51.99% of the vote, and Yanukovych 44.20%. Although Yanukovych protested the results, his complaints were rejected by the Supreme Court as being without merit. On 10 January 2005, the reconstituted Election Commission declared Yushchenko the winner of the election and the next president of Ukraine. He took his official oath of office in parliament on 23 January. That same day a “public inauguration,” witnessed by foreign dignitaries and hundreds of thousands of exuberant Ukrainians was held in the Maidan Nezalezhnosti. Despite fears of violence and civil strife, the Orange Revolution came to a peaceful conclusion.

What led to the Orange Revolution? The growing unpopularity of the corrupt Kuchma government was certainly a major factor. Moreover, the pluralism of the Ukrainian political system, which allowed opposition parties to exist and mobilize their supporters, helped to explain the confrontation. There was, furthermore, a significant number of oligarchs who supported

Yushchenko, an indication that a split had occurred in the ruling elite between those who favoured Kuchma's repressive regime and those who demanded change and modernization. A relatively free media, parts of which reported openly on events and presented evidence of electoral fraud, also played an important role. But perhaps most decisive was the widespread feeling that citizens of Ukraine had civic rights, including the right to fair elections, and no government could deprive them of this. The confidence of the average Ukrainian had grown markedly, as evident in one of the protesters' favourite chants: "Together we are many; we cannot be defeated."

It was not long before other, less well-known aspects of the Orange Revolution emerged. Ukrainians learned that they had come very close to the violence and bloodshed that many feared. Stationed just outside Kiev, about 10,000 troops received government orders to move against the demonstrators. However, the timely intervention of Ukrainian intelligence services, unwilling to do Kuchma's bidding, halted the deployment and prevented a bloodbath. It became known that the England-based Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky provided significant financial support to the protesters in order to foil the plans of his nemesis, President Putin. It was also revealed that some of the protesters, especially members of the youth organization Pora, which played a prominent role in the demonstrations, had received financial support and training from Western, primarily American, agencies. And lessons learned in the removal of Slobodan Milosevich in Serbia and in the Rose Revolution in Georgia were applied most effectively in Ukraine. This gave the Ukrainian events a geopolitical dimension, one that pitted Russia, anxious to preserve its sphere of influence, and the United States, eager to expand its reach into Eastern Europe, against each other. For Russia and especially Putin, the Orange Revolution represented a resounding defeat. Not only was it a point where Ukraine and Russia seemed to embark on different paths of development but it engendered in the Kremlin the fear that it too might have to face a similar demonstration of people power. From an international point of view, Ukrainian events were not only dramatic but pivotal. They meant that Ukraine finally broke out of the isolation and disinterest that had long enveloped it.

The Yushchenko years When he became president, Yushchenko had enormous political capital. In Ukraine millions stood ready to support him; abroad there were widespread declarations of admiration and willingness to help. All were waiting for the new, democratically elected government to initiate a period of fundamental, constructive reforms that would turn Ukraine into a successful democracy or, at least, place it firmly on the path to becoming one. What followed, unfortunately, was disappointment and disillusionment. Except for some initial and minor changes, no major reforms were implemented. Promises to punish those implicated in fraud were for-

gotten. After a brief downturn, corruption continued unabated. And the political forces that united to fight for a fair election soon turned on each other. Political crisis, petty politics, personal conflicts, and lack of progress became the hallmarks of the post-Orange Revolution period. A most promising opportunity to make Ukraine a better place in which to live faded away.

There were, no doubt, serious obstacles, both old and new, to progress. The constitutional changes weakening the presidency, which Yushchenko accepted in December 2004, proved to be debilitating. Ambiguous and poorly formulated, they created dual authority where the prerogatives of the president and the prime minister were contradictory and invited confrontation. To make matters worse, the personal rivalries between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, never far below the surface, came to the fore. Looking ahead to the presidential election of 2010, Yushchenko hoped to be re-elected. Meanwhile, the ambitious Tymoshenko clearly wanted to be the next president. This confrontation lay behind much of the political infighting that characterized the post-2004 period. Despite his defeat, Yanukovych, with numerous supporters in the east and south, was allowed to re-emerge as an important political force. This only emphasized the continuing differences between East and West in Ukraine. Oligarchs backing one party or another were able to retain their influence by continuing to use state institutions and policies to protect their own business interests. Perhaps most damaging was the fact that the new government did not seem to have a concrete program or goal of what it wanted to achieve.

From the outset, the new Orange government, led by Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, encountered problems. In an effort to enlarge her already large base of support, Tymoshenko adopted populist, if economically questionable, measures. She raised salaries, pensions, and student stipends. Moreover, she tried to impose government controls on prices rather than allow market mechanisms to function. Businessmen, expecting greater liberalism, were shocked, and economic development slowed. Efforts, albeit limited in scope, were made to punish some of the corrupt government officials and election committee chairmen involved in election fraud. Expecting the worst, one of Kuchma's ministers, Heorhiy Kirpa, committed suicide. A substantial number of government officials associated with the Kuchma regime were fired. But punishment of the guilty, so often promised in December 2004, did not go further. The worst offenders, such as Medvedchuk, Kuchma's right-hand man suspected of engineering the election fraud, were never brought to trial. Moreover, it became known that corrupt oligarchs had found their way into the new government and the president's office.

There were, however, some positive developments. The government did become more transparent in formulating its policies, the media enjoyed greater freedom, and non-governmental organizations continued to be active. The absurdly low-priced purchase of the Kryvorizhstal steel plant by

Pinchuk was reversed. Soon after, the plant was sold to an international firm, Mittal Steel, for a respectable \$4.8 billion. In April 2005, Deputy Prime Minister Roman Bezsmertny proposed a reform of local government that called for greater decentralization. However, his ambitious and much-needed plan was not implemented. In general, the first period of Orange rule presented a mixed and rather uninspiring picture. Meanwhile, infighting in the Cabinet of ministers reached the point where, on 8 September, Yushchenko decided to fire the entire government. Shortly thereafter, he appointed Yuriy Yekhanurov, a loyal and experienced supporter, to be the new prime minister and to form a new government. Thus, after only seven months in office, among mutual recriminations and ill feeling, the unity of the Orange coalition fell apart.

Hardly had the new prime minister settled in office when a new crisis arose. A bitter confrontation between Ukraine and Russia developed over the price of natural gas. On 2 January 2006, in order to pressure Ukraine, Moscow cut off its supply of gas. The Ukrainians, in turn, shut off the pipes that carried this gas to Western Europe. An international uproar resulted. The next day a compromise price was agreed upon and, for a while, the issue of Ukraine's energy costs was resolved. Nonetheless, the incident emphasized once more how dependent Ukraine was on Russian energy supplies.

On 26 March 2006 there was another election to parliament. Yanukovych and his Party of Regions and their allies received 40% of the vote, while parties that belonged to Orange coalition, led by Tymoshenko's BYuT (Fatherland) party, garnered 46%. But after the election, a nasty surprise awaited the Orange forces. Oleksandr Moroz and his Socialist Party, major members of the Orange coalition that defeated Yanukovych in December 2004, changed sides and joined Yanukovych to form, together with the Party of Regions and the Communists, a Coalition of National Unity. On 2 August, after four months of haggling and behind-the-scenes deal making, to the great surprise of many, Yushchenko appointed his recent and bitter opponent as the new prime minister. Many found it difficult to understand how the president, despite his assurances that he hoped thereby to bring East and West Ukraine together, could raise his erstwhile rival from relative political obscurity and make him the head of a new government.

Hopes that the two former opponents could work together were quickly dispelled. Once again the problem of dual authority and confrontations over who had authority to do what emerged. The emboldened Yanukovych clearly sought to emasculate the president. He challenged him on such issues as control of security troops and, in December, forced the resignation of presidential appointees in Cabinet such as Minister of Foreign Affairs Borys Tarasyuk and Minister of Interior Yuri Lutsenko. Seeing his authority deteriorating, Yushchenko implemented his usual option: on 3 April 2007 he dissolved parliament and ordered a new election. This concentration on politi-

cal infighting and failure to address larger issues clearly tested the patience of Ukraine's voters. Nonetheless, about 63% of them came to vote again in the parliamentary election of 30 September 2007. The 3,354 foreign observers declared the election was, by and large, fair. At least holding a fair election was a skill that the Ukrainian government, in contrast to most post-Soviet states, had mastered.

In the election, Yanukovych's Party of Regions won 34.5% of the vote, Tymoshenko's BYuT (Fatherland) 30.7%, and the pro-Yushchenko Our Ukraine–People Self Defence 14.1%. In addition, the Communists received 5.3% and the Lytvyn Bloc 3.9%. There was a clear loser: Moroz and his Socialist Party. Denounced for his political reversal about a year earlier, he and his party failed to attract enough votes to enter parliament. It was equally clear who the winner of the election was: Yulia Tymoshenko. Her BYuT party, together with other parties in the renewed Orange coalition, obtained a paper-thin majority in parliament of 228 deputies. As leader of the majority coalition, she once again became the prime minister of Ukraine.

The Tymoshenko government worked in an atmosphere of constant political crisis. Parliament was so evenly divided that it was practically ineffectual. Meanwhile, the president, hoping to diminish the popularity of Tymoshenko, the leading candidate in upcoming presidential elections in 2010, repeatedly criticized her. The result was debilitating for both. Tymoshenko's popularity did decline. However, Yushchenko's popularity suffered more, dropping to less than 10%. Once more the faith of Ukrainians in their leaders – indeed, in all politicians – dissipated. The government was unable to control widespread corruption. Oligarchs continued to exert influence in parliament, government, and the political parties. Most worrisome was the government's inability to control rampant inflation, which, in 2008, reached more than 20%. The familiar perception that Ukrainian politicians always placed their own interests above those of the nation again became widespread. Many became so disillusioned that they even did not want to be reminded of the high hopes they had nurtured during the days of the Orange Revolution.

During three years, from 2005 to 2008, Ukraine had four different governments. These short-lived administrations were interested primarily in their own survival. And this meant that they had neither the time nor the will to address major issues, especially the pressing need for fundamental reforms. Moreover, the competing, divergent, and self-centred policies of Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, and Yanukovych, and other leading politicians, added greatly to the instability. As 2008 drew to a close, there was more of the same: the Orange Coalition in parliament broke apart; on October 8 Yushchenko dissolved parliament and called for new elections (only to back away from these moves soon afterward); Arsenii Yatseniuk, a Yushchenko loyalist and speaker of parliament lost his position. Without a speaker, frac-

tured and unable to pass any laws, parliament practically ceased to function for several months. Meanwhile, Tymoshenko commenced talks with all sides of the political spectrum about forming a new ruling coalition. Finally, in December, a new coalition of BYuT, Our Ukraine, and the Lytvyn Bloc was cobbled together. Lytvyn, who had served previously as speaker, was elected to the post again. Tymoshenko attained what she wanted most: she remained prime minister. Reminiscent of soap operas, the chaotic politics appeared to be setting the stage for the next episode.

Viewed from a broader perspective, however, the depressing political scene could not obscure the major changes that had occurred. A hundred years earlier there were many doubts about the existence of a Ukrainian nation. Twenty years earlier, the country was an isolated, little-known component of the Soviet empire. Despite the political convulsions, in the early years of the new millennium Ukraine made significant progress towards democracy. Its institutions became more similar to those in other states, its leaders were internationally recognized, and its geopolitical importance was widely acknowledged. The disruptive confrontations and the immaturity of its elite notwithstanding, Ukrainian politics were being played more and more according to generally accepted rules.

International Relations

Ukraine's place in the international order changed dramatically in the first decade of the twenty-first century. From a country of peripheral interest to the West, it moved to the forefront of its concerns. For Russia, its importance, always great, became even greater. The long-overlooked "borderland" between West and East suddenly moved to the centre of globally significant developments. Certainly its location, straddling a large and strategically crucial area between Europe and Russia, helped to explain the growing realization of its importance. And its geopolitical potential – an independent Ukraine would curb Russian ambitions for regional dominance while a Ukraine subservient to Russia would encourage them – added greatly to its international relevance. Consequently, as Russia grew in importance, so too did Ukraine. The fact that within Ukraine itself there were both strong pro-Western and pro-Russian orientations encouraged both sides to pay more attention to the country. In short, somewhat unexpectedly Ukraine became a focal point of international attention and involvement. And its foreign policy – the formulation of which was the prerogative of the president – attained major relevance for both the East and the West.

Relations with the West Although Leonid Kuchma was elected president on a pro-Russian platform in 1994, during his first term in office his administration was surprisingly open to developing contacts with the West in gen-

eral, and the United States in particular. Indeed, between 1994 and 1999 us-Ukrainian relations enjoyed a kind of honeymoon. This was encouraged by Kuchma's willingness to carry through on the denuclearization of Ukrainian weapons systems and the growing attention that the Clinton administration began to pay to Ukraine. As a result, several bilateral agreements, notably the Nunn-Lugar Act of 1994 and the Gore-Kuchma Commission of 1996, led to a large increase in us aid to Ukraine. By 2002, us aid to Ukraine totalled \$2.82 billion, making it, after Israel and Egypt, America's third-largest aid recipient. Close contacts also encouraged more frequent and varied consultations and contacts between the two countries. As thousands of Ukrainian politicians, military officers, and students visited the United States in these years, a clear-cut pattern emerged: as us tensions with Russia rose – as they did in Boris Yeltsin's final years in office – American interest in Ukraine grew.

By 1999, however, a sharp reversal occurred. Washington became disillusioned by events in Ukraine, particularly by the behaviour of Kuchma's government. It criticized the elections of 1999, in which Kuchma was elected for a second time, as being patently unfair and undemocratic. In 2002 the "Kuchma-gate" scandal erupted when Mykola Melnychenko, a Ukrainian security officer, smuggled tapes to the West that implicated the Ukrainian president in the murder of the reporter Hryhorii Gongadze, in money-laundering and electoral fraud. In addition, the tapes indicated that Kuchma, at a time when the United States were enforcing an arms ban on Iraq, secretly sold the "Kolchuga" radar system to the Iraqis.¹ As a result, us-Ukrainian relations rapidly cooled. Aid diminished and consultations were aborted. The Ukrainian and American presidents no longer met. The attempts of the new Bush administration to establish a positive relationship with Putin only encouraged this rapid about-face. Kuchma responded in kind. In 2000 he replaced the pro-Western minister of foreign affairs, Borys Tarasyuk, with Anatolii Zlenko, who was more accommodating to Russia. And he concentrated on developing closer ties with Russia.

As the European Union expanded eastward and accepted Ukraine's neighbours into its fold, it seemed to Ukrainians, who considered themselves Europeans, that they too should be a part of the Union. This was the view not only of the Ukrainian elite, whose business ties with the West Europeans were growing, but also of the general populace that desired to attain the living standards of European Union members. However, during the Kuchma years, the European Union refused not only to set a time for membership but even to entertain the idea of Ukraine entering the Union. It argued that substantial economic and political reforms were needed before any discussion of membership could occur. Obviously a very considerable gap existed between the two sides.

Contacts, however, continued to grow. In 1993 the European Union established an office in Kiev and, two years later, Ukraine did the same in Brus-

sels. In 1998, when Kuchma was still in his pro-Western phase, Ukraine proposed a plan for its integration into the European Union. But the European Union again ignored the Ukrainian initiative. There was, however, considerable disagreement on this issue within the Union itself. Reluctant to irritate the Russians, Germany and France were not forthcoming to the Ukrainians. But countries that had experienced the Kremlin's domination in the past, such as Poland and the Baltic states, were much more encouraging. Consequently, while not mentioning membership, in December 2008 the European Union proposed a limited plan of cooperation with its neighbours to the east called the Eastern Partnership in specific areas such as illegal immigration, energy policy, and weapons control. It also included the possibility of visa-free travel to the West and a tax-free trade zone. For the Ukrainians it was a frustrating situation. It seemed that the European nature of their society was generally acknowledged. Indeed, they were becoming ever more European. Nonetheless, aside from making encouraging gestures, the European Union was not about to accept them into its fold.

Enter NATO Surprisingly, Ukraine's relations with the West's military alliance, NATO, were more productive and dynamic than those with the economic and political alliance represented by the European Union. Perhaps it was because issues in this relationship were more focused: worried by a re-emergent Russia, NATO was interested in maintaining stability in the former Communist sphere while Ukraine hoped to use NATO to ensure its own security. The event that set the relationship into play occurred in 1992 when Ukraine, under intense American and European pressure, agreed to give up its nuclear arsenal. Ukraine was confronted with a problem: what means could it now use to guarantee its security? Although not enunciated openly, it was clear that the primary threat came from Russia.

After a series of preparatory meetings, in 1995 Ukraine and NATO signed a Partnership for Peace Agreement that established a framework for cooperation. This led to the participation of Ukrainian peacekeepers in Bosnia and Hercegovina, and the formation of a combined Polish-Ukrainian battalion. In 1997, in Madrid, the Ukraine-NATO Partnership Agreement was signed. This deepened the relationship. It stressed that international law formed the basis for solving disputes, that formation of spheres of influence – clearly aimed at Russia – should be avoided, and that consultations, training of troops, and military exercises should be used to strengthen Ukrainian independence. It did not, however, offer Ukraine membership in the alliance. In 1999, at the Fiftieth Anniversary of NATO celebrated in Washington, Kuchma participated in the formation of the Ukraine-NATO Commission, which was meant to expand the relationship even further.

In late 1999, for the same reasons that caused American disillusionment with Kuchma, an abrupt cooling of relations occurred between Ukraine and

NATO. This led the Ukrainian president to emphasize once more Ukraine's ambiguous "multi-vector" policy. Soon thereafter he turned towards Russia and began discussions on closer economic and military cooperation. This did not mean, however, that he was ready to ignore NATO. On the contrary, even while drawing closer to the Kremlin, Kuchma, to the great annoyance of the Russians, did not want to isolate himself from the West. In 2002 another Action Plan was signed between NATO and Ukraine that was to prepare the latter for potential entry into the military alliance. More concretely, in 2003 Ukrainian troops were sent to Iraq to support NATO forces deployed there. But this did not produce concrete results. Russian pressure, German reluctance, and weakening American support led NATO, at its meeting in Brussels in December 2008, to postpone once more a membership plan for Ukraine and Georgia. Fearful of military conflicts in either of these two countries, the West's military alliance decided to keep them waiting.²

Poland At least at first glance, the important role Poland played in Ukraine's international relations was surprising. Given their long and bitter history, one might have expected there to be a certain coolness between the two states. But the opposite turned out to be the case. From the outset it was clear that, if international problems arose in the future, they would come from Russia. Poles said this openly; Ukrainians did so more cautiously. Consequently, both countries realized that they should concentrate on common interests – safeguarding themselves from Russian aggressiveness – rather than old animosities.

The Poles took the initiative. They were the first country to recognize Ukrainian independence. A cornerstone of their foreign policy became the support of an independent, stable, and democratic (and pro-Western) Ukraine. Indeed, Poland became a primary advocate for Ukraine's desire to enter the European Union and to join NATO. In many ways, Poland became, as it had been in the past, Ukraine's "Gateway to the West." After the initial enthusiasm, when institutional ties with Ukraine expanded rapidly, a more realistic phase began in the mid-1990s. Ukraine's internal weaknesses, its catastrophic economy, and the possibility of an east/west split in Ukraine, on the one hand, and Poland's concentration on becoming a member of NATO and the European Union, on the other hand, led to a certain cooling in relations between the two countries. But in the late 1990s and early 2000s the relationship again became dynamic and constructive.

The possibility that Ukraine might follow Belarus into the Russian sphere of influence alarmed the Poles. Moreover, growing Ukrainian-Polish trade reinforced the need to expand contacts. In 1997 President Kwasniewski visited Kiev. A year later the two presidents honoured both Polish and Ukrainian soldiers buried in the Luchakivsky cemetery in Lviv. In following years both sides acknowledged and regretted the massacres and forced resettlements

that occurred during and soon after the Second World War. In 2007 Poland and Ukraine were chosen by FIFA, the world soccer federation, to host the European championship in 2012. Minor variations notwithstanding, it was clear that supporting Ukraine in its pro-Western tendencies was a priority of Polish diplomacy.

Russia Of all Ukraine's foreign relations, those with Russia were the most crucial. They were each other's closest and most important neighbours. Their economics were largely interdependent, especially in the sphere of energy. And their cultural, historical, and social ties were very close. The fact that about 17% of Ukraine's population was Russian, about half of the country spoke Russian, and the large Russian Black Sea Fleet was based on Ukrainian territory in Sevastopol only emphasized the obvious point that relations between the two countries required special attention.

Even as he tried to improve relations with the European Union and NATO, Kuchma had to pay close attention to Ukraine's big northern neighbour. But as his second term in office began and progress in the West was scant, Russia became the most important focal point of Kuchma's foreign policy. Scandals undermined his relations with the United States and NATO; large, anti-Kuchma demonstrations in Kiev indicated growing weakness at home. Consequently, drawing closer to Russia, now led by the combative Putin, appeared to be the most promising option for the Ukrainian president.

Ukraine was quickly drawn into resurgent Russia's welcoming embrace. Kuchma and Putin met frequently, and after each meeting Russian influence in Ukraine seemed to grow. In 2000 Russian capital began to flood into Ukraine, buying up important enterprises on very favourable terms. In 2001 Pope John Paul II visited Ukraine, but the government's response, no doubt reflecting Russian influence, was extremely cool. That same year Prime Minister Yushchenko, suspected of pro-West tendencies, was replaced by Anatolii Kinakh, known for his loyalty to Kuchma. A very telling indicator of the radical changes was NATO's efforts to downplay the Ukrainian president's awkward presence at its conference in 2002. Soon afterwards, Kuchma openly declared that Russia was Ukraine's most important partner. In 2003 Ukraine joined the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Community. Meanwhile, Kuchma was chosen as the first non-Russian to head the Commonwealth of Independent States. It seemed that Ukraine was now firmly in the bloc of post-Soviet states that Putin was drawing together as a counterbalance to the European Union and the United States.

The shift towards Russia was not total, however. Kuchma was too clever a politician to deprive himself of all options. In 2003 a book appeared under his name entitled *Ukraine Is Not Russia*. It made the point that drawing closer to its neighbour to the north did not mean that Ukraine was about to surrender its national interests and distinct identity. That same year, when

Russia tried to encroach on Ukraine's borders in Tuzla Island in the Sea of Azov, both Ukrainian public opinion and the president resolutely and successfully resisted. Even while moving ever closer to Putin – personal relations between the two men were very good – Kuchma repeatedly noted that Ukraine still hoped to join the European Union. But where it counted, it was clear that Kuchma was firmly on Putin's side.

Yushchenko's policies New presidents often mean new policies. However, when Yushchenko was elected president after the Orange Revolution of 2004, his foreign policies differed from those of his predecessor in the extreme. This was not entirely surprising. Putin's increasingly authoritarian Russia had been an unabashed and committed supporter of Yushchenko's rival, Yanukovich. Moreover, Yushchenko appeared to represent democratic values like those espoused in the West. Both the United States and the European Union clearly backed him. As a result, the new president quickly abandoned Ukraine's traditionally ambiguous multi-vector policy with its strong pro-Russian orientation and openly declared that his primary foreign policy goal was to draw closer to the West. Ukraine, he often stated, was an "obviously European country." This meant drawing closer to the European Union, a position that most Ukrainians supported. It also meant joining NATO, which was a move that the vast majority of the population rejected.

Yushchenko's desire to see Ukraine become a member of NATO greatly angered Russia, which considered the possibility of the Western military alliance drawing right up to its borders to be a major threat to its security. Despite making a conciliatory initial visit to Moscow in January 2005, the new president's relations with Russia began badly. And they grew worse. After Moscow, Yushchenko embarked on a series of visits to key capitals in the West where, as a result of positive media exposure, he had, at least initially, celebrity status. A meeting with Secretary-General Javier Solana revived hopes for Ukraine's closer cooperation with the European Union. And at the European Parliament in Strasbourg Yushchenko argued for Ukraine's inclusion in the Europe community. In April 2005 Yushchenko visited Washington and met with George Bush. The visit bore concrete results. Not long afterwards, the United States removed Ukraine from the list of former Soviet states to whom the restrictions of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment applied. He also received assurances that the United States would support Ukraine's efforts to join NATO. The West's welcoming gestures were clearly very different from the cold shoulder it had shown to his predecessor.

Soon, however, problems emerged. Implicit in the West's welcoming attitude was the assumption that Ukraine would launch its long-delayed domestic reforms. These reforms, it was hoped, would bring the country closer to European norms and make cooperation easier. It quickly became apparent, however, that the new president would make little progress in this area.

Unwilling to threaten the interests of Ukrainian oligarchs, confronted by numerous domestic enemies, especially in the East, and confronted by growing tensions with the popular Tymoshenko, his partner from Orange Revolution days, the new president's domestic policies soon disillusioned many of his supporters. All this made it difficult for Yushchenko to pursue his foreign policies.

The election to parliament in 2006 complicated matters further. It resulted in the unexpected appointment of Yanukovich as prime minister and the occupation by members of the Donetsk clan of many key government positions. The new prime minister and his Cabinet clearly wished to reduce tensions with Russia. Consequently, the policies of the president and the prime minister diverged sharply. An indication of the mounting tension was Yanukovich's concerted and successful effort to force the resignation in 2006 of the president's appointee, Borys Tarasyuk, a pro-West foreign minister, from the Cabinet. This, however, brought little satisfaction to the pro-Russian prime minister. At about the same time, Russia increased its pressure on Ukraine by shutting off deliveries of natural gas. After several days of national and international consternation, the flow of gas resumed. But the price that the Russians demanded from Ukraine for their gas was much higher than before. Internal tensions brought on another parliamentary election in September 2007. This time Yanukovich failed to gain a majority, and Tymoshenko became prime minister with a paper-thin majority. Her Cabinet included Minister of Foreign Affairs Volodymyr Ohrysko, a strong proponent of pro-Western policies.

Why did Yushchenko, despite fierce opposition from Russia and his domestic foes – especially the adherents of Russia who regularly organized anti-NATO demonstrations in Crimea where joint Ukraine-NATO exercises took place – insist on bringing Ukraine into NATO? Like many others, he believed that the military alliance would guarantee Ukraine's security, especially from potential threats from Russia. Moreover, it would bring Ukraine closer to Europe. The relationship with the West, however, was becoming ever more convoluted and complex. Although Ukraine cooperated with NATO in many ways and received from it encouraging signals, especially while post-Orange Revolution enthusiasm was still high in the West, it made little concrete progress in gaining membership. Lack of meaningful reforms in Ukraine was one reason. Moreover, France and Germany, fearful of irritating Russia, their major supplier of energy, also discouraged progress. Even strong American support could not bring Ukraine into the military alliance. This became evident at the NATO meeting in Brussels in December 2008 when Ukraine was asked, once more, to wait.

Although Ukrainian efforts to gain entry into the European Union did not have the fierce opponents that the pro-NATO camp inspired, the results were similarly unclear and frustrating. In 2005 the European Parliament expressed

a desire to expand Ukraine's economic integration in and political cooperation with the European Union. In that year a joint Action Plan that was to work toward this end was concluded. Certainly, the growing economic contacts were encouraging. Between 2000 and 2007, trade between the European Union and Ukraine grew by more than 300%. Nonetheless, Ukraine still accounted for only 2% of the European Union's exports. The never-ending political conflicts within Ukraine and lack of reforms continued to raise doubts about Ukraine readiness to enter the European Union. Ever sensitive about what Russian reactions might be, Germany led the other countries of "Old Europe" in urging that no legally binding commitment be made to Ukraine. However, some half measures were allowed. In September 2008 in Paris Ukraine signed an association agreement with the Union. It called for the negotiation of a free trade zone and raised the possibility of a more liberal visa regime. Once again, while stating that "Ukraine's future was in Europe" the European Union made no commitment regarding membership.

Despite these frustrations, due in large part to Ukraine's chaotic internal politics, Yushchenko did not abandon his pro-Western policies. This was evident in his active support of pro-Western Georgia in its confrontation with Russia. When the brief conflict broke out between Georgia and Russia in September 2008, Yushchenko joined other East European presidents in rushing to Tbilisi to show his support for the Georgians. The conflict also revealed that Ukraine had, legally but very irritatingly for Russia, provided Georgia with arms. Another expression of Yushchenko's pro-Georgian stance was the restrictions that the Ukrainian government attempted to impose on the return of the Russian Black Sea Fleet from the area of conflict to its base in Sevastopol.

The Ukrainian president's pro-Western policies did bring some indirect benefits for Ukraine. In February 2008 it was accepted into the World Trade Organization (WTO) while Russia's application still remained under consideration. When the global financial crisis struck in the fall of 2008, the International Money Fund (IMF) offered Ukraine a loan of \$16.4 billion to help it deal with the financial strains on its banking system. The fact that American influence was strong in both of these international organizations undoubtedly worked to Ukraine's advantage.

It was, however, the strained relationship with Russia that increasingly overshadowed the Ukrainian president's foreign policy. It was clear that Ukraine and Russia would, sooner or later, have to find a way to resolve the tensions between them. These confrontations often flared up as a result of the deep-rooted stereotypes that each side had about the other. As Putin's Russia strove to regain its international prominence and regional dominance, it proved difficult for the Kremlin to accept its former "younger brother" as an independent and equal state (although the inhabitants of both countries had a much more positive view of each other). Indeed, in 2008 Putin clearly stat-

ed to Bush that Ukraine was not really a full-fledged state.³ Most Russians did not consider Ukraine a separate nation. For its part, Ukraine's political elite was extremely sensitive to what it perceived as Russian "bullying" and it used every opportunity to emphasize its national distinctiveness.

There were, however, more concrete reasons for the tensions between the two states. The fact that Russia provided Ukraine with much of its energy and set prices to serve its interests was a constant cause of concern for the Ukrainians. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian government's insistence that Russia's Black Sea Fleet, based in Sevastopol, should leave when its lease ran out in 2017 irritated the Kremlin, leading it to encourage pro-Russian tendencies in the largely Russian-populated Crimea. The sensitive issue of the role of the Russian language and media in Ukraine, aroused not only Ukrainian- and Russian-speakers in the country but involved sharp exchanges between Russian and Ukrainian governments.⁴

As 2008 drew to a close, it was evident that adding to or even maintaining tensions in the highly strained Ukrainian–Russian relationship was unproductive for both sides. Early indications that a more conciliatory approach was needed came from Prime Minister Tymoshenko, who adopted a more balanced view of the Georgia–Russia conflict than President Yushchenko. Moreover, in her negotiations with Putin about energy issues there were further indications of her efforts to find grounds for better understanding between the two states. Meanwhile, Yanukovich travelled to Moscow to participate in United Russia's party congress and to emphasize, once more, that he stood for improved Ukrainian–Russian relations. The leader of Ukraine's Communists, Petro Symonenko, did the same. Even Yushchenko himself, disillusioned by lack of progress in his pro-West policies, seemed to be slowly coming to the conclusion that a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with Russia was needed. For this purpose, he created a special commission to study ways in which improved relations could best be achieved. It appeared that major changes in Ukraine's foreign policy were in the making.

The Ukrainian-Russian "Gas War" As 2009 began, the extremely sensitive and important Ukrainian–Russian relationship engendered a sharp confrontation. Western media called it the "gas war." The origins of the conflict reached back to Soviet times when natural gas was obtained in Russia and transported to Europe by a transit system that ran primarily through Ukraine. Since 1991 the two countries argued repeatedly about how best to divide the benefits from this energy trade. In 2006, after an altercation with Ukraine that saw Russia briefly shut down its gas deliveries to Europe, it was decided that Ukraine, in return for providing its northern neighbour with cheap transportation facilities, would pay Gazprom, the Russian gas company, \$179.50 per 1,000 cubic metres of gas. This was far below the market price. Moreover, at the suggestion of Putin, Gazprom and the Ukrainians

established, on very opaque terms, the Rosukrenergo company to act as a middleman in the relationship.

On 1 January 2009, arguing that Russia was no longer willing to provide Ukraine with cheap, subsidized gas, Gazprom demanded that the Ukrainians pay \$250 per 1,000 cubic metres. When Kiev protested, Gazprom raised the price to \$450. Tense negotiations continued. They became more confrontational when, on 7 January, Gazprom accused Ukraine of siphoning off Europe-bound gas, an accusation that the Ukrainians vehemently denied. Nonetheless, the Russians cut off all gas deliveries to Europe. This meant that European countries, especially those in the eastern and central parts of the continent, were deprived, in the midst of a very cold winter, of the means to heat their homes. Suddenly, an apparently commercial altercation between two countries on the continent's periphery became an extremely pressing, all-European problem. It was the first time Europe had run into such difficulties and the EU became heavily involved in pressuring both Ukraine and Russia to find a solution as soon as possible.

A well-prepared Russian public relations campaign sought to present Ukraine as the main culprit. The Ukrainians denied all accusations. Meanwhile, the EU, furious and frustrated, blamed both countries. Finally, on 19 January, the two prime ministers, Yulia Tymoshenko and Vladimir Putin, met in Moscow and, after exhausting negotiations, reached an agreement. As a result, Ukraine agreed to pay, in 2009, the market price for gas minus a discount of 20%. Thereafter, Ukraine would pay the European average price for gas and Russia would pay market rates for the transportation of the gas in 2010 but at reduced rates in 2009. The agreement was for ten years. Moreover, Tymoshenko obtained the removal of Rosukrenergo, which she accused of corruption, from the commercial relationship. According to the Ukrainian prime minister, the agreement was a victory for Ukraine (her rival, Yushchenko, called it a defeat); the Russians believed that they gained the upper hand. And Europe, disillusioned by both countries, began to consider alternate sources and supply routes for its gas.

From the outset, it was clear that the "gas war" was not only a commercial conflict. Still smarting from his setback in 2004, Putin was clearly eager to punish Yushchenko, by applying pressure on the vulnerable Ukrainian economy, for his pro-Western policies and support of Georgia in the fall of 2008. Moreover, he hoped to widen the gap between Ukraine and the EU. The internal Ukrainian political conflict between Tymoshenko and Yushchenko also played a role, with the former eager to show that she, unlike the president, was capable of coming to a understanding with Russia. In broader terms, however, the conflict had a crucial impact on the Ukraine–Russia relationship. The long-standing view that Ukrainians and Russians shared a uniquely close and fraternal relationship suffered a major setback. Mean-

while, the perception that the two peoples lived in separate, sovereign states that should and did pursue their own particular interests grew.

State and Nation Building

By 2000 Ukraine's existence as an independent state had become generally acknowledged. It was accepted into the international community, and its state served as the primary political framework for its inhabitants. Ukraine now had all the external features of statehood: president, parliament, a constitution, government ministries, a large bureaucracy, political parties, an army and police forces, taxes, and passports. This, however, did not mean that the state was strong and effective. On the contrary, as was the case in many other post-Communist countries, Ukrainian statehood, compared to its Soviet predecessor, was relatively weak and unstable.

State building Essentially, the problem was that the state was not guided by, and it certainly did not work for, the public interest. In the early 2000s the Ukrainian state was largely under the sway of the new oligarchic elite. When the USSR collapsed, many of the more flexible members of the old Communist elite left politics and concentrated on enriching themselves by privatizing what had once been state property. By the 2000s this new and wealthy elite returned to politics in order to manipulate the state and its policies on its own behalf. To achieve this end, however, a weak state was much more desirable than a strong one. Consequently, although Ukraine possessed all the usual features of statehood, these functioned primarily to serve the interests of the influential. Wealth and connections, not the rule of law or the common good, often decided what policies would be adopted. Reforms that might make the state more effective were not something that the new elite desired. Thus, while the Ukrainian state existed and even expanded, the benefits that it brought to society as a whole were limited.

There were, of course, variations in this general state of affairs. To a large extent they depended on who was president, that is, who occupied the highest level in the state hierarchy. During Kuchma's presidency, particularly the second term from 1999 to 2004, there was a tendency to use the state to support the increasing authoritarianism. This became especially evident in 2002 when the president expanded his presidential secretariat, run by the ruthless Viktor Medvedchuk, to exert greater control over the government apparatus and society as a whole. As a result, media censorship increased and opposition businessmen were frequently harassed by the tax department. However, the results of the parliamentary elections of 2002 hindered the president's attempts to control parliament. Despite presidential interference, the national democratic opposition did well in these elections. This meant that

the 450-member parliament would continue to be an institution that could stand up to the president. True, many of the parliamentarians – according to some estimates about 300 deputies were millionaires – belonged to the oligarchic elite. Yet only some supported the president while others sided with his opposition. And a recalcitrant parliament hindered the imposition of complete presidential control.

Formally, the parliamentary deputies were members of political parties. But Ukrainian political parties were not parties in the Western sense. Some had vague ideological platforms, with those on the centre and right of the political spectrum espousing nationalist or national democratic values and a pro-Western orientation, while those on the left supported socialist internationalism and pro-Russian positions. More important, however, was the identification of these parties with the person of their leaders. Thus, politics often had a strong admixture of personality conflicts. Except for the fading Communists, the political parties usually did not have large grass-roots organizations nor did they represent significant segments of society. Instead they were often controlled by major oligarchic clans and their leaders. Most were based in the largely industrial regions of the country. Thus, the Party of Regions, based in Donetsk, was led by Yanukovych; Medvedchuk and Surkis in Kiev headed the Social Democrats (united); and the Labour Party in Dnipropetrovsk had Pinchuk as its leader.

In 2001 there were about 2.5 million party members, that is, approximately 5% of the population belonged to 125 political parties, most of which were little more than formal entities. Membership in the largest parties comprised Communists – 140,000, Socialists – 60,000, Rukh I – 47,000, Rukh II – 48,000, and Social Democrats (the party of power that dominated the government) – 350,000. The Party of Regions claimed 400,000 members, but this figure was probably exaggerated. Loyalty to one particular party was not great. Between 2002 and 2005 numerous members of parliament, most probably because of bribes or blackmail, changed party affiliation. Ukrainian political parties, therefore, were not a promising base for building a democratic society.

A major change in the prerogatives of the presidency occurred in 2004 during the Orange Revolution. In order to convince his opponents to accept his presidency, Yushchenko agreed to important changes in the constitution that limited the president's power. Henceforth, the president had the right to appoint only the ministers of foreign affairs and defence. The prime minister and other ministers were chosen by the dominant party or coalition of parties in parliament. Ostensibly this weakening of the presidency and strengthening of parliament brought the Ukrainian political system closer to those of Central and Eastern Europe. However, as formulated in Ukraine, there were serious flaws: their ambiguous wording in the constitution created a competition between president and prime minister for power. This set

the stage for continual conflict at the top of the government apparatus and created instability in its branches.

The new government, and specifically Minister of Defence Anatoliy Hrytchenko, did attempt to introduce reforms into the military. By 2008 Ukrainian military forces consisted of about 150,000 active personnel, far below the unmanageable levels of the 1990s. Moreover, there were 33,000 Ministry of Interior troops and close to 50,000 border guards. The primary goal was to transform the military, which was based on the draft, into an army of professionals. However, it soon became apparent that the state simply lacked the money to achieve this goal. Consequently, a professional army remained something to strive for in the future. Meanwhile, burdened with increasingly obsolescent weaponry, the military continued to exist on a meagre budget, about 1.4% of the GDP in 2005.

When he was elected, Yushchenko agreed to introduce reforms in local government, by providing it with more funds and greater decentralization. Furthermore, he indicated that he would strive to eliminate the widespread corruption. However, when the 2007 parliamentary elections brought his rival, Tymoshenko, into the office of prime minister, a struggle for primacy between the two erstwhile allies soon broke out. The reforms in local administration as well as the promised assault on corruption were quickly forgotten. Instead of reforms, the government structure of Ukraine remained mired in a “cursed triangle” of competitors: a destructive struggle among the president, the prime minister, and parliament.

How did the population of Ukraine react to these developments? The general response was highly negative. In 2007, only 8% indicated that they had confidence in their government, while 83% stated that the government was thoroughly corrupt. Evaluations of other government institutions and functions were equally low: only 8% trusted the courts and only 18% had confidence in the electoral process. The 33% confidence rating in the military was significantly higher, and religious institutions enjoyed the highest approval rating, 47%.⁵ This sorry state of affairs reflected the growing government bureaucracy’s traditional tendency to bully citizens, unless paid appropriate bribes, rather than help them. Consequently, a huge gap developed between the people and the *vlada*, or powers-that-be, with average citizens trying to have as little as possible to do with the government that was supposedly there to serve them.

Nation building As a new state, Ukraine clearly needed a consolidated society to support it. Given the ethnic, linguistic, and regional differences in the country, creating a sense of national unity and solidarity was a difficult task. Differences between the western and the eastern regions were daunting enough. Numerous other identities – religious, local, regional, Soviet, Eurasian, and even pan-European – also competed with the national one.

Nonetheless, the effort to create a widely accepted Ukrainian identity did have one advantage that it never had before: the existence of an independent and sovereign Ukrainian state meant that for the first time the effort to instil Ukrainian national consciousness could utilize the resources of the state and not, as in the past, have to struggle against them.

The politics of identity, therefore, became largely the domain of the Ukrainian state and the political elite and not, as had previously been the case, of the intelligentsia. This meant, for example, that such important institutions as the school system could be utilized, in terms of language use and curriculum, to support the Ukrainian national idea. Nonetheless, the widespread use of Russian and the existence of pro-Russian attitudes still remained prevalent, especially in the large cities and regions of the east and south. Therefore, nation building remained a complicated, slow-moving process, one that depended greatly on those who led the state. When Kuchma was in power, he preferred not to emphasize the issue of national identity, perhaps on account of his own background. However, his successor, Yushchenko, made it one of his priorities.

What it meant to be Ukrainian continued to revolve around the two concepts that appeared with independence in 1991: the one stressed the civic aspect of Ukrainian citizenship and the other was based on ethnic-cultural background. The civic aspect, with its pluralistic, multicultural dimension, appealed to many Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian inhabitants of the country. It was especially widespread in the east and south where many Russians and other non-Ukrainians lived and where Russian was primarily spoken. Despite their ethnic Ukrainian majorities, these areas consisted of lands colonized in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries under the aegis of the Russian empire and by other ethnic groups. Moreover, their industrial centres attracted many Russian workers. Consequently, a civic definition of nationality was preferred here. In the central and especially the western areas of the country, where more than 90% of the inhabitants were ethnic Ukrainians and where they had been the clear majority for centuries, it was the ethnic definition of nationality, based on Ukrainian language, ethnic roots, and cultural traditions that had the greatest appeal. Government policies tended to vacillate between these two options of how to define nationality, although more frequently they favoured the civic variant since it was more inclusive and less problematic politically. Be that as it may, the census of 2001 revealed an increase in the number of those who identified themselves as ethnic Ukrainians from 72% to 77% and a decline of those who considered themselves to be Russians, from 22% to 17%. It was an indication of how easily, depending on political circumstances, one could move from one national identity to the other.

Of greater concern to most Ukrainians, however, was the language question. It had a strong emotional aspect as well as a practical, career-oriented

dimension. Ukrainian was the official language of the country. In 2001 more than 70% of its schools and universities used it and this percentage continued to grow. It was also the language of government. Of the country's inhabitants 67.5% considered Ukrainian their native tongue (14.5% stated that it was Russian). Compared to the late Soviet period, the status and prestige of the Ukrainian language improved considerably. In the west, 91% considered it their native language, in the centre the figure was about 72%, and in the east and south it was approximately 38%.⁶

While the status of Ukrainian rose, it did not mean that it was the predominant language in the land. Russian continued to dominate in the big cities and large parts of the east and south. While Ukrainian was generally utilized in the government-controlled television and radio, Russian was used most often in the privately owned newspapers and book publications. In short, little changed in language use in Ukraine. Clearly Russian continued to retain its association with modernity, urban life, and cultural richness. Especially among young urban dwellers it was the "cool" language. However, although constantly debated and of great political significance, the language issue was not something Ukrainians were willing to fight about. Indeed, they demonstrated remarkable tolerance as to who chose to use which language. Most probably, widespread bilingualism took the edge off a potentially explosive issue.

Regionalism In a country as large as Ukraine with a history that varied greatly from region to region, it was inevitable that regionalism would be a factor of considerable importance. Not surprisingly, the autonomous republic of Crimea continued to be especially problematic. Its status had both national and international ramifications. The 2 million inhabitants of the peninsula were mostly Russians: they constituted 52% of the population, whereas Ukrainians were 25% and Tatars 18%. In addition, the Russian Black Sea Fleet, with about 15,000 Russian military personnel, was based in Sevastopol. Relatively quiescent during the Kuchma presidency, Ukrainian–Russian tensions mounted during Yushchenko's years in office. As the president pushed his pro-Western policies, Crimea's Russian population, which included many veterans of the Soviet military and government, not only protested; its radical elements repeatedly demonstrated pro-Russian attitudes. They were supported by leading Russian politicians, most notably Yuri Luzhkov, mayor of Moscow, who questioned the legitimacy of Crimea belonging to Ukraine. The largely rural Ukrainian population of the peninsula remained passive. However, the Crimean Tatars, resentful of Russian dominance in Crimea, supported the central government in Kiev. Complicating the situation even more were the murky interests of the powerful criminal organizations that operated on the peninsula.

In 2005 Ukrainian students protested the Russian navy's use of what were

formally Ukrainian installations. A year later pro-Russian elements mounted demonstrations against combined NATO-Ukrainian exercises in Crimea. But in the fall of 2008, during the brief Georgian–Russian armed conflict, tensions reached a high point when the Ukrainian government attempted to restrict the access of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which supported the Russian invasion of Georgia, to its base in Sevastopol. More serious was the Ukrainian insistence that, in accordance with the terms of Treaty of 1997, Russia should prepare to abandon its naval base in Sevastopol by 2017. This confrontation, and Russia's actions in Georgia, raised fears, especially in Europe and the United States, that Crimea, despite the Kremlin's assurances to the contrary, would be the next target of Russian expansion.

A much less threatening brush with separatism occurred in November 2004 during the Orange Revolution. Unhappy about the rejection of a Yanukovich presidency, about 3,500 deputies of various jurisdictions representing seventeen oblasts gathered in the city of Severdonetsk in the Luhansk oblast to consider their options. They even threatened to break away from a pro-Yushchenko Ukraine and to form a separate South East Ukrainian Republic. However, this idea was quickly rejected by Yanukovich himself and little came of it. In the fall of 2008 another minor manifestation of separatist tendencies emerged briefly in Transcarpathia when a meeting of 107 delegates, led by Dimitrii Sidor, a priest belonging to the Moscow Patriarchate, demanded autonomy for Rusyns in the region. It also failed to mobilize any meaningful support. Indeed, there was a growing tendency among Ukrainians, while recognizing differences among themselves, not to view these as a justification for separatism. Often when threats of separatism arose, many perceived them to be serving the interests of local politicians rather than reflecting the concerns of the people.

In its attempts to strengthen the sense of national solidarity, the Yushchenko administration laid great stress on the uniqueness of Ukrainian history. To a large extent this was a response to the old Soviet and modern Russian tendency to emphasize the closeness and interweaving of the Russian and Ukrainian past. In contrast to old Soviet attempts to besmirch the OUN-UPA as Nazi collaborators, the government presented them as praiseworthy fighters for Ukrainian independence. A high point of this tendency occurred in 2008 when Roman Shukhevych, commander of UPA (and viewed in Russia as an inveterate enemy), was posthumously awarded the Hero of Ukraine medal, much to the irritation of Russia and the many Red Army veterans in Ukraine. But the greatest effort to emphasize Ukraine's historical specificity was the commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Great Famine. This undertaking, which had some success in mobilizing international recognition of the famine, greatly irritated the Kremlin, which interpreted the commemorations not only as a tactic to stress Ukrainian and Russian differences but to blame it for the tragedy. Nonetheless, even in southern and eastern

Ukraine, where scepticism about aspects of Ukrainization was frequently expressed, the response to the Famine commemorations was positive, probably because in these areas the tragedy claimed most of its victims. Although the Russian-speaking regions in Ukraine also accepted many pro-Europe aspects of national historiography, they rejected the anti-Russian components that new versions of Ukraine's past often included, a feature that west Ukrainians often emphasized.

Although many Ukrainians continued to believe that their society was largely fragmented, and although their views on nationhood varied considerably, there were, nonetheless, indications of some consolidation. In 2008 opinion polls revealed that in response to the question whether they would choose Ukraine as their homeland if they had a choice, 76% of those over sixty and 64.5% between eighteen and twenty-eight responded in the affirmative. In a 2007 poll, asked if they considered themselves to be Ukrainian patriots, 44.2% responded with "yes" and 35.6% with "rather yes" (about 14% did not consider themselves to be patriots of Ukraine).⁷ Thus, while regional, ethnic, and linguistic distinctions continued, it was possible to see progress toward the creation of a modern Ukrainian nation.

Economy

Change from the isolation of Soviet times to the unpredictable, dynamic global market was most evident in the economy. In the 1990s the economy of Ukraine was disintegrating: its innumerable ties with former republics were sundered, its factories stood still, its workers were unpaid, and much of the population was sinking into poverty. The country's GDP dropped by more than 60%. But in the 2000s the economy began to adjust to the demands of the market. In the process, signs of improvement began to appear. True, they occurred on such a depressed base that any positive development attracted attention; nonetheless, the indications that market-oriented activity was increasing were undeniable.

In the first years of the new millennium, Ukraine's annual GDP rose by an impressive 7–10% a year. In 2007 it even grew 12%. Moreover, the country's basic economic assets were still formidable: it had great expanses of some of the richest soil in the world, its industrial base was extensive, and its supply of natural resources was bountiful. It also had a large, well-trained labour force that was much cheaper than any in Western Europe. Analysts who looked more closely at the economy of Ukraine began to use the phrase "great potential" with growing frequency.

The first significant signs of revival appeared in the huge steel plants – some with a workforce of 60,000 – of the southeast. In Soviet times, Ukraine was one of four top steel producers in the world. Therefore, it is not surprising that its five major steel mills, privatized for most part, were the first to

find their way to both old and new markets. Steel products became Ukraine's primary export, constituting about 40% of its total exports. International contacts meant access to modern expertise, which Ukrainian plants, with their antiquated production facilities, desperately needed. Gradually, foreign investments began to flow into the steel sector. Most important was the purchase in 2005 of the Kryvorizhstal plant by the world leader in steel production, Mittal Steel, for \$4.8 billion. This reversed the controversial sale of the plant a year earlier to two Ukrainian billionaires, Viktor Pinchuk (Kuchma's son-in-law) and Renat Akhmetov, for the relatively paltry sum of \$800 million. But although steel products led the way, conditions in Ukrainian plants were far from satisfactory. In addition to the antiquated production facilities, the huge workforces were relatively unproductive. A Ukrainian steelworker produced only 76% as much as a Polish steelworker, 14% as much as a European, and 11% as much as an American. Thus, Ukraine's strongest performing economic sector continued to suffer from major weaknesses.

Coal mining was another pillar of the Ukrainian economy. Ukraine possessed 3.5% of the world coal reserves and was one of the world's top ten producers of coal. But signs of decline, primarily due to the lack of modernization, were already evident in Soviet times. In the 1990s and early 2000s matters grew worse. A telling indicator was the rapid decline of the workforce: in 1991 it consisted of 511,000 miners but in 2002 it shrank to 252,000. Although it was crucial to steel production and provided much of Ukraine's fuel and electricity, the coal mining sector, based mainly in the Donbas, remained stagnant. Extraction equipment was obsolete, the working conditions were extremely dangerous – mining disasters were a regular occurrence – and there was little new investment. Many mines were deeply indebted. For the owners, investing in improvements seemed unfeasible. Consequently, the prospect of closing the numerous unprofitable mines was frequently considered. But since the coal mines remained a crucial part of the economy and neither government nor owners could offer other employment options to the hundreds of thousands of miners and their families who depended on their abysmally low salaries, substandard conditions continued to exist.

A much more encouraging aspect of the economy was the growth of small businesses. Traditionally, this was a realm of economic activity where non-Ukrainians, especially Jews, had been most active. But the poor prospects and low salaries that traditional employment offered forced many to consider "biznes" as a more promising option. Momentum gathered slowly. Initially, it consisted of former teachers, engineers, or doctors travelling to Turkey or China to buy cheap goods and then selling them in hometown bazaars at a small profit. But with time, some accumulated enough capital to open food stores, restaurants, beauty parlours, tourist agencies, home repairs stores, dentist offices, and other businesses geared to the needs of growing numbers of consumers.

By 2007 small businesses had become a significant sector of the economy. They accounted for 20% of all production in Ukraine and grew at the rate of 11% a year. A growing internal market provided a base for this development. By 2007 about 2.6 million small businesses were registered in the country (although about a third proved to be unprofitable and unviable). Major retailers were often financed by European and Russian investors. These small businesses were the sector of the economy that exposed the average Ukrainian most directly to market forces. And it was here that they experienced the market's ability to respond to their needs and wants. The growth of consumerism, aided by the introduction of credit cards, became ever more evident. Nonetheless, Ukrainians still lagged far behind the buying power of West Europeans. For example, the average Ukrainian consumer had only 9% of the buying power of his German counterpart.

In the all-important agricultural sector the situation was more ambiguous. Ukraine possessed 42 million hectares of arable land but only one-third of it was farmed, producing 14% of the country's GDP.⁸ Despite widespread unemployment in the countryside (often as high as 40%), it still employed 25% of Ukraine's population compared to 5% in the European Union and 3% in the United States. By the early 2000s most former collective farm workers, about 6 million in number, had received title to their shares of the disbanded collective farms. This was a radical transformation in the countryside, perhaps as revolutionary as collectivization had been in the 1930s with the traumatic abolition of private land ownership. Private ownership of land was restored to the countryside (although restrictions remained on the right to sell this land). State ownership of land practically disappeared. Yet all this happened with little fanfare. There were no outbursts of joy or heightened activity among the villagers. The primary reason for this surprising reaction was the fact that the rural population was no longer able or willing to work and benefit from the lands that were returned to it.

A small number attempted to become independent farmers, leasing land from others, investing in farm machinery, hiring labour, and growing crops for the market. Many of their more passive neighbours, accustomed to the less demanding ways of the collective farms (with their numerous opportunities to shirk work or to steal) did not take kindly to such hardy individualists. The more usual option was to rent one's land at extremely low prices, since there were many willing to lease their holdings to the growing numbers of agribusinesses that began to appear, and that were often financed by foreign investors. These large-scale operations could afford major investments, were more efficient than small landowners in producing crops, and had ready access to markets. To many, they constituted the future of farming in Ukraine. Thus, although the fate of the country's large rural population was in doubt, rising food prices throughout the entire world seemed to indicate that the farming that re-emerged in the 2000s in Ukraine was a promising economic

undertaking. One way or another, Ukraine's fertile lands were certain to remain a central element in its economy.

After 2004, the economic potential of Ukraine – its proximity to European markets, its cheap labour and numerous natural resources – was frequently recognized by international investors. There was, moreover, the hope that the new government would institute more business-friendly policies. Consequently, foreign investment began to flow into Ukraine. In 2006, it amounted to about \$4.2 billion. A year later, the figure was almost \$8 billion and growing. Despite the financial crisis in 2008, foreign investment in the country grew by 54% more than in the previous year. Most of these funds went into banking, agricultural enterprises, car dealerships, retail malls and outlets, hotels, and machinery manufacturing. In 2008 Germany alone accounted for 20% of these investments. Other European Union countries such as Austria, the Netherlands, and Great Britain allocated another 38%. Surprisingly, Russian investment, which had been dominant in the Kuchma years, made up only 6% while the Americans accounted for a mere 5%. Another 20% of foreign investment funds came from an ostensibly unexpected source: Cyprus. It was, however, not difficult to decipher the real origin of these funds: they came from the offshore bank accounts of many of Ukraine's oligarchs. Apparently even they had decided that the investment of their often illegal gains in their native land was a promising venture.

Slowly, Ukraine's modest participation in global markets began to increase. Its two major trading partners were Russia and the European Union, each taking turns in playing the leading role. Each accounted for about 20% of Ukraine's foreign trade. Between 2002 and 2007 European purchases of Ukrainian products doubled. In addition to its largest export, steel products, Ukraine also exported machinery, chemicals, and agricultural produce. This, however, was a rather limited variety of products to offer on global markets, and it explains why Ukraine was only sixteenth in the European Union's list of trading partners. On the one hand, it demonstrated Ukraine's severely limited ability to rival foreign competitors. On the other hand, it was also an indication that Ukrainian manufacturers were becoming more familiar with the global marketplace and learning how to compete more successfully. Commercial relations with the much-heralded EEC, based on the weak or unbalanced economics of the former Soviet countries, remained moribund. However, in 2008 Ukraine took a major step toward improving its position in global commerce. After many years of negotiation, it was finally accepted into the World Trade Organization (WTO). By forcing Ukrainian manufacturers to make the adjustments required by international commerce, the entry into the WTO drew them even more into the global marketplace.

The economic upsurge that characterized the early 2000s could not hide the fact that Ukraine's economy was still saddled with major problems. Because the country failed to introduce reforms into its political and econom-

ic system, the result was one political crisis after another. Such instability, coupled with bureaucratic red tape, pointless restrictions, and corruption frightened off many potential investors. Moreover, there was the problem of energy. Ukraine imported about 90% of its energy from Russia. Exacerbating the situation was the fact that Ukrainian enterprises were shockingly inefficient in their use of energy. Indeed, Ukraine had the dubious distinction of being a world leader in this regard. Consequently, it was extremely vulnerable to price increases in energy and, as tensions with Russia rose, the low energy prices that Ukraine once enjoyed also increased.

A dramatic reflection of this dilemma came in late 2005 to early 2006 when Russia reacted to protests about price rises by shutting off gas deliveries to Ukraine. The result was momentary panic not only in Ukraine but in all of Europe, because much of the latter's energy supplies flowed through the gas lines in Ukraine. Eventually, the issue was settled, at least temporarily. But henceforth, Ukraine's industries and growing numbers of car owners had to learn to live with oil and gas prices that were ever closer to world market levels. There were other problems: the country's domestic market was still relatively weak, despite the presence of numerous scientific institutes, innovation in the high-tech sector was practically non-existent, and its economic infrastructure, especially in the area of transportation, was woefully inadequate. On top of all this, in the early 2000s inflation hovered at about 10–15% a year, reaching as high as 20% in 2008. Thus, despite encouraging improvements in some sectors of its economy, Ukraine still faced major obstacles in its efforts to modernize the economy.

When the global financial crisis struck in the fall of 2008, its impact on the highly vulnerable economy of Ukraine was great. Indeed, Ukraine, together with Iceland and Hungary, headed the IMF list of countries in urgent need of support. The sudden evaporation of credit was evident in troubles encountered by the country's banks. To prevent runs on their holdings, the banks greatly limited withdrawals. This meant that businesses could not obtain funds to pay salaries. Unemployment quickly rose, especially in the crucial and hard-hit steel sector, where exports declined by more than 20% and steel prices dropped by 50%. About one-third of the workers in the large plants in Mariupol were laid off; thousands of steelworkers and miners lost their jobs or went on unpaid leave in Donetsk. Layoffs spread to all sectors of the economy. Some of the country's oligarchs lost a large part of their wealth.

By October 2008 the country's industrial output sank by 20% and an even greater decline was expected. Meanwhile, the currency, which had been relatively stable, went into a tailspin, losing 20–30% of its value against the US dollar. The situation was even worse on Ukraine's tiny stock market, which sustained losses of about 75%. Suddenly, Ukraine's rosy economy descended into crisis. Conservative estimates called for a 5% decline in its GDP in the coming year. Widespread panic was avoided, however, by a timely loan

from the us-backed International Monetary Fund (IMF) of \$16.4 billion. The loan had another encouraging aspect: it indicated that the state of Ukraine's economy was of concern to an important international financial organization. For better or worse, the country's economy was well on the way to becoming a part of the global economic system.

Society

The transformation of Ukrainian society from Soviet models to those of the West accelerated in the early 2000s. But even as social change occurred, the country's society retained many uniquely post-Soviet features. Consequently, elements of two very different social systems continued to coexist.

The oligarchic elite Perhaps most striking was the consolidation of the new elite of Ukraine. For the first time in centuries the elite became Ukrainian: its rise, status, and even plans for the future were based in Ukraine. No longer, as in Soviet, Habsburg, or Russian imperial periods did the most ambitious, talented, or well-connected Ukrainians move to imperial capitals such as Moscow, St Petersburg, and Vienna to make their fortunes. Businessmen, politicians, actors and writers, professionals of every type now accepted Ukraine as the context in which they could best develop their talents. This is not to say that they were ethnically, culturally, or linguistically Ukrainian. Many were not. But for them Ukraine now served as the basic framework for their recent successes and plans for the future.

In terms of origins, most of these oligarchs had usually been clever, opportunistic, and junior members of the former Soviet establishment, and they knew how to use their old connections to great advantage. This helped them, during the chaotic 1990s, to acquire, usually in an illegal or suspect fashion, ownership of Ukraine's huge steel mills, coal mines, chemical and heavy machinery plants, construction companies, and banks. Some monopolized entire industries such as steel production or coal mining, becoming incredibly wealthy in the process. Renat Akhmetov of Donetsk became one of the richest men in Europe with a fortune estimated at \$6 billion. Based in Dnipropetrovsk, Viktor Pinchuk accumulated about \$5 billion, while Ihor Kolomoisky was valued at over \$3 billion. In addition to about a dozen billionaires, several thousand millionaires engaged in banking, energy, and the manufacture of heavy machinery and chemicals. Leading politicians also belonged to this cohort, having used state funds and connections to enrich themselves. Thus, oligarchic interests and politics were very closely linked.

Like the old feudal nobility, many members of the new elite engaged in conspicuous consumption. Kiev, it seemed, had more Mercedes, Bentleys, and Maybachs clogging its ever more crowded streets than other European cities. Huge and elaborate homes, encircled by security fences, sprang up in

suburbs such as Koncha Zaspa. The children of oligarchs were often sent to elite schools abroad. However, as opportunities for easy enrichment dwindled in the early 2000s, entry into this group became more difficult, and it increasingly began to function as a closed, privileged caste.

Although many of the oligarchs had regional bases, usually in industrial centres such as Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk or, to a lesser extent, Odessa and Lviv, they tended to congregate in the capital, Kiev, because it was here they could influence the political decisions that were relevant to their business interests. Indeed, they often viewed the state as yet another instrument for self-enrichment. In the early 2000s the oligarchs, in a fashion typical of all new elites, began to legitimize their recently acquired wealth by conducting business in ever more legal or accepted ways. This helped in developing international connections, especially in the West. Some even attempted to improve their image by engaging in philanthropic or charitable activities. However, in most cases, this did not alter the extremely negative image that they had among the general population. For the most part they were viewed as rapacious and dishonest opportunists who cared little for their workers or the general public. In the fall of 2008 the overbearing confidence of the very rich was badly shaken when the impact of the global financial crisis hit Ukraine. As steel prices fell, industrial production plummeted, and banks tottered, the wealth of many oligarchs declined dramatically. For them it seemed their best times were behind them.

The new middle class Among Western observers it was common practice to look for signs of a rising Western-style middle class in the former Soviet countries. This reflected the belief that an expanding middle class would provide the social base for the growth of democracy. Signs appeared that such a development was taking place, but they were limited. Given the great number of well-educated individuals in the country, it is not surprising that many considered themselves to be members of the middle class. However, few had incomes of \$1000–\$3000 a month that, in Ukraine, could support a middle-class lifestyle. In short, this segment of society, which was highly dependent on an expanding economy, was only beginning to form.

The new middle class included professionals, government officials, middle management, small business owners, and employees in foreign-owned businesses. Its members tended to be young, constituting a Ukrainian equivalent of the yuppie generation. Usually they inhabited large cities, especially Kiev, where well-paying jobs were most plentiful. Also Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Odessa, and Lviv had sizable numbers of this new class. Its members could afford cars, apartments, computers, foreign travel, and even modest dachas. Avid participants in consumer culture, they tried to emulate Western lifestyles. As a rule, this up-and-coming social group was not given to reminiscing about the Soviet past and was more inclined to look to the

future. In political terms, it usually espoused liberal views and supported policies that drew its country closer to Europe.

Although expanding, this class was still limited in size. Most optimistic estimates considered that it constituted less than 10% of the population, far below the number needed to form the core of a social structure like that of Western societies.⁹ The financial crisis of 2008, and particularly job losses in the financial and management sectors, slowed the growth of this social stratum even more. Nonetheless, its impact was noticeable. It provided customers for the assortment of sophisticated goods and services that increasing numbers of retailers provided. Very fashion conscious, it added colour to the once-drab streets of large cities. Its members often supported efforts to change the traditional passivity of Ukrainians into a more activist mode. Most importantly, they usually supported freedom of speech, civic activism, and political awareness.

The fading intelligentsia As a Western-style middle class slowly emerged, another important social group – the intelligentsia (people with a higher education) – gradually declined. Since the nineteenth century the intelligentsia, while never numerous, had been in the forefront of ideological and political developments in Ukraine. In Soviet times it formed the literary, artistic, scientific, and technological elite. In the 1980s, the intelligentsia numbered about 2.5 million. And as long as one did not challenge the political order, members of this social group lived relatively well.

But the growing market economy, consumer culture, and mass media had not been kind to the traditional intelligentsia. What it produced – ideologies, scholarship, and literary and artistic works – was needed less and less in the consumer-oriented, materialistic society that valued entrepreneurs, managers, computer specialists, and professional politicians. Consequently, the income of many members of the old intelligentsia, especially those in cultural fields and education, decreased greatly. Some managed to move into the new middle class. Others, teachers most notably, slipped lower on the social scale. Statistics reflected the decline: in 1991 there were about 300,000 *doktory* (the highest academic rank) in Ukraine; in 2008 the number sank to fewer than 140,000. The fact that the golden age of the *intelligenty* was coming to an end was also reflected in the leadership of crucial political events. In the early 1990s it had still been the traditional, culturally oriented intelligentsia that formed *РУКН* and spearheaded the drive for independence. The Orange Revolution, on the other hand, was led primarily by professional politicians and businessmen.

The troubles of the intelligentsia did not translate into a decline in educational levels. A high level of education, a heritage of Soviet times, remained: the literacy rate was 99.4%, about 15% of the population had higher education, and 78% completed secondary education. There were close to 8 million

pupils in primary and secondary schools and about 1 million in post-secondary institutions. Financing education, as usual, was a major problem. In the difficult 1990s it sank from 2.3% of the GDP to 0.6%. Research institutions lost about 70% of their budgets and a significant portion of their personnel. However, by 2006, as the economy improved, expenditures for education rose to 6.3% of the GDP. Efforts were also made to introduce a more democratic, decentralized mode of education. An important step in this direction was Ukraine's acceptance of the Bologna Agreement, which sought to bring its universities closer to the West European models. Another positive feature was the appearance of private institutions of learning, especially on the secondary school level, which introduced some variety and competition into the educational system. Nonetheless, progress was slow. Innovation often met with stubborn resistance, textbooks were frequently substandard, school reforms were only partial, and, as always, financing was inadequate. Thus, while the number of educational opportunities remained high, their quality was in need of improvement.

Other urban dwellers Urbanization, which began in earnest in Soviet times, continued unabated. About 67% of the country's inhabitants lived in cities and it was obvious that this percentage would increase in the future. In the forefront of urban development was Kiev. It developed into a large – officially its population was 2.6 million but unofficially it was closer to 4 million – modern megapolis where jobs were relatively plentiful, cultural attractions frequent and varied, educational opportunities numerous, and career growth promising. As the capital, the city set the tone for urban life in the entire country. Indeed, complaints were often heard that it attracted far more than its share of talented, skilled, and ambitious individuals. Moreover, the capital received by far the largest percentage of foreign capital investment. Other large cities, those of about 1 million inhabitants, were Kharkiv, with its many educational institutions, Dnepropetrovsk, a major industrial centre, Donetsk, known for its coal and steel production as well as its rich, powerful “mafia,” the colourful seaport Odessa, heavily industrialized Zaporizhia, and picturesque Lviv. The last was the only major city that was Ukrainian-speaking; Russian dominated in the other urban centres. Inhabited by relatively sophisticated citizens – it was usually in large cities that the 7% of the country's population that owned computers lived – they offered most employment opportunities and the greatest variety of consumer goods.

Life in smaller cities such as Krvyi Rih, Mykolaiv, Mariupol, Luhansk, Poltava, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Chernivtsi, Uzhorod, Vynntysia, Rivne, and Chernihiv was much less dynamic and often provincial. For the most part, these smaller cities were far behind the large urban centres in economic development. However, some of these cities, notably those in the west, such as Chernivtsi and Ivano-Frankivsk, boasted impres-

sive Habsburg-era buildings and attracted more foreign investment than others in their category. Mid-sized urban centres in the east, however, were usually drab and economically passive. Small towns in Ukraine were usually characterized by little commercial activity, high unemployment, few opportunities, and many inhabitants who were absorbed by the struggle to survive. Numerous inhabitants in these towns were also preoccupied with finding ways to move to larger urban centres or to find work abroad.

The problem of unemployment and low salaries was especially acute in the primarily rural western oblasts, where unemployment was several times higher and salaries about half those in the country as a whole. There was some improvement in the housing of the inhabitants of large urban centres. Most apartments had been privatized, making their inhabitants owners of their dwellings. In the large cities, especially Kiev, where real estate prices grew at one of the fastest rates in the world, even owners of modest apartments significantly raised their net worth. Communal apartments, shared by several families and widespread in Soviet days, largely disappeared. Many Ukrainians renovated their dwellings. However, costs of maintenance rose steadily, availability of hot water and heating was often unreliable, and common areas were frequently neglected. Moreover, it was not uncommon for members of several generations to live in the same apartment.

The wages of most urban inhabitants were generally low, about \$300–500 a month on average. However, Kievans often earned about 40% more than that. The variety of employment was typical of large urban centres: skilled and unskilled labourers, employees in the service and retail sectors, clerks, minor government officials, taxi drivers, bookkeepers, street vendors, business employees, teachers, nurses, technicians, and the like. In Donetsk coal miners were numerous, in Zaporizhia it was steelworkers, and in Dnipropetrovsk industrial workers predominated. Urban dwellers frequently had to take two or even three jobs in order to make ends meet. For most of them their earnings allowed for survival – the cost of living was still relatively low – but little else. The contrast to West European living standards was glaring: on average the spending power of West Europeans was eight times greater than that of Ukrainians. The average consumer in Ukraine could afford only 9% of what an average German could buy. For most Ukrainians it was common to depend on help from family, especially parents, and friends, in times of need. Despite the improving economy, approximately 25–35% still lived in poverty.

In sharp contrast to Soviet times, feelings of financial insecurity were widespread. Salaries were frequently paid irregularly and working conditions were often poor. Between 2000 and 2005 inflation was about 10–12% but it rose to over 20% in 2008. For growing numbers of the elderly, the pensions they depended on were very meagre, usually about \$20–40 a month. Officially medical care was free, but one usually had to pay for medicine

and food in the poorly equipped hospitals. Bribing doctors to get better care was common practice. Women, although as qualified as men, were often at a disadvantage in the labour market. Generally they had the lowest-paid jobs and were the first to be fired. Consequently, about 80% of the unemployed were female. Little wonder that hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian women sought work abroad. Many became trapped in the growing and exploitive sex trade.

To make matters worse, alcoholism increased. One in three males and one in twelve females was a heavy drinker. Moreover, the number addicted to drugs and suffering from HIV also rose. Even when living standards improved after 2000 – by as much as 80% in the 2000–4 period alone – many Ukrainians remained pessimistic, complaining that they were very dissatisfied with the current state of their society. In terms of global standards of living, Ukraine was only about seventy-sixth in world, a rating similar to that of other post-Soviet societies.

The declining village For centuries Ukrainian language, folk culture, and economy, indeed all that was considered genuinely Ukrainian, was based in the village. It was the core of the country's society and the primary source of its national distinctiveness. It was here that traditions were preserved, customs respected, and religion practised, and here too where the roots of many Ukrainian families lay. Its inhabitants lived in their own houses, worked their gardens, cared for livestock, and existed in their own small, relatively isolated worlds. By the early 2000s, however, the rural population, constituting about 15 million inhabitants or 33% of the country's inhabitants, began to undergo fundamental changes. In almost every region it slowly declined. Diminishing numbers of rural dwellers was, of course, a global phenomenon. But given the importance of the village in Ukrainian life and identity, this disturbing transformation was especially meaningful and far-reaching.

Life in the village had always been hard. In the 1990s, as the collective farm system gradually disintegrated, as fuel and farm machinery were far beyond the means of an average farmer, and as a market for his products was lacking, mere survival was the primary concern for most villagers. Moreover, many of the villagers' city-based relatives made the trek to their home villages to grow food to help family members survive. In the early 2000s, however, signs of change began to appear. Former collective farm workers received shares of former collective farm land. But they lacked the means to work these plots. Therefore they usually rented them out, at minimal rates, to agricultural entrepreneurs or risk-taking farmers who began to appear. Villagers concentrated their efforts on their garden plots that provided them with most of their food. Hard work and lack of opportunity – unemployment in the countryside was about 17%, two to three times higher than in urban centres – did not appeal to the younger generation, who often moved to cit-

ies. Consequently, the village population grew not only smaller but older. By 2006 over 30% of the villagers were beyond retirement age and dependent on their meagre pensions. Generating greater income was difficult, however, because wages in the countryside were very low, less than half of industrial wages. As result, about 66% of the rural population lived below the poverty level.¹⁰

The general upsurge in Ukraine's economy that came after 2004 brought improvements to the village. Rising prices for food allowed many villagers to earn additional income. Often, especially in the western regions, villagers sought work abroad, sending money back home to support their families (although the extended absence of a wife or husband created a new set of problems). Generally, women from western parts of Ukraine found employment as domestics or caregivers to the elderly in Italy, Spain, and Portugal, while men from the eastern regions sought work in Russia, usually in construction. As a result, between 2001 and 2006 rural incomes more than tripled. Although this was still less than the increase in incomes in the cities, it did mean that money became more plentiful in the villages.

Most important was the increase in socio-economic differentiation as the number of those who considered themselves to be well off rose from 0.5% in 2002 to 5% in 2006. The percentage of the very poor declined from 91% in 2001 to 45% in 2006. There were, of course, regional differences. Although their land was less fertile, village households in the western regions appeared to be more economically feasible while those in eastern regions such as Luhansk or Donetsk, despite the fertile soil, had much less promising prospects. The stronger traditions of private ownership in the west may help explain these differences.

Economic improvement did not mean, however, economic strength. Consequently, by 2008, the economic options available to many ageing villagers were rather stark: they could rent their land to increasing numbers of large agribusinesses, often foreign owned, for minimal prices, thus encouraging the development of Latin American-style latifundia, or they could try to develop – with government subsidies or expensive bank loans – small but efficient family farms similar to those in Western Europe and Poland. In 2008 the first option seemed more likely. This meant that more transformations awaited the village.

Even more disturbing were the demographic aspects of village life. Poor health care and widespread alcoholism, especially among males, meant that death rates were higher in villages than in cities. Unemployment remained high and many villagers urged their children to seek an easier life in the cities. As a result, between 1996 and 2000 rural population declined by 750,000. And in the initial decade of new millennium the rural population decline continued unabated. It was estimated that by 2010 only about 20% of the country's population would be living in villages. Population decline was

particularly sharp in the northern and eastern regions of Chernihiv, Poltava, Sumy, Luhansk, and Donetsk. In short, the village was rapidly losing its traditional place as the social and cultural core of life in Ukraine.

For Ukraine, the fading of the traditional intelligentsia and the decline of the village were momentous developments. For centuries these two social segments had been at the centre of crucial events in the country. They had set it apart from the noble-dominated society of Poland, from the bureaucratized elites of the Russian empire, and from the urban, industrialized model of the Soviet man. However, the decline of the intelligentsia and the peasantry and the simultaneous growth of the new, urban, globally oriented, educated, middle class meant that Ukrainians were increasingly moving towards a social structure that was similar to that of other societies in Europe. A new era in the social history of Ukraine had commenced.

Corruption One of the most depressing aspects of life in Ukraine was the prevalence of corruption. To a certain degree, it was a global phenomenon. But in the former Soviet countries, where wages were low, the rule of law weak, and ethics ambiguous, it was especially widespread.¹¹ Bribery and corruption were often commonly accepted ways of getting things done. Over 90% of the country's inhabitants believed that their society was thoroughly corrupt. About 67% of Ukrainians stated that, in the last twelve months, they had had to bribe government bureaucrats. Little wonder that in 2007 about 83% of Ukrainians believed that corruption was widespread in government.

Corruption took many forms: it could be deputies selling their votes for huge sums or the well-connected arranging to acquire public property at absurdly low prices. On a more mundane level, traffic fines or customs duties could be bypassed with the help of bribes. Perhaps most disturbing was the widespread use of bribes to ensure acceptance into institutions of higher learning and to ensure high grades or to influence decisions in the courts of law. In cities that lacked major industries, such as Lviv, for example, bribes were often seen as a means of generating additional income. Clearly these practices were highly detrimental to society as a whole: they demoralized the citizenry, undermined the rule of law, and made the conduct of business more complicated and expensive. Despite frequent promises by state leaders to attack the problem, little was done. Obviously numerous vested interests lay behind this lack of progress.

Demographics In the long list of woes that confronted Ukrainians there was yet another, even more serious problem – demographic decline. A century ago, Ukraine had one of the highest birth rates in Europe; in 2008, however, it had one of the lowest in the world. In 1992 its population was 52.2 million; sixteen years later it sank to 46.2 million. And estimates predicted a continuation of the sharp decline. For every nine babies born born per 1,000, there

were sixteen deaths per 1000. In all industrialized countries, people lived longer. In Ukraine, however, the average lifespan of males dropped to sixty-two, while females lived to seventy-four. The reasons for this worrisome decline were many. Although a population decline was already noticeable in the late Soviet period, the economic crisis of the 1990s had discouraged the creation of families. Worsening health care and cramped housing added to the problem. Moreover, modern, educated women, especially in problem-ridden Ukraine, were reluctant to have the 2.2 children per family needed to maintain a steady level of population. Consequently, the average number of children per family in Ukraine was merely 1.3. In urban centres it was even lower.

Regional differences were noteworthy. The death rate, especially among men, was especially high in the heavily industrialized, ecologically dangerous centres of eastern and southern Ukraine. In the poorer but more agrarian western oblasts, the death rate was much lower. It was, perhaps, an indication that rural life was more difficult but healthier. In contrast to Western Europe, immigration to Ukraine was still small, numbering about 150,000. But given the country's declining population it was possible that immigrants from more densely populated parts of globe would appear in greater numbers in Ukraine.

The early 2000s witnessed yet another striking social phenomenon – the generation gap. It was inevitable that an older generation, raised in the heavily ideological, regimented, and controlled Soviet system, and the younger generation, growing up in the materialistic market economy and chaotic political system of most recent times, would differ more than usual. These differences led, on the one hand, to frequent complaints that the young lacked idealism and, on the other, that the old stood in the way of much-needed change. In essence, these tensions reflected the fact that two very different cultures and systems of values – the old Soviet and the new global – co-existed in Ukraine. However, the inevitable tensions did not lead to open confrontations. But the gap between of old veterans who proudly wore Soviet service medals and young teenagers who listened to English rock music on their iPods added complexity to conditions that were already difficult.

Emigration Given the numerous difficulties confronting Ukraine's inhabitants, it was not surprising that many sought to emigrate. In 2008 it was estimated that between 2.5 and 3 million had left their homeland during the last twenty years. A rough estimation of where they settled is as follows.¹²

Russia	1 million	Spain	100,000
Poland	300,000	USA	20,000
Italy	200,000	Canada	15,000
Portugal	150,000		

The vast majority of those who emigrated were so-called illegals – they did not have a legal right to remain in the countries where they lived and worked. Men, especially from eastern regions, tended to seek work, usually in construction, in Russia. Work in construction sites also attracted men to the Czech Republic, Spain, and Portugal. Women, often from the villages and small towns of the western regions where unemployment was high, often made their way to southern Europe where they worked as domestics or caregivers for the elderly.

While emigration was not unusual for Ukrainians, certain features of this most recent variant were new and worrisome. About half of the emigrants had higher education. Many were highly trained scientists, computer specialists, and scholars. And they were for the most part young. Clearly these were people no country could afford to lose. Moreover, most of the women who emigrated left their children and husbands back home. The growing numbers of motherless children and alcoholic men created major problems in the communities the women left behind. However, the huge emigration also had a positive aspect: according to a United Nations report, in 2007 alone Ukrainian emigrants sent about \$8 billion back home. The Ukrainian National Bank claimed that the figure was closer to \$20 billion or about a quarter of the country's GDP.

Commonly called the "fourth wave," this latest exodus of people from Ukraine was obviously motivated by economic considerations. In this it differed greatly from its predecessors, the politicized displaced persons of the post-Second World War period. When they came into contact with previous waves of emigrants in the United States or Canada, members of the "fourth wave" tended to stress their differences rather than similarities. By and large, the new emigrants, especially those from eastern Ukraine, were not drawn to the numerous Ukrainian institutions and organizations their predecessors had established. However, many heritage schools, credit unions, and media benefited greatly from a much-needed infusion of new emigrants who could speak proper contemporary Ukrainian. In countries such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal, where there had not been a significant Ukrainian diaspora, the new immigrants, especially those from western Ukraine, had a great impact. There they established numerous parishes, heritage schools, and social organizations, making the geographic dispersion of Ukrainian emigrants much wider than ever.

Religion One aspect of life in Ukraine that exhibited impressive growth was religion. In 1991 about 15% of Ukraine's inhabitants declared that they were religious; in 2007 the figure rose to 65–70%. What was the explanation for this outburst of religiosity? The removal of Soviet repression certainly played a role. However, the deep roots that religious practice had in the Ukrainian village and among the poorer strata of population was perhaps more decisive.

Even in Soviet times, religious belief was more widespread in Ukraine than Russia. In the more traditionalist western regions it was especially deeply rooted. But the spread, or rather, re-emergence, of religion did not mean that it took a unified form. Quite the opposite. Religious worship in Ukraine was not only fragmented but also had important political ramifications.

The vast majority of Ukrainians were, of course, Orthodox. But they belonged to three different churches. The largest church, led by Metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan) was based mainly in the east and south, and remained, as in Soviet times, subordinated to the patriarch in Moscow. It energetically favoured close ties with Russia. In 2008 its domain was extensive: in addition to numerous monasteries and seminaries, it had about 11,200 parishes and 9,200 clergy. In central Ukraine, after independence, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Kievan Patriarchate emerged, led by the controversial Metropolitan Filaret. With 3,900 parishes and 2,900 clergy, it strove to be a Ukrainian national church, using Ukrainian in its liturgy and cultivating Ukrainian religious traditions. It too had numerous monasteries and seminaries and was especially well represented in Kiev. In the western regions, another new Orthodox church, the Autocephalous Orthodox church had about 1,200 parishes and approximately 660 clergy. It also cultivated a Ukrainian character and looked to the Orthodox patriarch in Istanbul for ecclesiastical leadership.

Rounding out the list of major churches was the Greek-Catholic church based in the western regions, where it re-emerged in 1991. It ministered to about 4 million west Ukrainians, mainly in Galicia, in its 3,600 parishes. Well-organized and dynamic, it had about 2,200 clergy, numerous seminaries, and a newly established Ukrainian Catholic university in Lviv ably led by its rector, Borys Gudziak. In order to emphasize its all-Ukrainian character, its leader, Cardinal Lubomyr Huzar, moved its seat from Lviv to Kiev, where he began the construction of a Greek-Catholic cathedral. However, longstanding attempts by the reinvigorated church to have the pope raise its leader to the rank of patriarch, fiercely opposed by the Orthodox leadership in Moscow, proved fruitless.

The Roman Catholic church in Ukraine had about 1 million members, most of whom were of Polish background. The majority of its approximately 880 parishes were on the Right Bank or in Galicia, where once many Poles lived. Served by about 500 clergy, Roman Catholic services were held in Polish, Ukrainian, Russian, and Latin. An important advantage of the Roman Catholic church was the very significant support, both in human resources and financial aid, that it received from Poland. Protestants in Ukraine, mostly Baptists, were organized in numerous communities. However, these were usually small, and only about 125,000 or 2–3% of the country's population belonged to one of the Protestant churches. In the 1990s, some Protestant churches, aided by co-religionists in the West, proselytized very actively, but

in the early 2000s this activity declined noticeably. Muslims were concentrated mostly in the Crimea, where the approximately 300,000 Crimean Tatars lived. There were also sizable Muslim communities in Ukraine's eastern and southern regions. In all, they supported about 150 mosques. Although small in number – estimates ranged from 100,000 to 200,000 – the Jews of Ukraine were well organized. They had over 100 Lubavitcher and 50 Reform synagogues. A large percentage of Jews, between 35 and 40%, were active in their secular and religious organizations. Because a significant portion of the very wealthy were Jewish, their organizations and synagogues had strong financial support and considerable political influence. Moreover, they benefited from a significant and consistent flow of aid from Israel and the North American diaspora.

Although the number of church, mosque, and synagogue members had burgeoned, it did not mean that the majority of Ukrainians were regular practitioners. Only about 5 million could be considered as belonging to this category. Most were vaguely religious and practiced religious rites during major religious holidays, without paying much attention to the ecclesiastical adherence of the church they attended. Indeed, unlike their neighbours in Russia, Ukrainians exhibited a great degree of religious tolerance. Moreover, for the most part they did not support – except in the western regions – the idea of having one dominant national church. The churches themselves, however, were not reticent about taking sides in non-religious matters, often urging their faithful to support one or another political cause. The adherents of the Moscow Patriarchate were notably energetic in this regard, especially when it came to advocating closer ties with Russia. Be that as it may, religious growth in Ukraine clearly reflected the fact that its inhabitants felt a need, based on old traditions or current needs, for spiritual solace.



By the first decade of the third millennium, despite frequent confrontations, self-serving obstructions, repeated delays, and numerous weaknesses, Ukraine reached the point of no return. Resuscitating the old Soviet order in any shape or form was no longer an option. Few even considered it seriously. Its many defects notwithstanding, as a large and increasingly important state, Ukraine entered a new era. Its economy, still in pressing need of reform, nevertheless showed great promise. And its inhabitants, while still relatively impoverished, were beginning to improve their lot. The characteristic features of the past – the inferiority complexes bred by domineering empires, the numerous and exploited villages, the crucial role of a tiny intelligentsia – were fading fast. They were replaced by an emerging middle class, large cities teeming with cars, computers that fostered a growing openness to the world, and an impatient, confident younger generation. Even though financial crisis

slowed the rise in the standard of living, most believed that sooner or later it would improve. Without a violent revolution taking place, the fundamental changes occurring in politics, the economy, and society were nothing short of revolutionary. A country long characterized by crippling abnormalities, Ukraine was gradually becoming normal, that is, more and more like other countries. It had become a full-fledged member of the global society.

Image Not Available

Ukrainian opposition presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko's supporters stand in front of the parliament in Kiev while the parliamentary session takes place inside, on Wednesday, 1 December 2004.

Image Not Available

Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators gather to protest alleged fraud in the presidential elections on the main square of the Ukrainian capital Kiev, 23 November 2004.

Notes

Introduction

- 1 S. Rudnytskyj, *Ukraine: Land und Volk* (Berlin: Soizuz Vyzvolennia Ukrainy, 1916), 27.
- 2 The term Trypillia derives from the village of the same name in the Kiev region where, in the final decade of the 19th century, V. Khvoiko discovered the archaeological remains of the civilization. See *Arkheologiiia Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1971) I: 149–205.
- 3 *Istoriia Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1979) I: 126.
- 4 T. Sulimirski, *The Sarmatians* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1972), 28.
- 5 G. Rawlinson, ed., *History of Herodotus* (New York: Appleton, 1882) III: 82.
- 6 Sulimirski, *The Sarmatians*, 32.

Chapter 1

- 1 S. Cross, ed. and trans., *The Russian Primary Chronicle* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930), 144–5.
- 2 O. Pritsak, *The Origin of Rus'* (Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1981), 8–33.
- 3 See R. Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime* (New York: Scribner's, 1974), 31.
- 4 M. Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, new edition (New York: Knyhospilka, 1954) I: 458.
- 5 *Ibid.*, I: 459.
- 6 N. Polonska-Vasylenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy* (Munich: Ukrainske Vydavnytstvo, 1972) I: 148.
- 7 S. Tomashivsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy: Starynni viky i seredni viky* (Munich: UVU, 1948), 72.

Chapter 2

- 1 G. Vernadsky and M. Karpovich, in their work *Kievan Russia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948) II: 102–5, estimate that the population of Kievan Rus' might have been 7.5 million. However, many Western scholars consider this figure to be too high.
- 2 M. Tikhomirov, *Drevnerusskie goroda* (Moscow: Vysha Shkola, 1950).
- 3 M. Pogodin, "Zapiska o drevenem iazike Russkom," *Izvestiia otd. russkogo iazika i slov. Akad. Nauk* (St Petersburg, 1856) V: 70–92.
- 4 For an English translation of Hrushevsky's famous article see "The Traditional Scheme of 'Russian' History and the Problem of a Rational Organization of the History of the Eastern Slavs," *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States* (henceforth: *Annals*) 2 (1952): 355–64.
- 5 V. Mavrodin, *Obrazovanie drevnerusskogo gosudarstva i formirovannii drevnerusskoi narodnosti* (Moscow: Vysha shkola, 1971).

Chapter 3

- 1 See Hrushevsky, "The Traditional Scheme," 357.
- 2 Tomashivsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy*, 78.
- 3 K. Sofronenko, *Obshchestvo-politicheskii stroi Galitsko-Volinskoi Rusi XI–XIII* (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1955), 36.
- 4 *The Lay of the Warfare Waged by Igor* (Moscow: Progress Press, 1981), 65.

Chapter 4

- 1 Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, IV: 98.
- 2 *Ibid.*, IV: 99.
- 3 Hrushevsky, "The Traditional Scheme," 358–60. This point is also forcefully argued by the Russian historian M. Liubavsky, *Ocherk istorii litovskogo-russkogo gosudarstva* (Moscow, 1910), 1–3.
- 4 See D. Doroshenko, *Narys Istorii Ukrainy* (Warsaw: Ukrainskyi Naukovyi Instytut, 1932), 104–5.

Chapter 5

- 1 See A. Jabłonowski, *Zródła Dziejowe* (Warsaw, 1889) XIX: 73. Soviet Ukrainian historians have challenged these figures as being far too low. They argue that Jabłonowski underestimated the size of the native population in order to make the Polish role in the colonization of the area appear more impressive. See A. Baranovich, "Naselenie predstepnoi Ukrainy v XVII v.," *Istoricheskie zapiski* 32 (1950): 198–232, and O. Kompan, "Do pyttannia pro zaselenist Ukrainy v XVII st.," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal* 1 (1960): 65–77.
- 2 The word *szlachta* derives from the German *Geschlecht* (family, lineage).

Chapter 6

- 1 Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, VI: 458.
- 2 H. Luzhnytsky, *Ukrainska tserkva mizh skhodom i zakhodom* (Philadelphia: Providence Association, 1954), 307.
- 3 Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, VI: 238.
- 4 I. Isaevych, *Bratstva ta ikh rol v rozvytku ukrainskoi kultury XVI–XVIII st.* (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1966), 153. Also see Polonska-Vasylenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy*, I: 399.

Chapter 7

- 1 I. Berezovsky, ed., *Istorychni pisni* (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1961), 63.
- 2 See J. Pelenski, "The Cossack Insurrections in Jewish-Ukrainian Relations," in P. Potichnyj and H. Aster, eds., *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988), 41. Estimates of Jews in the entire Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 17th century range from 70,000 to 480,000. See B. Weinryb, *The Jews of Poland: A Social and Economic History of the Jewish Community in Poland from 1100 to 1800* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1972), 193–4.
- 3 Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, VII: 302.
- 4 *Ibid.*, VII: 218.
- 5 *Ibid.*, VII: 538.
- 6 *Ibid.*, VII: 539.

Chapter 8

- 1 N. Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) I: 444.
- 2 I. Dzyra, ed., *Litopys Samovydtisia* ("Eye Witness Chronicle") (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1971), 52.
- 3 Estimates of Jews killed in the uprising have been greatly exaggerated in the historiography of the event. According to B. Weinryb, the total of losses reported in Jewish sources is 2.4 million to 3.3 million deaths, clearly a fantastic figure. Weinryb cites the calculations of S. Ettinger indicating that about 50,000 Jews lived in the area where the uprising occurred. See B. Weinryb, "The Hebrew Chronicles on Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Cossack-Polish War," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1 (1977): 153–77. While many of them were killed, Jewish losses did not reach the hair-raising figures that are often associated with the uprising. In the words of Weinryb (*The Jews of Poland*, 193–4), "The fragmentary information of the period – and to a great extent information from subsequent years, including reports of recovery – clearly indicate that the catastrophe may not have been as great as has been assumed."

- 4 Z. Wójcik, *Dzikie Pola w ogniu. O kozaczyźnie w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej*, 3rd rev. ed. (Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1968), 187.
- 5 The various interpretations of the Pereiaslav Agreement are summarized in J. Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1982).
- 6 *Ibid.*, 180.
- 7 See M. Braichevskiy, *Annexation or Reunification*, ed. and trans. by G. Kulchycky (Munich: Ukrainisches Institut für Bildungspolitik, 1974).
- 8 I. Kholmsky [I. Krypiakievych], *Istoriia Ukrainy* (New York–Munich: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1949), 208.
- 9 Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, IX (2): 1417.
- 10 Kholmsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy*, 216.

Chapter 9

- 1 S. Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii* (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Sotsialno-Ekonomichnoi Literatury, 1961) VI: 113.
- 2 Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, IX (2): 977.
- 3 *Ibid.*, 968.

Chapter 10

- 1 O. Ohloblyn, *Hetman Ivan Mazepa ta ioho doba* (New York: ODFFU, 1960), 135.
- 2 *Ibid.*, 176.
- 3 Letter of Pylyp Orlyk to Stefan Iavorsky in *Osnova* (St Petersburg) 1862 no.11, p. 5. The letter of Mazepa's chancellor, Pylyp Orlyk, is the most informative source available regarding Mazepa's decision to go over to the Swedes. For an English translation of this fascinating document, see O. Subtelny, *The Mazepists: Ukrainian Separatism in the Early 18th Century* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1981), 178–205.
- 4 Ohloblyn, *Mazepa*, 261.
- 5 Orlyk to Iavorsky, *Osnova*, 14.
- 6 B. Krupnytsky, *Hetman Danylo Apostol i ioho doba* (Augsburg: UVAN, 1948), 28.
- 7 *Ibid.*, 28.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 49.
- 9 Doroshenko, *Narys*, 423.
- 10 Z. Kohut, "The Abolition of Ukrainian Autonomy (1763–1786): A Case Study in the Integration of a Non-Russian Area into the Empire" (PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1975), 85.
- 11 B. Nolde, "Essays in Russian State Laws," *Annals* 4 (1955): 889–90.
- 12 Kohut, "Abolition of Ukrainian Autonomy," 111.
- 13 *Ibid.*, 110.
- 14 See T. Hunczak, *Russian Imperialism* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1974), ix.

- 15 See V. Golobutsky, *Zaporizka sich v ostanni chasy svoho isnuvannia, 1734–1775* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo Akademii Nauk URSR, 1961), 410.
- 16 V. Rich, trans., *Taras Shevchenko: Song out of Darkness* (London: Mitre Press, 1961), 11.

Chapter 11

- 1 E. Hobsbawn, *Bandits* (New York: Dell, 1969), 16.
- 2 D. Myshko, "Borotba trudiashchykh mas Pravoberezhnoi Ukrainy na peregodni Koliivshchyny," in *Koliivshchyna* (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1970), 47–8.
- 3 See D. Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography*, a special issue of the *Annals* 5–6 (1957): 48.
- 4 *Ibid.*, 49.

Chapter 12

- 1 See S. Pushkarev, *The Emergence of Modern Russia* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), 21.
- 2 D. Von Mohrenschildt, *Toward a United States of Russia* (Rutherford: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1981), 13.
- 3 Rich, *Song out of Darkness*, p. 71.
- 4 See N. Storozhenko, "K istorii malorossiiskikh kozakov v kontse XVIII i v nachale XIX vv.," *Kievskaiia starina* 11 (1897): 145.
- 5 V. Lypynsky, *Lysty do brativ-khliborobiv* (Vienna: Hermann, 1926), 418.
- 6 M. Slabchenko, *Materiialy do ekonomichno-sotsialnoi istorii Ukrainy XIX st.* (Odessa, 1925–27), 98.
- 7 F. Iastrebov, *Narysy z istorii Ukrainy* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo Akademii Nauk URSR, 1939), 106.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 107.
- 9 C. Macartney, *The House of Austria* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1978), 1.
- 10 I.L. Rudnytsky, "Observations on the Problem of 'Historical' and 'Non-Historical' Nations," *HUS* 5 (1981): 358–68.

Chapter 13

- 1 H. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1961), 429.
- 2 See D. Miller, "Ocherki iz istorii i iuridicheskogo byta staroi Malorossii: Prevrashchenie malorusskoi starshiny v dvorianstvo," *Kievskaiia starina* 1 (1897): 26.
- 3 O. Ohloblyn, ed., and V. Davydenko, trans., *Istoriia Rusiv* (New York: Visnyk, 1956), 134.

- 4 N. Kostomarov, *Autobiografiia: Literaturnoe nasledie* (St Petersburg: Stasiulevich, 1890), 28.
- 5 J. Herder, "Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769," *Herders Sämtliche Werke* (Berlin, 1878) iv: 402.
- 6 A. Mickiewicz, "Literatura slowian," *Dziela* (Warsaw, 1955) x: 109.
- 7 See G. Luckyj, *Between Gogol and Ševčenko* (Munich: Fink Verlag, 1971), 26.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 33–4.
- 9 H. Kohn, *Idea of Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1944), 432.
- 10 Hulak, quoted in Luckyj, *Between Gogol and Ševčenko*, 44.
- 11 Metlynsky, quoted in *ibid.*, 63.
- 12 Luckyj, *Between Gogol and Ševčenko*, 36.
- 13 *Ibid.*, 137.
- 14 W. Kirkconnell, trans., *The Poetical Works of Taras Shevchenko: The Kobzar* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), 62.
- 15 Rich, *Song out of Darkness*, 85.
- 16 *Ibid.*, 36.
- 17 Cited in Luckyj, *Between Gogol and Ševčenko*, 165.
- 18 G. Luciani, trans. and ed., *Le Livre de la Genèse du Peuple Ukrainien* (Paris: Institut D'Études Slaves, 1956), 140–2.
- 19 Luckyj, *Between Gogol and Ševčenko*, 186.
- 20 J. Kozik, *Ukraiński ruch narodowy w Galicji w latach 1830–1848* (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1973), 103.
- 21 *Ibid.*, 106.

Chapter 14

- 1 J. Kozik, *Między Reakcją a Rewolucją: Studia z Dziejów Ukraińskiego Ruchu Narodowego w Galicji w latach 1848–1849* (Warsaw: PWN, 1975), 37.
- 2 M. Bohachevsky-Chomiak, *The Spring of a Nation: The Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia in 1848* (Philadelphia: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1967), 44–5.
- 3 L. Bazyłow, *Dzieje Rosji, 1801–1917* (Warsaw: PWN, 1970), 207.
- 4 See *Revoliutsionnaia sytuatsiia v Rossii v 1859–1861 gg.* (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk SSR, 1960–72) vols 1–6.
- 5 A. Rieber, *The Politics of Autocracy: The Letters of Alexander II to Prince A.I. Bariatinskii, 1857–1864* (The Hague: Mouton, 1966), 94–7.
- 6 B. Pares, *History of Russia*, 3rd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1926), 341–66.

Chapter 15

- 1 W. Blackwell, *The Beginnings of Russian Industrialization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 26.
- 2 See I. Hurzhyi, *Ukraina v systemi vserosiiskoho rynku 60–90kh rokiv XIX st.* (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1968), 168–78.

- 3 See M. Iavorsky, *Ukraina v epokhu kapitalizmu* (Kiev: Derzhavne Vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, 1924).
- 4 R. Serbyn, ed., “Lénine et la question ukrainienne en 1914: le discours ‘séparatiste’ de Zurich,” *Pluriel*, no. 25 (1981): 83.
- 5 M. Volobuev, “Do problemy ukrainskoi ekonomiky,” in *Dokumenty ukrainskoho kommunizmu* (New York: Prolog, 1962), 132–250.
- 6 B. Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth Century Ukraine* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1985), 13.

Chapter 16

- 1 V. Antonovych, “Moia ispoved,” *Osnova* 1 (St Petersburg 1862): 85.
- 2 A. Voloshchenko, *Narysy z istorii suspilno-politychnoho rukhu na Ukraini* (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1974), 114–15.
- 3 See I. Krevetsky, “Ne bylo, net i byt ne mozhet!” *Literaturno-Naukovyi Visnyk* 26 (1906): 138–9. This notorious slogan was originally formulated by Colonel Gribovsky of the Kiev police. See F. Savchenko, *Zaborona Ukrainstva 1876 r.* (Kiev: Derzhavne Vydavnytstvo, 1930), reprinted in *Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 14 (1970), 186.
- 4 For a description of the membership of the Kiev branch see Savchenko, *Zaborona*, 97. Because the membership of the Kiev branch overlapped to a great extent with the Old Hromada, data about the former are a good indicator of who belonged to the latter. The membership of the Kiev branch included, in part, 21 professors, 8 members of scholarly societies, 41 high-level bureaucrats, 3 generals, 21 county and *zemstvo* officials, 10 landowners, 5 physicians, and 24 engineers and lower-level bureaucrats. The vast majority were from Kiev and the Kiev region, although the Poltava, Chernihiv, and Volhynia regions were also well represented.
- 5 Cited in Iu. Okhrymovych, *Rozvytok Ukrainskoi nationalno-politychnoi dumky* (Lviv: Novitnia Biblioteka, 1922), 71.
- 6 I.L. Rudnytsky, ed., *Mykhaylo Drahomanov: A Symposium and Selected Writings in Annals* 2 (1952): 115.
- 7 See V. Zhuchenko, *Sotsialno-ekonomichna prohrama revoliutsiinoho narodnytstva na Ukraini* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo Kievskoho Universytetu, 1969), 156.
- 8 *Ridnyi Krai*, no. 37, cited in Y. Boshyk, “The Rise of Ukrainian Political Parties in Russia, 1900–1907” (PhD dissertation, Oxford University, 1981), 366.
- 9 W. Serczyk, *Historia Ukrainy* (Wrocław: Ossolenium, 1979), 300.
- 10 In general, the reaction of the Russian intelligentsia to the Ukrainian movement was a combination of surprise, confusion, and hostility. Thus, the noted Russian historian and philosopher G. Fedotov wrote: “The awakening of the Ukraine, and especially the separatist character of the Ukrainian movement, surprised the Russian intelligentsia, and remained incomprehensible to it to the very end. We loved the Ukraine, its land, its people, its songs – and

considered all this our very own" (G. Fedotov, *Novyi grad* [New York: Izd. imeni Chekhova, 1952], 191). In his famous article "Obshcherusskaia kultura i ukrainski partikularizm" (*Russkaia mysl* [January 1912], 85), P. Struve wrote: "Should the intelligentsia's 'Ukrainian idea' ... strike the national soil and set it on fire ... [it will lead to] a gigantic and unprecedented schism of the Russian nation that, I firmly believe, will result in a veritable disaster for the [Russian] state and for the people."

11 V. Doroshenko, *Ukrainstvo v Rossii* (Vienna: SVU, 1917), 91.

Chapter 17

- 1 V. Budzinovsky, "Ahrarni vidnosyny Halychyny," *Zapysky Naukovoho Товариства im. Shevchenka* 4 (1894): 47.
- 2 I. Vydanovych, *Istoriia ukrainskoho kooperatyvnoho rukhu* (New York: TUK, 1964), 75. According to W. Najdus (*Skice z historii Galiciji* [Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1958] I: 71), in 1900 the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Galicia numbered about 10,000–12,000.
- 3 Ivan Franko, cited in *Istoriia selianstva* (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1967) I: 441.
- 4 S. Szczepanowski, *Nędza Galicji w cyfrach ...* (Lviv, 1888), 68.
- 5 Egan quoted in L. Rothkirchen, "Deep-Rooted Yet Alien: Some Aspects of the History of the Jews of Subcarpathian Ruthenia," *Yad Vashem Studies* 12 (Jerusalem, 1977): 163.
- 6 J. Perenyi, "Iz istorii zakarpatskich ukrajincev," *Studia Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungariae* 14 (Budapest, 1957): 136.
- 7 K. Levytsky, *Istoriia politychnoi dumky halytskykh ukraintsov, 1814–1914* (Lviv, 1926), 71.
- 8 M. Mykolaievych [M. Stakhiv], *Moskofilstvo. Ioho batky i dity* (Lviv: Hromadskiyi Holos, 1936), 45.
- 9 Levytsky, *Istoriia politychnoi dumky*, 105.
- 10 I.L. Rudnytsky, "Polish-Ukrainian Relations: The Burden of History," in P. Potichnyj, ed., *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980), 15.
- 11 Levytsky, *Istoriia politychnoi dumky*, 90.
- 12 *Ibid.*, 90.
- 13 Mykolaievych, *Moskofilstvo*, 52.
- 14 Drahomanov, cited in M. Yaremko, *Galicia* (New York: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1967), 151.
- 15 W. Feldman, *Stronnictwa i programy polityczne w Galicji, 1846–1906* (Cracow: Książka, 1907) II: 316.
- 16 F. Bujak, *Galicja* (Lviv: Altenberg, 1909–10) I: 94.

Chapter 18

- 1 Levytsky, *Istoriia politychnoi dumky*, 722.
- 2 Sazonov, quoted in Serczyk, *Historia Ukrainy*, 319.
- 3 T. Hunczak, ed., *The Ukraine, 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1977), 382. This volume contains translations into English of all four “universals.”
- 4 D. Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy 1917–1923 rr.* (Uzhhorod 1932; reprinted New York, 1954) I: 127.
- 5 *Ibid.*, 150.
- 6 N. Popov, *Ocherki kommunisticheskoi partii (Bolshevikov) Ukrainy*, 5th ed. (Kharkiv, 1933), 13.
- 7 B. Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and the Ukraine 1918–1953* (New York: Bookman, 1956), 25.
- 8 Cited in *ibid.*, 42.
- 9 R. Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism 1917–1923* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 68.
- 10 V. Lenin, “Kritichiskie zamitki po natsionalnomu voprosu,” *Sochineniia*, 4th ed. (Moscow: Politicheskaiia Literatura, 1941–50) XX: 16–17.
- 11 Pipes, *Formation*, 125.
- 12 O. Pidhainy, *The Formation of the Ukrainian Republic* (Toronto: New Review Books, 1966), 597.
- 13 J. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 142.
- 14 V. Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia natsii* (Vienna, 1920) I: 258.

Chapter 19

- 1 *Istoriia Ukrainiskoi RSR*, III: 355.
- 2 V. Lypynsky, *Lysty do brativ-khliborobiv* (Vienna, 1926), 755–80.
- 3 According to S. Baron, *The Russian Jews under the Tsars and the Soviets* (New York, 1964), 184, about 50,000 Jews died in the pogroms. J. Pelenski in his “The Cossack Insurrections in Jewish-Ukrainian Relations,” in P. Potichnyj and H. Aster, eds, *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988), 41, citing “reliable Jewish sources,” states that the Jewish fatalities numbered about 35,000. Of these, about 27,000 were killed by the Whites. Approximately 6000 Jews died at the hands of the anarchistic and largely Ukrainian partisan forces of Makhno, Zeleny, and Hryhoriiv. And between 1500 and 2000 Jews died in pogroms staged by Ukrainian military units.
- 4 P. Kenez, *Civil War in South Russia, 1917–1920*: (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977) II: 166. The Soviet historians I. Rybalka and V. Dovhopol briefly note that during their short stay in Ukraine, the Whites staged 400

pogroms. See their *Istoriia Ukrainiskoi RSR: Epokha Sotsializmu* (Kiev: Vyscha Shkola, 1982), 118.

- 5 For conflicting views on Petliura's responsibility for the pogroms, see T. Hunczak, "A Reappraisal of Simon Petliura and Jewish-Ukrainian Relations, 1917–1920," and Z. Szajkowski, "A Reappraisal of Simon Petliura and Ukrainian-Jewish Relations, 1917–1920: A Rebuttal," in *Jewish Social Studies* (July 1969): 163–213. B. Wolfe noted that, traditionally, Jews sided with "the Great-Russian culture as against the Ukrainian peasants and the handful of Ukrainian intellectuals who were striving to create a Ukrainian language and literature, and beginning to aspire to autonomy for their culture and their land ... Thus, almost unconsciously most of the Jews in the cities of Poland, Lithuania, and the Ukraine tended to become opponents of the national separation movements that arose during the breakup of the empire." See his *Three Who Made a Revolution* (New York: Dial, 1964), 182–3.
- 6 Hunczak, *The Ukraine, 1917–1920*, 182–3.
- 7 M. Lozynsky, *Halychyna v rr. 1918–1920* (Vienna: Institut sociologique ukrainien, 1922), 144.
- 8 Kenez, *Civil War*, 173.
- 9 See J. Borys, *The Sovietization of Soviet Ukraine 1917–1923*, rev. ed. (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980), 249–50.
- 10 Lenin, quoted in *ibid.*, 254.
- 11 See Borys, *Sovietization*, 256.
- 12 *Ibid.*, 257.
- 13 Trotsky, quoted in *ibid.*, 295.

Chapter 20

- 1 R. Serbyn argues that although the 1921 famine in Russia was caused by natural calamities, in Ukraine it was caused primarily by Soviet economic and political policies. See his "The Famine of 1921–1923: A Model for 1932–1933?" in R. Serbyn and B. Krawchenko, eds, *Famine in Ukraine, 1932–1933* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986), 147–78.
- 2 Lenin, *Sochineniia*, XXXIII: 335.
- 3 Kaganovich, quoted in Krawchenko, *Social Change*, 101.
- 4 Tolstoi, quoted in Krawchenko, *Social Change*, 92.
- 5 B. Antonenko-Davydovych, *Zemleiu ukrainskoiu* (Lviv, 1942; reprinted Philadelphia, 1955), 148.
- 6 See Mace, *Communism*, 42–3.
- 7 G. Lapchynsky, "Gomelskoe soveshchanie (vospominaniia)," *Letopis revoliutsii* (Kharkiv, 1926), 41.
- 8 See Iu. Lavrinenko, ed., *Rostriliane vidrodzhennia: Antolohiia 1917–1933* (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1959), 827–8.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 830–1.

- 10 See Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and the Ukraine*, 106.
- 11 *Ibid.*, 104.
- 12 *Ibid.*, 112.
- 13 See G. Luckyj, *Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, 1917–1934* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), 38.
- 14 Mace, *Communism*, 130.
- 15 See Lavrinenko, *Rostriliane vidrozhennia*, 789.

Chapter 21

- 1 N. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 494.
- 2 For an analysis of Stalin's views on the peasantry, see M. Lewin, *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968).
- 3 J. Stalin, *Sochineniia* (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1952–55) XIII: 40–1.
- 4 According to recent statements by semiofficial Soviet sources, during the 1930s about 5 million peasant families were deported to Siberia and a total of 17 million Soviet citizens passed through the gulags. See *Christian Science Monitor*, 16 June 1987.
- 5 See R. Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 143.
- 6 For a vivid description by a Communist activist of collectivization in Ukraine, see L. Kopelev, *The Education of a True Believer* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978).
- 7 *Pravda* 2 March 1930.
- 8 Stalin, *Sochineniia* XIII: 221.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 216–17.
- 10 Conquest, *Harvest of Sorrow*, 221–2.
- 11 P. Grigorenko, *The Grigorenko Memoirs* (New York: Norton, 1982), 36.
- 12 See Conquest, *Harvest of Sorrow*, 245.
- 13 V. Kravchenko, *I Chose Freedom* (New York, 1946), 118.
- 14 *Ibid.*, 130.
- 15 M. Maksudov in "Ukraine's Demographic Losses 1927–1938" in *Famine in Ukraine*, 27–44, argues that no less than 4.4 million people perished in Ukraine between 1927 and 1938. According to V. Kozlov, *Natsionalnosti SSSR: Etnodemograficheskii obzor* (Moscow, 1975), 249, in the period between 1926 and 1939, the population of Russia rose by 28% and that of Belorussia by 11.3%. During that same period the population of Ukraine dropped by 9.9%.
- 16 *The Five-Year Plan for Agricultural Construction*, 3rd ed. (Moscow 1930) III: 127.
- 17 V. Holubnychy, "The Causes of the Famine of 1932–1933," *Meta*, no. 2 (1979): 23.
- 18 Krawchenko, *Social Change*, 125

- 19 V. Grossman, *Forever Flowing* (New York, 1972), 148.
- 20 Stalin, *Collected Works*, VII: 71.
- 21 *Proletarska Pravda*, 22 January 1930, cited in D. Solovey, "On the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Great Man-Made Famine in Ukraine," *The Ukrainian Quarterly* 19 (1963): 7.
- 22 Recently Soviet authorities have begun to admit that the Famine of 1932–33 was largely the result of Stalin's policies. See, for example, the speech of V. Shcherbytsky in *Pravda Ukrainy*, 26 December 1987.
- 23 M. Carynnyk, L. Luciuk, and B. Kordan, eds, *The Foreign Office and the Famine: British Documents on Ukraine and the Great Famine of 1932–1933* (Kingston: Lime-stone Press, 1988), 397.
- 24 Conquest, *Harvest of Sorrow*, 321.
- 25 Kopelev, *The Education*, 277.
- 26 Postyshev, cited in Krawchenko, *Social Change*, 131.
- 27 Postyshev, quoted in Conquest, *Harvest of Sorrow*, 271–2.
- 28 Postyshev, cited in Krawchenko, *Social Change*, 145.
- 29 L. Trotsky, *The Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1939–1940* (New York, 1969), 72.
- 30 A. Ulam, *A History of Soviet Russia* (New York: Praeger, 1976), 130–1.
- 31 Cited in R. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 1917–1957* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 226.
- 32 Cited in *ibid.*, 229.
- 33 *Ibid.*, 229–30.
- 34 Cited in *ibid.*, 230.
- 35 Postyshev, cited in Krawchenko, *Social Change*, 147.

Chapter 22

- 1 J. Tazbir, ed., *Dzieje Polski* (Warsaw: PWN, 1976), 736.
- 2 M. Drozdowski, *Spółeczeństwo, Państwo, Politycy II Rzeczypospolitej* (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1972), 24.
- 3 A. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1980), 153.
- 4 *Ibid.*, 144.
- 5 I.L. Rudnytsky, *Mizh istorieiu i politykoiu* (New York: Suchasnist, 1973), 239.
- 6 A. Motyl, "Ukrainian Nationalist Political Violence in Inter-War Poland, 1921–1939," *East European Quarterly* 1 (1985): 53.

Chapter 23

- 1 M. Rudnytska, ed., *Zakhidna Ukraina pid Bolshevykamy* (New York: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1958), 454.
- 2 *Ibid.*, 456.

- 3 A. Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941–1944: A Study in Occupation Policies* (London: Macmillan, 1957), 107.
- 4 I. Kamenetsky, *Hitler's Occupation of Ukraine, 1941–1944: A Study of Totalitarian Imperialism* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1956), 35.
- 5 Dallin, *German Rule*, 67.
- 6 *Ibid.*, 123.
- 7 *Ibid.*, 127.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 141.
- 9 Quoted in E. Hesse, *Der sowjetrussische Partisanenkrieg 1941 bis 1944 im Spiegel deutscher Kampfanweisungen und Befehle* (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1969), 189.
- 10 Quoted in M. Cooper, *The Phantom War: The German Struggle against Soviet Partisans, 1941–1944* (London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1979), 25–6.
- 11 J. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939–1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), 172.
- 12 *Ibid.*, 156.
- 13 P. Potichnyj and Y. Shtendera, eds, *Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground 1943–1951* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986), 342.
- 14 A. Szczesniak and W. Szota, *Droga do nikąd* (Warsaw: Wojskowy Instytut Historyczny, 1973), 170.
- 15 N. Starozhilov, *Partizanskie soedinennia Ukrainy v Velikoi Otchestvennoi Voine* (Kiev: Vyshcha Shkola, 1983), 67.
- 16 V. Zamlynsky, "Ukrainskaadianska istoriohrafia pro partyzanskii rukh na Ukraini v roky Velykoi Vitchyzniano Viiny," *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal* 1 (1971): 133 argues that previous estimates of 220,000 Soviet partisans in Ukraine were too small and that actually the figure was about 500,000 with 1 million men in reserve. Meanwhile, the authoritative *Sovetskaia istoricheskaia entsiklopediia* (Moscow, 1967) x: 878 states that there were about 62,000 Soviet partisans in Ukraine.
- 17 Rybalka and Dovhopol, *Istoriia Ukrainskoi RSR*, 366.
- 18 *Borotba trudiashchyykh zakhidnykh oblastei URSR* (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1984), 200, and B. Ananiichuk, *Vyzvolennia zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainy* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo Kievskoho Universytetu, 1969), 121.
- 19 P. Pirogov, *Why I Escaped* (New York: Duell Sloan and Pearce, 1950), 232. Cited in Y. Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964), 10.

Chapter 24

- 1 Rybalka and Dovhopol, *Istoriia Ukrainskoi RSR*, 442.
- 2 Bilinsky, *Second Soviet Republic*, 282.
- 3 See A. Szczesniak and W. Szota, *Droga do nikąd*, and I. Blum, *Z dziejów Wojska*

Polskiego w latach 1945–1948 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Obrony Narodowej, 1960).

- 4 *Istoriia Ukrainskoi RSR*, VIII: 83.
- 5 Cited in D. Treadgold, *Twentieth Century Russia*, 4th ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1976), 442.
- 6 Cited in Bilinsky, *Second Soviet Republic*, 12.
- 7 See Ukraine: *A Concise Encyclopedia*, I: 896.
- 8 B. Lewytzkyj, *Die Sowjet Ukraine, 1944–1963* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1964), 70.

Chapter 25

- 1 B. Lewytzkyj, *Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine, 1953–1980* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1984), 5.
- 2 *Ibid.*, 5.
- 3 *Radianska Ukraina*, 7 December 1957.
- 4 *Robitnycha Hazeta*, 10 November 1962, quoted in Lewytzkyj, *Politics and Society*, 55.
- 5 Quoted in *ibid.*, 59.
- 6 *Komunist Ukrainy*, no. 6 (1963): 53.
- 7 Lewytzkyj, *Politics and Society*, 65.

Chapter 26

- 1 Krawchenko, *Social Change*, 251.
- 2 I. Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), 213.
- 3 A. Motyl, *Will the Non-Russians Rebel?* (Ithaca-London: Cornell University Press, 1987), 133–4.
- 4 Krawchenko, *Social Change*, 251–3 and W. Isajiw, "Urban Migration and Social Change in Contemporary Soviet Ukraine," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 1 (March 1980): 56–66.
- 5 I.L. Rudnytsky, "The Political Thought of Soviet Ukrainian Dissent," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, no. 6 (1981): 11.
- 6 D. Shumuk, *Za skhidnim obriem* (Paris-Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1974), 423–4.
- 7 Rudnytsky, "The Political Thought," 11.
- 8 Dziuba, *Internationalism*, 95.
- 9 Vasyl Stus (b. 1938), one of the most gifted Ukrainian poets of the 20th century, died in a Soviet gulag in 1986.
- 10 R. Szporluk, "Russians in Ukraine and Problems of Ukrainian Identity in the USSR," in P. Potichnyj, ed., *Ukraine in the Seventies* (Oakville, ON: Mosaic Press, 1975), 212.
- 11 V. Pokshishevsky, "Urbanization and Ethnographical Processes," *Soviet Geography*, no. 2 (1972): 119.

- 12 Ibid., 118–19.
- 13 See I. Koropecykj, ed., *The Ukraine within the USSR: An Economic Balance Sheet* (New York: Praeger, 1977), 11.
- 14 Ibid., 311.
- 15 Ibid., 54 and 263–4.
- 16 V. Bigulov, et al., “Materialnoe blagosostoianie i sotsialnoe blagopoluchie,” *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, no. 4 (1984): 92, quoted in Motyl, *Non-Russians*, 60.
- 17 *Literaturna Ukraina*, 12 March 1987.
- 18 Ibid.

Chapter 27

- 1 Iu. Bachynsky, *Ukrainska immigratsiia v zedynenykh derzhavakh Ameryky* (Lviv: Balytsky & Harasevych, 1914), 253.
- 2 P. Magocsi, *Our People: Carpatho-Rusyns and Their Descendants in North America* (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1984), 32.
- 3 M. Kuropas, *To Preserve a Heritage: The Story of Ukrainian Immigration in the United States* (New York: Ukrainian Museum, 1984), 9.
- 4 J. Petryshyn, *Peasants in a Promised Land: Canada and the Ukrainians 1891–1914* (Toronto: Lorimer, 1985), 21.
- 5 O. Martynowych and N. Kazymyra, “Political Activity in Western Canada 1896–1923,” in M. Lupul, ed., *A Heritage in Transition: Essays in the History of Ukrainians in Canada* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982), 89.

Chapter 29

- 1 *Ukrainian Weekly*, 24 November 1991.
- 2 *Financial Times*, 27 January 1993.
- 3 David Lane, *Soviet Society under Perestroika* (London and New York: Unwin Hyman, 1992), 172, and Susan Senior Nello, “The Food Situation in the Ex-Soviet Republics,” *Soviet Studies* 44 (1992): 857.
- 4 David Marples, *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, 4 October 1991.
- 5 *Svoboda*, 23 January 1993.
- 6 *Ukrainian Weekly*, 29 November 1992.

Chapter 30

- 1 Z. Brzezinski, “The Premature Partnership,” *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 2 (March–April 1994): 80.
- 2 T. Kuzio, “The Polish Opposition and the Ukrainian Question,” *JUS* 12, no. 2 (1987): 26.
- 3 B. Krawchenko, “From Commonwealth to Democracy: The Challenge of Public Service Reform in Ukraine,” *Ukraine–Canada Policy and Trade Monitor* 2 (1993): 33–40.

- 4 T. Kuzio, *Ukraine: State and Nation Building* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 17.
- 5 Ia. Dashkevych cited in A. Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), 83.
- 6 Ia. Hrytsak, "Ukraine: A Special Case of National Identity?" *Ukrainian Weekly*, 26 January 1992, 7.
- 7 T. Kuzio, *Ukraine*, 173.
- 8 T. Kuzio, R. Kravchuk, and P. D'Anieri, eds., *State and Institution Building in Ukraine* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1999), 234.
- 9 P. D'Anieri, R. Kravchuk, and T. Kuzio, *Politics and Society in Ukraine* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999), 166.
- 10 I. Marushkina and I. Tanchyn, "Stan doslidzhen suchasnoi politichnoi elity v Ukraini," *Studii Politolohichnoho Tsentru "Geneza"*, no. 2 (1995): 132–5.
- 11 S. Makeev and N. Kharchenko, "The Differentiation of Income and Consumption in Ukraine," *International Journal of Sociology* 29, no. 3 (1999): 22–3.
- 12 O. Malynovska, *Mihratsiina sytuatsiia ta mihratsiina polityka v Ukraini* (Kiev: Natsionalny Instytut Stratehichnykh Doslidzhen, 1997), appendix 3.
- 13 *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 7 April 2000, 1.
- 14 S. Pavlychko, "Progress on Hold: The Conservative Faces of Women in Ukraine," in M. Buckley, ed., *Post-Soviet Women: From the Baltic to Central Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 219–34.
- 15 A. Karatnycky, A. Motyl, and B. Shor, *Nations in Transit, 1997: Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997), 615.
- 16 D'Anieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio, *Politics and Society*, 71–89.

Chapter 31

- 1 See Taras Kuzio, ed., *Democratic Revolution in Ukraine: From Kuchmagate to Orange Revolution* (New York: Routledge, 2009).
- 2 For Ukraine's relations with the European Union and NATO, see Razumkov Center, *National Security and Defence*, no. 9 (2006), and no. 5 (2007).
- 3 *Unian*, 7 April 2008, 1.
- 4 For an overview of Ukrainian–Russian relations, see Razumkov Center, *National Security and Defence*, no. 5 (2006).
- 5 Razumkov Center, *National Security and Defence*, no. 10 (2007): 21 ff.
- 6 Vse-Ukrainskyi perepys naseleattia 2001 / English version. Also see Razumkov Center, *National Security and Defence*, no. 7 (2006): 4.
- 7 Razumkov Center, *National Security and Defence*, no. 9 (2007): 19.
- 8 USDA, Ukraine: Agricultural Overview, 16 December 2004.
- 9 Mark Resnicoff, "Ukraine's Middle Class," <http://www.suite101.com>, 17 July 2007, 1. Also see Razumkov Center, *National Security and Defence*, no. 7 (2008).
- 10 The World Bank, "Ukraine Poverty Assessment," <http://web.worldbank.org/>

WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/UKRAINEEXTN/o,,contentMDK:20810635~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:328533,00.html.

- 11 Jan Neutze and Adrian Karatnycky, "Corruption, Democracy and Investment in Ukraine," *Atlantic Council of the United States* (October 2007). See also *Nations in Transition: Ukraine* 2005.
- 12 See Olena Malynovska, "Caught between East and West, Ukraine Struggles with Its Migration Policy," *Migration Information Source*, January 2006.

This page intentionally left blank

Abbreviations

DP	Displaced Person
Cheka	Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-revolution, Speculation and Delinquency (Soviet political police)
CP(b)U	Communist Party (bolshevik) of Ukraine
CPU	Communist Party of Ukraine
FYP	Five-Year Plan
GUO	General Ukrainian Organization
KGB	Committee of State Security (Soviet political police)
Komsomol	Young Communist League
KPZU	Communist Party of Western Ukraine
MTS	Machine Tractor Station
MVD	Ministry of Internal Affairs
NEP	New Economic Policy
NKVD	People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Soviet political police)
OGPU	Unified State Political Administration (Soviet political police)
OUN	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
OUN-B	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Bandera faction)
OUN-M	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Melnyk faction)
RUP	Revolutionary Ukrainian party
SVU	Union for the Liberation of Ukraine
UAOC	Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church
UCC	Ukrainian Central Committee
UHVR	Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council
UNDO	Ukrainian National Democratic Union
UPA	Ukrainian Insurgent Army
UVO	Ukrainian Military Organization
UNR	Ukrainian National Republic
ZUNR	West Ukrainian National Republic

Glossary

<i>boyars</i>	nobles in the Kievan and subsequent periods
<i>chern</i>	term for lower classes, rabble in 16th–18th centuries
<i>chernozem</i>	fertile black-earth soil of Ukraine
<i>druzhyna</i>	retinue of fighting men of a prince during the Kievan period (pl. <i>druzhyny</i>)
<i>gymnazium</i>	secondary school, preparatory for university (pl. <i>gymnazia</i>)
<i>haidamak</i>	participant in spontaneous, popular uprisings against the Polish nobles in Right-Bank Ukraine in the 18th century (pl. <i>haidamaky</i>)
<i>hetman</i>	highest military, administrative, and judicial office among Ukrainian Cossacks
<i>hromada</i>	peasant commune or community; in the late 19th century, associations of Ukrainian intelligentsia
<i>kulak</i>	well-to-do peasant
<i>narod</i>	the people or peasant masses; in modern Ukrainian usage also means nation
<i>narodnyk</i>	populist in late 19th-century Russian Empire (pl. <i>narodnyky</i>)
<i>oblast</i>	major administrative unit in Soviet Ukraine
<i>Ostarbeiter</i>	forced laborers from Eastern Europe in Germany during the Second World War
<i>otaman</i>	Cossack leader in the 16th–18th centuries; partisan leader in Ukraine during the 1918–21 period (pl. <i>otamany</i>)
<i>rada</i>	council or assembly
<i>sejm</i>	Polish parliament
<i>sloboda</i>	free, uncolonized lands in Ukraine; temporary postponement of obligations for the use of uncolonized lands (pl. <i>slobody</i>)
<i>starosta</i>	local Polish official
<i>starshyna</i>	officer elite in Cossack Ukraine
<i>szlachta</i>	nobility of Poland-Lithuania

<i>wojewoda</i>	high Polish administrative and military official
<i>votchyna</i>	hereditary landholdings
<i>vozhd</i>	absolute, unlimited leader
<i>zemstvo</i>	institutions of local administration in late 19th-century Russian Empire (pl. <i>zemstva</i>)

ILLUSTRATION CREDITS

Sec. 1: Female statuette, Trypillian ceramic, Scythians in combat, Scythian binding, A reconstruction, Dancing couple (*Istoriia ukrainskoho mystetstva*, vol. 1 [Kiev, 1966]); Gravestones (Sovfoto); East Slavic idol (Novosti Press Agency); A reconstruction (*Krizivky: Kiev v obrazotvorchomu mystetstvi* [Kiev, 1982]); Christianization (R. Wallace, *Rise of Russia* [New York, 1967]); Mosaic from St Sophia [2] (*Sofia Kievka* [Kiev, 1971]). Sec. 2: Cossack camp (*Istoriia Ukrainkoi RSR*, vol. 1 [Kiev, 1979]); Church fortress, Khmelnytsky (private collection); Zaporozhians dancing, Four inhabitants (A. Rigelman, *Letopisnoe povestvovanie o Maloi Rossii* [Kiev, 1847]); Lviv in 17th c. (*Istoriia ukrainskoho mystetstva*, vol. 2 [Kiev, 1967]); Battle of Poltava (*Poltavaska bitva* [Kiev, 1960]); Zaporozhians writing (*Repin* [Moscow, 1970]); Students of Kiev, Title page (*Krizivky*); Church on Left Bank (*Istoriia ukrainskoho mystetstva*, vol. 3 [Kiev, 1968]). Sec. 3: In search of work, Marketplace in Lviv, Opera house (*Istoriia ukrainskoho mystetstva*, vol. 4 [Kiev, 1969]); Village wedding (*Ukrainske naraodne vesillia* [Kiev, 1970]); West Ukrainian (Forum); Ukrainian peasant women (unavailable); The proletariat (*Ukrainska RSR v period hromadianskoi viiny*, vol. 1 [Kiev, 1970]); Ivan Kotliarevsky, Antonovych, Shevchenko (private collection); Drahomanov, Ukrainka (*Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 1 [Toronto, 1984]). Sec. 4: Hrushevsky (*Encyclopedia of Ukraine* vol. 1); Skoropadsky, Petrushevych, Petliura, Metropolitan Andrei, Peasants on pilgrimage (private collection); Skrypnyk, Greycoat Division (*Ukrainska RSR v period hromadianskoi viiny*); Kiev during proclamation (*Encyclopedia of Ukraine* vol. 2); Bolshevik troops (*Ukrainska RSR* vol. 2); Bolshevik officers, Propagandists (not available); Nestor Makhno (M. Palij, *Anarchism of Nestor Makhno* [Seattle, 1976]); Construction on Dnieper, Destruction of a church (J. Carmichael, *An Illustrated History of Russia* [New York, 1960]); Dead and dying peasants (*Famine in the Soviet Ukraine 1932–1933* [Cambridge, MA, 1986]); Evhen Konovalets (V. Martynets, *Vid uvo do OUN* [n.p. 1949]). Sec. 5: Ukrainians welcoming (B. Shub and B. Quint, *Since Stalin* [New York, 1951]); Identifying victims, Andrii Melnyk, Stepan Bandera, V. Kubijovyc, Nazis executing (original source: Bundesarchiv, Koblenz) (Y. Boshyk, ed. *Ukraine During World War II* [Edmonton, 1986]); Ukrainian Ostarbeiter (*Istoriia Ukrainkoi RSR*, vol. 7 [Kiev, 1977]); Roman Shukhevych, UPA unit (*Litopys UPA*); Sydir Kovpak, Soviet troops (*The Great Patriotic War* [Moscow, 1976]); Identifying victims (D. Baltermants, *Izvestiia*); Kaganovich and Khrushchev (not available); Brezhnev and Scherbytsky (Kiev [Kiev, 1975]); Aged female, Schoolgirls, Ukrainian immigrants, Members of banned, A meeting, Statue of (private collection). Sec. 6: Student protesters (Serhii Siryi); Map 30, The Ukrainian flag, Roman Popadiuk, Donetsk miners (*Ukrainian Weekly*); Levko Lukianenko (Pavel Pashchenko); Voting in the referendum (Chrystyna Lapychak, *Ukrainian Weekly*); Cadets in Kiev, Speakers during the Rukh congress (Marta Kolomayets, *Ukrainian Weekly*); A scene reflecting circumstances for the elderly (Evhen Lukatsky). Sec. 8: Ukrainian opposition and Hundreds and thousands (AP/Wide World Photos [Efrem Lukatsky])

This page intentionally left blank

Selected Readings in English

ABBREVIATIONS OF PERIODICALS

<i>Annals</i>	<i>The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the USA</i>
CASS	<i>Canadian American Slavic Studies</i>
CSP	<i>Canadian Slavonic Papers</i>
EEQ	<i>East European Quarterly</i>
HUS	<i>Harvard Ukrainian Studies</i>
JGO	<i>Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas</i>
JUS	<i>Journal of Ukrainian Studies</i> (formerly <i>Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies</i>)
NP	<i>Nationalities Papers</i>
PR	<i>Polish Review</i>
RR	<i>Russian Review</i>
SEER	<i>Slavonic and East European Review</i>
SR	<i>Slavic Review</i>
SS	<i>Soviet Studies</i>
SU	<i>Studia Ucrainica</i>
UI	<i>Ukrainskyi Istoryk</i>
UQ	<i>Ukrainian Quarterly</i>
UR	<i>Ukrainian Review</i>

Reference Works

Encyclopedias

- Kubijovyč, V., ed. *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*. 2 vols. Toronto, 1963–71
– *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*. Vols 1–2 (A–K). Toronto, 1984, 1988
Soviet Ukraine. Kiev, 1969

Bibliographies and Other Reference Works

- American Bibliography of Russian and East European Studies*. Bloomington. Published annually since 1957
- Doroshenko, D., and O. Ohloblyn. *A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography*. Special issue of *Annals*. New York, 1957
- Magocsi, P. *Galicja: A Historical Survey and Bibliographic Guide*. Toronto, 1983
- Magocsi, P., and G. Matthews. *Ukraine: A Historical Atlas*. Toronto, 1985
- Mirchuk, I., ed. *Ukraine and Its People: A Handbook of Maps, Statistical Tables and Diagrams*. Munich, 1949
- Pelenskyj, E. *Ucrainica: Selected Bibliography on Ukraine in West European Languages*. Munich, 1948
- Weres, R. *The Ukraine: Selected References in the English Language*. Kalamazoo, MI, 1961
- Wynar, B. "Doctoral Dissertations on Ukrainian Topics in English." *UI* 6 (1979): 108–27

General Histories

- Allen, W. *The Ukraine: A History*. Cambridge, 1940
- Chamberlin, W. *The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation*. New York, 1944
- Chirovsky, N. *An Introduction to Ukrainian History*. 3 vols. New York, 1981–86
- Doroshenko, D. *A Survey of Ukrainian History*. Winnipeg, 1939. Updated by O. Gerus, 1975
- Hrushevsky, M. *A History of Ukraine*. New Haven, 1941
- Manning, C. *The Story of the Ukraine*. New York, 1957
- Nahayevsky, I. *History of Ukraine*. Philadelphia, 1962
- Szporluk, R. *Ukraine: A Brief History*. Detroit, 1979

Collected Essays

- Andrijijsyn, J., ed. *Millennium of Christianity in Ukraine*. Ottawa, 1987
- Potichnyj, P., ed. *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present*. Edmonton, 1980
- Potichnyj, P., and H. Aster., eds. *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*. Edmonton, 1988
- Potichnyj, P., et al, eds. *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*. Edmonton, 1992
- Pritsak, O., I. Ševčenko, and J. Labunka, eds. *Essays Commemorating the Millennium of Christianity in Rus'-Ukraine*. Special issue. *HUS* 12 (1988)
- Rudnytsky, I.L. *Rethinking Ukrainian History*. Edmonton, 1981

Readings and Anthologies

- Chirovsky, N., ed. *On the Historical Beginnings of Eastern Slavic Europe*. New York, 1976
- Gerus, O., ed. *Readings in Ukrainian History, 1687–1984*. Edmonton, forthcoming

- Pushkarev, S., comp. *A Source Book for Russian History from Early Times to 1917*. Vol. 1. New Haven and London, 1972
- Sichinsky, V., ed. *Ukraine in Foreign Comments and Descriptions from the 6th to the 20th Centuries*. New York, 1953
- Subtelny, O., and I.L. Rudnytsky, eds. *Essays in Ukrainian History*. Edmonton, forthcoming

General Works in Related Fields

- Chyzhevsky, D. *A History of Ukrainian Literature from the 11th to the End of the 19th Centuries*. Littleton, 1975
- Ilarion, Metropolitan. *The Ukrainian Church: Outline of the History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church*. Winnipeg, 1986
- Kononenko, K. *Ukraine and Russia: A History of the Economic Relations between Ukraine and Russia, 1654-1917*. Milwaukee, 1958
- Koropecyji, I., ed. *Ukrainian Economic History: Interpretative Essays*. Cambridge, MA, 1991
- Rudnitsky, S. *Ukraine: The Land and Its People: An Introduction to Its Geography*. New York, 1918
- Wasovsky, I. *Outline History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church*. 3 vols. New York, 1956

From Earliest Times to 1350

Sources

- Cross, S., trans. *The Russian Primary Chronicle*. Cambridge, MA, 1930
- Heppell, M., trans. *The "Paterik" of the Kievan Caves Monastery*. Cambridge, MA, 1988
- Hollingsworth, P., trans. *The Hagiography of Medieval Rus'*. Cambridge, MA, 1988
- Nabokov, V., trans. *The Song of Igor's Campaign*. New York, 1960
- Perfucky, G., trans. *The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle*. Munich, 1973

Historiography

- Chubaty, N. "Kievan Christianity Misinterpreted." *UI* 9 (1972): 100-9
- Horak, S. "Periodization and Terminology of the History of the Eastern Slavs: Observations and Analyses." *SR* 31 (1972): 853-62
- Miller, D. "The Kievan Principality on the Eve of the Mongol Invasion: An Inquiry into Current Historical Research and Interpretation." *HUS* 10 (1986): 215-40
- Polonska-Vasylenko, N. *Two Conceptions of the History of Ukraine and Russia*. London, 1968
- Sashkolskii, I. "Recent Developments in the Normanist Controversy." *Varangian*

- Problems. Scando-Slavica. Suppl. 1* (Copenhagen, 1970): 21–38
- Sulimirski, T. "Late Bronze Age and Earliest Iron Age in the USSR. A Guide to Recent Literature on the Subject." *Bulletin of the Institute of Archaeology in London* 8–9 (1968–69): 117–50
- Wynar, L. "Michael Hrushevsky's Scheme of Ukrainian History in the Context of the Study of Russian Colonialism and Imperialism." In M. Pap, ed., *Russian Empire, 19–40*. Cleveland, 1985

Studies

- Andrusiak, N. "The Kings of Kiev and Galicia." *SEER* 33 (1954): 342–50
- Blum, J. "The Beginnings of Large-Scale Private Landownership in Russia." *Speculum* 28 (1953): 776–90
- *Lord and Peasant in Russia: From the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century*. Princeton, 1961
- Boba, I. *Nomads, Northmen and Slavs: Eastern Europe in the 9th Century*. Wiesbaden, 1967
- Bratzkus, J. "The Khazar Origin of Ancient Kiev." *SEER* 22 (1944): 108–24
- Czekanowski, J. "The Ancient Home of the Slavs." *SEER* 24 (1946–47): 356–72
- Dimnik, M. "The Struggle for Control over Kiev in 1235 and 1236." *CSP* 21 (1979): 28–44
- *Mikhail, Prince of Chernigov and Grand Prince of Kiev 1224–1246*. Toronto, 1981
- Dunlop, D. *The History of the Jewish Khazars*. Princeton, 1954
- Dvornik, F. "Byzantine Political Ideas in Kievan Russia." *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 9–10 (1956): 73–121
- *The Slavs in European History and Civilization*. New Brunswick, NJ, 1962
- *Byzantine Missions among the Slavs: Sts. Constantine and Methodius*. New Brunswick, NJ, 1970
- Ericson, K. "The Earliest Conversion of the Rus' to Christianity." *SR* 44 (1966): 98–121
- Fedotov, G. *The Russian Religious Mind: Kievan Christianity: The Tenth to Thirteenth Centuries*. Cambridge, 1946
- Fennell, J. "The Tatar Invasion of 1223." *Forschungen zur Osteuropaischen Geschichte* 27 (1980): 18–31
- Gimbutas, M. *Bronze Age Culture in Central and Eastern Europe*. Paris and London, 1965
- Grekov, B. *Culture of Kievan Rus'*. Moscow, 1947
- Halpern, C. "The Concept of the *Ruskaia Zemlia* and Medieval National Consciousness from the Tenth to the Fifteenth Centuries." *NP* 8 (1980): 75–94
- *Russia and the Golden Horde*. London, 1985
- Hanak, W. "Some Conflicting Aspects of Byzantine and Varangian Political and Religious Thought in Early Kievan Russia." *Byzantinoslavica* 37 (1976): 46–55
- Kaiser, D. *The Growth of the Law in Medieval Russia*. Princeton, 1980

- Klein, R. *Ice-Age Hunters of the Ukraine*. Chicago, 1973
- Knysh, G. "Eastern Slavs and the Christian Millennium of 1988." *SU* 3 (1986): 13–35
- Kordysh, N. "Stone Age Dwellings in the Ukraine." *Archeology* 6 (1953): 167–73
– "Settlement Plans of the Trypillian Culture." *Annals* 3 (1953): 535–52
- Langer, L. "The Medieval Russian Town." In M. Hamm, ed., *The City in Russian History*, 11–33. Lexington, KY, 1976
- Luciw, J. *Sviatoslav the Conqueror*. State College, PA, 1986
- Obolensky, D. "Russia's Byzantine Heritage." *Oxford Slavonic Papers* 1 (1950): 37–63
- Pasternak, Y. "The Trypillian Culture in Ukraine." *UQ* 6 (1950): 122–33
– "Peremyshl of the Chronicles and the Territory of the White Croats." *Proceedings of the Shevchenko Scientific Society* 2 (1957): 36–9
- Paszkiwicz, H. *The Origins of Russia*. New York, 1954
- Polonska-Vasylenko, N. *Ukraine-Rus' and Western Europe in the 10–13th Centuries*. London, 1964
- Poppe, A. "The Political Background to the Baptism of Rus': Byzantine-Russian Relations between 986–989." *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 30 (1976): 197–244
– "The Original Status of the Old-Russian Church." *Acta Poloniae Historica* 39 (1979): 5–45
– *The Rise of Christian Russia*. London, 1982
- Pritsak, O. "The Invitation to the Varangians." *HUS* 1 (1977): 7–22
– "Oleg the Seer and Oleg the 'Grand Prince of Rus'." In *Festschrift for Oleksander Ohloblyn*, 389–99. New York, 1977
– *The Origin of Rus'*. Cambridge, MA, 1981
– "When and Where Was Olga Baptized?" *HUS* 9 (1985): 5–24
- Rice, T. *The Scythians*. London, 1957
- Rostovtzeff, M. *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia*. Oxford, 1922
- Ševčenko, I. "The Christianization of Kievan Rus'." *PR* 5 (1960): 29–35
– "Byzantium and the Slavs." *HUS* 7 (1984): 289–303
– "The Many Worlds of Petro Mohyla." *HUS* 8 (1984): 9–44
– *Byzantium and the Slavs*. Cambridge, MA, 1988
- Stokes, A. "The Balkan Campaign of Svjatoslav Igorevich." *SEER* 40 (1962): 466–96
- Sulimirski, T. *The Sarmatians*. London, 1970
- Tikhomirov, M. *The Towns of Ancient Rus'*. Moscow, 1959
- Vasiliev, V. *The Russian Attack on Constantinople in 860*. Cambridge, 1946
- Vernadsky, G. "The Status of the Russian Church during the First Half-Century Following Vladimir's Conversion." *SEER* 20 (1941): 294–314
– *Kievan Russia*. New Haven, 1948
– "The Problem of Early Russian Campaigns in the Black Sea Area." *SR* 8 (1949): 1–9
– "The Royal Serfs (*servi regales*) of the 'Ruthenian Law' and Their Origin." *Speculum* 24 (1951): 255–64

- *The Mongols and Russia*. New Haven, 1953
- *The Origins of Russia*. New Haven, 1959
- Voyce, A. *The Art and Architecture of Medieval Russia*. Norman, OK, 1967
- Zernov, N. "Vladimir and the Origin of the Russian Church." *SEER* 28 (1949-50): 123-38, 425-38
- Zguta, R. "Kievan Coinage." *SEER* 53 (1975): 483-92
- Zhdan, M. "The Dependence of Halych-Volyn Rus' on the Golden Horde." *SEER* 35 (1956-57): 505-23

From 1350 to 1800

Sources

- Borschak, E. "Pylyp Orlyk's Devolution of Ukraine's Rights." *Annals* 6 (1958): 1296-1312
- Hannover, N. *Abyss of Despair. The Famous 17th Century Chronicle Depicting Jewish Life during the Chmielnicki Massacres of 1648-49*. New York, 1950
- Levy, A. "The Contribution of the Zaporozhian Cossacks to Ottoman Military Reform: Documents and Notes." *HUS* 6 (1982): 372-413
- Mackiw, T. *English Reports on Mazepa, 1687-1709*. New York, 1983
- Perfecky, G. "Mazepa's Speech to His Countrymen." *JUS* 6 (1981): 66-72
- Pernal, A. "Six Unpublished Letters of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, 1656-1657." *HUS* 6 (1982): 217-32
- Struminsky, B. *Psuedo-Meleško: A Ukrainian Apochryphal Parliamentary Speech of 1615-1618*. Cambridge, MA, 1984
- *The Defense of Church Unity in 1617 and Zakhariia Kopystensky's 'Palenodiia.'* Cambridge, MA, 1988
- Subtelny, O. *Letters of Ivan Mazepa to Adam Sieniawski, 1704-1708*. New York, 1975
- "The Letter of Pylyp Orlyk to Stefan Iavorsky." In his *The Mazepists: Ukrainian Separatism in the 18th Century*, 178-205. Boulder, CO, 1981
- Sysyn, F. "Documents of Bohdan Xmelnyckyj." *HUS* 2 (1978): 500-24
- Wynar, L., and O. Subtelny. *Habsburgs and Zaporozhian Cossacks: The Diary of Erich Lassota von Steblau, 1594*. Boulder, CO, 1975

Historiography

- Basarab, J. *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study*. Edmonton, 1982
- Braichevsky, M. *Annexation or Reunification: Critical Notes on One Conception*. Trans. and ed. by G. Kulchycky. Munich, 1974
- Fedenko, P. "Hetman Mazepa in Soviet Historiography." *UR* 9 (1960): 6-18
- Kohut, Z. "Myths Old and New: The Haidamak Movement and the Koliivshchyna (1768) in Recent Historiography." *HUS* 1 (1977): 359-78

- Krupnytsky, B. "Mazepa and Soviet Historiography." *UR* 3 (1956): 49–53
- Reshetar, J. "The Significance of the Soviet Tercentenary of the Pereyaslav Treaty." *Annals* 4 (1954): 981–94

Studies

- Andrusyshen, C. "Skovoroda, the Seeker of the Genuine Man." *UQ* 2 (1946): 317–30
- Babinskii, H. *The Mazeppa Legend in European Romanticism*. New York, 1974
- Backus, O. *The Motives of West Russian Nobles in Deserting Lithuania for Moscow, 1377–1514*. Lawrence, OK, 1957
- "The Problem of Feudalism in Lithuania, 1506–1548." *SR* 21 (1962): 635–59
- Baran, A. "The Kievan Mohyla-Mazepa Academy and the Zaporozhian Cossacks." *UI* 12 (1975): 70–5
- "Shahin Girai of the Crimea and the Zaporozhian Cossacks." In *Jubilee Collection of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences in Canada*, 15–35. Winnipeg, 1976
- Baran, A., and G. Gajeky. *The Cossacks in the Thirty Years War*. 2 vols. Rome, 1969–83
- Bartlett, R. *Human Capital: The Settlement of Foreigners in Russia, 1762–1804*. Cambridge, 1979
- Bida, C. "Early Eastern Slavic Primers." *SU* 1 (1978): 65–74
- Borschak, E. "Early Relations between England and Ukraine." *SEER* 10 (1931–32): 138–60
- "A Little Known French Biography of Yuras' Khmelnytsky." *Annals* 3 (1953): 509–17
- *Hryhor Orlyk, France's Cossack General*. Toronto, 1956
- Chirovsky, N. "Economic Aspects of the Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaty of 1654." *UQ* 10 (1954): 85–92
- Chubatyy (Czubatyj), N. "Mazepa's Champions in the 'Secret du Roi' of Louis XV, King of France." *UQ* 5 (1949): 37–51
- "Moscow and the Ukrainian Church after 1654." *UQ* 10 (1954): 60–70
- "Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Ruler of Ukraine." *UQ* 13 (1957): 197–211
- *Old Ukraine: Its Socio-Economic History Prior to 1781*. Madison, 1963
- Chynczewska-Hennel, T. "National Consciousness of Ukrainian Nobles and Cossacks from the End of the Sixteenth to the Mid-Seventeenth Century." *HUS* 10 (1986): 377–92
- Chyzhevsky, D. "Ivan Vyshenskyj." *Annals* 1 (1951): 113–26
- Collins, L. "The Military Organization and Tactics of the Crimean Tatars during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries." In V. Parry and M. Yapp, eds, *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*. Oxford, 1975
- Cracraft, J. "Prokopovyč's Kiev Period Reconsidered." *HUS* 2 (1978): 158–83
- Doroshenko, D. "Ukrainian Chronicles of the 17th and 18th Centuries." *Annals* 1 (1951): 79–87

- Egerton, W. "Laying a Legend to Rest: The Poet Kapnist and Ukraino-German Intrigue." *SR* 30 (1971): 551-60
- Fisher, A. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, 1978
- Frick, D. "Meletij Smotryckyj and the Ruthenian Question in the Early Seventeenth Century." *HUS* 8 (1984): 351-75
- "Meletij Smotryckyj and the Ruthenian Language Question." *HUS* 9 (1985): 25-52
- Friedman, P. "The First Millennium of Jewish Settlement in the Ukraine and the Adjacent Areas." *Annals* 7 (1959): 1483-1516
- Gajecy, G. "Cossack General Staff Officers." In *Jubilee Collection of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Science*, 36-61. Winnipeg, 1976
- *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*. 2 vols. Cambridge, MA, 1978
- Goldblatt, H. "Orthodox Slavic Heritage and National Consciousness: Aspects of East Slavic and South Slavic National Revivals." *HUS* 10 (1986): 336-54
- Gordon, L. *Cossack Rebellions: Social Turmoil in Sixteenth-Century Ukraine*. Albany, 1983
- Grabowicz, G. "Three Perspectives on the Cossack Past: Gogol, Ševčenko and Kuliš." *HUS* 5 (1981): 179-94
- Graham, H. "Peter Mogila – Metropolitan of Kiev." *RR* 19 (1955): 345-56
- "Theofan Prokopovich and the Ecclesiastical Ordinance." *Church History* 25 (1956): 127-35
- Halecki, O. "Ukraine, Poland and Sweden in the Time of Ivan Mazepa." *UQ* 15 (1959): 128-32
- Horak, S. "The Kiev Academy: A Bridge to Europe in the 17th Century." *EEQ* 2 (1968): 117-37
- Hunczak, T. "The Politics of Religion: The Union of Brest 1596." *UI* 2-4 (1972): 97-106
- Huttenbach, H. "The Ukraine and Muscovite Expansion." In T. Hunczak, ed., *Russian Imperialism*, 131-66. New Brunswick, NJ, 1974
- Ivanytsky, S. "Did the Treaty of Pereiaslav Include a Protectorate?" *UQ* 10 (1954): 176-82
- Kaminski, A. "The Cossack Experiment in *Szlachta* Democracy in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: The Hadiach (Hadiacz) Union." *HUS* 1 (1977): 178-97
- Kentschynskyj, B. "The Political Struggle of Mazepa and Charles XII for Ukrainian Independence." *UQ* 15 (1959): 241-59
- The Kiev Mohyla Academy*. Special issue, *HUS* 8 (1984)
- Kohut, Z. "A Gentry Democracy within an Autocracy: The Politics of Hryhorii Poletyka (1723-1784)." *HUS* 3-4 (1979-80): 507-19
- "The Ukrainian Elite in the 18th Century and Its Integration into the Russian Nobility." In I. Banac and P. Bushkovitch, eds, *The Nobility in Russia and Eastern Europe*, 65-98. New Haven, 1985
- "The Development of a Little Russian Identity and Ukrainian Nation-building." *HUS* 10 (1986): 559-76

- *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s–1830s*. Cambridge, MA, 1988
- Kortschmaryk, F. *The Kievan Academy and Its Role in the Organization of Education in Russia at the Turn of the Seventeenth Century*. New York, 1976
- Krupnytsky, B. "The Mazeppists." *UQ* 4 (1948): 204–14
- "Federalism and the Russian Empire." *Annals* 2 (1952): 239–60
- "The Treaty of Pereiaslav and the Political Orientation of Bohdan Khmelnytsky." *UQ* 10 (1954): 32–40
- "The Swedish-Ukrainian Treaties of Alliance 1708–1709." *UQ* 12 (1956): 45–57
- "The General Characteristics of Pylyp Orlyk." *Annals* 5 (1958): 1247–59
- Kulchycky, G. "Three Attempts at Federation in 17th Century Eastern Europe." *NP* 9 (1981): 207–24
- Levin, P., and F. Sysyn. "The Antimaxia of 1632 and the Polemic over Uniate-Orthodox Relations." *HUS* 9 (1985): 145–65
- Levytsky, O. "Socinianism in Poland and South-West Rus'." *Annals* 3 (1953): 485–508
- Lewitter, L. "Poland, Ukraine and Russia in the 17th Century." *SEER* 27 (1948): 157–71
- Lypynsky, V. "The Ukraine at the Turning Point." *Annals* 3 (1953): 605–19
- Mackiw, T. *Prince Mazepa, Hetman of Ukraine*. Chicago, 1967
- "An Imperial Envoy to Hetman Khmelnytsky in 1657." *Annals* 12 (1969–72): 217–27
- Manning, C. *Ivan Mazepa, Hetman of Ukraine*. New York, 1957
- Medlin, W. "Cultural Crisis in Orthodox Rus' in the Late 16th and Early 17th Centuries as a Problem of Socio-Economic Change." In A. Bland, ed., *The Religious World of Russian Culture, 173–88*. The Hague, 1973
- Nadav, M. "The Jewish Community of Nemyriv in 1648." *HUS* 8 (1984): 376–95
- O'Brien, C. *Muscovy and Ukraine: From the Pereiaslav Agreement to the Truce of Andrusovo 1654–1667*. Berkeley, 1963
- Ohloblyn, O. "Western Europe and the Ukrainian Baroque." *Annals* 1 (1951): 127–37
- "Where Was the *Istoriia Rusov* Written?" *Annals* 3 (1953): 670–93
- "The Pereyaslav Treaty and Eastern Europe." *UQ* 10 (1954): 41–50
- *The Treaty of Pereyaslav 1654*. Toronto, 1954
- "Ukrainian Autonomists of the 1780s and 1790s and Count P.A. Rumyantsev." *Annals* 6 (1958): 1313–26
- Pelenski, J. "The Incorporation of the Ukrainian Lands of Old Rus' into Crown Poland (1569)." In *American Contributions to the Seventh International Congress of Slavists*, 19–52. The Hague, 1973
- "The Haidamak Insurrections and the Old Regimes in Eastern Europe." In J. Pelenski, ed., *The American and European Revolutions, 1776–1848: Sociopolitical and Ideological Aspects*, 228–47. Iowa City, 1980
- Pernal, A. "The Expenditures of the Crown Treasury for Financing of Diplomacy between Poland and the Ukraine during the Reign of Jan Kazimierz." *HUS* 5 (1981): 102–20

- "The Initial Step Towards the Union of Hadiach." *CSP* 25 (1983): 284-300
- Polonska-Vasylenko, N. *The Settlement of Southern Ukraine (1750-1775)*. Special issue, *Annals* 4 (1955)
- Pritsak, O. "Kiev and All of Rus': The Fate of a Sacral Idea." *HUS* 10 (1986): 271-8
- Prokopovych, V. "The Problem of the Juridical Nature of Ukraine's Union with Muscovy." *Annals* 3 (1955): 917-80
- Rosman, M. *The Lords' Jews: Magnates and Jews in the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth during the 18th Century*. Cambridge, MA, 1988
- Scherer, S. "Skovoroda and Society." *UI* 8 (1971): 12-22
- "Beyond Morality: The Moral Teaching and Practice of H.S. Skovoroda, 1722-94." *UI* 18 (1981): 60-73
- Senioutovitch-Berezny, V. "The Creation of the Volhynian Nobility and Its Privileges." *Proceedings of the Shevchenko Scientific Society* 2 (1957): 44-6
- Serczyk, W. "The Commonwealth and the Cossacks in the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century." *HUS* 2 (1978): 73-93
- Šerech, J. (Shevelov, G.) "Stefan Yavorskyj and the Conflict of Ideologies in the Age of Peter I." *SEER* 30 (1951): 40-62
- "Feofan Prokopovych as Writer and Preacher in His Kievan Period." *Harvard Slavic Studies* 2 (1954): 211-23
- Ševčenko, I. "Byzantium and the Eastern Slavs after 1453." *HUS* 2 (1978): 5-25
- Subtelny, O. "From the Diary of Pylyp Orlyk." *UI* 6 (1971): 95-104
- "Peter I's Testament: A Reassessment." *SR* 33 (1974): 663-78
- "Great Power Politics in Eastern Europe and the Ukrainian Émigrés, 1709-1742." *CASS* 12 (1978): 136-53
- "Mazepa, Peter I and the Question of Treason." *HUS* 2 (1978): 158-83
- "Russian and the Ukraine: The Difference that Peter I Made." *RR* 39 (1980): 1-17
- *The Mazepists: Ukrainian Separatism in the 18th Century*. Boulder, CO, 1981
- *Domination of Eastern Europe: Native Nobilities and Foreign Absolutism 1500-1715*. Montreal, 1986
- Sydorenko, A. *The Kievan Academy in the Seventeenth Century*. Ottawa, 1977
- Sysyn, F. "Adam Kysil and the Synods of 1629: An Attempt at Orthodox-Uniate Accommodation in the Reign of Sigismund III." *HUS* 3-4 (1979-80): 826-42
- "Seventeenth Century Views on the Causes of the Khmelnytskyi Uprisings: An Examination of the 'Discourse on the Present Cossack or Peasant War.'" *HUS* 4 (1980): 430-66
- *Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil 1600-1653*. Cambridge, MA, 1985
- "Concepts of Nationhood in Ukrainian Historical Writing, 1620-1690." *HUS* 10 (1986): 393-423
- Tazbir, J. "The Political Reversals of Jurij Nemyryč." *HUS* 5 (1981): 306-19
- Velychenko, S. "The Origins of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1648." *JUS* 1 (1976): 18-26

- "Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Rakoczis of Transylvania during the Polish Election of 1648." *JUS* 8 (1983): 3-12
- "The Ukrainian-Rus Lands in Eastern European Politics 1572-1632. Some Preliminary Observations." *EEQ* 19 (1985): 201-8
- "Cossack Ukraine and the Baltic Trade 1600-1648. Observations on an Unresolved Issue." In I. Koropeckyj, ed., *Integration Processes of the Ukrainian Economy: A Historical Perspective*. Cambridge, MA, 1988
- Vernadsky, G. *Bohdan, Hetman of Ukraine*. New Haven, 1941
- Weinryb, B. "The Hebrew Chronicles on Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and the Cossack-Polish War." *HUS* 1 (1977): 153-77
- Williams, G. "Protestants in the Ukraine during the Period of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth." *HUS* 2 (1978): 41-72, 184-210
- Wójcik, Z. "The Early Period of Pavlo Teterja's Hetmancy in the Right-Bank Ukraine (1661-1663)." *HUS* 3-4 (1979-80): 958-72
- Wolff, L. "Vatican Diplomacy and the Uniates of the Ukraine after the First Partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth." *HUS* 8 (1984): 396-425
- Wynar, L. *The History of Early Ukrainian Printing 1491-1600*. Denver, 1962
- "Ukrainian Cossacks and the Vatican in 1594." *UQ* 21 (1965): 64-78
- "Birth of Democracy on the Dnieper River: The Zaporozhian Kozakdom in the 16th Century." *UQ* 33 (1977): 41-9, 144-56
- Yakovliv, A. "Istoriia Rusov and Its Author." *Annals* 3 (1953): 620-69
- "Bohdan Khmelnytsky's Treaty with the Tsar of Muscovy in 1654." *Annals* 4 (1955): 904-16

From 1800 to 1914

Sources

- Hryhorijiv, N. *The War and Ukrainian Democracy. A Compilation of Documents from the Past and Present*. Toronto, 1945
- Kostomarov, M. *Books of Genesis of the Ukrainian People*. New York, 1954
- Serbyn, R. "In Defense of an Independent Ukrainian Socialist Movement: Three Letters from Serhii Podolynsky to Valerian Smirnov." *JUS* 7 (1982): 3-32

Historiography

- Velychenko, S. "Tsarist Censorship and Ukrainian Historiography, 1828-1904." *CASS*, forthcoming

Studies

- Agursky, M. "Ukrainian-Jewish Inter-marriages in Rural Areas of the Ukraine in the Nineteenth Century." *HUS* 9 (1985): 139-44
- Andrusiak, M. "The Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia." *SEER* 14 (1935): 163-75, 372-9

- Bilinsky, Y. "Mykhaylo Drahomanov, Ivan Franko and the Relations between Dnieper Ukraine and Galicia in the Last Quarter of the 19th Century." *Annals* 7 (1959): 1542-66
- Bohachevsky-Chomiak, M. *The Spring of a Nation: The Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia in 1848*. Philadelphia, 1967
- "The Ukrainian University in Galicia: A Pervasive Issue." *HUS* 5 (1981): 497-545
 - "Feminism in Ukrainian History." *JUS* 7 (1982): 16-30
- Brock, P. "Ivan Vahylevych (1811-1866) and the Ukrainian National Movement." *CSP* 14 (1972): 153-90
- Chyzhevsky, D. "The Influence of the Philosophy of Schelling (1775-1854) in the Ukraine." *Annals* 5 (1956): 1128-39
- Ciuciura, B. "Ukrainian Deputies in the Old Austrian Parliament 1861-1918." *Mitteilungen: Arbeits und Förderungsgemeinschaft der ukrainischen Wissenschaften* 14 (Munich, 1977): 38-56
- "Galicia and Bukovina as Austrian Crown Provinces: Ukrainian Experience in Representative Institutions 1861-1918." *SU* 2 (1984): 175-96
 - "Provincial Politics in the Habsburg Empire: The Case of Galicia and Bukovina." *NP* 13 (1985): 247-73
- Dmytryshyn, B. "Introduction." In F. Savčenko, *The Suppression of Ukrainian Activities*, v-xxxix. Munich, 1970
- Doroshenko, D. "The Uniate Church in Galicia, 1914-1917." *SEER* 12 (1933): 622-7
- "Mykhaylo Drahomanov and the Ukrainian National Movement." *SEER* 16 (1938): 654-66
- Elwood, R. *Russian Social Democracy in the Underground: A Study of the RSDRP in the Ukraine, 1907-1914*. Assen, 1974
- Flynn, J. "The Affair of Kostomarov's Dissertation: A Case Study of Official Nationalism in Practice." *SEER* 52 (1974): 188-96
- Gerus, O. "P.A. Stolypin and the Ukrainian School Question." *UI* 3-4 (1972): 121-6
- "The Ukrainian Question in the Russian Duma, 1906-1917." *SU* 2 (1984): 157-74
- Herlihy, P. "Odessa, Staple Trade and Urbanization in New Russia." *JGO* 21 (1974): 121-37
- "The Ethnic Composition of the City of Odessa in the Nineteenth Century." *HUS* 1 (1977): 53-78
 - "Death in Odessa: A Study of Population Movements in a Nineteenth-Century City." *Journal of Urban History* 4 (1978): 417-41
 - *Odessa, A History 1794-1914*. Cambridge, MA, 1986
- Himka, J-P. "Voluntary Artisan Associations and the Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia (the 1870s)." *HUS* 1 (1978): 235-50
- "Priests and Peasants: The Greek Catholic Pastor and the Ukrainian National Movement in Austria, 1867-1900." *CSP* 21 (1979): 1-14
 - "Hope in the Tsar: Displaced Naive Monarchism among Ukrainian Peasants of the Habsburg Empire." *Russian History* 7 (1980): 125-38
 - "Young Radicals and Independent Statehood: The Idea of a Ukrainian Nation-State, 1890-1895." *SR* 41 (1982): 219-35

- "The Background to Emigration: Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovyna, 1848-1914." In M. Lupul, ed., *A Heritage in Transition: Essays in the History of Ukrainians in Canada*, 11-31. Toronto, 1982
- *Socialism in Galicia: The Emergence of Polish Social Democracy and Ukrainian Radicalism, 1860-1890*. Cambridge, MA, 1983
- "Serfdom in Galicia." *JUS* 9 (1984): 3-28
- "The Greek Catholic Church and Nation-Building in Galicia, 1772-1918." *HUS* 8 (1984): 426-52
- *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century*. Edmonton, 1987
- Horak, S. "Alexander Herzen, Poles and Ukrainians: A Dilemma in Unity and Conflict." *EEQ* 17 (1983): 185-212
- Hryniuk, S. "Peasant Agriculture in East Galicia in the Late Nineteenth Century." *SEER* 63 (1985): 228-43
- "The Peasant and Alcohol in Eastern Galicia in the Late Nineteenth Century: A Note." *JUS* 11 (1986): 75-86
- *Peasants with Promise: Ukrainians in Southeastern Galicia, 1880-1900*. Edmonton, 1992
- Klier, J. "Kievljanin and the Jews: A Decade of Dissillusionment, 1864-1873." *HUS* 5 (1981): 83-101
- Kozik, J. *The Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia, 1815-1849*. Edmonton, 1986
- Krawchenko, B. "The Social Structure of Ukraine at the Turn of the 20th Century." *EEQ* 16 (1982): 171-81
- Luckyj, G. *Between Gogol and Ševčenko: Polarity in Literary Ukraine 1798-1847*. Munich, 1971
- *Panteleimon Kulish: A Sketch of His Life and Times*. Boulder, CO, 1983
- Luckyj, G., ed. *Shevchenko and the Critics*. Toronto, 1980
- Magocsi, P. "Old Ruthenianism and Russophilism." In P. Debreczeny, ed., *American Contributions to the Ninth Slavic Congress*, vol. II, 305-24. Columbus, OH, 1983
- Manning, C. "Gogol and Ukraine." *UQ* 4 (1950): 323-30
- Markovits, A., and F. Sysyn, eds. *Nation-building and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia*. Cambridge, MA, 1982
- Mirtschuk, J. "The Ukrainian Uniat Church." *SEER* 10 (1931): 377-85
- Mishkinsky, M. "The Attitude of the Southern-Russian Workers' Union to the Jews 1880-1881." *HUS* 6 (1982): 191-216
- Paneyko, B. "Galicia and the Polish-Ukrainian Problem." *SEER* 9 (1930-31): 567-87
- Papazian, P. "N. Kostomarov and the Cyril-Methodian Ideology." *RR* 29 (1970): 59-73
- Pipes, R. "Peter Struve and Ukrainian Nationalism." *HUS* 3-4 (1979-80): part 2, 675-83
- Pritsak, O. "The Pogroms of 1881." *HUS* 11 (1987): 8-43
- Pritsak, O., and J. Reshetar. "The Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building." In D. Treadgold, ed., *The Development of the USSR*, 236-67. Seattle and London, 1964

- Prymak, T. "Herzen on Poland and Ukraine." *JUS* 7 (1982): 31-40
 – "Hrushevsky's Constitutional Project of 1905." *NP*, forthcoming
- Revutsky, V. "The Act of Ems (1876) and Its Effect on Ukrainian Theatre." *NP* 5 (1977): 67-78
- Rudnytsky, I.L. "Mykhaylo Drahomanov as a Political Theorist." *Mykhaylo Drahomanov: A Symposium and Selected Writings*. Special issue, *Annals* 2 (1952): 70-130
 – "The Intellectual Origins of Modern Ukraine." *Annals* 6 (1958): 1381-1405
 – "The Role of the Ukraine in Modern History." In D. Treadgold, ed., *The Development of the USSR*, 211-28. Seattle and London, 1964
 – "The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule." *Austrian History Yearbook* 3 (1967): 394-429
 – "Mykhailo Drahomanov and the Problem of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations." *CSP* 11 (1969): 182-98
 – "The Ukrainian National Movement on the Eve of the First World War." *EEQ* 11 (1977): 141-54
 – "Franciszek Duchinski and His Impact on Ukrainian Political Thought." *HUS* 3-4 (1979-80): 690-705
 – "Observations on the Problem of 'Historical' and 'Non-historical' Nations." *HUS* 5 (1981): 358-68
 – *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*. Edmonton, 1987
- Saunders, D. *The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture 1750-1850*. Edmonton, 1985
- Serbyn, R. "Ukrainian Writers on the Jewish Question: In the Wake of the *Illustratsiia* Affair of 1858." *NP* 9 (1981): 99-104
- Siegelbaum, L. "The Odessa Grain Trade: A Case Study in Urban Growth and Development in Tsarist Russia." *Journal of European Economic History* 9 (1980): 113-51
- Sirka, A. *The Nationality Question in Austrian Education: The Case of the Ukrainians in Galicia 1867-1914*. Frankfurt am Main, 1979
- Solchanyk, R. "Mykhailo Drahomanov and the Ems Ukase: A Note on the Ukrainian Question at the 1878 International Literary Congress in Paris." *HUS* 1 (1977): 225-9
- Theide, R. "Industry and Urbanization in New Russia from 1860 to 1910." In M. Hamm., ed. *The City in Russian History*. Lexington, KY, 1976
- Treadgold, D. *The Great Siberian Migration: Government and Peasant in Resettlement from Emancipation to the First World War*. Princeton, 1957
- Weinstein, H. "Land Hunger and Nationalism in the Ukraine 1905-1917." *Journal of Economic History* 2 (1942): 24-35
- Wilcher, A. "Ivan Franko and Theodor Herzl: To the Genesis of Franko's *Mojsej*." *HUS* 6 (1982): 233-41
- Yaremko, M. *Galicia: From Separation to Unity*. New York, 1967
- Yurkevich, M. "A Forerunner of National Communism: Lev Iurkevych 1885-1918." *JUS* 7 (1982): 50-6

20th-Century Ukraine

REVOLUTION AND CIVIL WAR

Sources

Hryhorijiv, N. *The War and Ukrainian Democracy. A Compilation of Documents from the Past and Present*. Toronto, 1945

"The Four 'Universals' of the Central Rada." In T. Hunczak, ed., *The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution*, 382-95. Cambridge, MA, 1977

Margolin, A. *From a Political Diary: Russia, Ukraine and America 1905-1945*. New York, 1946

Mazlakh, S., and V. Shakhrai. *On the Current Situation in the Ukraine*. P. Potichnyj, ed. Ann Arbor, 1970

Pigido, F., ed. *Material Concerning Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Years of the Revolution (1917-1921)*. Collections of Documents and Testimonies by Prominent Jewish Political Workers. Munich, 1956

Historiography

Symonenko, R. "The Falsifiers Do Not Let Up: A Soviet Critique of Ukrainian Historiography and Its Studies of the Revolution." *New Review* 8 (1972): 37-50

Studies

Adams, A. "The Bolsheviks and the Ukrainian Front in 1918-1919." *SEER* 36 (1958): 396-417

- "The Bolshevik Administration in the Ukraine, 1918." *The Review of Politics* 20 (1958): 289-306

- "Awakening of Ukraine." *SR* 22 (1963): 217-23

- *Bolsheviks in the Ukraine: The Second Campaign, 1918-1919*. New Haven, 1963

Andriewsky, O. "The Triumph of Particularism: The Kuban Cossacks in 1917." *JUS* 4 (1979): 29-41

Arshinov, P. *History of the Makhnovist Movement 1918-1921*. Detroit, 1974

Borys, J. *The Sovietization of Ukraine 1917-1923*. Edmonton, 1980

Brinkley, G. *The Volunteer Army and the Allied Intervention in South Russia 1917-1921*. Notre Dame, 1966

Chikalenko, L. "Ukrainian-Russian Negotiations in 1920." *Annals* 7 (1959): 1647-55

Chubaty, N. "The National Revolution in Ukraine 1917-1919." *UQ* 1 (1945): 32-7

Dmytryshyn, B. "German Occupation of the Ukraine 1918: Some New Evidence." *Slavic and East European Studies* 10 (1965-66): 79-92

Dushnyk, W. "The Russian Provisional Government and the Ukrainian Central Rada." *UQ* 23 (1967): 109-29

Epstein, J. "German-Ukrainian Operations during World War I." *UQ* 15 (1959): 162-8

- Eudin, X. "The German Occupation of the Ukraine in 1918." *RR* 1 (1941): 90-103
- Fedyshyn, O. *Germany's Drive to the East and the Ukrainian Revolution 1917-1918*. New Brunswick, NJ, 1971
- Gauthier, S. "The Popular Base of Ukrainian Nationalism in 1917." *SR* 38 (1979): 30-47
- Gerus, O. "Manifestation of the Cossack Idea in Modern History: The Cossack Legacy and Its Impact." *UI* 19 (1982): 22-39
- Holubnychy, V. "The 1917 Agrarian Revolution in Ukraine." In I. Koropecykyj, ed., *Soviet Regional Economics: Selected Works of Vsevolod Holubnychy*, 3-65. Edmonton, 1982
- Hunczak, T. "Sir Lewis Namier and the Struggle for Eastern Galicia, 1918-1920." *HUS* 1 (1977): 198-210
- Hunczak, T., ed. *The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution*. Cambridge, MA, 1977
- Kamenetsky, I. "The Ukrainian Central Rada and the Status of German and Austrian Troops after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk." *UI* 20 (1983): 119-27
- "Hrushevsky and Ukrainian Foreign Policy 1917-1918." *UI* 21 (1984): 82-102
- Kenez, P. *Civil War in South Russia, 1917-1920*. Berkeley, 1977
- Liber, G. "Ukrainian Nationalism and the 1918 Law on National-Personal Autonomy." *NP*, 15 (1987): 22-42
- Maistrenko, I. *Borotbism: A Chapter in the History of Ukrainian Communism*. New York, 1954
- Malet, M. *Nestor Makhno in the Russian Civil War*. London, 1982
- Martos, B. "The First Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada." *UQ* 24 (1968): 22-37
- Mazepa, I. "The Ukraine under Bolshevik Rule." *SEER* 12 (1934): 323-46
- Meyer, H. "The Germans in the Ukraine 1918." *SR* 9 (1949-50): 105-15
- Magosci, P. "The Ruthenian Decision to Unite with Czechoslovakia." *SR* 34 (1975): 360-81
- Moskalenko, A. "The Hetmanate in 1918 and Bolshevik Aggression in Ukraine." *UR* 11 (1964): 81-4
- Nahayevsky, I. *History of the Modern Ukrainian State 1917-1923*. Munich, 1966
- Palij, M. *The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, 1917-1921: An Aspect of the Ukrainian Revolution*. Seattle, 1976
- Paneyko, B. "The Conditions for Ukrainian Independence." *SEER* 2 (1923-24): 336-45
- Peters, V. *Nestor Makhno: The Life of an Anarchist*. Winnipeg, 1970
- Pidhainy, O. *The Ukrainian-Polish Problem in the Dissolution of the Russian Empire 1914-1917*. Toronto, 1962
- *The Formation of the Ukrainian Republic*. Toronto, 1966
- "The Kiev Bolsheviks and Lenin's April Theses." *Eastern Europe. Historical Essays*, 33-8. Toronto, 1969

- Pipes, R. *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917–1923*. Cambridge, MA, 1954
- Procyk, A. "Treatment of the Ukrainian Question at the Yassy Conference in November 1918." In *Oleksander Ohloblyn Festschrift*, 400–10. New York, 1977
- Prymak, T. "The First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets and Its Antecedents." *JUS* 4 (1979): 3–19
- "Mykhailo Hrushevsky: Populist or Statist." *JUS* 5 (1981): 65–78
- *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*. Toronto, 1987
- Reshetar, J. *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism*. Princeton, 1952
- "Lenin on the Ukraine." *Annals* 9 (1961): 3–11
- "The Ukrainian Revolution in Retrospect." *CSP* 10 (1968): 116–32
- Rudnytsky, I.L. "Volodymyr Vynnychenko's Ideas in Light of His Political Writings." *Annals* 16 (1984–85): 251–74
- Saunders, D. "Britain and the Ukrainian Question, 1912–1920." *The English Historical Review* 103 (1988): 40–68
- Shandruk, P. *Arms of Valor*. New York, 1959
- Shulhyn, O. "The Doctrine of Wilson and the Building of the Ukrainian National Republic." *UQ* 12 (1956): 326–31
- Sonevytsky, L. "Bukovina in the Diplomatic Negotiation of 1914." *Annals* 7 (1959): 1586–1629
- "The Ukrainian Question in R.H. Lord's Writings on the Paris Peace Conference of 1919." *Annals* 10 (1962–63): 68–84
- Stachiw, M. "The System of the Hetman Government in Ukraine in 1918." *Proceedings of the Shevchenko Scientific Society* 2 (1957): 51–3
- *Ukraine and Russia: An Outline of the History of the Political and Military Relations, December 1917–April 1918*. New York, 1967
- Stachiw, M., and J. Sztendera. *Western Ukraine at the Turning Point of European History, 1918–1923*. New York, 1971
- Voline (Eichenbaum V.). *The Unknown Revolution (Kronstadt 1921, Ukraine 1918–1921)*. New York, 1955
- UKRAINIAN/JEWISH RELATIONS 1917–1921
- Bilinsky, Y. "Ukrainians and Jews: A Review Article." *Annals* 14 (1978–80): 244–57
- Bykovsky, L. *Solomon I. Goldelman: A Portrait of a Politician and Educator (1885–1974)*. A Chapter in *Ukrainian Jewish Relations*. New York, 1980
- Goldelman, S. "Patterns of Life of an Ethnic Minority." *Annals* 7 (1959): 1567–85
- *Jewish National Autonomy in Ukraine, 1917–1920*. Chicago, 1968
- Heifetz, E. *The Slaughter of the Jews in the Ukraine in 1919*. New York, 1921
- Hunczak, T. "A Reappraisal of Simon Petliura and Jewish-Ukrainian Relations 1917–1921," and Z. Szajkowski, "A Rebuttal." *Jewish Social Studies* 31 (1969): 163–213

- Lichten, J. "A Study of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations." *Annals* 5 (1956): 1160-77
- Mintz, M. "The Secretariat of Internationality Affairs (*Sekretariat mizh-natsionalnykh sprav*) of the Ukrainian General Secretariat, 1917-1918." *HUS* 6 (1982): 25-41
- Pogroms in the Ukraine 1917-1920 under the Ukrainian Governments*. London, 1927
- Schechtman, J. "Jewish Community Life in the Ukraine, 1917-1919" In G. Frumkin, et al., eds, *Russian Jewry, 1917-1967*, 39-57. New York, 1969
- Schulman, E. "Pogroms in Ukraine in 1919." *The Jewish Quarterly* 17 (1966): 159-66
- Trotsky, I. "Jewish Pogroms in the Ukraine and in Byelorussia." In J. Frumkin, et al., eds, *Russian Jewry 1917-1967*, 72-87. New York, 1969
- Ukrainians and Jews: A Symposium*. New York, 1966

SOVIET UKRAINE: THE 1920S

Sources

- Khvylovy, M. *The Cultural Renaissance in Ukraine: Polemical Pamphlets 1925-1926*. M. Shkandrij, ed. and trans. Edmonton, 1986

Bibliography

- Lawrynenko, J. *Ukrainian Communism and Soviet Russian Policy toward the Ukraine: An Annotated Bibliography*. New York, 1953

Studies

- Bilinsky, Y. "Mykola Skrypnyk and Petro Shelest." In J. Azreal, ed., *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices*, 105-43. New York, 1978
- Bociurkiw, B. "The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, 1920-1930: A Case Study in Religious Modernization." In D. Dunn, ed., *Religion and Modernization in the Soviet Union*, 105-43. Boulder, CO, 1977
- "Ukrainization Movements within the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church." *HUS* 3-4 (1979-80): part 1, 92-111
- "The Soviet Destruction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church 1929-1936." *JUS* 12 (1987): 3-21
- Czajkowski, M. "Volodymyr Vynnychenko and His Mission to Moscow and Kharkiv." *JUS* 5 (1978): 6-24
- Dmytryshyn, B. "National and Social Composition of the Membership of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine 1918-1925." *Journal of Central European Affairs* 17 (1957): 243-58
- Fedenko, P. "Mykola Skrypnyk: His National Policy, Conviction and Rehabilitation." *UR* 5 (1957): 56-72
- Holubnychy, V. "The Views of M. Volobuev and V. Dobrohaiyev and Party Criticism." *UR* 3 (1956): 5-12

- "Outline History of the Communist Party of Ukraine." In I. Koropec'kyj, ed., *Soviet Regional Economics: The Selected Works of Vsevolod Holubnychy*, 66-137. Edmonton, 1982
- Krawchenko, B. "The Impact of Industrialization on the Social Structure of Ukraine." *CSP* 22 (1980): 338-57
- Liber, G. "Language, Literature and Book Publishing in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923-1928." *SR* 41 (1982): 673-85
- Luckyj, G. *Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine 1917-1934*. New York, 1976
- Mace, J. *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine 1918-1933*. Cambridge, MA, 1983
- "The *Komitety nezamozhnykh selian* and the Structure of Soviet Rule in the Ukrainian Countryside, 1920-1933." *SS* 35 (1983): 487-503
- Nakai, K. "Soviet Agricultural Policies in the Ukraine and the 1921-1922 Famine." *HUS* 6 (1982): 43-61
- Palij, M. "The First Experiment of National Communism in Ukraine in the 1920s and 1930s." *NP* 12 (1984): 85-106
- Reshetar, J. "Ukrainian Nationalism and the Orthodox Church..." *SR* 10 (1951): 39-49
- "National Deviations in the Soviet Union." *SR* 12 (1953): 162-74
- Serbyn, R. "The Famine of 1921-1923: A Model for 1932-1933?" In R. Serbyn and B. Krawchenko, eds, *Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933*, 147-78. Edmonton, 1986
- Stachiw, M. "Soviet Statehood in Ukraine from a Sociological Aspect." *UQ* 16 (1959): 38-47
- Sullivant, R. *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine 1917-1957*. New York, 1962
- Veryha, W. "Famine in Ukraine in 1921-1923 and the Soviet Government's Countermeasures." *NP* 12 (1984): 265-86
- Weinstein, H. "Language and Education in the Soviet Ukraine." *SR* 1 (1941): 124-48

SOVIET UKRAINE: THE 1930S

Sources

The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book, vol.1. Toronto, 1953

Studies

- Borys, J. "Who Ruled the Soviet Ukraine in Stalin's Time?" *CSP* 14 (1972): 213-33
- Dmytryshyn, B. *Moscow and the Ukraine 1918-1953: A Study of Russian Bolshevik Nationality Policy*. New York, 1956
- Dragan, A. *Vinnitsia: A Forgotten Holocaust*. Jersey City, 1986

- Kostiuk, H. *Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine*. New York, 1960
- Krawchenko, B. "The Impact of Industrialization on the Social Structure of Ukraine." *CSP* 22 (1980): 338–57
- *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine*. New York, 1985
- Manning, C. *Ukraine under the Soviets*. New York, 1953
- Sullivant, R. "The Agrarian-Industrial Dichotomy in the Ukraine as a Factor in Soviet Nationality Policy." *Annals* 9 (1961): 110–25

THE GREAT FAMINE OF 1932–33

Sources

- The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: The Great Famine in Ukraine in 1932–1933*, vol. 2. Detroit, 1955
- Carynnyk, M., B. Kordan, and L. Luciuk, eds. *The Foreign Office and the Famine: British Documents on Ukraine and the Great Famine of 1932–1933*. Kingston, 1988
- Dolot, M. *Execution of Hunger: The Hidden Holocaust*. New York, 1985
- The Great Famine in Ukraine: The Unknown Holocaust*. Jersey City, 1983
- Grigorenko, P. *Memoirs*. London, 1983
- Hryshko, W. *The Ukrainian Holocaust of 1933*. Toronto, 1983
- Kopelev, L. *The Education of a True Believer*. New York, 1977
- Kravchenko, V. *I Chose Freedom*. New York, 1946
- Solovey, D., ed. *The Golgotha of Ukraine: Eye Witness Accounts of the Famine in Ukraine*. New York, 1953
- Woropay, O. *The Ninth Circle*. Cambridge, MA, 1983

Historiography and Bibliography

- Brovkin, V. "Robert Conquest's *Harvest of Sorrow*: A Challenge to the Revisionists." *HUS* 11 (1987): 234–45
- Luckyj, G. *Keeping A Record. Literary Purges in Soviet Ukraine (1930s): A Bio-Bibliography*. Edmonton-Toronto, 1987
- Pidhainy, A. "Bibliography of the Great Famine in Ukraine, 1932–1933." *New Review* 13 (1973): 32–68
- Radziejowski, J. "Collectivization in Ukraine in Light of Soviet Historiography." *JUS* 5 (1980): 3–17

Studies

- Ammende, E. *Human Life in Russia*. London, 1936; reprint Cleveland, 1984
- Anderson B., and B. Silver. "Demographic Analysis and Population Catastrophes in the USSR." *SR* 44 (1985): 517–36

- Carynyk, M. "The Famine the 'Times' Couldn't Find." *Commentary*, November 1983, 32-40
- Conquest, R. *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine*. New York, 1986
- Crowl, J. *Angels in Stalin's Paradise: Western Reporters in Soviet Russia, 1917-1937*. Washington, 1982
- Dalrymple, D. "The Soviet Famine of 1932-1934." *SS* 15 (1934): 250-84
 - "The Soviet Famine of 1932-1934: Some Further References." *SS* 16 (1965): 471-4
- Holubnychy, V. "The Causes of the Famine of 1932-1933." *Meta* (Toronto, 1979): 22-5
- Krawchenko, B. "The Man-Made Famine of 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine." *Conflict Quarterly* 4 (1984): 29-39
- Mace, J. "Politics and History in Soviet Ukraine, 1921-1933." *NP* 10 (1982): 157-79
 - "Famine and Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine." *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1984, 37-50
 - "The Man-Made Famine of 1933 in Soviet Ukraine: What Happened and Why?" In I. Charny, ed., *Proceedings of the International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide*. Boulder, CO, 1984
- Maksudov, S. "The Geography of the Soviet Famine of 1933." *JUS* 8 (1983): 52-8
- Rosefielde, S. "Excess Collectivization Deaths, 1929-1933: New Demographic Evidence." *SR* 43 (1984): 83-8
- Serbyn, R., and B. Krawchenko, eds. *Famine in Ukraine, 1932-1933*. Edmonton, 1986
- Wheatcroft, S. "New Demographic Evidence on Collectivization Deaths: A Rejoinder to Steven Rosefielde." *SR* 44 (1985): 505-8

WESTERN UKRAINE BETWEEN THE WARS

- Bohachevsky-Chomiak, M. *Feminists despite Themselves: Women in Ukrainian Community Life, 1884-1939*. Edmonton, 1988
- Budurowycz, B. "The Ukrainian Problem in International Politics, October 1938 to March 1939." *CSP* 3 (1958): 59-75
 - "Poland and the Ukrainian Problem, 1921-1939." *CSP* 25 (1983): 473-500
- Horak, S. *Poland and Her National Minorities, 1919-1939*. New York, 1961
- Magocsi, P. *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948*. Cambridge, MA, 1978
- Manning, C. "The Linguistic Question in Carpatho-Ukraine." *UQ* 10 (1954): 247-51
- Motyl, A. "The Rural Origins of the Communist and Nationalist Movements in Wolyn Wojewodztwo, 1921-1939." *SR* 37 (1978): 412-20
 - *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism 1919-1929*. Boulder, CO, 1980
 - "Ukrainian Nationalist Political Violence in Inter-War Poland, 1921-1939." *EEQ*

- 19 (1985): 45–54
- “Viacheslav Lypynskiy and the Ideology and Politics of Ukrainian Monarchism.” *CSP* 27 (1985): 31–48
- Orzell, L. “A ‘Hotly Disputed’ Issue: Eastern Galicia at the Paris Peace Conference.” *PR* 25 (1980): 49–68
- Pelenski, J., ed. *The Political and Social Ideas of Vjačeslav Lypynskij*. Special issue, *HUS* 9 (1985)
- Radziejowski, J. *The Communist Party of Western Ukraine, 1919–1929*. Edmonton, 1983
- Rudnytsky, I.L. “Carpatho-Ukraine: A People in Search of Their Identity.” *EEQ* 19 (1985): 139–59
- Shandor, V. “Carpatho-Ukraine and the International Bargaining of 1918–1939.” *UQ* 10 (1954): 235–46
- Solchanyk, R. “The Foundation of the Communist Movement in Eastern Galicia 1919–1921.” *SR* 30 (1971): 774–94
- Sole, A. “The Jews of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, 1918–1938.” In *The Jews of Czechoslovakia*, vol. 2, 401–39. Philadelphia–New York, 1968
- Stercho, P. *Diplomacy of Double Morality: Europe’s Crossroads in Carpatho-Ukraine 1919–1939*. New York, 1971
- Wynot, E. “The Ukrainians and the Polish Regime, 1937–1939.” *UI* 7 (1970): 44–60
- “Poland’s Christian Minorities 1919–1939.” *NP* 13 (1985): 209–46

UKRAINE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Sources

- “Documents relating to Ukrainian Nationalists during the Second World War.” In Y. Boshyk, ed., *Ukraine during World War II: History and Its Aftermath*, 163–246. Edmonton, 1986
- Luciuk, L., and B. Kordan, eds. *Anglo-American Perspectives on the Ukrainian Question 1938–1951: A Documentary Collection*. Vestal, NY, 1987
- Mirchuk, P. *In the German Mills of Death*. New York, 1975
- Potichnyj, P., and Y. Shtendera, eds. *The Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground 1943–1951*. Edmonton, 1986
- Shumuk, D. *Life Sentence: Memoirs of a Ukrainian Political Prisoner*. I. Jaworsky, ed. I. Jaworsky and H. Kowalska, trans. Edmonton, 1984

Historiography

- Veryha, W., “The ‘Galicia’ Ukrainian Division in Polish and Soviet Literature.” *UQ* 36 (1980): 253–70

Studies

- Armstrong, J. *Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939–1945*. New York, 1963; reprint Littleton, CO, 1980
- “Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe.” *Journal of Modern History* 40 (1968): 396–410
- Boshyk, Y., ed., *Ukraine during World War II: History and Its Aftermath*. Edmonton, 1986
- Dallin, A. *German Rule in Russia 1941–1945: A Study in Occupation Policies*. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO, 1981
- Dmytryshyn, V. “The Nazis and the SS Volunteer Division ‘Galicia.’” *SR* 15 (1956): 1–10
- Elliot, M. *Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America’s Role in Their Repatriation*. Urbana, 1982
- Fireside, H. *Icon and Swastika: The Russian Orthodox Church under Nazi and Soviet Control*. Cambridge, MA, 1971
- Friedman, P. “Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation.” *YIVO, Annual of Jewish Social Science* 12 (1959): 259–96
- Heike, W. *The Ukrainian Division “Galicia,” 1943–1945: A Memoir*. Toronto, 1988
- Heiman, L. “We Fought For Ukraine – The Story of Jews with the UPA.” *UQ* 23 (1964): 33–44
- Hunczak, T., ed. *The Second World War in Ukraine*. Forthcoming
- Kamenetsky, I. *Hitler’s Occupation of Ukraine, 1941–1944: A Study of Totalitarian Imperialism*. Milwaukee, 1956
- *Secret Nazi Plans for Eastern Europe: A Study of Lebensraum Policies*. New York, 1964
- “The National Socialist Policy in Slovenia and Western Ukraine during World War II.” *Annals* 14 (1978–80): 39–67
- Kosyk, W. “Ukraine’s Losses during the Second World War.” *UR* 33 (1985): 9–19
- *The Third Reich and Ukraine*. Forthcoming
- Lewin, K. “Metropolitan Andreas Sheptytsky and the Jewish Community in Galicia.” *Annals* 7 (1959): 1656–68
- Marples, D. “Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia under Soviet Occupation: The Development of Socialist Farming, 1939–1941.” *CSP* 27 (1985): 158–77
- Possony, S. “The Ukrainian-Jewish Problem: A Historical Retrospective.” *UQ* 31 (1975): 139–51
- Prociuk, S. “Human Losses in the Ukraine in World War I and II.” *Annals* 13 (1973–77): 23–50
- Reitinger, G. *The House Built on Sand: The Conflicts of German Policy in Russia, 1939–1945*. Westport, 1960
- Sodol, P. *UPA: A Brief Combat History of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, 1942–1947*. New York, 1987
- Szporluk, R. “War by Other Means.” *SR* 44 (1985): 20–6

- Tys-Krokhmaliuk, Y. *UPA Warfare in Ukraine: Strategic, Tactical and Organizational Problems of Ukrainian Resistance in World War II*. New York, 1972
The Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the Fight for Freedom. New York, 1954
 "Ukrainians in World War II: A Symposium." *NP* 10 (1982): 1-40
 Wytwycky, B. *The Other Holocaust: Many Circles of Hell*. Washington, 1980

POST-SECOND WORLD WAR UKRAINE

Historiography

- Armstrong, J. "New Prospects for Analyzing the Evolution of Ukrainian Society." *UQ* 29 (1973): 349-57
 Bilas, L. "How History Is Written in the Soviet Ukraine." *UR* 5 (1958): 39-47
 Horak, S. "Ukrainian Historiography, 1953-1963." *SR* 24 (1965): 258-72
 - "Soviet Historiography and the New Nationalities Policy: A Case Study of Ukraine and Belorussia." In J. Shapiro and P. Potichnyj, eds, *Change and Adaptation in Soviet and East European Politics*. 201-16. New York, 1976
 Krupnytsky, B. "Trends in Modern Ukrainian Historiography." *UQ* 6 (1950): 337-45
 Pelenski, J. "Soviet Ukrainian Historiography after World War II." *JGO* 12 (1964): 375-418
 - "Recent Ukrainian Writing." *Survey* 59 (1966): 102-12
 Shtepa, K. "The Lesser Evil Formula." In C. Black, ed., *Rewriting Russian History*. 107-19. New York, 1962
 Subtelny, O. "The Soviet Ukrainian Historical Journal." *Recenzija* 1 (1972): 38-48
 Szporluk, R. "National History as a Political Battleground: The Case of Ukraine and Belorussia." In M. Pap, ed., *Russian Empire*, 131-50. Cleveland, 1985
 Tillet, L. *The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities*. Chapel Hill, 1969
 Velychenko, S. "The Origins of the Current Soviet Interpretation of Ukrainian History: A Case Study of Policy Formulation." *Forschungen zur osteuropaische Geschichte* 46 (1990): forthcoming
 Wynar, L. "The Ukrainian-Russian Confrontation in Historiography." *UQ* 30 (1974): 13-25
 - "The Present State of Ukrainian Historiography: A Brief Overview." *NP* 7 (1979): 1-25

Studies

- Bandera, V., and Z. Melnyk, eds. *The Soviet Economy in Regional Perspective*. New York, 1973
 Bilinsky, Y. "The Soviet Education Laws of 1958-1959 and Soviet Nationality Policy." *SS* 14 (1962): 138-57

- *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II*. New Brunswick, NJ, 1964
- "Education of the Non-Russian Peoples of the USSR, 1917-1967." *SR* 28 (1968): 411-43
- "The Incorporation of Western Ukraine and Its Impact on Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine." In R. Szporluk, ed., *The Influence of East Europe and the Soviet West on the USSR*, 180-228. New York, 1976
- "Shcherbytsky, Ukraine and Kremlin Politics." *Problems of Communism* 32 (1983): 1-20
- Clem, R., ed. *The Soviet West: Interplay between Nationality and Social Organization*. New York, 1975
- Hodnett, G. "The Views of Petro Shelest." *Annals* 14 (1978-80): 226-34
- Hodnett, G., and P. Potichnyj. *The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis*. Canberra, 1970
- Isajiw, W. "Urban Migration and Social Change in Contemporary Soviet Ukraine." *CSP* 26 (1984): 56-66
- Kolasky, J. *Education in Soviet Ukraine: A Study in Discrimination and Russification*. Toronto, 1968
- *Two Years in Soviet Ukraine*. Toronto, 1970
- Koropecykyj, I., ed. *The Ukraine within the USSR: An Economic Balance Sheet*. New York, 1977
- "A Century of Moscow-Ukraine Economic Relations: An Interpretation." *HUS* 5 (1981): 467-96
- *Integration Processes in the Ukrainian Economy: A Historical Perspective*. Cambridge, MA, 1988
- *Studies in Ukrainian Economics*. Edmonton, 1988
- Krawchenko, B., ed. *Ukraine after Shelest*. Edmonton, 1983
- Lewytzkyj, B. *Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine 1953-1980*. Edmonton, 1984
- Marples, D. "The Kulak in Post-War USSR: The West Ukrainian Example." *SS* 36 (1984): 560-70
- "The Soviet Collectivization of Western Ukraine." *NP* 13 (1985): 24-44
- *Chernobyl and Nuclear Power in the USSR*. New York, 1986
- *Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s*. New York, 1992
- Motyl, A. "The Foreign Relations of the Ukrainian SSR." *HUS* 6 (1982): 62-78
- Pennar, J., I. Bakalo, and G. Beredây. "The Ukrainian and Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republics and Their Schools." In J. Pennar, I. Bakalo, and G. Bereday, eds, *Modernization and Diversity in Soviet Education*, 215-34. New York, 1971
- Perfcky, G. "The Status of the Ukrainian Language in the Ukrainian SSR." *EEQ* 21 (1987): 207-30
- Potichnyj, P., ed. *Ukraine in the Seventies*. Oakville, 1975
- Sawczuk, K. *The Ukraine in the United Nations Organization: A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy 1944-1950*. New York, 1975
- Shevelov, G. "The Language Question in Ukraine in the Twentieth Century." *HUS* 10 (1986): 71-170 and 11 (1987): 118-224

Szporluk, R. "Kiev as Ukraine's Primate City." *HUS* 3-4 (1979-80): part 2, 843-9

NATIONALITY ISSUES

Bilinsky, Y. "Assimilation and Ethnic Assertiveness among Ukrainians of the Soviet Union." In E. Goldhagen, ed., *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union*, 147-84. New York, 1968

- "The Concept of the Soviet People and Its Implications for Soviet Nationality Policy." *Annals* 14 (1978-80): 87-133

Birch, J. "The Ukrainian Nationalist Movement in the USSR since 1956." *UR* 17 (1970): 2-47

Farmer, K. *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era: Myth, Symbol and Ideology in Soviet Nationalities Policy*. The Hague, 1980

"The Kichko Affair: Additional Documents." *Soviet Jewish Affairs* 1 (1971): 108-13

Motyl, A. *Will the Non-Russians Rebel? State, Ethnicity and Stability in the USSR*. Ithaca and London, 1987

Smal-Stotsky, R. *The Nationality Problem of the Soviet Union and Russian Communist Imperialism*. Milwaukee, 1952

Solchanyk, R. "Molding 'the Soviet People': The Role of Ukraine and Belorussia." *JUS* 8 (1983): 3-18

Szporluk, R. "Nationalities and the Russian Problem in the USSR: An Historical Outline." *Journal of International Affairs* 27 (1973): 22-40

- "The Ukraine and the Ukrainians." In Z. Katz, et al., eds, *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities*, 21-48. New York, 1975

- "West Ukraine and West Belorussia: Historical Tradition, Social Communication and Linguistic Assimilation." *SS* 31 (1979): 76-98

- "The Ukraine and Russia." In R. Conquest, ed., *The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future*. 151-82. Stanford, 1986

Tillet, L. "Ukrainian Nationalism and the Fall of Shelest." *SR* 34 (1975): 752-68

Wexler, P. *Purism and Language: A Study of Modern Ukrainian and Belorussian Nationalism, 1940-1967*. Bloomington, 1974

UKRAINIAN DISSENT

Sources

Browne, M. *Ferment in the Ukraine: Documents by V. Chornovil, I. Kandyba, L. Lukianenko, V. Moroz, and Others*. London, 1971

Chornovil, V. *The Chornovil Papers*. New York, 1968

Dzyuba, I. *Internationalism or Russification: A Study of the Soviet Nationalities Problem*. London, 1968

Moroz, V. *Report From the Beria Reservation*. Ed. and trans. by J. Kolasky. Toronto, 1974

- *Boomerang: The Works of Valentyn Moroz*. Baltimore, 1974
- Osadchy, M. *Cataract*. New York, 1976
- Plyushch, L. *History's Carnival: A Dissident's Autobiography*. New York and London, 1977
- Sverstiuk, I. *Clandestine Essays*. Introduction and trans. by G. Luckyj. Cambridge, MA, 1976
- The Ukrainian Herald: Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the USSR*. Baltimore, 1976
- Verba, L., and B. Yasen, eds. *The Human Rights Movement in Ukraine: Documents of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group*. Baltimore, 1980

Bibliographies

- Jones, L., and L. Pendzey. "Dissent in Ukraine: A Bibliography." *NP* 6 (1978): 64–70
- Liber, G., and A. Mostovych. *Nonconformity and Dissent in the Ukrainian SSR, 1955–1975: An Annotated Bibliography*. Cambridge, MA, 1976

Studies

- Bilinsky, Y. "Political Aspirations of Dissidents in Ukraine." *UI* 15 (1978): 30–9
- Himka, J-P. "Leonid Plyusch: The Ukrainian Marxist Resurgent." *JUS* 5 (1980): 61–79
- Kamenetsky, I. ed. *Nationalism and Human Rights: Processes of Modernization in the USSR*. Littleton, CO, 1977
- Klejner, I. "Ukrainian Dissidents and the Jews." *Soviet Jewish Affairs* 11 (1981): 3–14
- Kowalewski, D., and C. Johnson. "The Ukrainian Dissident: A Statistical Profile." *UQ* 40 (1984): 50–65
- Krawchenko, B., and J. Carter. "Dissidents in Ukraine before 1972: A Summary Statistical Profile." *JUS* 8 (1983): 85–8
- Luckyj, G. "Polarity in Ukrainian Intellectual Dissent." *CSP* 14 (1972): 269–79
- Potichnyj, P. "The Struggle of the Crimean Tatars." *CSP* 17 (1975): 302–19
- Rudnytsky, I.L. "The Political Thought of Soviet Ukrainian Dissent." *JUS* 6 (1981): 3–16
- Sawczuk, K. "Valentyn Moroz: A Voice of Ukrainian National Renaissance." *NP* 2 (1973): 1–9
- "Opposition in the Ukraine: Seven versus the Regime." *Survey* 20 (1974): 36–46

THE CHURCH IN SOVIET UKRAINE

- Bociurkiw, B. "The Uniate Church in the Soviet Ukraine: A Case Study of Soviet Church Policy." *CSP* 7 (1965): 83–113
- "The Orthodox Church and the Soviet Regime in the Ukraine, 1953–1971." *CSP* 14 (1972): 191–211
- "Religion and Nationalism in the Contemporary Ukraine." In G. Simmonds, ed.,

- Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin*, 81–93. Detroit, 1977
- “The Religious Situation in Soviet Ukraine.” In W. Dushnyk, ed., *Ukraine in a Changing World*, 173–94. New York, 1977
 - “Ukrainization Movements within the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.” *HUS* 3–4 (1979–80): 92–111
 - “Soviet Religious Policy in Ukraine in Historical Perspective.” In M. Pap, ed., *Russian Empire*, 95–112. Cleveland, 1985
- Dirscherl, D. “The Soviet Destruction of the Greek Catholic Church.” *Journal of Church and State* 12 (1970): 421–39
- Dunn, D. “The Disappearance of the Ukrainian Uniate Church: How and Why.” *UI* 9 (1972): 57–65
- Hvat, I. “The Ukrainian Catholic Church, the Vatican and the Soviet Union during the Pontificate of Pope John Paul II.” *Religion in Communist Lands* 11 (1983): 264–79
- Markus, V. “Religion and Nationality: The Uniates of the Ukraine.” In B. Bociurkiw and J. Strong, eds, *Religion and Atheism in the USSR and Eastern Europe*, 101–22. London, 1975
- Moroziuk, R. “Antireligious Propaganda in Ukraine.” In M. Pap, ed., *Russian Empire*, 113–30. Cleveland, 1985
- Reynarowych, R. “The Catholic Church in Western Ukraine after World War II.” *Diakonia* 4 (1970): 372–87
- Senyk, S. *Women’s Monasteries in Ukraine and Belorussia to the Period of Suppressions*. Rome, 1983
- Sysyn, F. “The Ukrainian Orthodox Question in the USSR.” *Religion in Communist Lands* 11 (1983): 251–63

UKRAINIANS ABROAD

Bibliographies

- Boshyk, Y., and B. Balan. *Political Refugees and Displaced Persons, 1945–54*. Edmonton, 1982
- Boshyk, Y., and W. Kebalo, eds. *Ukrainian DP Publications: A Bibliography of the John Luczkiw Collection at the University of Toronto*. Edmonton, 1988
- Momryk, M. *A Guide to the Sources for the Study of Ukrainian Canadians*. Ottawa, 1984
- Sokolysshyn, A., and V. Wertsman. *Ukrainians in Canada and the United States: A Guide to Information Sources*. Detroit, 1981

United States

- Basarab, S., et al. *The Ukrainians of Maryland*. Baltimore, 1977
- Chyz, Y. *The Ukrainian Immigrants in the United States*. Scranton, 1932

- Dragan, A. *The Ukrainian National Association: Its Past and Present, 1894-1964*. Jersey City, 1964
- Ewanchuk, M. *Hawaiian Ordeal: Ukrainian Contract Workers, 1897-1910*. Winnipeg, 1986
- Halich, W., *Ukrainians in the United States*. Chicago, 1937
- Isajiw, W., ed. *Ukrainians in American and Canadian Society*. Jersey City, 1976
- Isajiw, W., Y. Boshyk, and R. Senkus, eds. *The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II*. Edmonton, 1992
- Kuropas, M. *The Ukrainians in America*. Minneapolis, 1972
- *The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations, 1894-1954*. Toronto, 1991
- Lushnycky, A., ed. *Ukrainians in Pennsylvania*. Philadelphia, 1976
- Magocsi, P. *Our People: Carpatho-Rusyns and Their Descendants in North America*. Toronto, 1980
- Magocsi, P., ed. *The Ukrainian Experience in the United States: A Symposium*. Cambridge, MA, 1979
- Markus, V. "Ukrainians in the United States." In V. Kubijovyč, ed., *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, 1100-51. Toronto, 1971
- Pekar, A. "The Historical Background of the Carpatho-Ruthenians in America." *UI* 13 (1976): 87-103 and 14 (1977): 68-84
- Procko, B. "Pennsylvania: Focal Point of Ukrainian Immigration." In J. Bodnar, ed., *The Ethnic Experience in Pennsylvania*, 206-32. Lewisburg, 1973
- Stefaniuk, M. and F. Dohrs. *Ukrainians in Detroit*. Detroit, 1979
- Subtelny, O. *Ukrainians in North America: An Illustrated History*. Toronto, 1991
- Wolowyna, O., ed. *Ethnicity and National Identity: Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Persons with Ukrainian Mother Tongue in the United States*. Cambridge, MA, 1986

Canada – Sources

- Czumer, W. *Recollections about the Life of the First Ukrainian Settlers in Canada*. Edmonton, 1981
- Kolasky, J., ed. *Prophets and Proletarians: Documents on the History of the Rise and Decline of Ukrainian Communism in Canada*. Edmonton, 1988
- Kordan, B., and L. Luciuk, eds. *A Delicate and Difficult Question: Documents in the History of Ukrainians in Canada 1899-1962*. Kingston, 1986

Canada – Bibliographies

- Boshyk, Y. *Slavs in Canada: A Guide to Archival Resources*. Edmonton, forthcoming

Canada – Studies

- Aster, H., and P. Potichnyj. *Jewish Ukrainian Relations: Two Solitudes*. Oakville, 1983

- Darcovich, W. *Ukrainians in Canada: The Struggle to Retain Their Identity*. Ottawa, 1967
- Gregorovich, A. *Chronology of Ukrainian Canadian History*. Toronto, 1974
- Isajiw, W., ed. *Ukrainians in the Canadian City*. Special issue, *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 12 (1980)
- Kaye, V. *Early Ukrainian Settlers in Canada, 1895–1900: Dr. J. Oleskiw's Role in the Settlement of the Canadian Northwest*. Toronto, 1964
- Kazymyra, B. *The Achievement of Metropolitan Andreas Sheptytsky*. Toronto, 1958
- Kolasky, J. *The Shattered Illusion: The History of Ukrainian Pro-Communist Organizations in Canada*. Toronto, 1979
- Luciuk, L., and S. Hryniuk. *Canada's Ukrainians: Negotiating an Identity*. Toronto, 1991
- Lupul, M. *Ukrainian Canadians, Multiculturalism and Separatism: An Assessment*. Edmonton, 1978
- *A Heritage in Transition: Essays in the History of Ukrainians in Canada*. Toronto, 1982
- Martynowych, O. *Ukrainians in Canada: The Formative Years, 1891–1924*. Edmonton, 1991
- Marunchak, M. *The Ukrainian Canadians: A History*. Winnipeg, 1970
- Petryshyn, J. *Peasants in a Promised Land: Canada and the Ukrainians, 1891–1914*. Toronto, 1985
- Petryshyn, W. *Changing Realities: Social Trends among Ukrainian Canadians*. Edmonton, 1980
- Prymak, T. *Maple Leaf and Trident: The Ukrainian Canadians during the Second World War*. Toronto, 1988
- Rozumnyj, J., ed. *New Soil – Old Roots: The Ukrainian Experience in Canada*. Winnipeg, 1983
- Skwarok, J. *The Ukrainian Settlers in Canada and Their School, 1891–1921*. Toronto, 1929
- Swyrypa, F. *Ukrainian Canadians: A Survey of Their Portrayal in English-Language Works*. Edmonton, 1978
- Swyrypa, F., and J. Thompson. *Loyalties in Conflict: Ukrainians in Canada during the Great War*. Edmonton, 1983
- Tropper, H., and M. Weinfeld. *Old Wounds: Jews, Ukrainians and the Hunt for Nazi War Criminals in Canada*. Toronto, 1988
- Young, C. *The Ukrainian-Canadians: A Study of Assimilation*. Toronto, 1931
- Yuzyk, P. *The Ukrainians in Manitoba*. Toronto, 1953
- Woycenko, O. *The Annals of Ukrainian Life in Canada*. 4 vols. Winnipeg, 1961–9

THE NEW ERA

- Bahry, R., ed. *Echoes of Glasnost in Ukraine*. Toronto, 1989.
- Jaworsky, J. *The Military-Strategic Significance of Recent Developments in Ukraine*. Department of National Defense project report 645. Ottawa, 1993

- Krawchenko, B. "Ukraine: The Politics of Independence." In I. Bremmer and R. Taras, eds., *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States*. Cambridge, England, 1993
- Marples, D. *The Social Impact of the Chernobyl Disaster*. New York, 1988
- *Ukraine under Perestroika: Ecology, Economics, and the Workers Revolt*. New York, 1991
- Motyl, A. *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism*. New York, 1993
- Pavlychko, S. *Letters from Kiev*. Edmonton, 1992
- Potichnyj, P. "The Referendum and Presidential Elections in Ukraine." *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 2 (1991): 123–38
- Solchanyk, R. *Ukraine: From Chernobyl to Sovereignty*. Edmonton, 1992
- "Ukraine, the (Former) Center, Russia and 'Russia.'" *Studies in Comparative Communism* 1 (1992): 31–45

THE TRANSITION PERIOD

International Relations

- Albright, D., and S. Appatov. *Ukraine and European Security*. London and New York, 1999
- Bilinsky, Y. "Basic Factors in the Foreign Policy of Ukraine: The Impact of the Soviet Experience." In F. Starr, ed., *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, 171–92*. Armonk, NY, and London, 1994
- Bukvoll, T. "Ukraine and NATO: The Politics of Soft Cooperation." *Security Dialogue* 28, no. 3 (1997): 363–74
- D'Anieri, P. *Economic Interdependence in Russian–Ukrainian Relations*. New York, 1999
- Garnett, S. *Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe*. Washington, DC, 1997
- Kremen, V. "The East Slav Triangle." In V. Baranovsky, ed., *Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda, 271–88*. Oxford, 1997
- Kuzio, T. "Ukraine and NATO: The Evolving Strategic Partnership." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 21, no. 2 (1998): 1–30
- Kuzio, T. "Ukrainian Security Planning: Constraints and Options." In R. Allison and C. Bluth, eds., *Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia, 134–51*. London, 1998
- Larrabee, S. "Ukraine's Balancing Act." *Security* 38, no. 2 (1996): 143–65
- Lester, J. "Russian Political Attitudes to Ukrainian Independence." *Journal of Post-Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 10, no. 2 (1994): 193–233
- Nordberg, M. "Domestic Factors Influencing Ukrainian Foreign Policy." *European Security* 7, no. 3 (1998): 63–91
- Prizel, I. *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine*. Cambridge, UK, 1998
- Sherr, J. "Russia–Ukraine Rapprochement: The Black Sea Fleet Accords." *Survival* 39, no. 3 (1997): 33–50

Solchanyk, R. "Russia, Ukraine and the Imperial Legacy." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 9, no. 4 (1993): 337–65

State and Nation Building

Arel, D. "A Lurking Cascade of Assimilation in Kyiv." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 12, no. 1 (1996): 73–90

Birch, J. "Ukraine: A Nation-State or a State of Nations?" *JUS* 21, nos. 1–2 (1996): 109–24

Grytsenko, A. *Civil-Military Relations in Ukraine: A System Emerging from Chaos*. Groningen, 1997

Kuzio, T. "National Identity in Independent Ukraine: An Identity in Transition." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 2, no. 4 (1996): 582–608

Kuzio, T. *Ukraine: State and Nation-building*. London and New York, 1998

Oliynyk, S. "Emerging Post-Soviet Armies: The Case of the Ukraine." *Military Review* 74, no. 3 (1994): 5–18

Olynyk, S. "Ukraine as a Military Power." In S. Wolchik and V. Zviglyanich, eds., *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, 69–94. New York and Oxford, 1999

Shulman, S. "Competing versus Complementary Identities: Ukraine–Russian Identities and the Loyalties of the Russians in Ukraine." *NP* 26, no. 4 (1998): 599–614

Subtelny, O. "Imperial Disintegration and Nation-State Formation: The Case of Ukraine." In J.W. Blaney, ed., *The Successor States to the USSR*, 184–95. Washington, DC, 1995

Szporluk, R. "Ukraine: From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State." *Daedalus* 126, no. 3 (1997): 85–120

Wanner, C. *Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine*. University Park, PA, 1998

Wilson, A. *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith*. New York, 1997

Wolchik S., and V. Zviglyanich, eds., *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*. New York and Oxford, 1999

Politics

Arel, D. "Language Politics in Independent Ukraine: Toward One or Two State Languages?" *NP* 23, no. 3 (1995): 597–622

– "Voting Behavior in the Ukrainian Parliament: The Language Factor." In T. Remington, ed., *Parliaments in Transition: The New Legislative Politics in Russia and Eastern Europe*, 125–58. Boulder, CO, 1994

Arel, D., and V. Khmelko. "The Russian Factor and the Territorial Polarization in Ukraine." *Harriman Review* 9, nos. 1–2 (1996): 81–91

Birch, S. "Electoral Systems, Campaign Strategies, and Vote Choice in the Ukrainian Parliamentary and Presidential Elections of 1994." *Political Studies* 46, no. 1 (1998): 96–114

- “*Nomenklatura* Democratization, Electoral Clientelism, and Party Formation in Post-Soviet Ukraine.” *Democratization* 4, no. 4 (1997): 40–62
- Bojcum, M. “The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March–April 1994.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 47, no. 2 (1995): 229–49
- Bremmer, I. “The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 46, no. 2 (1994): 261–83
- Chudowsky, V. “The Ukrainian Party System.” In J. Micgiel, ed., *State and Nation-Building in East Central Europe: Contemporary Perspectives*, 305–21. New York, 1996
- D’Anieri, P., R. Kravchuk, and T. Kuzio. *Politics and Society in Ukraine*. Boulder, CO, 1999
- Kuzio, T. *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation*. Armonk, NY, 1998
- “Kravchuk to Kuchma: The 1994 Presidential Elections in Ukraine.” *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 12, no. 2 (1996): 117–44
- “Ukraine: Coming to Terms with the Soviet Legacy.” *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 14, no. 4 (1998): 1–27
- *Ukraine under Kuchma: Political Reform, Economic Transformation and Security Policy in Independent Ukraine*. London and New York, 1997
- Kuzio, T., P. D’Anieri, and R. Kravchuk. *State and Institution Building in Ukraine*. New York, 1999
- Laba, R. “The Russian–Ukrainian Conflict: State, Nation and Identity.” *European Security* 4, no. 3 (1995): 457–87
- Molchanov, M. “Borders of Identity: Ukraine’s Political and Cultural Significance for Russia.” *CSP* 38, nos. 1–2 (1996): 177–93
- Motyl, A. “Structural Constraints and Starting Points: The Logic of Systematic Change in Ukraine and Russia.” *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 4 (1997): 433–47
- Motyl, A., and B. Krawchenko. “From Empire to Statehood.” In I. Bremmer and R. Taras, eds., *New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations*, 235–75. Cambridge, UK, 1997
- Pirie, P.S. “National Identity and Politics in Eastern and Southern Ukraine.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 48, no. 7 (1996): 1076–104
- Shved, V. “The Conceptual Approaches of Ukrainian Political Parties to Ethno-Political Problems in Independent Ukraine.” *IUS* 19, no. 2 (1994): 69–84
- Solchanyk, R. “The Politics of State-Building: Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 46, no.1 (1994): 47–68
- Vydrin, D., and D. Tabachnyk. *Ukraine on the Threshold of the xxist Century: Political Aspects*. Kiev, 1995
- Wilson, A. “The Donbas between Ukraine and Russia: The Use of History in Political Disputes.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 30, no. 2 (1995): 265–89
- “Ukraine: Two Presidents and Their Powers.” In R. Taras, ed., *Postcommunist Presidencies*, 67–195. Cambridge, UK, 1997
- Zimmerman, W. “Is Ukraine a Political Community?” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 31, no. 1 (1998): 43–55

ECONOMY

- Banaian, K. *The Ukrainian Economy since Independence*. Cheltenham, UK, 1999
- Dabrowski, M. "The Ukrainian Way to Hyperinflation." *Communist Economies and Economic Transformation* 6, no. 2 (1994): 115–37
- Dabrowski, M., and R. Antczak. "Economic Transition in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus: A Comparative Perspective." In B. Kaminski, ed., *Economic Transition in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, 42–80. Armonk, NY, 1996
- Havrylyshyn, O. "The Political Economy of Delayed Reform in Ukraine." in S. Wolchik and V. Zvigliyanich, eds., *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, 49–68. New York and Oxford, 1999
- Havrylyshyn, O., M. Miller, and W. Perradin. "Deficits, Inflation, and the Political Economy of Ukraine." *Economic Policy*, no. 19 (1994): 354–402
- Krasnov, G., and J. Brada. "Implicit Subsidies in Russian-Ukrainian Energy Trade." *Europe-Asia Studies* 49, no. 5 (1997): 825–43
- Kubicek, P. "Post-Soviet Ukraine: In Search of a Constituency for Reform." *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 13, no. 3 (1997): 103–26
- Kushnirsky, F. "Ukraine's Industrial Enterprise: Surviving Hard Times." *Comparative Economic Studies* 36, no. 4 (1994): 21–39
- Smolansky, O. "Ukraine's Quest of Independence: The Fuel Factor." *Europe-Asia Studies* 47, no. 1 (1995): 67–90

Society

- Bilokin, S. "The Kiev Patriarchate and the State." In M. Bourdeaux, ed. *The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, 182–210. Armonk, NY, 1995
- Bociurkiw, B. "Politics and Religion in Ukraine: The Orthodox and the Greek Catholics." In M. Bourdeaux, ed., *The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, 131–62. Armonk, NY, 1995
- Bohachevsky-Chomiak, M. "Women's Organizations in Independent Ukraine." In S. Wolchik and V. Zvigliyanich, eds., *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, 264–84. New York and Oxford, 1999
- Hesli, V. "Public Support for the Devolution of Power in Ukraine." *Europe-Asia Studies* 47, no. 1 (1995): 191–215
- Kuzio, T. "In Search of Unity and Autocephaly: Ukraine's Orthodox Churches." *Religion, State and Society* 25, no. 4 (1997): 393–415
- Markus, V. "Politics and Religion in Ukraine: In Search of a New Pluralistic Dimension." In M. Bourdeaux, ed., *The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, 163–181. Armonk, NY, 1995
- Miller, A., V. Hesli, and W. Reisinger. "Comparing Citizen and Elite Belief Systems in Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 59, no. 1 (1995): 1–40
- Pavlychko, S. "Progress on Hold: The Conservative Faces of Women in Ukraine." In

- M. Buckley, ed., *Post-Soviet Women: From the Baltic to Central Asia*, 219–34. Cambridge, UK, 1997
- Pohorila, N., ed. Ukraine: Special Issue. *International Journal of Sociology* 29, no. 3 (1999). Part I.
- Shevtsova, L. "Ukraine in the Context of New European Migrations." *International Migration Review* 26, no.2 (1992): 258–268
- Siegelbaum, S. and D. Walkowitz, eds., *Workers of the Donbas Speak: Survival and Identity in the New Ukraine*. New York, 1995
- Szporluk, R. "The Strange Politics of Lviv: An Essay in Search of an Explanation." In Z. Gitelman, ed., *The Politics of Nationality and the Erosion of the USSR*, 215–321. London, 1992

AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

- Aslund, Anders, and Michael McFaul, eds. *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough*. Washington DC, 2006
- Barrington, Lowell, and Erik Herron. "One Ukraine or Many: Regionalism in Ukraine and Its Political Consequences." *Nationalities Papers* 32 (2004): 53–86.
- Belcamedá, Margarita. *On the Edge: The Ukrainian–Central European–Russian Security Triangle*. Budapest, 2000
- D'Anieri, Paul. *Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics and Institutional Design*. Armonk NY, 2007
- Fritz, Verena. *State-Building: A Comparative Study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus and Russia*. Budapest, 2007
- Harasymiw, Bohdan. *Post-Communist Ukraine*. Edmonton, 2002
- Karatnycky, Adrian. "Thermidor in Ukraine." *Foreign Affairs*, 28 September 2005 – "Ukraine's Orange Revolution." *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2005)
- Kubicek, Paul. *Unbroken Ties: The State, Interest Associations and Corporatism in Post-Soviet Ukraine*. Ann Arbor, 2000
- Kuzio, Taras, ed. *Democratic Revolution in Ukraine: From Kuchmagate to Orange Revolution*. New York, 2009
- Kuzio, Taras, and Paul D'Anieri. *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation-Building in Ukraine*. Westport CT, 2002
- Molchanov, Mikhail. *Political Culture and National Identity in Russian–Ukrainian Relations*. College Station, TX, 2002
- Moroney, Jennifer, Taras Kuzio, and Mikhail Molchanov, eds. *Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy*. Westport CT, 2002
- Perepelytsia, Grigoryi, ed. *Foreign Policy of Ukraine: 2007*. Kyiv, 2008
- Plokyh, Serhii, and Frank Sysyn. *Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine*. Edmonton, 2003
- Razumkov Center. *National Security and Defence Magazine*. 2000–8
- Stewart, Susan. *Explaining the Low Intensity Ethnopolitical Conflict in Ukraine*. Muenster, 2005

Whitmore, Sarah. *State-Building in Ukraine: The Ukrainian Parliament, 1990–2003*.

London, 2004

Wilson, Andrew. *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*. New Haven CT, 2005

– *Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World*. New Haven CT, 2005

Wolczuk, Kateryna. *The Moulding of Ukraine: The Constitutional Politics of State Formation*. Budapest, 2001

Wolczuk, Kateryna, and Roman Wolczuk. *Poland and Ukraine: A Strategic Partnership in a Changing Europe*. London, 2003

Yekelchuk, Serhy. *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*. Oxford, 2007

Index

- Abazyn, Andrii, Cossack leader 161
Abwehr, German military intelligence 463
Act of Federation 358
Action Plan 646, 650
Activist Church of Christ 401
Adamkus, Valdas, president of Lithuania 638
Adelaide 567
Adventists (Seventh Day) 520
Aegean Sea 13
agrarian civilizations and societies 5–6;
 association of Ukrainians with 526
Agrarian Party 628
Agricultural Academy 419
agriculture: in Kievan Rus' 48–9; and
 grian boom 86–7; in the Hetmanate
 178–9; percent of labor force in 262;
 commercialization of 264–5; percent
 of West Ukrainians in 308; restructur-
 ing of 411–13; old problems in 433;
 Soviet failings in 485; attempts to
 improve 503–5; recent problems in
 528; recent reforms in 591–2; in post-
 Soviet period 623
Akademicheskii kruzhok 322
Akhmetov, Renat 660, 664
Akkerman, Ottoman fortress 112
Alans 13
Alaska 539
Alaska Herald 539
Alberta 546, 564
alcoholism 669; among peasants 310;
 attempts to combat 324
Aldeigjuborg 26
Aleksei Mikhailovich, tsar of Muscovy:
 and Pereiaslav Agreement 134–5, 144
Alexander I, Russian emperor: hopes for
 reform by 202; and founding of
 Kharkiv University 224
Alexander II, Russian emperor: and
 emancipation of serfs 252–4; passes
 Ems Ukaz 283; assassination of 288
Alexander the Great 11
Algirdas (Olgerd), Lithuanian ruler 70,
 75, 78
Algirdovych, Volodymyr 76
Allies 489
All-Russian Constituent Assembly 350
All-Ukrainian Association of Proletarian
 Writers. *See* VUSPP
All-Ukrainian Congress of Teachers 536
All-Ukrainian Church Council 400, 402
All-Ukrainian Union of Zemstva 358
Amazons 12
America and Americans 122, 262, 502,
 527, 539–40, 592, 639, 646, 662
“American Circle” 545
American Civil War 539
American mainland 26
American Revolution 539
Ameryka 561

- Amur Basin: immigration to 262
 anarchists. *See* Makhno, Nestor
 Anastasia, wife of Iaroslav Osmomysl 60
 Andrew, king of Hungary 60
 Andrievsky, Dmytro 446
 Andrii, son of Prince Iurii 64
 Andropov, Iurii, Soviet leader 534
 Andrusovo, Treaty of 146, 149
 Angles 22
 Anglo-Saxons 547
 Anhel, partisan leader 362
 Anne, daughter of Iaroslav the Wise 33
 Antes 21, 53
 "Anti-Apokrisis" 101
 anti-Semitism 277, 312; traces of 442; 471; and Kichko book 508; 535
 Antonenko-Davydovych, Borys: and Ukrainization 389
 Antonov-Ovseenko, Vladimir, Bolshevik commander 350, 364
 Antonovych, Volodymyr, Ukrainian historian: leader of *khlopomany* 281, 302; views of 281; opts for compromise 284; and General Ukrainian Organization 293; and Galicia 320, 329–30
 "Apokrisis" 101
 Apostol, Danylo: hetmancy of 167–8; landholdings of 181
 "Apostol" 98
apparatchiki 604, 610
 Arabs 22
 Arakcheev, Aleksei, Russian minister: and military colonies 203, 207
arenda and *arendar* 124
 Argentina: Ukrainians in interwar period 551, 554; DPS in 557, 565
 Arianism 94
 Arkhangelsk 180
 Armenia and Armenians 45, 62; in Poland-Lithuania 81, 84; in Lviv 86, 188; Helsinki Group in 517; relationship with diaspora 572
 Armija Krajowa (AK) 474
 army: in Kievan Rus' 43; Russian garrisons in Ukraine 203; disintegration of Russian imperial 345; Ukrainians in Austrian and Russian 340; Central Rada view of 348; in Skoropadsky Hetmanate 357; of Directory 362; of ZUNR and UNR 372; of Soviets 376; size of Nazi and Soviet 460
 Army Staff 349–50
 Arpad dynasty 63
 Arrow Cross 442
Arsenal 397
 Arsenii, Greek scholar 98
 Asia, 3, 5
 Asia, central 38
 Asia Minor, 38, 112
 Askold, Varangian leader 26–7
 Assembly of Estates 216
 assimilation: in the USSR 521–5; among Ukrainians abroad 544, 568, 572
 Association of Ukrainian Youth (SUM) 561, 567
 Athos, Mount 101
 Atlantic Ocean 26
 "An Attempt at a Collection of Ancient Little Russian Songs" 228
 Audit Union of Ukrainian Cooperatives (RSUK) 438
 Augsburg 555
 Australia: DPS in 557; 566; Ukrainian community in 567–8, 594
 Austria 112, 308, 487, 491, 541, 662; alleged support of Ukrainophiles 299; capital from 312; weakness of 318; invades Ukraine 353; removes Central Rada 356; refugees in 554; DPS in 557, 568
 Austrian Empire: nature of 212, 219, 238; change in 243; impact of reforms of 1848 in 259; Galicia as internal colony of 308, 432. *See also* Austro-Hungarian Empire; Habsburg empire; Habsburgs Austrians 592
 Austro-Hungarian Compromise 314
 Austro-Hungarian Empire: transformation into 314; defeat of 367; 448, 539
 autocracy: arguments in favor of 202–3; Shevchenko rejection of 234
 autonomy: Poltava nobles desire for 209;

- support of peasants for 298; demands for Galicia and Bukovyna 343; cultural for Jews and Russians 347; Provisional Government reneges on 347; proclaimed in Third Universal 350; of Transcarpathia 450; Hungarian promise of 458; and Shelest 512
 Azov Sea 161, 635, 648
- Babii, Ivan, educator 445
babski bunty 411
 Babyn Yar (Babi Yar): massacre at 468
 Bachchesarai, Peace of 148
 Bachynsky, Iuliiian 328
 Bachynsky, Lev 436
 Bačka region 568
 Badeni, Casimir, governor of Galicia 331; and elections of 1895 332
 Badowski, Polish nobleman 111
 Baghdad 26, 39
 Bahalii, Dmytro, Ukrainian historian 48, 302, 399
 Bahazy, Volodymyr 465
 Bahriany, Ivan 557
bakalary 155
 Bakhmach: pogrom in 363
 Bakunin, Mikhail, Russian revolutionary 287–8
 Balaban, Dionysii 156
 Balaban, Gedeon, churchman 99–100
 Balitsky, Vsevolod, OGPU chief 418
 Balkans 6, 19, 31
 Balta 267
 Baltic ports 180
 Baltic republics 581, 583, 634
 Baltic Sea: and trade in 25–6, 47; Hansa in 56, 70; Teutonic Order on 74, 87
 Baltic tribes 34
 Banat region 568
 Bandasiuk, Semeon, Russophile 341
 Bandera, Stepan, nationalist leader: arrest of 445; revolutionary activity of 446; and rift in OUN 459–60; and Germans 463–4; assassination of 566
 Bandera, Volodymyr, economist 529
 Banderites: conflict with Melnykites 557; gain control 561; in Great Britain 567
bandura, musical instrument 122
 Bantysh-Kamensky, Dmytro, historian 226
 Baptists: in Ukraine 520, 674; in USA 561, 631
 Bar 94, 106, 190
 Bar, Confederation of 192
 Barabash, Iakiv, Cossack leader 143
 Baran, Stefan 435
 Baranovych, Lazar, churchman 155–6
 Barbareum 217
 Bariatinsky, Prince, Russian official 169
 Baroque: in Ukraine 160–1, 195–6
barshchina 179
 Barsky, Ivan Hryhorovych, architect 197
 Batoszice 571
 Barvinsky, Oleksander, Ukrainian activist 331
 Barvinsky brothers 321
 Basilian Order 440, 550, 567
 Batih, battle of 132
 Batory, Stefan, king of Poland 111, 125
 Batu, Mongol leader 39, 62
 Baturyn 141; Hetman's residence in 159; massacre at 164, 166, 171; plans for founding university in 195
 Bavaria 555
 Bayer, Gottlieb, German scholar 22
 Bazhan, Mykola, poet 396, 419
 "Beauty and Strength" 304
 Beketov, N., scholar 301
 Belarus. *See* Belorussia
 Belgium and Belgians 209; investment in Ukraine 267, 557
 Belinsky, Vissarion, Russian critic 234
 Belorussia 583, 646; and Union of Brest 99–100, 276; Belorussians 21; in Duchy of Lithuania 52–4, 69–70, 72; in Commonwealth 81, 114, 93, 96; in Poland 427, 454, 473, 475, 487, 534, 602
 Belorussian language 21
 Belsky, Fedir 78
 Belz 82, 99
 Belz, province of 154
 Bender 165
 "Bender Constitution" 165

- Benedict XII, Pope 73
 Berchtesgaden 555
 Berdychiv 161, 269
 Berestechko, battle of 132, 138
 Bereza Kartuzka, concentration camp:
 established in 430; Ukrainians in 431;
 OUN leadership in 445–6
 Berezil, theatrical troupe 397; shut
 down 419
 Berezovsky, Boris 639
 Berezovsky, Maksym, composer 197
 Beria, Lavrentii, secret police chief 496
 Berlin: and OUN 463; support of 464,
 489, 552
 Berynda, Pamba 119, 121
 Bessarabia 447, 455, 602
 Bestuzhev-Riumin brothers 209
 Bezborodko, Oleksander: views of 203,
 227
 Bezborodko family 182
 Bezsmertny, Roman, government minis-
 ter 641
 Bibikov, Dmitrii, Russian governor-
 general: and reforms on Right
 Bank 211–12
 Bible 99
bidniaky, formation and features of 263.
 See also peasants
 Bila Tserkva 106, 113, 117, 269; Direc-
 tory base 358
 Bilas, Vasyl, nationalist 445
 Bilhorod 153
biliny 51
 Bilozersky, Vasyl 236, 280
Bilshovyk Ukrainy 393
 Bilynsky, Yaroslav, scholar 487
 Biron, Ernst 169–70
Bironovshchina 169
bisurmany 112
 “Black Council” 149
 Black Hundreds: pogroms of 277,
 291
 Black Sea 3, 5, 6, 9; access to Mediter-
 ranean 11–13; Greek colonies on 15,
 25, 34, 57, 78, 82, 106, 110, 180, 185,
 188; export of wheat in 264;
 passim 447, 460, 528
 Black Sea coast: development of 188,
 238, 524
 Black Sea fleet 585, 586, 599, 600, 609,
 610, 647, 650, 651, 657, 658
 Black Sea Host 176
 Blakytny, Vasyl 384. *See* Ellan-Blakytny
 “Bloody elections” of 1895 332
 “Bloody Sunday” 296
 Bluecoat Division: formulation of 343
Boa Constrictor 327
 Bobrinsky family 265
 Bobrinsky, Georgii, governor 341
 Bodiansky, Osyp, scholar 229, 241; eval-
 uation of Kvitka-Osnovianenko 231
 Bogoliubsky, Andrei: destroys Kiev, 38,
 41; absolutist tendencies of 56, 60
 Bodrug, Ivan, immigrant activist 550
Bohdan Khmelnytsky, opera 494
 Bohemia 31
 Bohun, Ivan, Cossack leader 128
 Bohuslav 154, 193
 Boichuk, Ivan 192
 Boikos, regional group 432
 Bologna Agreement 667
 Bolsheviks (Russian Social Democratic
 Party–Bolshevik): emergence of 291;
 antiseperatism of 292; seize power
 348; number in Ukraine 348–9; and
 Ukrainian movement 349; cooperate
 with Central Rada 349–50; conflict
 with Central Rada 350–2; failure of
 uprising 358; second invasion of
 Ukraine 361–2; debate Ukrainian
 issue 364; number of 364; antagonize
 peasants 365; strengths of 378; and
 nationalism 383, 521, 551 and *passim*
 Bolsheviks, Central Asian 385
 Bolsheviks, Georgian 385, 390
 bolshevism 420
 “Book of the Genesis of the Ukrainian
 People” 236
 Boretsky, Iob, churchman 98, 119; con-
 secrated as metropolitan 120
 Boretsky, Mykola, churchman 417
 Bormann, Martin, Hitler associate 463
Borotba 363
 Borotbisty: secession of 363; and

- Bolsheviks 365; agitate for Ukrainian state 383–4. *See also* Communist Party of Ukraine
- Borovets, Taras (Bulba), partisan leader: and formation of UPA 473–4
- Borovykovsky, Levko, writer 231
- Bortniansky, Danylo, composer 197
- Borys, son of Volodymyr 34
- Boryslav 312
- Boryslav Is Laughing* 327
- Bosnia 568
- Bosnia-Herzegovina 645
- Bosphorus, Cimmerian 13
- Bosphorus, Straits of 252
- bourgeoisie: lack of 271
- boyars 37, 44; formation of 45, 47; in Galicia 56, 59, 61, 63; in Volhynia 59, 60, 70, 74, 76. *See also muzhi*; nobles
- Bradford 566
- Braichevsky, Mykhailo, Soviet historian 136
- Branicki family 189, 265, 275
- Brashchaiko, Mykhailo and Iulii 450
- Bratislava 569–70
- Bratslav 82; Tatar raids on 106; colonization of 107–8; Cossack insurrections in 113–14, 189, 190, 192
- Brautigam, Otto, Nazi official 470
- Brazil 311; 539; immigration to 545–6, 548, 565
- Brest 100, 583
- Brest-Litovsk, treaty of: terms of 352–3
- Brezhnev, Leonid, Soviet leader 486: era of 510–13, 515–16, 534–5
- Britain: Ukrainians in 566–7
- British Foreign Office: and 1932–33 Famine 416
- Briukhovetsky, Ivan 147, hetmancy of 147–50
- Brodii, Andrei 459
- Brodsky family 265
- Brody: percent of Jews in 311; battle at 477
- Bronevsky, Martyn 101
- Bronski, Krzysztof, author 97
- brotherhood (*bratstvo*): activity of 97–9, 115–16
- Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius 235; members of 236; goals and significance of 236–7, 279
- Brotherhood of Taras (Bratstvo Tarasivtsiv): formation and program of 293
- Brussels 644, 646, 649
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew 598
- Bucharest 569; University of 569
- Budapest 543
- Budka, Nykyta, churchman 549
- Budzynovsky, Viacheslav 323
- Buh Cossacks 176
- Buh River 3, 6, 13
- Buiurak, Vasyl 192
- Bujak, Francizek, Polish historian 333
- Bukovyna 91, 154, 177; population of 189; incorporation into Austrian Empire 213, 238, 248; revolution of 1848 in 250, 307–8; and spread of Russophilism 317; periodicals in 327; ethnic composition of 333; policy of Vienna in 334; Russophiles and Ukrainophiles in 334; occupied by Romanians 368; under Romanian rule 446–8; Soviets occupy 445, 483; immigrants from 546, 549, 560; in contemporary Romania 568, 602
- Buldovsky, Teofil, churchman 402
- Bulgaria and Bulgarians 31, 33; Russophilism of 317, 525, in the new era 592
- Bulgarian language 20
- Bulgars, Volga 29, 56
- Bund 291
- Bunge, Mykola, scholar 302
- Bunyan, Paul 51
- bureaucracy 655; function of 201; in Russian Empire and Ukraine 202–4; and Russification 203; ethnic composition and numbers of 204–5; in Austrian Empire 211–12; in Galicia 215; Polonization of 315; Vynnychenko view of 348; of Skoropadsky government 357–8; Ukrainians excluded from 434; Malenkov, spokesman of 496
- burghers 83, 89, 110, 185

- Burundai, Mongol leader 63
- Bush, George 580, 583; administration 644, 651
- Busha, battle of 136
- Buturlin, Vasiliï, Muscovite boyar 134
- BYuT (Fatherland) Party 641, 642, 643
- Byzantine Rite 547
- Byzantium and Byzantines 25–6, 28–9; turn against Sviatoslav 31; and Christianization of Rus' 33–4; attack on 35; links with 38, 41; pact with 47; cultural impact of 49–50, 52. *See also* Constantinople
- Calvinism 94, 99
- Canada 638; early immigration to 262, 311, 528, 539; immigration to 545–51, 672, 673; DPS in 553–4, 557–9, 561; Ukrainian community in 563–5, 567; in the new era 583, 593, 594
- Canadian Communist Party 553
- Canadian Friends of Rukh 593
- Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies 564–5
- Canaris, Wilhelm, admiral 463
- Carolingian empire 55
- Carpathian Mountains 3, 8, 19, 34, 55, 57, 60, 63, 84, 91; “social banditry” in 190, 448, 450, 455, 473; Kovpak’s raid to 476, 477, 570
- Carpathian Sich 450–1
- Carpatho-Ukraine: autonomy of 450–1; Hitler treatment of 463. *See also* Transcarpathia
- Casimir Jagiello, Grand Prince of Lithuania 77
- Casimir, Jan, king of Poland 129, 132, 145, 147
- Casimir the Great, Polish ruler 72–3
- Caspian Sea 8, 22, 26, 28, 47
- Catherine II, empress of Russia 154, 171; and liquidation of Hetmanate 172; and nobles 172–3, 174; and expansion of Russia 176–7, 182, 184, 192, 202; rationale for ruling Ukraine 203, 217; Shevchenko view of 235
- Catholic church 72, 74, 99–101
- Catholicism 75; in towns 86; adopted by nobles 89, 92, 95; attraction of 98, 102, 119; conversion of Orthodox to 190, 193
- Catholics 76, 86
- Caucasian lowlands 9
- “Caucasus” 235
- Caucasus Mountains 6, 13, 29, 31, 39, 182, 384
- Cecora, battle of 113
- Central Asia 384, 529–30, 532
- Central Committee of the Communist Party 418, 493–4, 499, 514
- Central Election Commission 637
- Central European Initiative 602
- Central Partisan Staff 475
- Central Powers 339; and Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 352–3
- Central Rada: formation of 345; support for 346; and Russians and Jews 346; and Provisional Government 347; policy toward army and bureaucracy 348; conflict with Provisional Government 349–50; conflict with Bolsheviks 350–2; loss of popularity 353; evaluation of 353–4; removed by Germans and Austrians 352; diplomatic relations of 357; association with Germans 378; recognized by Bolsheviks 383
- centralism, Russian 194; in Ukraine 204; Pestel support for 208; on Right Bank 210–11; Habsburg policy of 218; Shumsky attack on 393, 403; Shcherbytsky support of 513
- chaika* 112
- Chaikovsky, Mikhail, Russian revolutionary 287
- Chaikovsky family 83
- Chaly, Sava, Zaporozhian leader 192
- Charlemagne, emperor of the Franks 55
- Charles XII, king of Sweden: and Mazepa 163–5
- Charter of Nobility 173, 182
- Chartorysky family 83, 95. *See also* Czartoryski

- chauvinism: Great Russian 385, 394, 397, 418; Stalin rationale for 423
- Chechnya 609
- Cheka: Jews in 363; lead by Latsis 365, 374; and partisans 377, 381
- Chekhivsky, Volodymyr, UNR minister 360, 362; trial of 417
- Chepa, Adrian, Ukrainian noble 226
- Cherkasy 106, 109, 193; pogrom in 363
- chern* 45; conflict with *starshyna* 182
- Chernenko, Konstantin, Soviet leader 534
- Chernihiv 667, 671; assigned to princes 34–5, 38, 48, 61; under Lithuanian rule 77–8
- Chernihiv, province of: education during 18th and 19th centuries 300
- Chernivtsi 667; RUP publications in 294
- Chernivtsi University 334
- Chernobyl: nuclear disaster at 534–5, 574, 582, 590, 593, 619, 626, 627
- chernozem (black soil) 3, 5, 254
- Chernysh, Vasyl, Ukrainian noble 226
- Chernyshevsky, Nikolai, Russian literary critic 303
- Chersonesus (Korsun) 13, 33
- Chervonohrad 576
- Chetvertynsky, Gedeon Sviatopolk, churchman 156
- Chetvertynsky family 83
- China 12, 39, 390, 508, 660
- Chornovil, Viacheslav, dissident 517–18, 577, 583, 588; death of 613
“Chornovil Papers” 517
- Chorny, Hrytsko, Cossack leader 117
- Chortkiv: offensive at 370
- Chotyry shabli* 397
- Christianity: Volodymyr choice of 33; introduction of 41; and social change 45–6, 49; cultural impact of 50–1, 73, 99, 105; and Cossacks 113
- Christianization of Kievan Rus’ 33, 51, 535, 563, 567
- “Chronicle of Bygone Years” (*Povest vremennykh let*): compiler of 23; sympathetic to Olha 28; and Sviatoslav 29, 31, 33, 51
- Chubar, Vlas, Ukrainian Bolshevik 388
- Chubynsky, Pavlo, Ukrainian activist 283
- Chudniv, battle of 145
- Chuds 22
- Chuprynka, Taras, general. *See* Shukhevych, Roman
- church: in the Hetmanate 193–4; role among immigrants 541. *See also* clergy; Greek Catholic church; Orthodox church
- Church Slavonic 50, 96, 197, 217, 234, 239, 318, 401
- churches and cathedrals: Church of St Sophia 35, 50, 52; Hagia Sophia 35, 50; Bohoiavlensky church 119; St George cathedral 198, 247; St Sophia (Rome) 567
- Chyhyryn 117, 132, 137, 141; campaigns for 147–8, 154
- Chyhyryn Conspiracy 288
- Chyhyryn Cossack regiment 126
- Chykalenko, Evhen, Ukrainian activist 95, 345
- Cimmerians 9
- cis 635, 647; creation of 583, 585, 589, 599, 600, 601
- cities: and Ukrainization 389–90; dramatic expansion of 408; Nazi policies in 469; percentage of Ukrainians in 526. *See also* towns; urbanization
- Civic Congress 609
- Civil War: Ukraine’s casualties in 380; Bolshevik policies in 380–1, 385, 387; kulaks in 410, 597
- Clement VIII, pope 100
- clergy: appearance of 45, 50; number in Hetmanate 185; Greek Catholic in Galicia 214–15; and West Ukrainian intelligentsia 238; role in 1848 revolution 247–51; pro-Habsburg attitudes of 251; and spread of Russophilism 317; and Populists 320; influence of 322; in Transcarpathia 335; role among immigrants 541–2; and Mag-

- yarization of 449; in Hungarian occupation 459; and Galician/Transcarpathian schism 542–4, 553
 Clerical Society 240
 Clinton, Bill 601; administration 644
 coal mining 660
 Coalition of National Unity 641
 Cold War 565
 collaboration: issue of 471; types of 472
 collective farms 592
 collectivization: attempts at 365, 376; in first FYP 405; rationale for 409; and industrialization 409; tactics in 411; renewed efforts in 412, 418; in Western Ukraine 456; after Second World War 485, 491–2
 colonialism: and industrialization in Ukraine 268–9; “Asian” and “European” types of 269; views of Volobuev on 393–4; economists on 407; Polish policy of 429; in Eastern Galicia 433; in form of “brotherhood” 522; issue of 528–9
 colonization: of Ukraine 106–8; of southern Ukraine 185–8
 commerce: in Kievan Rus’ 47–9; in grain 86–7; in the Hetmanate 179–81; Russian advantages in 166, 180; and links with Russia 267; role of Jews in 311; in Eastern Galicia 311–12
 Commissariat of Education 389; purge of 419
 Committee for the Defense of the Ukrainian Catholic Church 519
 Committee of National Salvation 637
 Committees of Poor Peasants 376; revived 410
 Commonwealth. *See* Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth
 Commonwealth of Independent States. *See* CIS
 commune (*mir*, *zadruga*) 42
 commune (*obshchina*): relative absence in Ukraine 256; issue of 289
 Communist International: and Borotbisty 384, 393, 436
 Communist Party of Eastern Galicia 436
 Communist party of the USSR: and interpretation of Pereiaslav Agreement 135–6; mainly Russian 386
 Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) 634, 641, 642, 653, 654; purge of 419; liquidation of leadership 420, 475; increased influence of 485–6, 492, 497, 509; and recon-struction 504–5; differences with Moscow 510–12; growth spurt of 514; in the new era 577, 581, 588, 599, 606, 611–12, 613–16. *See also* Communists, Ukrainian
 Communist Party of the Ukraine (Borotbist). *See* Borotbisty
 Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine – CP(b)U 364, 376; purge of 418. *See also* Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU)
 Communist Party of Western Ukraine. *See* KPZU
 Communists 576; and reforms 577–8, 580, 583, 585; in Crimea 587, 593
 Communists, Russian: Shumsky criticism of 393
 Communists, Ukrainian: and Ukrainization 388; and nationality question 391; and Shumskyism 392–3; and FYP 407; and grain procurements 413; Postyshev castigates 414; dilemma of 418–19. *See also* Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU)
 companions of the standard, Cossack elite 151
 Comte, August, French philosopher 303
 concentration camps 420; uprisings in 502; Solzhenitsyn on 506
 Conference on Culture and Language 516
 Congress of National Democratic Forces 588
 Congress of Toilers 361
 Congress of Workers 346
 Connecticut 540
 Conquest, Robert, historian: on 1932–33 harvest 413; on 1932–33 Famine cover-up 416

- conservatism: weakness in Ukraine 296; clerical 437. *See also* Ukrainian Monarchists
- Constantinople: as commercial center 26–7; attacked 28; religious influence of 33–5, 39, 45, 47, 50; fall of 77–8, 93, 97, 110; Cossack attacks on 112
- Constantinople, patriarch of 99
- Constitution of 1996 605, 612
- Constitutional Agreement 611
- Constitutional Court 635
- Constitutional Democrats (Kadets) 291
- Contra Spem Spero* 304
- cooperatives: proliferation in Eastern Ukraine 297; growth in Western Ukraine 324–5; impact on Jews 325; closed by Russians 341; urge compromise 431; as school for self-government 437; organization and growth of 438; eliminated 455
- Copernicus, astronomer 93
- corruption 640, 642, 655, 671
- corvée: abolition of 245–6
- Cossack chronicles 196–7
- Cossack traditions: popularity of 207, 242; favorite topic of Romantics 231
- Cossackdom 109, 113; hopes for renewal 252
- Cossacks 5, 29, 105; origins of 108; early organization of 109; registered 110–11, 117; social change among 181–2; decline of 182–4; number in Hetmanate 185; in 1861 emancipation 256; cult of 281, 316; in Skoropadsky Hetmanate 356; idealization of 422, 512, 539
- Cossacks, of Danube 176
- Cossacks, of Kuban 176
- Council of Ambassadors 371, 427
- Council of Florence 99
- Counciliar-Episcopal church 402
- Counter-Reformation 94
- Coup of 19 August 581
- Coventry 566
- Cracow 47, 63, 72, 94; center of Ukrainian refugees 457, 458, 470
- Crimea: Scythians in 11; Greek colonies in 13, 86, Cossack attacks on 109–10, 112; factions in 116, 477, 483, 494; transfer to Ukraine 499–500, 530; in the new era 578, 581, 585, 586, 587, 599, 600, 601, 608–9, 612, 649, 657, 658, 675
- Crimean Khanate: founding of 78–80, 106; absorption of 176; administrative division of 204
- Crimean Mountains 3
- Crimean Tatars 675; expulsion of 483–4; homeland of 499–500
- Crimean War: participants in 252; and emancipation of serfs 253; lack of transportation in 265
- Croatia 122, 442
- Croatians, White 57
- Cro-Magnons (*Homo sapiens*) 6
- Cromwell, Oliver, English statesman 137
- Crusaders 39, 47
- cultural activity: in Kievan Rus' 49–52; in Poland-Lithuania 92–9; in Hetmanate 195–7; in 1861–1914 period 299–305; state support for 394; renaissance in 394–9; impact of revolution on 395
- Cultural Association of Ukrainian Workers (KSUT), in Czechoslovakia 569
- Curzon Line 481
- Cyprus 662
- Cyril, Saint, of Turiv 51
- Cyril and Methodius, saints 50
- Czajkowski, Michal, Polish nobleman 237
- Czaplinski, Daniel, Polish nobleman 126
- Czarnecki, Stefan, Polish commander 146
- Czartoryski family 189, 275. *See also* Chartorysky
- Czech Republic 601, 622, 673
- Czechowski, Emilian 445
- Czechoslovakia 20, 33, 74; Ukrainian émigrés in 551–2, 555, 565; current status of Ukrainians in 568–9, 572
- Czechs: in Galicia 215; at Slav Congress 248; Russophilism of 317, 323, 425, 439, 443; rule in Transcarpathia 448–50, 480, 483, 490, 511

- Dadenkov, Iurii, Soviet official 512
 Dallin, Alexander, historian 465
dan' 46
 Danes 262
 Danube River 11, 31, 60
 Danylo, prince of Galicia and Volhynia 39; reign of 61–3
 Danylyshyn, Dmytro, nationalist 445
 Darius, Persian king 11
 Darwin, Charles, scholar 302
 Dashkevych, Ostafii, border official 109
 Daszynski, Feliks 330
 Davies, Norman, English historian 124
 d'Azegli, Massimo 605
 Dazhboh, pagan god 49
 De Courtney, Jan Bedouin, scholar 299
 Debohory-Mokrievych, Volodymyr, revolutionary 287
 Decembrist Revolt: failure of 202; 205 impact in Ukraine 207–9
 Decembrists 232–3
 decentralization 608
 Declaration (of Directory) 361
 “Declaration of Faith of Young Ukrainians” 293
 Declaration of Understanding and Unity 602
 “Deluge” 136
 Demjanjuk, John 562
 Democratic Bloc 576, 577
 demography 670–2
 Denikin, Anton, general: and pogroms 363–4; offensive of 365, 373
 deportations: by Austrians and Russians 341; of kulaks 410; in Western Ukraine 456, 479; of UPA supporters 489; of Lemkos 490
 Derevlianians 21, 28–9, 31, 43
 “A Description According to the Chronicles of Little Russia” 226
 de-Stalinization 500–2, 506–7, 515–16
 Detko, Dmytro, Galician boyar 73, 80
 Diakonov, Nikolai, Russian legal specialist 135
 “Dialogue of Little Russia with Great Russia” 197
 Didytsky, Bohdan 318
 diet: of average Ukrainian 85; in 19th century 262; of East Galician peasants 310
Dilo 321; founding of 327
 Dir, Varangian leader 26, 27
 Directory: formation and uprising of 358–9; composition and goals of 360–1; conflict within 361; foreign relations of 361–3; and pogroms 363–4; administration and army of 372, 378; ecclesiastical policy of 400. *See also* Petliura
 displaced persons (DPS) 673; in Germany and Austria 554–5, 557, 560; disperse in West 563–6, 667
 dissent: emerges among intelligentsia 510, 514–15; main current in 515; manifestations of 516–18; religious 519–20; suppression of 520–1
 Divochka, Onysifor, churchman 93
 Divovych, Semen, author 197
 “Dizziness with Success” 411
 Dmowski, Roman, Polish leader 333; discredits Ukrainians 371, 428
 Dmytriw, Nestor, churchman 548
 Dmytro, Galician military commander 61
 Dnieper basin 105, 108
 “Dnieper clan” 512
 Dnieper rapids 27, 31, 109
 Dnieper River route 25, 36, 38
 Dnipropetrovsk 408, 465, 477, 514, 527, 576, 592, 614, 616, 622, 628, 631, 635, 654, 664, 665, 667, 668
 Dnister Insurance company 325
 Dnister River 3, 6, 9, 57, 59, 78, 106
 Dobriansky, Adolf, Transcarpathian leader 250, 334; Russophilism of 318
 Dobrudja 568
Dr. Zhivago 506
 Dołęga-Chodakowski, Zorian, Polish noble 237
 Dolenko, Volodymyr 470
 Dominican Order 74
 Don River 9, 12, 109, 122
 Donbas: coal miners in 270, 272, 637, 660; new plants in 406, 461, 477, 514;

- as part of "Russified" Ukraine 525, 578, 587, 607–10; strike in 620
- Donets basin: development of 267, 278
- Donetsk 268, 524, 527, 576, 578, 592, 608, 613–14, 622, 627–8, 654, 663, 664, 665, 667, 668, 670, 671; clan 635, 637, 643
- Dontsov, Dmytro, ideologue: views of 441–2, 552
- Dorohochyn, city of 62
- Doroshenko, Dmytro, Ukrainian scholar and activist 345; Skoropadsky minister 357, 552
- Doroshenko, Mykhailo, Cossack leader 116–17
- Doroshenko, Petro: hetmancy of 146–8; and Briukhovetsky 150; on Right Bank 151, 160
- Dostoevsky Fedor, Russian author 280, 423
- Dovbush, Oleksa, leader of *opryshky* 192
- Dovzhenko, Oleksander 397, 419, 501
- Drach, Ivan, poet 507, 515, 536, 587
- Drahomanov, Mykhailo, Ukrainian intellectual: and Aron Liberman 278; member of Old Hromada 282; contacts with Galicians 282; exile of 283; and emergence of Ukrainian socialism 284–6; federalism of 285, 286, 304; and Galician socialism 322; and Radicals 328, 329, 502
- Drai-Khmara, Mykhailo 396
- drevnerusskii narod* 54
- Drohobych 312
- Drozdenko, Vasyl, Cossack leader 146
- Druh* 322
- Druzhnyi lykhvar 322
- druzhyna*: Scandinavian members of 25; Ihor and 28, 31, 42; senior and junior members of 44–6
- Dubček government 569–70
- Dubno 190
- Dudykevych, Bohdan 497
- Dudykevych, Volodymyr 341
- Dukhnovych, Aleksander 334
- Dukhnovych Society 449–50
- Dulibians 21, 57
- duma* 43, 44, 122
- Duma (parliament): elections to 298; liberal members of 344
- Duranty, Walter, journalist: and 1932–33 Famine cover-up 416
- Durnovo, Petr, Russian minister 298
- dvorianstvo* 181
- dvoryshche* 90
- dvoviria* 44
- Dzhalali, Filon, Cossack leader 128, 132
- Dziuba, Ivan, critic and erstwhile dissident 507; criticizes nationality policy 515–17, 523
- East India Company 27
- East Prussia 570
- Eastern Europe 19, 60, 63, 69, 83, 90, 112, 122, 654; sovereignty in 133; and Pereia-slav Agreement 135, 142, 157, 173, 176–7; intelligentsia in 223; Revolution of 1848 in 244, 262, 425; bureaucracy in 434; rightist movements in 442; political extremism in 451; division of 454, 467, 527–8, 532
- Eastern Little Poland 428
- Eastern Partnership 645
- economy: of Hetmanate 178–81. *See also* agriculture; commerce; industrialization; manufacturing
- Edmonton 546; Ukrainians in 550; 563; Ukrainian mayor of 564
- Edna-Star: Ukrainian community in 546
- education: in Hetmanate 194–5; impact of Habsburg reforms 217; and West Ukrainian intelligentsia 238; impact of 1860s reforms on 258; expansion of 271; calls for Ukrainization of 298; comparison between 18th and 19th centuries 300; new universities and *gymnazia* 300–1; Polonization of 316; and Prosvita 323; expansion of 325; Ukrainians underrepresented in 326; in Transcarpathia 335; support of Hetmanate 357; and Ukrainization 388–9; innovations in 397–8; reversals in 419; in Polish-ruled Ukraine 438–40; Ukrainization in Western Ukraine 455; Nazi attitude toward

- 469; expanded opportunities in 492; reform of 1958 in 502; language in schools 536; among immigrants in Canada 549–50. *See also* Kievan Mohyla Academy; Kiev (St Vladimir's) University; Kharkiv University; Lviv University
- Efimenko, Oleksander, scholar 302
- Efremov, Serhii, scholar and activist 345; on Central Rada 354, 399; trial of 417
- Egan, Edmund: on peasant/Jewish relations 311–12
- Egypt 644
- Einsatzgruppen* 468
- Elbe River 19
- Electoral Commission 638
- electoral system: in Galicia 314; reforms of 331–2
- Eleniak, Vasyl, early pioneer 546
- elite, in Ukraine 96, 102; post-Soviet 621, 624–5. *See also* *apparatchiki*; *nomenklatura*
- Elizabeth, Russian empress 170–1
- Ellan-Blakytyn, Vasyl: organizes Hart 395; death of 396, 507
- emancipation of serfs 252; interpretations of 253; impact in Ukraine 254; failure to improve economic conditions 260
- Emergency Committee 581
- emigration 672–3; of Ukrainians eastward 262; necessity of 310; destinations of 311; ineffectiveness of 433
- émigrés: activity of Orlyk 165; Draho-manov in Geneva 285; associated with svu 340, 501; of 1917–20 period 551–2; post-Second World War 553, 554–7; Soviet 532. *See also* displaced persons
- Ems Ukaz: enactment and impact of 283–4, 321
- Encyclopedia of Ukraine* 565
- Eneida*, significance of 230–1
- Engels, Friedrich 90; links with Podolynsky 286, 291
- England 26, 252, 594, 639; capital from 312; and ZUNR 371; and Eastern Galicia 427, 454; Ukrainians in 566
- Entente 339, 358; blocking bolshevism 361; and ZUNR 370–1; and independence struggle 378, 425
- Entsyklopedia ukrainoznavstva* 566
- estate system, in Ukraine 82–5
- Estonia 532
- Eternal Peace of 1686 151
- Eurasia 31
- Eurasian 655
- Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) 635, 647, 662
- Eurasian steppe 8, 9, 13
- Europe 3, 5, 22, 33, 35, 44, 81, 89, 643, 649, 651, 658, 661, 666, 671, 673; tolerance in 94; social hierarchy in 95, 108, 533
- Europe, Western 45, 121, 659
- European parliament 648, 649
- European Union (EU) 638, 644 *passim*, 650, 652, 661, 662
- “Eye Witness Chronicle” 127, 156
- Ezhov, Nikolai: sent to Ukraine 420
- factionalism: among radical intelligentsia 295
- Fainsod, Merle, Sovietologist 511
- Famine of 1921–22: causes of 381
- Famine of 1932–33 658, 659; significance of 413; man-made aspects of 414, 582; descriptions of 414–15; deaths in 415; attempts to cover up 416; demographic costs of 529; and *glasnost* 535, 562, 565, 574
- Far East: number of Ukrainians in 262, 297
- farming, in Ukraine 5, 48. *See also* agriculture
- fascism: and OUN ideology 442
- Fastiv 154, 163, 193; pogrom in 363
- Fata Morgana* 304
- February Revolution: nature of 344, 348
- Fedak, Stepan 443
- Fedorov, Ivan, printer 96, 98
- federalism: views of Sts Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood 236; Draho-manov views on 285; views of

- Ukrainian moderates 295; call for 350; Soviet type of 385–7, 609
- Federation of Labor 627
- Federation of Ukrainian Organizations (Australia) 567
- Federation of Ukrainians in the USA 545
- Fedorovych, Taras (Triasylo), Cossack leader 117
- Fedorchuk, V.V. 512, 517
- Feldman, Wilhelm 329
- Fentsik, Stepan 459
- Ferley, Taras 550
- feudalism: in Kievan Rus' 46–7
- FIFA 647
- Filalet, Khristofor 101
- Filaret, Metropolitan 579, 630; Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kiev Patriarchate 674
- Filenko, Volodymyr 588
- Finno-Ugric lands 19
- Finns 23, 27, 34, 45, 205
- First World War: nature of 339; Ukrainians in 339–44; Russia's casualties in 344; Galicia in 340–4; aftermath of 425, 433, 472; immigration prior to 538, 540–1, 545, 547; antiforeigner hysteria in 550, 553
- Five Year Plans (FYP): goals of first 405–7; second and third 406–7; role of Ukraine in 415; fourth 484
- Fokin, Vitold 586, 592, 620
- folklore: role in development of national consciousness 227–9
- folwark* (*filwark*) 87
- Fomenko, M. 536
- "Forest Nymph" 304
- Forum* 561
- France 5, 645, 649; Norsemen raids in 26, 35; Anna, queen of 52, 53, 209, 252; investors in 267, 291; defeats Habsburgs 314; supports Russia 352; French in Odessa 361; and Directory 362; and ZUNR 371; and Eastern Galicia 427, 454, 480, 485; DPS in 557; Ukrainians in 566
- Francis I, Habsburg emperor 218
- Franciscan Order 74
- Frank, Hans, Nazi official 457
- Franko, Ivan, Ukrainian writer 305; on servitudes 309; founds Radical party 322, 323; works of 326–7; and National Democratic party 328; and Radicals 328; compromise attempts of 330, 455
- Franz Joseph, Austrian emperor: coronation of 249
- fraternal organizations: among Ukrainian immigrants 544–5
- Frederich I Barbarossa, German ruler 59
- "Free Cossacks" 350, 356
- French Revolution: and development of national consciousness 222, 232
- Frunze, Mikhail 389
- Frycz-Moderzewski, Andrzej, political theorist 93
- Futurists, literary group 396
- Fylypovych, Pavlo 396
- Galagan, Hryhorii 253; supports *Osnova* 280
- Galan, Iaroslav, propagandist 488; assassination of 490
- Galiatovsky, Ianokii, churchman 155
- Galicia 3, 48, 53, 83, 674; Polonization in 86–7, 91, 105–7, 114–15, 119; incorporation into Austrian Empire 213; Habsburg reforms in 216–18; demands for division of 248–9; socioeconomic conditions in 307–13; population of 308; Polish goals in 315–16; spread of Russophilism in 317; socialism in 322–3; in First World War 341; conflict in 367–70; Polish rule in 429–30 *passim*; and Carpatho-Ukraine 449–51; Soviet and German occupation of 456–8 *passim*, 520, 541; Galician/Transcarpathian schism 542–4; immigrants from 544–6, 548–9. *See also* Galicia, Eastern; Ukrainians, West
- Galicia, Eastern 188; population of 189; socioeconomic disadvantages of 218; proletariat in 312; education and cultural activity in 323–7; organizational

- upsurge in 323–9; Russian occupation of 341, 357; Polish policy in 427–9; as internal colony 433; organizational activity in 438–9; OUN in 443–4
 Galicia, Western 244
 Galician Division 472, 477; among DPS 555; in Britain 566–7
 Galician National Guard 250
 Galician Radical Party 549–50. *See also* Radicals
 Galician-Ruthenian Matytsia. *See* Halytsko Ruska Matytsia
 Galicia-Volhynia, principalities of 55–65, 69, 70; Polish expansion in 72–4, 79, 80, 82, 92
 Gapon, Georgii 296
Gardariki 21
 “Gathering of Rus” 75
 Gaul 53
 Gazprom 651, 652
 Gdansk 87
 Gediminas (Gedymin), Lithuanian ruler 70, 75, 83
 Gendarmes, Corps of: formation of 202
 General Government (Gouvernement) 467, 469–70; and UCC 457–8
 General Secretariat (UNR): formation of 347
 General Secretariat (ZUNR) 368
 General Ukrainian Council (Zahalna Ukrainska Rada) 340, 343
 General Ukrainian Organization (GUO): establishment and membership of 293–4; unites moderates 295
 Genyk-Berezovsky, Kyrylo 550
 Georgia and Georgians 182, 496, 639, 646, 650, 651, 652, 658; Helsinki Group in 517
 German law 84, 90
 Germanization 218
 Germans 19, 646, 661, 668; number of in Bukovyna 333; and Skoropadsky army 357; in the USA 540; joint ventures with 592
 Germany 635, 645, 649, 662: merchants from 62, 70, 72, 74, 81, 84, 86; trade with 87, 94; colonists in Ukraine 187, 262; alleged support of Ukrainophiles 299, 323; invades Ukraine 353; removes Central Rada 356; association with Central Rada and Hetmanate 378, 427, 450, 458; launches Second World War 469–71; and OUN 463–5; rule in Ukraine 467–71, *passim* 528; DPS in 554–5
 Gertrude, Babenberg princess 63
 Gestapo 457; represses OUN 464–5
 Gibraltar 13
 Girei dynasty, rulers of Crimea 78
 Gizel, Innokentii, churchman 155
glasnost 535–6, 574, 576, 579
 Gogol, Nikolai, writer 205; comparison with Shevchenko 234
 “Going to the People” 287. *See also* Chyhyryn Conspiracy
 Goldelman, Solomon, UNR minister 364
 Golden Horde: conflicts within 70; rule of 72, 75; and Moscow 77, 79
 Golden Peace 118–19
 Goluchowski, Agenor, viceroy of Galicia: policies toward Poles and Ukrainians 313–14; and “organic work” 315; approach of 316
 Gongadze, Hryhorii 634, 644
 Gorbachev, Mikhail, Soviet leader 513; and *glasnost* in Ukraine 534–6, 574, 579; and attempted coup 581; and dissolution of USSR 583
 Gore-Kuchma Commission 644
 Goszynski, Seweryn, Polish author 232
 Gothic invasion 13
 Goths 12, 22
 Gotland, island of 26
 Governing Council of the Hetman’s Office: establishment of 169; and reduction of autonomy of Hetmanate 170
 Grabski, Stanisław 429
 grain boom 86–7
 grain procurements: policy of 413
 “Grammar of the Little Russian Dialect” 230
 Grand Principality. *See* Lithuania

- Grave, Dmytro, scholar 399
- Great Britain 481, 485, 487, 557, 566, 662
- Great Depression 416, 429, 432; impact on immigration 551
- Great Discrepancy 537
- Great Famine of 1932–33. *See* Famine of 1932–33
- Great Migration of Peoples 12
- Great Northern War: impact on Ukraine 163, 183
- Great Purge of 1937–38: in Soviet Union as a whole 420, 497. *See also* Great Terror
- Great Revolt of 1648. *See* Revolt of 1648
- Great Terror: first phase in Ukraine 417; and Ukrainian Communists 418; gains momentum 419; impact in Ukraine 420–1; number of victims 421
- Grechko, Andrii, general 497
- Greece, ancient 5, 13
- Greece, Byzantine 5, 31, 101
- Greek Catholic church 120, 193, 674; repression in Russian Empire 211; and reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II 217; clergy in Eastern Galicia 214–15, 312; combats alcoholism 324; in Transcarpathia 335; repressed by Russians 341; in interwar Galicia 449, 456, 478–9, 488, 490, 495; in under-ground 519–20; eparchy in North America 541, 543; in the USA 541–4; in Brazil 545, 546; in Canada 548–50; in North America 561, 563; in contemporary Eastern Europe 569–71; in the new era 578, 630–1
- Greek Catholic rite 428, 543–4, 548, 568
- Greek faith 78, 102. *See also* Orthodoxy
- Greek language 95–6, 301
- Greek schism 95
- “Greek” trade route 27
- Greeks 9, 11; colonies in Ukraine 12–15, 28, 45; cultural and religious influence of 49–50, 86, 95, 188; minority in Ukraine 525
- Green Party 616
- Greenland 26
- Gregorian calendar 98
- Grekov, Oleksander, general 370
- Grendzha-Donsky, Vasyl, poet 449
- Greycoat Division: formation of 343
- Grigorenko, Petro, general and dissident 562. *See also* Hryhorenko
- “Group of 239” 577
- Gryzlov, Boris 638
- Gudziak, Borys, rector of Ukrainian Catholic University 674
- gymnazia* 217; and spread of ideologies 292
- Habsburg empire 187, 201, 664; reforms in Galicia 216–18
- Habsburgs, dynasty 112, 201, 243–4, 573; Ukrainian loyalty to 250, 313; pro-Polish policy of 314–15
- Hadiach 159
- Hadiach, Treaty of 144
- Haidamaks, Marxist group 553
- haidamaky* 174; origins and activity of 191–3; memories of 257, 281, 288. *See also* *Koliivshchyna*
- Haller, Jozef, general 370
- Halperin family 265
- Halych, city of 57; Iaroslav of 60; Danylo conquers 61; metropolitanate in 64, 97, 247
- Halych, metropolitanate of: renewal of 217
- Halych-Volhynia 38, 48. *See also* Galicia-Volhynia
- Halytsko-Ruska Matytsia: founding of 249, 319
- Hamaliia, M., scholar 302
- Hankevych, Lev 436
- Hankevych, Mykola, Ukrainian socialist 323, 328
- Hansa 56
- Harasevych, Mykhailo, scholar 240
- Hart, literary group 395–6
- Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute 562, 564
- Haslo* 294
- Havliček, Karel, Czech intellectual 241

- Hawaii: Ukrainians in 539
- Hel, Ivan, dissident 515
- Helga 45
- Helgi 45
- Hellenistic world 13
- Helsinki Accords 510
- Helsinki Committee (Moscow) 517
- Helsinki Group (Kiev). *See* Ukrainian Helsinki Group
- Helsinki Watch Committee 576
- heneralna starshyna* 140, 145
- heneralny khorunzhy* 141
- heneralny obozny* 141
- heneralny osavul* 141
- heneralny pidskarbii* 159
- heneralny pysar* 140
- heneralny sudiiia* 141
- Herasym, metropolitan 77
- Herder, Johann, German philosopher: and development of nationhood 222, 225; views on folklore 228; views on language 229; philosophical concepts of 233, 240
- "The Heretic" 235
- Hermaize, Osyp, Ukrainian historian 399; trial of 417
- Hero of Ukraine medal 658
- Herodotus, Greek historian 9, 12
- Herriot, Edouard: praises Soviets 416
- hetman* 110
- Hetmanate: government of 158–60; relationship with tsars 160–5; decline of autonomy 165–172; liquidation of 172–3; significance of 177; population of 185, 237, 284
- Hetmanate (in 1918): replaces Central Rada 356; organization and administration of 357; diplomatic relations of 357; cultural policies of 357; opposition to 358; evaluation of 359; association with Germans 378
- Himmler, Heinrich, Hitler associate 469, 472, 477
- Hiroshima 534
- history: role in development of national consciousness 225–7
- "A History of Little Russia" 226
- Hitler, Adolf 363; and Carpatho-Ukraine 451, 463; and Ukrainians 457; and Nazi-Soviet pact 460; plans for Ukraine 467. *See also* Germany
- Hladky, Iosyp, Cossack leader 176
- Hlib, son of Volodymyr 34
- Hlukhiv 141, 166, 170–1
- Hlynsky, Mykhailo, magnate 78, 80
- Hobsbawn, Eric, English historian 191
- Holland 87, 144
- Holochynsky family 95
- Holoskevych, Hryhorii: trial of 417
- holota* 174
- Holovatsky, Iakiv, Ukrainian intellectual: and Ruthenian Triad 240–1, 250; at Lviv University 313; and Russophilism 317
- Holovinsky, Iulian, nationalist 445
- Holovna Ruska Rada. *See* Supreme Ruthenian Council
- Hołowko, Tadeusz 428, 445
- Holub, Oliifer, Cossack leader 116
- Holubnychy, Vsevolod, Ukrainian economist: on 1932–33 Famine 415
- Holy Synod 194
- Homer 9
- Honchar, Oles, author 506, 536
- Honcharenko, Ahapii, early immigrant 539
- Honta (Gonta), Ivan, *haidamak* leader 193
- Horodlo 76
- Horska family 95
- Horyn, Bohdan 577
- Horyn, Mykhailo 577, 587, 588
- Horyn brothers, dissidents 515
- Hoshcha 155
- Hrabianka, Hryhorii, Cossack chronicler 197
- Hrabovsky, Pavlo, poet 304
- Hrinchenko, Borys, Ukrainian activist: views on Ukrainian/Russian relations 284, 292
- hromada*: formation and goals of 280; in Kiev 280–2; young members of 284; Drahomanov activity in 285; generational differences in 289; and dissemi-

- nation of ideologies 292; growth of 293; in 1905 297
- Hromada, Old: formation of 282; agreement with Drahomanov 285; establishes *Kievskaiia starina* 302
- Hromada Party 616
- hromadskyyi diiach* 323
- Hrushevsky, Mykhailo, Ukrainian historian 23, 29, 48, 53, 57; student of Antonovych 302; arrival and activity in Lviv 326; and National Democratic party 328, 329; arrest and exile of 343; president of Central Rada 345–6, 354, 360; returns to Kiev 398; in Academy 399; death of 417; influence of 494
- Hrushka, Hryhorii, churchman 545
- Hryhorenko (Grigorenko), Petro, dissident 518
- Hryhoriiv (Grigoriev), Matvii, partisan leader 360; joins Bolsheviks 362; defects from Bolsheviks 365
- Hryhorovych, Petro 448
- Hryniiov, Volodymyr 614
- Hrynko 394
- Hrytsenko, Anatoliy, minister and deputy 655
- hryvnia*: introduction of 623
- Huculak family 594
- Hudson's Bay Company 27
- Hughes, John, British industrialist 268
- Hulak, Mykola 236–7
- Hulak-Artemovskyy, Petro, Ukrainian writer: views of 231, 305
- Hulevykh, Ielyzaveta, noblewoman 119
- Huliai-Pole: Makhno base 360
- Humanism 94
- Hungary and Hungarians 8, 31–3, 583, 663; in Galicia 56–7, 59–61, 63, 112, 122, 244, 262; Habsburg concessions to 314; in Transcarpathia 334–5; in Eastern Galicia 341, 442, 450; incorporate Transcarpathia 458–9, 483, 511, 539, 541; joint ventures with 592, 598, 601, 602, 622, 632
- Hunia, Dmytro, Cossack leader 118
- Huns 12–13
- Hunter, Holland, economist 529
- Hurenko, Stanislav 577
- Hurzhyi, Ivan, Soviet scholar 268
- Hutsuls 432, 526
- Huxley, Aldous, British author 263
- Huzar, Lubomyr, cardinal and primate of Greek-Catholic church 674
- Hyria, Ivan, Cossack leader 128
- Iakhnenko family 265
- Iakhymovych, Hryhorii, churchman 247
- Iakir, Iona, Old Bolshevik 389
- Ianiv, Volodymyr 444
- Ianovsky, Iurii 396–7
- iarmarky* 269
- Iaropolk, son of Sviatoslav 31–2
- Iaroslav, city of 77, 94, 97, 126
- Iaroslav, prince of Kiev: reign of 34–7, 41; reforms of 43; and St Sophia 50; establishes school 52, 57
- Iaroslav Osmomysl, Galician prince 59–60
- iasyr* 78
- Iatvigiants, Lithuanian 32
- Iavorsky, Iuliiian, Russophile 341
- Iavorsky, Matvii, Ukrainian historian 399; exile of 419
- Iavorsky, Stefan, churchman 194–6
- Iavorsky family 83
- iazychie* 319, 322, 329. *See also* language lazygians 12
- Iceland 26, 663
- ideologies: growth of 221; spread of Marxism 289–91; among *hromada* members 292; intelligentsia concern with 306; growth of socialism in Galicia 322–3; and Ukrainian politicians 347; Nazi racism 466; declining interest in 503; in “post ideological age” 533; fading influence of 537. *See also* Marxism; nationalism; socialism
- Ihor (Igor, Ingvarr), prince of Kiev 26, 27; reign of 28, 29
- Ihor, prince of Volodymyr-in-Volhynia 35
- Ihorevychi, Galician princes 61

- Ilarion, metropolitan 35, 57
- Illinois 540
- immigration: to the USA 538–40; immigrant institutions and organizations 541, 544–5; to Brazil 545–6; to Canada 546–550
- Imperial Academy of Sciences 170
- Imperial Geographic Society (Kiev Branch): Ukrainophiles in 282; liquidation of 283
- Imperial Heraldic Office 226
- Ilmen, Lake 26
- independence: fourth Universal proclaims 352; Lenin rejects 376; and intelligentsia and peasants 377; Lapchynsky demand for 391; view of Shelest and Shcherbytsky 513
- Independent Greek Church 548
- Indo-Europeans 9, 12, 19
- Industrial Revolution 260
- industrialization: appearance in Ukraine 260; government support for 267; particularities of 268; barriers to in Galicia 308, 312–13; in first FYP 405–7; location of 407–8; slow growth of 433; in Western Ukraine 484–5, 491, 505; in 1970s and 1980s 527; deterioration of 591
- Ingvarr 45
- Innocent IV, pope 62
- Inspector General* 205
- Institutes of Popular Education (INO) 398
- intelligentsia 656; development of 221, 223–4; numbers of 224; chronic weakness of 233; in Western Ukraine 238–9; growing numbers of 271; Ukrainian underrepresentation in 272; and Russians 275; activism of 279; and *hromady* 281; social composition and numbers of 286; gatherings of 293; leftist tendencies of 296; and “high culture” 300; number in Galicia 309; views of Poles and Ukrainians 316; cooperation with peasantry 325; supports Central Rada 346; as “ideological sect” 359; dilemma of 361; and struggle for independence 377; in Great Terror 417–19; losses under Stalin 423; under Polish rule 430, 433–4; numbers and occupations of 434; in Transcarpathia 449; flight to West 479; renewed attacks on 494–5; and Ukrainian scholarship 501, 508; and dissent 510; and Shelest 513; current status of 531; sign of restiveness 535; post-Soviet 624; fading of traditional type 666–7
- International Association of Ukrainianists 593
- International Monetary Fund (IMF) 623, 650, 664
- International Relief Organization (IRO) 554
- “Internationalism or Russification?” 517
- Interregional Bloc for Reforms 608, 615
- Inventory Regulations 211
- Iran 39
- Iraq 635, 644
- Ireland and Irish 26, 165, 333, 445; in the USA 540
- Iron Age 9
- Iron Guard 442
- Isajiw, Wsewolod, sociologist 516
- Iskra, Zakhar, Cossack leader 154, 161
- Islam 33, 105
- Islam Girei, Crimean Tatar khan 129
- Islamic civilization 26, 34. *See also* Muslims
- Ismail 112
- Israel 644, 675
- Istoriia Rusov* (“History of the Rus’”): origin and significance of 227
- Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*: publication of 326
- Italy 87, 94, 314, 527, 672, 673; Galicia Division in 555; Ukrainian community in 567, 605
- Itil 29
- Iudenich, Nikolai, general 373
- Iurii, prince of Galicia and Volhynia 64
- Iurii-Bolesław, of Mazowia and Galicia 64, 72–3
- Iushchenko, Viktor 623

- Iuzefovych, Mikhail: denounces Ukrainophiles 283
- Iuzivka 268
- Ivan II, tsar of Muscovy 77
- Ivan the Terrible: compared to Stalin 404
- Ivano-Frankivsk 667
- Ivashko, Volodymyr 577
- Iz zapysok kholiuiia* 397
- izhoi* 36, 46
- Iziaslav, prince of Kiev 35–6
- Izmailov, A., Russian official 166
- Izum 153
- Jablonowski, Aleksander, Polish historian 81
- Jackson-Vanik Amendment 648
- Jadwiga, queen of Poland 73–4
- Jagiello (Jogailo) 74–6
- Jamestown: colony in Virginia 539
- Japan 527
- Jedrzejewicz, Wacław 431
- Jehovah's Witnesses 520
- Jersey City 545
- Jesuits 94, 99, 119, 121; and education on Right Bank 194
- Jews 660, 675; in Kiev 45, 52; in Galicia 62; in Poland-Lithuania 81, 84; in towns 86, 90; in colonization of Dnieper basin 107–8; activity as leaseholders 124; losses in 1648 uprising 127–8, 188, 193, 204; as tavern-keepers 214; influx into Right Bank 269; growing numbers of 272; numbers in Ukraine 276; minority in Ukraine 276–8; socioeconomic organization of 277; relations with Ukrainians 277–8; relations with Ukrainian socialists 295; as moneylenders 310; numbers and occupations in Galicia 311–12; impact of cooperatives on 325; in Bukovy-na 333; and Central Rada 346; resentment against 360; among Bolsheviks 363; massacres of 363; and SUNR 368; in Galician army 369; in universities 398; in interwar Galicia 433–4; in KPZU 436–7; and Soviet occupation 455–6; executions of 468, 470, 472–3, 483–4, 494; dissidents among 521, 525, 527; in the USA 540, 562, 565; and referendum of 1 December 1991 583, 632
- Joseph II, Habsburg emperor: views on government 212–13; and reforms in Galicia 216–18, 245
- Jozewski, Henryk, Polish official 428–9
- Judaism 22
- Judaism without Embellishment* 508
- Juridical School 52
- "Jurists' Group" 516
- Kachkovsky, Mykhailo, Russophile 318
- Kachkovsky Society 324; reading rooms of 329
- Kaffa, Crimean city 78, 106, 112, 115
- Kaganovich, Lazar, Stalin associate: leads party apparatus 387–8; demands for recall of 393, 486, 494, 507
- kahals* 277
- Kaidasheva simia* 303
- Kalchenko, Nykyfor 497
- Kalinowski, Marcin, Polish commander 127
- Kalinowski family 108
- Kalka River, battle of 39
- Kalynts, Ihor and Iryna, dissidents 515
- Kalyntsky, Timofei, Ukrainian noble 226
- Kamianets(-Podilskyyi) 83, 86, 94, 106, 190; university in 357; UNR in 362
- Kandyba, Ivan, dissident 518
- Kaniv 106, 109, 110, 117
- Kaniv Four 617
- Kapnist, Vasyl, Ukrainian noble; and ties with Prussia 173, 207
- Kapnist family 205
- Kapuschchak, Ivan 249
- Karabelesh, Andrii 449
- Karaganda; prisoner revolt in 502
- Karavansky, Sviatoslav, dissident 518, 562
- Karazyn, Vasyl, Ukrainian noble: and founding of Kharkiv University 224
- Karpenko-Kary (Tobilevych), Ivan 305
- Karpov, Gennadii, scholar 302

- Katerynoslav, city of: population and economic role of 269–70; Prosvivta in 297
- Katerynoslav, province of 204
- Katerynoslav faction 364
- katsap* 275
- Kazakhstan 456, 504
- Kedryn, Ivan 435
- Kenez, Peter, historian: on pogroms in Ukraine 363
- Kerch 13
- Kerensky, Aleksander: negotiates in Kiev 347
- KGB 512, 581; and dissident publications 517; and dissent 520–1, 534; harshness in Ukraine 535. *See also* Cheka; NKVD; OGPU
- Khanenko, Mykhailo, Cossack leader 147
- Khanenko, Mykola 107
- Kharkiv 180, 665, 667; college in 195, 197; population and economic role of 269; attacked by Bolsheviks 361; capital of Ukraine 386, 408, 465, 468–70, 471, 524, 608, 614, 629
- Kharkiv region 132, 153
- Kharkiv Romantics 233, 239, 321
- Kharkiv University: and Ukrainian culture 231; Ukrainian courses in 301
- Khataevich, Mendel, Stalin associate: on 1932–33 Famine 415
- Khazars: empire of 22, 25; defeat of 29, 31, 52
- Kherson 188
- Kherson, province of 204; base of partisans 360
- Khiba revut voly ...* 303
- khlopomany*: appearance of 281; views and activity of 281; accusations against 282; and peasants 287
- Khmara, Stefan 578
- Khmelytsky, Bohdan: background of 125–7; early victories of 127–8; difficulties during revolt 129–33; relations with Tatars 130; foreign relations of 133–4; contacts with Swedes 136–7; impact and evaluation of 136–7; death of 143, 146–7, 154, 156–7, 159, 184; portrayal in *Istoriia Rusov* 227; Shevchenko evaluation of 235; order of 478
- Khmelytsky, Iurii 143; elected hetman 145; appointee of Ottomans 148
- Khmelytsky, Mykhailo, father of Bohdan 126
- Khmelytsky, Tymish 130
- Khodakevych, Anna 97, 119
- Khodkevych, Hrydorii, magnate 96
- khokhol* 206, 275, 524, 526
- Kholm 82, 97, 99, 357, 428; Orthodox churches in 432; Polish rule in 435–40; German occupation of 457, 474–5
- khology* 46
- Khoriv 25
- Khotyn: battle of 113, 116; town of 447
- Khreshchatyk 637
- Khrushchev, Nikita, Soviet leader: on Stalin 404; sent to Ukraine 420–2, 485–6, 493, 497, 499–509; successors of 510–11; and de-Stalinization 515–16
- Khrystiuk, Pavlo 345
- Khust 451
- Khvylovism: rejection of Russian influences 391–2; orientation to West 392
- Khvylovy, Mykola, writer: background of 391; return to literature 394; leads Hart 396; works of 396; suicide of 419, 501
- Kichko, T.K., propagandist 508
- Kiev 635, 646, 652, 654; rise of 24–7; assets and liabilities of 31; decline and destruction of 37–41; conquered by Lithuanians 70, 77, 82; in decline 86, 94; on frontier 105–6; during Cossack period 113–19, 121–2; population in 1723 180, 185, 189, 190; transformation into bastion of Russian culture 211; population and economic role of 269; number of Jews in 273; *hromada* in 280; first Marxist groups in 290; student groups in 293; revolution in 345–6; struggle for 350–1; Directory captures 359; abandoned

- 362; Galicians capture 373; declared capital 421, 436; German victory near 460; damaged by Soviets 461, 465; executions in 468; population loss of 469, 477, 499–505, 507, 510, 512; dissidents in 514–17, 521, 524, 526, 531; in Gorbachev era 534–6, 539; in the new era 576, 578, 580, 592, 593, 598–630 *passim*; protests in 637, 639; Crimean Tatars 657; oligarchic elite 664, 665; population of 667; economy 668; Ukrainian Orthodox Church 674
- Kiev, metropolitan of 93, 194
- Kiev, province of 106–7, 204
- Kiev (Mohyla) Academy 151, 155, 159–61; highpoint of 195, 196–7
- Kiev brotherhood 97, 115–16
- Kiev Commune 287
- Kiev faction 364
- Kiev Scholarly Society 302
- Kiev University 282; Drahomanov association with 284; expulsion of students from 292; conservatism of faculty 301, 516
- Kievan Cave Monastery (Kievo Pecherska Lavra) 51–2, 119–21, 197
- Kievan Cossacks 252
- Kievan Rus': origins of 22–5; rise of 25–7; early rulers of 31–7; zenith of 31–7; decline of 39–41; society and culture of 42–54; historiography of 52–3; regionalism in 55–6; institutional vestiges of 77, 81–2, 85; Orthodoxy in 92–3; portrayal in *Istoriia Rusov* 227. *See also* Kiev
- Kievlianin* 282, 299
- Kievskaiia starina* 302
- Kievskii telegraf* 282
- Kilia 112
- Kinakh, Anatoliy, prime minister 635, 647
- Kiriak, Iliia 564
- Kistiakovsky, Volodymyr, scholar 302, 399
- Kliuchevsky, Vasilii, Russian historian 202
- Klymiv, Ivan 446
- Klymyshyn, Mykola, nationalist 446
- kniazii* 21
- Knights of King Arthur's Round Table 51
- Kobylianska, Olha, author 305; works of 327
- Kobylytsia, Lukian, Bukovynian rebel 250
- Kobzar* ("The Bard"): significance of 233
- kobzari*: repression of 419
- Koch, Erich, Nazi official: rule of in Ukraine 467–9, 473
- Kochanowski, Jan, author 94
- Kochubei 182, 205
- Kochubei, Viktor: views of 206; and reforms on Right Bank 210
- Kodak, fortress of 117
- Kodnia 193
- Kohut, Zenon, historian 171
- Kolchak, Aleksander, admiral 373
- Koliivshchyna* 192–3. *See also* *haidamaky*
- Kolkhoz Council 627
- Kollár, Ján, Slovak intellectual 241
- Kollard, Iurii, Ukrainian activist 294
- Kolomoiskyi, Ihor 664
- Komarno 97
- komnezamy*. *See* Committees of Poor Peasants
- kompaniitsi* 150, 381
- Komsomol: support of FYP 406; implementations collectivization 410, 610
- Komunist Ukrainy* 507
- Koncha Zaspa 665
- Konev, Ivan, general 477
- Konieczpolski, Aleksander, Polish commander 128
- Konieczpolski, Stanislaw, Polish military leader 116–17
- Konieczpolski family 108
- Konotop, battle of 144
- Konovalets, Evhen: commands Sich Riflemen 359; leads UVO/OUN 443–4; generation of 446; assassination of 459; in Berlin 552; and immigrants 553
- Konstantynovych, Ivan 545

- Konysky, Oleksander 284; relations with Galicia 282, 293, 320, 329
- Kopelev, Lev 418
- Kopitar, Bartholomeus, Slovene intellectual 241
- Kopystensky, Sakhariah, churchman 100, 119
- Koran, Polovtsian khan 39
- korenizatsiia*: See Ukrainization
- Koretsky family 108
- Koriatovych, Fedir 76
- Kormylchych, Vladyslav, prince 61
- Korniichuk, Oleksander, playwright: minister of foreign affairs 478; recants 494, 497, 506
- Koropeckyj, Ivan, economist 529
- Koropynsky family 95
- Korotchenko, Demian 497
- Korotych, Vitalii, poet and editor 535
- Korsh, Fedor, scholar 299
- Korsun 117, 193: battle of 127
- Korsun-Shevchencko, battle of 477
- koshovy* 174
- Kosiv, Sylvester, churchman 156
- Kossior, Stanislav: purge of 420
- Kostelnyk, Gabriel, churchman 488, 490
- Kostenko, Lina, poetess 507, 515
- Kostomarov, Mykola, Ukrainian historian 23, 138; interest in ethnography 233; Shevchenko's impact on 235; role in Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius 236, 280; and St Petersburg *hromada* 280; defeatism of 284; writings of 320
- Kosynka, Hryhorii 397
- Kosynsky, Krystofor, Cossack leader 113–14
- Kozalin region 570
- Kotliarevsky, Ivan, writer: significance of his *Eneida* 230–1; festivities in honor of 293, 303, 305
- Kotsiubynsky, Mykhailo, novelist 304
- Kotsko, Adam, student 332
- Kovalenko, O., Ukrainian activist 295–6
- Kovalevsky, A., scholar 301
- Kovalevsky, Mykola, Ukrainian activist 345, 354
- Kovpak, Sydir, partisan leader 475–6, 478
- Kozlovsky, Stanislav 323
- КРЗУ (Communist Party of Western Ukraine): supports Shumsky 393; activity of 436–7, 501
- Krakus* 432
- Kravchenko, Victor: on 1932–33 Famine 414
- Kravchuk, Leonid 577, 579, 580, 581; election of 583, 585, 588, 589, 594, 599–630 *passim*
- Kravtsiv, Bohdan, nationalist 444
- Krawchenko, Bohdan, scholar 273; on 1932 harvest 413, 415; on dissent 516
- Kremenchuk 477
- Kremenians, Polish college at 210, 479
- Kremlin 465, 475, 497, 499, 635, 639, 645, 646, 650, 651, 658; and de-Stalinization 501–2; economic experimentation of 502, 504–7; attempts at reform 510–11, 513–14, 517, 521, 523, 531
- Kretchetnikov, Mikhail, Russian general 193
- Krivichians 22
- Krivorizhstal 635, 640, 660
- Krokovsky, Ioasak, churchman 195
- Kromerizh 249
- Kronstadt revolt 381
- Kropyvnytsky, Marko 305
- Krushelnytska, Solomea, singer 327
- Krushelnytsky, Antin 436
- Kruty, battle at 352
- kruzhyky* 224
- Krychevsky, Mykhailo, Cossack leader 128
- Krylov, Mykola, scholar 399
- Krymsky, Ahatanhel, scholar 302; in Academy 399
- Kryvonis, Maksym, Cossack leader 128
- Kryvyi Rih 667; development of 267; number of workers in 268, 270, 272, 278
- Kuban River 78, 176
- Kubijovyč, Volodymyr, scholar and

- activist: heads ucc 457–8; protest of 470, 472; and encyclopedia 565–6
 Kuchma, Leonid 587, 592, 600–31
passim, 633 *passim*, 653, 657, 660, 662
 “Kuchma-Gate” 644
 Kuchma-Gore Commission 601
 Kuchuk Kainarji, Treaty of 174, 176
 kulaks (*kurkuls*): formation and characteristics of 263; anticommunism of 376; and NEP 405; liquidation of 409–10. *See also* peasants
 Kulchytsky family 83
 Kulish, Mykola, playwright 396–7; disappearance of 419, 501, 507
 Kulish, Panteleimon, writer: evaluation of Khmelnytsky 138, 233; views of 237; and St Petersburg *hromada* 280; contacts with Galicians 282; and cultural Ukrainism 283; writings of 320, 329–30
 Kumeiki, battle of 117
 Kuntsevych, Iosafat, churchman 120
 Kurbas, Les: leads Berezil troupe 397; exile of 419, 501, 507
 Kurbsky, Andrei, Muscovite émigré 96
 Kuron, Jacek 601
 Kursk, battle of 476
 Kurtsevych, Iosyf, churchman 119
 Kuzma, Roman 436
 Kviring, Emmanuel, Bolshevik leader 393
 Kvitka-Osnovianenko, Hryhorii, writer: views of 231
 Kvitkovsky, Denys 448
 Kwasniewski, Aleksander, president of Poland 638, 646
 Kybalchych, Mykola, revolutionary 288
 Kyi 25
 Kyrychenko, Oleksii 497, 499
 Kysil, Adam, magnate 133

 Labor (Trud) party 435
 labor unions 627
 Labour Party 654
 Ladoga canal 166
 Ladoga, Lake 26
 land ownership 661

 landholdings: among West Ukrainian peasants 214; impact of emancipation on 256; communal and non-communal 256; in Ukraine and Russia 289; in Eastern Galicia 309; in Bukovyna 334; and collectivization 415; in Polish-ruled Ukraine 433; of Polish landlords 455
 language: at Lviv University 217; Herder views of 229; status and role in development of national consciousness 229–30; attitude of Mohylnytsky 240; views of Ruthenian Triad 241; call for standardization 250; Valuev ban on Ukrainian 282–3, 297, 300; Polish in education 316; impact of Russophilism 318; preference for Polish 319; rejection of vernacular 319–20; and Ukrainization 388; glorification of Russian 422; and 1958 reform 502; Shelest support of Ukrainian 512; protests over 536; in post-Soviet period 606–8, 618. *See also* Church Slavonic; *iazychie*
 Lantskoronsky, Predslav, border official 109
 Lapchynsky, Iurii, Ukrainian Bolshevik 375; and federalist opposition 391
 Lapland 535
 Lasotta, Erich von, Habsburg envoy 112
 Laszcz, magnate 108
 Latin, language 674; in Galicia and Volhynia 73–4, 121, 301, 314
 Latin America 557, 565, 670
 Latos, Jan, scholar 97
 Latsis, Martin, Cheka leader 365
 Latvia 532
 Lavrov, Petr, Russian revolutionary: views of 287
 law: impact of 1860s reforms on 258; under Polish rule 427
 “law of diminishing dictators” 511
 Law on Power 611
 “Laws According to Which the Little Russians Are Governed” 170
 Lazarenko, Pavlo 616, 622
 Lazarevsky, Oleksander, scholar 302

- League of Landowners 356
 League of Militant Atheists 478
 League of Nations 430
 Lebed, Dmitrii 387
 Lebed, Mykola, nationalist 445–6
Lebensraum 467
 Lebid 25
 Left Bank 117; population density in 18th century 188; Cossack traditions in 204, 467, 476–7, 483, 525, 530
 Legion of Ukrainian Nationalists (DUN) 463
 Legion of Ukrainian Nationalists (Podebrady) 443
 Legislative Commission 172, 177
 Legnica 571
 Lemkos 432, 490; and Ukrainian identity 526; as immigrants 539, 541; expulsion of 570–1
 Lenin, Vladimir: criticism of kulaks 263; on economic exploitation of Ukraine 269; and emergence of Bolsheviks 291; in revolution 348; on nationalism 349; and use of violence 350 *passim*; criticizes Russians and Jews 375; tactical skill of 381; and nationalism 383; and formation of USSR 385–6; death of 394, 495, 523, 533
 Leninism 393
 Lenkavsky, Stefan, nationalist 444
 Leszczyński, Stanisław, king of Poland 164
 “Letter to the Bishops Who Abandoned Orthodoxy” 101
 Lev, Galician prince 62–4
 Levant 25
 Levytsky, Boris, scholar 499
 Levytsky, Dmytro, painter 197
 Levytsky, Dmytro, politician 435
 Levytsky, Evhen, Ukrainian activist 328
 Levytsky, Iosyf, scholar 240
 Levytsky, Kost, Ukrainian activist 340, 368
 Levytsky, Mykhailo, churchman 240
 Levytsky, Venedikt, censor 241
Lex Grabski 429
Lexikon 121
 Liberal Party 614
 Liberation of Labor 290
 Liberman, Aron: and Drahomanov 278
 Lions’ Society (*Tovarystvo Leva*) 575
 literacy: in eastern Ukraine 300; rise of 388, 398
 “Literary Discussion” 396
 literature: in Hetmanate 196–8; role in development of national consciousness 230–2; and European models 293; during 1876–1905 period 302–5; in Eastern Galicia 326–7; in 1920s 395–7; emergence of new generation 507; ideological crackdown in 508
Literaturna Ukraina 575
 Lithuania and Lithuanians 53, 638; and Galicia-Volhynia 56–7, 62, 64; expansion into Ukraine 69–72; policies of grand princes of 74–6; overlordship of 80–1, 83; social change in 89–90; Orthodoxy in 93, 96; grand princes of 106, 276, 443; Helsinki Group in 517, 532
 Lithuanian Statute 84–5, 170; liquidation of 211
 Little Russian Collegium: first 166–8; second 172
 “Little Russian Folksongs” 228
 “Little Russian Stories by Hrytsko Osnovianenko” 231
 Little Russians (*Malorossy*) 165; use of term 201, 203; mentality of 206, 318, 499; Shcherbytsky model of 512, 514; modern version of 523, 526
 Little (Minor) Seminary 567
 Liubartovych, Fedir, Volhynian prince 76
 Liubchenko, Panas: purge of 420
 Liubech 36
Liubit Ukrainu 478, 494
Liuboratsky 303
liudy 45
 Liupanov, O., scholar 301
 Livonia 115
 Lloyd George, David, British prime minister 371
 Loboda, Andrii, scholar 399

- Loboda, Hryhorii, Cossack leader 114
 Lobosevych, Opanas, Ukrainian noble 227
 Lomonosov, Mikhail, Russian scholar 23
 London 48
 "Lost Epoch" 285
 Lototsky, Oleksander, Skoropadsky minister 400
 Louis, king of Hungary 72-3
 Lozynsky, Iosyf, scholar 240
 Lozynsky, Mykhailo 436
 Lubachivsky, Myroslav, cardinal 578, 594
 Lubart, Lithuanian ruler 73
 Lubavitcher (Jews) 675
 Lublin, town of 79, 570
 Lubny 159
 Lubomirski, Andrzej, magnate 312
 Lubomirski, Jerzy, magnate 191
 Lubomirski family 187-90, landholdings on Right Bank 190
 Luckyj, George, scholar 232; on significance of *Kobzar* 233
 Luh, organization 439
 Luhansk 608, 618, 658, 667, 670, 671
 Lukaris, Kyril 97
 Lukasevych, Vasyl, Ukrainian noble 209
 Lukashenka, Alexander 602
 Lukianenko, Levko, dissident 516, 518, 577, 578, 588
 Lukomsky family 95
 Lupul, Manoly, scholar 564
 Lutsenko, Yuri, government minister 641
 Lutsk 83, 94, 97, 99, 157, 190, 461
 Lutsky, Ostap, activist 435, 438
 Luzhkov, Iuri, mayor of Moscow 599, 657
 Lviv 48, 646, 667, 671, 674; founding of 62; 74; population in 15th century 86, 94-5, 97-9, 101, 107, 119; administrative center of Galicia 216; 244; RUP publications in 294; population of 311; struggle for 367-8, 428; "secret" university in 439; Theological Academy in 440; activity of OUN in 443-5; Germans arrive in 463, 465, 470, 477-8, 490-2, 515; Chornovil in 517; in the new era 576, 578, 579, 592, 629, 665
 Lviv, diocese of 194
 Lviv brotherhood 98, 120
 Lviv "secret" university 439
 Lviv University: founding of 217, 238-9; Holovatsky at 313; Polish/Ukrainian conflict at 321-2; Ukrainians in 326, 434; Ukrainization of 455
 Lypa, Ivan, Ukrainian activist 292-3
 Lypkivsky, Vasyl, churchman: heads UAOC 400-1; arrest of 402
 Lypynsky, Viacheslav, Ukrainian historian: evaluation of Khmelnytsky 138; view of Little Russian mentality 206; views on Hetmanate 359, 568
 Lysenko, Mykola, composer 293, 304
 Lysianka 193
 Lytvyn, K.Z. 493-4
 Lytvyn, Volodymyr, speaker of parliament 643
 Lyzohub, Dmytro, revolutionary 288
 Lyzohub, Fedir, Skoropadsky minister 357
 Macedonian language 20
 Macedonians 11
 Machine Tractor Stations. *See* MTS
 Madrid Summit 601, 645
 Magdeburg 83
 Magdeburg Law 83, 124, 142; liquidation of 204, 211
 magnates: role in Union of Lublin 79; Polonized 87, 99, 101-2, 106; role in colonization 107; and Cossacks 109; and manufacturing on Right Bank 180. *See also* nobles, *szlachta*
 Magyarization 335, 448, 458
 "magyarones" 335, 543
 Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) 637, 638
 Mailov, Aleksei 445
 Main Committee 253-4
 Makarenko, Antin, Soviet educator 397
 Makhno, Nestor, partisan leader 360; defects from Bolsheviks 365

- Maksymovych, Karlo, leader of KPZU 393, 436
- Maksymovych, Mykhailo, scholar 229, 241
- Makukh, Ivan, activist 436
- Mala Khoritytsia 109
- Malanchuk, Valentyn 508, 512, 517
- Malaniuk, Ievhen, poet 444
- Malczewski, Antoni, Polish author 232
- Malenkov, Georgii, Soviet leader 496
- Malinovsky, Radion, general 477, 497
- Malorossiiia 141, 159
- Manchester 566
- Manchuria 8
- Manitoba 550
- manufacturing: in Kievan Rus' 48; in Poland-Lituanian 86; in Hetmanate 180. *See also* industrialization; workers
- Manuilsky, Dmitrii, Bolshevik leader 364–5
- Maramarosh 447, 568
- Marchuk, Ievhen 616–17
- Margolin, Arnold, UNR minister 364
- Maria Theresa, Austrian empress: reforms of 212, 217
- Mariupol 663
- Markovych, Iakiv, historian 197, 226
- Markovych, Roman, Ukrainian noble 226
- Markush, Alexander 449
- Marx, Karl: links with Podolynsky 286
- Marxism 54; basic concepts of 289–90; appeal of 290; spread of 290–1; and RUP 294; in Eastern Galicia 328, 477, 518
- Marxism, Institute of 399; attack on 419
- Marxism-Leninism 390, 523; in “post-ideological” age 533
- Masalsky family 95
- Maslosoiuz 438
- Masol, Vitalii 578
- Matiushenko, Opanas 296
- Matusevych, I., Ukrainian activist 294
- Mazepa, Ivan: background of 160; hetmancy of 160–1; relations with tsar 161–5; and Charles XII 163–5, 171; landholdings of 181, 196; reputation of in the new era 575
- “Mazepism” 299, 341
- Mazepist or Cossack Baroque. *See* Baroque
- Mazepists 165
- Mazlakh, Serhii, Bolshevik 391
- Mazowia, principality of 63–4
- Mazurenko, Iurii, Ukapist leader 384
- Mechnikov, I., scholar 302
- Medical Academy 195
- Mediterranean civilization 11
- Mediterranean Sea 9, 11, 13, 25
- Medvedchuk, Viktor 616, 634, 635, 636, 640, 653, 654
- Melbourne 567
- Melenevsky, Marian, revolutionary 294–5
- Melnikov, Iurii, revolutionary 290
- Melnikov, Leonid 497
- Melnychenko, Mykola 644
- Melnyk, Andrii, nationalist leader 359; and rift in OUN 459–60
- Melnykites 460, 557
- “Memoires of a Pug-Nosed Mephistopheles” 305
- Mendvog, Lithuanian ruler 63, 70
- Mengli Girei, Crimean khan 78
- Mensheviks: and Jews 363
- Menshikov, Aleksander, Russian statesman 164, 166; landholdings in Ukraine 167–8
- Merians 22
- Meshko, Oksana, dissident 518
- Meshkov, Iuri 609
- Meta* 321
- Metlynsky, Ambrozii, writer 231
- Metternich, Prince: resignation of 244
- Metz 551
- Mezhenko, Iurii 396
- Miakotin, Venedikt, Russian historian 135
- Mickiewicz, Adam, Polish poet: praise of Ukrainian folklore 228
- middle class 665–6
- Middle East 38
- Mikhnovsky, Mykola, Ukrainian

- activist 292; and *Samostiina Ukraina* 294; intense nationalism of 295
 military forces 655
 Miliukov, Pavel, Russian leader 343
 Miliutin, Dmitrii, Russian minister 282
 Milosovich, Slobodan, president of Serbia 639
 Mindaugas (Mendvog) 70
 Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories 467
 Ministry of Agriculture 628
 Ministry of Defense 604
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 604
 Minneapolis 542
 minorities. *See* national minorities
 "Mirror of Theology" 121
 "Misery of Galicia" 310
Misto 397
 Mithridates VI 13
 Mittal Steel 641, 660
 Mittenwald 555
 Mnohorshny, Damian 147; hetmancy of 150
 modernization: weak Ukrainian participation in 271–4; and Ukrainization 399; cost of 423; in Russian guise 424; and peasant expectations 451; Stalin approach to 500; and Ukrainians abroad 560; in the new era 595
 Mohyla, Petro, churchman 120–1
 Mohyla Academy 121–2
 Mohylnytsky, Ivan, churchman 239; attitude toward Ukrainian vernacular 240
 Montronnynsky Monastery 192
 Moldavia: revolt in 91; Ottomans in 112, 114, 187, 205, 447, 602
 Moldavians 59; among Cossacks 108; and Vyshnevetsky 110
 Moldavian law 84, 90
Moloda Rus' 320
molodshi liudy 45
 Molotov, Viacheslav, Stalin associate: sent to Ukraine 420
 Motolov-Ribbentrop Pact 602
 Monash University 568
 Mongols: conquests of 39–41, 48, 53; impact of invasion 54; extent of empire 55; defense of Kiev against 61; and Galicia-Volhynia 62–4, 70, 77, 85, 106
 Montreal 551
 Moravia 308
 Moroz, Oleksander, leader of the Socialist Party 588, 611, 613, 616, 617, 641, 642
 Moroz, Valentyn, dissident 516–17, 562
 Morozov, Konstantyn 586
 Moryntsi 233
 Moscow 38, 53, 577, 581, 635, 641, 648, 651, 657, 664, 674; example of regionalism 56–7, 59, 69, 70, 74; rise of 77–8, 115, 252; Ukraine's railroad links with 267; role in decision making 386, 437, 474–5, 483, 493, 497, 499–509; and dissent 515–17, 521; and Ukraine's economy 528–9, 532, 535, 537, 567, 589; and Ukraine in the new era 585. *See also* Kremlin; Muscovy; Russia; Russians.
 Moscow, metropolitan of 93
 Moscow, patriarch of 194, 440, 456, 465, 579, 631
 Moscow Patriarchate 658, 675
 Moscow University 195, 229
moskal 274
 Moskalenko, Kyrylo 499
Moskovskii vedomosti 282
 "The Most Bitter Wars of Bohdan Khmelnytsky" 197
 Motyl, Alexander, political scientist 441, 516
 "Movement in Defense of Civil Rights" (*pravozakhysny rukh*) 518
 MTS (Machine Tractor Stations) 412, 504
 Mstyslav, the Brave 34
 Mstyslav, son of Volodymyr Monomakh 37, 57
 Mudry, Vasyl 431, 435
 Mukachevo 636
 Mukachiv 335
 Mukha, revolt of 91

- Müller, Gerhard, German scholar in Russia 22
- multiculturalism, in Canada 565
- Munich 55, 566
- Munich Pact 450, 454
- Muraviev, Mikhail, Bolshevik commander: captures Kiev 350, 352–3
- Muraviev-Apostol brothers 209
- Muromets, Iliia 51
- Muscovy and Muscovites 69; and Kievan traditions 72; weakness of laws in 85; influence of 99, 109; Cossacks in service of 113–15, 120; portrayal in *Istoriia Rusov* 227. *See also* Moscow
- Muslims 47, 105, 116, 632, 675
- muzhi* 45, 60
- MVD 489
- Mykhailo, prince of Kiev 39
- Mykhalchuk, Konstantyn 281
- Mykolaiv 667
- Mykytych, Dobrynia 51
- Myloradovych family 205
- Myrhorod 159, 168
- Myrny, Panas, author 303
- Mystyslav, patriarch 579, 594
- Nachtigall* 463, 474
- Nahirmy, Vasyl: pioneers cooperative movement 324–5
- Naima, Ottoman historian 112
- Nalyvaiko, Damian, churchman 97, 114
- Nalyvaiko, Severyn, Cossack leader 114
- Napoleon: invasion of 206–7
- Narodna Rada 321
- Narodna Torhivlia 324, 438
- Narodnaia Volia: tactics of 288
- Narodnia Volia* 561
- narodnyky*: origins and activity of 287–9; relations with Ukrainophiles 289
- Narodovtski*. *See* Populists
- Nashe Slovo* 571
- Natalka Poltavka* 305
- “national awakeners”: in Western Ukraine 239, 242
- national communism: phenomenon of 390; in Ukraine 390–4; sign of 513. *See also* Khvylovyism; Shumskyism; Volobuevism
- national consciousness: growth in Western Ukraine 237–41; growth in 1917–20 379; in Transcarpathia 449–50; ucc attempts to raise 457–8
- National Democrats (Polish) 428
- National Democrats (Ukrainian) 610–13, 622
- National Guard 604
- national minorities: in Ukraine 274–8; political parties among 291; in Poland 437–8; population shifts among 482–4; assimilation into Russian 525
- National Socialism. *See* Nazis
- nationalism: changes in 293; and Russian revolutionaries 286; and socialism 391; factor in 1932–33
- Famine 415–16; Stalin view of 422
- nationalism, integral: genesis of 441; ideology of 441–2; attraction of 452; among Ukrainians abroad 553–4. *See also* OUN
- nation-building 354, 377, 653–9; two crucial generations in 424; progress of 526
- nationhood: development of concept 221; key ideas of 224–32; growth among West and East Ukrainians 241–2; as issue in 1848 Revolution 245–51; and appearance of *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* 326; in post-Soviet period 605–10
- NATO 599–602, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 658
- Naumovych, Ivan, Russophile 318
- Navrotsky, Volodymyr, Ukrainian activist 309
- Nazar Stodola* 305
- Nazis: and Carpatho-Ukraine 450–1; foreign relations of 454; police of 457, 464; policies in Ukraine 467–73. *See also* Germans; Germany; Hitler; Koch, Erich
- Nazi-Soviet Pact 454, 460
- Nebaba, Martyn, Cossack leader 128
- Nebyliw 546

- "Nebyliw Group" 546
 Nechai, Danylo, Cossack leader 128
 Nechui-Levytsky, Ivan, author 303
 Negrych, Ivan 550
 Nemyriv 161
 Nemyrych, Iurii, Ukrainian nobleman 144
 Neosytets, Dnieper rapid 27
 Neoclassicists 396
 Neolithic period 6
 NEP: introduction of 381; features of 382; success of 383; and peasants 387; concessions of 403; and kulaks 405, 409–10
 Nestor, chronicler 23, 27, 28, 51
 Nestorenko, Maksym, Cossack leader 128
 Netherlands 662
Neva 321
 New Ukraine bloc 614
 New Economic Policy. *See* NEP
 New Jersey 540
 New Serbia 187
 New York 540, 553
New York Times 416
 Nicholas I, Russian emperor: rule of 202; and reforms on Right Bank 210; and Shevchenko 237; and Crimean War 251; death of 279
 Nicholas II, Russian emperor: in 1905 Revolution 296, 298, 344, 356
 Nikovsky, Andrii: trial of 417
 Nizhyn 180; economic activity in 149, 159, 185
 NKVD: fabricates plots 420, 455, 461, 475, 479, 488–90
 nobles 74–5; ties of Polish nobles with Lithuanians 76; Orthodox nobles 77; role in Union of Lublin 79, 80, 82–3; ascendancy of 87–9; rights of 94, 96, 100, 102; numbers in Kiev province 107, 178; number in Hetmanate 185; landholdings in southern Ukraine 187; and townsmen 190; and resistance to Habsburg reforms 218; interest in Ukrainian history 226–7; and emancipation of serfs 253–7; decline of 264; number of on Right Bank 275. *See also* boyars; elite; gentry; magnates; *szlachta*; *starshyna*
 Nogais, Turkic nomads 78
 nomads: emergence of 8; conflicts among 15, 39. *See also* Cimmerians; Mongols; Sarmatians; Scythians; Tatars
nomenklatura 603, 606, 607, 610, 614, 616, 621
 non-governmental organizations 628–9
 Norilsk: prisoner revolt in 502
 Normanist Controversy 22–5, 53
 Normans 22
 Norsemen 26
 North America and North Americans 532, 545, 548, 557, 565–6, 675
 North Dakota 541
 Northern Society 207, 209
 Norway 35
 "Notes Concerning Little Russia" 226
 Nottingham 566
 Novakivsky, Oleksander, painter 327
 Novgorod: Varangians in 26; Volodymyr in 31; Iaroslav in 34–5, 38; school in 52; and regionalism 56, 59–60; conquest by Moscow 77
 Novhorod-Siverskyi 76, 227
 Novi Sad 568
Novoe Vremia 299
 Novorossia: population of 187; grain trade 188
 Novytsky, Oleksii 399
 Nunn-Lugar Act 644

obozny, Cossack official 110
obrok 179, 254
obshchyny 48
 Ochakiv 112
 October Manifesto 296
 October Revolution: nature of 348
 Odessa 665, 667; railroad links with 267; growth and population of 269; number of Jews in 273; *narodnyk* group in 287; university in 301; French land in 361, 468; in the new era 578, 592

- Odyssey* 9
Ogonek 535
 OGPU: quells uprisings 411; in Great Terror 417–18
 Ohio 540
 Ohloblyn, Oleksander, Ukrainian historian 399
 Ohonovsky, Oleksander 324
 Ohrysko, Volodymyr, minister of foreign affairs 649
 Oka River 19, 29, 34
 Okhrymovych, Vasyl, nationalist 502
 Okhtyrka 153
 Olbia 13
 Old Believers 187, 274
 Old Hromada. *See* Hromada, Old
 Old Ruthenians: Russophilism of 317–18; and Habsburgs 318; and vernacular 319
 Oleh, son of Sviatoslav 31–2
 Oleh (Helgi, Oleg), prince of Kiev 27; reign of 28, 41, 47
 Oleksandrivsk 188
 Oleskiw, losyf 546
 Olesnytsky, Evhen, Ukrainian activist 325
 Olha (Helga, Olga), princess of Kiev: reign of 29, 33
 Oligarchic elite 664–5
 oligarchs 610, 614, 617, 621, 630, 642, 649, 653, 654
 Oliynyk, Volodymyr 617
 Olsztyn region 570
 Olznych-Kandyba, Oleh, nationalist poet 444
 Omelianovych-Pavlenko, Mykhailo, general 369
 “On the Current Situation in Ukraine” 391
 “On Law and Grace” 51
One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich 506
 Opalinski, Władysław 73
 Opara, Stefan, Cossack leader 146
opryshky 192
 Orange Revolution 636–9, 642, 648, 649, 654, 658, 666
 Order Number One 345
 “organic work” 315, 323
 Organization for the Rebirth of Ukrainian Statehood (ODWU) 553–4
 Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. *See* OUN
 Orlyk, Hryhor, Ukrainian Cossack émigré 165
 Orlyk, Pylyp, hetman-in-exile: activity abroad 165, 197
 Orthodox church 34, 674; discrimination against 86; in Poland-Lithuania 93–4; and Union of Brest 99–101, 121; persecution of on Right Bank 190; in Bukovyna 334; attempts to convert Galicians to 329; subordinated to Moscow 400; attempts to Ukrainize 400–1, 429, 432; in Volhynia, Polissia, and Kholm 440–1, 456, 464; tolerated by government 520; in the USA 542, 561; in Canada 548–9, 563; post-Soviet era 630; Kiev Patriarchate 674. *See also* UAOC
 Orthodox East 57
 Orthodoxy: and Polish expansion 72–4; and Lithuanian rulers 76–7, 92; decline of 93–4, 95–6; revival of 96, 97, 116, 119, 122; in Western Ukraine 194, 196; and conversion of Greek Catholics 211, 488. *See also* Greek faith
 Ortynsky, Soter, churchman 541–3, 549
 Osadchy, Mykhailo, dissident 515
osavul, Cossack official 110
 Osmachka, Teofil 397
 Osman II, Ottoman sultan 112
Osnova: establishment of 28; Antonovych “confession” in 281; ceases publication 282, 321
 Ossolinski family 108
 Ostapenko, Serhii, UNR minister 362
Ostarbeiter 469, 554
 Ostrianyn, Iakiv, Cossack leader 118
 Ostrih 96, 101, 114
 Ostrih Academy 96–7, 119
 Ostrih Bible 96
 Ostrih Cleric 97, 101
 Ostrohsk 153
 Ostrorog, Mikołaj, magnate 128

- Ostronog family 124
 Ostrozky, Janusz, magnate 113
 Ostrozky, Konstantyn, magnate 79, 83;
 and the Ostrih Academy 96–7; and
 Union of Brest 99–100
 Ostrozky family 108, 113–14
otaman, Cossack official 109
otaman, partisan leader 358; prolifera-
 tion of 360
 Ottoman Empire 78, 93, 573; conquers
 Constantinople 105–6; and Cossacks
 109–12; wars with 115–16; ties with
 Khmelnytsky 133–4; and Iurii
 Khmelnytsky 147; support of Orlyk
 165; loss of Bukovyna 213; in Crimean
 War 252, 568. *See also* Constantinople
 OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nation-
 alists): change of tactics of 430–1;
 emergence and ideology of 441–3;
 organization and activity of 443–6,
 448, 451, 457; great rift in 459–60, 472–
 4, 479, 489–90, 495, 502, 519; among
 immigrants 552–4, 557; in the new
 era 588, 594. *See also* Bandera, Stepan;
 Melnyk, Andrii; OUN-B; Banderites;
 OUN-M; Melnykites; OUN-UPA
 OUN-B: and Germans 463–5, 472–4. *See
 also* Bandera, Stepan; Banderites
 OUN-M: and Germans 463–5, 473–4. *See
 also* Melnyk, Andrii; Melnykites
 OUN-UPA 658
Our Soviet Ukraine 512
 Our Ukraine Party 634, 643
 Pacific Ocean 55, 311
 Pacification: in Eastern Galicia 430–1,
 440, 445
pacta conventa 89
pacta et constitutiones. *See* Bender Consti-
 tution
 Padura, Tymko, Polish Ukrainophile
 237, 276
 Pale of Settlement: establishment of 276
 Palii, Semen, Cossack leader 154; revolt
 of 161–2
Palimodiia 121
Pamiat 535
 Panch, Petro 396
 Pankivsky, Kost, activist 470
 Parana 545
 Pares, Bernard, British historian 253
 Paris 120, 650; Ukrainians in 552, 566
 Paris Peace Conference 371; rejects
 Ukrainian appeals 374
 parliament (Verkhovna Rada) 599, 604,
 607
 “Partisan clan” 486
 partisans: neo-Cossack anarchism
 of 360; abandon Directory 365; anti-
 Bolshevik 376–7; the UPA 473–4, 488–
 90; pro-Soviet 475–6
 Partnership for Peace 601, 645
 Party for the Democratic Rebirth of
 Ukraine 588
 Party of Democratic Revival 614
 Party of Labor 614
 “party of power” 609, 614–15
 Pasternak, Boris, author 506
 Pasternak, Iaroslav, scholar 48
 pastoralists 8–9
Paterikon 51
Patetychna Sonata 397
 Patriarchal church 401
 Paul of Aleppo, traveler 155
 Pavliuk, Mykhailo 322
 Pavliuk, Pavlo, Cossack leader 117
 Pavlov-Sylvansky, Nikolai, Russian
 historian 46
 Pavlovsky, Oleksii, scholar 230
 Pavlychko, Dmytro, poet 507, 536, 587,
 588; in the new era 588, 594
 Pavlyk, Mykhailo, Ukrainian
 socialist 323; and Radicals 328
 Pavlykovsky, Iuliian 438
 Pchilka, Olena, author 304
 Peasant Democratic party 588
 Peasant Party 615, 628
 peasants: status in Poland-Lithuania 84–
 5; enserfment in 16th century 90–1; in
 colonization of Ukraine 107; differ-
 ences with Russia 179; reenserfment
 of 184–5; number in Hetmanate 185;
 on Right Bank 189–90; and Bibikov
 reforms 211–12; under Habsburg

- rule 213–14; alcoholism among 214; folklore of 228–9; and reforms of Joseph II 216–17; during 1848 Revolution 244–7; in postemancipation era 260–3; socioeconomic differentiation among 262–4; attitudes toward Russians 275; idealization of 287; and communal landownership 289; attempts to politicize 294; support for autonomy 298; in Eastern Galicia 309–11; relationship with Jews 311–12; cooperation with intelligentsia 325; general strike of 331; and Central Rada 346; against Skoropadsky 358; attitudes during Civil War 360; against Bolsheviks 365; Bolsheviks placate 376; and struggle for independence 377–8; and NEP 382–3; Stalin's attitude toward 404; attack on 409–10; and collectivization 411–12; and nationalism 415–16; losses under Stalin 423; under Polish rule 429–30, 433; and Soviet occupation 455–67; Nazi exploitation of 468–9; role diminishing 527; and recent reforms 591. *See also* kulaks; serfs
- Pechenegs 31, 34, 36
- Pelchytsky, Leontii 99
- Pennsylvania 448, 539–41, 544, 548
- Pentecostals 520
- People's Democratic Party (NDP) 614
- Pereiaslav 35, 48, 61, 117; college in 197, 180
- Pereiaslav, agreement of 1654; circumstances surrounding 134–5; interpretations of 135–6, 137, 145, 150; and Peter I 166, 168; celebration of 498–500, 502
- Pereiaslav, pact of 1659 145, 149
- Pereiaslavets 31
- Perekop 112
- Peremyshl (Przemysl) 57, 238; center of cultural activity 239; Poles capture 368, 477, 570
- Peremyshl Circle 239
- perestroika* 534, 574, 579, 580
- Peretts, Volodymyr 399
- Perun, pagan god 49
- Pestel, Pavel, Decembrist leader: program of 207–9; views on Ukraine 209
- Peter I, Russian emperor 133, 158; and reaction to Mazepa's defection 164; limits autonomy of Hetmanate 164–7, 198, 202; Shevchenko view of 235
- Petliura, Symon, Ukrainian political leader: and Vladimir Zhabotinsky 278; in Central Rada 345; and Kruty battle 352; feud with Vynnychenko 354; opposes Skoropadsky 358; and army 361–2; and pogroms 363–4; and Poles 374–5 *passim*, 552. *See also* Directory
- Petrovsky, Hryhorii: purge of 420
- Petrushevych, Evhen: leads Ukrainian Parliamentary Club 343; president of ZUNR 368; appointed dictator 370; forms government-in-exile 374, 436, 552
- Petryk, Ivan Ivanenko, Cossack leader 161
- Philadelphia 541, 543
- Philip of Macedon 11
- Piatakov, Georgii, Bolshevik leader 349, 364
- Piatka River, battle of 114
- Pidlasia 82
- Pid osinnymy zoriamy* 396
- Pidmohylny, Valerian 397
- pidpomichnyky* 183
- Pieracki, Bronislaw, Polish minister 431; assassination of 445
- Pilsudski, Józef, marshal 427; attempted assassination of 443; as revolutionary 445
- Pinchuk, Viktor 635, 641, 654, 660, 664
- Pipes, Richard, historian 27, 28, 352
- Pivdenmash factory 615
- Plachynda, S., writer 536
- Plast, scouting organization 340; and urban intelligentsia 439; in Transcarpathia 450; in West 555, 561, 567; in the new era 594, 629

- Plaviuk, Mykola 594
- Plekhanov, Georgii: and spread of Marxism 290
- Pletenetsky, Elisei, Galician nobleman 119
- Pliushch, Ivan 587, 612
- Pluh, literary group 395–6
- Pluzhnyk, Evhen 397
- Pochaino River 33
- Podebrady 443, 552
- Podhorny, Mykola 499
- Podilia 3; under Polish rule 77; population of 82–3, 87, 106, 190, 204
 “Podolians” 315–16, 333
- Podolynsky, Serhii 282; links with Marx and Engels 286
- Pogodin, Mikhail, Russian historian 52, 317
- pogroms: in 1881 and 1903–5 277; and usdwp 297; in Ukraine 363–4; in Lviv 369
- Pohruzhalsky 508
- Pokshishevsky, V.V., Soviet scholar 526
- Poland 638; and Kievan Rus’ 32–4; and Galicia-Volhynia 56–7, 59, 61–3; expansion into Ukraine 72–6, 79, 81, 86, 91; cultural growth of 93–4, 108, 115–16; and Cossacks 105 *passim*; rising influence in Galicia 313–16; view of Ukrainian aspirations 315; claims Eastern Galicia 367; in interwar period 427–30; and Pacification 432; and socioeconomic conditions 433–4; Ukrainian response to 436–9; in Second World War 456–8, 470–1; Polish/Ukrainian massacres 474, *passim* 526–7, 539; Ukrainian émigrés in 551–2; Ukrainians in 570–2; and Ukrainian independence 583, 598, 601–2, 619, 621, 626; support of Roman Catholic Church 674; relations with 646–7, 670, 671, 672, 674. *See also* Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; Polonization
- Poland-Lithuania 53, 92, 94
- Poles: as a minority in Ukraine 275–6; number of 308; conflict with Ukrainians 330–3; as immigrants in USA 540; joint ventures with 592, 632
- Poletyka, Hryhorii, Ukrainian noble 172, 197, 227
- Poletyka, Vasyl, Ukrainian noble 226–7
- Poletyka family 205
- Polianians 21–3; and rise of Kiev 25–6, 28, 42, 53
- Poliansky, Dmytro 499
- Polish Communist party 436
- Polish language 20, 121
- Polish Military Organization 368
- Polish National Council (Rada Narodowa): establishment of 244; at Slav congress 248
- Polish National Democratic party 333
- Polish Socialist party 291
- Polish uprising of 1830: in Ukraine 209–10
- Polish uprising of 1863 281
- Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 79; Ukrainians in 81–2, 87, 91, 94, 96–7, 99, 100, 108, 110–11, 114–15, 117, partitions of 176–7, 213; Ukrainian population in 18th century 189; Polish forces in 191; attempts to restore 243
- Polish-Ukrainian Battalion 645
- Polish-Ukrainian Bulletin* 431
- Polish/Ukrainian war: stages of 369–70, 435
- Polissia 8; Polish policies in 428, 438; political parties 435–6, 654; education in 438–9; church in 440; UPA in 473, 475
- Polissian Sich 473. *See also* Borovets, Taras
- Politburo 499, 512, 535
- political parties: non-Ukrainian in Ukraine 291–2; Ukrainian 292–6; growth in Galicia 327–9; in Polish-ruled Ukraine 435–7
- polk* 117
- Polonization 86; of Ukrainian nobility 94–6, 102, 105, 122; and West Ukrainian clergy 239; of bureaucracy in Galicia 315; of education 316, 428, 437, 441

- Polotsk 56, 120
 Polotsky, Simeon, churchman 196
 Polovtsians (Cumans): attack Kiev region 36; stable relationship with 39, 52, 56, 61
 Polozovych, Senko, border official 109
 Poltava 142, 671; development of 153, 159, 180, 269, 477
 Poltava, battle of 164, 195
 Poltava region 108
 Polubotok, Pavlo, Cossack leader 167; portrayal in *Istoriia Rusov* 227; Shevchenko view of 235
 Poniatowski, Stanislaw 192
 Pope John Paul II 647
 Popov, Nikolai: on Bolsheviks in Ukraine 349
 Popovych, Alosha 51
 Popovych, Oksana, dissident 518
 Popular Movement for Restructuring in Ukraine. *See* Rukh
 population: of Hetmanate and of Kiev 185; of Zaporozhian lands 187; of Ukrainian lands in 18th century 188–9; growth spurt in 19th century 261; of Kiev 269; in Galicia 308; changes after Second World War 481–4; recent developments 529–90
 Populists (*Narodoivtsi*): emergence, views and activities of 319–21; conflict with Russophiles 320; work with peasants 325; and formation of National Democratic party 328
 Pora, youth organization 639
 Porsh, Mykola, Ukrainian activist 294
 Portugal 672, 673
posadnyky 43
 positivism 301
 Postyshev, Pavel, Stalin associate: role in 1932–33 Famine 414; mandate in Ukraine 418; attacks Ukrainization 419; reign of terror of 419–20; doubts about Stalin 420, 421
 Potebnia, Oleksander, scholar 302
Potemkin: mutiny on 296
 Potii, Ipatii, churchman 99–101
 Potocki, Andrzej, governor: assassination of 332
 Potocki, Mikolaj, magnate 127
 Potocki, Stefan, magnate 193
 Potocki family 108; landholdings on Right Bank 190, 265, 275
 Pozen, M.P. 253
 Poznansky, Borys 281
 Poznansky, Dmytro 294
 Prague 47; OUN in 443–4; and Transcarpathia 448, 450, 552; and Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia 569–70
 Prague congress. *See* Slav congress
Pravda: Galician newspaper 283, 293, 321
Pravda (Moscow) 494
 Presbyterian church 549
 press: in Galicia 282; restrictions on 283; repression of 299; in 1905 Revolution 299; number of publications 302; in Transcarpathia 327; and decline of Ukrainization 423; decline of Ukrainian in 523–4
 Prešov 335; Ukrainians in 448, 569–70
 Prešov Region Ukrainian National Council 569
 Pretvych, Bernard, border official 109
 “prisoners of conscience” 520–1
 Pritsak, Omeljan, scholar 25, 562
 privatization 621
 Prokopovych, Teofan, churchman 195–6
 proletariat: emergence and numbers of 270–1; underrepresentation of Ukrainians among 272; in Marxist theory 289; in Eastern Galicia 312; and Bolsheviks 349; percentage of Ukrainians in 408. *See also* workers
 Proletcult 395
 Pronsky family 95
 propaganda: Bolshevik use of 352; Stalin “offensive” 477–8
 Proskuriv: pogrom in 363
 Prosvita Society: spread in Eastern Ukraine 297, 298; activity of 321; growth and membership of 324; congress of 325; reading rooms of 329,

- 439; in Transcarpathia 449–50; and Soviets 455, 548; in Canada 549
- Prosvita Ukrainian Language Society 588
- Protestant sects: dynamism of 520
- Protestantism and Protestants 674; in Poland-Lithuania 92, 94, 100, 196, 630–1
- Providence Association of Ukrainian Catholics 561
- Provincial Committee 302
- Provisional Government: formation of 344; response to Central Rada 347; overthrow of 348
- Prucznicki, churchman 95
- Prudentopolis 545
- Prussia: Kapnist mission to 173; and partitions of Poland-Lithuania 176–7; defeats Habsburgs 314
- Prut River 6, 57
- Pryluky 159
- Prypiat marshlands 19
- Pugachev, Emelian, Russian rebel leader 174
- purges: in 1920s 417; highpoint of 418; indications of renewal of 494; rehabilitation of victims 501–2; by Shcherbytsky 513. *See also* Great Terror
- Pushkar, Martyn, Cossack leader 143
- Pushkin, Alexander, Russian poet 235, 285, 423
- Pustovoitenko, Valeri 622
- Putin, Vladimir 634, 636, 639, 647, 648, 650, 651, 652
- Pyliavtsi, battle of 128
- Pylypenko, Serhii: leads Pluh 395
- Pylypiw, Ivan, pioneer 546
- pysar*, Cossack official 110
- Pysarzhevsky, Lev, scholar 399
- quadrivium* 96
- Quebec 565
- “Rabble” 304
- radhospy* 412
- Radianska Ukraina* 593
- Radical party: in interwar period 435–6
- Radicals: emergence, views, and activities of 321–3, 324; organization of 328
- Radimichians 32
- Radio Liberty 635
- Radziwiłł, Krzysztof, magnate 79
- railroads: construction of 265–7; in Galicia 321
- Rakoczi, Gyorgy II, prince of Transylvania 136
- Rakovsky, Khristian, Bolshevik leader 349, 364–5; and Ukrainization 384; replaced 388
- Rakushka-Romanovsky, Roman, Cossack official 156
- rastsvetanie* 521
- reading rooms (*chytalni*) 549
- Realism: in Ukrainian literature 303
- Rebet, Lev, nationalist: assassination of 566
- Red Army 658; size of 376; food for 381; and Soviet republics 385; attempts to Ukrainize 389; in 1920 occupies Galicia 436; retreat of 461; prisoners from 468, 473, 476–9, 489, 518
- referendum of 1 December 1991 xiii, 581, 582; results of 583, 584, 585
- Reform (Jews) 675
- Reformation 94
- reforms 207; on Right Bank 210–12; in Galicia 216; in 1860s in Russian Empire 257–8; by Soviets in Western Ukraine 455–6; of Khrushchev 500–2
- Regensburg 47, 555
- regionalism 608
- Reichskommissariat Ukraine 467, 469–70
- Reichstag: Ukrainians in 249
- religion 673–5
- Renaissance 93
- Republican party, in Crimea 609
- Repnin, Prince, governor-general 226
- “Report from the Beria Reserve” 517
- Reshetar, John, scholar 354
- Revival of Regions party 614
- Revolt of 1648: on eve of revolt 123–5; campaigns during 127–32; foreign

- relations during 132–6; final phase of 136–7; 155–6. *See also* Bohdan Khmelnytsky
- Revolution, French 133
- “Revolution in Ukraine” 391
- Revolution of 1848: in Galicia 244–51; peasant issue 244–7; and nationality issue 247–8; significance of 251; impact of 259
- Revolution of 1905 296–7; impact in Ukraine 297–8
- Revolution of 1917. *See* February Revolution; October Revolution
- Revolutionary Democratic party 557
- Revolutionary Ukrainian party (RUP): organization of 294; splits in 295; activists flee abroad 298; socialism and nationalism in 306, 323. *See also* Spilka; Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers party
- riad* 44
- Riazan 39
- Riazanovsky, Nicholas, historian 404
- Rieber, Alfred, historian 253
- Riga 166, 180
- Rigelman, Oleksander, historian 226
- Right Bank 117; population of 188–9; reforms and centralization in 210–11, 467, 477, 483, 525, 530
- Riurik, ruler of Novgorod 26–7
- Riurikid dynasty 28; struggle within 32, 34; provides unity 37–8, 42; and rise of Kievan Rus’ 43; branches of 45, 59, 72, 83
- Rivne 363, 461, 467, 667
- “The Rock of the Faith” 196
- Roh, pagan god 49
- Rohatyn 97
- Roland* 463
- Roman, Galician prince 63
- Roman Catholic church 674
- Roman Catholicism 34, 632
- Roman Mstyslavych, prince of Galicia and Volhynia 60–1
- Romanchuk, Iuliian, Ukrainian activist 321, 331
- Romania and Romanians 333; Iron Guard in 442; Bukovyna under rule of 446–8, 455, 470, 483; Ukrainians in 568, 601–2
- Romaniuk, Vasyl, dissident 518, 520
- Romanov dynasty 172, 201, 243, 573
- Romanovichi, princes of Volhynia and Galicia 60–4
- Romans 12–13
- Romanticism: and national identity 225; emotionalism of 301; fading of 303
- Rome 13, 34, 50, 62, 77, 95, 100, 441, 579; OUN conference in 460, 488; Ukrainian community in 567, 572
- Romny 180, 269
- Romzha, Teodor, churchman 488
- Rose Revolution 639
- Rosenberg, Alfred, Nazi ideologue: and Ukraine 465; plans for Ukraine 467–8; associate of 470
- Rostov 53, 56, 77
- Rostyslavychi, princes of Galicia 57, 59–60
- Rosukrenergo 652
- Rotterdam 446
- “Route from Varangians to the Greeks” 26, 38, 41. *See also* Dnieper route; Greek trade route
- Roxolians 12, 23
- Rozbudova Natsii* 444
- Rozhdenytsia, pagan god 49
- Rozumovsky, Kyrylo: hetmancy of 170–2; assets of 179, 195
- Rozumovsky, Oleksii 170
- Ruban, Vasyl 226
- Rudavsky, Stefan, author 304
- Rudenko, Mykola, dissident 518, 562
- Rudenko, Raisa, dissident 562
- Rudnytska, Milena, activist 435, 440
- Rudnytsky, Ian Lysiak, Ukrainian historian 316; on Ukrainian nationalism 442, 518
- Rudnytsky, Stepan 436
- Ruin, period of 139; onset of 143–6; political orientations during 146–8; causes of 157, 158, 160
- Rukh 654; creation of 575, 577, 578;

- weakening of 587, 588, 593, 606, 613, 616, 627
- Rumiantsev, Peter, Russian official:
administration of Left-Bank
Ukraine 172–3
- Rus': etymology of 23
- Rus', palatinate (*województwo*) of 151.
See also Galicia
- Rus River 23
- Rusalka 321
- Rusalka Dnistrovaia 241
- Ruska pravda: codification of 35; and
justice 43–4; penalties imposed by 46
- Ruskaia zemlia 38
- Ruski Krstur 568
- Ruskyi Dnevnyk 248
- Rusna River 23
- Rusov, Mykhailo, Ukrainian activist 294
- Rusov, Oleksander, Ukrainian
activist 282
- Russia 635, 638 *passim*, 646; size of 3;
East Slavs in 21; original homeland
29; migration to 53, 56; name of 69;
cities of 70, 122; and Ukrainian
themes 232, 243; power of 318;
response to Central Rada 346; princi-
ple of "one, indivisible" 354; and con-
quest of Ukraine 378; glorification
of 422–3, 491; presence in contempo-
rary Ukraine 524–6, 598–627 *passim*;
relations with 647–51, 648 *passim*,
654, 658, 661, 663, 671 *passim*. *See also*
Moscow; Muscovy; Russian Empire;
Russification
- Russia Bloc 609
- Russians: number in far East 262; num-
ber of 272; in cities of Ukraine 273; as
minority in Ukraine 274–5; peasant
view of 275; in Communist party 386;
in Ukraine's universities 398; immi-
grants' identification as 542; lan-
guage 656, 657
- Russian Agrarian party 437
- Russian Empire 165; expansion of 173–
7, 187, 193; nature of 202; presence in
Ukraine 202–6, 219; emergence of
intelligentsia in 223; impact of 1860s
reforms in 259; population growth
in 261; collapse of 339, 432, 477, 534.
See also Kremlin; Moscow; St Peters-
burg
- Russian Monarchist party 291
- Russian National party 329
- Russian Orthodox church 478, 488, 520;
in the USA 542
- Russian Orthodox Mission 542
- Russian Orthodoxy 548
- Russian Peasant party 437
- Russian revolutionary movement: in
Ukraine 286–91; and Ukrainian
issue 288–9; and Ukrainian
intelligentsia 289; reaction to 293
- Russian Social Democratic party: cre-
ation of 290; split in 291: RUP branch
of 294, 297
- Russian Social Democratic Group 290
- Russian Socialist Revolutionary party:
formation of 291
- "Russian Truth" (*Ruskaia pravda*) 207
- Russification 122, 203; Pestel views on
209; emergence of 210; in cities 274,
408; intensified 421–3; renewed 424,
492, 500, 502, 507; and Shelest and
Shcherbytsky 512–13; and dissent
516–17, 521; rationale for 521; and
dissidents 523; in language 524;
demographic aspect of 524–6, 531–2;
in schools 536, 562, 565
- Ruskyi Narodnyi Soiuz (Ruthenian
National Union) 545. *See also* Ukrain-
ian National Association
- Russo-Ottoman War of 1768–75; impact
on Ukraine 173–4
- Russophiles: emergence and views of
317–19; conflict with Populists 320,
321; attacked by Radicals 322; decline
of 329; in Bukovyna and Transcar-
pathia 334; internment of 341; flight
of 343; in Transcarpathia 449–50, 458,
508, 542
- Russo-Turkish War of 1735–9 169
- Rusyny. *See* Ruthenians
- Ruthenian, old Ukrainian/Belorussian
language 72–3

- Ruthenian Assembly (*Ruskyi Sobor*) 248
 Ruthenian Council (Ruska Rada) 319, 334
 Ruthenian National Home 313, 319
 Ruthenian Riflemen 250
 Ruthenian Society 334
 Ruthenian Training School 550
 Ruthenian Triad: members of 240; goals and significance of 241, 317, 319
 Ruthenian (Rus') *województwo* 74
 Ruthenianism (*Rutenstvo*): attitudes associated with 218–19
 Ruthenians (*Rusyny*) 69, 86, 95; usage of term 307, 311, 315, 318; in interwar period 448–9; national identity of 458, 526; identity among immigrants 541–3; in contemporary Czechoslovakia 568–70; in Transcarpathia 578, 658
 Ruzyna family 95
 Ryłski, Maksym, poet 396
 Ryłski, Tadei 281
 Rzewuski family 189
- Saburov, Alexander 475
 Sadovsky (Tobilevych), Mykola 305
 Šafarik, Pave, Slovak intellectual 241
 Sahaidachny, Petro Konashevych, Cossack leader 113; policies of 115–16, 121
 St George cathedral 578
 St George circle 317
 St Petersburg 166–8, 170, 180–1, 207, 664; formation of *hromada* in 280
 St Vladimir University: founding of 210; bulwark against Polish influence 211, 224. *See also* Kiev University
 Sajudis 587
 Sakharov, Andrei, Soviet scientist and dissident 515
 Sakovych, Kassian, rector 116, 119–21
 Saksahansky (Tobilevych), Panas 305
 Sambir 115, 474, 561
 Samoilyvych, Ivan 148; hetmancy of 150–2, 154, 156, 160
Samostiina Ukraina 294
 Samus, Samuilo, Cossack leader 154, 161
 San River 475
- Sangushsky family 83, 95. *See also* Sanguszko family
 Sanguszko family 189
 Sarai, Mongol capital 62
 Sarcelles 566
 Sardinia and Sardinians 252, 314
 Sarmatians: in Ukraine 11–12
 Saskatoon 559, 564
 Sazanov, Sergei, Russian minister 343
 sb (Sluzhba Bezpeky) 475, 489
sbliuzhenie 521
 Scandinavia and Scandinavians 26, 31, 32, 35, 45, 122, 534. *See also* Normans; Norsemen; Varangians
 Schlöder, Ludwig, German scholar 22
 scholarship: in late 19th century 301–2; Skoropadsky support of 357; renaissance in 1920s 398–9; attack on 419; decline in quality 501; among Ukrainians abroad 552, 562, 564, 566–72
 Scranton 448
 Scythia and Scythians: society and realm of 9–13
 “Second Revolution” 403
 Second World War: phase one in Ukraine 453–8; phase two in Ukraine 460–3, 465; collaboration in 471; Ukrainian losses in 479–80, 554, 562, 564, 569, 597
 Secret Chancellory: introduction of 169
 secret services, British and American: ties with UPA 490
sejm, sejmiki 79, 87, 89, 431
 self-determination: Shevchenko calls for 235, 349; principle of 371, 379; Bolshevik promises of 387; applied unevenly 425
Selianyn 294
 Semesenko, partisan *otaman*: and Proskuriv pogrom 363; execution of 364
 Semichastny, Volodymyr 499
 Senchenko, Ivan 396–7
 Senenko, Mykhailo 396
 Senyk, Iryna, dissident 518
 Senyk, Omelian 446, 464
 separatism: Bolshevik antagonism to 292, 523. *See also* “Mazepism”

- Serafim, bishop: and Orthodoxy in
Canada 548–9
- Serbia and Serbs 176, 639; colonists in
Ukraine 187; Russophilism of 317
- Serbo-Croatian 20
- serdiuky* 146
- seredniaky*: formation and characteristics
of 263. *See also* peasants
- Seredost culture 8
- serfdom and serfs 125; establishment in
Ukraine 90; impact on agriculture
178; reintroduction in Hetmanate
184–5; among West Ukrainian
peasants 213–14; in Galicia 218; dis-
cussed in *Istoriia Rusov* 227; liquida-
tion of 252; extent in Ukraine 258,
262; impact on education 300
- Serpent Island 602
- Serving Sisters 550, 567
- servitudes 309
- Sergeevich, Vasilii, Russian legal
historian 135
- Sevastopol: defense of 252; and the
Black Sea fleet 585, 599, 600, 609–10,
647, 650, 657, 658
- Ševčenko, Ihor, scholar 122
- Severians 21, 22, 43
- Severodonetsk Conference 637, 638, 658
- “Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors” 304
- Shafonsky, Opanas, historian 226
- Shafranov, Petr, Russian archivist 135
- Shakhmatov, Aleksei, Russian scholar
19, 299
- Shakhrai, Vasyl, Ukrainian Bolshevik
391
- Shakovskoi, prince, Russian official
168–9
- Shandro, Andrew 550
- Shapoval, Mykyta, Ukrainian activist
345, 552
- Shashkevych, Markian, poet 240
- Shaulo, Matvii, Cossack leader 114
- Shaw, George Bernard: praises Soviets
416
- Shchek 25
- Shcherbytsky, Volodymyr, Ukrainian
Soviet leader: policies of 511–14, 517,
528; in Gorbachev era 535–6; in the
new era 574, 577
- Shelest, Petro, Ukrainian Soviet
leader 499, 511–14, 517, 528
- Sheptytsky, Andrei, metropolitan 327;
exile of 341; growing popularity of
343; criticizes OUN 431; respect for
440; and OUN 446; on deportations
456; and OUN-B 464, 472; death of 478,
488, 549
- Shevchenko, Taras, poet: evaluation
of Khmelnytsky 138; view of Hetma-
nate 177; poetry of 232–5; call for
Ukrainian self-determination 235;
portrayal of Peter I and Catherine
II 235; political views of 237; release
of 279; and St Petersburg *hromada*
280; grave of 292; celebrations in
honor of 293; influence of 304;
inspires youth 319; writings of 320,
516, 539; statue of in Washington
562
- Shevchenko Literary Society 283, 321
- Shevchenko Scientific Society: reorga-
nized by Hrushevsky 326, 330; in
Lviv 436; in the USA 562; in Australia
568
- shkilnyi poriadok* 98
- shliakhta* 171, 182. *See also* *szlachta*
- “Short Chronicle of Little Russia” 226
- “Short Response to Piotr Skarga” 101
- Shrah, Mykola, Ukrainian activist 354
- shtetl* 277
- Shukhevych, Iurii, dissident 518
- Shukhevych, Roman, UPA commander
446, 474, 490, 518, 658
- Shulgin, Vasilii, Russian publicist 374
- Shumsky, Oleksander 384; background
of 392; ideas condemned 393; transfer
of 394; death of 419, 436
- Shumskyism 394
- Shumuk, Danylo, dissident 518, 565
- Shwartzbart, Samuel: assassinates
Petliura 552
- Shynkar, Mykola, Borotbist 384
- Siberia 150, 163, 167, 174; deportations
to 488–9, 491, 493; labor camps in 502;

- unused lands in 504, 511, 513; investment in 528–9, 532
 Sich (mass organization) 324, 333, 553
 Sich (student club) 322, 340
 Sich Riflemen 350, 358; in UNR army 443
 Sichko, Petro, dissident 518
 Sichynsky, Myroslav: and assassination of Potocki 332
 Sicily 26
 Sidor, Dimitrii 658
 Sifton, Clifford 546–7
 Sigismund, grand prince of Lithuania 78
 Sigismund, prince of Starodub 76–7
 Sigismund III, king of Poland 99
 Sigismund Augustus, king of Poland and grand prince of Lithuania 79, 110
 Silskyi Hospodar 325
 Sinn Fein 445
 Sirko, Ivan, Cossack leader 153
 “sixtiers” 507, 515
 Skaba, Andrii 507
 Skarga, Piotr, polemicist: attacks Orthodox 94–5, 99; and Union of Brest 101
 Skoropadsky, Ivan 164; hetmancy of 166–7; landholdings of 181
 Skoropadsky, Pavlo, general: rejected by Central Rada 347–8; background of 356; links with Russians 359; opposition to 358; flight of 359; and Orthodox church 400; movement among émigrés 552–3
 Skoropadsky-Myloradovych, Elisaveta 283
 Skovoroda, Hryhorii, philosopher: views of 197–8
 Skrypnyk, Mykola, Ukrainian Bolshevik 349, 364; on Russian chauvinism 385; and Ukrainization 389–90; criticizes “nationalist deviations” 394; suicide of 419, 501, 512
 Skrypnyk, Mystyslav. *See* Mystyslav, patriarch
 Slabchenko, Mykhailo, Ukrainian historian 399; trial of 417
 Slav Congress 248
 Slavic colonization 19–20
 Slavo Serbia 187
 Slavs 11; dispersion of 19, 22, 25, 27, 121, 467–8
 Slavs, East: dispersion of 19; society of 21; and Varangians 22–6; trade with Constantinople 26–7, 31, 42, 44, 49, 50; Hrushevsky views on 53–4, 56, 185
 Slavs, South 20
 Slavs, West 20
sliianie 521
 Slipy, Iosyf, cardinal and patriarch: successor of Sheptytsky 478, 488, 567, 579
 Sloboda Ukraine: home of Kharkiv Romantics 231, 237
slobody 87, 107, 189
 Slovak language 20
 Slovaks: rightist movement among 442, 532, 541; and Ukrainians 569–70, 572
Slovo 283, 318, 321
slovo i delo (Word and Deed Statute): impact in Ukraine 169
 Slowacki, Juliusz, Polish poet 276
 Slutsky, Iurii, magnate 96
 Slutsky family 95
 Smal-Stotsky, Stepan, Ukrainian activist 334
 small business 661
 Smolensk 35, 38, 77
 Smotrytsky, Herasym, rector 96–7
 Smotrytsky, Meletii, churchman 95–6, 120
 Sobieski, Jan, king of Poland 154
sobor 100
 “social banditry” 191–2
 Social Democratic Party of Ukraine 588, 614
 Social Democrats (United) Party 654
 socialism: impact of Drahomanov on 284–6; in Galicia 286; first socialist party 287; and peasants 287; and peasant communes 289; in Galicia 322–3; and nationalism 391; in Polish-ruled Ukraine 435–7; among immigrants 553
 Socialist party 588, 589, 592, 613, 615
 Society of Nestor the Chronicler 302

- Society of Notable Military Fellows 181.
See also *starshyna*
- Society of Ukrainian Progressives. See TUP
- Society of United Slavs 207
- Soiuz Ukrainok 440, 594
- Sokol, youth organization 324, 333, 340, 439
- Sokolovsky, partisan leader 362
- Sokolynsky family 95
- Solana, Javier, of the EU 638, 648
- Solidarnosc 587
- Solomyretsky family 95
- Soloviev, Sergei, Russian historian 144
- Solzhenitsyn, Aleksander, Russian author 506, 515
- Somko, Iakiv, Cossack leader 145, 148
- Soniashni kliarnety* 396
- Sosiura, Volodymyr, poet 397, 478, 494
- sotni* 140
- South America 551
- South East Ukrainian Republic 658
- South Russian Workers Union 288
- Soviet 655, 657, 658, 660, 662, 664 *passim*, 671, 673, 674
- Soviet Bashkir Republic 461
- Soviet Central Asia 461
- Soviet Constitution of 1924 385
- Soviet Constitution of 1936 421
- Soviet Ukrainian encyclopedia 501
- Soviet Ukrainian Republic: formation of 350
- Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies: Kiev 345; Petrograd 345
- sovietskii narod* 521
- Sovnarkhoz* (economic council) 505
- Spain 672, 673
- Spartocid dynasty 13
- Spilka 295; in 1905 Revolution 297–8
- “Spring of Nations” 244
- Sreznevsky, Izmail, scholar 231, 241
- ss, elite units 468–9, 472
- Stadion, Franz, governor of Galicia 244; policy toward peasants 245–7; pro-Ukrainian attitudes of 247
- Stalin (Dzhughashvili), Iosif: and formation of USSR 385–6; on Ukraine 387; criticism of Shumsky 393; criticism of Khvylovy 396; background of 403; control of party 404; attitude to peasants 404; and “socialism in one country” 405; and industrialization 406; orders collectivization 409; and attack on peasants 409–10; and 1932–33 Famine 413–16; and Great Terror 416–21; and local nationalism 422; and Hitler 454; and Western Ukraine 455; faith in Hitler 460; and scorched earth 461, 471; and Soviet return 477–505; postwar policies of 481–7; and retrenchment 492–7; and de-Stalinization 499–508, 510–11, 514–15, 518; cult of 535
- Stalin Prize 478, 494
- Stalingrad, battle of 472, 476
- Stalinism: features of 404, 503, 506, 508, 509, 511
- Stanyslaviv 368, 428, 461, 477, 479
- Starodub 78, 185
- Starodvorsky, M., revolutionary 287
- starosty*, Polish officials 109
- starosty*, Skoropadsky officials 357
- START treaty 585
- starshyna*, Cossack officer-elite 10; and manufacturing on Left Bank 180, 195; growth of privileges and wealth 181–2; imperial orientation of 182, 206; interest in Ukrainian history 226, 281, 294. See also companions of the standard; Society of Notable Military Fellows
- Sarytska-Cherniakhivska, Liudmyla: trial of 417
- Sarytsky, Mykhailo, playwright 304–5
- Stashinsky, Bohdan, KGB assassin 566
- state-building: Ukrainian attempts at 354, 377; in post-Soviet era 603–5
- Stauropagian Institute 319
- Stavrovetsky, Kyril, churchman 98, 121
- Stechishin, Myroslav 550
- steel production 660
- Stefanovych, Iakiv, revolutionary 287–8
- Stefanovych, Vasyl, author 305

- Stefanyk, Semen 497
 Stefanyk, Vasyl, author: works of 327
 Stempkowski, Józef, Polish commander 193
 Sterniuk, Volodymyr, bishop 578
 Stetsko, Iaroslav, nationalist 446, 463
 Stetsko, Slava 594
 Stone Age 260
 Stowe, Harriet Beecher, author 280
 Strabo, Greek scholar 12
 Strasbourg 648
 Strauss, Emil 393
 Strokach, Timofei 475
 Strokata-Karavansky, Nina, dissident 518, 562
 Struve, Petr, Russian publicist: views on Ukrainian issue 299
 Stryi 97
Strzelcy 432
 Stsiborsky, Mykola 446, 464
 Stundists 541
 Studium Ruthenum 217; liquidation of 239
 Studites 567
 Stus, Vasyl, poet 515, 518, 524
 Subotiv 126
 Suceava 130
sudiiia, Cossack official 110
 Sudzilovskyy-Rusel, Nicholas 539
 Sukhoviienko, Cossack leader 147
 Sullivant, Robert: on glorification of Russians 422
 Sultan Galiev 385
 Sulyma, Ivan, Cossack leader 117
 Sumy 153, 269, 667, 671
 Supreme Court 638
 Supreme Ruthenian Council (Holovna Ruska Rada): creation of 244; members of 247; and elections to parliament 249; achievements of 251; dissolution of 313, 319
 Surazky, Vasyl 97
 Surkis, Hryhorii 616, 635
surzhuk 608
 Sushko, Roman, nationalist 446
 Suzdal 53; regional differentiation in 56–7, 60
 Svaroh, pagan god 49
 Sverstiuk, Ievhen, dissident 507, 515
 Sviatopolk 34
 Sviatoslav, prince of Chernihiv 35
 Sviatoslav, prince of Kiev 25, 29; reign of 29–31, 41
 Sviatoslav, son of Volodymyr 34, 36
 Svidnik 570
 Svidrigaillo, prince of Siversk 76–7, 80
 Svitlychna, Nadia, dissident 518, 562
 Svitlychny, Ivan, dissident 507, 515
Svoboda 561
 SUM. See Association of Ukrainian Youth svu (Union for the Liberation of Ukraine – Soiuз Vyzvolennia Ukrainy): formation of 340; activity of 343; trial of 417
 Svydnytsky, Anatol, author 303
 “The Swan” 155
 Sweden and Swedes 23, 26; and Mazepa 164
 Świerczewski, Karol, general: killed by UPA 490
 Switzerland 144, 324
 Sydney 443, 567
 Sylvester 51
 Symbolists, literary group 396
 Symonenko, Petro, leader of the Communist Party 613, 617, 651
 Symonenko, Vasyl, poet 507, 515
 Symyrenko, Vasyl 283
 Symyrenko family 265
Syni Etiudy 397
Synia dalechin 396
 “Synopsis” 155
 Szczepanowski, Stanisław, Polish publicist 310
szlachta: emerges as estate 83–4; gains political control 87, 89; oppressiveness of 105; and rise of Cossacks 113–14, 118, 238. *See also* nobles
 Szporluk, Roman, historian 525
 Tahanrih, conference 364
 “Tale of the Cossack War with the Poles” 197
 “Tale of the Host of Ihor” 51, 59, 61
 Talerhof: Ukrainians interned in 341

- Tanais 12
- Tarashchanka, rebellion in 358
- Tarasyuk, Borys, minister of foreign affairs 641, 644, 649
- Tarnavsky, Myron, general 374
- Tarnavsky, Vasyly 280
- Tarnow 552
- Tatars 39, 72; in Crimean Khanate 78–9, 82; Kiev exposed to attack of 86, 105; raids of 106, 107, 109; conflict with Cossacks 111, 122, 165; last major raid in Ukraine 176, 178; in post-Soviet era 609, 632. *See also* Crimean Khanate
- Tavria, province of 204
- Tbilisi 650
- Tekeli, Russian general: and destruction of Zaporozhian Sich 174
- Teliha, Olena 444, 465
- temnyki* 634
- Temujin (Jenghiz Khan) 39
- Tenth Party Congress 381
- Teofan, patriarch of Jerusalem 115–16, 119
- Teplov, Russian official 171
- Terekhtymyryv 111, 119
- Terelia, Iosyp, dissident 565
- Tereshchenko family 265
- Terletsky, Kyrylo 99–100
- Ternopil 428, 631, 667
- Testament, Old 9
- Testament, New 51
- “Testament,” of Volodymyr Monomakh 51
- Teteria, Pavlo, Cossack leader 145–6
- Teutonic Knights 56, 64, 70, 74
- theater: in late 19th and early 20th centuries 305, and national consciousness 321
- Theodosia 13
- Theological Academy (Lviv) 440
- “Theory of the Struggle of Two Cultures” 387
- Third Reich: areas conquered by 465, 468; officials of 470; Ukrainian organizations in 471
- Third Rome doctrine 77
- Third Section: establishment of 202, 205
- Thor, pagan god 49
- “Thoughts and Dreams” 304
- Tien Shan Mountains 8
- Tikhomirov, Mikhail, Soviet historian 48
- Tikhon, patriarch 400–1
- Time of Troubles 115
- Tiutiunnyk, Iurii, partisan leader 362, 376
- Tivertsians 21
- Tkachenko, Mykola, Ukapist leader 384
- Tkachenko, Oleksander 612, 613, 617
- Tmutorokan 34
- Tobilevych family. *See* Saksahansky, Karpenko-Kary, Sadovsky
- Tolstoy, Lev. Russian author 423
- Tomashivsky, Stefan, Ukrainian historian 38, 57
- Toronto 551–2, 563–4
- Toth, Alexis, churchman 542
- towns and townsmen: growth of 107; in Great Northern War 163; number in Hetmanate 187; in Western Ukraine 215; in Eastern Galicia 311–12. *See also* burghers, cities
- Trabizond 112
- Transcarpathia: population in 18th century 189, 213, 238, 248; and 1848 Revolution 250, 307; and spread of Russophilism 317; number of periodicals in 327; Hungarian control of 334; population and national consciousness in 334–5; Hungarians in 368; under Czech rule 448–9; nationality issues in 449–50; Hungarian occupation of 458–9, 483, 488; population as immigrants 520, 539, 541–4; population in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia 568, 569; in the new era 578, 587, 636, 658
- Transcarpathian Rus’ 63. *See also* Transcarpathia
- Transcarpathian/Galician Schism 542–4

- Transnistria 470
 Trans-Siberian railroad: construction of 262
 Treaty of 1997 658
 Treaty of Cooperation and Good Neighborly Relations 602
 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership 599
 "Trenos or the Lament of the Holy Eastern Church" 95
 Trepov, general 288
 Triasylo. *See* Fedorovych, Taras
 Trilateral Treaty 600
trivium 96
 Troshchynsky 182
 Trotsky (Bronstein), Leon, Bolshevik leader: on Soviets in Ukraine 378; on purge in Ukraine 419
 Trotskyism 419, 455
 Trubetskoi, Aleksei, Russian commander 144–5
 Thrush, Ivan, painter 327
 Trylovsky, Kyrylo, Ukrainian activist 323–4
Trynadsyiata vesna 396
 Trypillian culture 6–8
 Tsentrobank 438
 Tsentrosoiuz 438
 Tsertelev, Nikolai, scholar 228
 Tugor Khan (Tugurin) 52
 Tuhai-Bey, Tatar leader 127
 Tuhan-Baranovsky, Mykhailo, scholar 302
 Tukalsky, Iosyp, churchman 146
 Tulchyn 207
 Tumansky, Fedir, Ukrainian noble 226
 TUP (Tovarystvo Ukrainskykh Progresystiv) 343, 345
 Tuptato, Dymtro, churchman 196
 Turgenev, Ivan, Russian author 280
 Turiv 96, 99
 Turkic peoples 13, 45
 Turkey 626, 660
 Turks 111, 122
 Tustanovsky, Zyzanii, churchman 98
 Tuzla Island 635, 648
 Tver 53, 77
 Twelfth Party Congress 387
 Twentieth Party Congress 500
 "twenty-five thousands" ("25,000ers") 410
 Tychna, Pavlo, poet 396, 419
 Tymoshchenko, Yulia, prime minister 634, 637, 640 *passim*, 649, 651, 652, 655
 Tymoshenko, Semen, general 454
 "Typographical Description" 226
 "Tyrolians of the East" 313, 315
tysiatsky 43
 UAOC (Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church) 674; creation of 400–1; growth slowed 401; repression of 402; implicated in svu trial 417; in Second World War 464–5, 594, 631
 Ukapisty: goals of 383–4. *See also* Ukrainian Communist party
ukhody 109
Ukraina: usage of term 105
Ukraina, scholarly journal 399
Ukraina Irredenta 328
Ukraine Is Not Russia (Kuchma) 647
 Ukraine, Sloboda: emergence of 132, 153, 181; population of 189, 198
 Ukraine, southern: colonization of 185–8; population of 189
 Ukraine-NATO Commission 645
 Ukraine-NATO Partnership Agreement 645
 Ukrainian: usage of term 307; language 656, 657
 Ukrainian Academy of Husbandry and Technology 552
 Ukrainian Academy of Sciences: established by Skoropadsky 357; under Soviets 398; attack on 417; fire at library of 508, 516; in USA 562
 Ukrainian Alliance of America 545
 Ukrainian American Coordinating Council 561
 "Ukrainian Anthology" 231
 Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church. *See* UAOC
 Ukrainian Autonomous church 579

- Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox church 464
- Ukrainian Canadian Committee (ucc) 563
- Ukrainian Catholic church. *See* Greek Catholic church
- Ukrainian Catholic National party 440
- Ukrainian Catholic party 437
- Ukrainian Catholic University 567, 674
- Ukrainian Central Committee (ucc), in Cracow 457–8, 470, 472
- Ukrainian Communist Party. *See* Ukapisty
- Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (ucca) 561
- Ukrainian Congress of Peasants 346
- Ukrainian Culturalogical Club: emergence of 535
- Ukrainian Farmers Organization 628
- Ukrainian Fraternal Association 561
- Ukrainian Free University 552, 566
- Ukrainian Galician Army: formation of 369; size and quality of 372; disintegration of 374
- Ukrainian Greek Orthodox church 549
- Ukrainian Helsinki Group 517–19
- “Ukrainian Herald” 232
- Ukrainian Herald* 517
- Ukrainian Insurgent Army (upa): emergence and activity of 473–9; under Soviet occupation 488–91, 495, 502, 518; in Germany 555; in Polish media 571; reputation of in the new era 575
- “Ukrainian Journal” 232
- Ukrainian Labor Temple Association 553, 565
- Ukrainian Land Committee 470
- Ukrainian Legion 340
- Ukrainian Military Organization (uvo): establishment of 443; and violence 445
- Ukrainian Monarchists 552–3
- Ukrainian National Assembly 588
- Ukrainian National Association 545, 561
- Ukrainian National Bank 673
- Ukrainian National Committee 545
- Ukrainian National Congress 346
- Ukrainian National Council 366, 368–9
- Ukrainian National Council (Kiev) 465
- Ukrainian National Democracy party: formation of 328
- Ukrainian National party 295; in Bukovyna 447–8
- Ukrainian National Republic (unr) 352; reestablished 359, 360; union with zunr 362; differences with zunr 372–3, 552; in the new era 576, 594. *See also* Directory; Petliura
- Ukrainian National State Union 358
- Ukrainian National Union (uno) 553, 588
- Ukrainian National Women’s League 561
- Ukrainian Nationalist Youth (Lviv) 443
- Ukrainian Orthodox church 579
- Ukrainian Orthodox church, Kiev patriarchate 579, 630–1
- Ukrainian Orthodox church, Moscow patriarchate 631
- Ukrainian Parliamentary Club 343
- Ukrainian Partisan Command 475
- Ukrainian Radical Democratic party 296, 298
- Ukrainian Republican party 578, 588
- Ukrainian School, in Polish literature 232
- Ukrainian Sich Riflemen (Ukrainskii Sichovi Striltsi) 340
- Ukrainian Social Cultural Association (uskt) 571
- Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers party (usdwp) 295; and Jews 297–8, in Galicia 328; in Central Rada 345; in General Secretariat 347; split in 363, 384
- Ukrainian Socialist Radical party 436
- Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries: in Central Rada 345, 347; membership of 348; split in 362–3, 384; in Volhynia 436
- Ukrainian Socialist Union 550
- Ukrainian Soviet government: first 350;

- second 364–5; third (Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic) 376; controlled by Moscow 383, 384; jurisdiction of 385; position in USSR 386; demand for independence 391
- Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR) 474
- Ukrainian Teachers' Association: in Transcarpathia 450
- Ukrainian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (USPP) 628
- Ukrainian Weekly* 561
- Ukrainian Workers'-Peasants' Socialist Union (Sel-Rob) 437
- Ukrainian Workingmen's Association 561
- Ukrainians, East: and West Ukrainians 219–20; interest in Western Ukraine 242; and imperial reforms 259; involvement in Galicia 329–30; attempts to establish state 377; government-in-exile of 428, 443; and OUN 464–5; in UHVR 474, 514; national consciousness of 526; emigration eastward 538; as émigrés 552; tension with Westerners 557; in Australia 567
- Ukrainians, West 62–4, transition from Polish-Lithuanian to Habsburg sovereignty 219–20; and imperial reforms 259; organizational abilities of 307, 335; attempts to establish state 367; new status of 425–8; socio-economic conditions of 432–4; response to Poles 434–40; revolutionary movement among 441–6; under Romanian rule 446–8; under Czech rule 448–50; absorption in USSR 491–2; and regional identities 526; emigration westward 538, 541, 545; as DPS 557
- Ukrainization: rationale for 387; implementation 387–8; of education 388–9; resistance to 389; in cities 389–90; and modernization 390; of Orthodox church 400–1; Stalin's dissatisfaction with 418; Postyshev criticism of 418; dismantling of 421–3; in Western Ukraine 455, 500, 524, 553, 569; in post-Soviet era 606, 608–9, 659
- Ukrainka, Lesia (Laryssa Kosach-Kvitka): works of 304
- Ukrainophilism: lack in Black Sea area 238; appearance of 279; Russian reaction to 280; features of 281; attacks against 282–3; critique of 293; and Russian nationalists 299; internment of supporters 341, 450, 458
- Ukrainske Slovo* 465
- Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal* 501
- Ulam, Adam: on Great Terror 421
- Ulychians 21, 28
- Uman 190
- Umov, N., scholar 301
- Uncle Tom's Cabin* 280
- UNDO (Ukrainian National Democratic Union): leading party in Galicia 435–6; disbanded 455
- Uniate. *See* Greek Catholic
- Union for the Liberation of Ukraine. *See* svu
- Union of Brest 99–102, 119; dissolution of 488
- "Union of Brest and Its Defense" 101
- Union of Greek Catholic Russian (Rusyn) Brotherhoods 544
- Union of Krevo 74, 76
- Union of Liberation 291
- Union of Lublin 78–9, 81, 85
- Union of Russian People: and pogroms 277, 291
- Union of Salvation 207
- Union of Slavs 233
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. *See* USSR
- Union of Ukrainian Students 588
- Union of Ukrainian Women. *See* Soiuz Ukrainok
- United Nations 487, 604, 673
- United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) 554
- United Russia Party 651
- United States 658, 661; West Ukrainians

- immigrate to 311, 481, 505; grain production of 528; first wave of immigrants to 538–41, 543, 545; comparison to Canada 548–9, 551, 554, 557; Ukrainians in 559–567, 599–600; Ukraine's relations with 635, 644, 647, 648; immigration to 672, 673
 “Unity of God’s Church” 95, 99
 universals: first 346; third 350; fourth 352
 universities: growth of 286; number of students in 304; created by Skoropadsky 357; Soviet reorganization of 398
Untermenschen 467, 469
 UPA. *See* Ukrainian Insurgent Army
 Ural Mountains 8
 urbanization 667–9; quickening tempo of 269–70; Ukrainian participation in 407–8; transformations due to 526–7
 USA. *See* United States
 USSR: creation of 383–4; structure of 385; Ukrainian response to 386; pseudo-federalism of 386; Volobuev on economy of 394
 Ustashi 442
 Uvarov, Sergei, Russian minister: and founding of St Vladimir’s University 210
 uvo. *See* Ukrainian Military Organization
 Uzhhorod 451, 667
 Vahylevych, Ivan: and Ruthenian Triad 240; role in 1848 248
 Vakhnianyn, Anatol: and founding of Prosvita 321, 324
 Valdemar 45
 Valnyiysky, Kyrylo 437
 Valuev, Petr, Russian minister 282–3
 Vaplite (Free Academy of Proletarian Literature) 36
 Varangians: trade of 22–3, 25; and Normanist controversy 26–7, 32, 34, 42. *See also* Normans; Norsemen; Scandinavians; Vikings
 Varna 112
 Vasylichuk, Pavlo 437
 Vasylenko, Mykola, scholar 399
 Vasylo, prince of Volhynia 61, 63
 Vasylo, Mykola, baron 334
vataha 109
 Vatican 541, 543, 549
 Vatutin, Nikolai, general 477, 479
Vechornytsi 320
 Vedel, Artem, composer 197
 Veliaminov, Russian official 167
 Velychko, Samuil, Cossack chronicler 197
Verkhovna Rada (parliament) 576
 Verlan, *haidamak* leader 192
 Vernadsky, Volodymyr, scholar: first president of Academy of Sciences 399
 Versailles 427
 Vershyhora, Petro, partisan leader 475
vertep 197
 Ves 22
Vestnik Iugozapadnoi Rossii 282
 Viacheslav, prince of Smolensk 35
 Viaticians 22, 29, 32
viche 43, 44; in modern period 321, 328
 Vienna 69, 112, 213, 216, 664; riots in 244; economic policies in Galicia 308; concessions to Poles 314; policy in Bukovyna 334, 443, 447, 552. *See also* Austria; Habsburg empire; Habsburgs
 Vikings 122
 village: decline of 669–71
 Vilnius 75
 Vinhranovsky, Mykola, poet 507, 515
 Vinnytsia 94, 106; mass graves in 421
 Vins, Georgii, dissident 520
 Vira, credit cooperative 325
 “virgin lands” project 504
 Virginia 539, 541
 Vishegrad Countries 601
 Vistula River 87
 Vistula valley 19
Viter z Ukrainy 396
 Vitovsky, Dmytro: leads coup 367
 Vityk, Semen 328
Vladimir 196

- Vladimirsky-Budnov, Mikhail, scholar 302
- Vladimir-Suzdal 38, 39, 41, 53; regionalism in 56–7
- Vobly, Konstantyn, scholar 399
- Voitsekhovych, Ivan, scholar 230
- Volga River 9, 19, 22, 26, 28, 29, 31, 47, 62
- Volhynia 3, 21, 53; Romanovychi in 60–4, 70; Polish expansion into 73–4; Polish-Lithuanian conflict in 76–7, 79, 83; towns in 86–7, 91, 94, 96; Tatar raids in 105–7; Cossack insurrections in 113–14, 119, 189, 192, 204; Napoleon's force in 207; in interwar Poland 428–9, 432–3, 435–40, 444; Orthodox church in 456; UPA in 473–4; Ukrainian/Polish massacres in 475, 479, 481, 483; UPA in 488–9; émigrés in 552
- Voliansky, Ivan, churchman 541, 544
- Volkhovsky, Fedir, revolutionary 287
- Volobuev, Mykhailo, economist: views on industrialization in Ukraine 269, 394
- Volobuevism: on economic exploitation of Ukraine 393–4
- Volodymyr, Galician prince 60
- Volodymyr, the Great, prince of Kiev 23–34; reign of 35, 41; panehyric to 51; court of 52, 57
- Volodymyr (Sabodan), Metropolitan, Ukraine Orthodox Church, Moscow Patriarchate 579, 674
- Volodymyr, prince of Volhynia 63–4
- Volodymyr Monomakh: reign of 36–7, 41, 51, 57
- Volodymyr-in-Volhynia 48, 57, 96, 99
- Volodymyrko, Galician prince 59
- Voloky Ustav of 1557 90
- Volshyn, Avhustyn 335; government of 450–1
- Volovych, Tyshko, Cossack 111
- Voniatovych, Varlaam, churchman 184
- Vorkuta: prisoner revolt in 502
- Voroshilovhrad 527
- votchyna* 37, 55
- Vovchok, Marko, author 280
- Vseslav, prince of Kiev 36
- Vsevolod, prince of Pereiaslav 35, 36, 52
- VUSPP 396
- vyborni* 183
- Vyhovsky, Ivan: election of 143; hetmancy of 143–5, 146–7, 156
- Vynntysia 667
- Vynnychenko, Volodymyr, author and politician 294; works of 304–5; in Central Rada 345; on bureaucrats 348; feud with Petliura 354; opposes Skoropadsky 358; preference for Soviets 361
- Vyshensky, Ivan, churchman and polemicist 101
- Vyshnegradsky, Russian minister 264
- Vyshnevetsky, Dmytro “Baiba”: establishes Zaporozhian Sich 109–10; grandson of 118
- Vyshnevetsky family 83, 95, 108. *See also* Wiśniowiecki family
- Vyshnia, Ostap, humorist 397, 493
- Vytautas (Vitovt), Lithuanian ruler 75–6, 82
- Vytvysky family 83
- Wächter, Otto, Nazi official 472
- Wallachia 134
- Wallenstein 137
- War Communism 380–3
- “Warning” 101
- Warsaw 69, 107, 114; and policy in Galicia 427, 473; Ukrainian émigrés in 552, 571
- Washington, DC 531, 562, 583, 585, 594, 598, 600, 601, 644, 648
- Wasilewska, Wanda 494
- Wasilewski, Leon 428
- wcfu (World Congress of Free Ukrainians) 563
- West: relations with 643, 665; influence on Ukraine 649, 664
- West European 667
- West Ukrainian National Republic. *See* ZUNR

- Western Europe 81–2, 85, 87, 90–1, 641, 654, 659, 668, 670, 672; markets in 181, 188; population growth in 261–2, 527, 531–2, 552
- White House 545
- Whites: French support for 361; and pogroms 363; attitudes toward Ukrainians 374. *See also* Denikin, Anton
- wild field (*dyke pole*) 106, 109
- Wiles, Peter, economist 529
- Wilson, Woodrow: Fourteen Points of 371
- “Wings of Song” 304
- Winnipeg 547–8: arrival of immigrants in 550–1, 563; mayor of 564
- “Wisla” action 490
- Wiśniowiecki, Jeremi, magnate: land-holdings of 108; quells uprising 118; terror tactics of 128
- Władysław IV, king of Poland 126–7
- Women’s Community (Zhinocha Hromada) 629
- Women’s Union (Souiz Zhinok) 629
- workers: increasing numbers of 288; general strike of 296; number in Ukraine 348; increase of in Western Ukraine 491–2; great growth of 530. *See also* proletariat
- Workers Congress 614
- World Bank 589, 623
- World Trade Organization (WTO) 650, 662
- Writers’ Union of Ukraine 535–6
- Wrocław 570
- Yalta Conference 481
- Yanukovych, Viktor, prime minister 635, 636, 638, 640, 641, 642, 649, 651, 654, 658
- Yatseniuk, Arsenii 642
- Year of Russia 635
- Yekhanurov, Yuriy 641
- Yeltsin, Boris 581, 583, 585, 586, 644
- Young Ukraine 588
- Yugoslavia 390; Ukrainians in 568, 601
- Yushchenko, Viktor, president of Ukraine 634 *passim*, 647; policies of 648–51, 650 *passim*, 658
- Zabachynsky, Orest 448
- Zabludniv 96
- Zaborovsky, Rafail, rector 195
- zakupy* 46
- Zaleski, Bogdan, Polish writer 232
- Zalizniak, Maksym, rebel leader 192–3
- Zalozetsky, Volodymyr 447
- Zamist sonetiv i oktav* 396
- Zamość 129
- Zamoyski family 108
- Zankovetska, Maria, actress 305
- Zap, Karel, Czech intellectual 241
- Zaporozhia: industry in 406, 408, 527, 667–8
- “Zaporozhian Antiquities” 231
- “Zaporozhian beyond the Danube” 305
- Zaporozhian Host 126, 138; organization of 140–1, 148, 151
- Zaporozhian lands: settlement of 174–6
- Zaporozhian Sich 190, 575; establishment of 115–17; final destruction of 187; support of *haidamaky* 191, 192
- Zaporozhians 110–12, 114–15, 184; numbers of 187; favorites of Ukrainophiles 281; in spirit of 397
- Zapovit* 234
- Zapysky* 326
- Zaslavsky, Evgenii, revolutionary 288
- Zaslawski, Dominik, Polish commander 128
- Zaslavski family 83, 95, 275
- Zasulich, Vera, revolutionary 287–8
- Zatonsky, Vladimir, Bolshevik leader 364
- Zavadovsky 182, 205
- Zavisny, Cossack commander, wife of 136
- Zbarazh 129
- Zbarazky family 83, 95, 108
- Zboriv, treaty of 129–31
- Zbyriusky, Dionisii, churchman 99
- Zeleny, partisan leader 362
- Zemlia* 397
- zemstva*: creation and function of 257;

- and medical care 261, 271; liberals in 291; support cultural Ukrainianism 299; and education 300
- Zerov, Mykola 396
- Zhabotinsky, Vladimir, Zionist leader: and contacts with Petliura 278; supports Ukrainian autonomy 299; and Jewish units 364
- Zhatkovych, Iurii 335
- Zhdanov, Andre, Stalin associate 493
- Zheliabov, Andrei, revolutionary 287; and assassination of Alexander II 288
- Zhmailo, Marko, Cossack leader 116
- Zhovti Vody, battle of 127
- Zhuk, Radoslav 564
- Zhydovyn 52
- Zhytetsky, Pavlo, Ukrainian activist 284
- Zhytomyr 269, 363, 464, 667
- Ziber, Mykola: member of Old Hromada 282; introduces Marx's ideas 286, 290
- Zina* 305
- Zinkivsky, Vasyl, Skoropadsky minister 400
- Zionists 291, 494, 508
- Zlenko, Anatolii, minister of foreign affairs 644
- Znachko-Iavorsky, Melkhysedek, churchman 191
- Zolotarenko, Vasyl, Cossack leader 128; in Belorussia 136, 149
- Zoria Halyt'ska* 248
- Zubrytsky, Denys, scholar 240, 317
- ZUNR (Zakhidno Ukrainska Narodna Respublyka): union with UNR 362, 576; and Jews 368; army and administration of 369; diplomatic relations of 370–1; evaluation of 371–2; differences with UNR 372–3, 435; contacts with UVO 443; in exile 552
- Zvenyhora* 397
- Zvenyhorod, rebellion in 358
- Zviahivsky, Iukhym 620
- Zyzanii, Lavrentii, churchman 119